

**STUDIES ON PALESTINE
DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD**

STUDIES ON PALESTINE DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

Edited by
MOSHE MA'OZ

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FOREWORD

The study of Palestine under Ottoman rule is, at the same time, both challenging and rewarding to students of history and international relations, as well as to those in the political and social sciences. Palestine during this period may be regarded as a case study in the imperial and administrative history of the Ottoman-Turkish Empire, that last great Muslim-Universal kingdom which ruled the Middle East for more than four centuries. The subject can also be approached through a study of the diplomatic history of the European powers of that period, notably France, Russia, and England, who struggled for influence in the area, particularly over the Holy Places, and who left their impact on the local society.

Another important means of viewing the study of Ottoman Palestine is the political, socio-economic and cultural-ideological developments among the local population; i.e., the rise of local leaders and notables, the demographic changes and economic conditions, the complexity of inter-communal relations, the position of the Jewish community, and the advent of the rival Jewish-Zionist and Palestine-Arab national movements.

All these aspects of the history of Palestine are inter-related, and should, therefore, ideally be woven into a single fabric. Unfortunately such a study of Ottoman Palestine has not yet been published, although some important works dealing with specific periods and areas of the history of Ottoman Palestine have appeared during the last two decades.

This volume is not intended as a complete study of Ottoman Palestine, since most of its chapters deal with the nineteenth century — that crucial era of attempted modernization and reform, of expanding foreign activities and of rapid developments in the area's politics and society. It nevertheless constitutes the first attempt to bring together studies, most of which are based on original and up-to-date research and which are devoted to the major subjects and issues in the field, from the point of view of a variety of disciplines: geography, demography, political science, as well as social, administrative, economic and intellectual history. The work does aim to complement the knowledge and understanding of the field, and also to provide an inter-disciplinary stimulus for further research efforts.

Future efforts should include an investigation of the political and social developments in Ottoman Palestine during the first centuries of Ottoman rule, utilizing the important source materials available in Turkey, Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries as well as those still extant in Europe.

FOREWORD

The present volume is an outgrowth of an international conference held in Jerusalem during the summer of 1970, on The History of Palestine and its Jewish Population during the Ottoman Period. The conference was sponsored jointly by the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Hebrew University and Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, both of which participated in publishing this book.

In addition to the authors of the various studies contained in this book, the following scholars participated in the conference and added to its success: G. Cohen, T. Gökbilgin, Y. Hershlag, N. Itzkowitz, E. Kedourie, A. Levi, B. Lewis, G. Warburg and Archbishop Vassilius. Although the late U. Heyd, the prominent pioneer scholar of Ottoman Palestine, unfortunately did not live to take part in the conference, an article of his has been included. Three other scholars whose contributions are included regretfully did not live to see the book: Aref al-Aref, Y. Hofman, and Ch. Wardi.

Prof. G. Baer was the co-organizer of the conference and Mr. N. Efrati assisted in editing the volume.

The generous contribution of the Jerusalem Van Leer Foundation helped greatly in financing the conference.

The publication of this volume was aided by grants from the Yitzhak Hofman Memorial Foundation established by his friends at the Hebrew University, and the Max Schloessinger Endowment Fund at Institute of Asian and African Studies.

MOSHE MA'OZ

*The Hebrew University
Jerusalem, November 1975*

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Annals</i>	Spyridon, S. N. (ed.), <i>Annals of Palestine 1821-1841. Manuscript Monk Neophytus of Cyprus</i> , Jerusalem, 1938.
'Awra	Al-'Awra, Ibrāhīm, <i>Ta'rikh Wilāyāt Sulaymān Bāshā al-'Ādil</i> , Sidon, 1936.
Ben-Zvi, Israel	Ben-Zvi, Izhak, <i>Eretz-Israel ve-Yishuvah bi-Ymei ha-Shilton ha-'Othmani</i> , Jerusalem, 5715 (1955).
<i>Br. Interests</i>	Tibawi, A. L., <i>British Interests in Palestine, 1800-1901</i> , London, 1961.
<i>BSOAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.</i>
Buckingham	Buckingham, J. S., <i>Travels in Palestine through the Countries of Bashan and Gilead East of the River Jordan, etc.</i> , London, 1822.
Burckhardt	Burckhardt, J. L., <i>Travels in Syria and the Holy Land</i> , London, 1822.
<i>EI</i> ¹	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , London and Leiden, 1913-38.
<i>EI</i> ²	<i>Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , New edition, Leiden and London, 1954.
Hyamson	Hyamson, A. M., <i>The British Consulate in Jerusalem (in relation to the Jews of Palestine, 1838-1914)</i> , 2 vols., London, 1939, 1942.
'Izz al-Dīn	Abū 'Izz al-Dīn, Sulaymān, <i>Ibrāhīm Bāshā fī Sūriyya</i> Beirut, 1929.
<i>JAOS</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society.</i>
<i>JPOS</i>	<i>Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society.</i>
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.</i>
Lewis, Notes	Lewis, B., <i>Notes and Documents from the Turkish Archives</i> , Jerusalem, 1952.
<i>Mahfūzāt</i>	Rustum, Asad, <i>Al-Mahfūzāt al-Malikiyya al-Miṣriyya</i> , 4 vols., Beirut, 1940-43.
Manṣūr	Manṣūr, As'ad, <i>Ta'rikh al-Nāṣira</i> , Egypt, 1924.
<i>Masa'ot</i>	Ya'ari, Abraham, <i>Masa'ot Eretz-Israel</i> , Tel-Aviv, 1946.
<i>MEJ</i>	<i>Middle East Journal.</i>
<i>MES</i>	<i>Middle Eastern Studies.</i>
<i>Mufaṣṣal</i>	Al-'Ārif, 'Ārif, <i>Al-Mufaṣṣal fī Ta'rikh al-Quds</i> , Jerusalem, 1961.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>Ott. Doc.</i>	Heyd, Uriel, <i>Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552–1615</i> , Oxford, 1960.
<i>Ott. Reform</i>	Ma'oz, Moshe, <i>Ottoman Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840–1861</i> , Oxford, 1968.
<i>PEFQSt</i>	<i>Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement.</i>
<i>POC</i>	<i>Proche Orient Chrétien.</i>
Polk-Chambers	Polk, William and Chambers, Richard (eds.), <i>The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East</i> , Chicago, 1968.
<i>PPTS</i>	<i>The Library of the Palestine Pilgrims Text Society.</i>
<i>QDAP</i>	<i>Quarterly of the Department of Antiquities in Palestine.</i>
Qusṭanṭīn	Al-Bāshā, Qusṭanṭīn (ed.), <i>Mudhakkirāt Ta'rikhiyya</i> , Lebanon, n.d.
<i>Survey</i>	Conder, C. R. and Kitchener H. H., <i>The Survey of Western Palestine</i> , 7 vols., London, 1881–83.
<i>TOEM</i>	<i>Tarih-i Osmani Encümeni Mecmuası.</i>
<i>Uṣūl</i>	Rustum, Asad, <i>Al-Uṣūl al-'Arabiyya li-Ta'rikh Sūriyya fī 'Ahd Muḥammad 'Alī Bāshā</i> , 5 vols., Beirut, 1930–34.
<i>ZDVP</i>	<i>Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina Vereins.</i>

INTRODUCTION

During the four centuries of Ottoman rule (1516–1917) Palestine never formed a political administrative unit on its own, but was divided into several districts (*sanjaks*) which, up to the beginning of the seventeenth century, were part of the Damascus province (*eyālet*). Later on most districts in central and southern Palestine, as well as those in the area east of the Jordan River, continued to be at least nominally under the jurisdiction of Damascus, while the Galilee districts were transferred to the newly established *eyālet* of Sidon. In 1841, after a decade of Egyptian occupation, all the Palestinian districts except for the area east of Jordan were placed in the province of Sidon (later called the *vilāyet* of Beirut).

The *sanjak* of Jerusalem was given higher status and was organized as a *mutasarrıflık* — an enlarged administrative unit which included also the *sanjaks* of Nablus and Gaza and was governed by a *mutasarrıf*, usually a pasha with the rank of *mürmirān*. During the Crimean War this area was elevated for a short time to the status of an independent province, and its governor, a pasha with the rank of *vālī*, was directly responsible to Istanbul. In 1873 the *mutasarrıflık* of Jerusalem, ranging from the Ramallah–Jaffa line in the north to the Egyptian border in the south, was again placed under the direct supervision of the central government in Istanbul.

The Ottoman central government did not attach great importance to the Palestinian districts until the middle of the nineteenth century, mostly because of their insignificant contribution to either the revenues or the military potential of the Empire. Palestine's prime value to the Ottoman state derived from its holy places to Islam, to Christendom, and, to a lesser degree, to Judaism. The Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, Hebron and Nabi Musa attracted pilgrims from many parts of the Islamic world who were on their way to or from Mecca and Medina; and the need to safeguard and assist these pilgrims was both a religious duty and a political necessity for the Muslim Ottoman Sultan.

Similarly, as very many Christians and Jews also made pilgrimage to Palestine, the status of their holy places also became, especially since the nineteenth century, a growing factor in the sultan's relations with the European powers.

The significance of Palestine to the Sublime Porte increased during that century, also because of the continuous loss of Ottoman territories in the

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Balkans and the Caucasus, and due to the growing need to consolidate Ottoman rule in the 'rear' provinces. Likewise, Palestine evolved at that time from a land-bridge to a border-land between the Ottoman Empire and newly independent Egypt. Thus, by mid-nineteenth century the Palestinian districts, especially Jerusalem, began to regain and enhance their strategic and political importance, and consequently attracted greater attention from Istanbul.

In certain respects this state of affairs was similar to that which had existed more than three centuries earlier, during the early days of Ottoman rule in Palestine. At that period, namely the era of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566), law and order reigned, and the government administration was properly organized. The population grew and the economy developed. However, the heyday of sixteenth century Ottoman Palestine did not last long, due in main to negative developments in the Ottoman centre.

The central institutions of the state began to deteriorate, frequent financial crises plagued the economy, and, from the end of the seventeenth century on, growing military pressure from the European powers, particularly Russia, intensified the internal decline. These events left their mark on the various districts of Palestine; the local governors became more corrupt, and neglected their obligations, the troops were beyond control and the Bedouin tribes from the desert broke into cultivated areas, turning vast sections into wilderness. As a result, disorder and insecurity spread, government construction and public works were neglected, agriculture and trade were severely damaged, the majority of the population was oppressed and impoverished. The resultant suffering strengthened the hand of local rulers and leaders in various parts of the country, who ruled their areas with varying degrees of autonomy, sometimes succeeding in driving the Bedouins from the settled areas and in achieving a certain degree of security for the inhabitants.

These local leaders were of various types: rural sheikhs of Mount Nablus, the Judean hills and Mount Hebron who controlled their respective areas during most of the Ottoman era; Druze amirs of the House of Ma'n in southern Lebanon who extended their control to parts of northern Palestine during various periods between the end of the sixteenth century and the middle of the seventeenth century; Bedouin chiefs such as those of the Ṭurābāy family who ruled Jenin, Lajjūn and the Carmel area during part of the seventeenth century; and Dāhir al-'Umar of the Bedouin Zaydān family, the well-known ruler of the Galilee for a long period during the eighteenth century.

From the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Acre and northern

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Palestine were successively subjected to the rule of the Ottoman pashas Aḥmad al-Jazzār (1775–1804), Sulaymān (1804–1818) and ‘Abdullāh (1819–1831). These pashas were able to restore a large degree of direct control in the area, but they themselves (except for Sulaymān) defied the orders of the central government.

In 1831 Ottoman rule in Palestine was interrupted by Muḥammad ‘Alī, the rebellious Egyptian pasha who occupied Palestine and Syria until 1840. A new era began which was characterized by political and social reform aimed at centralizing control of the country, modernizing the administration and granting equal rights to non-Muslim minorities. The country was opened for the first time to widespread political, cultural and economic activity by the European powers. These new developments continued after the Ottoman rule was resumed in 1840–41 under the new reform movement — the *Tanzimat*. During the second half of the nineteenth century direct Ottoman control was gradually consolidated in all parts of the country, Bedouin attacks were checked, general security increased, the oppression of the urban population was eased to a considerable extent, and the involvement of the European powers expanded greatly. These developments brought about certain improvements in the country’s economy and in the conditions of the inhabitants.

The population of Palestine, which numbered some 300,000 in the sixteenth century and reached twice that number by World War I, was heterogeneous and divided. Aside from the divisions between urban, rural and nomad populations, a prolonged traditional rivalry existed, among villagers as well as nomads, between the Qays and Yaman factions. In addition, enmity between Sunni Muslims, Shi‘is and Druze, and conflicts between Muslims, Christians and Jews further compartmentalized the various sectors of the population. The *Tanzimat* attempts to introduce equality between Muslims and non-Muslims did not ease the tense intercommunal relations and even deepened the conflict between the majority and the minorities.

The majority of the population was Sunni Muslim and Arabic speaking. The cultural life of this group was by and large lacking in creativity. Their political identity was reflected in loyalty to the Muslim Ottoman state on one hand, and to the local leadership on the other. Yet, it would appear that the Muslim population in central and southern Palestine had a certain collective identity based in common rituals at the holy places, particularly Nabi Musa, and in the common administrative and judicial framework which the Ottoman government established for Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza. However, until the end of Ottoman rule, there was very little tendency toward self-determination or Arab national aspirations among the

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Muslims of Palestine. The majority of the Muslim population remained loyal to the sultan, and the Muslim urban elite was well rooted in the Ottoman establishment in Palestine. Inclinations towards Arab nationalism at that time were expressed mainly by Christian Arab intellectuals.

The Christian population of Palestine during the hundreds of years of Ottoman rule was torn by internal strife and conflict between the different sects. In addition, relations with Muslims and Jews were also tense. The activities of the European powers and the missionary societies during the nineteenth century increased the internal divisions, but also contributed to the expansion of educational and cultural activity among the Christians of Palestine and to the penetration of nationalist ideas among the educated class. Influenced by these ideas and by their traditional link to the Holy Land, the patriotic attachment of the Christian intelligentsia to Palestine, particularly among the Greek Orthodox, grew prior to World War I. This attachment was linked to the advent of the Arab national movement in Palestine, which developed partly in reaction to the strong nationalist feelings towards Palestine, Eretz Israel, within the Jewish-Zionist community.

With the Ottoman conquest of Palestine and the immigration of Jewish exiles from Spain the Jewish community entered a period of recovery and prosperity. Leading in this resurgence was the Jewish community of Safed, which enjoyed physical security and economic prosperity during most of the sixteenth century, and became a world-wide centre for religious and spiritual learning as well as Kabbalist literature. In Tiberias, too, a Jewish centre was rebuilt at the initiative of Dona Gracia, Don Yosef Nasi and Don Shlomo Ben-Yaish.

At the end of the sixteenth century the Jewish communities of Safed and Tiberias declined, and the focus of Jewish communal and spiritual life was transferred to Jerusalem during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Jewish population of Jerusalem, mainly of Sephardic origin, was constantly increasing, and learning and religious-cultural creativity were on the rise. Jewish communities existed at that time also in Hebron, Gaza, Nablus, Acre, and in a few villages in the Galilee.

From the 1840's the Jewish community in Palestine grew considerably through new waves of immigrants, mainly from Russia, many of whom settled in Jerusalem. Jerusalem's Jewish population doubled in twenty years, making up half of the city's population in the late 1850's. In the early 1880's the Jewish population of Palestine was further augmented by Zionist immigration and settlement. Agricultural settlements were founded in many parts of the country and new Jewish urban centers were established in Jaffa and Haifa.

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The growth and consolidation of the Jewish national movement in the land during the first decade and a half of the twentieth century coincided with the expansion of European activities, ideas and norms in the various aspects of life, and collided with the emerging Arab nationalist movement in Palestine, which had developed as a reaction to the tyrannic and Turkish-nationalist nature of the Young Turks' régime.

These diverse factors and movements, each in its own way, substantially weakened the Ottoman position in Palestine and helped prepare the groundwork for the new era in the history of Palestine which began in 1917.

PART ONE
GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION

1. THE PATTERN OF SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Geographical Research on Turkish *Defter-i Mufasssal**

by WOLF HÜTTEROTH

I

Among the frequent historical reports and studies on the "Holy Land" there are several that differentiate between *phases* of relative wealth and decay. Yet such histories rarely come down to consider *individual villages* during specific periods. Therefore the presentation of earlier cultural landscapes seems to be vague and uncertain. Usually, the impressions and descriptions of the nineteenth-century travellers are projected back to the post-Roman period. The only attempt to survey individual settlements was made for the time of the Crusaders.¹ Individual villages have been mapped on the basis of contemporary European sources. Today, Israeli scholars try to catalogue all references to settlements in Palestine, provided they are mentioned in descriptions of journeys of the last centuries.² Yet, since these descriptions, as well as the initial scientific investigations, began only in the late eighteenth century, the reconstruction of a settlement pattern refers merely to the last century of Turkish rule in Palestine. This century is usually regarded in historical descriptions as the last period of a more or less continuous negative development. According to the latest comprehensive study on the geography of settlements in Palestine³ the main reason for decay is generally and justly seen as the growing inability of the State to prevent Bedouin tribes from raiding frontier villages. Both unusual and recurring patterns of village destruction in the border areas between settled and nomadic regions are well known, and they could be observed well into the twentieth century.

The question has not yet been solved as to what the cultural landscape looked like in the long period between the Roman Empire and the nineteenth century. Is it possible to record more than a general decline of settlements?

¹ *Atlas of Israel*, Amsterdam 1970, Map IX/ 10.

² See, for example, the works by Margalith and Ben-Arieh cited in the bibliography.

³ D. H. K. Amiran, "The Pattern of Settlement in Palestine," *Israel Exploration Journal*, Vol. 3 (1953).

Are there intermediate stages? Can the general pattern of density of settlements be reconstructed for a specific period of time?

These questions are raised especially in view of the enormous number of ruined villages (*khirba*), which can be found everywhere in the country. The map of the Palestine Exploration Fund from 1869–1878 already registered them frequently. This map reflects a situation where modern pacification and extension of settlements had just begun. Only a few ruined villages had been resettled or recultivated. The detailed mapping succeeded because in most cases derelict villages were so well remembered (with the help of visible ruins or the use of a lost village as pasture land, well, garden, etc.) that the locality and name of a former village could be determined without difficulty. Amiran compared the number of the lost villages mentioned on the map of the Palestine Exploration Fund to the number of existing villages in 1922 and got a ratio of 2.6 lost villages to one existing village.⁴ Again, this obviously expressed the general decay of settlement, but there was no indication when these villages were *last inhabited*.

A group of documents which have only recently become available has made it possible to study the situation in the sixteenth century to determine the period when villages were being deserted.

The source in question is Ottoman tax registers which were established for each Turkish *sanjak* in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries to assess the provinces. These registers are nearly complete for all the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth century, and for some regions they even cover periods of thirty years. These registers are made up in such a way that town quarters, villages, periodic settlements (*mezra'a*) and nomadic tribes each form a unit of assessment, and are listed according to a code number. The *sanjaks* of Palestine (Jerusalem, Nablus, Gaza, Lajjūn, 'Ajlūn) are made up in such a way that settlements paying the Sultan are listed first, then those paying the governor (*mīr liwā'*), and last those which were the feudal tenure of higher or lower military ranks (*zi'āmet* and *tīmār*). The lists are spatially organized according to districts (*nāḥiye*), which makes it easier to locate settlements. In each village the individual tax-payers, that is men above 16 years of age, are named. Multiplying by five as a rule of thumb one gets roughly the number of inhabitants. The amount of tax which each unit of assessment had to pay is specified according to cereals, orchards, vegetables, cattle, persons and land. Thus in the future, a land-use map of the sixteenth century could be feasible.

An attempt has been made here to interpret this statistical material for the *sanjaks* of Jerusalem (al-Quds) and Nablus, including the mountain

⁴ *Ibid.*

regions of Judea and Samaria, and for the *sanjak* of 'Ajlūn, which included the Jordan rift valley and the Transjordan heights south of Irbid. Galilee and the interesting region of the southern coastal plain have still to be taken into account, for these sources have only very recently been accessible (*sanjaks* of Gaza and Lajjūn).

II

The first results of the interpretation of the Ottoman register are presented in Map I. Inside the individual *nāhiye* — whose borders had first to be reconstructed — the existing settlements of that time are roughly mapped in circles according to their size, and nomadic tribes are correspondingly marked in triangles. Yet the picture has to be completed because not all the mapped settlements have been exactly identified. The reliability of identification is related to the size of individual units of administration. The larger a unit of administration, the larger is the area for searching, and the greater the possibility that a sought-after name of a village or lost village will turn up several times. In the district of Jerusalem, with 150 villages in the sixteenth century, the degree of identification is the lowest. Just about two-thirds of the settlements of the period could still be identified today. The position of the remaining villages in Map I is uncertain. But to give an overall impression of the density of settlements, they have been mapped at places where a settlement might be expected.

This situation of the country in the last third of the sixteenth century can be contrasted with a reconstruction of the density and size of settlements as they were in the last third of the nineteenth century.

Map II is based on the map of the Palestine Exploration Fund. The size of settlements has been mapped according to estimates by the surveying officers Conder and Kitchener, as listed in the supplements to the map mentioned. As figures are very vague, the map of the late nineteenth century shows a far less reliable picture than that representing the sixteenth century. The placing, number and size of signs for Bedouin settlements are based on the estimates of von Oppenheim, which were made mainly between 1900 and the First World War.

The situation thus mapped is not that of the lowest point of development, for a gradual increase in the density of settlements had already begun in Palestine under the Egyptian occupation of 1831–1841, and this development was only shortly interrupted by the Turkish reoccupation. Transjordan saw the beginning of modern times later on: in northern Transjordan new settlements began to appear during the 1880's when Circassian immigrants arrived in the area and began to rebuild Amman. Two decades later the south also participated in the new development. The part of Transjordan in

the map has been reconstructed according to the first official village registers in government registers (*salnāme*) of the late nineteenth century. They exist for 1881 and 1898, supplemented by figures from descriptions of journeys of Robinson, Seetzen, Oliphant and others. If one referred to the pattern of settlement in the *first* half of the nineteenth century, as it is reconstructed by Margalith according to travel descriptions, the contrast would be the more striking. But these modern Israeli researches on the geography of Palestine in the early nineteenth century (by Margalith and Ben Arie) do not yet allow a satisfying comparison with the map of the Palestine Exploration Fund.

Still, comparing the density of settlement maps of 1580 and 1880, a quotient of lost villages for individual regions can be computed (*Wüstungsquotient*). The distribution of regions with certain quotients is very informative (Map III). The mountain regions of Judea and Samaria show a little-altered picture of the density of settlements in comparison with the situation in the nineteenth century. This means that the stability of settlement, which Amiran stated for the towns of the uplands, is also valid for villages. The quotient is about 9%; and if one referred to the first half of the nineteenth century, according to the reconstruction of Margalith, perhaps 15% would be achieved. In these uplands there is a small area to the northwest of Nablus where an increase in lost villages of Ottoman times can be noted. This is the region of Wadi Zaymar. The reasons for this phenomenon are not obvious at first sight. The wadi contains an old road and, as we know, along highly frequented roads (like the highland road from Nablus via Jerusalem to Hebron) the density of settlements was certainly lower.⁵ But in the period under survey the surrounding areas of the far more frequented highland road have seen less alterations than has this remote region.

As one might expect, the border regions of the upland show higher quotients. The northern part of the coastal plain (Sharon plain) belongs to the *sanjak* of Nablus and has therefore been included. It is evident that in the sixteenth as well as in the nineteenth centuries the real plain was without settlements and had been invaded by nomadic tribes. Yet the hilly borderland, which was without swamps and through which a famous road, the *Via Maris* ran, had noticeably more settlements. The boundary of peasant settlements was definitely not the boundary of potential non-irrigated arable land. It coincided with the edge of the protecting mountain region opposite the free plain dominated by nomads.

Even the region of the *sanjak* of Gaza had a dense ^mnet of settlements in the nineteenth century, at the time of the Palestine Exploration Fund survey. The map of Jacotin, surveyed for the French expedition to Palestine in

⁵ See *ibid.*, fig. 7.

1799–1801, already showed a dense net of settlements. Analogous to the north, a higher quotient of lost villages is therefore to be expected in the southern plain and the southern Shefela hills. At the same time the boundary of settlement may have been pushed to the north, as the land of the nomads advanced from the south into a plain of non-irrigated agricultural land between the Hebron Mountains and the Gaza coastal strip.

In the southern Judean mountain region, in the old district of Hebron, the boundary between peasant and nomadic settlements nearly coincided with the boundary of economic non-irrigated agricultural land. Possible variations are limited from the beginning. Nevertheless, the Hebron region is surrounded on three sides by the land of nomads. This exposed position is pointed up by the high quotient of lost villages. While the villages Dūra, Yatta and Zāhiriyya were the most advanced southern outposts in the nineteenth century, in the sixteenth century there were at least six more villages in the southern fringe of peasant settlements.

Along the eastern slope of the mountain region of Palestine, against the Ghor, another fringe could be noticed, where the proportion of lost villages varied between 40% and 50%. Thus, the mountain region, with a relatively steady settlement, was surrounded by a fringe where the utmost boundary of potential peasant settlements hardly fluctuated. Yet the basis of the fellah's existence was often threatened by invading Bedouins.

The Ghor region between the lake of Tiberias and the Dead Sea, like the heights of Transjordan, belonged to the *sanjak* of 'Ajlūn. It is noteworthy that during the sixteenth century no Bedouins roamed in the central and northern parts of the Jordan valley. The district of Ghor contained 18 villages, one of which (al-Mashāriqa al-Tahta) had Jewish inhabitants. These villages, which depended on additional irrigation, were concentrated on the alluvial fans on both sides of the Ghor. Further concentrations were situated at the lower Yarmūk and in the valley of Beisan. In the nineteenth century there remained only the greatly reduced towns of Jericho, Beisan, and five villages at the mouth of the Yarmūk, where non-irrigated agriculture could be practised.

The heights of Transjordan show an interesting pattern of stages from the north to the south, which remarkably correspond to agrarian zones: first, 'Ajlūn proper with the three districts of 'Ajlūn, Kūra and Banī 'Adwān, showed a density of settlements similar to that of the mountain regions of Judea and Samaria. Nomadic tribes were not yet named, while many villages near 'Ajlūn and Jerash had Christian inhabitants. The region of Balqā' south of the Zarqā river showed the relatively strongest decay. This part of the Transjordan escarpment receives less precipitation than the north and south. At the same time the eastern slope is nearly level and less dissected,

and roads lead there from the east to the Jordan valley and further on to Judea. All this means that a wide gap is open to any nomadic invasion. In the sixteenth century there were altogether ten villages listed in the tax register, apart from the town of al-Şalt. Yet the progressive decay could already be noticed, as next to five of these settlements was entered the remark that either no taxes could be collected from them or that their peasants had run away. On the other hand, the taxed nomads were as common then as before the First World War. Among them were the Banī Şakhr, the most powerful tribe until the middle of the twentieth century. Further south the escarpment reaches heights of over 1700 metres, and there it is more dissected. This region, once the homeland of the Nabateans, had practically been overlooked in later Ottoman times, and only during the 1870's was southern Transjordan reconquered. Yet, peasants could survive there among nomads around Karak, Shawbak and Wādī Mūsā, although the quotient of lost villages was about 45%.

III

In conclusion, it has been shown that during the last centuries the decay of the cultural landscape along the settlement boundary in Palestine and Transjordan developed differently from that of the vast and flat steppes of north Syria and Anatolia, where the nomads conquered wide areas of arable and previously cultivated steppes. In Palestine and Transjordan the zone of level landscapes suitable for non-irrigated agriculture is very narrow and, while between Gaza and Beersheba this zone is about thirty kilometres wide, the average width south of Hebron as well as in the Transjordan escarpment is five to ten kilometres. But the actual "retreat" — in comparison to the maximum extension at the time of the Roman Empire — seems to have taken place earlier. In the golden age of the Ottoman Empire, in the sixteenth century, when a certain degree of security in the country could be guaranteed, the boundary had been hardly different from that in the second half of the nineteenth century. The decisive process in the development of the settlement pattern was the *desertion of villages at the boundaries of fellah land* inside the mountain region, where only a limited number of villages could survive. In this process Transjordan had disadvantages against Palestine, for the strip of land with fellah villages was long and very narrow and nearly everywhere surrounded by Bedouin tribes. Consequently, the process of deserting villages in Transjordan led to a break-up of the "strip" into several isolated islands.

Thus we have got a cross-section in the development of settlements in an Oriental landscape of 400 years ago and have noticed the different densities of both stages. What has not yet become really clear is *why* villages were

Fig. 1: Position and size of rural settlements (circles) and bedouin tribes (triangles) in the last quarter of the 16th century.
For the Sanjaks of Gaza in the south-west and Lajjūn in the north research is not yet completed.




Fig. 1

**NOMADEN-
STÄMME**

DÖRFER

• 0 - 25 Henecher	•
▲ 25 - 50	•
▲ 50 - 100	•
▲ 100 - 200	•
▲ 200 - 500	•
▲ 500 - 1000	•

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 km

Fig. II: Position and approximate size of rural settlements (circles) and bedouin tribes (triangles) at the end of the 19th century. Open symbols for the area of Gaza and Lajjün (not yet comparable with data for 16th century).





Fig. III: Percentage of deserted vil-
lages between end of 16th century
and end of 19th century.



deserted and at exactly what times. Nomadic invasions may often have been the only reason for deserting villages, but why did this occur more often since the sixteenth century? Until then the government of the Sultan could control tribes, collect taxes, and invest Turkish dignitaries and soldiers with villages. But there are many indications in the political, social and economic history of later centuries that the Ottoman Empire was shaken by heavy interior crises starting between the end of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries. One may suppose that those developments had their influence on Palestine as well, especially when considering the centralized organization of the Ottoman administration. The symptoms of Ottoman decay began in the course of the second half of the sixteenth century with the devaluation and debasement of Ottoman currency. At the end of the sixteenth century the Turkish feudal system collapsed, and the tax system of *muqāṣa'a* or *iltizām*, being a form of tax farming, developed. There was no longer an officially protected (and at the same time state-supporting) feudal class, but only tax collectors, who were usually indigenous chiefs of tribes, and village sheikhs. Local or regional independent peasant groups emerged, especially around Nablus, Hebron and in Transjordan (under the sovereignty of great Bedouin tribes). At the same time, about 1600, the Turkish tax registers were discontinued, and in later centuries no new registers were prepared. Obviously, assessments were no longer possible in many villages.

Only in the last quarter of the nineteenth century did official registers begin to reappear under the growing consolidation of Ottoman rule and recolonization of vast areas.⁶

The extension of settlements in the twentieth century reached, for the first time, the density of Ottoman times, at least in the mountainous parts of the country. In coastal plains and border regions of the desert steppes in the south and east the settlement exceeds that of the sixteenth century and approaches or even surpasses the density of settlements in ancient times.

⁶ The development since that time is outlined, especially in Israeli studies; for example, *Atlas of Israel*. In German it is to be found in W. Richter's work.

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2. THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE BEDOUINS IN PALESTINE IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES*

by MOSHE SHARON

I. Introduction

Although we have very little information as to the number of Bedouins in Palestine¹ or their inter-tribal relations, we are well informed about the important role they played in the history of the country during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule. Our main and most important sources for the study of the internal problems of Palestine during this period, amongst which the problem of the Bedouins was one of the most grave, are the documents of the *Muḥimme Defteri*. Most of the documents relating to Palestine were collected and published in English translation by the late Professor Uriel Heyd,² whose work has immeasurably facilitated the research on the Bedouins of Palestine. Additional material for this study is to be found in the itineraries of travellers in this area written in European languages and in Hebrew, and in the biographical dictionaries of Ghazzī³ and Muḥibbī.⁴

The position of Palestine, flanked as it is by deserts on its eastern and southern borders, has greatly affected the history of the country throughout

* This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor U. Heyd.

¹ The most important sources for statistical information on the inhabitants of Palestine in the sixteenth century are the documents of the cadastral registers (*Tāpū defterleri*). See B. Lewis, "Studies in the Ottoman Archives I," *BSOAS*, Vol. XVI (1954), p. 479; and in Hebrew, *Eretz Israel*, vol. IV (1956), p. 175.

² *Ott. Doc.*

³ Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, *al-Kawākib al-Sā'ira bi-A'yān al-Mi'a Al-'Ashira*, Beirut, 1945-59. Most of the material concerning the Bedouins is, however, to be found not in the three volumes of the printed *Kawākib*, but in the appendix volume (*dhayl*) called *Luṭf al-Samar wa-Qaṣf al-Thamar*, which is still in manuscript form. For this study I consulted the copy which is preserved in the private collection of Sheikh 'Abdullāh Khayr, of the village of Abū Sinān in the Lower Galilee. I believe that this manuscript is the autograph of the author. An excellent copy of the *dhayl* is kept in the Chester Beatty Library in Dublin, (Ms. No 3708). A careful study of this manuscript should furnish first class material for the history of Syria and Palestine in the latter part of the seventeenth century.

⁴ Muḥammad al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-Athar Fi A'yān al-Qarn al-Hādī 'Ashar*, Cairo, 1284 A.H.

the ages. It was the constant victim of raids by the desert dwellers who, time and again, tried to attack it either in small groups or in great waves. The degree of success of such raids was usually determined by two closely related major factors, namely the strength and efficiency of the government and the density of the sedentary population. When Palestine was ruled efficiently, enjoying well-organized administrative and defence systems, and when, at the same time, the towns and villages were densely populated, as for example, under the Romans and the Byzantines as well as under the Umayyads, the Bedouins were usually kept in check. However, whenever the government's grasp weakened and the military power designed to ensure the country's security became corrupt and inadequate, there followed a sharp drop in the population, and the country was once again vulnerable to attacks by the Bedouin tribes.

Under Islamic rule, this process was set into motion in the second half of the eighth century, very soon after the 'Abbāsids had replaced the Umayyads as the rulers of the country. Balādhurī mentions that towards the end of the century land in Palestine had already been abandoned by the peasants.⁵ The 'Abbāsids initially made an effort to stop the desertion of cultivated areas, but as their attention became increasingly devoted to the eastern provinces of their empire, they tended to neglect Syria and Palestine.

From the second half of the ninth century onwards, Palestine was not blessed with any long periods of stable government and passed through a succession of rulers. The Tulūnids seized it from the 'Abbāsids and annexed it to their Egyptian domains (878-905). In 905, it was restored to a very ineffective 'Abbāsīd rule which lasted thirty years. Then it became, once again, a part of the Egyptian kingdom of the Ikhshīds for thirty-four years, during which the country suffered severely from the abuses of government officials and tax collectors. It seems that by the end of the Ikhshīd rule, the sedentary population had diminished radically and the country's borders were exposed to more frequent Bedouin raids, which intensified even more under the Fāṭimids, who succeeded the Ikhshīds in 969. Even though their rule was far more efficient than that of their predecessors, Palestine did not seem to head the list of the Fāṭimids' interests. In 971, parts of Syria and Palestine had already been captured by the Qarāmiṭa, who remained in the country for three years. No sooner had the danger of the Qarāmiṭa passed, than it was overrun by Bedouin tribes led by the powerful tribe of Ṭay'. It was probably the policy of the Fāṭimids that was in many ways responsible for the boldness of the Bedouins. The central government in

⁵ Aḥmad ibn Yabīyā al-Balādhurī, *Futūḥ al-Buldān* (M. J. De Goeje, ed.), Leiden (Netherlands), 1866, p. 144.

Egypt relied partially upon them to keep the mutinous and wayward governors of Syria and Palestine in check. However, the Bedouins themselves became so powerful that around 1013 they were able to denounce the Fāṭimid Caliph and set up a counter-caliph in Syria.⁶ This time only a powerful army sent from Egypt was able to quell them; but as this military expedition was followed up with neither the reformation nor the reorganization of the defence system of the country, the Bedouins were able once again to rebel in 1024 and to rule a great part of Palestine for the following five years. Although they were eventually repulsed to the desert by the Fāṭimids, the Bedouins continued to constitute a major threat to Palestine throughout the remainder of the Fāṭimid period.⁷ The continuous disturbances and wars that characterized the end of Fāṭimid rule — the Seljuk invasion, the Crusader wars and the unstable Ayyūbid rule in Syria — all had ruinous consequences for Palestine. By the time the country was taken over by the Mamluks, in the middle of the thirteenth century, special attention and intensive measures were required to restore peace and security. At the beginning of their rule, the Mamluks paid a certain amount of attention to securing the main towns and principle highways. They took precautions against the Bedouin tribes of Sinai, which constituted a grave menace to the road that led into Palestine from Egypt.⁸ However, they very rapidly lost interest in the welfare of Palestine, directing most of their attention to Egypt. Syria and Palestine were speedily converted into places of exile, to which insubordinate Mamluk officers were usually banished.⁹ The radical measures badly needed to restore tranquillity to the country were not applied; therefore, the general deterioration was not checked.

II. *The Bedouins at the Close of the Mamluk Period*

Towards the end of the Mamluk period, most of the main roads of Palestine and southern Syria were almost paralysed by the Bedouins. Even the *hajj*

⁶ On the activity of the *Qarāmlqa* in Palestine between 360 A. H./970–71 and 363 A. H./973–74, see Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil*, (Torenberg, ed.,) VIII, 452–53, 469–70. See there also on the role played by the Bedouins of Banū Jarrāh of Tay' in the events that followed the Fāṭimid occupation, and cf. Yahyā ibn Sa'īd al-Anṣārī, *Annales* (cont. of Eutychius), (Cheikh, ed.), Beirut, 1909, pp. 201–202, 207. Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhayl Ta'rikh Dimashq*, (Amedroz, ed.) Leiden, 1908, pp. 1–3, 22–23, 25.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 77 ff.

⁸ Muḥammad ibn Baṭṭūṭa, *Rihla*, Cairo, 1928, p. 31, relates that the Mamluks used the Bedouins themselves to guard the road. See also the description of the Bedouins of Sinai and their relations with Mamluk Sultans as given by Sir John Maundeville, in Wright, *Early Travels in Palestine*, London, 1848, p. 160.

⁹ See 'Abd al-Rahmān Mujīr al-Dīn, *al-Uns al-Jalīl bi-Ta'rikh al-Quds wa-l-Khālī*, Cairo, 1283 A. H., p. 618.

caravan was not spared by them, and travellers from Egypt to Palestine were subject to great risks.¹⁰ A Jewish traveller, Rabbi Meshullam, who travelled from Egypt to Palestine in 1481, summed up the hazards that confronted the travellers in the following words:

From Cairo to Gaza there are 'miles of murder' [the numerical equivalent of the Hebrew word *retzah* (murder) is 298] and how much we are indebted to God who rescued us from the dangers that lurk between Cairo and Gaza!¹¹

The road north-east of Gaza that led to Hebron and Jerusalem was also extremely perilous.¹² In the same year the Christian traveller Felix Fabri described the dangerous situation in central Palestine saying:

The Arabs, who at that time were spread abroad throughout many parts of the Holy Land, thrice came to meet us [on the road from Jaffa to Ramla]; but seeing that we were well protected by armed defenders they offered us no violence... Had we not travelled with so great a force, they would have fallen upon us and beaten us with stones, sticks and staves, as often befalls pilgrims between Joppa and Ramla.¹³

Mujir al-Din, relating the events of 914 A.H./1508-9, says that by that date ten years had passed since the last *hajj* caravan travelled from Jerusalem to Mecca "because of the bad times and the insecurity of the road."¹⁴ The *hajj* was renewed in the above mentioned year only when the Bedouins themselves agreed to safeguard the pilgrims as far as Ayla (Eilat).¹⁵

Fourteen years before, in Muḥarram 900 A.H. /Oct. 1494, the Mamluk government had been powerless to prevent the almost complete annihilation of the Syrian *hajj* caravan near Karak. The Bedouins of the tribe of Banū Lām, who at that time roamed about that area, fell upon the caravan, which, according to Ibn Iyyās, numbered as many as thirteen thousand camels, and pillaged it. Only sixteen camels escaped without their cargo. "Women and children in countless numbers were killed" and the rest were taken prisoners. The government suffered a great loss of prestige through this event, for amongst the prisoners was the Mamluk leader of the caravan (*amīr al-rakb*).¹⁶ Although the Sultan "was disturbed and aggrieved" by the catastrophe,¹⁷ five years elapsed before a military expedition was sent to take revenge upon Banū Lām; but such military expeditions had only

¹⁰ G. W. Stripling, *The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs*, Urbana, 1942, p. 19.

¹¹ I. D. Eisenstein (ed.), *Otzar Masa'ot*, New York, 1926, p. 97. ¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ F. Fabri, "The Book of Wanderings," *PPTS*, Vol. IV (1896), pp. 245-246.

¹⁴ L. A. Mayer, "A Sequel to Mujir al-Din's Chronicle," *JPOS*, XI: 2(1931), pp. 11-12.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12

¹⁶ Ibn Iyyās, *Badd'ī' al-Zuhūr fi Waqā'i' al-Duhūr*, Būlāq, 1310-1312, II, 286; cf. Mujir al-Din, *op. cit.*, p. 700

¹⁷ Ibn Iyyās, *loc. cit.*

fleeing influence upon the Bedouins; the minute that the army left their territories, they rebelled again.¹⁸

It appears that the Bedouins were so fully aware of the weakness of the government that from time to time they would even go so far as to take up arms against its officials. On one occasion in the year 884 A.H./1480 Bedouins from the vicinity of Jerusalem broke into the city in order to take revenge on its governor Nāṣir al-Dīn ibn Ayyūb, who had executed some rebels from their tribe, the tribe of Banū Zayd. The chronicler reporting this event points out that the attack on Jerusalem was made in broad daylight and that the governor of the town succeeded in fleeing from the city by the skin of his teeth. The markets closed down and the inhabitants did not venture forth into the streets. For some time after, the roads around the town were abandoned to the mercy of the Bedouins.¹⁹

The sedentary population was also within reach of the Bedouins. They used to impose "special taxes" upon the fellahin, "taxes which were known by the locals as *maḥlīmā* (injustice)."²⁰ The payment of "protection" fees by the villagers to the Bedouins continued up to the twentieth century in various parts of the Middle East where sedentary areas bordered on the desert. This "protection" fee or tax was known as *khāwa* or *khuwwa* (probably abbreviation of *ukhuwwa*). As late as the nineteenth century villages in Ḥawrān were impoverished as a result of the *khāwa* which they had to pay to the Bedouins.²¹

One of the reasons for the boldness of the Bedouins was the fact that the Mamluk governors were in constant strife amongst themselves and would incite the Bedouins to attack each other's territory.²²

Towards the end of the fifteenth century, the tension in Palestine increased due to the growing danger of the Ottomans from the north. In 1481, the Mamluks, assisted by Khalīl ibn Ismā'īl, a Bedouin sheikh from Nablus, made an attempt to recruit Bedouins and fellahin to the auxiliary units of the army by force. This attempt ended with a rebellion of the Bedouins. The Fuqarā' Bedouins who wandered in the area around Jerusalem attacked the Mamluk governor and freed the members of their tribe who had been kidnapped by him.²³ Other Bedouins attacked the city of Ramla and set

¹⁸ See, e. g., Muḥṣin al-Dīn, *op. cit.*, p. 695, and cf. Ibn Iyyās, *op. cit.*, II, 280.

¹⁹ Muḥṣin al-Dīn, *op. cit.*, pp. 655-656.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 676-677.

²¹ Burckhardt, pp. 299, 301-302, 307; *Idem.*, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys...*, London, 1831, pp. 16-17; cf. also A. Musil, *Northern Negd*, New York, 1928, pp. 256-257.

²² Muḥṣin al-Dīn, *op. cit.*, p. 703. And see also on p. 657 the description of the entrance of the new governor of Jerusalem to the town in 885 A. H./1480, escorted by multitudes of Bedouins.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 659.

part of it on fire. The governor of Gaza, who took to the field against the rebels, was heavily defeated and his army almost completely wiped out.²⁴ Nevertheless, the Mamluks, who were in great need of additional manpower, tried to continue the policy of compulsory recruitment. The first hostilities that broke out between the Ottoman Sultan Beyazîd II (1481–1512) and the Mamluk Qānşūh al-Ghūrî, beginning in 1484, forced the Mamluks to intensify their search for additional forces from amongst the local inhabitants. They preferred the Bedouins, probably in the belief that the Bedouins were inherently more warlike. That the Mamluks had to recruit local Arabs to their army significantly illustrates the general deterioration of the Mamluk Sultanate towards its end. Until then membership in the Mamluk army was the *privilege* of a certain class and not the *obligation* of the subjects.²⁵

It seems that, at the outset, recruitment was restricted to the area of Jerusalem,²⁶ but that later on it was extended to other parts of Palestine. In 1486 a high ranking Mamluk officer (*dawādār*) was sent from Cairo to supervise the recruitment operation, and he began to travel from place to place within the country, "encamping sometimes in Lajjūn, sometimes in Qāqūn and at other times in Ramla."²⁷ The actual enlistments were, in fact, conducted not by this *dawādār* but by the above mentioned Khalīl ibn Ismā'īl of Nablus who supported the government on this issue and was, in all probability, remunerated for his assistance. Money was assigned to him and with this he had to pay the recruits before presenting them to the army commander.²⁸ However, it is reported that two years later the governor of Jerusalem, together with a *qāḍī*, who was sent especially from Egypt, assumed responsibility for recruiting soldiers. They, too, paid the recruits their first salary in advance and then transferred them directly to the army, which was encamped in Gaza ready to move northwards against Beyazîd.²⁹

The Bedouin auxiliaries were not much help to the Mamluks in the field; many of them deserted. In answer to this, the government sent units of soldiers to punish the tribes and families of the deserters and to extract from them the money that had been paid to the recruits.³⁰

²⁴ Eisenstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 98–99.

²⁵ Stripling, *op. cit.*, 38.

²⁶ In the same year (1484) we read that "Bedouins who were collected in the mountains of Jerusalem" were brought by the governor of the town to the Mamluk army commander who had arrived from Cairo on his way to fight Beyazîd. Muḥr al-Dīn, *op. cit.*, p. 663.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 666.

²⁸ *Loc. cit.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 673.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 675: The governor of Jerusalem became famous for the torures he inflicted upon Bedouins and others whom he suspected of receiving money and deserting the army.

In addition to the compulsory recruitment, heavy taxes were imposed upon the inhabitants in order to furnish the army with more cavalry and infantry units.³¹ The despair and the wretched conditions of the people were described by Ibn Iyyās in the following words: "Everyone, peasants as well as landlords and *waqf* administrators, yearned in his heart to be able to roam to another country, away from the heavy oppression that had overtaken him. The Bedouins of Nablus suffered especially, for they were obliged to pay sums of money for the infantry when the expedition left."³²

The Mamluks had, therefore, to fight a mighty enemy with their backs to a hostile population in Syria and Palestine. It comes as no surprise then, that after the defeat of the Mamluks in Marj Dābiq (August 1516) the Druze leaders and Bedouin sheikhs came to swear allegiance to the victorious Selīm I.³³

Bedouins from the Ṭurābāy family, whom we shall meet later, approached the Ottomans and offered to act as guides to the army on its way to Egypt.³⁴ Meanwhile, other Bedouins taking advantage of the Mamluk retreat fell upon the rear of the army and cut off its lines of communications and supplies. At the same time, there were Bedouins who did not spare Selīm's army, which they ambushed in many places on its way to Egypt.³⁵

III. The Bedouins Under Ottoman Rule

A. Ottoman Intentions

The Ottomans no doubt realized from the outset of their rule in Palestine the importance of keeping the Bedouins in check. This fact is clearly indicated in a firman from the year 986 A. H. / 1578 which contains the following statement: "The Province of Damasus [of which Palestine formed a part] is the borderland of the desert and the frontier of the rebellious Bedouins."³⁶ Like the Romans and Byzantines, the Ottomans understood that one of their main tasks was to protect the cultivated areas of Syria and Palestine from the desert-dwellers on whose borders these lands lay. Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan, as the "servant of the two noble sanctuaries" (in Mecca and Medina) had to safeguard the pilgrims on their way to

There were "people who had to sell their daughters in the market like slaves," Mujir al-Dīn says, in order to save themselves from him.

³¹ Ibn Iyyās, *op. cit.*, II, 302.

³² *Ibid.*, III, 60

³³ 'Isā Ma'īūf, *Ta'rikh Fakhr al-Dīn al Ma'nī al-Thānī*, Beirut, 1943, pp. 7-8; Ben-Zvi, *Israel*, p. 10.

³⁴ Evliya Çelebi, "Travels in Palestine," translated by St. H. Stephan, *QDAP*, Vol. VI (1935), p. 88.

³⁵ Ibn Iyyās, *op. cit.*, III, 90.

³⁶ *Ott. Doc.*, p. 40 and n. 1.

the shrines of Islam, in addition to those who went to visit the Holy places within Palestine; in Jerusalem, Hebron, Nabl Mūsā and other places.³⁷ At this time Palestine also regained its historical importance as a land bridge between Constantinople and Egypt, and this increased the obligation of the Ottoman Government to safeguard its security.

However, the Ottomans failed in this task and, as in the previous Mamluk period, most of the roads were at the mercy of the Bedouins. Rarely did the *hajj* caravan succeed in returning from Mecca unmolested. The failure of the Ottomans must be attributed to three main causes: the weakness of the military force that was stationed in the country; the growing power of the Bedouins who had newly acquired fire-arms; and the sparseness of the sedentary population.

During the first two centuries of Ottoman rule in Palestine, the armed forces of the Empire were either involved in wars in Europe or were fighting against the Safavid kingdom, so that it was impossible to allocate substantial forces to ensure the security of Palestine. Moreover, even those forces that were stationed in the country were summoned, from time to time, to participate in the wars of the Empire.

B. Fire-Arms in Bedouin Hands

During the first quarter of Ottoman rule in Palestine, fire-arms made their way to the Bedouins. The acquisition of fire-arms by those incorrigible rebels made them even more dangerous, for once they had acquired such weapons, the superiority of the Imperial forces over them was very greatly reduced if not completely destroyed. The appearance of modern fire-arms in the hands of the Bedouins startled the authorities. In a firman dated 985 A. H./1577 it is related that the bey of Safed sent a letter to Istanbul in which he reported that "formerly nobody in the said *sanjak* used a musket and (the inhabitants) had no idea what a musket was." The bey continued to report that in his time fire-arms in immense quantities were imported by sea into the country via the port of Acre and sold to the Bedouins. "It is possible," he wrote, "that there are now three or four thousand serviceable muskets in the possession of the Bedouins ..." ³⁸ Fire-arms from the Imperial arsenals in Istanbul found their way to the Bedouins or to rebellious Druzes with the help of ship captains coming from Istanbul to Acre, Tyre or Beirut to load grain. The captains used to sell muskets to the rebels at very high profits.³⁹ In addition to these captains, arms merchants were also very active.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 39–40.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 81, No. 33.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, notes 1–3; around the years 1574–1577 a musket was sold for 15–20 gold pieces or 25–30 florin.

Some of them harmed Ottoman interests doubly by engaging in illegal transactions with European merchants. It is reported in one firman that a certain Muḥammad ibn Abi Jālūs, a tax farmer and market inspector from Safed, "... buys wheat and barley, sells it to the hostile infidels [who] load it on ships and take it away to the Land of War. And from the Land of War he has muskets and other arms brought and sells them to rebellious Bedouins [thereby] strengthening the rebel."⁴⁰

Not only did the Bedouins acquire fire-arms but they also developed and improved their classical weapons. A firman from the year 975 A. H./1567 reflects the astonishment of the authorities in the province of Damascus when confronted with arms "peculiar to the rebellious Bedouins" such as "certain large bows, arrows with flat wide iron heads and daggers generally known as *aqfa*."⁴¹ It was soon discovered that the Bedouins possessed fire-arms which were of a more modern and of a better quality than those of the Imperial troops. Urgent calls went out to the central government in Istanbul from the local authorities in Syria demanding better arms and, in particular, modern cannons and muskets with a longer range of fire.⁴² The authorities in Istanbul were not very cooperative as we learn from the continuation of the above firman, and the dangerous position was reached wherein even the fortresses on the pilgrim road to Mecca might be left without cannons.⁴³

C. *The Extent of the Bedouin Problem Under the Ottomans*

The Bedouins began to harass the new rulers of Syria and Palestine almost from the first day of Ottoman rule. A few months after the conquest of the country, Sultan Selīm I was faced with a serious uprising of the Bedouins in the Biqā'. This rebellion was led by the Bedouin sheikh, Nāṣir al-Dīn ibn al-Ḥanash, whom Selīm had previously nominated as the ruler of that area.⁴⁴

Three years later the ruler of Tripoli was unable to reach his province from Egypt "because the Bedouins rebelled against him" and almost killed him. He eventually succeeded in traversing Palestine and reaching Tripoli, but only after substantial reinforcements had come from Egypt to escort him.⁴⁵

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 83, No. 35.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 94, No. 47.

⁴² The Druze and Bedouin rebels used long muskets that fired from places beyond the range of the old muskets of the Imperial troops. *Ott. Doc., loc. cit.*, and note 4. See also p. 95.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Ahmad Ibn Zunbul, *Ta'rikh al-Sulṭān Salīm*, Cairo, 1278 A. H., p. 22.

⁴⁵ Ibn Iyyās, *op. cit.*, III, 256. The chronicler adds to this that "the Bedouins in those days were extremely rebellious in Syria." The greatest troublemakers were the tribes of Banū 'Aṣā and Banū 'Aṭīyya from the vicinity of Gaza.

Many of the *sanjak beys* had to leave the country, taking most of their soldiers with them, in order to participate in the wars of the Empire, mainly against Persia (in the sixties and seventies of the sixteenth century). The Bedouins exploited this situation and became the virtual masters in many parts of the country. A document dating from that time says that as a result of the weakness of the government the Druze and Bedouin rebels gained such a grip on the country that for three years, from 1578 until 1581, the fief-holders were unable to collect taxes from their fiefs. Trade and agriculture came to a complete standstill and the security, both of the roads and the villages, reached its lowest ebb.⁴⁶ Since the government was unable to guarantee even the most minimal backing to the civil and religious authorities, the judges and courts of justice were rendered useless. The leaders of the Bedouins who oppressed and robbed peasants and travellers regarded summonses to court with the utmost contempt and ignored them.⁴⁷

The Ottoman armed forces that were stationed in the country, being limited and dispersed in many fortresses, could make only a negligible contribution to the peace and internal security of the country.⁴⁸ The Bedouins would not allow them to exercise their authority outside the walls of their fortifications.⁴⁹ Moreover, as they were usually cut off from their supply centres, they were forced, in many cases, to surrender and retreat from their positions in order to save their lives.⁵⁰

Even on those few occasions when the government attempted to restrain the Bedouins, greater attention was paid to the Ḥawrān and to the pilgrim road from Damascus to Mecca, the first being important from the economic point of view as the granary of Syria and the second for its religious significance. However, although the protection of the *hajj* was regarded as the sacred duty of the Sultan, the Ottomans were unable to ensure the safety of the pilgrims. The situation that had prevailed under the Mamluks remained

⁴⁶ *Ott. Doc.*, p. 88, No. 42.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 48–49, No. 2.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

⁴⁹ A firman from 1581 contains a detailed order to build Khān al-Tujjār near Mount Tabor, an area which according to the same firman was meeting place of rebellious Bedouins and other robbers who became the masters of one of the most important roads to Damascus. Nevertheless, only 30–40 soldiers were allotted to guard such an important fortress. *Ibid.*, pp. 110f., No. 62.

⁵⁰ See, e. g., the description of the fall of the fortress of 'Ajlūn in 1624. Aḥmad Khālidī, *Lubnān fī 'ahd al-Amīr Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ma'ni al-Thāni*, Beirut, 1936, p. 202. Khālidī says that 7,000 soldiers were needed to escort a caravan of supplies to al-Ṣalt and 'Ajlūn, but in case the Bedouins gave their consent, such a caravan could go there without any escort at all. Although the figures seem highly exaggerated, the story of the chronicler gives a basically true reflection of the prevailing situation.

basically unchanged. Three years after the occupation of Syria a pilgrim caravan was attacked and plundered.⁵¹ When the Government realized that the pilgrims could not be protected by means of force, it decided to pay the Bedouin sheikhs along the road an annual payment called *surra* in return for which they were to abstain from attacking the pilgrim caravans. The *surra* was paid by the *amīr al-ḥajj*.⁵² In addition, an army commander would escort the caravan with several hundred soldiers,⁵³ and the entire revenue of the *sanjak* of Nablus was dedicated to the financing of the caravan; nonetheless, the Bedouins continued to attack it on frequent occasions. Even the personal friendship of the *amīr al-ḥajj* with the Bedouin chiefs was not always respected. In 1081 A.H./1670 a large caravan was almost completely annihilated in spite of the fact that its *amīr*, an army officer called Mūsā ibn Turkmān, was known to be on excellent terms with the Bedouins and had many friends amongst their chiefs. He himself was killed and an army unit sent to punish the offending Bedouins was also crushed by them.⁵⁴

The situation in western Palestine was no better, for, just as in the Mamluk period, the Bedouins attacked pilgrims travelling to Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus.⁵⁵ The Bedouins of Gaza terrorized the roads in the south⁵⁶ while Banū Jayyūs of Nablus spread fear on the main Damascus-Cairo road that passed near Qāqūn.⁵⁷ Further to the north, merchants and pilgrims were attacked near Mount Tabor not far away from the *khān* and the fortress of Khān al-Tujjār on the same main road.⁵⁸

John Sanderson, who travelled in Palestine in 1601, writes the following about the area around Tiberias where he stayed for only four hours:

Thence we passed for feare of Arabian theeves which ar in tropps about those contryes pitching their tents at divers times in divers plains and frutefull places, liveinge a little commonwelth amongst themselves, subject to no lawe, begitting childeren and breeding up all sorts of cattle for thier use... and amongst them have exelent runing horses wherwith they often ride theeving.⁵⁹

⁵¹ Ibn Iyyās, *op. cit.*, III, 190-191.

⁵² Khālidī, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-87, 133.

⁵³ Evliya Çelebi, *op. cit.*, VIII, 137. Evliya speaks there about 500 soldiers that used to escort the pilgrims.

⁵⁴ Muḥibbī, *op. cit.*, IV., 434.

⁵⁵ *Ott. Doc.*, p. 76, No. 28.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116, No. 66. ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 96-97, No. 49.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-113, No. 62. In this particular case, the document dated 1581 says that the Bedouins not only plundered the travellers but also took their wives and families captive. Earlier in 1567 the Bedouins took the son of a woman pilgrim as a hostage and would not release him until ransom was paid to them. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88, No. 41.

⁵⁹ W. Forster (ed.), *The Travels of John Sanderson in the Levant*, London, 1931, p. 114.

Travellers report that not even short distances within the country could be covered without a military escort, and even when such escort could be found, travellers were still obliged to pay the Bedouins if they wished to travel in safety.⁶⁰ Maundrell, who travelled in Palestine at the end of the seventeenth century, points out that nowhere were the Bedouins so audacious as in Palestine. Travellers, he says, were molested both by government officials and by the Bedouin sheikhs, and were forced to pay them special road taxes. Moreover, the Bedouins were not always satisfied with a fixed sum of money and would usually, in addition, appropriate from the traveller whichever of his possessions that they desired.⁶¹ The complete impotence of the Ottomans to suppress this lawlessness in western Palestine turned this region into one of the most desolate areas in Syria.⁶²

References to the desolation and destruction of the country are frequent in the itineraries from the period under discussion and thereafter. Hasselquist, the Swedish traveller who visited Palestine in the middle of the eighteenth century, says that most of the cultivable plains were deserted, and he got the impression that the country was almost uninhabited. If it were not for the income from travellers, he said, the Turks would not have had any revenue from it.⁶³ The fertile plains were turned into grazing areas and battlefields for the Bedouins.⁶⁴

IV. Ottoman Plans to Solve the Bedouin Problem

A. Plans for Resettling Palestine

The Ottomans undoubtedly understood that the desolation of the country and the sparseness of its rural population, especially in the plains, were amongst the most important causes of the difficulties in defending it against the growing domination of the nomads and other brigands. Several firmans from the second half of the sixteenth century bear witness to this and show that there were plans for solving the problem of the Bedouins by reinhabiting at least certain strategically important areas in Palestine. As early as 1559 we read in one firman that "Arish is an uninhabited place in the wilderness where

⁶⁰ Laurent d'Arvieux, *Voyage dans la Palestine*, Amsterdam, 1718, p. 2. H. Maundrell, *A Journey from Aleppo to Jerusalem, in 1697*, London, 1810, p. 78; cf. for the end of Mamluk period, Fabri, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-46.

⁶¹ Maundrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 58, 111.

⁶² Muḥammad Khalīf al-Murādī, *Silk al-Durar fī A'ydn al-Qarn al-Thānī 'Ashar*, Būlāq, 1301 A.H., II, 62; cf. Volney, *Voyage en Egypte et en Syrie, 1783-1785*, Paris, 1787, II, 199. Gibb and Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, London, 1950, I, 266.

⁶³ F. Hasselquist, *Voyages and Travels in the Levant*, London, 1866, p. 118.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 156-157. See also, Maundrell, *op. cit.*, p. 57. For the position at the end of the fifteenth century, cf. Fabri, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

Bedouins constantly attack pilgrim and merchant caravans. . . .” For their protection, an order was given for a fortress to be built and “people to be settled at this place, which has agricultural possibilities.”⁶⁵ Another firman dated from 1581 clarified the ways in which the resettlement was to be tackled:

According to an imperial firman issued by the finance department (*mālīyye*), two hundred households of peasants (and others) “who come voluntarily and are willing to settle there”⁶⁶ will assume the responsibility for the safe passage of the caravans. In return for their service they will be exempt from sultanlic impositions, which is customary reward for guarding dangerous passes.⁶⁷

Another firman shows that four years earlier there were also plans for the compulsory settlement of peasants in areas haunted by Bedouins and robbers.⁶⁸

The idea of solving the Bedouin problem in Palestine by means of rural settlement was an excellent one, but unfortunately it was never executed on a large scale. Such a programme of resettling the country needed a large budget, careful planning and, above all, devoted and diligent officials to execute it. By the time the above firmans had been issued in Istanbul, corruption was already rife within the Ottoman administration, and even the limited plans for settling the few places of high strategic importance could not be carried into effect.⁶⁹ Instead, the desertion of the country continued. Plagues and famine, Bedouin pressure, frequent quarrels of the local governors, and strife between the factions of Qays and Yaman amongst the fellahin, all resulted in the further diminution of the rural population which was limited to the hilly region of central Palestine.⁷⁰

⁶⁵ *Ott. Doc.*, p. 103, No. 55.

⁶⁶ The place referred to is “Sa’sa’a, an isolated halting-place near Damascus on the road to Jerusalem, Hebron, Gaza and Egypt.” *Ott. Doc.*, p. 101, No. 54.

⁶⁷ *Loc. cit.*

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 100, No. 53.

⁶⁹ More comprehensive plans for the systematic resettling of the deserted plains of Jezreel and Beisan or the coastal plains were never considered.

⁷⁰ Yūsuf al-Dibs, *Ta’rikh Sīriyya*, Beirut, 1893–1905, VII, 32, 182, and also 176. See also, Ghazzi, *Dhayl* fol. 48b. Speaking about the rebellion of the Druze Ibn Jānbulāt in 1606–1607, Ghazzi makes the following remarks: “The situation was horrible, for the country from the borders of Aleppo to the borders of Safed, a distance of fifteen days march, was completely deserted and its inhabitants were scattered. They left their lands, their property and their belongings.” On Qays and Yaman in the vicinity of Hebron (Qays) and Bethlehem (Yaman) see Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 194–195, 197. *Ott. Doc.*, pp. 39, 86 n. 1. In some cases fellahin from one faction formed an alliance with some Bedouin tribes and attacked the villages of the opposite faction. Muhibbi, *op. cit.*, IV, 426–428. *Ott. Doc.*, No. 37.

B. *Bedouins in the Ottoman Feudal System*

Unable to exercise its own military power to bring law and order to Palestine, the Ottoman government tried to impose its authority on the Bedouins by incorporating their leaders into the official administration and the feudal system. This was done by bestowing official appointments on the natural leaders of certain areas. Many Bedouin sheikhs and other local notables were nominated to be *sanjak beys*, sheikhs of *nāhiyes*, and some of them were also awarded feudal fiefs in return for their services.⁷¹ Some of the Bedouin sheikhs were explicitly nominated as the guardians and defenders of certain important roads in the country. In a way, this was a policy of letting the cat guard the milk. The system was quite simple; a certain road section which passed through the area of some Bedouin tribe was determined as a "guarded area" (*derek*, or in Arabic *darak*) and its defence was entrusted to the hands of the most important local sheikh (or local notable). He got the title of *şāhib-i derek* (Arabic: *şāhib al-darak*). A fief was bestowed upon him, or if he already had a fief, it was enlarged (e.g. from *tīmār* to *zi'āmet*).⁷² The Ottomans thus tried to incorporate the defence of Palestine within the general feudal organization of the empire. A document from 1614, for instance, speaks of some forty *tīmār* and *zi'āmet* holders from the *sanjak* of Jerusalem whose task was to defend the pilgrims from Jerusalem to Mecca and back.⁷³ In the agreement between the *şāhib-i derek* and the authorities, the former undertook to see to it that nobody was harmed in the section of the road under his protection. Should a traveller, however, be molested, the *şāhib-i derek* was obliged to compensate him.⁷⁴

It seems that this system functioned for a short time only; it soon proved to be inefficient because the authorities were unable to compel the nominees to fulfil all the conditions of the agreement and, in particular, the one referring to compensation. The "guardians" themselves, being fully aware of the impotence of the authorities, exploited their positions in order to molest and rob the wayfarers and inhabitants of the very area they had been appointed to protect.⁷⁵

C. *Bedouins as Sanjak Beys*

The Ottomans tried to continue a tradition that had existed in Syria and Palestine before their time — namely to give legal endorsement to the natural leaders of certain regions. They hoped to achieve the following two

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67, No. 18, n. 15 (document dated 1559).

⁷² *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91, 99, No. 52, and n. 5.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 76, No. 28.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*, and pp. 109–110, 198–199 Nos. 52, 62

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 49, cf. No. 52, n. 10.

objectives: firstly, to save themselves the expense, trouble and effort of organizing their own administration; secondly, to encourage local leaders to take an interest in the security and welfare of their regions.

But in such a method there lay a potential weakness. The method could only function as long as the central government was strong enough to maintain its authority over the various provinces of the empire. However, as soon as the local leaders detected any weakness on the part of their Ottoman masters, they tended to free themselves of their obligation to the government and become independent. There is no shortage of examples to prove the existence of this tendency in Syria and Palestine from the beginning of Ottoman rule.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Sultan Selīm I nominated a Bedouin sheikh, Nāṣir al-Dīn ibn al-Ḥanash, as the governor of Sidon and the Biqā' in Lebanon. Ibn al-Ḥanash seized the first opportunity to rebel against the Ottomans. The Sultan chose to entrust the quelling of the rebellion to the Druze family of Ma'n, hoping, most probably, that in playing the local chiefs against each other he would succeed in reducing their strength. On this occasion, however, the Ma'nids succeeded in achieving a quick victory over Ibn al-Ḥanash, who was killed, and to emerge as a strong local power in Lebanon.⁷⁶

In the second half of the sixteenth century, another Bedouin family rose to power in the Biqā', the family of Maṣṣūr ibn Furaykh. The details of its rise and fall were given in the *dhayl* of Ghazzī and were copied, almost verbatim by Muḥibbī.⁷⁷

The Ma'nids helped Maṣṣūr ibn Furaykh to earn the governorship of the Biqā' after the elimination of Ibn al-Ḥanash. He was so successful in his task of bringing law and order to his region and in restraining the obstreperous Bedouins, that he was nominated the *sanjak bey* of Nablus. Meanwhile the Ma'nids of Lebanon grew stronger and Korkmaz, the son of Fakhr al-Dīn (d.1544) was able to extend his rule along the Lebanese and Palestinian coast down to Caesarea. The clash between him and Maṣṣūr ibn Furaykh was inevitable. The Ottomans chose to interfere at that moment in order to crush the power of the Ma'nids. Ibrāhīm, the Pasha of Egypt, attacked Korkmaz and put an end to his rule in 1585. The latter died five years later, probably having been poisoned.⁷⁸ The fall of Korkmaz led to the further increase in the power of Ibn Furaykh, and Nablus, Safed, the Biqā' and 'Ajlūn were all brought under his rule. He was honoured twice with the

⁷⁶ Ibn Zūbul, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

⁷⁷ Ghazzī, *Dhayl*, fols. 145b-146a. Muḥibbī, *op. cit.*, IV, 426-428.

⁷⁸ P. K. Hitti, *History of Syria*, London, 1951, p. 68.

important role of *amir al-ḥajj*, in 1589 and 1590. His growing strength and importance eventually aroused the misgivings of the Ottomans, who decided to eliminate him. He fell victim to a well known, yet successful stratagem. In 1593, he was invited to a party in Damascus at which he was arrested and put to death. His son, who was with him, succeeded at first in escaping, but he also was captured and put to death. Nablus was put under the governorship of a Circassian Mamluk called Farrūkh.

V. *The House of Ṭurābāy*

A. *The Family*

One of the most interesting and important Bedouin families to rule Palestine was the family of Ṭurābāy. The origin and early history of this family are obscure. According to Muḥibbī, the Ṭurābāys belonged to the clan of Ḥāritha, which belonged to the Sinbis — a subdivision of the great tribe of Ṭay'.⁷⁹ The name Ṭurābāy, however, is not an Arab one and appears in many different forms, e.g. Tūrabak, Ṭūra Bak, Ṭūra Bay,⁸⁰ and also Ṭurabāy.⁸¹ The name Ṭurābāy, in any of the above mentioned spellings, was quite a common name amongst the Circassian Mamluks. Many Mamluk officials, including some who held posts in Palestine, bore this name.⁸² In 1520 the name appears for the first time in the sources as belonging not to a Mamluk but to a Bedouin from the vicinity of Nablus, Qaraja ibn Ṭurābāy, who participated in the rebellion of Jānbirdī al Ghazzālī in that area.⁸³ How a common Mamluk name was acquired by a Bedouin family that traced its genealogy to a South Arabian tribe is still an enigma. It appears from our sources that at the end of the Mamluk period this family had already constituted a political unit in the north of Palestine in the vicinity of Safed, and that its members served as guides to the Ottoman army on its way to Egypt. Selīm I rewarded the family for its services by granting it the governorship

⁷⁹ Muḥibbī, *op. cit.*, I, 221. M. Von Oppenheim, *Die Bedouinen*, Leipzig, 1943, p. 51. On Sinbis cf. Qalqashandī, *Ṣubḥ al-A'sḥā*, I, 321–322.

⁸⁰ *Ott. Doc.*, No. 5. n. 1. D'Arvieux, who visited the leader of the family in the middle of the seventeenth century, suggested implausibly that the name is abbreviated from the Arabic *ṭurāb* (soil), which seems unlikely. See d'Arvieux, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁸¹ Mujīr al-Dīn, *op. cit.*, p. 672. A Druze family in Israel holds the name Tarabēh. Except for the similarity in name, the present writer was unable to discover from members of the family any information which might suggest a connection with the family under discussion.

⁸² Ibn Iyyās, *op. cit.*, II, 14, 224, 305, 332, 346, 355–357, 368, 371, 376, 381, 383, 384, 390, 391, 395; III, 16, 39, 42, 43, 45, 47, 52, 91.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 190–191, 244. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52, suggests that this Qaraja was actually the head of the Ṭurābāy.

of the *sanjak* of Lajjūn.⁸⁴ Amongst the firmans collected by Heyd in the Ottoman archives there are several which mention the family. One of the dominant figures mentioned in these documents is *amir* 'Assāf ibn Ṭurābāy, who guarded the roads passing through the *sanjak* of Lajjūn to Damascus and Cairo with great success.⁸⁵ 'Assāf proved to be so efficient that the Ottomans also entrusted him, it seems, with the supervision of the road from Quneitra to Nablus, as well as the collection of the public revenue.⁸⁶ The Ottomans, however, observing his growing powers, refused to grant him the governorship of Nablus; in 1583, when they felt that he was becoming so strong as to constitute a menace, they dismissed him. He was banished to Rhodes and possibly put to death after attempting to rebel.⁸⁷

The government in the *sanjak* of Lajjūn remained, however, in the hands of the family. Its greatest leader was Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy, who ruled the whole of northern Palestine for almost 47 years, beginning with the year 1601/2. The Ṭurābāys did not alter their Bedouin way of life. The *amirs* of the family continued to live in tents in the midst of their tribe. The tribe of Banū Ḥāritha, including the Ṭurābāy family, usually roamed along the coast of Palestine; in the summer they journeyed northwards to the river Na'amān near Acre and in the winter they moved southwards to Caesarea.⁸⁸ The Ṭurābāy *amirs* clung out of choice and pride to their nomad ways, and although they could have moved into a palace, as we learn from d'Arvieux's report, they refused to do so.⁸⁹ However, they introduced two innovations as a mark of their official status: they formed an orchestra composed of drums, tambourines, trumpets and oboes, and they hired a professional secretary, a person who knew how to read and write, whose only duty was to deal with the correspondence with their superiors and neighbours.⁹⁰

The relations between the Ṭurābāys and the Ottomans were based on an agreement, namely that the former were not to pay taxes to the central

⁸⁴ The leader of Ṭurābāy bore the title of *Amir al-darbayn*, "the Amir of the two roads," which meant, most probably, that he had to protect the two strategic roads — the *Via Maris* and the road from Lajjūn to Jerusalem, which passed through Jenin and Nablus; cf. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁸⁵ *Ott. Doc.*, No. 4. See also No. 18 (n. 15).

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 61 and also, No. 4 (n. 8).

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, Nos. 30, 5 (n. 5, 6). 'Assāf built in the village of Ṭira (of the Carmel) a mosque on which he left an inscription bearing his name. See Z. E. Von Mälinen, "Beiträge Zur Kenntnis des Karmels," *ZDPV*, Vol. XXXI (1908), p. 62.

⁸⁸ D'Arvieux, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 174–175.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 110–111.

⁹⁰ D'Arvieux relates how for some time he himself filled this office of secretary to the *amir*, when he visited the tribe (the secretary had died suddenly and a new one was not yet found). *Ibid.*, pp. 59 ff.

government but were obliged instead to participate in the wars of the Empire whenever summoned. They undertook the responsibility of guarding the roads in their areas. The former condition was apparently never fulfilled in reality. On the other hand, the Ṭurābāys succeeded in bringing relative peace and order to northern Palestine for almost a century. They also established good relations with the sedentary population. They nominated a sheikh in each village, to whom they sent their orders. The village sheikhs usually collected the taxes, which they transferred to the *amīr*, and in return their life and property were defended.⁹¹ The revenues of the *amīr* from the taxes on the peasants were augmented by the customs duties which he used to levy on European vessels that came from time to time to the two "ports" under his rule — the port of Haifa and that of Ṭanṭūra.⁹²

B. *Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy and Fakhr al-Dīn II*

Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy's rule coincided with the reappearance on the political scene of the Ma'nids in Lebanon, headed by Fakhr al-Dīn II.

The rise of Fakhr al-Dīn in the first decade of the seventeenth century and his expansion towards the Galilee brought him to clash with Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy. During the rebellion of Ibn Jānbulāṭ from Aleppo (1606/7–1608), who was assisted by Fakhr al-Dīn II, Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy joined forces with the government in order to put down the rebel.⁹³ Five years later, in 1613, when the Ottomans decided to end the rule of Fakhr al-Dīn, Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy was amongst those who were called upon by the government to stop the Ma'nid leader in his flight to the desert. The latter was obliged to leave Lebanon in the same year to seek refuge in Europe.⁹⁴

When Fakhr al-Dīn returned in 1618 to Lebanon from Europe, the quarrels between the two were renewed, although they had made some attempts to turn over a new leaf in their relations.⁹⁵ Fakhr al-Dīn expanded his rule over 'Ajlūn and made attempts to gain a foothold in Nablus as well. Aḥmad understood that the Ma'nids threatened him from the north, east and south,⁹⁶ and a war between the two was unavoidable. When Fakhr al-Dīn's forces invaded northern Palestine, Aḥmad fell back and chose to fight the decisive battle near Ramla. Fakhr al-Dīn was aided by Bedouins from 'Ajlūn, and Ibn Ṭurābāy had the tribes of the vicinity of Nablus and

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 108–109, and also p. 61 where a sample of an order to a village sheikh is given.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 109

⁹³ Muḥibbi, *op. cit.*, I, 222; III, 136–140. Khālidī, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹⁴ Khālidī, *op. cit.*, pp. 15–16.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 86, 115–116.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 137–138.

the tribe of Sawālma from Ramla as allies. In the battle that took place in 1622, Fakhr al-Dīn was defeated and had to retreat to Lebanon, evacuating all the areas which he had previously captured.⁹⁷ In 1623, moreover, a new war opened between the two bringing the same results, and thus Fakhr al-Dīn was compelled to abandon his plans for subjecting northern Palestine to his rule.⁹⁸

This time Aḥmad took the initiative, together with Muḥammad ibn Farrūkh, the governor of Nablus (since 1620), by continuously inciting the Ottomans against his Druze foe, describing him as a major threat to their sovereignty in Syria.⁹⁹ When the Ottomans decided to put an end to Fakhr al-Dīn II in 1633, and attacked him on land and sea, Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy and Ibn Farrūkh willingly joined them with their forces. The Ṭurābāys also handed over to the Ottomans the Ma'nid *amir* Muḥim ibn Yūnis, who had sought refuge with them.¹⁰⁰

Aḥmad died in 1647, when he was approximately eighty years old.¹⁰¹ His position as the head of the family and *sanjak bey* of Lajjūn was taken by his son Zayn, who was described by both d'Arvieux and Muḥibbī as a courageous, wise and modest person. He died in 1660.¹⁰² His brother Muḥammad succeeded him. Under his rule the family began to deteriorate. D'Arvieux, who visited him and stayed in his court for some time, described him as a dreamy person, severely addicted to hashish.¹⁰³ He continued, however, to perform all his duties as the *sanjak bey* of Lajjūn, defending the roads, safeguarding the merchants and protecting the Imperial post. He also gave military assistance to the Ottomans on one occasion, when the fellahin rebellion broke out in Nablus.¹⁰⁴ He died in 1671 and was buried in Jenin. After his death the family deteriorated still further, and, in 1677, their rule was stripped from them and was given to an Ottoman officer, Aḥmad Pasha Ṭarazī. The deterioration of the family was probably due to the migration of the tribe of Banī Ḥāritha to the Jordan Valley and 'Ajlūn.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 142 ff.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 177–199. And see also short account in Muḥibbī, *op. cit.*, I, 221.

⁹⁹ P. Carni, *Fakhr ad-Din II Principe del Libano ...* (in Arabic), Roma, 1936–1938, II, 141.

¹⁰⁰ Al-Dibs, *op. cit.*, pp. 185–186. On the wars of Aḥmad ibn Ṭurābāy cf. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 52–53.

¹⁰¹ Muḥibbī, *op. cit.*, I, 221. The report transmitted by Khālidi (*op. cit.*, p. 254) puts his death in the year 1623–4, but it seems that Khālidi confused two people of the family who bore the name Aḥmad.

¹⁰² Muḥibbī, *op. cit.*, I, 222. D'Arvieux *op. cit.*, p. 104.

¹⁰³ D'Arvieux, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*


¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 73–79.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 103–112. For the last sentence, see pp. 261–262 and cf. also, Murādi, *op. cit.*, IV, 166. Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

The memory of the Ṭurābāys was completely erased with their fall. Towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, the political scene in northern Palestine had been prepared for the appearance of another Bedouin family to take over: the Zaydāns, headed by Ḍāhir al-'Umar.

THE ṬURĀBĀY FAMILY

(in brackets: year of death if known)



¹⁰⁶ Ott. Doc., p. 78, No. 31.

3. A HISTORY OF THE DRUZE SETTLEMENTS IN PALESTINE DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

by SALMAN FALAH

I. The Sources

A. Limitations

The Druzes in Palestine did not receive much attention in the older sources, nor in modern investigations. We have no survey, essay or study that summarizes or details the history of the Druzes in Palestine or their condition during the four hundred years that the country was under Ottoman rule (1516–1917) and afterwards. The slight mention of the Druzes in Palestine is not incidental and can be explained by three reasons:

1. The Druze centre throughout the Ottoman period was in Lebanon. Their leaders, *amirs*, enjoyed semi-autonomous rule. At the end of the period in question, the centre passed to Jabal al-Drûz in Syria. The Druzes of Palestine were for the most part removed from the Druze centre, located between the two areas of concentration in Lebanon and Jabal al-Drûz, and their settlements in Palestine were spread throughout a large region that was settled by a non-Druze population. The traveler or the researcher who became interested in the Druzes would turn his gaze to the Druze centres, and when he would mention the Druzes of Palestine, it was only a passing reference. In addition, the travelers excluded visiting the Galilee, apparently not wanting to pass through this dangerous hilly region, and thus generally passed by way of the main roads and visited the large cities. The Druze villages, which were all small and hilly, did not benefit from many visits of travelers and researchers.

2. The Ottoman government did not recognize the Druzes in Palestine as a separate community, and it was difficult for a traveler to know of their condition, or even of their existence. In the *tahrîr defteri* (Ottoman land registration ledgers) and in other official government documents, the Druzes are not mentioned by name and they appear as "Muslims" or as "others".

It was only in 1957 that the Druzes of Israel were recognized as a separate community. In comparison, the Ottoman government recognized the Druzes of Lebanon as a separate community as early as the nineteenth century.

3. The principle of *taqiyya*¹ that is accepted by the Druzes made a deep impression on the Druzes in Palestine because throughout their history they were a small minority and far from the Druze centres. Due to their attachment to this principle of *taqiyya*, it was difficult for the stranger to identify the Druzes in Palestine.

B. *The Travelers as a Primary Source*


The most important sources in which the Druzes are mentioned, are the memoirs of travelers who toured in Palestine during the Ottoman period. The travelers who visited this country during the first two hundred and fifty years were especially interested in the Holy Places and dedicated their essays to the places that they visited. From the second half of the eighteenth century, we begin to find mentions of Druzes in their travelogues. The first distinguished one in this field is Volney, who visited the area in 1783–1785. From then onward, almost all the travelers that visited the country and wrote memoirs and travelogues mentioned the Druzes with whom they came into contact in Lebanon, in the Galilee, in the Carmel and in Ḥawrān. However, these authors introduced very little new material in this field, and they obviously copied each other. Volney, followed by Burckhardt who visited the region in 1810–1812, are the only ones who attempted to investigate the Druzes and their history and analyse the phenomena that they themselves observed. The rest of the travelers depended upon one of these two and did not introduce any new information. The traveler Van de Velde, who visited the country in 1851–1852, investigated the phenomena noted by the earlier travelers, and when he saw that he had nothing to add to what they wrote on the Druzes, he said that there was no reason “to bring extracts on the Druzes that you may find in our books at home.”² Also, the later travelers at the end of the last century and the beginning of this century, did not add anything new.

The travelers not only copied from each other, but also knew very little about the Druzes. With their limited knowledge, that was generally gleaned from the local population, especially from the Muslims who passionately hated the Druzes, their understanding of the Druzes was rather limited. A characteristic example of what the travelers knew of the Druzes may be found in Pococke:

If any account can be given of the origin of the Druzes, it is that they are the remains of the Christian armies in the Holy War; and they themselves now say that they are descended from the English (some say,

¹ The assimilation into the Muslim environment demanded concealing their faith in order to protect themselves from persecution.

² C. W. M. Van de Velde, *Narrative of a Journey through Syria and Palestine in 1851 and 1852*, London, 1854, p. 122.



they are descended from the Franks, whom Godfrey of Bulloign brought with him to the Holy War; and that Feckerdine pretended to be related to the house of Lorraine). They are esteemed men of courage, and of greater probity than any other of these Eastern parts. As they and their prince are protectors of the Christians that live among them, so they seem to have the best opinion of Christians, and the greatest regard for them; tho', in reality, it is to be feared that they have little or no religion at all; they occasionally profess themselves Mahometans, but go as seldom as possible to their mosques, which they do only to enjoy the privileges of the established religion; and I have been informed, that in some of their books that have accidentally been found, they both blaspheme our Saviour, and speak evil of Mahomet. They have among them a sort of religious persons, whom they call by the name of Akel, they drink no wine, and will not eat anything that belongs to the prince, because, they say, it is rapine³: they have private places under their houses for their ceremonies of worship; and I have been informed, they do not perform any openly, except reading out of their books over the dead, before they are carried to burial, though as to this I much doubt my authority. These religious people meet together in their private places, and seem to be rather like the wise men, or philosophers of old, than the chief persons of a religion, in a community that has little or none. I rather think if these in particular have any, that they are worshippers of nature. I was indeed told, that, by some accident, the statue of a calf had been seen in their retired places; but if the information of one, who pretended to have discovered some of their secrets, is to be depended upon, they have a small silver box, closed in such a manner, as not to be opened, and many even among them, know not what it contains; they pay a sort of worship to it; and he said he was informed that there were in these boxes the image of the nature of both sexes.⁴

A third deficiency of the travelers' literature as a source to investigate the history of the Druzes is the different attitudes of the travelers toward the Druzes. In the nineteenth century, when Catholics and Maronites passed under French patronage, and Orthodox believers under Russian patronage, England, desiring to find for herself a foothold in the region, appeared as the "protector" of the Druzes. As a result of this situation, the French travelers began to describe the Druzes in black colours, while attributing to the Catholics, their co-religionists and partners, many positive qualities. As opposed

³ All possessions not gained by one's own work were considered impure in the eyes of those of the Druze faith.

⁴ R. Pococke, *A Description of the East and Some Other Countries*, London, 1745, II, 94.

to this, British travelers and visitors emphasized the negative qualities of the Maronites, "and ignored the atheism of the Druzes, which is, according to Catholic belief, their greatest sin and transgression."⁵

II. *The Settlement of the Druzes in Palestine*

A. *The General Problem*

The setting of an exact date for the settlement of the Druzes in Palestine is impossible because available information is insufficient. Local residents know nothing of the time of their settlement, and it is very difficult to depend on their estimates. Burckhardt claims that all who ask them about the time of their settlement receive the answer, "a long time ago," or "*min qadīm*."⁶

The few researchers who attempted to clear up this question, were met by two conflicting conjectures: one being the tradition accepted among the members of the community, which states that the Druzes have lived in the country since the founding of their faith in 1017; while the second is accepted as being the more proven and historical conjecture. According to the latter conjecture, the Druzes settled here at a later period, and not before the rule of the Druze *amīrs* of the Ma'nid dynasty over the whole northern sector of the country to Mt. Carmel. These two conjectures were forwarded by investigators unable to decide between them, owing to the lack of sources and historical facts.⁷ According to the information that I have found, the validity of both these conjectures may be demonstrated, as the settlement of the Druzes in the country occurred in three stages:

1. The founding of the faith during the first years of the eleventh century;
2. The period of Druze rule of the Ma'nid family over northern Palestine in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;
3. The frequent waves of migration during the last three hundred years from the end of the Ma'nid rule until today.

B. *The Stages of Settlement*

1. *The Period of the Founding of the Faith*

The first evidence pointing to the existence of the Druzes in Palestine, at the time of the founding of the faith, are to be found in the writings of the Druzes. In the book popularly known as *al-Mu'allaf*,⁸ three centres for the

⁵ Van de Velde, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

⁶ Burckhardt, p. 305.

⁷ Ben-Zvi, "Hevel HaDruzmim be-Yisrael," *Eretz-Israel*, II (1953), p. 206.

⁸ Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ashrafānī, *Kitāb 'Umdat al-'Arifīn fī Qlās al-Nabīyyīn wa-l-Umam al-Sāliḥīn*, 1273 A. H./1806 (MS).

spreading of the Druze faith are mentioned, the regions of Aleppo, al-Shūf and Safed. The centre of proselytization in Safed contained three areas of Druze concentration:

1. Al-Sāhil — the coastal lowlands. The Druze villages in this region mentioned in the source noted above are: Yirkā, Jathth, Kuwaykāt, Mīmās, Ikhl and al-Ḥanbaliyya. Those appointed to supervise the spreading of the religion in this region were the sheikhs of the Turāb Family — Shuyūkh Āl Abī Turāb, and the most distinguished among them was Sheikh Abā Sarāyā from Yirkā.

والشيخ ابا سرايا واسمه ستايم بن محمد اصله من يركا من اعمال ساحل حكا وكان كبير شيوخ الساحل ، مات بيركا ومدفنه بها من جهة الشمال . وله بها سلاة ودار عامرة للان .

The rest of the sheikhs and the disseminators of the Druze doctrine during the beginning of the eleventh century were:

- (١) ابا محمد وهو من قرية بالساحل تسمى كويكات والمشهور مرباه ومات ومدفنه بها .
 - (٢) ابا هروس من قرية جث ، تقرب من يركا ومدفنه بها تحت قبة .
 - (٣) ابا عداقه من قرية ميماس من العمل المذكور (ساحل حكا) بمغار بها عين ماء وتقرب من قرية ابو سنان من جهة الغرب .
 - (٤) ابا جمعة وقرينه اكليل شمالي يركا . هو الذي ارسل معه مولاي منشوره لنصر بن فوح .
 - (٥) ابا محمد ايضاً فهو من الحنبلية ، قرب جث وميماس ومدفنه بها تحت سديانات .
- ومن ثم يقول هذا المصدر : «هذه القرى متقاربة وكانوا يحتضمون بحوزة المشايخ بالقرب من ميماس وكويكات زيتونات روميات مجتمعات» .

2) Al-Ḥimā — this area corresponds approximately to the eastern Lower Galilee, according to the outlining in the source:

«بلاد بأطراف ساحل حكا من الجبل بمشاريق كفر كنا» .

The two important Druze villages in this region were Dāma and al-Sāfirīyya, and their leaders were Sheikh Abū al-Dir Jawshan and Abū al-Liqā Thābit.

3) Al-Shāghūr (the valley) — this is the eastern Upper Galilee. The villages mentioned in this area are 'Ayn 'Āth (next to the present village of Sājūr) and its leader Sheikh al-Khayr Abū al-Shakal, from the family of Abū Turāb, the village of Jarmaq and its leader Sheikh Abū al-Shakal, from the family of the village of Jarmaq and its leader Sheikh Abū al-Shakal. (الشيخ ابو الخير ابو الشكل من عين حاث — انتقل مهاجراً الى مصر حيث تربى عند المقتنى ثم عاد وسافر مع السادات .) (الشيخ ابو عداقه محمد الكاوي 'Abdullāh Muḥammad al-'Akkāwī al-Jarmaqī. (الجرمي وهو اكبر زنادقة آل ابي راب

From this we can see that whole villages in the Acre-Safed region accepted the new faith of the Druzes, or were settled by Druze preachers with the spreading of the religion during the beginning of the eleventh century. Some of these villages still exist, and some were destroyed, while the rest were settled by neighbouring Muslims, who had superseded the Druze inhabitants.

Not only Druze writings testify to the existence of Druze settlements in the country in the founding period of the Druze faith. In two Arabic sources from the beginning of the Mamluk period, Druze settlements in the region of Safed are mentioned. Al-Dimashqī (1256–1327)⁹ mentions Druze settlements on Mt. al-Zābūd¹⁰ next to Safed and notes the existence of Druzes in Peqi'In (al-Buqay'a).¹¹

«... وجبل عاملة ، وجبل البقيعة من صفد ، كل هؤلاء حاكبه وأمريه ودروز وحلولية وتناسخية وحفظية وزنادقة وهم كفار بالشرائع ومسلمون على ما يزعمون...»
«... ومن أعمال صفد مرج عيون وأرض الحرمق (وهي مدينة قديمة عادية كانت بها طائفة من المبراتيين ينسبون إليها يقال لهم الجرامقة) ومن عملها جبل بقية (وبه قرية يقال لها البقيعة لها مياه جارية وبها سفرجل مليح وبه قرى كثيرة الزيتون والفواكه والكرم) وجبل الزابود مشرف على صفد والزابود قرية وبها قرى كثيرة وأهل هذا الجبل دروز وحاكبه وأمريه وهم قوم دهرية ، حلولية ، يكذبون الرسل وينكرون الشرائع وإن لا يمت ولا نشور ويأكلون لحم الخنزير والميتة ولا يصومون ولا يصلون ولا يحجون ولا يزكون (ويعتقدون أن الحاكم ظهر مظهر الإله تع وتقدس عما يقولون غلواً كبيراً...)».

A second Arabic source, the *Ta'rikh Şafad* by al-'Uthmānī,¹² mentions the existence of Druzes in Peqi'In, in the village of al-Zābūd, and in the vicinity of Mt. al-Zābūd. The author covers the history of Safed and its ten districts (*a'māl*).

وأما معليا فلها حصن يسكن به القاضي وبلادها جبال . وقرية البقيعة منها بها مياه تجري واشجار سفرجل كثيرة ومنها جبل الزابود يشرف على صفد وتمتد حوله قرى كثيرة الفواكه ، وهذه المعاملة قلعة القرنين حصن جيد فتحه الملك الظاهر وبوادي القرنين بساتين وطواحين وفواكه لطيفة وثمار مختلفة . وأهل هذه البلاد غالبهم حاكبه دروز دهرية ينكرون الشرائع ويعتقدون التناسخ ولا يعتقدون صلاة ولا صوماً ولا زكاة ولا حجاباً ولا بشتاً ولا نشوراً . ويستحلون المحارم من المنكح والمأكل والمشرب فيأكلون الميتة ولحم الخنزير ويشربون الخمر وينكحون المحارم ولا يقتلون من جنابة ويرزعون الحشيشة المسكرة في قرية يقال لها الزابود ويعتصرون الخمر حتى تبقى عندهم مخازن وفي غالب السنين يجهز اليهم ملك الامراء - إذا كان ديناً - من يريق خمورهم ويكتب عليهم القسامة بأن لا يعصروا شيئاً من الخمر إلا أن معاملة هؤلاء القوم في البيع والشراء والأخذ والعطاء جيدة موثوق بها لا يكذبون في إيمانهم...».

⁹ Shams al-Dīn Abū 'Abdullāh ibn Abī Ṭālib al-Anṣārī al-Dimashqī, *Nukhbat al-Dahr fī 'Ajdā'ib al-Barr wa-l-Baḥr*, Petersburg, 1865–86, pp. 200, 211.

¹⁰ Mt. Meron.

¹¹ L. Oliphant, *Halfa or Modern Life in Palestine*, London, 1887, p. 111, states that the Druzes settled in Peqi'In 300 years ago, around 1580. However, he did not know of the existence of the evidence mentioned above.

¹² Al-qādi Shams al-Dīn al-'Uthmānī, the *qādī* of Safed, lived during the second half of the fourteenth century. He wrote his book during the years 1372–74, as we may infer from the dedication of the book to the governor of Safed (*'alamdār*) who officiated at this post during these years. The book was lost, and the parts that remained were published by Bernard Lewis in *BSOAS*, Vol. XV (1953), pp. 477–488. The text cited here is to be found on pp. 484–5.

The account of Evliya Çelebi supports the supposition that a Druze settlement existed in Palestine prior to the Ma'nid period. Although he visited the country during the Ma'nid rule (1649–1670), he states that the Druze inhabitants know from the days of their ancestors the burial places of the prophets and the sons of the prophets.¹³ Perhaps we can assume that this is a hint of the antiquity of their settlement. He also notes the existence of Druzes around al-Jishsh (Gūsh Ḥalav).¹⁴

2. *The Period of the Rule of the Druze Ma'nid Dynasty over Northern Palestine*

The rule of the Druze Ma'nid family began in Lebanon a short time before the Ottoman conquest. Sultan Selīm I, who led the Turkish forces, captured Syria, Lebanon and Palestine in 1516, and a year later completed the campaign with the conquest of Egypt. Upon his arrival in Syria, the Sultan was aided by the Druzes, especially by the *amīr* Fakhr al-Dīn I. By virtue of the help given Selīm I by Fakhr al-Dīn, and the Sultan's desire to acknowledge the Druze support, Fakhr al-Dīn I was awarded the emirate of the Druzes. This *amīr* did not attempt to extend his rule, and did not incorporate Palestine into his domain.

His son, Korkmaz (1544–1586) extended his rule over Tyre, Acre and Caesarea and consequently over a territory that included most of the Galilee. This aroused the anger of Ibrāhīm Pasha, the governor of Egypt, and he turned against him and ended Korkmaz' rule in 1585. A year later, Korkmaz was succeeded by his son Fakhr al-Dīn II (1586–1635), who is the most renowned *amīr* of the Ma'nid dynasty.

During the period between 1603 and 1607 he ruled all of southern Lebanon and a large part of Palestine. All of the region between Beirut and Caesarea, the sources of the Jordan, the Ḥuleh, Safed, Tiberias, Nazareth and Mt. Tabor came under his control. For a short time, he or his ally Junbalāt also ruled southern Palestine on both sides of the Jordan, down to al-Ṣalt in Jordan and Gaza in southern Palestine.¹⁵ In 1613, he went into exile in Italy, at a point when he controlled all of the Galilee. When he returned in 1618, he regained all of the territories that he had governed before his exile and even expanded further south. His control of the Galilee continued till his death in 1635. The desire for power and expansion of his political rule led the Sultan to send a Turkish governor to the area and brought about the subsequent downfall of Fakhr al-Dīn II in 1635.

Druze rule in Palestine came to an end with the death of Fakhr al-Dīn.

¹³ "Evliye Tabelebi's Travels in Palestine," *QDAP*, 1935, p. 105.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹⁵ 'Isā Iskandar al-Ma'lūf, *Ta'rīkh al-Amīr Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ma'nī*, Jūniya, Lebanon, 1934, pp. 405–407.

The settlements of the Galilee, especially Safed and Tiberias, suffered from the attempts of Muḥim, the nephew of Fakhr al-Dīn, and other *amīrs*, to regain control of this region. Finally, in 1653, Muḥim succeeded in capturing the *sanjak* of Safed. The Druze *amīrs*' rule over northern Palestine continued about one hundred and fifty years, with short intervals, from the middle of the sixteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century.

There is no doubt that new Druze settlements were established in Palestine under Ma'nid rule; the settlement on the Carmel was established at this time, and historians are inclined to set the date of its creation during the time of Fakhr al-Dīn II.¹⁶ It may be assumed that the founding of new settlements took place during the early period of Fakhr al-Dīn II's rule, when his rule was strong, firm and prospering, and when he wanted to protect his borders by a faithful Druze settlement. Maundrell,¹⁷ who passed through the country in 1697, says that there were many hills, extending from Kisrawān to Mt. Carmel, which belonged to the Druzes. From this we can assume that at the time of his visit, there already existed a Druze settlement on Mt. Carmel.

Among all the Druze villages established on Mt. Carmel during the rule of the Ma'nid family, there remain only two, 'Isfiyā and Dāliyat al-Karmil. With the liquidation of Druze rule in Palestine, the new settlements that had not sufficiently established themselves were unable to hold their position in a hostile environment and under the pressure of an oppressive government. At different times, twelve villages were destroyed.¹⁸

Besides the founding of new villages and settlements by migrating Druzes, other Druze immigrants from Lebanon and Syria most probably settled in already existing Druze settlements in the Galilee. It may be that during this period some of the villages in the Galilee were established, but the sources are not clear at all on this point.

3. *Frequent Waves of Migration During the Last Three Hundred Years*

There was migration of Druzes both to and from the country, not just in one direction. During periods of abundance and prosperity in Palestine, and oppression and wars in Lebanon and Syria, they migrated into the country; during periods of plenty outside the country, and persecution and oppression in Palestine, the direction of migration changed, and the Druzes left the country and sought refuge with their brothers in Syria and Lebanon.

¹⁶ L. Oliphant, "The Khurbets of Carmel," *PEFQS*, 1884, p. 31. F. Müllinen mentions a stone ruin east of Dāliyat al-Karmil bearing Fakhr al-Dīn's name, in "Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Karmels," *ZDPV*, Vol. 30 (1906), p. 156. See also H. Blanc, *Studies in North Palestinian Arabic*, Jerusalem, 1953, p. 114, n. 13.

¹⁷ Thomas Wright, ed., *Early Travels in Palestine*, London, 1848, p. 418.

¹⁸ See the following chapter on villages.

Undoubtedly, the greatest wave of immigration into Palestine was during the Ma'nid rule over the country. There were many other waves; the first followed the battle of 'Ayn Dārā between the factions of Qays and Yaman. It has been pointed out that the two villages on Mt. Carmel, al-Damūn and al-Manṣūra, were established by Druze settlers coming there soon after the battle of 'Ayn Dārā in 1711. These two villages were destroyed by their Muslim neighbours in 1840, following the retreat of Ibrāhīm Pasha. After the Druzes, nomads inhabited the destroyed villages.¹⁹

For the beginning of the nineteenth century, there are facts on the migration of many Druzes from the region of Aleppo and northern Syria to the safer places of Jabal al-Drūz and Palestine. Burckhardt notes:

In 1811 the Druses of Djebel Ala, between Ladakie and Antioch, were driven from their habitations by Topal Aly, the governor of Djissar Shogher, whose troops committed the most horrible cruelties. Upwards of fifteen hundred families fled to their country men in the Libanus, where they were received with great hospitality; upwards of two hundred purses were collected for their relief, and the Djonbelat assigned to them convenient dwellings in different parts of the mountain. Some of them retired into the Haouran.²⁰

Probably some came to Palestine. Burckhardt notes that when he stayed in 'Arā (Jabal al-Drūz), information was received on the arrival of one hundred and twenty Druzes who had left the Western mountains and come to settle in the Ḥawrān.²¹

Mashāqa²² tells us that in 1817 the residents of Aleppo persecuted the Druzes of that region; as a result they fled to Lebanon, where they were received with honour by the *amir* Bashīr Shihāblī, and the sheikh Bashīr Junbalāt.

ووافق لأهالي حلب أنهم اضطهدوا دروز تلك البقاع وارغموهم على الزواج فأتوا لبنان وقصد وفد منهم دير القمر وطلب من الأمير والشيخ بشير جنبلاط قبولهم في جوارهم وكان من الأمير والشيخ ابداء كل حفاوة بهم ورحبا بنزولهم في بلادهما وكثر عددهم واكثر الشيخ من الاعتناء بهم وبمن دخل بخدمة منهم .

Conder²³ testifies that many Druzes emigrated from Lebanon to the Ḥawrān and elsewhere following the *Règlement Organique* of 1861 and the

¹⁹ Ben-Zvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209.

²⁰ Burckhardt, p. 205.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

²² Mikha'el Mashāqa, *Kitāb Mashhad al-A'yān biḥawādith Suriyya wa-Lubnān*, Cairo, 1980, p. 70.

²³ C. R. Conder, *Heth and Moab*, London, 1883, p. 388.

liquidation of the Druze authority there. In most of the Druze villages today one finds Lebanese Druze families who say that their fathers fled to Palestine as a result of the disturbances in 1860; there are even many families that still keep their Lebanese accent, and are usually called Shawāfna and Ḥalabiyya (singular — Shūfānī, Ḥalabī), after the al-Shūf region in Lebanon, and the Ḥalab (Aleppo) region in Syria.

Thus the sources bear witness to the fact that during the Ottoman period, until 1860, the main direction of migration was from Aleppo and Lebanon to Palestine. However, we have evidence that until that time there were two cases of migration from Palestine to Jabal al-Drūz, and one case involving the migration of the residents of complete villages.

The first instance was of a single migrant in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. Abu Rāshid tells us that a man by the name of Khalīl al-Ḥamdān fled from the district of Safed to Jabal al-Drūz and assisted Ḥamdān al-Ḥamdān, the first of the Druze rulers of the Mountain (who came to power in 1688) to consolidate his government there.²⁴

«نزع رجل يدعى خليل الحمدان ، من صفد من اعمال فلسطين . وذل ضيفاً على حمدان الحمدان ، وبالنظر لكون حمدان الحمدان ، ليس له اخ يستند عليه قربه منه وتأخيا على الحياة والموت وولاء على نجران ، حيث استولي هو على السويداء» .

The second case, and the more important one, occurred in the 1830's, during the time of the Egyptian occupation and the rule of Ibrāhīm Pasha, when whole Druze villages on the Carmel were destroyed and when their inhabitants could no longer bear the heavy burden of taxes, the conscription to the army and the forced labour that the Egyptians demanded. The residents of the villages fled to Jabal al-Drūz,²⁵ finding refuge there. A few years after the disturbances of 1860, and at the end of the nineteenth century, the country decayed and the Ottomans made a habit of following the practice of the Egyptians by oppressing the population. The Druzes here suffered greatly from conscription and the many taxes levied on the inhabitants. In contrast, Jabal al-Drūz during this period was semi-autonomous, a place of refuge to flee to, thus escaping the oppressive government and dodging military service.

Increasing migration to Jabal al-Drūz appeared to Oliphant, at the beginning of the 1880's, to be inevitable. He notes that:

Besides the two villages on Carmel, there are fourteen Druze villages, nearly all within sight of it, on the southern slopes of the mountains of Galilee. It is not improbable that, unable to support the military

²⁴ Ḥannā Abū Rāshid, *Hawrān al-Dāmiya*, Cairo, 1926, p. 179.

²⁵ *A Handbook of Syria*, The British Admiralty, London, 1920, p. 511. 'Izz al-Dīn, p. 198.

conscription and taxation which presses upon them, the inhabitants may before long abandon their present homes, and go to swell the numbers of their brethren in the Jebel Druse. The whole population of the Druse nation is about 120,000; they can put into the field 25,000 men of the best fighting material in Turkey; they are slowly migrating to the Jebel Druse, where about two thirds of the nation have already asserted their semi-independence.²⁶

Later he notes that: "The Druses number 600 men, more or less, because of their constant, slow migration to Jebel Druse which is practically living under independent rule. The reason for the migration is persecution."²⁷

The migration from Palestine to Jabal al-Drūz continued till the end of the First World War and the beginning of the British Mandate in Palestine.²⁸

Eight years later, in 1925, the Druze Revolt began, and the direction of migration once again changed. Many fled from Syria and Lebanon to Palestine, which was outside French control. This direction of flight continued until 1948, when a few hundred young men enlisted in the Israeli army, staying in the country after the establishment of the State of Israel.

III. The Foundation of New Settlements

A. Administrative Division

From the time of the Ottoman conquest and the division of the country into five *sanjaks* (Safed, Lajjūn, Nablus, Jerusalem and Gaza), all of the Druze settlements in the Galilee became part of the *sanjak* of Safed. This *sanjak* was part of the *eyālet* of Damascus until 1613, and only with the submission of Fakhr al-Dīn II and his flight to Italy in that year, was it joined to the *sanjak* of Sidon-Beirut as an independent province (*eyālet*).²⁹ The area of the Galilee where the Druzes in Palestine lived during the Ottoman period (excepting the Carmel settlements) were always politically oriented north, and not directly linked with the centre of Palestine.

The northernmost Druze village was Metulla and now is Ḥurfaysh, while the southernmost village, even today, is Dāliyāt al-Karmil. The Druze sector of the Galilee was divided into three internal administrative units: al-Sāḥil — coastal lowlands; al-Jabal — the region of the mountain; and al-Shāghūr — the valley between the two mountains. The following villages belonged to

²⁶ Oliphant, *Haifa*, p. 92.

²⁷ *Ibid.* p. 112.

²⁸ V. Schwöbel, "Die Verkehrswege und Ansiedlungen Galilaas in ihrer Abhängigkeit von den natürlichen Bedingungen," *ZDPV*, Vol. XXVII (1904), p. 32.

²⁹ *Ott. Doc.* p. 45.

the coastal region: Jūlis, Yirkā, Abū-Sinān, Kafr Yasīf and all of the destroyed villages that had existed in their vicinity. The following villages belonged to the mountain region: Yānūḥ, Kafr Sumay', Kisrā, Hurfaysh, Peqi'n, Bayt Jann, and 'Ayn al-Asad. Belonging to the al-Shāghūr region were: al-Rāma, al-Maghār and Sājūr. The village of Jathth is on the border between the mountain and the coastal regions. Robinson³⁰ speaks of a similar division that sets the boundaries of the regions as follows; al-Jabal southwards to the Bilād al-Bishāra (southern Lebanon) between Safed and Acre; and al-Shāghūr between Nazareth and this region. This division is still well known and accepted by the local Druzes.³¹

Three villages are not included in this division: 'Isfiyā, Dāliyat al-Karmil and Shafā 'Amr. The fact that they do not receive much attention on the part of the Druzes in the Galilee is not incidental. Until the establishment of the State of Israel, the ties between the Druzes of Galilee and these villages were weak. The history of the Druzes in Israel is closely linked to the settlements of the Galilee. The Carmel and Shafā 'Amr did not play an important role, because of the distance between the regions and the lack of communication. In addition, the settlements on Mt. Carmel are relatively new and were founded at a time when the Druzes in the Galilee were already established a few hundred years. The Ma'nid rule strengthened the position of these villages but they did not long survive the passing of Druze rule from the region as twelve of the fourteen settlements were destroyed.

Shafā 'Amr was never a purely Druze village, and the Druzes there always represented but a small percentage of its inhabitants and played only a secondary role. Thus the Druze settlement on Mt. Carmel and in Shafā 'Amr was weak, relatively unstable, and unable to fulfill a major function in Druze history.

B. Population Size

Most investigators note that the number of Druzes was large, rather larger than the number of Mutawāllis throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Druzes numbered roughly 100,000.³² This number does not include Palestine, as

³⁰ E. Robinson and E. Smith, *Biblical Researches in Palestine, Mount Sinai and Arabia Petraea*, London, 1841, II, 646.

³¹ U. Heyd, *Ḍāḥir al-'Umar* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1942, p. 75. Heyd points out that this division was accepted during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Al-Sāhil belongs to the district (*qaḍā'*) of Acre, and al-Jabal to the district of Safed; both belong to the *mutaṣarrifiyya* of Acre.

³² According to F. E. Roger, *La Terre Sainte*, Paris, 1664, p. 336, the physician of Fakhr al-Dīn, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Druzes numbered 6,000

none of the investigators mentioned noted the Druzes of this country, except Oliphant who estimated the number of Druzes in a few villages in Palestine.³³ Conder was of the opinion that most of the population in the Galilee and on Mt. Carmel were Druzes,³⁴ but he did not mention any figures.

The only estimate that we have from the last century on the number of Druzes in each village is from 1887 and is to be found in the publication of the Palestine Exploration Fund. According to this estimate, their number at the end of the last century was 7,860.³⁵ (Today there are 35,000 Druzes in Israel.)

Druzes for the most part are not concentrated in cities. In the villages they live with Christians, but none of their villages has a Muslim majority. In those places where they represent a minority, they live in a separate neighbourhood called "*ḥārat al-Durūz*". A Druze neighbourhood like that exists in Shafā 'Amr, for example.

fighters. The region of the Druzes according to Charles Roux, *Les Echelles de Syrie et de Palestine au XVIII Siècle*, Paris, 1928, pp. 60-64, was crowded and their number reached 100,000-120,000 in the eighteenth century. C. F. Volney, *Travels through Syria and Egypt*, London, 1786, p. 72, estimated their number in 1784 to be 120,000, among them 40,000 combatants. In his opinion, the density in the Druze region can be compared to that of the most affluent areas of France. In the thirties of the nineteenth century, in Robinson, *op. cit.*, Eli Smith estimates the number of Druzes at 70,000. Van de Velde, *op. cit.*, p. 123, who reports this, says that a larger number than this was given to him. W.F. Lynch, *Narrative of the United States' Expedition to River Jordan and the Dead Sea*, second edition, revised, London, 1850, p. 478, is of the opinion that in 1847 there were about 10,000 Druze combatants and altogether 50,000; while Conder, *op. cit.*, p. 390, thinks that their number reached 100,000 in 1880, 10,000 of whom were combatants. W. R. Wilson, *Travels in Egypt and the Holy Land*, London, 1824, p. 315, who was in the country at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and W. M. Thompson, *The Land and the Book*, London, 1905, p. 167, who was in the area during the last thirty years of the last century, agree with these numbers. Oliphant, *Halfa*, p. 92, considered their number to be about 120,000 and the number of combatants 25,000, and he pointed out that they were among the strongest armed forces in the Ottoman Empire. Two-thirds of their number were centred, in his opinion, in Jabal al-Durūz. H. B. Tristram, *The Land of Israel*, London, 1865, p. 19, estimated their number in Lebanon to be about 75,000. He is of the opinion that there were 200,000 Druzes in the area in the nineteenth century (II, 134).

³³ He estimated the number of Druzes on Mt. Carmel in 1883 as 800 men, 500 in 'Isfiyā and 300 in Dāliyat al-Karmil (Oliphant, *Halfa*, p. 85, 88). In the same year he found about 480 at Peqi'in (*ibid.*, p. 109), and a year later he found in Shafā 'Amr 600 Druzes (*ibid.*, p. 120).

³⁴ C. R. Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine*, London, 1878, p. 301.

³⁵ G. Schumacher, "Population List on the Liwā of 'Akka," *PEFQS*, 1887, pp. 169-191.

C. *Destroyed Villages*

It appears that throughout the history of the Druzes, from the beginning of the eleventh century until the beginning of the 1840's, there were more Druze villages in Palestine than exist today. The present number of Druze villages is eighteen, which is the number of villages that remained after the last wave of destruction following the Egyptian retreat from the country in 1840. Three villages are exceptions: 'Ayn al-Asad next to Bayt Jann, which was established by people from Bayt Jann who were joined by migrants from Jabal al-Drūz and Lebanon; and al-Jarmaq and Metulla, which were abandoned by their Druze inhabitants at the end of the last century.

Druze religious writings speak of eight villages where sheikhs and Druze preachers lived at the time of the founding of the faith in the eleventh century. Of these villages, only two are remembered today, al-Kuwaykāt, which was Muslim till the establishment of Israel, and al-Jarmaq, which was settled by Druzes until the end of the last century.

Seven of these villages were not mentioned in early sources other than in the Druze religious papers; the eighth, al-Jarmaq, is mentioned as a Druze village in the thirteenth century by al-Dimashqī (1256-1327)³⁶ and al-'Uthmānī,³⁷ in the second half of the fourteenth century. The six villages that are not mentioned in the sources are:

a) In the al-Sāḥil region — Mīmās near Abū Sinān, Iklīl north of Yirkā, and al-Ḥanbaliyya, between Jathth and Mīmās.

b) In the al-Shāghūr region — 'Ayn 'Āth near Sājūr, Dāma and al-Sāfirīyya, both of them east of Kafr Kannā.

Evliya Çelebī, in the seventeenth century, notes Druze settlements in 'Anabtā, Sūq al-'Atīq and Gūsh Ḥalav (al-Jishsh).

Guérin,³⁸ Conder and Kitchener³⁹ and also Mülīnen⁴⁰ present a long list of destroyed Druze villages on Mt. Carmel and in the Galilee. Besides the eleven villages mentioned above, these sources list another thirteen destroyed villages in the Galilee and twelve on Mt. Carmel. Out of these thirty-six villages that were settled by Druzes, some of the villages are still existing and inhabited by Muslims — Dayr al-Asad, Judayda and Makr; by Christians — Fassūta and al-Bi'na; and by Jews — Metulla. The villages that were

³⁶ al-Dimashqī, *op.cit.*, p. 211.

³⁷ B. Lewis, "An Arabic Account of the Province of Safed," *BSOAS*, XV (1953), p. 484.

³⁸ V. Guérin, *Description Géographique, Historique et Archéologique de la Palestine*, Paris, 1880, *passim*.

³⁹ C. R. Conder and H. H. Kitchener, *Memories of the Survey of Western Palestine*, Vol. I, London, 1881, *passim*.

⁴⁰ F. Mülīnen, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

inhabited until the establishment of the State of Israel were: Al-Kuwaykāt. (Beit Ha-'Emek of today), 'Amqā, Iqrith and al-Manṣūra in the Galilee, and Umm al-Zināt on Mt. Carmel. The rest of the places had been destroyed by the end of the last century.

All thirty-six villages mentioned above are known as Druze villages in the oral tradition, and to these are added more names of villages and ruins, among them the large village of Lūba next to Tiberias. However, I have not recorded these names as I have not found any substantiation to this oral tradition.

IV. The Period of Destruction

The sources do not set exact dates for the beginning of the destruction of Druze villages and it is not known exactly when this period of destruction ended. The destruction did not happen in a methodical and planned way, but rather occurred during the generations, from the founding of the faith until the start of the present century.

The first known destruction of a Druze village was during the seventeenth century, and it was effected by the Zaydān family when it first came to the country. When the family settled in the north of the Baṭṭūf Valley in the district of Nablus, it exterminated the Druzes who ruled in the north of Nablus district, centering in the village of Salāma⁴¹ (today the ruins of Salāma are next to Maghār). The people of 'Arāba assisted the Zaydān family in perpetrating this act. Almost all the sources⁴² agree that the destruction of the greatest number of villages occurred at the time of the Egyptian conquest and the rule of Ibrāhīm Pasha, by the conquering army and by neighbouring Muslims after Egypt's retreat. The region that suffered more than others from this conquest and the retreat of the conquerors was that of Mt. Carmel.

The last incident of the destruction of a Druze village occurred towards the end of the last century when the landowners of Metulla sold the fields of the village to Baron de Rothschild, who founded the settlement of Metulla on 19 May 1896.⁴³ The Druzes refused to abandon the land where they had lived as tenant farmers, and for a few years the dispute continued between the buyers, the sellers and the Turkish officials; finally the Druzes agreed to leave the village and they migrated to other Druze settlements. The Wahb family of Isfiyā is known to have originally come from there.

There is no doubt that the rest of the destroyed villages were demolished

⁴¹ Manṣūr, pp. 48-49; 'Isā Iskandar al-Ma'lūf, *Dawān al-Quṭūf fī Ta'rīkh Banī al-Ma'rūf*, Ba'abda, 1907-8, p. 129.

⁴² Y. Ben-Zvi, *op. cit.*, p. 207; Oliphant, *Halfa*, p. 89; Mälinen, *op. cit.*

⁴³ Z. Vilnay, *Encyclopedia Li-Ydi'at ha-Aretz*, Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv, 1956, II, 813.

and left by their Druze inhabitants because of the persecution and hate of their Muslim neighbours. Apparently after the retreat of Ma'nid rule and the loss of their control over northern Palestine, the Muslim residents and the succeeding government took revenge on the Druzes, who were members of the same community as the former rulers.

It is hard to know the exact reasons for the destruction of most of the villages. However, it is possible to ascertain from the sources some of the general reasons that applied in most of the cases. The main causes were:

a) Government persecution. The government, undoubtedly, was one of the most important factors contributing to the destruction of Druze villages, for it had the power to oppress the Druzes more than any other factor. This applies especially during the rule of the Zaydāns and during the occupation of the country by Ibrāhīm Pasha.

b) The hate and oppression at the hands of their neighbours. It is hard to distinguish between the persecution of the government and that of the neighbours, as often the two would cooperate in oppressing the Druzes. The destruction of the village of Salāma, for example, was performed in a joint action between the Zaydāns who ruled the area and the inhabitants of the village of 'Arāba. On Mt. Carmel what the Egyptian army of occupation did not succeed in destroying was accomplished by the neighbouring Muslim villages after the Egyptian retreat. The lion's share of these persecutions was taken by the residents of the villages of Tira and Ijzim.⁴⁴

c) Migration following an economic state of depression. This factor was a usual and important one in the destruction of Druze villages in Palestine. In many cases, the inhabitants of a village were unable to bear the burden of taxation and decided to leave their settlement and emigrate to a place where the taxes were not as heavy. At times, they would register the lands in the name of a wealthy man who would in return pay their taxes, and in this manner they were transformed gradually into tenants; in the course of time they were forced to leave the place.

In documents⁴⁵ from the beginning of the last century we find that 'Abdullāh Pasha, and after him Ibrahim Pasha, oppressed the Druzes and imposed upon them new taxes which the Druzes could not bear. At this same time, the Druzes left the villages of al-Judayda and al-Makr, and a large part of them migrated to Yirkā. However, they still continued to hold on to their land, as shown by documents of an agreement between the people of Yirkā and the non-Druze inhabitants of al-Judayda who settled in their places.

⁴⁴ Oliphant, "Khurbeta," *PEFQS*, 1884, pp. 31-32.

⁴⁵ These documents are in the possession of the author of this article.

d) The sale of land by its owners. This was the case in Metulla. The land was owned by a wealthy Lebanese family and the Druzes lived on the land as tenants. With the coming of Baron de Rothschild at the end of the last century, the owners sold him the land of the village and the Druzes were forced to leave after the failure of their resistance. Probably there were other cases similar to this that are not known to us.

e) Individual disputes. Disputes between a Druze village and its neighbour, as the result of blood vengeance and insults, occurred regularly, and not once did this bring the destruction of one of the two villages. Occasionally, it would cause feuds that would continue for many years. An interesting case of an individual dispute that cost the lives of many Druzes was the destruction of the village of Salāma following the desire of a Druze sheikh to take as his wife the daughter of a Muslim family from 'Arāba. The following is a summary of the story: When the Zaydān family came to the country, they tented in the north of the Baṭṭūf Valley. The dignitaries of the adjoining village 'Arāba invited them to their village. In the village of Salāma, known today as Khirbat Salāma, there was a Druze sheikh known for his power and his influence over all the surrounding area. Once while passing the village of 'Arāba, he saw a pretty girl. He went to the village dignitaries and suggested that they give him this girl as his wife. As he was a Druze and they Muslims, this suggestion was repulsive to them. Zaydān asked the reason for their confusion and when it was made known to him, he advised them to agree and arrange the time of the marriage. It was agreed that the groom and his men, who were permitted to take their weapons to the wedding feast, would be greeted courteously. After the dances and the ceremonies, each person took one guest to his house to spend the night and in their sleep Zadyān slew all the Druzes and destroyed the village.⁴⁶ The date of the destruction of this village by Zaydān was 1110 A.H./1698-1699.⁴⁷

A similar case of the destruction of Druze village is mentioned in the sources in relation to the village of al-Shallāla on Mt. Carmel. A Muslim woman from 'Ayn Hawd whose name was Āmina, daughter of Abū al-Hayjā, had no children. She went to a neighbouring village to seek the advice of its Christian priest, wanting to have a child. The Druzes who saw this thought it a sin and a desecration of God's honour. They killed her on the road near al-Shallāla and burned her body in a mashḥara.⁴⁸ When this became known

⁴⁶ Manṣūr, p. 49; Michael Assaf, *Ha-'Aravim Taḥat ha-Tzalbanim ha-Mamlukim ve-ha-Turkim*, Tel-Aviv, 1941, p. 39.

⁴⁷ Heyd. *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴⁸ I.e., a stack of wood that is covered with dust. Charcoal is produced when the wood is burned. This is the way villagers obtained and still obtain charcoal.

to the people of 'Ayn Hawd, they united with the people of Ijzim and Umm al-Zīnāt to avenge the blood of the girl, and so the village of al-Shallāla and other neighboring villages were destroyed.

The time and causes of the destruction of the oldest villages mentioned in the religious writings are unknown.

4. THE POPULATION OF THE LARGE TOWNS IN PALESTINE DURING THE FIRST EIGHTY YEARS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, ACCORDING TO WESTERN SOURCES*

by YEHOASHUA BEN-ARIEH

I. Introduction

The nineteenth century constitutes a turning-point in the history of settlement in Palestine. At the opening of the century the country was in a state of utter devastation. At the same time the picture of settlement in the land underwent certain changes. Some trace the beginning of these changes back to 1799, when Napoleon invaded the country. This invasion marks the entry into the modern era of Palestine and of the Middle East as a whole.

It is therefore highly important to make an estimate of the population of Palestine throughout the century and especially during the first half of it. On the one hand, such an estimate could provide basic knowledge about the density of the population in the country before the beginning of modern Jewish settlement. On the other hand, it could serve as a starting-point for the task of drawing up population estimates of Palestine in the preceding centuries.

For the purposes of the present study, aimed at making a population estimate of Palestine in the nineteenth century, it was possible to rely on the reports of Western travellers who came to the country in increasing numbers throughout the century. These travellers, surveyors and researchers, were generally motivated by religious sentiments and by their interest in the history of the country, particularly during biblical times. Nevertheless, interspersed at random among the other material in their books are interesting and important details about the country at the time of these visits, among them figures indicating the size of the population in various towns and settlements. However, these figures give rise to considerable difficulties owing to their great number and the tremendous discrepancies between them. Many hundreds of travellers reached the country in the nineteenth century, so that the number of population estimates to be found in their reports runs into at least several score. Any attempt to establish an average is bound to

* This paper is part of a study on the pre-modern landscape of Israel which is being financed by the Central Research Fund of the Hebrew University.

fail. Most of the estimates are unreliable, entirely remote from reality, and were reported by travellers who did not check their facts and who were devoid of any knowledge of or orientation towards the subject as a whole. Nevertheless, there are a limited number of estimates given by scientific researchers who were interested in the subject and who conscientiously examined their data before making their reports, so that these are reliable to a certain extent. It is therefore necessary to distinguish carefully between the relevant and correct reports and those which are secondary and incorrect.

The author of this paper has been engaged for years in studying the various sources left by nineteenth century Western travellers. The present study will attempt to present a *selection* of those sources which are dependable and might serve as a basis for a population estimate.¹

Fundamental to this attempt is the assumption that one should not rely on any single source, whatever it may be, including even those sources which purport to rely on Turkish censuses and data. There are sufficient reasons to assume that even these estimates were, at least in some cases, too general in character and inaccurate. The present investigation will attempt to examine all the relatively reliable estimates while bearing in mind the general process of development characteristic of the country throughout the century, and to use the first population census that was held during the period of the British Mandate (1922) in order to arrive at a retrospective estimate. This should make it possible to form a *single* estimate of population growth during the century.

In connection with the census of 1922, it is important to note that during World War I not only was population growth halted in many towns, but the population actually decreased (as a result of war casualties, deportations, epidemics, etc.). The figures included in this census should, therefore, be considered only as a general indication of the rate of growth. Furthermore, it must be stressed that this study deals mainly with first eighty years of the century. The years between 1880 and 1922 are a subject for special investigation in themselves. The data relating to this period are given solely for purposes of comparison.

II. *The Twelve Important Towns*

A. *Jerusalem*

At the outset this investigation will deal with the city that presents the most complicated problem. Among the hundreds of Western travellers who

¹ For details on travellers see: Y. Ben-Arieh, *The Rediscovery of the Holy Land in the Nineteenth Century* (in Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1970.

came to Palestine during the first half of the nineteenth century and whose reports are available for this study, there is hardly one who did not visit Jerusalem. Scores of them included estimates of the population of the city in their books. There are many contradictions among these estimates, and the present study will deal with the more reliable ones.

The first researcher to be quoted here is Seetzen. This German traveller, who was one of the most prominent scientific researchers at the beginning of the century (1806), records the inquiries he made of the Turkish governor in Jerusalem as to the number of citizens in the town. He reports the following figures: Muslims — 4,000; Jews — 2,000; Christians: Greeks — 1,400; Catholics — 800; Armenians — 500; Copts — 50; Abyssinians — 13; Syrians — 11; total — 8,774. Commenting on this figure, Seetzen states that it seems an underestimate; he claims that Jerusalem was the only place in the Levant where he was given underestimated data; he thinks that the more probable figure is 12,000 (3,000 of them Jews).² The present author's opinion is that the first figure may well be the correct one.

Another important investigator, whose evidence is generally considered to be reliable, is Edward Robinson. He visited Jerusalem at a later date (1838) and reports the population as 11,500.³ It is true, as is well known, that in that year the town was afflicted by an epidemic which may have caused the flight of a number of its inhabitants; it is doubtful, however, whether the total population was much larger than the figure he gives.

A third important researcher, whose first visit to Jerusalem took place in 1835, was Tittus Tobler. He established the size of the population as 12,000.⁴ At a later date this German traveller published a comprehensive monograph on the city of Jerusalem, including an estimate of its population in 1846 which he reported to have reached 17,173, divided as follows: Muslims: a) civilians — 4,500, b) soldiers — 1,600; Christians: a) Greeks — 2,000, b) Roman-Catholics — 900, c) Greek-Catholics — 50, d) Armenians — 400; e) Copts — 100; f) Protestants — 50 (their number was constantly increasing); g) Abyssinians — 38; h) Syrians — 20; Jews: Sephardim (of Spanish origin) — 6,000, Ashkenazim (of Western origin) — 1,500, Karaites — 15.⁵ Tobler also prepared a table including the different population estimates of Jerusalem, according to Western travellers, up to his third visit to the country, indicating the difficulties arising from the differing and

² U. J. Seetzen, *Reisen durch Syrien, Palästina, etc.*, Berlin 1854-59, II, 18.

³ E. Robinson and E. Smith, *Biblical Researches in Palestine, etc.*, London, 1841, II, 100.

⁴ T. Tobler, *Lustreise ins Morgenland*, Zurich, 1839, II, 53.

⁵ *Idem*, *Denksblätter aus Jerusalem*, Konstanz, 1853, pp. 360-61. It is interesting to compare these figures with Seetzen's data.

contradictory data.⁶ He stated that one could generally accept the assumption that city's population had increased since 1814, but this did not necessarily reflect the data in the travellers' reports. The problem, he believed, was that some of these estimates included the pilgrims who visited the city on the holy days. During the Christian holy days, especially Easter, there were several thousand visitors in Jerusalem. He noted that detailed tables of the communities in the city at these times indicated a marked increase in the number of Christians with, simultaneously, a decrease in the number of Muslims; these figures he considered to be highly inaccurate. He stated that the community that had grown most was that of the Jews, many of whom had settled in the city itself.⁷

More population estimates appear during the 1850's and the 1860's; very surprising among the more reliable ones are the relatively small population figures, which contradict the general information that the town had been growing and developing since the early 1840's. Liebetrut, for instance, reports the information given him by the Prussian Consul, Schultz, according to which the population (1851) was 15,000 (Jews — 7,000; Muslims — 5,000; Orthodox — 2,000; Catholics — 900; Armenians — 350; Copts — 100; Syrians — 20; Abyssinians — 20; Protestants — 100).⁸ Stewart reports that, taking into account the size of the city, its population was estimated at 25,000–30,000, which is an exaggeration. A government census (1851) of all non-Jewish men leads to the conclusion that the overall population figure was 16,000.⁹ Hyamson quotes a report submitted somewhat later to the British Foreign Office (May 1864) estimating the population at approximately 15,000;¹⁰ elsewhere he states that the population was about 18,000 (March 1865).¹¹ Wilson, in his survey of the city (1865), records a population of 16,000, which, with the addition of the visitors during Easter, reached a figure of 30,000.¹²

In view of the above, it is possible to assume that at least during the fifties and early sixties there was no considerable growth in the town's population. The rate of growth was more rapid from the late sixties onwards.

Hyamson reports that during the 25 years preceding 1890 the population of Jerusalem had doubled, from 20,000 to 40,000, the most conspicuous

⁶ Idem, *Jerusalem*, p. 354.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ F. Liebetrut, *Reise nach dem Morgenland ... Jerusalem und dem Heiligen Land*, Hamburg, 1854, II, 25.

⁹ R. W. Stewart, *The Tent and the Khan; a Journey to Sinai and Palestine*, London, 1857, p. 289.

¹⁰ Hyamson, II, 331.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II, 336.

¹² C. W. Wilson, *Ordnance Survey of Jerusalem*, Southampton, 1866, p. 8.

growth having taken place among the Jews, who constituted over one half of the entire population.¹³ The research exploration mission of Lortet (1875–1880) arrived at a population-estimate of about 28,000;¹⁴ however, the figures presented by this mission are known to be exaggerated. The Memoirs of the Survey of Western Palestine (henceforth referred to as MSWP) quote Consul Moore's figure for 1873, of 20,900 persons in Jerusalem; the surveyors themselves give an estimate of 40,000 for the population in 1882.¹⁵ This last figure seems, in the opinion of the present author, to be exaggerated; as mentioned above, Hyamson reports a similar population estimate for the year 1890. A further figure is included in the first official census that took place in 1922, viz., 62,578.¹⁶ It seems, strangely enough, that a considerable population growth occurred in Jerusalem in the years 1880–1914 and in the period following World War I until the British census. It is highly probable that in 1880 the population of Jerusalem did not exceed 30,000.

To sum up, we would estimate population-growth of Jerusalem in the nineteenth century as follows: 1800: 8,000–10,000; 1840: 12,000–14,000; 1860: 18,000–20,000; 1880: 30,000; 1890: 40,000; 1922: 65,500.

B. Acre

Acre was the second most important town in the country at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in a certain sense even the most important. Its development is exactly the opposite of that of Jerusalem; in the second half of the century, and especially at the end of the century, it underwent a decline.

Population estimates for Acre in the works of the nineteenth-century travellers are far smaller than those for Jerusalem. In most cases there appear to be no extreme exaggerations as to the size of population. The factor of pilgrimages or religious significance did not influence the estimates in this case. It is, however, important to note that most of the accounts describe the city, especially in the early years of the century, as large and important.

In order to arrive at a correct estimate of the population of Acre, let us begin with the end of the nineteenth century. The relatively reliable sources on the 1870's and 1880's almost unanimously agree upon a population estimate of 8,000–9,000. Mrs. Rogers, sister of the British Vice Consul of

¹³ Hyamson, II, 450.

¹⁴ D. Lortet, *La Syrie d'aujourd'hui, Voyages dans la Phénicie, le Liban et la Judée*, Paris, 1884, p. 305.

¹⁵ *Survey*, III, 162–63.

¹⁶ J. B. Barron, *Palestine, Report and General Abstracts of the Census of 1922*, Jerusalem, 1923.

Haifa, who was thoroughly acquainted with the city, reports a figure of 9,000 (about 7,500 Muslims including the Turkish soldiers, with the rest composed of various Christian sects, a very small number of Protestants and Jews).¹⁷ Guérin (1875) reports somewhat similar figures.¹⁸ The Lortet mission (1875–1880) records 12,000 (3,000 Christians),¹⁹ but its figures are known to be always higher than those of the other sources. The survey reports of the MSWP quote Guérin, and add Socin's report (1874) of 8,000 (5,600 Muslims).²⁰ All the sources, as a matter of fact, report approximately the same figure. Schumacher, ten years later (1886), gives a figure of 9,800, excluding soldiers,²¹ which corresponds to the previous data.

A reliable estimate of the population at the end of the century was easily arrived at. As far as the earlier part of the century was concerned, however, the problem was far more difficult. Several circumstances should be noted in this connection. The city had suffered through its conquest by Ibrāhīm Pasha in 1832, but its condition became even worse after the Ottoman armies invaded it in 1840 and it was severely bombed by the navies of its allies. It is known that a large part of the city was damaged, and for several years it was in a state of partial destruction.²² Furthermore, after the war the neighbouring cities, Beirut in the north and Haifa in the south, began to compete with Acre, so that its position and importance as a central port were impaired. On the other hand, when the city was the seat of the Pasha early in the century, it gained a powerful position. The special activities of the Pashas in this city — Jezzār, Sulaymān, and 'Abdullāh — undoubtedly brought about a growth in the population. This explains why there was a larger population at the beginning of the century than at the end. Several works by relatively reliable travellers can be referred to in this context. Joliffe, relying on Forbin (1817–1818), reports a figure of 8,000 — 10,000.²³ William Wilson (1820)²⁴ and Prokesch (1829)²⁵ estimate the population of

¹⁷ M. E. Rogers, "Acre" in C. W. Wilson (ed.), *Picturesque Palestine, Sinai and Egypt*, London, 1883, II, 73–91.

¹⁸ V. Guérin, *Description géographique, historique et archéologique de la Palestine — Galilee*, Paris, 1880, I, 506.

¹⁹ Lortet, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

²⁰ A. Socin, "Alphabetisches Verzeichniss von Ortschaften des Paschalik Jerusalem," *ZDPV*, II (1879) pp. 135–163; Conder and Kitchener, *Survey*, I, 216.

²¹ G. Schumacher, "Population Lists of the Life of Akko," *PEFQS*, 1887, pp. 169–191.

²² For instance, De Saulcy gives such a report on his visit to the city in 1851.

²³ T. R. Joliffe, *Letters from Palestine, Galilee, Judea ... Dead Sea*, London, 1819, pp. 17–26.

²⁴ W. R. Wilson, *Travels in the Holy Land*, London, 1822, pp. 54–57.

²⁵ A. Prokesch, *Reise ins Heilige Land im Jahre 1829*, Wien, 1831, p. 142.

Acre as 10,000. Some sources record lower estimates,²⁶ but on the whole they do not give a figure lower than 5,000, and most estimates lie between the two extremes. Later sources emphasize the fact that in spite of the great destruction of 1840, quite a large population still remained in the city.²⁷ Ritter in his summary accepts J. Wilson's estimate for 1843 (after the destruction), which is approximately 8,000–10,000 (150 Jews).²⁸ Robinson, however, on his second visit (1852) reports that after the destruction there were about 5,000 persons in Acre;²⁹ but his data are known to be generally low (see also his estimate for Jerusalem), Stewart establishes the population in 1854 as 10,000.³⁰ All the above-mentioned facts and data support the belief that before the destruction, when the town flourished, its population reached a figure of approximately 10,000. After the destruction this number decreased by several hundreds, or perhaps even thousands.

The 1860's were another period of revival for Acre. Various sources report renewed activities both in the city and in the port;³¹ it seems that the general resuscitation that took place in these years all over the country, particularly the seaports, reached Acre too. But it was not long before the same neighbouring towns, Beirut and Haifa, again competed with Acre. The city once more deteriorated, and at an even more rapid pace, especially during World War I, so that the first British census in 1922 reports a population of 6,420.³²

Acre's population-growth can thus be summarized as follows: 1800: 8,000; 1840 (before the destruction): 10,000; 1840–1850: 8,000–9,000; 1860: 10,000; 1880: 8,000–9,000; 1922: 6,420.

C. Haifa

Haifa was the growing town in the north which competed with Acre. In comparison with the relatively static population of Acre, which actually signified a regression in the town's growth, Haifa showed important signs of development in the nineteenth century, and especially during its second half.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Seetzen (1806) describes the

²⁶ For instance, W. Turner, *Journal of a Tour in the Levant*, London, 1820, p. 111; W. Jowett, *Christian Researches in the Mediterranean from 1815–20*, London, 1822, pp. 144–153.

²⁷ D. Millard, *A Journal of Travels in ... the Holy Land*, Rochester, 1843, pp. 332–337.

²⁸ W. L. Gage (ed.), *The Comparative Geography of Palestine etc ...* (by Carl Ritter), Edinburgh, 1866, p. 366.

²⁹ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–100.

³⁰ Stewart, *op. cit.*, pp. 453–457.

³¹ K. Furrer, *Wanderungen durch Palästina*, Zurich, 1865, pp. 293–298.

³² Barron, *op. cit.*

city as small and poor.³³ Buckingham (1816) records a population of about 1,000 in Haifa.³⁴ Prokesch (1829) already reports a figure of 3,000 (including ten Jewish families).³⁵ The Russian Consul, Norow (1835), also estimates the population at 3,000.³⁶ Other sources of the 1830's also indicate that after considerable improvements in the city the population had reached a figure of 3,000.³⁷

The conquest of Acre by Ibrāhīm Pasha (1832), the earthquake of 1837 and the Ottoman reconquest in 1840 all caused a movement of population from Acre to Haifa. It is therefore surprising to read in sources of the 1850's that the population of Haifa was still estimated as 3,000 and even less.³⁸ The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the figure of 3,000, mentioned in the sources relating to the first forty years of the century, was a general estimate, and that in 1840 the population was actually far smaller. The town had a population of 3,000 only by the end of the 1850's. The British Vice Consul, Rogers, reports for 1859 a population of 3,000.³⁹ Guérin (1870) sets the figure at about 3,180 (including 900 Jews);⁴⁰ it may be assumed that he does not include the several hundred inhabitants of the German Colony. Lortet's exploration mission (1875–1880) sets the figure at 6,000 (including 800 Germans),⁴¹ but the figures reported by this mission are generally over-estimates. The MSWP quote Pere Lievin's (1869–1872) estimate of 4,194 (Muslims — 1,140; Jews — 1,000; Christians — 2,054),⁴² a figure that seems quite close to reality. Schumacher (1886) gives an estimate of 7,165.⁴³ Carmel, in his research on Haifa,⁴⁴ accepts the last two figures and indicates a rate of population growth in Haifa in 1886–1914 achieved by no other city in the country at the time; according to him the population grew in that period from 7,500 to 22,000–23,000. Afterwards, during World War I,

³³ Seetzen, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–6.

³⁴ Buckingham, pp. 114–115.

³⁵ Prokesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–23.

³⁶ A. S. Norow, *Reise nach dem Heiligen Land im Jahre 1835*, St. Petersburg, 1838, pp. 218–220.

³⁷ For instance, W. R. Wilde, *Narrative of a Voyage ... including a Visit to Algier, Egypt, Palestine, Tyre ...*, London, 1840, pp. 388–389.

³⁸ As in Liebetrut, *op. cit.*, pp. 288; and in W. Ritchie, *Azuba or the Forsaken Land*, Edinburgh, 1856, p. 434.

³⁹ *Survey*, I, 282–285.

⁴⁰ Guérin, *Description — Samarie*, II, 251–53.

⁴¹ Lortet, *op. cit.*, pp. 174–175.

⁴² *Survey*, pp. 282–285; F. Lievin de Hamme, *Guide Indicateur des sanctuaires et lieux historiques de la Terre Sainte*, Louvain, 1896, p. 593.

⁴³ Schumacher, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁴⁴ A. Carmel, *The History of Haifa under Turkish Rule* (in Hebrew), Haifa University College, Israel, 1969, p. 172.

this growth was halted and the population decreased, but during the first four years of British rule it was resumed, resulting in a figure of 24,643 in the British census of 1922.

The summary of Haifa's population estimates suggested by the present study is: 1800: 1,000; 1840: 2,000; 1860: 3,000; 1870: 4,000; 1880: 6,000; 1922: 24,000.

D. Jaffa

This city developed along lines on the whole similar to those of Haifa, but with several differences. At the beginning of the century Seetzen (1806) reported its population as 2,500–3,000.⁴⁵ Abū Nabūt's rule over the city in the second decade of the century, during which there was a certain amount of building and reconstruction, probably caused some growth in its population. The works of the century's travellers record a constant increase in the figures. William Wilson (1820), for instance, reported a figure of 4,000,⁴⁶ Norow (1835)⁴⁷ and Tobler (1835)⁴⁸ one of 5,000, J. Wilson (1843) 5,000,⁴⁹ and E. Robinson (1852) 7,000⁵⁰ (this is probably exaggerated). It seems that during the first forty years of the century the town underwent a process of continuous growth. But this is not reflected in other works written during the century. Indeed, later reports prove the opposite to be true. The MSWP, for instance, notes that according to the 1851 census the population of Jaffa was 4,841 and of the neighbouring villages 4,370.⁵¹ It is possible that the earlier sources included in their figures part of the population of the neighbouring villages. Other sources note a continuation of the population growth during the forties and fifties, indicating that by the end of the 1850's the population had reached 6,000.⁵² This means that in the preceding years the city had been smaller. Bartlett, for instance, reports that in the period between his first trip (1842) and his second (1853) the town had undergone considerable growth, particularly in its port.⁵³ It seems that, like Jerusalem, Jaffa's population greatly benefitted from the pilgrimages to the holy places, to which Jaffa served as a port. One of the sources notes that in 1857 about

⁴⁵ Seetzen, *op. cit.*, pp. 69–72.

⁴⁶ W. R. Wilson, *Travels*, pp. 169–175.

⁴⁷ Norow, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–111.

⁴⁸ Tobler, *Morgenland*, II, 121–123.

⁴⁹ J. Wilson, *The Lands of the Bible etc.*, London, 1842, II, 256–58.

⁵⁰ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, III, 31.

⁵¹ *Survey*, II, 254–255; Socin, *op. cit.*,

⁵² For instance, F. Bovet, *Egypt, Palestine, etc.*, London, 1858, pp. 96–103.

⁵³ W. H. Bartlett, *Jerusalem Revisited etc.*, London, 1855, pp. 52–3.

15,000 pilgrims passed through the town.⁵⁴ Guérin suggests that in 1863 there was a population of 10,000,⁵⁵ but states that it included both the town and its environs. It is important to note that Jaffa resembles Jerusalem in that there are many population estimates for both, most of them contradictory. Many estimates set the population figure for the sixties and seventies at 15,000,⁵⁶ but there is generally no basis for this.

During the 1860's there was indeed a high rate of population growth in the city. However, Mrs. Rogers, who was thoroughly familiar with the town, still reports that its population was only 8,000 in the mid seventies.⁵⁷ The MSWP, according to Socin (1876), records a population of 8,000, and according to Pere Lievin, who relied on Turkish sources (1869), a figure of 6,185 (4,900 Muslims, 400 Jews, and the rest Christians).⁵⁸ Tolkovski, in his study on Jaffa, accepts the figure of 17,000⁵⁹ for the population of Jaffa in 1886 (compare this with Schumacher's figure of 7,205 for Haifa in the same year). This is an exaggerated estimate. Other data accepted by Tolkovski show that Jaffa grew considerably; for 1908 there was a population estimate of 50,000, while the 1922 census, following World War I, recorded 47,779 (including Tel-Aviv).⁶⁰ A very high rate of population growth for the years 1880–1914 and 1918–1922 seems acceptable in view of the regression during the war. The figures established by Tolkovski for 1886–1908, however, are generally higher than they actually were. His sources were guides for travelers in Palestine,⁶¹ the accuracy of which is doubtful.

Population estimates for nineteenth century Jaffa may be summarized as follows: 1800: 2,500–3,000; 1820: 3,000–4,000; 1840: 4,000–5,000; 1860: 6,000; 1880: 10,000; 1922: 47,779.

The estimate of the population in 1880 indicates that this city, like Haifa, grew considerably in the period 1880–1922.

E. Ramla and Lod

Seetzen (1806) estimates Ramla's population at about 2,000–3,000 (Muslims and Christians, Greeks and Armenians).⁶² Other sources set the

⁵⁴ R. Buchanan, *Notes of Clerical Furlough Spent Chiefly in the Holy Land*, London, 1859, pp. 79–87.

⁵⁵ Guérin, *Description — Judée*, I, 2–11.

⁵⁶ For instance, W. M. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, New York, 1860, I, 5–7.

⁵⁷ C. W. Wilson, *op. cit.*, II, 139–144.

⁵⁸ *Survey*, II, 254–5.

⁵⁹ S. Tolkovski, *The History of Jaffa* (in Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1926, p. 153.

⁶⁰ Barron, *op. cit.*

⁶¹ Tolkovski, *op. cit.*

⁶² Seetzen, *op. cit.*, II, 67.

figure higher, but they seem unreliable.⁶³ Robinson (1838) also mentions a figure of 3,000 souls (a third of them Christians).⁶⁴ This figure appears again and again in many other sources up until the fifties and sixties.⁶⁵ Sometimes it goes down to 2,000, as in Guérin's works.⁶⁶ The census of 1851 gives the population estimate for the town as 2,065, and for the neighbouring villages as 10,200.⁶⁷ T. Drake's estimate (1852) is 2,584 (Muslims, 2,000; Christians, 582; Jews, 2).⁶⁸ Lortet's mission (1875–1880) records a figure of 6,000,⁶⁹ but their data are usually too high. The MSWP quote three sources: Socin — 3,000, Pere Lievin (1889) — 3460 (3,000 Muslims, which is very doubtful), and Drake's above-mentioned estimate.⁷⁰

All the data given above indicate that Ramla's population was static throughout the century: 2,000–3,000 persons. From about 1880 onwards there may have been a certain increase in population. The 1922 British census establishes the population at 7,312,⁷¹ which means that between 1880 and 1922 there was some movement in the city. This could have been due to the fact that the city lies on the route between two towns which developed considerably during those years: Jaffa and Jerusalem.

No population estimate for Lod (Ramla's neighbor) could be found for the first half of the century under study. The place is generally described as an unimportant town.⁷² Many travellers state their impression that Ramla's progress had the effect of keeping back Lod's development.⁷³ The first reliable population estimates appear during the second half of the nineteenth century. The 1851 census reports it as 1,345 for the town and 4,400 for the neighboring villages.⁷⁴ A different source, in the late fifties, sets the population at 2,000.⁷⁵ The MSWP, quoting Pere Lievin, gives a figure of 6,850 for 1869,⁷⁶ but there has probably been a misunderstanding here, and the

⁶³ For instance, Buckingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 162–168: 5,000 souls; W. R. Wilson, *Travels*, pp. 178–184: 6,000 souls.

⁶⁴ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, III, 25.

⁶⁵ For instance, Liebetrut, *op. cit.*, II, 166–168; Ritchie, *op. cit.* pp. 339–404; Gage-Ritter, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–259.

⁶⁶ Guérin, *Description ... Judée*, I, 34–38.

⁶⁷ *Survey*, II, 278.

⁶⁸ C. F. Drake, Tyrwhitt, *Unexplored Syria*, London, 1872, cited in *Survey*, II, 253.

⁶⁹ Lortet, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

⁷⁰ *Survey*, II, 252–253.

⁷¹ Barron, *op. cit.*

⁷² For instance, J. D. Paxton, *Letters from Palestine ...*, London, 1839, pp. 105–106; G. M. Wortabet, *Bayroot, Syria and Syrians*, London, 1856, II, 162.

⁷³ Seetzen, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

⁷⁴ *Survey*, II, 279.

⁷⁵ Thomson, *op. cit.*, II, 291–296.

⁷⁶ *Survey*, II, 32.

figure may include the surrounding villages. Guérin's estimate of 5,000⁷⁷ perhaps also refers not only to the city. Lod's development started relatively late, but when it did start the population growth was rapid, partly due to the railroad that passed through the town. By 1922 the British census showed that Lod had a larger population than Ramla (8,103).⁷⁸ This period of the town's development, however, does not fall within the scope of the present study, which deals solely with the first eighty years of the nineteenth century.

F. Gaza

Gaza is one of the towns for which the population estimates create a problem, particularly as far as the early part of the nineteenth century is concerned.

Many travellers report no data about the city, and among those who do include Gaza in their works there are great differences. The population estimates vary between 2,000–3,000 and 15,000–16,000.⁷⁹ Some of the discrepancies may be explained by the tendency of the inhabitants of several towns to leave their homes for the villages in hard times and to return when the situation improved. This happened in Gaza when it was conquered by Napoleon and also after the conquest by Ibrāhīm Pasha, who often oppressed the citizens, collected high taxes from them and even recruited them into his army.⁸⁰ Since in dealing with the other towns we have noted such events even when their impact was not felt during the entire century, we shall also in the case of Gaza, attempt to describe the development it underwent during the greater part of the century.

One of the most interesting pieces of information about Gaza is offered by Robinson (1838), who reported that the population estimates for the city at that time varied from 2,000 to 5,000; he himself arrived at an estimate of 4,000 taxpayers in the town, which would mean that there was a population of 15,000–16,000.⁸¹ However exaggerated Robinson's estimate may seem, it impresses upon us the necessity to taking into account a population relatively larger than the estimates current at the time for the beginning of the nineteenth century. It appears that the figure closest to reality is quoted by Joliffe from Forbin (1817–1818): 8,000 souls.⁸² This could lead to the

⁷⁷ Guérin, *Description ... Judée*, I, 322–323

⁷⁸ Barron, *op. cit.*

⁷⁹ For instance, Joliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 279–283: 8,000; Robinson, *op. cit.*, II, 372–373: 2,000–5,000 or 15,000–16,000; Liebetrut, *op. cit.*, II, 167–168: 16,000.

⁸⁰ M. A. Meyer, *A History of the City of Gaza*, New York, 1907, pp. 100–102; J. E. Dowling, *Gaza, a City of Many Battles*, London, 1913, pp. 82–93.

⁸¹ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, II, 372–373.

⁸² Joliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 279–283.

assumption that Gaza was at that time the third town in the country (in terms of size) and that its population was very similar to that of Acre and Jerusalem, which would be in keeping with its position as a southern port and as a town that served both as an exit to and a communications centre with the desert and Egypt.

Under the rule of Ibrāhīm Pasha some of the inhabitants left the town in order to evade both enlistment in the army and taxes; at the same time, this régime brought about the agricultural development of the environs and the settlement of Egyptians in the city itself.⁸³ The general picture shows a growth of population towards the end of the Egyptian rule. In 1839 an epidemic broke out in the town, causing many deaths,⁸⁴ but when it was over the population increased again, and at an even higher rate. By the late fifties the population estimates reach a figure of about 16,000.⁸⁵ The MSWP and the bulletin of the Palestine Exploration Fund both give a figure of 18,000 as the population estimate for 1875.⁸⁶ Tristram, in his summary of Gaza in Wilson's picturesque book, establishes the population of 1883 as over 20,000.⁸⁷ The Palestine Exploration Fund in 1886 also set the figure at 20,000.⁸⁸ This rapid growth continued up to World War I, during which the town was severely damaged, with the result that a population of only 17,480 was reported in the 1922 British census.⁸⁹

The acceptance of the data relating to the period between 1800–1880 means that in those years Gaza had attained a position of being a town second in size to Jerusalem to (be surpassed only later by Jaffa and Haifa). The figures support the assumption that already in the early years of the century — up to the 1840's — Gaza had a population of considerable size; without this basic assumption the relatively high figures of the later years cannot be understood.

Population estimates for Gaza during the century may be summed up as follows: 1800: 8,000; 1840: 12,000; 1860: 14,000–16,000; 1880: 18,000–20,000; 1922: 17,480.

G. Hebron

The population estimates for Hebron relating to the nineteenth century point to a slow but constant growth throughout the entire period. Seetzen

⁸³ See Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, II, 372–378.

⁸⁴ Church of Scotland, *Narrative of a Mission of Inquiry to the Jews*, 1839, I, 101–105.

⁸⁵ Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 331.

⁸⁶ *Survey*, III, 234–235; *PEFQSt*, 1857, p. 161.

⁸⁷ H. B. Tristram, "Gaza," in C. W. Wilson, *op. cit.*, II, 169–170.

⁸⁸ G. Schumacher, "Researches in Southern Palestine," *PEFQSt*, 1886, pp. 175–76.

⁸⁹ Barron, *op. cit.*

establishes the population at 5,000 for the beginning of the century.⁹⁰ Other sources give figures close to this, until the 1830's, while some arrive at higher estimates, up to 10,000.⁹¹ For the fifties and sixties there are similar estimates.⁹² The sources of the MSWP for the seventies record three figures: 1874 — 10,000; 1875 — 17,600 (an estimate that does not seem plausible); and 1875 (according to Socin) — 8,000–10,000.⁹³ Lortet's mission (1875–1880) arrived at a figure of 14,000⁹⁴ for the population estimate of Hebron, but as in the previous cases, the figures recorded by this mission are too high. The picture of Hebron's population growth is quite simple: from 5,000 at the opening of the century to about 10,000 by the mid seventies. The British census (1922) sets the population of Hebron at 16,577.⁹⁵

H. Bethlehem and Bayt Jālā

The general picture of population growth in Bethlehem in the nineteenth century is similar to that of Hebron, but the overall figures are generally low. At the beginning of the century Seetzen states that the population estimate for Bethlehem — 2,400 — seems to him exaggerated.⁹⁶ Buckingham (1816) sets the figure at 1,000–1,500.⁹⁷ Robinson (1838) estimates the population of Bethlehem as more than 3,000 persons (800 taxpayers).⁹⁸ During the forties and fifties the estimates still centre around this figure, with some going down to 2,000 and other reaching as high as 4,000 and more.⁹⁹ One of the sources for the population of 1858 mentions reports of a population of 4,000–4,5000, but the actual population estimate is not higher than 2,000.¹⁰⁰ Guérin sets the population for 1863 at 5,000.¹⁰¹ But, as already stated, many of his figures are implausible. The MSWP quotes two sources:¹⁰² Socin — 2,023 (Schick notes that perhaps this figure includes only men;¹⁰³ in the present

⁹⁰ Seetzen, *op. cit.*, pp. 47–51.

⁹¹ For instance, Church of Scotland, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

⁹² For instance, Ritchie, *op. cit.*, pp. 341–347: 8,000 souls; Wortabet, *op. cit.*, II, 314–323: 8,000–10,000 souls.

⁹³ *Survey*, III, 309.

⁹⁴ Lortet, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

⁹⁵ Barron, *op. cit.*

⁹⁶ Seetzen, *op. cit.*, pp. 214–216.

⁹⁷ Buckingham, p. 218.

⁹⁸ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, II, 158–59.

⁹⁹ For instance, S. Olin, *Travels in Egypt ... and the Holy Land*, New York, 1843, II, 91–101: 2,000–3,000 souls; Ritchie, *op. cit.*, pp. 355–364: 3,000; Norow, *op. cit.*, pp. 293–308 and Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–248: 4,000 souls.

¹⁰⁰ Bovet, *op. cit.*, pp. 208–292.

¹⁰¹ Guérin, *Description ... Judée*, I, 120–28.

¹⁰² *Survey*, III, 28–29.

¹⁰³ See also the article by D. H. K. Amiran and A. Shahar, "Estimates of the Urban

author's opinion this need not necessarily be so), and Pere Lievin — 5,000. Other sources relating to the 1860's and the 1870's mention the same or lower figures.¹⁰⁴ In view of these data, the estimate of 6,658¹⁰⁵ recorded by the first British census (1922) is surprising, since it is very low. It would therefore seem that for the nineteenth-century population estimates of Bethlehem the lowest figures should be preferred. It should also be noted that most of the sources of information, both residents and travellers who wrote books, were Christians who wanted to prove that this renowned Christian town had a large population as compared with that of the neighbouring Muslim settlements. Another factor in the overestimates of the population of Bethlehem are the pilgrimages and visits to the holy sites.

In view of the above it is possible to arrive at the following estimates for the population of Bethlehem: 1800: 1,500; 1820: 2,500; 1860: 3,500–4,000; 1880: 4,500–5,000; 1922: 6,658.

The population estimate for Bayt Jālā should be added to that of Bethlehem. Most of the nineteenth-century travellers do not give any estimates for this town. The few who do so report only general estimates: Robinson (1838), 2,000;¹⁰⁶ Finn (1835), 3,000;¹⁰⁷ Guérin (1863), 3,000.¹⁰⁸ The MSWP quotes Pere Lievin's figure of 3,000.¹⁰⁹ However, the British census (1922) also reports a figure of 3,101.¹¹⁰ Here, as in the case of Bethlehem, the exaggeration serves "Christian causes". The population of Bayt Jālā probably varied between 1,000 and 2,000 during the first eighty years of the century under study.

I. Nablus (*Shkhem*)

As in the cases of Hebron and Bethlehem, Nablus too underwent a growth of population in the nineteenth century, but on a smaller scale. The population of Nablus at the beginning of the century was larger than that of Hebron, and this was true also of the seventies. Later, however, in 1922, the population of Hebron exceeded that of Nablus. But it would seem that this development started at the end of the nineteenth century and thus took place during the period not covered by this study.

Population of Palestine in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century," *Israel Exploration Journal*, Vol. X (1960), pp. 181–183.

¹⁰⁴ For instance, C. L. von Haller, *Orientalische Ausflüge*, Schaffhausen, 1872, pp. 352–364: 3,000 souls; and C. Orelli, *Durch's heilige Land*. Basel, 1878, p. 161: 5,000 souls.

¹⁰⁵ Barron, *op. cit.*

¹⁰⁶ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.* II, 323.

¹⁰⁷ J. Finn, *Byways in Palestine*, London, 1868.

¹⁰⁸ Guérin, *Description ... Judée*, I.

¹⁰⁹ *Survey*, III, 20.

¹¹⁰ Barron, *op. cit.*

In 1806 Seetzen reports the population of Nablus as 8,000.¹¹¹ Buckingham mentions a figure of 10,000 which he was given and which he considers exaggerated.¹¹² Other sources, in the twenties and thirties also set the figure at around 8,000–10,000,¹¹³ the estimate of 10,000 sometimes including the neighbouring villages.¹¹⁴

Robinson (1838) establishes the population at 8,000.¹¹⁵ Other sources in the forties and the fifties repeat this figure or give a similar one.¹¹⁶ The earthquake of 1837 that damaged the town may have prevented the growth of its population. Later sources note a figure of 10,000 and even higher:¹¹⁷ Tristram (1863), 9,000;¹¹⁸ Guérin (1870), 10,590.¹¹⁹ The MSWP¹²⁰ quotes two sources: an estimate for 1875 of 13,000, and the figure recorded by the missionary, Falsher, for 1881 of 20,760 (which seems inaccurate). The British census (1922) estimates the town's population as about 16,000.¹²¹

A summary of the population estimates of Nablus in the nineteenth century shows that its population was somewhat static, with increases being only slight: 1800: 7,000–8,000; 1840: 8,000; 1860: 9,000–10,000; 1880: 12,000–13,000; 1922: 16,000.

Whereas at the beginning of the century Nablus was among the four largest towns in the country, towards the end of the century it had lost this position and was overtaken by other towns. By 1922 the British census showed that Nablus had been surpassed by Jaffa and even by Hebron.

J. Nazareth

At the beginning of the nineteenth century most of the travellers note that Nazareth was only a small town, inhabited mainly by Christians and based on agriculture.¹²² Seetzen (1806) estimates the population as 1,000,¹²³ Buckingham (1816) as 2,000,¹²⁴ and others as varying between 1,200–1,400.¹²⁵

¹¹¹ Seetzen, *op. cit.*, II, 172.

¹¹² Buckingham, p. 521.

¹¹³ For instance, W. R. Wilson, *Travels*, I, 370–379: 10,000 souls; and Paxton, *op. cit.*, pp. 173–174; 6,000–8,000 souls.

¹¹⁴ Norow, *op. cit.*, II, 116–127.

¹¹⁵ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.* III, 113

¹¹⁶ For instance, Millard, *op. cit.*, pp. 308–312; Liebetrut, *op. cit.*, I, 304–320.

¹¹⁷ For instance, Orelli, *op. cit.*, pp. 209–220: 14,000 souls.

¹¹⁸ H. B. Tristram, *The Land of Israel, etc.*, London, 1866, p. 146.

¹¹⁹ Guérin, *Déscription ... Samarie*, I, 389–403.

¹²⁰ *Survey*, II, 166–167.

¹²¹ Barron, *op. cit.*,

¹²² For instance, Joliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–40; and W. R. Wilson, *Travels*, I, 384–398.

¹²³ Seetzen; *op. cit.*, II, 143.

¹²⁴ Buckingham, pp. 91–101.

¹²⁵ For instance, Joliffe, *op. cit.*, pp. 28–40.

Robinson's estimate (1838) is that of 3,000 souls, composed of 325 Christian families and 120 Muslim families.¹²⁶ His overall population figure seems to be exaggerated. In the 1840's the estimates return to figures close to 2,000, but some report a figure of 3,000 and over.¹²⁷ In the fifties and sixties the estimates become higher.¹²⁸ Tobler, who wrote a comprehensive monograph on the town, establishes the population for 1856 at 4,350 (2,300 Muslims and 2,050 Christians).¹²⁹ The MSWP quotes several sources: Rogers (1859) — 4,000; Pere Lievin (1869) — 5,935; Guérin (1870) — 4,950; and Socin (1874) — 5,660.¹³⁰ Schumacher gives a population estimate of 6,575 for 1886.¹³¹ The British census figure in 1922 is 7,424.¹³² In view of the above, the following estimate is suggested: 1800: 1,000–1,500; 1840: 2,000–2,500; 1860: 4,000; 1880: 6,000.

Nazareth's growth after 1840 was undoubtedly due to its importance as a Christian centre and to the increase in pilgrimages to the holy places. The marked discrepancies between the estimates, especially during the first part of the century, may perhaps be explained to a certain extent by the tendency of the neighbouring villagers, particularly in the Valley of Jezreel, to leave their homes for the town when the Bedouins invaded the area and to return to their villages when they became relatively quiet.¹³³

In comparison with Bethlehem, another town of Christian tourism and pilgrimage, Nazareth's development in the period 1840–1880 was in a way more rapid.

K. Tiberias

Tiberias and Safed are two cities with a similar pattern of development: an increase in population up to the earthquake in 1837, a halt in this increase and regression after the earthquake, then a certain degree of recovery followed by little development up to the seventies. The two cities differ in their general population figures, with Safed having double the population of Tiberias.

¹²⁶ Robinson and Smith; *op. cit.*, III, 183–185.

¹²⁷ For instance, C. Pelle and L. Gilbert, *Voyage en Syrie et dans l'Asie Mineure*, London and Paris, 1840, I, 14: 2,000, p. 60: 1,800 souls; C. Pardieu, *Excursion en orient ... le Mont Sinaï ... la Palestine*, Paris, 1851, pp. 296–299: 3,000 souls.

¹²⁸ For instance, Buchanan, *op. cit.*, pp. 354–360: 3,000–4,000 souls.

¹²⁹ T. Tobler, *Nazareth in Palästina etc.*, Berlin, 1868, p. 64.

¹³⁰ *Survey*, I, 228.

¹³¹ G. Schumacher, "Das jetzige Nazareth," *ZDPV*, Vol. XIII (1890), p. 235.

¹³² Barron, *op. cit.*

¹³³ Tobler, *op. cit.*; also Thomson, *op. cit.*, pp. 129–136.

Estimates of Tiberias's population at the beginning of the nineteenth century vary between 4,000 and 1,000.¹³⁴ Burckhardt (1812), one of the most important researchers of the century, establishes the figure at 4,000 (one-quarter Jews)¹³⁵ but he is probably mistaken here, mainly in his estimate of the Muslim population of the town. Buckingham's estimate (1816) is of 2,000 people (500 buildings, one-half of them occupied by Jews);¹³⁶ others record similar figures. The estimates that are low during the first and second decades become relatively higher in the thirties. Many travellers note that before the earthquake of 1837 the town had a population of 4,000, and that in that earthquake half of the population was destroyed.¹³⁷ Robinson estimates the remaining population as 2,000.¹³⁸ Other sources relating to the forties and fifties generally repeat the figures of 2,000–2,500 (in most cases half are Jews). Others report higher figures.¹³⁹ For 1875 Guérin reports 3,500 persons (2,500 Jews).¹⁴⁰ Lortet (who is known for his over estimates) sets the figure at 5,000 (3,000 Jews).¹⁴¹ The MSWP quotes two sources: an estimate of 2,000 (900 Jews), and Socin, 3,000 (half of them are Jews).¹⁴²

In view of the above, the following summary is suggested: 1800: 2,000; 1837 (before the earthquake): 3,000–4,000; 1840: 2,000; 1860: 2,500; 1880: 3,000. The British census for 1922 records a population of 6,950,¹⁴³ which is actually a result of the development between 1880 and 1922.

L. Safed

The estimates of Safed's population for the beginning of the century present several difficulties. Some researchers report the number of buildings or families instead of offering population estimates.¹⁴⁴ But the figure of 1,000 to 1,500 families seems close to reality, indicating a population of about 5,000–6,000.¹⁴⁵ Burckhardt (1812) estimates the number of houses in the

¹³⁴ For instance, H. Light, *Travels in Egypt, Nubia, the Holy Land, Mount Lebanon and Cyprus*, London, 1818, pp. 202–206: 1,000 souls; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 139–144: 550 houses.

¹³⁵ Burckhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

¹³⁶ Buckingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 459–465,

¹³⁷ J. N. Visino, *Meine Wanderung nach Palästina*, Passau, 1840, pp. 268–276.

¹³⁸ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, III, 253–263.

¹³⁹ E. Q. Schulz; *Reise in das Gelobte Land*, Muellheim, 1852, pp. 263–266: 4,000 souls.

¹⁴⁰ Guérin, *Description ... Gallée*, I, 250–263.

¹⁴¹ Lortet, *op. cit.*, p. 498.

¹⁴² *Survey*, I, 361–362.

¹⁴³ Barron, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁴ Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 141; Jowett, *op. cit.*, pp. 181–185.

¹⁴⁵ This would be correct if we could establish an average of 4–5 people in one house or family, which is relatively low.

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town as 600;¹⁴⁶ however, the term "house" in Safed is evidently difficult to define. In any case, this figure corresponds to our own estimates.

Up to 1837 the population of Safed showed an increase. A considerable number of sources report a population of 7,000–8,000, with half, or even more than half, being Jews.¹⁴⁷ The earthquake caused great damage to the population, especially among the Jews. Hyamson (1839) finds 1,500 Jews;¹⁴⁸ other sources also report 1,000 Jews for the same period.¹⁴⁹

In the forties and fifties both the Jewish and the Muslim populations increased. Many sources return to figures close to 6,000,¹⁵⁰ of which the Arab population constituted the majority, particularly in the sixties and seventies. It is worth noting in this context that a Muslim population from North Africa had begun to settle in the town in large numbers. The relatively dependable population estimates for Safed in the seventies are in a sense peculiar; they also include certain errors and are in some ways confused. Guérin (1880) arrives at a population estimate of 7,000 Jews and 6,000 Muslims, and a final total of 13,150¹⁵¹ (which seems too high). On the other hand, the MSWP's estimate for 1877 is 4,550 (3,000 Muslims, 1,500 Jews)¹⁵² — a figure relatively low in general and particularly as far as the Jews are concerned.

Lortet's research mission (1875–1880) records a rather low figure for the population of Safed — 5,500 (two-thirds Jews);¹⁵³ the strangest estimate is included in Schumacher's census (1886): 24,615,¹⁵⁴ which is probably an error. In general, one may accept the assumption that Safed's population increased in the sixties and seventies, but it is doubtful whether it ever surpassed the figure reached before the earthquake in 1837. The British census of 1922 supports this assumption with an estimate of 8,761.¹⁵⁵

The suggested estimate is as follows: 1800: 5,000–6,000; 1837 (before the earthquake): 7,000–8,000; 1840: 4,000–5,000; 1860: 6,000–7,000; 1880: 7,000–8,000.

¹⁴⁶ Burckhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 317.

¹⁴⁷ Robinson and Smith, *op. cit.*, III, 319.

¹⁴⁸ Hyamson, I, 5.

¹⁴⁹ Olin, *op. cit.*, II, 411–417.

¹⁵⁰ Schulz, *op. cit.*, pp. 268–270: 7,000 souls; Liebetrut, *op. cit.*, I, 187–188: 7,000 souls.

¹⁵¹ Guérin, *Description ... Galilée* II, 419–421.

¹⁵² *Survey*, I, 199–200.

¹⁵³ Lortet, *op. cit.*, p. 535.

¹⁵⁴ Schumacher, "Population Lists."

¹⁵⁵ Barron, *op. cit.*

III. Summary and Conclusions

The following table summarizes the suggested estimates of the population of the towns under survey

<i>City</i>	1800	1840	1860	1880	1922
Jerusalem	9,000	13,000	19,000	30,000	62,500
Acre	8,000	10,000	10,000	8,500	6,400
Haifa	1,000	2,000	3,000	6,000	24,600
Jaffa	2,750	4,750	6,520	10,000	47,700
Ramla	2,000	2,500	3,000	3,500	7,400
Gaza	8,000	12,000	15,000	19,000	17,500
Hebron	5,000	6,500	7,500	10,000	16,600
Bethlehem	1,500	2,500	3,570	4,750	6,600
Nablus	7,500	8,000	9,500	12,500	16,000
Nazareth	1,250	2,250	4,000	6,000	7,500
Tiberias	2,000 (3,500)*	2,000	2,500	3,000	7,000
Safed	5,500 (7,500)*	4,500	6,500	7,500	8,800
TOTAL	54,000	70,000	90,000	120,750	228,600

* before the earthquake.

A. The Entire Population

The above table shows that the population of the twelve major towns in Palestine reached a total of 50,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and by the end of the 1870's approximately 120,000. These figures are lower than most previous estimates and indicate that the entire population in the country may have been smaller than was thought.

B. Changes throughout the Century

In general, the population of the towns grew constantly during the century under study, but the rate of growth varied: during the first forty years it was slow; during the next twenty years it was doubled, in this short period reaching the same absolute increase as in the former period of forty years; and between 1869 and 1880 it was even higher. The highest growth rate was recorded for the period 1880-1914, prior to the British conquest.

C. Changes in the Position of the Towns

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the twelve towns could be divided into four categories (according to size of population): 1. Jerusalem, Acre, Gaza and Nablus, each of which had a population of about 8,000-10,000; 2. Safed and Hebron, with populations of about 5,000-6,000 each; 3. Tiberias, Jaffa and Ramla, with populations of 3,000 each; 4. Haifa, Nazareth and Bethlehem, with populations of about 1,000-1,500 each.

THE POPULATION OF THE LARGE TOWNS

By the middle of the nineteenth century Jerusalem had attained a position in which she stood alone with the largest population of all. Jaffa's position as a port had served to increase her population. Gaza's population continued to grow. Acre, Safed, Tiberias and Ramla were somewhat static in their development. Nablus and Hebron continued their slow rate of growth. Haifa, Nazareth and Bethlehem showed some signs of growth.

By the end of the nineteenth century Jerusalem's superior position was strengthened. Jaffa's position as a port became even more important. Ramla and Lod began to show some growth. Gaza retained its position and its population increased. Acre's population became smaller while Haifa's rose. Nablus and Hebron continued their slow growth. Nazareth and Bethlehem increased their growth rate at a relatively high speed. In Safed and Tiberias there were no apparent changes in comparison with the earlier period.

The development of the towns in Palestine in the nineteenth century reflects the character of the age; moreover, it shows the transition from periods of depression during Ottoman rule to periods of revival by the termination of this rule, up to modern times.

5. CHANGES IN THE URBAN GEOGRAPHY OF HEBRON DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY*

by YEHUDA KARMON

I. Geographical Conditions

A. The Hebron Mountains

The town of Hebron is the highest town in Palestine, and few other towns in the Middle East are situated at a same or higher elevation. The old city, which represents the town of the nineteenth century, climbs on a slope rising to about 900 to 925 metres, while the modern part of the city is built on hills up to 1000 metres. The town is situated in a valley on the upper reaches of Wadi al-Khalil (Wadi Hebron), a tributary of Wadi Beersheba, near the southern edge of a rocky limestone plateau.

This plateau forms the backbone of the Hebron Mountains, the southern half of the Judean Mountains. It is the natural hinterland of Hebron and it has never possessed another urban centre. This plateau is the highest continuous mountainous region in Palestine and possesses some singular geographical features. It rises in steep scarps over its flanks: in the west the hills of the Shefela; in the east the Judean desert, which drops in steps to the Dead Sea, 1400 metres below the plateau. Towards the south it descends more gradually to the arid basins of Beersheba and Arad, which lie at elevations 300 and 500 metres above sea level, respectively. Thus the Hebron Mountains form a natural fortress, isolated from three sides, and continued only in the north by the mountains of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, which are lower by 200 metres. Along the flanks of the plateau erosion has created steep, deeply incised, dry river valleys (see Map No. 1), but the top of the plateau has scarcely been affected by erosion. It contains a number of wide, flat valleys, which have been formed by the dissolution of limestone. They are covered with deep, although stony, soil and are separated from each other by rocky hills, the elevation of which lies around 1000 metres, whereas the valleys possess an average height of 850-900 metres. The width of the plateau is about 12 kilometres, and its length approximately 20 kilometres. Nowhere else in Palestine is there an almost level plateau of such dimensions.

* This paper is based on a survey of Hebron carried out by the author in collaboration with Mr. A. Shmueli.

The climate of the plateau is characteristic of a mountainous area in the sub-humid Middle East. In summer, day temperatures are high, up to 30°C, but there occurs a considerable cooling during the night. Winter temperatures are generally cool, with frost occurring on several nights each month. Rainfall diminishes rapidly from north to south. In the northern part of the Hebron Mountains average yearly rainfall surpasses 700 millimetres, yet Hebron receives only about 500 millimetres average, and 5 kilometres south of it precipitation is less than 400 millimetres, the margin of permanent grain cultivation. However, the efficiency of precipitation is increased by a high amount of dew in summer and frequent fogs in winter. The southern slopes of the plateau receive only 300 millimetres of rainfall, which makes even grain production precarious. But the lack of rainfall is made up for, in part, by different types of soil which have developed on chalky rocks and are more easily worked.

The slopes thus form a zone of transition to the desert, and its proximity to the arid areas has always influenced the economy and life of Hebron. The conditions of topography and climate are reflected in the agriculture, characteristic of the plateau.

The rocky hills are unsuitable for any cultivation; only in the twentieth century have they been turned into plantations by expensive terracing and soil conservation. Agricultural land is provided only by the wide valleys and parts of the slopes, where softer rocks outcrop. The most suitable topography occurs on the southern and southeastern slopes, but marginal rainfall there allows only the growing of grains, with severe danger of drought. Therefore the mountain peasants always looked for additional cropland in the Negev or in the Shefela.

The main agricultural asset is the valleys of dissolution on the top of the plateau, which were utilized for plantations whenever economic conditions were favourable; however, because of their great elevation, they are unsuited to olives, which are restricted by climate to heights of up to 700 metres, above which the tree produces only poor crops. Since most of the agricultural land in the rest of Palestine lies below that altitude, the olive became there the most preferred branch of agriculture of all hill villages, and formed the main cash crop. But in the Hebron Mountains it is grown mainly on the upper slopes of the flanks, where the altitude is about 700 metres: on the plateau itself olives are grown only for the peasant's own consumption.

The most suitable crop for the utilization of the high valleys proved to be the vine, which, by skillful handling, could be turned into a profitable cash crop. Since antiquity Hebron and its surroundings were well known for the size and quality of their grapes, and throughout history Hebronites acted as advisors for viticulture all over the Middle East. They developed special

techniques for retention of moisture in the soil by frequent plowing and weeding, and became experts in utilizing topographical differences for lengthening the ripening season of the grapes. On south-facing slopes the grapes would ripen first, because of the strong insolation; thus the harvest could be around July–August. On north-facing slopes the ripening could be delayed until September or early October. The latest grapes would be grown in the valleys: the deeper soil retains more moisture and is thus generally cooler, and at nights air drainage collects cool air and dew, which retard the ripening. As a consequence, grapes ripen in the valleys between October and December.


The possibility of spreading the grape harvest over a period of almost six months gained special importance after the Muslim conquest, when both consumption and production of wine were forbidden. In the low-lying parts of Palestine it became necessary to abandon most of the vineyards, as there was no way to preserve the grapes, and the extent of this branch of agriculture was cut down to fit the needs of the village for fresh grapes during a season which lasted only a few weeks. Yet in the Hebron Mountains it was possible to base the diet of the population on grapes, which were available for half a year. There are a number of special dishes prepared from grapes or grape preserves which are known only in Hebron.¹ Nevertheless restriction of vineyards became necessary later on, when the subsistence agriculture of the later Middle Ages and Ottoman period demanded the production of a variety of crops for home consumption. Lack of security also impeded the planting of vineyards at a larger distance from the villages. Here too Hebron was an exception. Its peasants erected large fortified two-storey buildings — *qasr* — in the vineyards, where they spent most of the summer.²


Within the vineyards other fruit trees were grown too, mostly along their margins. Travellers of all times have never failed to mention the green belt of plantations which surrounds Hebron and some of the villages in the Hebron Mountains.


A severe problem of settlement in the Hebron Mountains is created by the water supply. Although the dissolution of the limestone on the plateau prevents runoff of rain and enables it to percolate underground, the water horizon is shallow and produces a large number of springs, which yield, however, only small quantities of water. The main concentration of these

¹ Even today people originating in Hebron who work in the oil-rich countries of Arabia, receive from their families food parcels containing those special dishes which are unavailable elsewhere.

² This custom has been perpetuated until today; the fortresses have been replaced by villas within the vineyards, and today 30% of the houses of Hebron are built within vineyards or plantations, and inhabited by 25% of the population of the town.







small springs occurs within the western drainage in the steep valleys, which are difficult to reach. Thus it was necessary to retain rain-water in cisterns, and in fact every house, even today, depends mainly on its own cistern.

The occurrence of springs on the slopes of the flanks was another factor which influenced the location of villages. Of the twelve villages situated on the top of the plateau, four lie on the outer edge of a spur which descends to the Shefela in the west, three villages lie in a similar position on the eastern edge of the plateau, and three more lie on the shoulders of the more moderately desiccated southern slopes. In the centre of the plateau, besides Hebron, there exists only one village: Ḥalḥūl. The last of the settlements, Sa'ir, is situated within a valley, close to a large spring. In ancient times the number of settlements was much larger, especially in the southeastern sector, where they existed on marginal grain cultivation.

The reduction of the number of settlements was caused mainly by problems of security. Bedouin from the surrounding arid grazing areas formed a constant danger to the fields and orchards of the settlements, and only very large villages situated in locations protected by nature were able to resist their onslaughts. This accounts for preference of a position on the edge of a spur, which made access impossible from three sides. In 1967 four of these villages comprised more than 5,000 inhabitants each, and another five villages more than 3,000. Although there exist no exact estimates on the population of these villages in the nineteenth century, it can safely be assumed that they were of a similar large size and were among the largest villages in Palestine. The large number of inhabitants strengthened the position of those villages opposite Hebron, and they actually dominated the region more than did the town.

B. Communications

The main advantage of Hebron over the villages lies in its position astride the traffic routes of the Hebron Mountains. The Mountains of Hebron provide the natural link between Jerusalem and the Negev or the southern end of the Dead Sea. These routes do not belong to the major trade routes of Palestine because they have to cross terrain of difficult topography and because the areas to the south have always been void of settlement and led to regions of little economic value.

The main trade routes of Palestine used to bypass the Hebron Mountains. The main highway of the country — the ancient "Way of the Sea," the Roman *Via Maris* — passed along the coastal plain from Sinai to the foot of Mount Carmel, and there it crossed over to the Jordan Valley, which formed the link to Damascus, and thence the highway continued to Anatolia or Mesopotamia. The Arabian trade routes utilized the plateau of Trans-

jordan in order to reach Damascus, or turned from Transjordan westwards to Beisan, towards Acre, which was the country's main port in Roman or Crusader times, and also in the eighteenth century.

However, in certain times, when security conditions or floods and swamps prevented the use of the above mentioned routes, Hebron offered an alternative route using the mountain road from Beisan via Nablus and Jerusalem. From Hebron it was relatively easy to reach Beersheba, the gateway to all Negev routes and especially to Egypt. This place, however, remained unoccupied throughout the Middle Ages until the end of the nineteenth century. A more difficult route led from Hebron through the Judean Desert towards the oasis of 'Ein Gedi on the western shore of the Dead Sea, and thence to the plateau of southern Transjordan, the Mountains of Edom. The use of this route depended, in addition to problems of security, upon the level of the Dead Sea. Travellers reported, in certain periods, that it was possible to cross the straits separating the Judean coast of the Dead Sea near Massada from the Lisān Peninsula on the Transjordanian shore. Today the maximum depth of the water on that passage amounts to 8 metres. However as the measurements since the beginning of the nineteenth century recorded fluctuations in the level of the Dead Sea of up to 15 metres, it may be deduced that there were times when a crossing of the straits was possible, which provided a shorter route to Arabia. This route also provided the best connection with the Mountains of Edom, where settlement on the plateau is almost completely isolated by the surrounding desert, and whence connections to the settled areas in Palestine or the Ḥawrān were dangerous, owing to the sparse settlement in the intervening Mountains of Gilead. These routes furthered the development of strong trade connections between The Hebron Mountains and Edom, and these connections were fortified by family ties.

Thus Hebron represented an important centre of routes of local significance. As such it provided a meeting ground for the Bedouin from the south and east with the peasants from the north and west, and a trading station for goods destined to the areas further north and traded in Jerusalem.

C. Topography of the Town

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the town of Hebron was approximately of the same extent as the present Old City. It lies along the narrowest stretch of the valley of Wadi Hebron.³ West of the old town there are a number of wide valleys of dissolution of a north-south direction, which have formed the main agricultural land of the town throughout

³ The old city of Nablus lies at a similar topographical position along the narrow upper stretch of Naḥal Alexander.

history. A similar group of valleys surrounds the area of the town from the north and the east. The valleys change their direction for a stretch about one kilometre long into NW-SE, before turning southwards again; along this stretch the valley is narrowest. It is flanked on the north and on the south by hills reaching a height of 970 metres, whereas the bottom of the valley lies at about an 880 metre elevation. The hill to the north, Jabal al-Ja'bara, sends towards the valley a number of spurs possessing a fairly steep lower slope, and divided from each other by indentations. These indentations are still used for agriculture; in each of them there are a number of small springs.

The main part of the old city is situated on the easternmost spur, part of which is called al-Rās; it stretches along its lower slope for a length of 750 metres and a width of 200 metres. The Ḥaram al-Khalīl, the mosque which is situated above the Patriarch's Cave (Me'arat ha-Makhpela), lies in its upper section, slightly east of its centre (see Map No. 2).

Northwest of the main section, on the slope of another spur called Jabal Baylūn, lies the small quarter of Ḥārat al-Shaykh attached to the mosque and tomb of Sheikh 'Alī al-Bakka', which was built by the Mamluk ruler Baybars in 1271. A third section, larger than the second one, was built on the hill south of the valley, adjoining the Birkat al-Sultān, and is called Ḥārat Qayṭūn. In this section, a plan of two perpendicular roads can still be discerned, indicating a probable Mamluk foundation. The separation of the sections from the main core could be explained in part by topography, but this may indicate that these quarters were originally occupied by strangers, maybe Kurds or Turkomans.

The splitting of the town into three separate sections prevented the construction of an encompassing wall; the protection of the town was achieved in such a way that the houses along the periphery of each section were continuous and had no outward-facing doors, and only in a few places "gates" were left open, which facilitated entry into the town through passages in the lower floor of a house. The main fortification of the town was a citadel built on the upper slope adjoining the Ḥaram al-Khalīl.

The main problem of the town was water supply. The small springs in the valleys, the flow of which diminishes to a trickle in the dry season, could not cope with the demands of a densely populated town and each house was provided with its own cistern for the storage of rain-water. Two large public cisterns—probably originating in antiquity—were constructed along the main valley at places where it was joined by the small indentations. In early Ottoman times they were enlarged, and water from all valleys and some springs was conducted to them by stone conduits. The westernmost of these, the Birkat al-Qazzāzin, is now covered, and a mosque has been built in its

place. The eastern cistern, known as Birkat al-Sulṭān, was enlarged and rebuilt within a chain of cisterns, all bearing the same name and constructed to facilitate the water supply for pilgrims of the *ḥajj*. They include the large cistern in Jerusalem, "Solomon's Pools," and also smaller cisterns in Khirbat Karmil and at 'Ein Gedi. They indicate that in early Ottoman times the pilgrim route went from Jerusalem to the Mountains of Edom through Hebron and the Dead Sea.

II. *Economic Foundations*

A. *The Agricultural Base*

Since, in the later days of the Ottoman Empire the economy of Palestine was based mainly on subsistence agriculture, urban settlements had to rely on their own food supply in a way similar to rural villages; thus it was important for each town to possess a large area of agricultural land. The area in the possession of Hebron, which was defined by mapping only during the British mandate, amounted to approximately 70,000 *dunam* (17,500 acres). Although this area may seem very large when compared with other villages in Palestine, its size is not extraordinary in the Hebron Mountains, where settlements had to be large (see above, p. 72), and actually many villages on the plateau possessed even much larger areas. However only part of the land was arable, most of it being rocky and usable only for grazing. The percentage of cultivated land in Hebron was always much larger than in the other villages. The villages situated on the edges of the spurs possess land mainly on the steep flanks or valley slopes. This land is unsuitable for agriculture even under modern methods of land reclamation. On the other hand, most of the lands of Hebron lie on the flat plateau, and especially in the wide valleys.

Land ownership is an important feature in the utilization of lands in Hebron and the surrounding villages. With the Muslim conquest, all land around Hebron was declared *waqf*; its income was earmarked for the upkeep of the Ḥaram al-Khalil and its institutions. The largest *waqf*, *waqf* Tamīm al-Dārī, comprises about 60 % of all land belonging to Hebron; 38 % of the land, mainly in the town itself, belongs to the *waqf* al Khalil al-Raḥmān, and 2 % are family *waqfs*. The ownership of the land by the *waqf*, which later became almost nominal and created conditions similar to private property, prevented the formation of large land ownerships or of a feudal system and served as a means to preserve the land-tenure of the inhabitants of Hebron. It provided the families of Hebron with a sense of security of land occupation and enabled them to invest in land reclamation and in plantations, whose fruit was ensured even for following generations.

These conditions prevailed in the surrounding villages too, but Hebron possessed an additional advantage. The closely-knit families and *hamūlas* comprised not only peasants, but also people engaged in urban activities, such as wholesale merchants and traders and, included even the highest social strata represented by religious leaders and *qādīs*. The social mixture of a family provided the peasant with investment funds and sources of credit unobtainable for villagers, and prevented a financial dependency which often led to a form of feudal dependency in other parts of the country. In Hebron the providing of funds usually turned into a form of partnership, which encouraged further investment in agriculture. This took the form of plantations (mainly mixed fruit orchards — *bustān*) in which, however, the vine was predominant. It has already been pointed out that natural conditions and dietary habits also encouraged the production of grapes; hence Hebron took up an outstanding position in this aspect.

On the other hand, the olive played only a minor part in the agriculture of Hebron. Olives trees were grown within the *bustān* but not in larger concentrations, and served mainly for the family's own supply.

Grain production was naturally pushed to marginal areas, where conditions are unfavourable for grapes. Many peasants preferred to rent land in distant regions in the west or south, or to buy grain from the inhabitants of the surrounding villages.

B. Trade and Manufacture

In spite of a generally prevailing subsistence economy there still remained a certain degree of urban activity in the few towns existing in Palestine during the Ottoman period. This activity focused mainly around trade based on transit routes or on the junction of two different economic regions. In Hebron the latter was the case; it served mainly as a marketing place for Bedouin of its vicinity. As their grazing animals were mainly sheep and goats, these animals and their products were the main trading object of the town's markets. The number of sheep alone in the area of Hebron in the nineteenth century is estimated as surpassing 200,000. Wool and cheese were the main products, and were bought not only by direct consumers, but also by wholesalers, who transported them to Jerusalem and the coast. A large slaughtering activity took place near the large cisterns, and the processing of hides formed the main manufacturing activity of the town. Tanning also took place near the cistern, in order to utilize its water, and for centuries Hebron was known as the only place where water bags were made of goat hides. This tradition is expressed today in a large shoemaking operations, which provides more than half of all shoes manufactured in Judea and Samaria. Bedouin also sold carpets and garments made of sheep hides.

Of special importance was the trade with the Mountains of Edom and Moab. This area was resettled in the seventeenth century by immigrants from Hebron, who introduced the vine there as well; towns like Karak or Shawbak, or even al-Şalt, are inhabited by many families from Hebron, who monopolized all trade. Trade caravans from these areas used to come regularly to Hebron and to proceed from there to Jerusalem. The range of goods traded in the markets of Hebron was extensive, and goods from Egypt or Arabia also found their way into the town, although at rare intervals.

A special feature of the town was glass manufacture, a monopoly which Hebron possessed for the southern area of the Ottoman Empire, until the nineteenth century; these glass products were exported mainly to Egypt. Glass manufacture was introduced at the beginning of the thirteenth century by Jews from Venice, but later passed into the hands of Muslims. At the beginning of Ottoman rule, Jewish refugees from Spain settled in Hebron in large numbers and introduced a number of other industries, such as dyeing and silk weaving.

C. Regional Centrality

It has already been pointed out that in an economy based on subsistence agriculture there is little dependence of rural settlements upon the services of a central town. Therefore the economic power of a town depended more upon its position along major routes than upon its centrality in a region. In addition, most of the major towns were based on services rendered to a wider area, for instance, ports which served a wide hinterland stretching from the Mediterranean coast as far as Iraq, or towns at the edge of the desert, which served as foci for all activities going on in a wide desert area. Hebron may be counted as belonging to the latter category, although its hinterland stretched only as far as the basins of Beersheba and Arad and the Mountains of Edom.⁴

However, Hebron fulfilled an additional central function, serving a much wider area; it was a religious centre of highest prestige, with sufficient appeal to deflect the *hajj* towards the town: the Ḥaram al-Khalīl, the tomb of Abraham and the other Patriarchs. This shrine stands high up in the hierarchy of Muslim holy places, and within Palestine it is second only to the Dome of the Rock and the adjoining Mosque of al-Aqṣā. Since the Arab conquest (637 A.D.) Hebron was regarded mainly as the guardian of the shrine, which was adorned with a mighty mosque (built on Herodian founda-

⁴ It may be noted that the southern Negev and the Arava were scarcely visited by Bedouins — mainly on their way from Arabia to Egypt — and that Aqaba did not fulfill any functions as a port.

tions and protected by a citadel): it has been a place of Muslim learning and provided facilities for pilgrims during many centuries. As mentioned previously, all the lands in the Hebron Mountains were turned into *waqfs*, whose income was earmarked for the upkeep of these institutions. In the first centuries of Arab rule the Arabs recognized the rights of the Jews to visit the cave and to pray in the hall above the tombs. But after the Crusades, Baybars, who restored and reinforced the mosque in 1266, issued an order forbidding both Jews and Christians to enter the mosque; this order was in force for 700 years, until 1967. Since Baybars' days, the guarding of the mosque from the visit of strangers became a source of religious fanaticism for which Hebron became known through all times. The prestige of the mosque and its religious leaders (*'ulamā'*) who settled in the adjoining quarters of al-Qal'a, Khidma and al-Madrassa, was so great that some of the leaders also achieved similar positions in Jerusalem; many high dignitaries of the Mosque of al-Aqṣā bear names which testify to their origin from Hebron. The mosque was frequented by the peasants of the Judean villages each Friday, and especially during the month of Ramaḍān. Many pilgrims on their way to and from Mecca stopped to visit the mosque. Today, all mosques of Hebron, save two, are still situated within the precincts of the Old City. Their number now is thirteen, but travellers of the Ottoman period report a much larger number of mosques.

On the other hand, Hebron did not exercise any political leadership in its surrounding area; this may be partly explained by the lack of regional interdependence between town and village in a subsistence economy, and partly by the absence of a proper regional administration within the Ottoman Empire, for administrative power was not exercised by government officials but rather by local strongmen, especially the tax farmers. Yet there were additional reasons which accrued from the special geographical position of the Hebron Mountains. The constant danger of attacks by Bedouins forced the population to concentrate in large settlements and to maintain a strong military deterrent force. This force could be strengthened by the formation of coalitions among a number of villages, whose combined number of inhabitants was much greater than the number of the inhabitants of Hebron. Also owing to the character of the terrain, Hebron would not be able to defend the mountain villages, which relied in their defense mainly on the difficult topography of their surroundings.

These fighting coalitions based on family relationships gained a special importance in the eighteenth century and in the first half of the nineteenth century, at the time of the general wars between such coalitions in Palestine, which were known as Qays and Yaman. The Yaman coalition in Judea was based on the town of Bethlehem and its surroundings, whereas the Qays were

divided geographically into a number of groups. The villages on the plateau belonged to the coalition of Zaf al-Jabal, headed by the leading family of the village of Dura (the largest on the plateau). This is the family of 'Amr, who until today provides the *mukhtār* of this village.

The town of Hebron did not belong to any coalition and was often attacked by forces of the villagers; there are reports from the nineteenth century of attacks by the villages of Sa'ir, al-Shūyūkh, and Yatta.

III. Hebron During the Nineteenth Century

A. Analysis of Travellers' Records

The main sources of knowledge on Palestine in the nineteenth century are travellers' reports. The number of travellers to the country increased considerably with the renewed interest in the area after the conquest by Napoleon. The change in the character of the reports is of special importance. Most of the travellers in the nineteenth century were not motivated by religious interest alone, and thus they did not confine themselves solely to visiting holy sites or to the identification of places mentioned in the Scriptures. Most of the travellers had acquired some knowledge in natural science or history, and even archaeology had become more scientifically oriented in that time.

Nevertheless most of the reports have to be read with reservations, especially concerning figures; there existed no statistical base for any numbers, and all figures were based either on quotations of previous travellers or on estimates which were often highly individual.

Only the figures concerning the Jewish population are reliable. The Jews of Hebron were concentrated in one narrow quarter and almost all of them received financial aid from Jews abroad. This was distributed by the leaders of the community, who hence must have possessed a knowledge of the exact numbers of the members of the congregations who regularly visited the synagogues. In the middle of the nineteenth century censuses were even held.

Travellers from the first decades of the nineteenth century generally report that Hebron was a flourishing town, surrounded by fields and plantations. This was in contrast to the countryside, described as being devastated, and the villages, partly in ruins — probably an outcome of the constant wars of the coalitions. The markets of Hebron were full of merchandise and served as an important centre of communications.

There is no reason to doubt these reports. The wars of Napoleon had almost completely destroyed all settlements and economic life in the coastal plain, through which the French army moved twice: on their way to

Acre, and on their retreat to Egypt. Especially during the latter, orders were given to destroy everything. Thus Gaza was completely in ruins; so was Jaffa, whose reconstruction did not start before the second decade of the nineteenth century, under the governorship of Abū Nabbūt. Ramla had also suffered much under the French occupation. It was a natural consequence that the trade routes were shifted to the mountains, lying outside the route of the French army. The caravans from Egypt chose a more southern route through Sinai, which led from Suez to Qusayma, and thence to Beersheba, Hebron and Jerusalem.

The *hajj* is also reported to have passed through Hebron. This fits in with the research on the level of the Dead Sea, which during the first thirty years of the nineteenth century reached one of its lowest points: 402 metres below sea level. It was therefore possible to cross to Transjordan over the Lisān Peninsula and thence to Karak, Shawbak and Tafila, whose strong connections with Hebron have already been mentioned.

Supporting evidence is given by travellers, who reported having seen caravans crossing the straits of Lisān. Only later on (1817) is there a report by Irby and Mangles, stating that the *hajj* had changed its route away from Hebron towards Jericho, probably because the passage of the straits had become impossible.

An important source of knowledge about trade and manufacture in Hebron is Seetzen.⁵ He reported that in Hebron there existed 26 kilns for glass manufacture (four for green glass for lamps, twelve for jewellery and ten for beads) with a total employment of about 150 persons. In view of the economic conditions of that time, such a number of workers must be regarded as representing a major industry. The caustic soda needed for glass manufacture was produced by Bedouins from plants near the shore of the Dead Sea, the sand was brought from the Judean Desert and fuel from shrub in the mountains. Besides glass, Seetzen mentions the manufacture of gourds from hides and also soap manufacture. Other travellers of that time report cotton spinning; it should be noted that cotton was grown in several places in Palestine, until it was put out of the market by the competition of Egyptian cotton in the 1830's.

Burckhardt, who visited the country some years after Seetzen, saw dyeing and manufacturing of cosmetic and pharmaceutical goods for which plants or spices were brought by Bedouins from the Jordan Valley. He is the main source of information about connections with Transjordan, where he mentions especially Karak, Shawbak and even Ma'an. Every two months a caravan used to leave for Jerusalem, packed with goods brought from the

⁵ U. J. Seetzen, *Reisen durch Syrien, Palästina, etc.*, Berlin, 1845-49.

Mountains of Edom; among the goods he mentions are the horns of gazelles, which were turned into all forms of goods in Hebron.

Few of the travellers mention any connections with the surrounding villages; perhaps they did not notice those everyday contacts, but it is evident that both trade with Transjordan and manufacture constituted the main base of the town's economy.

The living conditions of the Jews in Hebron were bad. Seetzen reports that about 50 families of Spanish origin lived in the crowded courtyards of the "ghetto". By the time of the visit by Irby and Mangles (1817) the number of households had risen to 100. However, Turner at the same time reported that most of the Jews were old people. The age structure of the Jewish population was unbalanced, as many of them had come to the town to pray and die. Therefore a "household" is not to be regarded as a complete family. The death rate was probably very high, and hence strong fluctuations in the number of Jews should be expected, since the net rate of natural increase was probably strongly negative, and the population grew only by renewed waves of immigration.

B. The Decline at Mid Century

The conquest of Palestine by Ibrāhīm Pasha (1831–1841) changed the position of Hebron completely. While the short Egyptian rule brought prosperity to the settlements and the population of the coastal plain and interior valleys which were liberated from the scourge of the Bedouin, the mountains suffered only destruction. The mountainous areas, which opposed the Egyptian army, were defeated in the beginning of the campaign, but revolted once more in 1834. As Hebron took an active part in the revolt, it was besieged by Ibrāhīm and during the siege the citadel was destroyed by cannon fire. The town was conquered and sacked, and many of its houses were destroyed.

Additional destruction was wrought upon the town by the earthquake of 1837, which was most severe in the Galilee and Tiberias, but also affected other parts of the mountains of Palestine. Even after the retreat of the Egyptian army the town did not return to its former position. Near the end of the Egyptian occupation, the leader of the Qays coalition, Sheikh 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Amr of Dūra, was appointed by the Turks as ruler of the Hebron Mountains, including the town itself. He imposed severe taxes on the town and threatened to expel its Jews and the few Christians living in it, and even prevented the British and Austrian consuls in Jerusalem from entering the town. He also renewed the war against the Yaman faction, whose centre was Bethlehem. His stronghanded manner finally aroused the wrath of the Ottoman governor, Muḥammad Pasha, who sent troops against 'Amr, who

had fortified himself in the town (1846). The Turkish cannons breached the walls of the outer houses, and after the conquest the soldiers were given a free hand in looting.

At the time of the restoration of Turkish rule the population of Hebron had dwindled to about 5,000, and the town was destroyed to a large extent. The decline of the town was felt in all ways of life. The traffic routes between Egypt and Syria had returned to the coastal plain, and only few Egyptian caravans entered the town. Their members had to spend a few days in quarantine, for which a large building was constructed above the edge of the cemetery south of the town.⁶

Glass manufacture had almost completely disappeared; this was due partly to the lack of fuel, as Ibrāhīm Pasha had destroyed almost all remaining forests to provide timber for the building of a fleet; another reason was the competition of European glass, for which Egypt had opened its markets, shutting off the major outlet for the products of Hebron.

Meanwhile the *hajj* had been entirely rerouted. Even after the flooding of the passage through the Dead Sea, some caravans went through Hebron to the Negev, in order to join the Egyptian caravans at Aqaba. Now the Egyptians organized the pilgrimage, which was also joined by pilgrims from North Africa, by using the sea route from Suez to Jidda; the Syrian caravans went all along the *darb al-hajj* in Transjordan, and the Palestinian pilgrims joined their caravans in Transjordan, crossing the Jordan at Dāmiya or near Jericho.

Only the Jews of Hebron had been granted a short respite during the Egyptian rule. Shortly before, in 1820, the community had been enlarged by the setting up of a community of Ashkenazim; first by 15 families from Safed, and later on by immigrants from central Europe. The régime of Ibrāhīm Pasha showed tolerance towards religious minorities, and some Christians too settled in the town. The new Jewish settlers engaged in economic enterprises, and the traveller Lortet mentions the additional activity of silk weaving, which was carried out in a separate quarter south of Ḥārat al-Shaykh. The traditional Jewish dyeing manufacture is also mentioned by others. Jews were also active in processing grapes into raisins and even into wine. An estimate of 1839 puts the number of Jews at 700, 60% of whom were Ashkenazim.

The revolts against Ibrāhīm Pasha were accompanied by persecution of the Jews, many of whom were forced to leave. The worst time for the Jewish community was the rule of 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Amr. As a result of these

⁶ It later became a Turkish barrack.

changes, the Jewish community was utterly impoverished; estimates of the early 1850's put their number at only three hundred.

C. Recovery in the Last Quarter of the Century

By the end of the nineteenth century conditions in Palestine changed gradually. The opening of the Suez Canal had renewed the interest of the European powers in the Middle East in general, and in Palestine political influence was supplemented by missionary activities and financial investment. The Turkish government strengthened the central authority and set up a programme of development of carriage roads and of frontier settlements (Circassian) as a barrier against Bedouins, especially in the Ḥawrān and Transjordan. The founding of Beersheba should be mentioned in this context, as it provided a basis to curb the Bedouin in the area south of Hebron. It is characteristic of the spirit of Hebron that a large part of the merchants who settled in the new town originated from Hebron.

Due to improved security conditions the people of Hebron were able to enlarge the areas of vineyards in the surroundings of the town. New markets for grapes were found in the rapidly increasing population of Jerusalem and the coastal towns. The population of the town grew slowly by natural increase, and the reports from the 1870's put its number at 8,000 to 10,000, and by the end of the century at about 14,000.

The increase in population demanded reconstruction of the destroyed houses or new building; lack of space within the walled town necessitated the construction of upper storeys in existing houses. Thus most of the houses rose to a height of three or four storeys. Empty spaces were filled in to such an extent that except for the *sūq* there was not even space left for lanes; hence the connections between the houses were confined to staircases carved out of the rock, or underground tunnels. The town became crowded in a way that necessitated moving out of the city. This was possible only when security had improved to such a degree that living outside the walls was no longer dangerous.

The movement out of town was speeded up by the construction of the carriage road to Jerusalem in the 1890's. The journey on this road to Jerusalem lasted about five hours. It began at the southern edge of the town, near the Birkat al-Sulṭān cistern, which had always served as the starting point for caravans.⁷

Along this road there developed the first built-up areas outside the Old City. At the time of the Palestine Exploration Fund survey there was only

⁷ The area has retained its function until today; it now contains the interurban bus station and the point of departure for the village buses.

one building outside the town: the Russian Monastery (Muskūbiyya), which had been erected in 1871 two kilometres west of the town, at the place known as "Abraham's Tree". In the 1880's some warehouses and wholesale shops were built at the western edge of the main core of the Old City, and a breach was made in the wall of houses in the western continuation of the *sūq*, in order to connect them with these houses. This area, known as Bāb al-Zāwiya, became the first "modern" commercial centre of the town, and has served in this capacity until today (see Map No. 3).

The Jewish community benefitted from the improved security and commercial development and increased to about 1,500 people by 1910.

However, the growth of the town and its population did not keep up its momentum, for by the end of the nineteenth century the geopolitical position of Palestine and its different parts started to change. The opening of the Suez Canal and the improvement of shipping in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean, the beginning railway development, the increasing immigration of Jews who no longer came to pray and die, but to live and work in Palestine — all favoured the development of new methods of agriculture and manufacturing and shifted the centre of gravity of the country towards the coast. While in the 1880's Hebron occupied the third place in size of population after Jerusalem and Gaza, the town was overtaken in the first decade of the twentieth century by Jaffa and Haifa.⁸

The town actually stopped growing when the natural increase was balanced by emigration, which has since become the main social feature characterizing Hebron. The Jewish community, too, reached its peak in the 1890's and then started declining rapidly, since new immigrants preferred other parts of the country.

Thus the fluctuations of the population and economy of Hebron during the nineteenth century show clearly that even a remote mountain town does not live an isolated life, but reflects the changes in the general administration of a country or in its geo-political position.

⁸ In the first census held by the British administration in 1922, its population was 16,500, and the town occupied the seventh place in size of population.

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6. THE GEOGRAPHY AND NATURAL RESOURCES OF PALESTINE AS SEEN BY BRITISH WRITERS IN THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

by C. G. SMITH

I

No country or area of comparable size outside Europe can have attracted more topographical and geographical description by British writers during the nineteenth century than Palestine. During the early years of the century this writing falls into two categories. Firstly, there are the accounts of what is virtually primary exploration by travellers such as Burckhardt,¹ Irby and Mangles,² and Buckingham,³ who between them made important geographical and archaeological discoveries in Ḥawrān, Edom, the Arava and Sinai between 1810 and 1818. Secondly, there were the accounts of travel by gentlemen who visited Palestine and the Levant in the manner of their eighteenth-century countrymen who made the Grand Tour of Europe; those who went to satisfy their curiosity and complete their education. The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and Palestine not only increased the strategic interest of European powers in the Levant, but also aroused an antiquarian and scientific interest in the region. Like the eighteenth-century revival of interest in Greek architecture and antiquity, this encouraged many Britons to extend the Grand Tour to the Levant and thus visit biblical sites; or even to make a separate tour of the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. The adventures of the eccentric British noblewoman Lady Hester Stanhope, a niece of William Pitt, who eventually settled in Lebanon where she died in 1839, may have encouraged many of her countrymen to visit the Levant; she certainly became for a while one of the objects of curiosity on the Levantine tour! The accounts of Captain H. Light,⁴ an officer in the Malta garrison, and Kinglake,⁵ whose *Eothen* is not only an excellent travel book

¹ J. L. Burckhardt, *Travels in Syria and the Holy Land*, London, 1822.

² C. L. Irby and J. Mangles, *Travels in Egypt and Nubia, Syria and Asia Minor during the years 1817-1818*, London, 1823.

³ J. C. Buckingham, *Travels in Palestine through the countries of Bashan and Gilead east of the river Jordan*, London, 1823.

⁴ H. Light, *Travels in Egypt, Nubia, Holy Land, Mount Lebanon and Cyprus in the year 1814*, London, 1818.

⁵ A. W. Kinglake, *Eothen*, London, 1844.

but also a remarkably perceptive account of the Levantines, come into this second category. There is often little of direct geographical relevance in these accounts, indeed, Kinglake is disappointing on topography; but they frequently add something to our knowledge of the country at this time.

The state of British knowledge and interest in Palestine at the beginning of the nineteenth century can be illustrated by two quotations from John Pinkerton's *Modern Geography*, a two volume work published in London in 1802.⁶ This work set out to include the results of the most recent travels and discoveries; but it preceded the early nineteenth-century travellers' interest in the Levant. In this work mainland Asia and Japan are treated in 430 pages, of which 28 are devoted to Turkey in Asia and 26 to Arabia. The chapter dealing with Turkey in Asia includes Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia; Palestine is merely included in the treatment of Syria as a whole. Although Aleppo and Damascus are briefly described as amongst the more important cities of the Turkish Empire, there is no mention of Jerusalem or any other city in Palestine. Similarly the only physical features in Syria considered worthy of mention are the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon mountains, the Orontes river and the Dead Sea. References to the state of the country and its agriculture presumably reflect the opinions of eighteenth-century travellers:

In Syria the agriculture is in the most deplorable condition; and the instruments and management are alike execrable. The peasants are in the most miserable situation; and although not sold with the soil, like those of Poland, are, if possible, yet more oppressed; barley bread, onions and water constituting their constant fare.⁷

The mineralogy of those extensive and mountainous provinces remains in a deplorable state of imperfection. Ancient Lydia was famous for the production of gold; but in modern times no mines seem to be indicated, except those of copper which supply Tokat. The indolence of the Turks, or indeed their industry in destruction, is alike inimical to metallurgy, and agriculture. Hasselquist observed lead and copper ore, with rock crystals, in the island of Cyprus. But his account of oriental minerals only contains whetstone and natron, both Egyptian, and he informs us that Moses must have inscribed the laws on granite, which constitutes mount Oreb and mount Sinai. The mountains of Judea, he says, are of a very hard limestone. If such be the profound observations of a naturalist, what is to be expected from other travellers?⁸

⁶ J. Pinkerton, *Modern Geography*, 2 vols., London, 1802.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

Such comments suggest little interest in Palestine, and a poor opinion of its character. The interest in the country, which was to inspire so much detailed research and writing in the nineteenth century, was much more an interest in its past condition than in its present state or future possibilities.

From a European point of view Palestine west of the river Jordan was in 1800 a relatively well-known part of Asia; and, unlike Arabia, Persia, Central Asia and above all Africa, it was not a country which attracted pioneer explorers or geographers in the nineteenth century. Burckhardt's travels in Syria and Sinai had been undertaken as a preliminary to a planned exploration of North and West Africa under the auspices of the African Association. By about 1840 the country between the Jordan and the desert was relatively well known in its broad geographical outlines thanks to the work of such British travellers as those mentioned above and other Europeans such as C. Niebuhr,⁹ E. F. Volney¹⁰ and U. J. Seetzen,¹¹ who had travelled in Western Asia a little earlier. By the early nineteenth century overland explorers were in the habit of carrying instruments to fix their latitude and longitude, although this was rather more difficult than at sea. The scattered observations of such scientific travellers, together with the Napoleonic surveys of Egypt and the fixing of the precise longitude of the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean enabled tolerably accurate maps of Palestine to be drawn. There is a vast difference between maps of Palestine published in the late eighteenth century and the maps of Berghaus (1835),¹² and Kiepert (1840 and 1843).¹³ The first of Kiepert's maps, at a scale of 1:400,000, was drawn to illustrate the *Biblical Researches* of the distinguished American cleric, Dr. Edward Robinson.¹⁴ With the travels and researches of Robinson we may say that the detailed geographical study of Palestine had begun. The importance of Robinson's work is acknowledged by two quite different authorities on the geography of Palestine: the pioneer German academic geographer, Professor Karl Ritter,¹⁵ and Sir George Adam Smith, the Scottish theologian and authority on the historical geography of Palestine.¹⁶ In 1894 George Adam Smith could write:

⁹ C. Niebuhr, *Reisen durch Syrien und Palästina nach Cypern*, Hamburg, 1837.

¹⁰ E. F. Volney, *Voyage en Syrie*, Paris, 1787.

¹¹ U. J. Seetzen, *Reisen durch Syrien, Palästina etc.*, Berlin, 1854-1859.

¹² H. Berghaus, *Atlas*, Gotha, 1835.

¹³ H. Kiepert, *Atlas in fünf Blatt zu Robinson's Palestina*, Berlin, 1840-1841.

¹⁴ E. Robinson and E. Smith, *Biblical researches in Palestine, Mount Sinai and Arabia Petraea in 1838*, (3 vols), London, 1841; and E. Robinson, *Physical Geography of the Holy Land*, London, 1865.

¹⁵ K. Ritter, *Vergleichende erdkunde der Sinai-Halbinsel, von Palästina und Syrien* (6 volumes), Berlin, 1848-1855.

¹⁶ G. A. Smith, *The Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, London, 1894.

With the exception of the results of early geographers, admirably summarised by Reland, the renewal of Syrian travel in the beginning of this century, and the great work of Robinson fifty years ago — the real exploration of Palestine has been achieved during the last twenty years. It has been the work of no one nation; its effectiveness is due to its thoroughly international character. America gave the pioneers in Robinson, Smith and Lynch. To Great Britain belong, through the Palestine Exploration Fund — by Wilson, Warren, Drake, Tristram, Conder, Kitchener, Mantell, Black and Armstrong — the splendid results of a trigonometrical survey of all Western, and part of Eastern Palestine, a geological survey, the excavations at Jerusalem and Tell el Hesi, very numerous discoveries and identifications and the earliest summaries of natural history and meteorology. But we cannot forget that this work was prepared for, and has been supplemented in its defects, both by French and Germans.¹⁷

Ritter who, together with Humboldt, is usually regarded as one of the founders of modern geography, never visited Palestine; but his six-volume work is an extraordinarily detailed and documented survey. In his review of the authorities on Palestine, Ritter wrote of the work of Robinson and Smith that it was "... a production which has already set the geography of the Holy Land on a more fixed basis than it had ever before, and which will ensure its continued advance."¹⁸

After the publication of Ritter's great work and the researches of Robinson and Smith, the literature on Palestine can be more clearly divided into mere travellers' accounts, which give personal impressions of places well known, and works of scholarship, which present the results of detailed investigations in the fields of archaeology, natural history, physical geography and topography. Because of the unique place of Palestine in the history of the Jewish and Christian peoples, and the wealth of biblical, classical and mediaeval historical sites, most of these scholarly works were concerned with the geography of Palestine in relation to its past; therefore, references to the present state of the country are often merely incidental to the theme of the work. Thus, while the physical features of the land were investigated in detail for the light they might throw on the past, there is rarely any systematic treatment of the human geography of Palestine in the nineteenth century. It is a remarkable fact that one of the more backward provinces of the Ottoman Empire should have been the subject of a trigonometrical survey of great accuracy, carried out by officers seconded from

¹⁷ Smith, *op. cit.*, p. ix (preface).

¹⁸ Ritter, *op. cit.*, English translation by W. L. Gage, *The Comparative Geography of Palestine and the Sinaitic Peninsula*, London, 1866, II, 70.

the British Army and the Ordnance Survey and financed by funds raised by an organization the aims and interests of which were essentially religious, archaeological and scientific rather than commercial or strategic. The Palestine Exploration Fund was founded in 1865 "for the purpose of investigating the Archaeology, Geography, Geology and Natural History of the Holy Land." Amongst its numerous publications three works are outstanding: the 26 sheets of the survey map of Palestine at a scale of 1:63,360, one inch to one mile, covering the whole of Western Palestine from Dan to just south of Beersheba, which was largely the work of Captain Conder and Lieutenant Kitchener; the nine volumes of the survey of Western Palestine which are in effect a detailed commentary on the maps, dealing with topography, archaeology, hydrology, botany, zoology, geology and a very detailed survey of the city of Jerusalem, were published between 1881 and 1888.¹⁹ Finally the rapid archaeological survey of the Negev in 1913 and 1914 by Leonard Woolley and T. E. Lawrence, published by the Fund under the title *The Wilderness of Zin*,²⁰ contains much geographical as well as archaeological detail and includes very shrewd and perceptive comments on such questions as the former extent of cultivation in the Negev, the methods of conserving and storing water, and the possibility that the climate of the region was wetter in Roman and Byzantine times. The speculations of the American geographer, Ellsworth Huntington, received scant support from Woolley and Lawrence. Huntington²¹ had sought to explain the ruined settlements of the Negev by postulating a much greater rainfall during the Roman and Byzantine period. Huntington's ideas were dismissed by Woolley and Lawrence who wrote:

We believe and shall attempt to show that the prosperity of the Byzantine Age was wholly due to the conservation of the normal water supply and to improved agricultural methods... Our opinion is that broadly these climatic conditions have been always the same, and that any agricultural prosperity the desert has known was due not to any change in them but to a greater adaptability of the then inhabitants.²²

There is an interesting comment on the possibility of restoring the ancient "fertility" of the Negev: "We believe that today, with ordinary methods of dry farming, the Negeb could be made as fertile as it ever was

¹⁹ Palestine Exploration Fund, *The Survey of Western Palestine*, London 1881-1888, 9 vols. (*Memoirs and Special Reports*).

²⁰ C. L. Woolley and T. E. Lawrence (for P. E. F.), *The Wilderness of Zin*, London, 1915.

²¹ E. Huntington, *Palestine and its Transformation*, London, Boston and New York, 1911.

²² Woolley and Lawrence, *op cit.*, p. 33.

in Byzantine times; only, with so many better parts of the world's surface waiting to be reclaimed, it is not worth while."²³

One is tempted to ask whether, after so many years of controversy, this view on the potential of the Negev would command general agreement in Israel.

The general picture of the state of Palestine during the nineteenth century that emerges from the accounts of British travellers and field workers is that of a poor and undeveloped country, suffering from neglect and misrule. By comparison with Egypt or Lebanon and parts of central Syria most travellers considered Palestine to be lacking in resources of land, water and capital. Such interest as was shown in the strategic importance of the country by British writers arose from its position on the northern flank of Sinai, adjacent to the isthmus of Suez, and athwart the land routes from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. One of the more curious proposals arising from this interest was the project to construct a ship canal from Haifa to Aqaba, which would have involved flooding the Jordan Valley up to the level of the Mediterranean, and excavating canals in the Valley of Jezreel and the Arava.²⁴ However, with the possible exception of Woolley and Lawrence's survey of the Negev in 1913 and 1914, it is probably a fair judgement that most of the detailed survey work in Palestine by Britons in the nineteenth century was undertaken for scholarly purposes relating to the country's past.

II

Between the foundation of the Palestine Exploration Fund in 1865 and the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, a great amount of detailed knowledge about the geography and resources of Palestine was accumulated by British scholars and travellers. The topography of the country from Dan to Beersheba was fully described and mapped. The sheet memoirs of the Palestine Exploration Fund's volumes dealing with the Survey of Western Palestine list the archaeological sites, the inhabited villages, the perennial and seasonal streams, the springs, wells and cisterns. The general character of the soil and agriculture of each district is described in these volumes and there is a special volume containing papers dealing with the ancient and present fertility of the country, the life and customs of the peasantry and the Bedouin. Two more popular works by Conder describe the work of the Survey, the nature of the country and the relationship between its past and present conditions.²⁵ In each of these the question of the apparent decline

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁴ W. Allen, *The Dead Sea, a New Route to India*, London, 1855.

²⁵ C. R. Conder, *Tent Work in Palestine*, 2 vols, London, 1878; and *Palestine*, London, 1889.

from a once more developed and prosperous condition is examined. Like George Adam Smith and Oliphant, who wrote from Haifa in 1886 giving his impressions of the country in which he had resided and travelled extensively, Conder found no difficulty in explaining the poor state of the country as due to misrule and neglect, exacerbated by foreign invasions, local feuds and the incursions of the Bedouin. However, it is clear from these writings that during the second half of the century things greatly improved. The influx of tourists and pilgrims under the protection of European consuls, the work of the Christian religious orders, the arrival of the first Jewish agricultural colonists after 1882 and the small groups of German Protestants, the Templars, in 1869, together with Ottoman reforms, all helped to stimulate economic development. The populations of the cities grew, particularly Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa, while the depredations of the Bedouin in the east and south of the country were to some extent controlled by the more forward policy of the Turkish administration which after 1870 included the planting of Circassian colonies on the desert fringe. Two chapters in Oliphant's book are significantly entitled: "Progress in Palestine" and "Progress Even in Palestine," and illustrate the rapid transformation of the country during the seventies and eighties.²⁶ Oliphant appears to have been a shrewd observer who was impressed with the changes brought about by the first Jewish agricultural settlements and the German Templar colonies. Because of his sympathy for the Zionists and for the Templars he was one of the few nineteenth-century British observers who took an optimistic view of the possibilities of European colonization in Palestine and of the improvements which might occur as a result of the inflow of capital and the development of roads and railways. He speculated on the effect which the proposed Haifa-Damascus railway might have on the agricultural development of Jezreel, Upper Galilee and the Hawrān; and even mused on the potential of the Jericho portion of the Jordan Valley as a winter health resort. The following quotations from his book, *Haifa, or Life in Modern Palestine*, indicate the range of his views and ideas:

Considering the number of tourists, both American and English, who annually visit the Holy Land, I have been much struck with the erroneous impression which still continues to prevail in regard to its availability as a field of colonization, and as an opening for foreign enterprise and capital.²⁷

Readers will be surprised to learn that almost every acre of the Plain Esdraelon is at this moment in the highest state of cultivation; that it is perfectly safe to ride across it unarmed in any direction, as I can

²⁶ L. Oliphant, *Haifa or Life in Modern Palestine*, London, 1886, pp. 59-62, 285-289.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

testify; that, so far from plundering and despoiling villages, the few Bedouins, whose "black tabernacles" are now confined to the southern margin of the plain, have, in their turn, become the plundered and despoiled, for they are all reduced to the position of being subject to inexorable landlords...²⁸

As it is the Bedouins are being gradually pushed east of the Jordan, and it is now becoming more and more rare for an Arab encampment to be seen in the neighbourhood of the more settled and prosperous part of the country.²⁹

The same erroneous impression prevails in regard to the barrenness of the country, as in regard to its insecurity. Few travellers see more than the beaten routes, where the hills happen to be unusually stony and barren; but the extent of the population which once inhabited the country furnishes the best evidence of what it is capable of supporting and its capacities in this respect have been most forcibly dwelt upon by the officers engaged in the survey of the country for the Palestine Exploration Fund, who have enjoyed unequalled opportunities of judging upon the question.³⁰

It needs only a more satisfactory administration on the part of the government, and the connection of this district with the sea by rail, to make Beisan an important commercial and manufacturing centre. All kinds of machinery might be driven at small expense by its abounding brooks, and then the lovely valley of Jezreel above it, irrigated by the Jalūd, and the Ghor Beisan below, watered in every part by many fertilizing streams, are capable of sustaining a little nation in and of themselves.³¹

The great plain of Genesareth, across which I rode a month ago, is now a waste of the most luxuriant wild vegetation, watered by three fine streams, besides being well supplied with springs. It was celebrated of old for the amount and variety of its produce, and I have no doubt is again destined to be so.³²

III

The appearance of Palestine seems to have provoked very different responses among Western observers; possibly this is, in part, due to the extraordinary variety of relief, climate and vegetation within such a small area. Those who,

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 66.

as tourists or pilgrims, passed quickly through the country and only saw the barren hills of Judea and the wilderness on the road to the Dead Sea, or traversed the coastal plain, with its expanses of sand dunes and undrained swamps, were not likely to be impressed. Those who stayed longer and visited the more fertile and beautiful tracts of Upper Galilee and Samaria and the higher areas of the Ḥawrān and Gilead, with their grain fields and carefully cultivated terraces, were more favourably impressed. Those who resided in the country for a year or more were in a better position to appreciate the character of its climate and the amount of water which in winter and spring fills the rivers and brooks, yet in summer is confined to the numerous permanent springs.

Although no regular hydrometric examination of the major rivers and springs was undertaken until the period of the British Mandate, some of the early nineteenth-century travellers gave accounts of the volume and appearance of the upper Jordan and Yarmūk.³³ George Adam Smith sums up his description of the climate and fertility of Palestine and its appearance to a Western observer in the following manner:

Such then is the fertility of the Holy Land in forest, orchard and field. To a western eye it must, at certain seasons of the year, seem singularly meagre and uninfluential — incapable of stirring the imagination or enriching the life of a people. Yet come in, with the year at the flood, with the springing of the grain, with the rush of colour across the field, the flush of green on the desert, and in imagination clothe again the stony terraces with the vines which in ancient times trailed from foot to summit of many of the hills — then, even though your eye be western, you will feel the charm and intoxication of the land. It is not, however, the western eye we have to consider. It is the effect of this fertility on the desert nomads from whom, as we have seen, the population of Syria was chiefly drawn.³⁴

The following quotation also suggests that many visitors were not in the habit of taking so favourable a view:

It has grown the fashion to despise the scenery of Palestine. The tourist, easily saddle-sore and missing the comforts of European travel, finds the landscape deteriorate from the moment he leaves the orange groves of Jaffa behind him, and arrives in the north with a disappointment which Lebanon itself cannot appease.³⁵

The comparison with Lebanon in this last sentence is significant; for those

³³ See, for instance: Buckingham, pp. 313–15; 442–49; Irby and Mangles, *op. cit.*, pp. 285–291, 296–298; Burckhardt, pp. 36–43, 273–279.

³⁴ Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

travellers who passed through Syria in the nineteenth century and who had not a special interest in biblical or classical sites almost invariably speak of Lebanon and of Damascus with more favour than of Palestine or Jerusalem. For instance Conder, referring to the state of Syria and Palestine as late as the 1880's, wrote:

The Lebanon district presents us with the one bright spot in the Turkish Empire, the freest and best governed of the Sultan's provinces. Under the guardianship of European states, with a Christian governor, a constitution, a taxation amounting to only a shilling a head, a smart mounted police, and a coach road over the mountain, the Lebanon province has become prosperous and happy, filled with a cheerful population, and covered with vineyards and gardens, thus presenting a most remarkable contrast to the ill-ruled province of Tripoli on the north and the ruined regions of Palestine on the south.³⁶

However, like Oliphant, Conder was optimistic about the possibilities for the future development of Palestine. He rejected the idea that the climate of the country had changed since biblical and classical times. Like George Adam Smith he compared the crops grown in Palestine in the past with those grown in his day and found that the only important differences were in the extent of the areas cultivated; except for such limited examples as the cultivation of sugar cane around the Dead Sea and in the Plain of Phoenicia, in Crusader times, which he thought would again be possible if the irrigation works were restored.

He observed that the sand dunes and marshes in the Plain of Sharon were the result of the neglect of drainage and the abandonment of cultivation; shrewdly remarking that in this area the evidence might first suggest that the rainfall had increased rather than decreased. He thought that the consequent spread of malaria in the ill-drained regions of Sharon and Upper Galilee had contributed to the decline of population and the neglect of the land. Conder, like Woolley and Lawrence writing about the Negev, observed that the distribution and size of the wells and cisterns was consistent with the conclusion that the rainfall of the country was virtually unchanged. The following observations taken from *The Survey of Western Palestine* and from his more popular work, *Tent Work in Palestine*, are revealing of his conclusions on the condition and natural resources of the country:

To sum up, the change in Palestine is one of *degree only* and not of kind. The curse of the country is bad government and oppression. Justice and security of person and property once established, Palestine would become once more a land of corn, vine and olives, rivalling in

³⁶ Conder, *op. cit.*, *Palestine*, pp. 212-213.

fertility and in wealth its ancient condition, as deduced from careful study of such notices as remain to us in the Bible and in the later Jewish writings.³⁷

The change in productiveness which has really occurred in Palestine is due to decay of cultivation, to decrease of population, and to bad government. It is man, and not Nature, who has ruined the good land in which was "no lack", and it is therefore within the power of human industry to restore the country to its old condition of agricultural prosperity.³⁸

Conder foresaw development occurring as a result of "a radical reform in government" and thought that the undertaking of restoring the fertility of the land was beyond the power of private individuals or of "semi-religious societies." He thought that the priorities for development were firstly, the construction of roads and bridges; secondly, drainage and irrigation; and thirdly, a programme of afforestation and the rigorous enforcement of forest laws. However he was not in favour of large-scale colonization by foreigners to achieve this, believing that the native peasantry were best suited to the task since they were more inured to the climate and accustomed to agriculture. In this respect his views were different from those of Oliphant who advocated European colonization. Like many Britishers at a later period, Conder was apparently unable to take Zionism seriously and could not believe that Jews in any number would forsake commerce for agriculture.

IV

This summary of the work of British travellers, surveyors and scholars in Palestine in the nineteenth century is both brief and highly selective; yet it should indicate the interest shown in the country and the very considerable contributions which they made to our knowledge of its character, topography and resources. It does not appear that strategic or military considerations played a very important part in this work for none of the authors I have quoted directly advocated a British annexation or protectorate. When, during the First World War, Britain found herself in conflict with Turkey and, as a result of the victorious campaigns of General Allenby and the Arab Revolt under Fayṣal and Lawrence, brought to an end four hundred years of Ottoman rule in Palestine, she found herself in possession of a country that was in most respects relatively well known. In the preface to the 25th edition of his classic work George Adam Smith wrote, "I have been much encouraged by the generous tributes from Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby and many of his officers in Palestine to the real usefulness of

³⁷ Conder, in *Survey, Special Papers*, p. 207.

³⁸ Conder, *Tent Work*, p. 323.

my volume in framing the strategy and tactics of their campaign ..."³⁹ Lloyd George describes how the writings and maps of George Adam Smith influenced discussions over the position of the northern boundaries of Palestine at the peace conferences after the First World War.⁴⁰

Following the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, and the acceptance of the Palestine Mandate in 1922, Britain became responsible for implementing the promises she had made to the Zionists; Britain thus became responsible for creating the conditions for that colonization foreseen by Oliphant and that restoration of the fertility of the land that Conder had believed could come about only after a change of government. Within a few years the British government became involved in a controversy over what came to be called "the absorptive capacity of the country", between the Zionists, who advocated increasing immigration, and the Arabs and their supporters, who opposed it. The first enunciation of this principle by a British government was contained in the White Paper of 1922, the so called "Churchill statement of policy" which contained the sentence: "This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."⁴¹

What this capacity might be was a major theme for discussion and argument in subsequent reports on the Palestine problem such as those of Sir John Hope Simpson in 1930⁴² and the Peel Commission in 1937.⁴³

It is through a study of the arguments and disputes over the capacity of Palestine to absorb Jewish immigrants, and particularly the question of the total water resources of the country, that the author has been prompted to look at some of the earlier British descriptions of Palestine during the Ottoman period. An examination of these writings is both surprising and depressing in that British ministers and officials appear to have paid little attention to these earlier accounts or at least failed to understand them. The impression that Palestine was, and might always remain, a poor country seemed to persist. This view provided an argument for those who were opposed to Jewish immigration; yet paradoxically it also led to somewhat exaggerated accounts of the Zionist achievements and to an underestimation of the difficulties in the way of development. If it could be represented that

³⁹ Smith, *op. cit.*, Preface to the twenty-fifth edition (1931), Collins Fontana Edition, 1966, p. 23.

⁴⁰ D. L. George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, London, 1938, II, 1176-1181.

⁴¹ Cmd. 1700, *Palestine, Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation*, London, H.M.S.O., 1922, p. 19.

⁴² Cmd. 3686, *Palestine, Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development*, by Sir John Hope Simpson, C.I.E., London, H.M.S.O., 1930.

⁴³ Cmd. 5479, *Palestine Royal Commission Report*, London H.M.S.O., 1937, pp. 297-301.

near miracles had been achieved by the Zionists it was possible to persuade Zionist sympathizers that more miracles were possible and anti-Zionists that such development was uneconomic and ephemeral! One of the most persistent of the popular myths about economic developments in Palestine after 1918 has been the idea that most of the country was a desert which has been transformed by Jewish efforts and colonization. The refutation of this myth implies no disparagement of the achievements of the Jewish immigrants or of the state of Israel; and the magnitude of the task is well illustrated by nineteenth-century accounts of the country. As Conder wrote when referring to the decay during the Ottoman period: "the change has been one of *degree only* and not of kind." The Jewish achievement has been to reverse the change.

At the time when the British War Cabinet were discussing the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 there was at first strong opposition to the idea from Lord Curzon. His objections were feared by Balfour and Lloyd George on account of Curzon's experience and reputation as Viceroy of India, his knowledge of Persia and his limited first-hand acquaintance with Palestine. In the end Curzon withdrew his objections but not before he had written a formidable memorandum on the subject of Zionism and Jewish settlement in Palestine. In view of the fact that Curzon had read widely on Palestine, had visited the country and was familiar with Muslim countries, the following extracts from this memorandum are revealing. They indicate that at least some of the British writings on Palestine had been read and understood by a British Minister:

Before the war it was calculated by competent authorities who had lived for years in the country that for many years it could not support an increased population. After the devastation wrought by the war it will be many decades before we can contemplate a population that will remotely approximate to that of Wales. This is a position due not merely to the ravages of war, but to the present physical condition of the country, brought about by centuries of neglect and misrule. Before any considerable revival can be expected there must be a colossal expenditure on irrigation and afforestation, on the re-building of the broken down terraces which formerly supported the cultivation. The Scriptural phrase, "a land flowing with milk and honey," which suggests an abounding fertility, must be read in relation to the desert features of Sinai, to which it stood in glowing contrast, and loses somewhat of its picturesque charm when we realise that the milk was that of the flocks of goats that roamed, and still roam, the hills while the honey was the juice of the small grape that was used as a substitute for sugar and still makes a palatable wine... Palestine is, in fact a poor

land, containing no mineral wealth, no coal, no iron ore, no copper, gold or silver. It depends entirely on live stock [i.e.: mainly goats which crop the bare hills] and agriculture. In parts, but in parts only, where there is sufficient water and a good climate, excellent crops of wheat and barley are produced. Olive oil, sesame, and oranges are the chief exports.

Such is the country, a country calling for prolonged and patient toil from a people inured to agriculture and even so only admitting after generations of a relatively small population — that we are invited... to convert into the national home of a people, numbering many millions, brought from other and different climates, and to a large extent trained in other industries and professions.⁴⁴

In some respects Lord Curzon was right. During the period of the British Mandate the population of Palestine rose from 757,000 in 1922 to 1,876,000 in 1946; subsequently during the first twenty years of the existence of Israel, the Jewish population of Palestine increased from 672,000 to 2,657,000. This was achieved through good government, and enormous capital expenditure by the Zionists, allied to the enthusiasm and hard work of the immigrant Jewish population. Fifty years after Lord Curzon wrote his memorandum, the total population of Palestine considerably exceeded that of Wales. In other respects Curzon was wrong. Only the most optimistic and idealistic Zionists could have foreseen in 1917 the precise methods by which this reclamation of the land was to be achieved. In this reclamation and development, the introduction of new crops, new types and methods of farming were as important as the development of types of industry which relied on skill and technology rather than on the basic or precious metals and traditional fuel mentioned by Curzon. In 1917 the Zionist movement did not lack faith, ideals or plans; rather it lacked immigrant manpower. Who in 1917 could have foreseen that within thirty years events in Central Europe, so disastrous and tragic for the Jewish people as a whole, would provide the means whereby a "National Home" could become a Jewish state? Curzon had correctly assessed the potentialities of the land of Palestine as described by British writers such as George Adam Smith, Conder, Oliphant, Woolley and Lawrence; but he had not foreseen the political, economic and technological developments that might so soon enable Palestine to stand once more in glowing contrast to the surrounding desert and steppe.

⁴⁴ George, *op. cit.*, pp. 1123–1132. Memorandum by Lord Curzon, quoted in full.

PART TWO
THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES

7. THE IMAGE OF ERETZ-ISRAEL IN THE VIEW OF JEWS ARRIVING THERE IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

by HAYIM HILLEL BEN-SASSON

I

The land of their fathers never ceased to be theirs in the view of all Jews in the Diaspora up to the first stirrings of assimilation in the eighteenth century, when this consensus of Jewish mind and heart met its first challenge from within. Yet, it would seem that in the High Middle Ages, Eretz-Israel was central, even for those Jews who went to it, and later described their travels and impressions, only on account of its Holy Places, for the sake of the sacredness of air and soil there and as a tangible anchorage of Messianic hope and longing; in short, who were drawn towards the land from ideal concepts only. The twelfth century, which brought forth the great theories of the poet and philosopher Yehuda Halevi on the essentiality of the land to proper Jewish life and gave us the itineraries of the famous Jewish travellers of that century — Benjamin of Tudela, Petahia of Regensburg and Jacob ben Nathanael — bears out the impression that lofty idealism and bound duty were the dynamic forces; economic and social reality in the Holy Land was either that of the alien conquerors or a tale of the misery and humble existence of the Jews there. It is difficult to find a connecting link between the grand scope of thought and emotion attached to Eretz-Israel and the humble Jewish reality there as seen by returning visitors, as envisaged by those who wanted to live and end their days amidst holiness, ashes and beloved remains.

II

With the end of the fourteenth century, different lines and new accents began to emerge in tales about and attitudes towards Eretz-Israel. Almost immediately after the attacks on Jews in Christian Spain in 1391 and in the atmosphere of constant pressure exerted there on Jews to convert throughout the fifteenth century, the ancient and abiding holiness of the land in the East was set up as an actual source of comfort and as a place of refuge from Western reality. The communities of Aragon wrote, under the shadow of destruction, a letter asking for support for one of their Rabbis, Yehudah

ben Baqa of Huesca, on his journey to Eretz-Israel. The land is described in this communal letter in flowery phrases. The purports of those phrases is mainly that here and now Eretz-Israel is a "city of strength to us." It is always a focus of Jewish love for it is the Jews' rightful lot and inheritance, as given to the tribes of Israel. Love of the Holy Land and its glorious past are a source of fortitude in the troubled present; this is explicit in the juxtaposition and confrontation of those praises and hopes with the dire situation in Aragon. "R. Yehudah has bravely decided to go to Eretz-Israel, in the hope of the imminent coming of the Messiah."¹

III

At the end of the fifteenth century, the evolving trend towards concretization of Eretz-Israel was shaped by growing insecurity in the air of mounting crisis in southwestern Europe, which came to a catastrophe with the expulsions from Spain, Portugal and Sicily in 1492-1497. The tales and letters are, of course, also shaped by the different cultures of the various people telling about their experiences in the Land and their impressions of what they saw and heard.

In 1848 the great commentator of the Mishna, Ovadiah of Bertinoro, wrote, on his own initiative, a letter from Eretz-Israel to his old father in Italy. Its new spirit was brought out in sharp relief through another letter of his, written in answer to questions and hints contained in a letter of his brother, who remained in Italy. From the moment Ovadiah set foot in the country, at Gaza, he told about the character of the towns in general, about the economic and social life of Jews (with whom he associated not only Karaites but Samaritans as well), as he described those features all along his route to the Holy Land. He was very cautious about accepting at face value remains from the past and miraculous tales connected with them. Thus, he told his father, "I have seen in Gaza the building that Samson threw down on the Philistines, *according to what the inhabitants there, the Jews, told me.*"²

¹ H. Brody (ed.) *Beiträge zu Salomo da Pieras Leben*, Berlin, 1893, pp. 16-18. The letter was composed by the poet Shlomo de Piera on behalf of the Aragon communities. A letter written in Saragossa in 1396 (ed. by H. Beinart in *Sefunot*, Vol. V, No. 30 (1961), pp. 116-117) expresses similar sentiments, confronting the Holy Land as a refuge and land of hope with troubled Spain. As for the prevalence of the combination of fervent messianic hope with a growing movement of going to live in Eretz Israel, see: B. Dinur, "The Emigration from Spain to Eretz Yisrael after the Disorders of 1391", *Zion*, Vol. XXXII (1957), pp. 161-174.

² A. Ya'ari, *Igrot Eretz Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1943, p. 125. Gaza is the first town he entered in the Land, coming up from Egypt. The same attitude is more or less revealed by other travellers, e.g., A. Ya'ari (ed.), *Masa' Meshulam mi-Voltera* (in 1481), Jerusalem, 1948, pp. 68 (Gaza), 69 (Hebron), 74-75 (beauty of Jerusalem), 76-77 (its climate and ill health).

The life and complicated problems of Jewish Jerusalem are described in detail. Ovadiah added that "for all its ruins and desolation, it has four long and very beautiful markets; I have not seen the like of them. They are situated at the end of Zion; all are covered by rows of cupolas; and you have lines of windows in those cupolas, through them comes light."³ He also was curious and asked about the buildings on the Temple Mount and relates in detail and with caution what had been told to him.⁴ With a kind of a "archaeological bent" he stressed in his description of the remnants what his eyes had seen:

The Western Wall, still standing — meaning part of it — its stones are very large and thick; I have not seen like their size in any ancient building, neither in Rome nor elsewhere; in the north-east corner of the Temple there is a section built of very big stones. I entered beneath that section — one finds there a huge building, structured on big and tall pillars: they are very many, so that I tried of going to the very end of this building.⁵

In a charming way Ovadiah combined his interest in telling about what he saw, his concern in relating exactly what had been told him and his care to add to them his cautious and mild scepticism, when telling about the fickle Jerusalem weather. He was told that it is caused by this: "All the winds in the world blow in Jerusalem. People say that each and every wind before going to its assigned quarter, comes to worship God in Jerusalem. *Blessed be He who knows the truth.*"⁶

The letter to his brother shows that even people in Italy younger than Ovadiah's father were interested in miracles and tales such as former travellers used to tell. Ovadiah is sorry to disappoint them. Much of such matter is puerile invention. "Wise men like you, my brother, should probe matters, and not be misled by lies."⁷ Some of the miraculous cures ascribed to Holy Places are by their very character "matters that cannot be decided one way or the other."⁸ Ovadiah is ready to tell about wonders and to believe

³ Ya'ari, *Igrot*, p. 131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 134–135. Ovadiah notes near and distant landscapes (*Ibid.*, pp. 135–136). He considers information on the Christians in Jerusalem of interest to his father. Writing to pre-Reformation, monolithic Italy, he tells about the phenomenon of "five differing sects of Christians living now in Jerusalem; being — Romans, Greeks, Jacobites, Armenians and Abyssinians, those of Prester John. Each of them considers the faith of the others as false, as the Samaritans and Karaites conceive in relation to Rabanites. Each sect has a chapel [Hebrew: 'a room'] for itself in the sepulchre." (*Ibid.*, pp. 136–137.)

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 137.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 139.

⁸ *Ibid.*

unusual things, but not about healings and *Ioca Sancta*. He relates to his brother what:

Those Jews told us, that it is well known and undoubted, from the mouth of truthful Moslem merchants, that... a journey of fifty days through the desert, there is the famous Sambathion river; it surrounds like a thread the whole country where the Children of Israel live; it throws up stones and sand and rests on Sabbath only. The reason that no Jew goes to this country is because they avoid desecrating the Sabbath. They have it by tradition, that all those — the Descendants of Moses — are saintly and pure like angels, there are among them no sinners. On the outer side of the Sambathion river there are the Children of Israel as many as the sands of the seashore, kings and lords, but they are not as saintly and pure as those living on the inner side of the river... Continuously⁹ do Christians coming from the Lands of Prestor John tell us that those Jews who attack their land have been heavily defeated by Prester John. We are afraid lest, God forbid, this tale is true, as it is spreading more and more; may God defend His people and servants. Amen.¹⁰

Legend has become "realistic" and fighting; living in Jerusalem, his heart and mind go out to independent Jewish existence, to Jewish warriors far away and to various degrees and manners of pure Jewish life. In this matter, his scepticism has disappeared. He differentiates between degrees of holiness of an "inner", enclosed, Jewish existence and an "outer", open, one. But all are God's servants in battle; his heart is trembling at the thought of their defeat, of the "outer" ones, for only they can be seen as attackers of the Christian realm. It is a case where scepticism nurtured in late Renaissance Italy turned on old subjects and turned away from new ones. Holiness and importance are alive for him in the substance measured in stones and in the faraway independent Jewish existence.

The beauty of the Jerusalem markets impressed Isaac ben Meir Latif, who wrote in 1481-1486.¹¹ But his longing for past glories prompts him to add that all this present day beauty is but "vain consolation.... For what advantage is there in the beauty of a stool, when the feet of the king are not on it; what pleasure in an ornate table, as long as the family is exiled from it. The more so with us who feel in their souls the sorrow that our inheritance has been turned over to aliens, our House to strangers." The context shows that he gives expression here to his bitterness at perceiving the Temple Mount

⁹ Hebrew: *Ve-khol ha-yom* (All day long).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-41.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.

in Muslim hands.¹² Actual impressions mingle with reawakened Jewish feelings to bring out this lament in a letter intended by the sender to be a public one, to be "sent also from one community to another."¹³

IV

With the impact of the great expulsions of the end of the fifteenth century on the one hand, and the impression of the new centre of life and activity at Safed¹⁴ on the other, the attitude toward and assessment of Eretz-Israel as a Fatherland in the full sense of this concept grew rapidly. Hopes were both realistically and mystically bound in a dynamic way with the landscape of Eretz-Israel and Jewish society there and then.

Moses Basola of Pesaro in Italy, writing in about 1523, stressed the plenty of victuals and the growth of commerce at Safed, a place wide open to trade.

You find there plenty of *bottechi* [shops] of woollen clothes, as well as *ofmerceria* and spices. In all those three branches many shops belong to Jews; they bring the *merceria* and spices from Damascus and sell in the town.¹⁵ With the *galeas* [galleys] they go to Beirut to buy cloth and other things. There are also many Jews peddling around continuously in the villages to sell *merceria* and other peddlars' ware...for many earn also by buying cotton, thread, wax, *salmonea*¹⁶ when prices are on the cheap side, and sell them in proper time. There are also Jews in the market selling fruit, vegetables, oil, cheese and other merchandise. Anyone who wants may deal in corn, wine and oil, each in its time. Generally, the country is much more *mercandatesca* than Italy, for Ismaelites will buy much more willingly from Jews than from others. One who has no capital to start in commerce, has to be an artisan. Throughout Eretz-Israel, there are four worthwhile crafts: weavers, goldsmiths, shoemakers, tanners and masons. Anyone who is strong enough to hire himself as a day hireling in this branch¹⁷ is being well paid. The tailor will also earn his money well. But you cannot hope to be hired as a teacher or servant in a home or shop, and you cannot

¹² *Ibid*, pp. 96-97.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹⁴ See: S. Schechter, "Safed in the 16th Century — A City of Legists and Mystics," in his *Studies in Judaism*, second series, Philadelphia, 1908, pp. 202-301; Gershom G. Scholem, *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, Jerusalem, 1941, seventh lecture, pp. 240-282; *Sefunot*, vols. VI-VII, Jerusalem, 1963; R. J. Z. Werblowsky, *Joseph Karo*, 1962.

¹⁵ Safed.

¹⁶ A medicament.

¹⁷ I. e., masonry.

hope for charity, for there are many poor. Therefore let no one come out of Italy who has neither craft nor capital.¹⁸

This sense of the real new, dynamic and promising life in the Holy Land vibrates in the touching letter of the first half of the sixteenth century by a son of the Ibn Pichon family. The man had lost his entire family: "There is none of my fathers' household but myself. Don't be sad and let it not anger you, for thank God all of them are buried in the Yehoshaphat Valley, Peace be with them. Of the house of R. Moses Navarro there is also neither remnant nor memory; only his wife remains alive, stark mad."¹⁹ Yet, this forsaken man is sending tidings of hope. He repeatedly calls the readers of his message to come to Eretz-Israel:

For the sake of God, blessed be His name, for the sake of His Holy Torah, come immediately and do not tarry. Whosoever wants to come let him come. For they will be able to earn their livelihood here always in crafts. These are the worthwhile crafts over here: goldsmith, tailor or clothmender, carpenter, cobbler, weaver and iron smith. And in commerce — anyone to whom God has granted some money. In truth any one who knows Torah well will eke out a living here. See, I who know no craft, live out of Torah study... I who speak and write here in the Holy City in Jerusalem, Shmuel Son of Rabbi Joseph Pichon.²⁰

The sacred valley where his family was entombed made his lonely fate less forlorn; the economic activity will gather his brethren to him in holy Jerusalem.

V

The merging of the landscape and life rhythms of Eretz-Israel in the mind and imagination, penetrating dreams and eschatological imaginings, is evident in the writings of great cabbalist R. Hayim Vital (1543–1620). He kept a kind of notebook of his dreams and the dreams others dreamt about him.²¹ In his dreams he identified himself often with the Redemption, sometimes even with the person of Messiah, son of Joseph.

The dream he had in about 1562 is very instructive. In it, Vital saw himself "standing on top of the great mountain west of Safed, amidst its two big peaks, which rise above Meron village." There he beheld the Messiah, saw tens of thousands of Jews flocking to him for battle, and after victory, the

¹⁸ Ya'ari, *Masa'ot*, pp. 138–39. He too notes the beauty of Jerusalem's covered markets (pp. 147–48).

¹⁹ Ya'ari, *Igrot*, p. 180.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

²¹ A. Z. Eshkoly (ed.), *Sefer ha-Hezyonot*, Jerusalem, 1954.

triumphant, avenging entrance into the Temple.²² Another eschatological dream, rich in symbols, starts by the going out in dream "to the wall of the old tower in Safed, westwards, opposite the *khān* where there was formerly the entrance in the wall."²³

Not only do the mountains, peaks, towers and *khāns* of Safed provide the background for Vital's eschatological vision, the vision sometimes blends with the actual life of the Muslim society around his community. In about 1570, Vital sees himself in a dream "coming down from the *khān* of Safed on the stone steps²⁴ leading down to the market. There, at the butchers' bazaar, two roads meet." On this crossroads, he meets various dead. In their company he goes "to the Jewish street. I beheld a gathering of all Israel together there. The sun set at high noon; it was pitch dark everywhere, in all the world, and all Israel were crying there bitterly. And here was a man looking like the solitary dervishes,²⁵ his clothes torn, his hair long, reaching to his feet. He came from the west, by way of the synagogue of the Aragonese, towards the above mentioned street. He was chanting a sweet song loudly; this song was made up of several strophes — after the manner of songs — dealing entirely with *yibum mitzva*²⁶ and the *yevama* and the subject of the Messiah and redemption — as explained in the Zohar on the verse 'if he would redeem you, let him redeem.' None understood his words, nor listened to his voice, only I. He came singing to where I was; the sun shone again."²⁷ In this dream "all Israel" and the loneliness of the dreamer meet, the Jewish street of Safed, its synagogues and byways are merged with "the whole world" and cosmic sun-darkening, and a dervish-like figure is singing the mysteries of messianic redemption according to the Zohar. Cabbalistic tradition has become one with Eretz-Israel of the sixteenth century.

The ten faraway Tribes of Israel haunt the imagination of Vital as they filled the writings of R. Ovadiah (see above). He dreamt about them several times.²⁸ In one dream, dreamt repeatedly, he saw their mighty army "encamped in tents. I entered one tent and saw their King sitting there, inclined ... He is a tall man, his beard black, about fifty years old."²⁹

²² *Ibid.*, Sect. II, No. 2, p. 41.

²³ *Ibid.*, sect. II, No. 5, p. 43.

²⁴ Hebrew: *ha-sulam shel avanim* — stone ladder.

²⁵ Hebrew: *Bi-dmūt ha-prushim ve-ha-mitbodedim*.

²⁶ Levirate marriage commandment.

²⁷ Eshkoly, *op. cit.*, Sect. II, No. 10, pp. 52–54.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Sect. II, No. 34, p. 66; No. 42, pp. 71–72.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66. Vital's dreams also include his going as the Messiah, son of Joseph, to Jerusalem; the quarrel of the Jerusalem and actual Galilee [i.e. Safed] communities over him and his own essential inclination to Galilee (*ibid.*, Sect. I, No. 9, p. 5); "a beadle" of the Dome of the Rock saw Vital in the moonlight hovering in the air over the Temple Mount

The letter of a cabbalist exile from Portugal, R. Avraham ben Eliezer Halevi, dated from Jerusalem in 1528, shows how "information" about "the Tribes" and far away Jewries, was accepted eagerly in Jerusalem. It was combined with and merged into mystic tradition. Jerusalem circles took care to disseminate these glad tidings in letters sent abroad. R. Avraham is, in time and character, a kind of "connecting element" between the thought and imagination of R. Ovadiah and R. Hayim.³⁰

The above survey shows how Eretz-Israel became more real and more political in both thought and imagination to Jews who came to live in the land and to tell about it in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, becoming both realistic and mystic under Ottoman rule in Safed, in response to their fate of desolation in alien lands, and rebirth in Eretz-Israel.

for about an hour (*ibid.*, Sect. I, No. 13, p. 7). The reality of Safed community life enters another dream of his (*ibid.*, Sect. II, No. 6, p. 48). For other elements and traits of Vital's vision, see H. H. Ben-Sasson, *Toldot 'Am Israel*, Vol. II, Tel-Aviv, 1971, pp. 290-291, 296-297.

³¹ M. Beit-Arié "Igeret me-'Inyan Yud ha-Shvatim me'et R. Avraham ben Eliezer ha-Levi ..." in *Kobez al Yad, Minora Manuscripta Hebraica*, Tom. VI, Jerusalem, 1966, pp. 371-378, contains earlier literature on R. Avraham. See also H. H. Ben-Sasson, "The Reformation in Contemporary Jewish Eyes," *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, Jerusalem, 1971, IV, 260-269.

8. TURKISH DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE JEWS OF SAFED IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY*

by URIEL HEYD

I. Orders of Expulsion to Cyprus

Not long ago Prof. B. Lewis published Turkish orders concerning the expulsion of a thousand Jewish families from Safed to Cyprus in 1576 and five hundred families in 1577.¹ In his commentary on these documents Lewis notes that he found no proofs that these Jews reached Cyprus and he suggests that the Jews of Safed most likely succeeded in cancelling the decree.

This matter is especially interesting in the light of the well-known fact that in the early 1580's this community, which since the Turkish conquest had become the centre of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, began to decline. The question arises, therefore, as to whether or not these orders were one of the causes of this decline.

New details of these events can be learned from additional Turkish orders, which are also contained in the *Mühimme Desterleri*, kept today in the National Archives in Istanbul. They contain copies of the official orders which were sent from the capital of the Ottoman Empire to governors, judges and other officials throughout the Empire.

The first order relevant to our topic was issued about three years before the expulsion order of 1576 published by Lewis, i.e., already during the reign of Selim II, conqueror of Cyprus (see also A. Galanté, who does not mention their source).² This document shows that the question of expelling Jews from Safed to Cyprus arose as a result of a Jewish appeal (or slander) to the Istanbul government.³

* This article was originally published by the late professor Heyd in Hebrew, in *Yerushalayim, Mehkarey Eretz Israel*, Jerusalem. 5716, pp. 128-135.

¹ Lewis, *Notes*, pp. 28-34.

² Abraham Galanté, *Histoire des Juifs d'Istanbul*, Istanbul, 1941, I, 11 (on the invitation to five hundred Jews to settle in Cyprus).

³ M. Bnayahu has brought to my attention a document from Safed signed by three of the city fathers, Rabbi Joseph Caro, Rabbi Moshe Mitrani and Rabbi Israel Bar Meir Kuriel. The letter is directed against a Jew from Safed who "wanted to be called a Nagid" and put the community in a difficult position — it is probable that this is the same slanderer. In this source he is said to have informed on the Jews to the authorities and "how

Following is the text of the order (*Mühimme Defterleri*, Vol. 22, p. 282⁹ No. 556), issued in the month of Rabī' II 981/August 1573.

DOCUMENT I

Order to the Governor and Judge of Safed:

The members of the Jewish community residing in Safed have sent a man [and reported that] in their midst there are several Jewish thieves and scoundrels, some of whom are registered [in the court registers]:⁴ concerning some of them, there is no [such] record, but the heads of the community know of their corrupt deeds; and some are receivers of stolen goods. [Members of the community] have requested that the condition of these men be investigated and that those whose corrupt deeds are discovered be punished.

I have therefore commanded that when [this order] arrives you are to send these men who are not upright and law-abiding, but rather receivers of stolen goods, thieves and scoundrels whose corrupt deeds have been discovered, immoral and villainous, guarded by appropriate men, together with a copy of the register concerning them, to Cyprus. And you will send to My Threshold of Felicity a copy of the register, in which the number of men sent and the property in their hands will be listed. But guard against [using] this pretext for interfering in the affairs of upright and law-abiding [men] and extorting money from them under threat of sending them without anything [?] to Cyprus. If such a thing be heard, you will certainly be reprimanded. Accordingly, you are to be diligent [in executing the order].

Several years later, in October 1576, the previously mentioned order concerning the expulsion of 1,000 wealthy Jews, together with their families and possessions, from Safed and its environs to Famagusta, in Cyprus, was issued. In August 1577, new orders, also published by Lewis, were issued, this time concerning the expulsion of 500 families, to be settled on an appropriate site on the same island.

Yet these orders were not executed, but rather — as it now seems — were cancelled in the following year. The Jews of Safed succeeded in gaining the support of the Muslim judge of their city. The latter requested cancellation

many fortunes has he handed over to the gentiles, how much robbery of orphans and widows has he taken into his house ... how much has he slandered to hand over Jewish Souls to execution, how many Jewish homes has he destroyed by his slander." The elders of Safed excommunicated him and in their order of excommunication wrote about his malicious acts. The document was published in Luncz, *Jerusalem*, V, 161–163.

⁴ As former law-breakers.

of the order for fear that the expulsion might lead to the economic decline of the city and considerably lower the revenues of the state treasury and certain Muslim endowments. This we learn from the following document (Vol. 34, p. 278, No. 581), which was issued in the month of Rabi' I 986/May 1578.⁵

DOCUMENT II

Order to the Judge of Safed:

You have sent a letter and have reported that members of the Jewish community residing in the town of Safed have come to the [Muslim] court [complaining that] orders have been given to deport them from this holy land⁶ to Cyprus. From the time this news spread, those who are traders have not [any more] attended to [their] trade or other business [but] have abstained [from it] completely. [Until now] whenever their poll-tax amounting to a fixed sum of 1,500 florin⁷ and the extraordinary levies⁸ fell due, they were paid in full to the Imperial Treasury. Moreover, they actually live in a *khān* which is an endowment in honour of the Friend of the All-Compassionate, the Lord Abraham the Prophet,⁹ blessings upon him and upon our prophet, and for the venerable Dome of the Rock,¹⁰ and pay every year 400 florin [as] rent. And the town customs have an average [?] income of more than 10,000 florin from them. If it is decided to deport them to Cyprus, the Public Revenue will lose the above-mentioned amount of money and the town of Safed will be on the verge of ruin. The Treasury of Damascus will suffer a great loss [since the collection of] their poll-tax, extraordinary levies, customs duties, stamp-duty on broadcloth,¹¹ customs on felt [?] and the tax farm of the dye-houses will [all] be discontinued. Their houses will also remain deserted; no buyer will be found [for them]. Their landed property will go for nothing. [In short] considerable loss and damage will result. If [on the other hand] they stay, the Treasury will derive very great benefits in every respect. Hence you have suggested that they shall be pardoned and not be deported to Cyprus.

⁵ Cf. *Ott. Doc.*, No. 118.

⁶ *Arāḍi muqaddasa*, a name common among the Muslims, as well. (See, for example, Evliya Çelebi's book of travels, in Vol. IX, frequently.)

⁷ Gold piece (in Hebrew sources, *perah*).

⁸ *Avārid*.

⁹ A *waqf* to the Mosque of the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron.

¹⁰ The "Mosque of Omar" in Jerusalem.

¹¹ Cf. Lewis, *Notes*, p. 14.

I have therefore commanded that when [this firman] arrives you shall desist from deporting members of the Jewish community to Cyprus. They shall live at their present places and attend to their businesses. You shall not let the aforesaid be troubled in the said matter.

Yet it seems that even after this order was given, the Jews of Safed were not left alone. The governor of Cyprus needed new settlers to rebuild the ruined island, as is specifically stated in many orders from those years.¹² He saw the Jews of Safed as an important addition to the population of his land, since he certainly heard that among them were wealthy merchants and talented and experienced craftsmen. The clothing industry which the Jews of Safed had developed won great fame in the neighbouring lands. It is also possible that the governor of Safed did not reconcile himself to the revocation of the decree which was sent to the city's judge. In any case the government found it necessary to reaffirm its order after several months. In Vol. 36 (p. 13, No. 40) the order issued on 8 Dhū al-Qa'da 986/6 January 1579 to one of the officers of the court named Süleymān Cha'ush (the same man who, two years earlier, was given the task of transferring the exiles from Safed to Cyprus?)¹³ is registered:

DOCUMENT III

Order to the Governor and Judge of Safed:

Although my noble firman granting amnesty to the Jews of Safed that they not be exiled to Cyprus had been previously issued, Ḥasan, governor-general of Cyprus, may his happiness long endure, has again brought the matter of their expulsion before us.

Since in the past my Imperial firman granting the aforementioned [Jews] amnesty has been issued, I have once again given an order granting them amnesty according to my earlier noble order. I have commanded that when [this order] arrives you shall not allow the above-mentioned Jews to be troubled in the matter of their expulsion to Cyprus. Beware of doing anything contrary to my previous noble order.

In spite of this, the governor of Cyprus did not lose hope of settling Jews on the island. If the Sultan would not give him Jews from Safed, perhaps he would be able to seize a group of Jews on their way there. Shortly after

¹² Cf., for example, *Mühimme Defterleri*, Vol. 35, p. 264, No. 668.

¹³ Cf. Lewis, *Notes*, pp. 29–30.

the governor failed in his last appeal to Istanbul, a ship from Salonica containing a group of Jews wishing to immigrate to Safed happened into the area of his jurisdiction. This time the government granted his request and sent him the following order (Vol. 36, p. 303, No. 801) in Rabl' II 987/ June 1579:

DOCUMENT IV

Order to the Aforementioned:¹⁴

You have sent a letter reporting that 100 Jews with their wives and children entered the port of Famagusta which is in the island of Cyprus, on their way from Salonica to Safed, and were delayed and detained [there]. As they are necessary to the aforementioned island in all ways, you have requested a noble order from me to settle them [on the island].

I have therefore commanded you to settle the above-mentioned Jewish group in an appropriate place on the island and not to let them go out [from it].

As long as there is no confirmation by a Jewish source of this group's settlement in Cyprus, it must be assumed that this order suffered the same fate as the orders concerning the Jews' expulsion from Safed.

II. Oppression by the Authorities

In the first twenty-seven volumes of the *Mühimme Defterleri*, which cover the years 961–983/1554–1575, we found no information on acts of oppression by the Turkish authorities in Safed. These were the last days of the glorious reign of Sultan Süleymân the Lawgiver and the reign of his son, Selim II, in whose court high-ranking Jews, such as Josef Nassi, protected their people throughout the Empire. During this period the Safed community reached the peak of its development. But in 1574 Sultan Selim II died, and at approximately the same time the spiritual leaders of the Jews of Safed passed away — Rabbi Isaac Luria in 1572 and Rabbi Joseph Caro in 1575. In the next year the threat of expulsion hovered over the Jews of Safed, and it is in that same year that we find the first evidence of the community's appeal to the government in Constantinople to put an end to the evil deeds of the governor of Safed.

In answer to this, an order was issued to the governor-general and judge of Damascus, in whose province Safed was included (Vol. 28, p. 145, No.

¹⁴ The governor-general (*beylerbey*) of Cyprus.

341). The document was delivered on 29 Rabi'II 984/26 July 1576 to one of the Jews of Safed¹⁵ who had filed the complaint against Muḥammad, governor of the city. (Many orders of this type were not sent directly to the governors or judges, but were delivered to the men who brought their requests before the Imperial Divan in Constantinople.) From the order we learn that the Jews accused the governor of many acts of injustice towards them. From one Jew he extorted a large sum of money by accusing him of adultery. From another he demanded a large "gift" under a different pretext, and tortured him until he paid. Among the governor's men there were several night watchmen, dragomans and other officials — including one Jew — who committed injustices against the people. An order was given to thoroughly investigate all these matters and return the stolen goods to their owners.

At the same time an order was sent to the governor of Safed (Vol. 28, p. 223, No. 528), in which he was ordered to dismiss immediately all these corrupt officials, including the Jew, and to employ them no longer.

These orders did not put an end to the unjust deeds of the city's rulers. Members of the community complained again and again in Constantinople that the governor of Safed interfered with their Sabbath rest and extorted money from them in various and strange ways. When thieves attacked the house of a Jew and killed him, the governor accused the members of the community of murdering him, imprisoned some of them, ordered them flogged, and demanded five hundred gold pieces from them. The governor's soldiers broke into the Jewish homes one night. The next day the governor ordered the members of the community to find the thieves, imprisoned many Jews, ordered them to be given seventy or eighty lashes with a whip, and fined them as much as he pleased. The night watchmen also oppressed the Jews. They ambushed Jewish trade caravans passing between Safed and Damascus¹⁶ and collected one *para*¹⁷ from them for each animal. All this information is contained in an order to the governor — general of Damascus and the judge of Safed (Vol. 29, p. 178, No. 426), which was sent on 26 Dhū al-Qa'da 984/14 February 1577 to the Jew who submitted the community's complaint.

In the matter of payment of regular taxes as well, the pressure of the authorities increased. In Rajab 985/September 1577, an order (Vol. 31, p. 311, No. 690) was sent to the governor—general of Damascus and the treasurer (*defterdār*) of that province. In the order, it is stated that the Jews of Safed

¹⁵ In this document the name of the city appears as both Şafat and Şafad, the usual spelling in the other documents.

¹⁶ On Jewish trade between Safed and Damascus, see writings of Rabbi Moshe Basula in *Ya'ari, Masa'ot*, p. 138.

¹⁷ A silver coin.

did not pay the poll-tax imposed upon them in its entirety. Until then they had paid a fixed comprehensive sum which was quite small, and those people who were added to the community were not taken into account at all. It was thus necessary to put together a new list of all those residents of long standing and newcomers, who were subject to the tax, and to collect the tax according to this list.

The order dated Rabi' II 986/June 1578 to the governor and judges of Safed (Vol.35, p. 10, No. 16) is somewhat surprising. This order, sent to the governor of Safed through the *kethudā*, i.e., his official agent in Constantinople, demands that the Jews (and other subjects) in the Safed region be prevented from using rifles and charges the governor with confiscating the rifles in their possession. It is likely that this order was a result of slander and it is possible that it was aimed primarily at the other religious communities. For it is known from many other documents in *Mühimme Defterleri* that the central government sent frequent and apparently unsuccessful instructions during this period to disarm the Druze, who frequently rose up against the Turkish forces.¹⁸ It should be remembered, however, that the state of security was greatly worsened in these years and the that Jews of Safed were frequently placed in mortal danger. The situation became so critical that in 1585-1586 the Jews of Constantinople agreed to build a *khān*, a fortified courtyard, in Safed in which the members of the community would be able to find refuge from "night bandits, armed thieves who come in the dark of night while they are in their homes."¹⁹

There is no doubt that the prosperity of the Jewish community of Safed aroused jealousy and hatred in the zealous Muslims. Their fear that this development might obscure the Islamic character of the city is reflected in the following document from Dhū al-Qa'da 992/November 1584, contained in Vol. 55 (p. 48, No. 85):

DOCUMENT V

Order to the governor-general and Judge of Damascus:

The judge of Safed has sent a letter to My Threshold of Felicity and has reported that in the town of Safed there are only seven sacred mosques. And the Jews [who] in olden times had three synagogues have now thirty-two synagogues,²⁰ and they have made their buildings very

¹⁸ Cf., for example, Vol. 31, p. 361, No. 801 (Rajab 985); Vol. 46, p. 358, No 830 (Šafar 990).

¹⁹ Luncz, *Jerusalem*, Vol. 8 (1909), p. 112.

²⁰ There is confirmation from Jewish sources for this. Rabbi Moshe Basola, who visited Safed in 1521-23, i.e., shortly after the Turkish conquest of Palestine, found there "three synagogues, one Sephardi, one Morisco, and one Western" (in *Masa'ot*, p. 138).

high.²¹ And they have bought much real estate and constituted it as pious foundations to their synagogues.²² [Thereby] they have given much annoyance to the Muslims.

I have therefore ordered that you shall personally investigate the said matter and report the matter to me in truth. I have ordered that when [this order] arrives, you must act diligently in this matter as is fitting and investigate it according to the laws of the Noble *Shar'ā*. You must faithfully report whether the above-mentioned synagogues are ancient synagogues, which have remained [in existence] since the imperial [Ottoman] conquest²³ or newly established synagogues;²⁴ if they are new, how [and] when they were established. Report [this] honestly, in detail and in the above—mentioned manner, and bring the matters before me in truth. Beware of bringing the matter before me not in accordance with the facts.

The fear of expulsion to Cyprus, oppression of the governors, worsening of the security condition and the fanaticism of the Muslim inhabitants of the city were among the factors which, together with other occurrences, such as drought and plagues, caused the decline of the Jewish community of Safed at the end of the sixteenth century.

While in a letter by the leaders of the Safed Jewish community from 1603 it is mentioned that at that time there were "in this city ... twelve synagogues and sixteen *midrashas*, *yeshivas* and *talmud-toras* for children" (Ya'ari, *Igrot Eretz-Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1943, p. 191). Rabbi Shlomo Shlumieli Meinstrel, who came to Safed in 1602, relates even larger numbers. He says: "Eighteen *yeshivas* did I find in Safed, may it be rebuilt soon, and twenty-one synagogues and great *belt-midrash*," (*ibid*, p. 197).

²¹ This hurt the feelings of their Muslim neighbours.

²² The legality of Jewish (and Christian) endowments for synagogues (and churches) was, at least theoretically, a disputed question in Islamic religious law.

²³ The Turkish conquest of Palestine.

²⁴ According to Muslim law, Jews (and other *dhimmi*s) were not permitted to establish new houses of worship.

9. SOME DEMOGRAPHIC PECULIARITIES OF THE JEWS OF JERUSALEM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by USIEL O. SCHMELZ

I. Introduction

A. General Characterization of Jerusalem's Jewish Population in the Nineteenth Century¹

Until the 1860's, the Jewish population of Jerusalem was small, poverty-stricken and unstable. As we shall see later on in greater detail, it was subject to very high mortality, which resulted in a remarkable deficit of the natural movement of that population, i. e., an excess of deaths over births. This deficit was balanced by relatively large immigration from abroad. Jews came to Jerusalem and stayed there mainly for religious motives, in disregard of the hardships of life in the city. The organized *haluka* provided to most only a pittance insufficient for a proper livelihood. Yet both the peculiar system of social values and the undeveloped state of the economy, particularly the lack of purchasing power by the public, hampered successful initiative in crafts or commerce.

Jerusalem as a whole was a rather small provincial town in the wide and badly administered Ottoman Empire. Towards the middle of the century, conditions in Jerusalem started to improve, not least of all under the influence and through the local activities of interests from abroad (consular; ecclesiastical and missionary; Jewish, e.g., Sir Moses Montefiore; etc.).

In the last third of the century, a relatively rapid rise of the Jewish population took place, because of increased immigration, and there was a general amelioration in the living conditions of the Jews. An outstanding feature was the successive establishment of new residential quarters outside the walled Old City.

Determination of the size of Jerusalem's Jewish population at any time in the nineteenth century, and especially during the first two-thirds of that century, is a matter of considerable difficulty. Many estimates can be found in the narratives of Christian travellers, but they are patently inconsistent

¹ Cf. (U.) O. Schmeltz, "Development of the Jewish Population of Jerusalem During the Last Hundred Years," *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. II, No. 1 (June, 1960), pp. 56ff.

and mostly worthless. The Jewish leadership must have had a fair knowledge of the numbers of their community, because this was indispensable for the distribution of the *haluka*. Conflicting interests were, however, involved in revealing any such information to outsiders: alleged higher numbers might augment the financial assistance from abroad and enhance the importance of the community in the eyes of Christian circles; whereas in relation to the Turkish authorities, fewer persons implied payment of less tax. From a study of the available sources, this author is inclined to give some credence to the following data of exclusively Jewish provenance, but even they are to be viewed as no more than rough indications of the order of magnitude of Jews in Jerusalem: 1839 (census organized by Moses Montefiore)²: 3,000; 1856 (figure obtained and published by L. A. Frankl)³: 5,700; 1872: (figure obtained by H. Graetz) 8000;⁴ around 1880: 13,900 and about 1895: 28,100 (the latter two are well-known estimates by A. M. Luncz);⁵ 1914: (estimate of A. Ruppin and of D. Gurevich) 45,000.⁶ For most purposes of this paper, it suffices to know that in the middle part of the nineteenth century the number of Jews in Jerusalem was still rather small.

Regarding the ethnic origins of the Jews in Jerusalem in the first half of the nineteenth century, the great majority were Sephardim (in the narrow sense of this word), or Jews from Asia and Africa; together these groups amounted to 83 per cent, according to Montefiore's census of 1839. The Ashkenazim had re-established a foothold in the city only in 1812. However, from the middle of the nineteenth century, the Ashkenazim received relatively large additions of immigrants. Hence their absolute and relative numbers began to swell. They turned into a majority of the city's Jews before the close of the century, probably by the 1880's.

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sephardic "community" (*'eda*) organizationally encompassed all Oriental Jewish groups. In 1854, a separate Maghrabi (North African) community was established. Subsequently other Oriental groups achieved organizational separation from the Sephardic community.

² For censuses organized by Montefiore, see note 7.

³ A. L. Frankl, *Nach Jerusalem*, Leipzig, 1858, II, 500.

⁴ J. Meisl, *Heinrich Graetz*, Berlin, 1917, p. 142.

⁵ A. M. Luncz, "Jerusalem Jewish Population and its Occupations," in *Jerusalem*, Vol. I (1882), pp. 34, 48. A. M. Luncz (ed.), *Luah Eretz Israel* (Palestine Calendar), Vol. I (1895), p. 28.

⁶ A. Ruppin, *Soziologie der Juden*, Berlin, 1930, I, 146; D. Gurevich, *The Jewish Population of Jerusalem*, Jerusalem, 1940, p. 14.

B. Objectives of this Paper

Several peculiar features in the demographic patterns of Jerusalem's Jews in the nineteenth century shall be discussed in this paper. They are:

1. Frequency of premature marriages and their demographic consequences (Section III).
2. High mortality and the deficit of the natural movement of the Jewish population (Section IV).
3. The compensation of this natural deficit through the influx of immigrants (Section V).

The discussion of the specific topics will be preceded by a somewhat selective account of the living conditions of the Jews of Jerusalem, with particular emphasis on direct and indirect health aspects (Section II). This is intended as background information in order to facilitate an understanding of the high morbidity and mortality which then prevailed.

The paper will focus on conditions in the middle third of the nineteenth century, which will hereafter be referred to as the "middle" of that century. During that time, the peculiar demographic conditions selected here for consideration were very conspicuous and are sufficiently documented. Later these peculiarities were already on the wane; for earlier decades there is a lack of relevant data.

The main sources which made this investigation possible for the middle of the nineteenth century, can be divided into two groups:

1. The population censuses undertaken at the initiative of Sir Moses Montefiore. The lists of Jerusalem Jews drawn up from the censuses of 1839 and 1866 are preserved. They were statistically processed, and the data thus obtained were analyzed, by this author.⁷
2. Published accounts by contemporary observers, among them physicians.

II. Living Conditions Detrimental to Good Health

The high mortality of the Jews in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century, which is the main theme of this paper, will be more readily understood after some acquaintance with the then prevailing living conditions.

⁷ Photocopies of the original population lists were put at the disposal of the author by the Ben Zvi Institute, directed by Dr. M. Benayahu; their assistance is gratefully acknowledged. A transcription of the 1839 census lists, made by the late J. Meisl, was also used. (Meisl compiled from this material statistical tables on his own; see his paper: "Reshimat Yehudei Tzfat u-Svivoteha mi-Shnat 5699" [List of the Jews of Safed and Surroundings in 1839], in *Sefunot*, Vol. VI [1962]). A description and evaluation of the Montefiore censuses transcends the bounds of this paper. They are a unique, interesting and very productive source for detailed statistical data on the Jewish population at that time; on the whole, they appear rather reliable for the demographic characterization of that population.

From the very numerous accounts — some casual others more systematic and a few even highly detailed, — available on Jerusalem's Jews at that time, the following summary of the detrimental living conditions can be presented:

1. Bad housing conditions in the Old City: unsanitary dwellings in ancient structures, lacking light, fresh air and sewerage; uncleanness and foul smells; and, with the increase of immigrants and population, ever more acute crowding.

2. Absence of public canalization and garbage disposal.

3. Unsatisfactory water supply from cisterns deficient in both the quantity and quality of the water available during the hot season.

4. Malnutrition and, in winter, insufficient clothing and heating.

5. Certain forms of conduct that could be injurious to health, such as prolonged hours of study in *heder* and *yeshiva* under unsanitary conditions, frequent fasting, etc.

6. Great frequency of endemic and epidemic diseases. Fevers, i.e., apparently various forms of malaria, were widespread, as well as dysentery. Once every few years, there occurred an outbreak of cholera, plague or the like.

7. Years of drought and ensuing famine were not rare.

Some of the above-listed conditions resulted from the general unhealthiness of life in a dilapidated and increasingly crowded Oriental city, whose historic fame and religious attraction to the Jews were out of all proportion to the sanitary arrangements and the water supply available in the middle of the nineteenth century. A serious aggravation came from the impecunious state of most Jews, who depended solely on the pittance of the *haluka* and were unable to afford adequate lodging, food and water, clothing and heating.

Moreover, a larger and larger percentage of the recent immigrants, were Jews from Europe, who were not accustomed to the climatic and living conditions in Jerusalem. All contemporary authors who wrote on this subject agreed that the lot of the new immigrants was particularly hard, their acclimatization protracted and difficult, and the mortality among them very high.

It is easy to grasp that this was so for European Jews; but it will be instructive to find what hardships and high level of child mortality were encountered by the Yemenite Jews who settled in Jerusalem as late as the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see below).

Thomas Chaplin M. D., an English physician practising in Jerusalem, published a paper on "The Fevers of Jerusalem" in the medical journal, *Lancet*, of 1864. While his scientific approach to diseases is certainly quite outdated, considerable interest attaches to his reasoned account of the

unhealthiness of Jerusalem at that time, with which he prefaced his paper. This interest is even enhanced by the fact that young A.M. Luncz, when he published, in 1876, his first book, *Ways of Zion and Jerusalem* (a Jerusalem guide-book), saw fit to devote a not inconsiderable portion of the slender volume to a Hebrew translation of the relevant passages of Dr. Chaplin's paper. We, too, shall quote here some of these passages as a contemporary substantiation of many of the points summarized by us above and as emphatic evidence of the unusually high morbidity prevailing in Jerusalem:

Jerusalem is one of the most unhealthy of cities, and fever is its principal disease. Orientals and Europeans, immigrants and natives, alike suffer; and during the sickly period of the year almost one-fourth of the population become ill. Yet Jerusalem is situated more than 2000 feet above the level of the sea, in a country not naturally insalubrious, on the summits and sides of lofty hills; it is surrounded for three-fourths of its extent by deep and precipitous valleys, which afford admirable facilities for drainage, and has not a marsh within fifteen miles. Its position, therefore, can in no way account for the great amount of sickness and mortality which prevails within its walls. The causes of this are to be found in the evil chances which have befallen the city during its long history, and which have left behind them an accumulation of rubbish scarcely credible to those who have not witnessed it; in the almost total absence of sanitary regulations; in the poverty and filth of a great part of its population; and, lastly, in certain peculiarities in connexion with its water-supply. Some consideration of each of these circumstances is required before we can arrive at a proper understanding of the peculiar nature of the fevers to which they give rise.

1. *The rubbish.* Jerusalem has been sacked some seventeen times — more than once almost totally destroyed; and the present city is built upon the *débris* of nearly 3000 years. Accordingly, both without the walls and within is found an immense quantity of rubbish, consisting of stones, earth, ashes, bits of pottery, bones, and decayed wood. The slopes of Zion and Moriah, of Akra and Bezetha, with the valleys which separate them, and indeed almost the whole area of the city, are covered with such an accumulation, in some places to a depth of upwards of forty feet. ...

2. *Neglect of sanitary regulations.* It cannot be said that sanitary measures are entirely neglected in the Holy City. Many European residents and the principals of the larger convents are aware of their importance, and put them in practice so far as their own dwellings and the streets in which they are situated are concerned. Recent Pashas

also have, both by example and authority, done a good deal in promoting cleanliness and decency, and the city has consequently become much cleaner than formerly. Nevertheless, if judged by European standards, it is shamefully and abominably dirty. Some ancient drains are still in existence; but they are imperfect, and not one house in fifty has its cesspools connected with them. This would not matter so much if the cesspools were emptied at proper times and into proper places; but a citizen of Jerusalem, after his privy has been running over for some weeks, when he begins at last to bestir himself, too often digs a hole *in the street*, puts the contents of the latrine into it, fills in the earth, and congratulates himself upon his energetic attention to health and cleanliness. Occasionally he shows more foresight, and establishes an opening between the place of convenience and the street, thus saving himself the expense and trouble of emptying his cesspool by never allowing it to become full. All kinds of animals and vegetable matter are allowed to lie and rot in the streets. If a dog or a cat dies, it putrefies in the roadway, or is eaten by one of its companions. In a walk through the city during the cold weather, a dozen of these animals may be seen lying dead. The remains of horses, donkeys, and camels are usually dragged outside the city, and left just under the walls to be devoured by dogs and jackals. There is no end to the melon-rinds, stalks of grapes, dung, feathers, bones, and refuse of all sorts which find their way into the street. The Oriental's notion of a street would appear to be a *receptacle for whatever is useless*; and as there are no scavengers, and it is only by lodging a complaint at the Seraille that a person can be compelled to remove a nuisance, the public ways are always disgracefully dirty. More disgusting than all to a European is the shameless indecency with which the thoroughfares are turned into places of convenience. For seven months of the year there is no rain, and the air during this long dry season becomes filled with the loathsome dust and odour which result from so much impurity.

3. *The poverty and filthy habits of the people.* To dwell upon all the various ways in which the peculiar habits and the poverty of the inhabitants of Jerusalem prove injurious to health is foreign to the present purpose. Dirt, privation, insufficient clothing, and houses ill lighted, ill ventilated, and undrained, produce the same effects here as elsewhere; and the pale faces and feeble limbs which glide about the streets of the poorer quarters of the city tell too plainly their tale of want and misery. The Jews ... suffer most; and the wretchedness which poverty invariably brings in its train is not a little increased by the neglect of cleanliness which characterizes a great proportion of them.

Among all classes of the native population there exists a strong prejudice against washing children. They have a notion that a clean skin induces delicacy of constitution, and that dirt is the best preventive of disease. Hence, even the children of well-to-do people are often to be seen literally coated with a layer of filth and effete cuticle

4. *The water-supply.* Almost the whole of the water drunk in Jerusalem is collected from the rains and preserved for use in underground tanks or cisterns. Every dwelling-house has one or more such reservoirs, and for the most part the houses are built over them. With proper care in cleaning cisterns, water may in this way be kept sweet and good for many months; but if such care be not taken, it becomes loaded with organic matter, and acquires a bad smell and taste. The water of the best wells, indeed, usually contains abundance of animalculae towards the end of the summer; and it is the custom in every well-regulated household to strain away the numberless *Daphnes* and *Cyclopses* before drinking it. Such water, however, has not always a bad flavour, and is therefore by many persons drunk in large quantities without the precaution. In great numbers of instances, owing to the poverty or carelessness of the people, the wells are allowed to go on accumulating organic matter from year to year; and hence it happens that long before the summer is over their water becomes quite unfit to drink. Rats and mice also fall in and still further contaminate it. On the whole, it may safely be affirmed that after the month of July no water in the city is fit to be drunk without being previously filtered or boiled. Good fountain water may be obtained from several places within a short distance — as from Lifta, Malha, and 'Ain Karim; but the cost of carriage makes it too expensive for ordinary use.

The quality of the water is not the only thing in connexion with the water-supply by which the health is influenced. Many cisterns become exhausted long before the rainy season sets in, and as it is difficult to remove the whole of the water by means of a bucket, a small quantity is always left, which evaporates from its bed of organic matter exactly as a marsh dries up in the drought of the summer. Moreover, there can be no doubt that many undiscovered receptacles of this kind exist under the ruins which abound all over the city, and these, being out of repair and leaky, become empty very soon after the rains have ceased. Of all the causes of disease in operation in the Holy City this factitious kind of malaria is undoubtedly the most influential.

The dampness of the houses, most of which are built entirely of stone; the excessive heat of the sun by day, and the cold and heavy dews of night; the siroccos or desert winds; the scarcity of green

vegetables, and want of variety in the food, are circumstances also of great importance in connexion with the causes of fevers ...⁸

Chaplin also remarked later in his paper, that "the Jews are on the whole more sickly, and suffer from a greater variety of non-febrile diseases, than other classes of the population."⁹

Luncz inserted the above and other passages of Chaplin's paper in his guide-book of Jerusalem with the intention of showing "how very bad the health conditions were" in Jerusalem and what precautions should be taken to reduce the risk of falling ill. He made, *inter alia*, additional points which may be summarized as follows:¹⁰

1) During the decade which elapsed between the publication of Chaplin's article and his own book, already written in the mid seventies, sanitary conditions in Jerusalem had not improved very much.

2) Febrile diseases affected newcomers even far above the extent to which they afflicted veteran residents.

3) In an attempt to demonstrate "statistically" (in his own words) the spread of fevers in Jerusalem, he calculated that the amount of quinine annually sold to Jews sufficed for two ordinary portions per individual.

The physical debility of many of the Jews in Jerusalem, in consequence of malnutrition, unsanitary living and disease, was also repeatedly referred to when plans for their occupation were put forward at that time. Their poor physique was then mentioned as a factor handicapping practical measures for getting them to do manual work.

III. The Demographic Consequences of Premature Marriages

An early age of first marriage among the Jews of Jerusalem of both sexes in the middle of the nineteenth century was mentioned by not a few contemporary authors — either when relating particular instances or in generalized statements. To refer here only to a few well-known books: Schwarz stated that the marriage age for both sexes was about 14 or 15, after several years of betrothal.¹¹ The physician Neumann indicated that the marriage age among the Sephardim was low, though in general not before the thirteenth year of life.¹² Frankl's book reports on a wedding between a 14 year

⁸ Thomas Chaplin, "The Fevers of Jerusalem," *The Lancet*, Vol. II (1864), pp. 236f.

⁹ A. M. Luncz, *Nesivot Tziyon vi-Yerushalayim* (Ways of Zion and Jerusalem), Jerusalem, 1876, pp. 27ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 36f.

¹¹ J. Schwarz, *Das Heilige Land* (translation of *Tvu'ot ha-Aretz*), Frankfurt am Main, 1852, p. 341.

¹² B. Neumann, *Die Heilige Stadt und deren Bewohner*, Hamburg, 1877, p. 368.

old groom and a 12 year old bride, and contains other references to the early occurrence of marriages.¹³ Tobler relates that there was a custom among the Jews of Jerusalem not to marry off their children before their twelfth year of life, but this could be circumvented by holding the wedding outside the city, e.g., in the village of Al-Tur on the Mount of Olives.¹⁴ This statement of Tobler's was repeated in Frankl's book.¹⁵

A very early marriage age is also confirmed by a study of the censuses undertaken in 1839 and 1866 at the initiative of Moses Montefiore. By comparing the ratio of male individuals in the age of adolescence who were recorded as boys (together with their parents) or as household heads, respectively, the average marriage age of males is found to have been roughly 15-16 in 1839, and about 17 among the Ashkenazim and Maghrabis in 1866.¹⁶ With insignificant exceptions, all males married before the age of 20. In both censuses, hardly any females at age 15 or above were reported as girls (i.e., enumerated with their parents).

Much later references to the then declining practice of premature marriages are still found in writings of Luncz and Ben Yehuda¹⁷ and in the publication of the Jerusalem census of 1916.¹⁸

Relatively early marriage was still usual among the Jews in Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century, and it was certainly widespread among the Oriental Jews and the Muslim populations. But Tobler, Frankl and Graetz wrote expressly that the Jews of Jerusalem were wont to have their children marry at a lower age than the local Arabs.¹⁹

Moreover, there are to be found very explicit statements in the writings of that time on the failure of the premature marriages to increase reproduction, and on their detrimental effects on the health and survival of the young mothers and their infants. Some of these statements come from well-qualified observers whose sharp criticism of the respective conditions among the Jews in Jerusalem suggests that these were actually worse than in comparable populations. Both because of the intrinsic interest of these matters to the demographic history of Jerusalem's Jews — and even to demographic history in general — and because of their relevance to the then prevailing

¹³ Frankl, *op. cit.*, II, 128ff., 179ff. and *passim*.

¹⁴ T. Tobler, *Denkblätter aus Jerusalem*, Konstanz, 1853, p. 317.

¹⁵ Frankl, *op. cit.*, II, 180.

¹⁶ The respective breakdown is not available for the Sephardim in 1866.

¹⁷ See notes 20 and 21.

¹⁸ Ha-Misrad ha-Eretz Israeli shel ha-Histadrut ha-Tziyonit, *Sefirat Yehudei Eretz Israel* (Zionist Organization, Palestine Office, Census of Jews in Palestine), Part 1, 1918, p. 15.

¹⁹ Tobler, *op. cit.*, p. 317; Frankl, *op. cit.*, II, 180; Meisl, *Heinrich Graetz*, p. 144.

high mortality (see Section IV), we shall quote here some of the available evidence.

The reproductive failure of the premature marriages is taken for granted in two somewhat later statements. Luncz wrote, in an article published in 1901: "The very early marriages have almost disappeared; at any rate it is known that they do not raise appreciably the natural increase."²⁰ And Ben Yehuda wrote in 1908 about the Yemenites in Jerusalem: "They make their sons and daughters marry at the age of 12 and 13, and because of this prematurity the offspring is not viable."²¹

The negative consequences of the premature marriages on health and survival were emphasized in greater detail in earlier statements.

The physician Tobler wrote about the Jews of Jerusalem, in a book based on his visit in 1845-1846 and published in 1853:

Few unmarried persons are encountered, as those are more or less ostracized by public opinion; on the contrary, everything possible is done that people may enter married status at a very young age. ...Before the persons become nubile, before their organs and ability of procreation are duly developed, those latter are utterly misused. When the boy or girl reaches the age at which the cycle of physical development is completed and nature calls only then for procreation, the best strength is already wasted; weaklings produce, with utmost effort and exertion, little weaklings of whom about two thirds view the light of the world for no more than a few days or weeks. One rarely finds a family with many children, whereas childless young couples are very frequent.²²

The renowned historian Graetz and his travelling companions on a journey to the Holy Land in 1872, wrote thus in their report:

This physical weakness, connected as it is with pauperism, is due to a deeply rooted evil, namely the marriage of young children with one another. The custom continues of marrying boys between thirteen and fifteen years with girls between twelve and fourteen. This is nothing less than infanticide. For even if the young mother and her child survive the first confinement, the issue of such a union will be affected throughout life with physical weakness and mental apathy. Such an offspring is forever dependent on alms.²³

²⁰ A. M. Luncz, "Yesodei Sefiroteinu" (The Sources of our Population Estimates), in *Jerusalem*, Vol. V (1901), p. 184, note 1.

²¹ A. Z. Ben Yehuda (Idelson), "Yehudei Teiman u-Zmiroteihem" (The Yemenite Jews and their Songs), in *Luah Eretz Israel*, Vol. XIV (1908), p. 105.

²² Tobler, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

²³ Meisl, *Heinrich Graetz*, p. 144.

The wide spread of the premature marriages was denied in some rejoinders from Jerusalem Jews to Graetz's report. Yet as late as 1887, Dr. Schwarz, the director of the local Rothschild hospital, included the following passage in a paper on "The sanitary conditions in Jerusalem":

They [i.e., the boys] are married when they have barely reached sixteen and often even earlier. It is easy to understand what the offspring is like! The children are almost without exception affected with scrofula, and their death rate is enormous. The girls are somewhat better developed, for they are not subject to the above-mentioned educational regime [i.e., in the "*heder*"]. Yet, they often wither after getting married, for here fourteen-year-old mothers are nothing exceptional.²⁴

Statements by Jewish physicians in Palestine at that time also reveal another malpractice connected with nuptiality and the eager quest for offspring: self-administered treatments by young wives who failed to become pregnant often led to complications and produced the very opposite of the desired effect.²⁵

Study of the population censuses organized by Montefiore among Jerusalem's Jews, confirms strikingly the small number of children alive in young families — despite the low marriage age. Of the families headed by men aged 15–24, 70 per cent had no living children in 1839, and the average of children alive per family was 0.37. The analogous figures for the Ashkenazi and Maghrabi families of men aged 15–24 in 1866²⁶ were 64 per cent childless and an average of 0.45 children per family.

Demographic literature, reporting *inter alia* findings from India and other non-European countries, corroborates the negative effects of premature marriage for health and survival of the young mothers and their infants. Such marriages may somewhat increase fertility per se, but are likely to reduce net reproduction (i.e., the actual extent of demographic replacement by the next generation, taking into account the operation of mortality). Thus the premature marriages were one of the causes of the high mortality encountered among the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century (see Section IV).

Another indirect effect of the too early marriages may have been an increased tendency towards divorce. In 1910, Luncz published a retrospective account "Jerusalem During the Last Forty Years", in which he inserted the following remarks: "...Parents made their children marry at an early age....

²⁴ (Dr.) Schwartz, "Die Sanitaeren Verhaeltnisse Jerusalems," *Jerusalem*, Vol. II (1887), p. 82.

²⁵ (Dr.) Blueden, "Ueber die Sanitaeren Verhaeltnisse Safeds," *Jerusalem*, Vol. III (1889), p. 97; Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

²⁶ The respective breakdown is not available for the Sephardim in 1866.

The groom did not see the bride except for a fleeting glance, they were never allowed to talk, let alone become acquainted with each other. As a consequence, divorce and remarriage were common...."²⁷ Luncz continued with a somewhat satirical description of the ease with which a divorce could be obtained among the Ashkenazim of Jerusalem in the past, but it seems unlikely that his main contentions were unsupported by facts, as he was writing about local conditions in the lifetime of his own contemporaries, and indicated names of persons and other details. Moreover, in a Jewish physician's account on "The Sanitary Conditions in Safed", published already in 1889, one reads: "Early marriage and its consequence — divorce — are here even more common than in Jerusalem. One often finds 25 year old women that have already been divorced from 2-3 husbands."²⁸

It may be assumed that the childlessness of many young couples (see above) facilitated divorce.

IV. *The Very High Mortality and Natural Deficit of the Population*

A. *In the Middle of the Nineteenth Century*

1. *High Mortality*

There seem to be virtually no direct statistical data on mortality extant from that period.²⁹ Yet there is plenty of indirect evidence to show that morbidity and mortality among the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century were, on the average, extremely high. It may be assumed that, as usual under such conditions, considerable fluctuations occurred in the yearly death rate, with peaks occasioned by outbreaks of epidemics, famine, etc. The main evidence for very high average morbidity and mortality can be summarized as follows:

a) Their prevalence is a basic theme in the accounts of Tobler, Chaplin and Neumann — all three of them doctors — as well as in the reports of Luncz and Graetz from the 1870's. Some passages from these writings, relating either to morbidity and mortality among the whole Jewish population in Jerusalem or among the Jewish children, have already been quoted or mentioned here. Let it be added that in the reminiscences of Mrs. Finn (the wife of the British consul in Jerusalem during 1845-1862) the following statement is found: "We had now [in 1847] in Jerusalem an able young

²⁷ A. M. Luncz, "Yerushalayim be-Arba'im Shana ha-Aharonot" (Jerusalem During the Last Forty Years), in *Luah Eretz Israel*, Vol. XVI (1910), p. 29.

²⁸ Blueden, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

²⁹ Tobler, *op. cit.*, p. 348, relates some sporadic information on child mortality.

English surgeon ... He was greatly interested in the Jews and he told us that ... the ordinary mortality was that of plague or pestilence in Europe."³⁰

b) The small number of children found alive in Jewish families in Jerusalem. General considerations regarding a traditional religious society like the Jews in Jerusalem, as well as the evidence presented in Section III about the early marriage age, etc., cannot but lead to the assumption that fertility and natality must have been rather high. If, nevertheless, few living children were found in the Jewish families of Jerusalem at that time, very heavy child mortality must have been the cause. We have already presented above the data from the censuses of 1839 and 1866 on the small number of children in young families, i.e., those headed by men aged 15-24, and also quoted the explicit corroboration by Tobler. We can now add that the maximum average number of children was found, according to both censuses, in families headed by men aged 35-44. Yet even this average was but 1.3 children per Ashkenazi and Maghrabi family in 1839, and 1.6 in 1866. (This information is not available for Sephardim.) Of these families, 34 per cent in 1839 and 22 per cent in 1866 did not include any children at the time of the census. The average number of children in the numerous families headed by widows (see below) was even far fewer. Demographers think that, in the absence of birth control, a woman who survives to the end of her fertile period will have, on the average, 6 to 8 live births. Under the very difficult sanitary and economic conditions of the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century, the lower figure will seem more realistic. Even so, comparison with the number of children actually enumerated in families shows that a great majority of the children born must have died at an early age.³¹

c) The great frequency of widows in the population. This is most strikingly brought out by the data of the Montefiore censuses: 49 per cent of all Jewish women³² in 1839, and 36 per cent in 1866, were widows.³³ Since, we know that the overwhelming majority of the men were married at the time of the censuses, there was a large surplus of women over men in the adult Jewish population and also of females over males in the entire Jewish population. Also, various literary sources mention either the frequency of widows, or the surplus of women over men, among Jerusalem's

³⁰ Elizabeth Anne Finn, *Reminiscences of Mrs. Finn*, London, 1929, p. 74.

³¹ Considering also any already married and any future children of the men enumerated at age 35-44 in the censuses.

³² I.e., the sum of married wives and of women reported as widows (but excluding young girls enumerated with their parents).

³³ Those enumerated as "widows" may have also included divorced women who had not remarried.

Jews. There are some indications that widows used to migrate to Jerusalem, both from religious motives and because they found there support from public funds.³⁴ This may have been especially so among the Sephardim from nearby regions of the Ottoman empire. But the major cause for the large proportion of widows must have been the mortality of husbands. In this context it may be mentioned that it is demographically usual for more women than men to become, and remain, widowed because of the higher average age of the husbands, the greater age-specific mortality of men as compared to women, and the better chances of remarriage for men. As for the specific conditions in Jerusalem, analysis of the census data shows that a considerable proportion of the widows were relatively young or had immigrated relatively young.

d) The great frequency of orphans in Jerusalem. In the censuses, no fewer than 29 per cent of all Jewish children in 1839, and 24 per cent in 1866, were listed as orphaned either from both parents or from the father.

e) The rapid decrease in the number of veteran residents. If Frankl's estimate of Jerusalem Jews in 1856 is compared to the figure of the 1866 census for residents remaining from 1856 — i.e. the sum of foreign-born resident for at least 10 years and of local-born aged at least 10 years — a decrease of about one half is found. This drastic reduction after only 10 years could be due to mortality and/or emigration.

At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emigration from Jerusalem and Palestine, because of the difficulties of earning a livelihood, occupied a prominent place in the population dynamics of the Jews there. But the emigration that took place at a later period, was very unlike the former in many respects: dimensions and motivations of immigration to Palestine, increased attention to economic questions among the Jews in Palestine, total extent of Jewish world migration, facilities for travelling, etc. For the middle of the nineteenth century, on the contrary, we have not found any reference to large emigration in the numerous and sometimes detailed accounts of conditions among the Jews. Frankl stated explicitly: "... the emigration from Jerusalem is very small, hardly noticeable."³⁵ If emigration was small, the above-mentioned decline in the number of 1856 residents to about one half after only 10 years must have been primarily due to very high mortality.

Before concluding this section, let it be pointed out that however grave the above-presented picture is, the statistical evidence from the Montefiore censuses shows that some tendency for improvement was already operating in the middle part of the nineteenth century. From 1839 to 1866 the average

³⁴ E.g., Buckingham, p. 399.

³⁵ Frankl, *op. cit.*, II, 175.

number of enumerated children per family increased, while the proportion of widows among all women and of orphans among all children went down.

2. *Deficit of Natural Movement*

In consequence of the high mortality among the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century, a striking deficit prevailed in their natural population movement, i.e., in the balance of natality and mortality. This deficit is shown, *inter alia*, by the following evidence:

a) For a couple of parents to replace themselves demographically, two children must reach maturity. For maintaining, in the long run, the size of an entire population through natural movement alone (irrespective of migrations), the number of children reaching maturity per couple of parents must exceed two, because of persons in the parental generation who were never married, or who became widowed or divorced during their fertile ages. The number of live births necessary for replacement is, obviously, still greater — in inverse proportion to the children born who die before reaching maturity.

In Jerusalem of the mid nineteenth century, the average number of children enumerated per family was highest in families headed by men aged 35–44, but reached, even for this category, no more than 1.3 children in 1839 and 1.6 in 1866 (Ashkenazim and Maghrabis).³⁶ In nearly all these families the male head was actually married at the time of the census, the few exceptions apparently being widowers or divorcés for whom the prospects of remarriage were high under the then prevailing conditions; hence, for simplicity, all these families may be considered to represent couples. Allowance should be made for the fact that some children of men aged 35–44 may already have left the parental home because of their own marriages, at the very early age of marriage then common; also, families headed by men 35–44 were sufficiently young to have additional children. On the other hand, some of the enumerated children might die before maturity and this risk was particularly great for any additional children to be born, as child mortality is highest in infancy. We have no direct information on the numerical importance of all these factors and can only assume, very roughly, that the two opposite tendencies more or less balanced each other. Consequently, the final number of children reaching maturity per couple was probably not very different from that enumerated in the censuses with regard to men aged 35–44. Hence that figure — 1.3 in 1839 and 1.6 in 1866 — fell short of the required minimum for demographic replacement, i.e., more than two children reaching maturity per average couple. Besides, under the

³⁶ The respective breakdown is not available for the Sephardim in 1866.

then prevailing conditions of high mortality, the enumerated average of 1.3 or 1.6 living children, respectively, must have included some children from previous marriages which had been dissolved by the death of one of the spouses; in this case the enumerated children stood in the place of more than two parents — which aggravated the insufficiency of demographic replacement for existing couples.

b) If there was insufficient replacement even for couples living in Jerusalem during, and up to the end of, their fertile ages, it is easy to point to other categories of the adult Jewish population whose replacement prospects in Jerusalem were far inferior or, even nil:

(i) Adults who died long before the end of their fertile ages.

(ii) Widows of fertile age, whose chances of remarriage were limited because of the great surplus of females in the population.

(iii) Immigrants arriving after the end of their fertile age, while leaving abroad some or all of their children (who may have already been adult and on their own).

c) We see above that among the Jewish residents of Jerusalem in 1856 only about half remained after a lapse of 10 years. This great decrease was mainly attributable to the consequences of mortality. By drawing upon further data from the 1866 census, one can assume that even the survivors from 1856 *plus* their children who were born during the interval 1856–1866 and remained alive up to the latter date, were by about one third less than the original number of 1856 residents. As a very rough estimate, merely as an illustration of the order of magnitude, one may therefore conjecture that the natural deficit of Jerusalem's Jewish residents of 1856 over the next 10 years was 40 per thousand annually. Assuming a birth rate of no more than similar size (because of the unfavourable living conditions), an average annual death rate of the staggering height of about 80 per thousand could be inferred. However, these conjectures relate not to the whole of Jerusalem's Jewish population but to a comparatively veteran section. Literary sources and general considerations both indicate that the mortality among recent immigrants and, under their influence, in the whole Jewish population was even higher than that of the more veteran elements.

3. *Demographic Evaluation*

In attempting to evaluate demographically the enormous mortality and natural deficit of Jerusalem's Jewish population in the middle of the nineteenth century, the age composition of that population obviously deserves attention. Among old people mortality is high everywhere; therefore a very large proportion of old people could offer a partial explanation of the unusual findings obtained for Jerusalem's Jews. It can, however, be pointed

out at once that the insufficient replacement for couples of fertile age, the heavy infant mortality in case of premature marriages and even the great relative frequency of young orphans cannot be connected with this issue.

In the historical literature, it is not unusual to find statements that a large proportion of the Jewish immigrants in the nineteenth century were old people. Already contemporary accounts emphasized a component of old people among the immigrants and among the Jewish population of Jerusalem. The censuses of 1839 and 1866 are, therefore, important as they allow a quantitative assessment that corrects mistaken generalizations in this respect. Among the recent immigrants, a not inconsiderable share of elderly people is found according to the census data, but the great majority were below the age of 50; only the recent immigrants of the Ashkenazi community in 1866 comprised a large proportion of elderly. Among the whole Jewish population, some tendency to "aging" can be perceived from the census data, but the actual share of the elderly was not striking in 1839 or in 1866 — again except for the Ashkenazim in 1866. In keeping with these census findings, Tobler remarked, in a book published in 1853, regarding his own contention that there was a natural deficit among Jerusalem's Jews: "One may retort, as an attempt at explanation, that only elderly people immigrate who are past procreative age and who, soon after reaching their terrestrial goal, come to rest in the soil of the valley of Yehoshafat. But, on the contrary, younger couples constitute the majority."³⁷ And Frankl wrote: "The Jews arrive mostly with wife and children,³⁸ or sufficiently young to have expectation of this blessing."³⁹

The above evidence points to a somewhat raised but not actually high proportion of elderly among the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is perhaps not so difficult to reconcile this finding with the contemporary literary sources emphasizing the old persons among the immigrants and the inhabitants:

a) The pathetic participation of elderly persons in long-distance migration "so as to die in Jerusalem" must have aroused legitimate interest; it also created practical problems: of their upkeep, etc.

b) The concept of an elderly person was different then from what it is now. Probably anyone above 50, or an age not much higher, was considered "old".

c) The abovementioned census data and quotations relate to the middle of the nineteenth century. It is possible that Jerusalem's Jews had a different age composition at other times. On the one hand, there may well have been

³⁷ Tobler, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

³⁸ The following sentences show that young children are meant.

³⁹ Frankl, *op. cit.*, II, 170.

before this, some tradition for elderly Jews to immigrate. On the other hand, a concentration of elderly is found among the Ashkenazim, both recent immigrants and inhabitants, according to the 1866 census — i.e., at the very end of “the middle” of the nineteenth century. At the present state of knowledge, no comparable statistical data are available for a later time in the nineteenth century. This leaves open the possibility that the respective 1866 data may also be indicative of a similar situation during some subsequent decades.

For the middle part of the nineteenth century, the somewhat pronounced share of elderly among the recent immigrants was, no doubt, a significant component in the mortality situation, but not the decisive one. If “aging” was not the decisive factor of the unusual mortality among Jerusalem’s Jews in comparison to other populations, an explanation of that situation and of the perseverance of a sizable Jewish population in Jerusalem despite the continual losses, may be attempted along the following lines:

a) The very high mortality was primarily the result of the objective conditions outlined in Sections II and III. While many of these conditions were common to both Jews and other inhabitants of Jerusalem, the Jews had the handicap of comprising a large proportion of new, yet unacclimatized immigrants (see Section V). It may also be that some of the living conditions of many of the Jews were particularly detrimental to health and survival.

b) Within the average mortality of an entire country, there is compensation between places with higher and lower mortality. Demographic history shows that in the past, unlike the recent conditions in technologically advanced countries, mortality tended to be higher in towns than in villages because of the problems of sewerage, water supply, infection, etc., under conditions of crowding; things being so, the rural localities could make up for any natural deficit in towns. But the Jews of Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century were all cooped up in one city, which, at that time, was particularly unhealthy.

c) Factually, the permanence of a sizable Jewish population in Jerusalem despite the heavy natural deficit, is explained by the continual arrival of new immigrants. These reinforcements, though themselves subject to particularly high mortality, kept increasing the otherwise declining numbers (see Section V).

d) Psychologically, it is likely that many of the Jews who, for religious reasons, had made their way from afar to Jerusalem, felt a strong attachment to this city — all hardships notwithstanding. Besides, the mode of life of Jerusalem’s Jews was consciously different from the usual pursuit of earthly objectives, with prominence given to the motif of mourning on the ruins of Zion. Perhaps the very attitude towards death became somewhat transmuted

in a society that saw immigrants arrive with the declared purpose "to die in Jerusalem."

B. Towards the End of the Nineteenth Century

While Jewish mortality in Jerusalem was extremely high in the middle of the nineteenth century, it had gone down to 19–17 per thousand by 1923–1925, when regular vital statistics began to be available. The evolution in the intervening period must be visualized, on the whole, as a gradual improvement. This does not exclude setbacks in years of epidemics or other calamities; e.g., it is known that a marked recrudescence of mortality occurred during World War I. During the period from the middle of the nineteenth century until the 1920's, the size and composition of the Jewish population and its living conditions changed radically. Suffice it here to point to the abandonment of the Old City by most Jews and the establishment of scattered residential quarters which, however backward some of them may appear to us now, presented decisive sanitary advantages over living in the Old City in conditions of overcrowding.

A few glimpses can be obtained of the evolution of mortality among Jerusalem's Jews up to the beginning of the present century:

For one year about 1880, Luncz collected and published figures on Jewish deaths in Jerusalem.⁴⁰ He himself computed a crude death rate of 43 per thousand. Such a rate would have been high enough to balance any then probable birthrate in the Jewish population with its still harsh living conditions and its somewhat "elderly" age composition. It seems, however, likely that Luncz's death figures were incomplete. On this assumption, the continuation of a natural deficit at that time, though on a much reduced scale, may be inferred.

For the Hebrew years 5654–5658 (1893/94–1897/98) figures on Jewish deaths in Jerusalem were collected from the burial societies of the various local Jewish communities (*hevrot kadisha*).⁴¹ If these figures are averaged for that whole five-year period and related to Luncz's contemporary population estimate, an annual crude death rate of 30 per thousand is obtained. This could have most probably left room for some natural increase. Yet, some remarks by the compiler of the death figures, and, in particular, comparison of the death rates implied for various communities (*'edot*) within the Jewish population of Jerusalem, render it likely that the data col-

⁴⁰ A. M. Luncz (ed.), "Statistic Table: Deaths Among Jews," *Jerusalem*, Vol. I (1882), pp. 144f. The exact year to which the data related is not stated.

⁴¹ "Juedische Sterblichkeitstatistik in Jerusalem fuer die Jahre 5654–5658," *Zeitschrift fuer Demographie und Statistik der Juden*, Vol. X, No. 4 (1914), pp. 62f.

lected were not quite complete. If so, the crude death rate must have been higher, and any natural increase smaller, than might appear on first sight.

Luncz himself wrote, in an article published in 1919: "... the natural increase in the Holy City and in the cities Tiberias and Safed, many of whose inhabitants are old people who came to spend here the rest of their lives, is smaller than the natural increase in cities abroad. The very early marriages have almost disappeared; at any rate, it is known that they do not raise appreciably the natural increase."⁴²

There was, however, one Jewish community in Jerusalem, the Yemenites, whose mortality was still very high at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The respective facts are of great interest, both as a reminder not to put too favourable an interpretation on the situation at that time and because of their comparative value for an assessment of the conditions prevailing more generally among Jerusalem's Jews at an earlier time. Let it be noted that the Yemenite Jews were comparative late-comers, appreciable numbers of immigrants arriving only as of 1882. Moreover, before World War I their living conditions were particularly wretched. There was then an expression current, "to live like Yemenites" — signifying extreme material hardship.⁴³

In an article pulished contemporarily (in 1908) on the folklore of the Yemenite Jews,⁴⁴ we read about the Yemenites in Jerusalem:

They live in very crowded conditions, six persons per room; hence they are much affected by various diseases, under the combined influence of bad nutrition and bad dwelling. They suffer from high mortality, especially high child mortality, so that a Yemenite family has usually no more than one or two children. Many families are even left without children, who have died from hunger and want and infectious diseases. And though Yemenites arrive here in large numbers, they fail to have a natural increase. It is the verdict of physicians that the Yemenite community [in Jerusalem] shows a population decline and is liable — God forbid — to disappear. Moreover, they make their sons and daughters marry at the age of 12 and 13, and because of this prematurity the offspring is not viable.

In 1948, Y. Razahbi published documents from that early period of the settlement of Yemenite Jews in Jerusalem, which showed that they turned

⁴² See note 20.

⁴³ This expression is explained as follows by the author quoting it: "The Yemenites content themselves with little and their food falls short even of that of the fellahin." J. Barzilai, "Mikhtavim me-Eretz Israel" (Letters From Palestine), Part 4. *Hashiloah*, Vol. XXIV (1911), p. 273.

⁴⁴ See note 21.

to the rabbis of San'a for advice about the alarming child mortality experienced in Jerusalem. In his explanatory text, Razahbi summarized the information which he had collected from the Yemenite community, as follows:

There was no family which did not receive the visitation of death: in some families, out of ten children born, two or three survived, in others not a single one remained alive. Therefore we are faced with the regrettable fact that some families of the early immigrants left no descendants after them and have died out. No statistical data have remained about the extent of the affliction but, according to the evidence of informed persons, on the average three-quarters of the infants died. ... Their Ashkenazi brethren attempted to comfort them with the report that they too had not succeeded in raising children during the first forty years of their settlement in Jerusalem, but afterward this mortality had ceased.⁴⁵

These accounts are essentially confirmed by the above-mentioned mortality data for 1893/94–1897/98, according to which the Yemenites had among all the specified Jewish communities (*'edot*) in Jerusalem by far the highest mortality. Their recorded deaths, related to Lunz's population estimate, give a crude death rate of 68 per thousand — a level clearly indicative of a deficit in the natural movement. The mortality data as such show that 63 per cent of the recorded Yemenite deaths were of children under 10, thus confirming the report of very high child mortality.

The startling fact emerges that, as late as the beginning of this century, Jews coming to Jerusalem from a remote region of Arabia experienced there a degree of child mortality unknown to them in their backward country of origin. This finding can be further concretized by data from Israel's population census of 1961 which showed that even up to the 1940's nearly half of the children born to Jews in Yemen used to die before reaching the age of 5.⁴⁶ Also interesting for the illustration of past mortality conditions in Jerusalem is the explicit parallelism, which lingered in the memory of the Yemenites in Jerusalem, between their originally very high child mortality in Jerusalem and similar conditions in another Jewish community in this city at a still earlier time. This agrees, essentially, with the picture presented

⁴⁵ Y. Razahbi, "Le-Farashat Hitnahalut Yehudei Teiman bi-Yerushalayim: Tmutat ha-Yeladim bein Teimanei Yerushalayim" (Notes on the Settlement of Yemenite Jews in Jerusalem: the Child Mortality Among the Yemenites of Jerusalem), *Jerusalem*, Vol. I (1947/48), pp. 114f.

⁴⁶ State of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Population and Housing Census 1961*, Vol. XXXII, *Marriage and Fertility*, Part II, p. 61; (U.) O. Schmelz, "The Israel Population Census of 1961 as a Source of Demographic Data on the Jews in the Diaspora," *The Jewish Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VIII, no. 1 (1966), p. 58.

above concerning Jewish mortality in Jerusalem in the middle of the nineteenth century.

V. Immigration from Abroad Made up for the Natural Deficit of the Population

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the natural movement of the Jewish population in Jerusalem showed a heavy deficit, as explained above. Yet the number of Jews in Jerusalem seems to have risen slowly from 1839 to 1856, and to have at least maintained itself from 1856 to 1866. The explanation for the apparent contradiction lies in immigration from abroad. The immigrants made up for the losses occasioned by mortality, and were the cause for any rise in population that occurred. This play of demographic forces was already perceived by contemporary observers.

In *Narrative of a Mission of Inquiry to the Jews from the Church of Scotland in 1839* we read: "There is, without doubt, a constant influx of Jews into this country. Yet not so great as to do more than supply the annual deaths." And also in the same *Narrative*: "There is always an influx, but then the mortality is great, and the number that come do no more than supply the places of those cut off."⁴⁷

The physician Tobler wrote: "The ratio of deaths to births is unlike the respective ratios found in other populations. A special factor enters here into play: the large number of annual immigrants is of great importance for a proper understanding of the Jewish population."⁴⁸

And the physician Neumann remarked in respect of Jerusalem's entire population, including the non-Jews: "...the population has sometimes rapidly declined because of the ravages of pestilence and other calamities, sometimes it has grown exceedingly through immigrants, who have been more numerous in certain years...."⁴⁹

Under these circumstances, a considerable proportion of Jerusalem's Jewish population, at any time during the middle of the nineteenth century, must have been composed of recent immigrants. Statistical evidence to this effect is furnished by Montefiore's censuses. Immigrants of the past 10 years constituted the following proportions of all Jewish men (including the local-born): in 1839 — 41 per cent, in 1866 (Ashkenazim and Maghrabis) — 52 per cent. In Jewish groups that had but recently established themselves in Jerusalem, the percentage of immigrants of the past 10 years was even higher: among the Ashkenazi men in 1839 — 66 per cent, among the

⁴⁷ A. E. Bonar and R. M. McCheyne, *Narrative of a Mission of Inquiry to the Jews from the Church of Scotland in 1839*, Edinburgh, 1846, p. 148 and p. 164.

⁴⁸ Tobler, *op. cit.*, p. 348.

⁴⁹ Neumann, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

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Maghrabi men in 1866-77 per cent. (The figures for Sephardim are not available.)

Thus Jerusalem's Jews in the middle of the nineteenth century were a particularly unstable population with comparatively limited biological continuity. On the one hand, there were the heavy inroads of mortality; on the other hand, immigration replenished or even increased the total numbers. The turnover of population was remarkably high.

10. CHANGES IN THE POSITION OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITIES OF PALESTINE AND SYRIA IN MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

by MOSHE MA' OZ

I. Introduction

It is commonly maintained that the Jews who lived for centuries in Ottoman dominions, including Palestine and Syria, enjoyed relatively good conditions, better than the conditions of their brethren in Christian Europe. Indeed the Jewish communities in the Muslim-Ottoman state were given a considerable degree of autonomy within the *millet* system — in matters of religious worship, personal status, education and the like. Members of these communities were engaged in commerce and craftsmanship, and some even in government administration, and were thus able to flourish.

These conditions, however, represent only one side of the coin; for the position of Jews was in many ways precarious. Like their Christian fellow subjects, the Jews were inferior citizens in the Muslim-Ottoman state which was based on the principle of Muslim superiority. They were regarded as state-protégés (*dhimmis*) and had to pay a special poll-tax (*jizya*) for that protection and as a sign of their inferior status.

Their testimony against Muslims was not accepted in the courts of justice, and in cases of the murder of a Jew or a Christian by a Muslim, the latter was usually not condemned to death. In addition, Jews as well as Christians were normally not acceptable for appointments to the highest administrative posts; they were forbidden to carry arms (thus, to serve in the army), to ride horses in towns or to wear Muslim dress. They were also not usually allowed to build or repair places of worship and were often subjected to oppression, extortion and violence by both the local authorities and the Muslim population.

The Jews in Ottoman Palestine and Syria lived under such ambivalent and precarious conditions for a number of centuries, up to the 1830's. Only during the 1840's and 1850's was their position stabilized for the first time and gradually improved, becoming better than ever before under Ottoman rule, and safer than that of their Christian fellow subjects. This profound change enabled the Jews of Palestine to increase their numbers considerably through immigration from Europe and helped them and their brethren in Syria to further consolidate themselves in the country.

This paper aims to trace the process of transformation of the Jews in Palestine, as compared to those in Syria — from the later period of the "Pashas' rule" through the Egyptian era and into the Tanzimat period. It will also attempt to examine the factors which brought about the improvement in the position of the Jews — as compared to the Christians — in the mid-nineteenth century.

II. The Period of the "Pashas' Rule"

The Jewish population of Palestine and Syria at the beginning of the nineteenth century totalled about 25,000; most of them were Sephardim — descendants of Spanish Jewry and of ancient local families; these were mainly Ottoman subjects. The rest were Ashkenazim — Jews of eastern and central European origin — who had come to the Holy Land throughout the Ottoman period, and largely continued to hold their former citizenships. The Jews dwelt mostly in towns: about half of them in the Four Holy Towns — Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed and Tiberias — and half in the Syrian towns of Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut and Tripoli.¹

Although negligible in numbers, Jews in some towns held senior economic and public positions. In the administrative and economic centre of Aleppo, a number of Jews were engaged in international commerce and in European consular work; the Picciotto family, for example, held over a certain period six out of ten consulships in Aleppo.² In other administrative centres too — Damascus and Acre — Jews occupied high positions in commerce and finance, as important merchants, bankers and senior officials of the provincial treasury.

The most conspicuous among those bankers and treasury officials in Damascus and Acre were the members of the Farḥī family: Shaul Farḥī and his sons Ḥayīm, Joseph and Raphael. They were engaged in the financial administration of the *pashalik* (province) of Damascus, namely keeping the accounts of the province, banking and moneylending, which also included financing part of the yearly pilgrims' caravan (*hajj*) from Damascus to Mecca.³

¹ The figures and numbers are estimates, having been worked out from the following sources: *Mass'ot*, pp. 502 ff.; *ha-Magid*, weekly, (ed. E. Zilbermann), Lyck, 1st year [1856], No. 14, pp. 55, 176; Great Britain, Public Record Office, F. O. 78/495, Rose to Canning, No. 36, Beirut, 24 May 1842.

² F. O. 78/380, quoted in A. Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century," *A Vision of History*, Beirut, 1961, p. 69; cf. A. Luzki, "Ha-Frankos be-Ḥaleb," *Zion*, Vols. VI-VII (1940-42), pp. 46ff.

³ Cf. 'Abd al-Qādir al-Maghribī, "Yahūd al-Shām mundhu Mi'at 'Ām," *Majallat al-Majma' al-'Ilmi al-'Arabi*, Vol. IX (1929), p. 642. On the position of the Farḥī family

Ḥayīm Farḥī, Shaul's eldest son, moved already at the end of the eighteenth century from Damascus to Acre to become treasury manager and administrative advisor to Aḥmad Pasha al-Jezzār, the *vālī* (governor) of the *Pashalik* of Sidon (1775–1804). During the reign of al-Jezzār's successor, Sulaymān Pasha (1804–1818), Ḥayīm Farḥī also became supervisor of income and expenditure, coordinator of the province's accounts with the central treasury and director of the administrative machinery. These functions enabled Farḥī to concentrate in his hands a great amount of power and influence. As a contemporary Christian historian noted with some bias: "Ḥayīm the Jew has been holding all reins of government and has been doing whatever he wishes. It is said that a Jewish person dominates the Muslims and the Christians, the great and the small, the near and the far — without any restriction."⁴

Farḥī's prominent position in Acre was, however, unique at that time, due to the mild character of Sulaymān Pasha "the Just" (al-ʿĀdil) who, in addition, owed Ḥayīm his ascendancy to the *pashalik*.⁵ For during the previous reign of Jezzār Pasha, Farḥī was no more than an ordinary senior official, and upon falling into disfavour — he was even discharged and arrested, one of his eyes was gouged out and his nose and ears were cut.⁶

That the position of Ḥayīm Farḥī was very precarious was even more evident under Sulaymān's successor, ʿAbdullāh Pasha (1819–1831). At the beginning of his rule, Farḥī's influence was at its peak and the Pasha was allegedly "unable to do a thing without Ḥayīm's consent."⁷ But a short time later, in 1820, Farḥī was executed and his property confiscated upon ʿAbdullāh's orders.⁸ It is evident that such a case was by no means uncommon as regards Jews or Christians during the period of the Pashas' rule. J.L. Burckhardt, the perceptive Swiss traveller, noted in 1811: "...there is scarcely an instance in the modern history of Syria of a Christian or Jew having long enjoyed the power or riches which he may have acquired. These persons are always taken off in the last moment of their greatest apparent glory."⁹

The unstable position of the Farḥīs in Acre and Damascus (in Damascus,

in Damascus and Acre during the period of 1780–1840, see S. Lulqo, *ʿAliyatah shel Mishpaha Farḥī vi- Yrīdatah*, an M. A. seminar paper, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1966.

⁴ ʿAwra, p. 477.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 27, 64.

⁶ Burckhardt, p. 180.

⁷ Mīkhāʿil al-Dimashqī, *Taʾrīkh Ḥawādith al-Shām wa-Lubnān*, Beirut, 1912, p. 922.

⁸ Mansūr, p. 59; Y. Schwartz, *Tvuʾot ha-Aretz*, Jerusalem, 5603 (1843), p. 44.

⁹ Burckhardt p. 180.

too, the Farḥīs were occasionally subject to arbitrary treatment¹⁰) may serve as an illustration of the shaky position of the Jewish communities in Ottoman Palestine and Syria for many years. In certain circumstances — under tolerant rulers such as Sulaymān Pasha¹¹, and in certain places — such as Aleppo, Jews enjoyed a certain degree of personal safety and religious freedom, and a few of them also acquired economic prosperity as well as social status.

These circumstances, however, were rare or limited. Sulaymān al-ʿĀdil was unique; more typical rulers were Aḥmad al-Jezzār (the Butcher) and ʿAbdullāh Pasha. They conducted a tyrannical and oppressive régime, which affected large sections of the local population, particularly the Jews and the Christians. Similarly, Aleppo was different from most Syrian and Palestinian towns: being a centre of international commerce and of European activities, it tended to adopt a tolerant attitude, particularly towards the consular and commercial communities. A number of Jewish families, mostly foreign protégés who belonged to those communities, were indeed relatively secure and prosperous. But many other local Jews, ordinary Ottoman subjects, were occasionally subject to violence and oppression from various quarters.¹² If that was the case in tolerant Aleppo, in other towns which were imbued with religious intolerance and were distant from Istanbul, the Jewish population was perhaps the most oppressed local element.

One of the major sources of their oppression was the local governors, public officials, soldiers and policemen, who maltreated the Jews and extorted money from them in various ways.¹³ It is true that Muslim townsmen were also occasionally oppressed and squeezed by tyrannical rulers and greedy soldiers.¹⁴ But many Muslims were nevertheless able to protect themselves against their oppressors with the help of the influential religious notables, or by placing themselves under the protection of local powerful leaders and military groups. It was also not very infrequent that Muslim masses would revolt against oppressive rulers and expel them from the town, or even kill them.¹⁵ The Jewish population obviously did not dare

¹⁰ Al-Dimashqī, *op. cit.*, p. 47; al-Maghribī *op. cit.*, p. 646; Lulqo, *op. cit.*, pp. 28, 35.

¹¹ See Burckhardt, pp. 322, 324, 329, 341.

¹² See H. L. Bodman, Jr., *Political Factions in Aleppo, 1760–1826*, North Carolina, 1963, pp. 45, 48, 102; E. B. B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey*, London, 1876, I, 306.

¹³ Burckhardt, p. 329; (Anon.), *Ḥasr al-Lithām ʿan Nakabāt al-Shām*, Egypt, 1890, p. 40; M. Montefiore, *Diaries* (ed. L. Loewe), London, 1890, p. 357; K. Schulman, *Sefer Ariel*, Vilna, 1856, pp. 72–73.

¹⁴ H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West*, London, 1950, I, 208ff.

¹⁵ *Ott. Reform*, p. 7.

and was unable to oppose its oppressors; and in places where they managed to acquire the protection of influential local notables they had to pay high sums for that protection.¹⁶ Otherwise — and this was another source of their misery — Jews were squeezed by local Muslim notables and molested by Muslim mobs. To quote a Jewish source: "When a Jew walked among them [the Muslims] in the market, one would throw a stone at him in order to kill him, another would pull his beard and a third his ear lock, yet another spit on his face and he became a symbol of abuse".¹⁷

The Jews and Christians of Syria and Palestine continued to live under such conditions during the first three decades of the nineteenth century, even though the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a process of reorganization and reform. In the framework of this reorganization, Sultan Maḥmūd II (1808–1839), the great Ottoman reformer, indeed tried to improve the lot of his non-Muslim subjects. Like some of his predecessors, he would occasionally send Imperial firmans to the authorities in Syria and Palestine and elsewhere ordering them not to levy illegal taxes on Jewish and Christian subjects and to allow them to conduct their lives without molestation.¹⁸ But the local pashas and rulers would usually disobey such orders as they disobeyed many other orders coming from the Sultan.

III. The Egyptian Occupation

The first ruler who actually succeeded in improving the state of the Syrian non-Muslim subjects — notably the Christians — was Ibrāhīm Pasha, who occupied the Syrian provinces from 1831 to 1840. During his rule Christians in Syria and Palestine enjoyed for the first time full equality and complete security of life, property and honour.¹⁹ They were no longer subject to oppression and extortion by Muslim notables, nor to assaults and attacks by Muslim mobs. Christian communities were permitted to build and repair their places of worship with no limitations, while their representatives took part in the work of the newly established local councils (*majlis*) alongside Muslim deputies. Moreover, the new rights of the local Christians even exceeded those of the Muslims in certain matters: Christians, for example,

¹⁶ See, for example, *Ḥasr al-Lithām*, p. 45.

¹⁷ M. M. Raysher, *Sha'arei Yerushalayim*, Lemberg, 1866, p. 29. See also *Masa'ot*, p. 519; Barker, *op. cit.*, II, 322–23.

¹⁸ See firman of Dhū al-Hijja 1246 (May-June, 1831) in L. A. Mayer, "Le-Korot ha-Yehudim be-Eretz-Israel," *Zion*, Vol. I, No. 3 (Nisan-Iyar, 5690), p. 7. See also D. Vaynreb, *ibid.*, No. 40 (5698), pp. 69–70; cf. A. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Dominion*, Harvard, 1965, pp. 218–219.

¹⁹ *Ḥasr al-Lithām*, p. 45; M. Mishāqa, *Muntakhabāt min al-Jawāb alā Iqtirāḥ al-Aḥbāb*, Beirut, 1955, p. 139. See also *Ott. Reform*, p. 17.

were exempted from conscription and became more acceptable for positions in the public administration as well.²⁰

The Jewish population of Palestine and Syria did not enjoy the same conditions as the Christians or the Muslims. Their position was, no doubt, improved in some respects, in comparison with the past. They were occasionally permitted to repair old synagogues or to erect new ones;²¹ Jews were also represented in the new local *majlises* and were officially given equal status before the new civil courts.²² Muslim notables were strictly ordered not to levy illegal dues and taxes on Jews, while a number of Muslim civilians, as well as some Egyptian soldiers, were severely punished for having maltreated Jews.²³

It should, however, be noted here that the measures taken to protect the Jews were only partly a result of the government's initiative and good will; they were mainly the consequence of the intervention and pressure from the European consuls. As Jews themselves stated: "Had it not been the consuls' supervision, we would have all been destroyed and lost, since the gentiles wish but to eat the Jews and to accuse them falsely."²⁴

Nevertheless neither the consuls nor the authorities were able to prevent all the acts of aggression which were directed against Jews, particularly in small towns. For Jews were not only occasionally maltreated and oppressed by local Muslims and Christians, but by Egyptian soldiers as well; in fact there occurred during the short period of Egyptian rule some of the gravest anti-Jewish outbreaks in the recent history of Palestine and Syria. In Hebron, for example, Jews were massacred in 1834 by Egyptian soldiers who came to put down a local Muslim rebellion.²⁵ About the same time Jewish houses and shops in Jerusalem were broken into and looted by local Muslim insurgents, who dominated the town for a time.²⁶ Similarly, the Jews of Safed were brutally attacked by Muslim and Druze peasants from the

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18 & n.

²¹ *Annals*, pp. 122-23; *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 366, No. 3077; Schulman, *Ariel*, p. 69.

²² F. O. 78/283 from Campbell, cited by I. Hofman, *Muḥammad 'Alī in Syria* (in Hebrew), unpublished Ph. D. thesis, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1963, p. 336. See also Montefiore, *op. cit.*, p. 358.

²³ Qusṭanṭīn, p. 119; Hofman, *op. cit.*, pp. 335, 407; Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 481.

²⁴ See letter from Jews in Tiberias to Sir M. Montefiore dated 5599 (1839) in Montefiore's collection, Ben-Zvi Institute, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; cf. 'Abd al-Karīm Gharāyibā, *Sīrīyya fī al-Qarn al-Tāst 'Ashar 1840-1876*, Cairo, 1961-62, pp. 124-25.

²⁵ Schulman, *Ariel*, p. 76; *Annals*, p. 100.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

vicinity in 1834 and again in 1837 (after the Safed earthquake).²⁷ Finally, in 1840, the Jews of Damascus were charged by local Christians with the notorious "blood libel". A number of prominent local Jews were subsequently arrested and tortured, some of them to death; many more were later put in jail, while the Jewish community in Damascus and the Jews in some Palestinian towns were subject to serious persecution by Christians and Muslims alike.²⁸

It seems that all these anti-Jewish outbreaks, like many other cases of persecution of Jews, had a common motivation among both Muslims and Christians, namely their traditional religious intolerance and popular feelings of contempt towards the Jews. As Mr. Young, the English Consul in Jerusalem, noted in 1839: "The spirit of toleration towards the Jews is not yet known here to the same extent it is in Europe ... still a Jew in Jerusalem is not estimated much above a dog."²⁹

In addition there were other factors involved: while Muslim peasants and Egyptian soldiers were tempted to attack Jews by their desire to loot and rape, the local Christians were driven by an intense antagonism to Jews not only because of religious traditions but also as a result of economic rivalries.

For generations there were strong rivalries between Jews and Christians in various parts of the Ottoman Empire for positions in government administration as well as in commerce and trade. Such rivalry took place in the provinces of Acre and Damascus, between the Jewish family of Farḥī and the Christian (Greek-Catholic) family of Baḥrī. While members of the Farḥī family occupied senior positions in financial administration, members of the Baḥrī family were engaged in the provincial administration as clerks and secretaries.

During some twenty years at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Farḥīs were more influential and gained an upper hand over their rivals in both Acre and Damascus. This was because of the senior standing given to the financial functionaries in the provincial hierarchy, and owing to the special status of Ḥayīm Farḥī in the *pashalik* of Acre during that period.

But when in 1820 Ḥayīm Farḥī was executed, the position of the Farḥīs was declining both in Acre and Damascus, and in Damascus attempts were then made by Christians to replace Raphael Farḥī as chief provincial banker (*ṣarrāf*) and treasury manager. But Raphael managed to withstand these

²⁷ Y. Ben-Zvi, "Me'ora'ot Tzfat," *Sefunot*, Jerusalem, Vol. VII (5723), pp. 277ff. See also Yūsuf al-Dībā, *Ta'rikh Sūriyya*, Beirut, 1893-1905, VIII, p. 649.

²⁸ For details see Y. Rivlin, "Alilat Damesek," in M. Hachohen (ed.), *Mishpatim ve-'Allot Dam*, Tel Aviv, 1967., pp. 42ff; Gharāyibā, *op. cit.*, p. 125; Montefiore, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-210; Mishāqā, *op. cit.*, pp. 132ff; Quṣṭanṭīn, pp. 188-203.

²⁹ F. O. 78/368, Young to Palmerston, No. 13, 25 May 1839, in Hyamson, I, p. 6.

encroachments and remained in his office for some years.³⁰ Only in the early thirties, with the Egyptian occupation, was Raphael discharged from his position, and Ḥannā Baḥrī, a member of the rival Christian family, was appointed chief accountant (*mubāshir*) of entire Syria (including Palestine), and president of the new advisory council of Damascus, which was the central council of Syria as well.³¹

These changes were accomplished partly as a result of the endeavours made by Ḥannā Baḥrī to undermine Raphael Farḥī's position³² and to establish himself in a senior post within the new administrative machinery. The Egyptian rulers were indeed inclined to prefer Christians to Jews in the administration of Syria, in order to please both their French allies and British rivals. In addition, the functions given to Ḥannā Baḥrī were compatible with the new administrative reorganization of the Syrian provinces which was introduced by the Egyptians. According to this reorganization, the old administrative division to *eyālets* (provinces) was abolished and provincial functions, such as that of the treasury director, were abrogated. Instead a new administrative and financial system was established throughout Syria and Palestine, and was centralized in Damascus under the supervision of Sharīf Pasha the *ḥükümdār* (civil governor-general) of Syria.³³

Yet, despite these changes, the public and economic positions of Raphael Farḥī were not completely destroyed. Farḥī was not only nominated to the new council of Damascus as deputy of the Jewish community;³⁴ he also continued to be engaged in his banking business on a large scale and with considerable success. (Among his clients were for example Ibrāhīm Pasha who deposited with Farḥī two million piasters, and Sharīf Pasha, having had a deposit of a quarter of a million piasters.)³⁵ Other members of the Farḥī family also held various posts in the local government administration,³⁶ while more Jewish families in Damascus, as elsewhere, continued to be engaged in the growing foreign trade with Europe.

All this obviously contributed to sharpening Christian-Jewish rivalries, particularly in Damascus. Some local Christians were apparently determined to use their strong position under the Egyptian régime to destroy their Jewish enemies once and for all. The means they adopted to achieve that

³⁰ Al-Maghribī, *op. cit.*, pp. 646-652.

³¹ *Maḥfūẓāt*, II, 486, No. 3849; Mishāqa, *op. cit.*, pp. 100, 120.

³² *Maḥfūẓāt*, I, 130, No. 1954.

³³ *Ott. Reform*, p. 12.

³⁴ Montefiore, *op. cit.*, p. 358; see also Quṣṭanṭīn, p. 56.

³⁵ F. O. 78/410, "Memorandum on the Persecution of the Jews of Damascus," encl. in Werry to Palmerston, No. 12, Damascus, 18 August 1840.

³⁶ Luḷqo, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

goal was to invent a religious "blood libel". They accused the Jews of murdering a Franciscan monk, Father Thomas, and using his blood for the feast of Passover. Unlike the past, the conditions were now favourable for the Christians to exploit this accusation in full. They enjoyed the backing and sympathy of the Egyptian government, the opportunistic cooperation of the Muslim mobs, as well as the active support of the French consul in Damascus, M. Ratti Menton; the latter on his part possessed great influence with the Egyptian authorities in Syria.

Consequently, the Jews of Damascus, and particularly their notables, were gravely affected. The leaders of the Jewish community in Damascus were arrested and tortured; among them were Raphael Farhi, as well as other members of his family and a number of rich Jewish merchants.³⁷ The Jewish populations in Damascus and in some places in Palestine were persecuted by Christians and Muslims alike, as already mentioned. The state of those Jews at the end of Egyptian rule in the year 1840 was thus at its lowest ebb in many centuries.

IV. 1840 — *The Turning Point*

Nevertheless this very year constituted the beginning of a new and happier era in the history of the Jews in Syria and Palestine: for the next two decades and thereafter, their position improved remarkably, and in many respects became better than ever before under Ottoman rule. To begin with, the "Damascus Affair" and its grave consequences aroused the attention of the Jewish communities in western Europe to the depressed conditions of their brethren in the East. Jewish leaders in France, such as Adolphe Cremieux, Shlomo Munck and the Rothschilds, and the prominent English Jewish leader Sir Moses Montefiore, all began to help the Jews of Damascus out of their trouble. The European Jewish leaders made, for example, great efforts to persuade the Egyptian ruler Muḥammad 'Alī — both directly and through their governments — to obtain a revision of the trial against the Damascus Jews. Muḥammad 'Alī refused, however, to do so, but in September 1840 he ordered that the Jewish prisoners be freed.³⁸ On 6 November 1840, while Ottoman troops were driving the Egyptians out of Syria and Palestine, with British help, Sultan 'Abdülmejd issued, upon the request of Sir Moses Montefiore, an Imperial firman in favour of the Damascus Jews. The firman denied and denounced the blood accusation against the Jews of

³⁷ Qusṭanṭīn, pp. 192–202.

³⁸ For full details on the trial and later developments, see F. O. 78/410, Werry to Palmerston, No. 6, 22 May 1840; No. 7, 22 May 1840; No. 8, 23 May 1840; No. 11, 20 July 1840; No. 12, 18 August 1840. See also Qusṭanṭīn, pp. 188–203.

Damascus (and Rhodes), stressing "that the charges made against them and their religion are nothing but pure calumny." The firman went on to declare that "in conformity to the Hatti Sherif which has been proclaimed at Gülhane, the Jewish nation shall possess the same advantages and enjoy the same privileges as are granted to the numerous other nations who submit to our authority. The Jewish nation shall be protected and defended."³⁹

A similar attitude was expressed in other Imperial orders sent to the Ottoman authorities in Syria and Palestine in 1841. In one firman, for instance, which dealt with the protection of the Christian communities, a special reference was made by the Sultan to the need to protect the Jews as well.⁴⁰ In the same year the first Jewish *hakkām bashī* (chief rabbi)— Rabbi Mirkadi Gagin — was nominated in Jerusalem by an Imperial order which granted him an official status and considerable authority over his community in religious and personal matters.⁴¹ Another firman of 1841 dealt with the preservation of the rights of the Jews in government administration,⁴² and about the same time Raphael Farḥī resumed his senior position as banker (*ṣarrāf*) of the provincial treasury of Damascus, and was nominated member of the new Ottoman provincial council.⁴³

These functions gave Raphael considerable power and influence in both the financial and administrative machinery. Raphael obviously did not fail to use his new powers, and taking advantage of the Muslim ill-feelings and reaction against the Christians, he began to square accounts with his Christian rivals and to reinstate his co-religionists in the government administration. The English consul Werry indicated:

Maalem Raffael Farchi, who in consequence of holding an old Berrat as Banker of the Pachas of this city in the former Government of the porte, has assumed — concerting and acting with those [Muslim] members [of the council] — an undivided control in the measures and appointments under the present government — an Enmity and fanatical feelings towards the Christians and an opposition to the appointment of Christians in the offices of the Government.⁴⁴

³⁹ "A Translation of the Firman Hatti-Sherif ... of 12 Ramazan 1256," in Montefiore, *op. cit.*, pp. 278–79. See also A. Galanté, *Documents Officiels Turcs Concernant les Juifs de Turquie*, Istanbul, 1931, pp. 158–159.

⁴⁰ Bayekâlet Arşivi (B. A.) Istanbul, Iradeler Hariciye, No. 527, 3 Jumādā I 1257; see also F. O. 195/181, Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 95, 21 April 1841 in Hyamson, I, 40.

⁴¹ B. A., Iradeler Hariciye, No. 532, 9 Jumādā I 1257; see also firman from *awākhir Rajab* 1257, Hebrew University Library, No. AR 40/35/MS 37 198.

⁴² B. A. Maliyeden Müldevver, No. 9061, p. 3, para. 9, 1257 (1841).

⁴³ Qusṭanṭīn, pp. 243–44; F. O. 78/447, Werry to Bidwell, private, Damascus, 21 August 1841.

⁴⁴ F. O. 195/170 Werry to Ponsonby, No. 1, Damascus, 14 January 1841.

...[he employs *wholly Jews* in the *different departments*... [and] discharged all the Christians and replaced them by Jews.⁴⁵

Yet Farḥī's prominent position in Damascus in 1840–41 was only temporary, being derived from the transitional character of the government which was set up in Damascus in the course of the military operations against the Egyptians. The Ottoman authorities found it expedient to administer the country for a transitional period along the pre-1831 patterns with the help of local pro-Ottoman and veteran officials such as Farḥī.

But when, at the end of 1841, a general reorganization was introduced into Syrian provincial administration, under the new Tanzimat regulations, the position of Raphael Farḥī was affected too. As under the Egyptian regime, the post of Banker of the provincial treasury was abolished, and all financial matters were directly supervised by the *defterdār*; the treasury was now managed by a junior official called *şandīq emīnī* (cashier). Raphael Farḥī continued for a few years to serve in the financial administration for an annual salary of 3500 *kurūsh* (piasters); but eventually he was replaced by an official sent from Istanbul.⁴⁶

In other Syrian towns under the new financial reorganization, more Jewish *şarrāfs* were deprived of their old *berats* (patents or warrants) as provincial treasurers or accountants. But at the same time Jews joined the new administration, particularly in the financial departments. A noticeable number of Jews were thus engaged as clerks, accountants and senior treasury officials in Syrian provincial centres, particularly Damascus and Aleppo.⁴⁷ In these towns Jews also played an important role in the economic spheres, such as foreign trade and private banking, and consequently were able to acquire wealth and influence.⁴⁸ Jewish influence was again remarkable particularly in Aleppo, due also to the local prominence of the Picciotto family whose members continued to hold or to manage no less than nine foreign consulates or consular agencies in the city.⁴⁹

In Palestine, by contrast, Jews did not occupy the same public and economic positions as in Syria. Only a few were engaged in governmental

⁴⁵ F. O. 78/447, Werry to Bidwell, private, Damascus, 21 August 1841.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*; B. A. Cevdet Dahiliye, Maliye 19213, Shawwāl, 1261; Qaştanfın, pp. 242–243.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Y. Levaton, *Sefer Nokhaḥ ha-Shulḥan*, Izmir, 5628 (1867–68), p. 112b; B. A. Irade Dahiliye, No. 10607, 16 Rabī' II 1265; F. O. 125/207, Werry to Canning, No. 16, Aleppo, 16 September 1843. See also *Ott. Reform*, p. 192.

⁴⁸ Israel Ben Yosef Binyamin, *Sefer Masa'ei Israel*, Lyck, 1859, pp. 12ff; F. O. 78/622, Wood to Canning, No. 13, encl. in Wood to Aberdeen, No. 21, Damascus, 24 June 1845.

⁴⁹ Of Austria, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, the United States, Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Tuscany; F. O. 78/1538, Skene to Russell, No. 17, Aleppo, 19 April 1860; France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (A. E.), Turquie, Alep, I, No. 55, 16 March 1841; Binyamin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

administration, mainly in junior positions;⁵⁰ if merely for the reason that the Palestinian districts were regarded second or third rate in Ottoman provincial administration. These districts were subordinated to the provinces (*eyālets*) of Damascus and Beirut and did not require many senior government officials. Jerusalem, the most important Palestinian town, was raised for only a short time in 1854 to the rank of a provincial centre, while Acre, once the centre of the Sidon *eyālet*, was seriously declining after the provincial centre moved to Beirut.⁵¹ (The Jewish population of Acre had already shrunk following the execution of Ḥayīm Farḥī by ‘Abdullāh Pasha in 1820.)

Similarly, hardly any Jew in Palestine was engaged in international commerce, if only for the reason that Palestine was not located on the international trade routes. A number of Jewish merchants and bankers, mostly in Jerusalem, were engaged in local business, but they suffered from Christian competition, and their commercial turnover was anyway small because of the limited economic activities in the town, and the low standard of living of its inhabitants. For these reasons, a large number of small Jewish shopkeepers and pedlars could hardly make a living and occasionally were in need of public alms (*haluka*), which for many other Jews was the only source of income.⁵² Consequently, any delay in the arrival of alms from Europe or any rise in food prices would drive the majority of Jerusalem Jews to hunger, disgrace and even death; such cases indeed occurred periodically during the mid-nineteenth century.⁵³

Gradually, however, more and more Jews in Jerusalem learned “to work for their own living instead of depending solely for subsistence upon the alms from Europe.”⁵⁴ A growing number of Jews began to make their living as artisans, craftsmen and even agricultural workers. Some of them were trained and employed in the various workshops and projects which were established by Sir Moses Montefiore and partly also by consul James Finn, during the 1840’s and 1850’s. Sir Moses, for example, established a weaving mill in Jerusalem and helped Jewish families in Galilee to practice agriculture. Consul Finn employed Jews in agriculture on two farms near

⁵⁰ B. Z. Gat, *Ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz-Israel, 1840–1881*, Jerusalem, 1963, pp. 47, 82, 88, 188.

⁵¹ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 33–34, 181.

⁵² F. O. 78/368, Young to Palmerston, No. 13, Jerusalem, 25 May 1839 in Hyamson, I, 4–7.

⁵³ J. Finn, *Stirring Times*, London, 1878, II, 57ff, 321.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 321ff, 408–9; F. O. 78/1454, Finn to Malmesbury, No. I, Jerusalem, 1 January 1859.

Jerusalem.⁵⁵ In 1857 Finn even suggested to the British government a plan "to persuade Jews in a large body to settle here [in Palestine] as agriculturists on the soil." The most suitable Jews for the project would be, according to Finn, Russian Jews who are coming now to Palestine "not as they used to come formerly, the aged and decrepit, but hale, robust men; men accustomed to outdoor employment."⁵⁶

The changes in character of the Jewish population in Palestine were indeed related to a larger process which took place in that period, namely the immigration of Jews from Europe (notably Russia) to Palestine, settling mostly in Jerusalem. The Jewish population of Jerusalem thus increased from 5,000 in 1839 to about 10,000 by the late 1850's, amounting to half of the total population of the city. Jews also started at that period to purchase land and buildings in and around Jerusalem, and their presence in the town was thereby further strengthened.⁵⁷

V. *Improvements during the Early Tanzimat*

It is evident that the increase and consolidation of the Jewish population in Jerusalem and Palestine during the mid-nineteenth century was not only a result of the traditional religious longing of Jews to come to Palestine. It was also a result of new conditions created in Palestine and Syria at that period; conditions which also helped to stabilize and improve the position of the veteran Jewish population in the area.

One major phenomenon which reflected the improvement in the conditions was the growing security of Jews in Syria and Palestine during the period under discussion. It is true that Jews were still occasionally insulted and attacked by their Muslim neighbours as well as by soldiers and policemen.⁵⁸ The Jewish traveller Binyamin II who visited Palestine in 1847 wrote a rather gloomy account of the position of his brethren:

They do not have any protection and are at the mercy of policemen and the pashas who treat them as they wish... they pay various taxes every now and then... their property is not at their disposal and they dare not complain about an injury for fear of the Arabs' revenge. Their lives are precarious and subject to daily danger of death.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*; also Finn, *op. cit.*, II, 63-69, 328, 409; F. O. 78/874, Finn to Palmerston, No. 9, 5 December 1851; Cf. Gat, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-47, 60ff.

⁵⁶ F. O. 78/1294, Finn to Clarendon, No. 36, Jerusalem, 15 September 1857.

⁵⁷ See *Ott. Reform*, pp. 207-208 & notes.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Binyamin, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9; cf. F. O. 78/839 Finn to Palmerston, No. 20, Jerusalem, 27 September 1850; Raysher, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

Yet in comparison with the past, the situation of the Jews in Palestine was markedly better, and as time went on it improved further. Consular reports from the 1850's indicate, for example, that "Jews ... obtain more redress from the local governors in Palestine" and that "the oppression of the Turkish governors ... almost ... completely ceased."⁶⁰

At the same time the Jews in Syria were even more secure and better off; in fact, their position became better than ever under Ottoman rule and much safer than that of the local Christians.⁶¹ The Christians were, during the period under survey, subject to a new form of Muslim violence: for the first time they were exposed to a number of riots or massacres, the principal of which occurred in 1850 at Aleppo, in 1856 at Nablus, and finally and most seriously in 1860 in Damascus. At these times a great number of Christians were massacred and their buildings and churches were looted and burnt down by Muslim rioters. But the Jews of those places were not hurt at all during these disturbances, and their houses and places of worship remained intact.⁶²

Another aspect of improvement, aside from relative physical security, was that the Jews of Palestine and Syria enjoyed a comparatively greater religious freedom during the early Tanzimat period. Thanks mainly to the Ottoman government's protection, Jews were able to enjoy their religious rights, despite occasional Muslim opposition; in fact they enjoyed during the 1850's greater freedom of worship than perhaps ever before under Ottoman rule. A considerable number of synagogues and other religious institutions were built or repaired by permission from Istanbul; at least one Ashkenazi synagogue in Jerusalem was constructed according to the designs and under superintendence of the Sultan's architect, Assad Effendi.⁶³ The local Ottoman Jews (usually Sephardim) who were officially recognized by the authorities as a *millet* continued, moreover, to enjoy a large degree of autonomy within their community in matters of education, religious worship, and judgment in personal matters. The chief rabbis (*hakhām bashīs*) of Jerusalem and Damascus were usually held in great official esteem by the authorities, and

⁶⁰ See respectively: F. O. 78/874, Finn to Canning, No. 10, encl. in Finn to Palmerston, No. 6, Jerusalem, 24 July 1851; *Jewish Intelligence*, XXII, No. 260, cited in F. O. 78/1217, Finn to Clarendon, No. 1, Jerusalem, 7 January 1856. See also Raysher, *op. cit.*, pp. 18, 28; F. O. 78/2068, Moore to Palmerston, No. 45, Beirut, 1 December 1849, in Hyamson, I, 156.

⁶¹ See F. O. 78/1220, letters of Damascus Jews to Consul Misk, encl. no. 1 & 4 in Misk to Clarendon, No. 12, Damascus, 31 July 1856; F. O. 78/448, Werry to Palmerston, No. 16, Aleppo, 28 July 1841; Binyamin, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

⁶² See *Ott. Reform*, pp. 186ff.

⁶³ F. O. 78/1383, Finn to Clarendon, No. 1, 1 January 1858 in Hyamson, I, 257.

their representatives were *ex officio* members of the administrative councils of their provinces.⁶⁴

It should not be denied that Jews as well as Christians in Palestine and Syria were in that period still far from being equal members in the local political community. Despite the Tanzimat edicts, which promised equality between non-Muslims and Muslims, the *dhimmis* continued to be actually inferior before the law of the state and its institutions. They had still to pay the poll-tax (*jizya*) — or from 1855 the *bedel* (compulsory exemption tax from military service). Their testimony against Muslims was completely discounted in the *maḥkama* (Muslim court), and in the various new Ottoman secular courts such testimony was occasionally rejected. Jews and Christians would similarly be discriminated against in cases brought before the *majlises*; even their deputies in these councils were usually disregarded and occasionally maltreated by their Muslim colleagues.⁶⁵

Yet, the mere presence of Jewish deputies in local councils represented an advance in the position of the Jews in comparison to the old days of Ottoman rule. Moreover, in some places, or under friendly pashas, Jewish deputies in the *majlises* were represented fairly and treated with respect, and were also allowed to take an active and important part in the council's work.

Thus, for example, the Jews of Damascus were represented in the local council during the early 1840's by three regular deputies, including the *ḥakhām bashī* and Raphael Farḥī,⁶⁶ who, as mentioned already, acquired great influence in local administration during that period. In Jerusalem, too, one of the Jewish members in the *majlis* held an important position in the council during the 1850's and enjoyed the backing and confidence of the pasha.⁶⁷ Even in judicial administration, Jews began in the course of the 1850's to gradually obtain better treatment and more justice, and their testimony against Muslims was frequently accepted in the new Ottoman secular courts.⁶⁸

Taking into account all these changes, it can be thus concluded that the position of the Jews in Palestine and Syria during the mid-nineteenth century was in a process of gradual improvement in the various spheres of life: religious, economic, political, and in physical security.

There is no doubt that these important changes were in line with the

⁶⁴ See respectively, Finn, *op. cit.*, I, 102; B. A. Iradeler Meclis-i Vala, 17 Rajab 1266.

⁶⁵ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 194–199.

⁶⁶ See B. A. Iradeler Dahiliye, No. 2117/14, 25 Jumādā I 1257; No. 1867, 27 Şafar 1257; Qusṭanṭīn, pp. 243–244.

⁶⁷ B. A. Iradeler Dahiliye, No. 21422/7, 9 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1271; F. O. 195/292, Finn to Canning, No. 8, Jerusalem, 5 July 1850; A. E., Jerusalem, V., 8 November 1856.

⁶⁸ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 196–197.

Tanzimat reforms, whose declared aims were complete political equality and full religious freedom, personal safety and economic welfare for all Ottoman subjects: Jews, Christians and Muslims. But as we know, many of the Tanzimat reforms remained in fact a dead letter; the above declared aims concerning the Jews were only partly achieved.

What then were the additional factors which contributed to achieving the advance in the state of the Jews in Ottoman Palestine and Syria?

VI. *Foreign Protection*

One of these factors was the pressure and intervention of certain European consuls in favour of the Jews. A large number of Jews in Palestine and some in Syria were, as we know, subjects of European countries, particularly Russia, Prussia, Austria and France. However, not all consulates of those countries were anxious or even willing to render protection to their Jewish subjects in the Syrian provinces. Mr. Finn stated, for example, that: "A peculiarity of the French consulates as far as they have come within my observation, is that they always show a strong desire to get rid of Jewish subjects."⁶⁹

A number of French consuls did in fact take a hostile attitude towards Jews in Syria and Palestine, in order to please the local Christians; the most notorious example was the conduct of M. Ratti Menton, the French consul in Damascus, over the 1840 "blood libel".

The Russian consuls, for similar reasons, were not keen to protect their Jewish subjects, and were glad to hand them over to British protection. By 1857, however, the Russian government changed its policy towards its Jewish subjects in Palestine for a while: it ordered its consuls in Palestine to extend their "goodwill towards Russian and Polish Jews, one of the elements of the population whom we recently let slip out of our hands against all reason."⁷⁰ Around the same time the Russian government allowed Jewish emigrants to travel cheaply in Russian ships which were sailing from Odessa to Palestine, carrying Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land.⁷¹

Nevertheless the Russian Jews in Palestine would have by and large preferred to be under British protection, while other Jews—Austrian and Prussian subjects—were happy to remain under the protection of their respective consuls.⁷² This was because those consuls, and especially the British,

⁶⁹ F. O. 78/963, Finn to Clarendon, No. 33, Jerusalem, 28 December 1853, in Hyamson, I, 219.

⁷⁰ D. Hopwood, *Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843–1914*, Oxford, 1969, p. 53.

⁷¹ F. O. 78/1454, Finn to Malmesbury, No. 1, Jerusalem, 1 January 1859.

⁷² The number of Jews in Palestine under European protection reached 5,000 by mid-nineteenth century. Out of them 3,000 were under Austrian protection, 1,000 under

showed an active interest in the well-being of the Jews and would usually endeavour to protect and help their Jewish protégés. For example, the British consuls, whose influence with the Ottoman authorities was usually great, would protect local Jews against persecution of all kinds — religious, economic and political. They helped Jewish children who had been forced to embrace Islam to return to their homes and faith;⁷³ refuted blood accusations by Christians and Muslims against Jews;⁷⁴ and brought about the punishment of government officials who had maltreated Jews.⁷⁵

British sympathy towards the Jews in Palestine and Syria was based partly on humanitarian motives and partly on political aims, namely to foster a friendly element and an object for protection and intervention in the Ottoman provinces. Moreover, Viscount Palmerston regarded the Jews as a useful and productive element who could contribute towards the development of Ottoman Palestine for the benefit of both the local population and the Sultan. He was perhaps the first great European statesman to perceive the Jewish national feeling for Palestine and he aimed at using these feelings in English Middle-Eastern policy. Already in 1840 Palmerston wrote: "There exists at present among the Jews dispersed over Europe a strong notion that the time is approaching when their Nation is to return to Palestine: and consequently their wish to go thither has become more keen, and their thoughts have been more intently than before upon the means of realizing that wish."⁷⁶ "There can be no doubt that every great benefit would occur to the Turkish Government if any considerable number of opulent Jews could be persuaded to come and settle in the Ottoman Dominions: because their wealth would afford employment to the people and their intelligence would give a useful direction to industry and the resources of the State would thereby be considerably augmented."⁷⁷

In view of these statements, it is not surprising that Palmerston ordered the British consuls in Palestine and Syria "to afford protection to the Jews generally"⁷⁸ including "Jewish subjects of Foreign powers who might have

British protection and the rest under the protection of Prussian, Russian and other European countries. See Gat, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

⁷³ See F. O. 195/226, Wood to Wellesley, No. 11, Damascus, 26 August 1846; F. O. 195/1458, Misk to Redcliffe, No. 12, Damascus, 10 June 1857.

⁷⁴ F. O. 78/1220, Misk to Clarendon, No. 12, Damascus, 31 July 1856.

⁷⁵ *Ott. Reform*, p. 217.

⁷⁶ F. O. 78/390, Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 134, F. O., 11 August 1840, in Hyamson, I, 33.

⁷⁷ F. O. 78/391, Palmerston to Ponsonby, No. 248, F. O., 24 November 1840, in Hyamson, I, 34.

⁷⁸ F. O. 78/368, Bidwell to Young, No. 2, F. O., 31 January, 1839, in Hyamson, I, 2.

forfeited their claim to be protected by the consular Agents of their own country."⁷⁹

Yet, British protection of the Jews was not comprehensive, as most Jews in Syria and Palestine were Ottoman subjects; nor was it self evident. For instance, the Earl of Malmesbury, British Foreign Secretary in 1852, unlike Palmerston, was not very keen to accept Russian Jews under British protection; he reproved Consul Finn of Jerusalem for encouraging them in that direction.⁸⁰ Similarly not all British consuls in the Syrian provinces supported the local Jews or all Jewish causes automatically. Consul Werry, for example, sided with the anti-Jewish camp over the Damascus Affair of 1840, and continued later to criticize strongly Raphael Farhī in Damascus and some Jewish bankers in Aleppo (where he moved as British consul in 1841).⁸¹

At this point it should also be stressed that British or other foreign protection was sometimes a liability rather than an asset for the Jews in Palestine and Syria. Such Jews were occasionally looked upon by both local Muslims and Ottoman authorities as being traitors who collaborated with foreign powers.⁸² Furthermore, foreign intervention was in many cases effected only after the wrong had been done, and it did not always serve to deter Muslims from committing acts of violence against the non-Muslim protégés. Thus, for example, European protection of the Christians, which was more active than that of the Jews, could not prevent the anti-Christian riots and massacres of 1850, 1856 and 1860 in Aleppo, Nablus and Damascus, respectively. In fact some European consulates were themselves attacked during those events. Indeed, foreign protection did not always immunize the protégés from Muslim hatred and attack; it actually constituted one of the major factors for Muslim antagonism to Syrian Christians in the mid-nineteenth century.⁸³ This can perhaps also partly explain why Jews in Palestine, who were largely foreign subjects, suffered from Muslim hostility more than the Jews of Syria, who were mostly Ottoman subjects.

VII. *Muslim Attitudes towards Jews and Christians*

In view of the fact that foreign protection was not always effective, the welfare of the local Jews depended largely on the attitude of two local

⁷⁹ F. O. 78/963, Rose to Finn, Circular, Beirut, 30 June 1847, in Hyamson, I, 220.

⁸⁰ F. O. 78/913, Malmesbury to Finn, No. 5, F. O., 8 November 1852.

⁸¹ See F. O. 78/447, Werry to Ponsonby, No. 1, 14 January 1841, encl. in Werry to Bidwell, Damascus, 17 January 1841; F. O. 195/207, Werry to Canning, No. 16, Aleppo, 9 September 1843.

⁸² See F. O. 78/801, Wood to Canning, No. 5, encl. in Wood to Palmerston, No. 4, Damascus, 16 February 1849.

⁸³ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 217ff.

elements, namely the local Ottoman authorities and the Muslim population. These elements were particularly important because Ottoman central control was still somewhat weak, and the local Muslim population was not completely obedient. To be sure, the Ottoman and local Muslim governors occasionally continued to oppress Jews, both foreign and native, particularly in small and remote Palestinian towns; they would obviously also overlook acts of oppression against Jews by local Muslims. Yet, in the course of years the number of such governors decreased owing to punitive measures taken by the central government against oppressive governors.⁸⁴ Furthermore, there was an increasing number of pashas who promptly executed the Sultan's orders and protected Jews against ill treatment and false accusations by both Muslims and Christians.⁸⁵

The improvement in the attitude of the local Ottoman authorities towards the Jews can be partly attributed to their concern lest the foreign consuls report to Istanbul on their flouting of the imperial orders.⁸⁶ Partly this attitude could be attributed to the growing new generation of Ottoman pashas who had been imbued with the liberal notions of the Tanzimat concerning equality of all Ottoman subjects.⁸⁷

It is nonetheless evident that the attitude of most pashas, including the "liberals", towards the local Christians was usually worse than towards the Jews; and this despite the fact that Christians more than Jews were an object for both the concern of the foreign consuls and the Tanzimat notions of equality. The reason for this diversity of attitude was that many Ottoman pashas believed that the Christians, unlike the Jews, did not sincerely wish to integrate into the Ottoman society, but desired to overthrow it with the help of Christian European powers.⁸⁸

In this belief the Turkish pashas did not differ from the local Muslim leaders; perhaps they were influenced by them. The latter on their part showed, like the Ottoman authorities, more respect toward the Jews than in the past. Muslim notables, for example, occasionally treated Jews and Jewish affairs with consideration in local councils and in some *shari'a* courts; at any rate they usually supported Jews in their disputes with Christians.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ See, for instance, F. O. 78/836, Moore to Palmerston, No. 21, Beirut, 1 April 1850; F. O. 78/872, Wood to Palmerston, No. 24, Damascus, 26 July 1851.

⁸⁵ See F. O. 78/1220, Misk to Clarendon, No. 12, Damascus, 31 July 1856; A. E., Damas, III, No. 24, 27 May 1855; Binyamin, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁸⁶ Cf. F. O. 78/874, Finn to Palmerston, No. 6, Jerusalem, 24 July 1851.

⁸⁷ See, for example, F. O. 78/1220, letter from the pasha of Damascus encl. in Misk to Clarendon, No. 12, Damascus, 31 July 1856.

⁸⁸ See *Ott. Reform*, pp. 210ff.

⁸⁹ See F. O. 195/207, Werry to Canning, No. 10, Aleppo, 10 April 1844; F. O. 78/2068,

Even the Muslim masses, on whose attitude the personal safety of their Jewish neighbours largely depended, somewhat improved their conduct towards the Jews, probably under the influence of their leaders and for fear of punishment by the authorities. In any case, Muslims treated Jews better than they treated Christians.

As is known, a preferential Muslim attitude towards Jews as against Christians was not a new phenomenon in Islamic or Ottoman history. But during the period under survey this attitude became conspicuous in connection with the new rights officially granted under the Tanzimat to both Christians and Jews, and it was influenced by the different interpretations the Jews and Christians gave these rights. The Jews, unlike the Christians, were satisfied with the liberties and privileges they were given in practice and did not demand the full equal rights which they were officially granted. Thus, for example, in the area of religious worship Jews continued to behave as in the past, unlike the Christians who immediately started to ring their church bells and to carry big crosses in public processions,⁹⁰ all of which was formerly forbidden.

Similarly, the Jews, unlike the Christians, refrained from demonstrating publicly those liberties which could hurt Muslim feelings, namely opening wine shops in the markets, riding horses in the towns and wearing clothes of green colour.⁹¹ Moreover, the Jews, unlike many Christians, would promptly obey government orders even if they were damaging — such as the order to set Muslim slaves free,⁹² or to pay a compulsory exemption fee (*bedel*) from military service.⁹³

That was indeed the major difference between the Jewish and Christian standpoints regarding their political position, and consequently the main cause of Muslim preferential attitude to Jews over Christians. The Christians strongly demanded full political equality and had the backing and support of some Christian European powers. They were therefore regarded by the Muslims as a political threat and a danger to security. Unlike them, the Jews were content with their religious privileges and economic opportunities, and did not insist on obtaining full political rights, realizing that this was not feasible. They continued to conduct their life as a small religious mino-

Moore to Palmerston, No. 44, Beirut, 25 April 1849; F. O. 78/1118, Wood to Redcliffe, No. 37, encl. in Wood to Clarendon, No. 43, Damascus, 9 November 1855.

⁹⁰ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 190–191.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 190ff.

⁹² F. O. 78/499, Wood to Aberdeen, No. 46, Damascus, 14 June 1842.

⁹³ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 232–233.

city who possessed no political aims and had but "an interest in the present and future welfare of the country."⁹⁴

Moreover, Jews in Syria and Palestine usually endeavoured to prove their loyalty to the Muslim Ottoman state, particularly when it was exposed to external danger, such as during the Crimean war.⁹⁵ One way of proving this loyalty was by joining Muslims in insulting and attacking Christians in time of anti-Christian tension.⁹⁶ The Jews who were involved in such acts were mostly from Damascus, having had an additional strong motivation for their anti-Christian attitude. They were apparently unable to forget the "Affair" of 1840; the Christians themselves would not let them forget it. "Blood libels" and other accusations were frequently directed by Christians against Jews, in Damascus and elsewhere in Syrian and Palestinian towns. And although nearly all of those accusations eventually proved false,⁹⁷ they caused great anxiety among the Jewish communities, brought them under constant suspicion, and in certain cases exposed them to attack and insult by Christians and Muslims alike.⁹⁸

Thus, there were Jews in Syria, notably in Damascus, who would exploit Muslim-Christian tension in order to side with the former against the latter. And the fact that the Christians now became the common enemy presumably helped to improve Muslim-Jewish relations. A contemporary Jewish observer described with some exaggeration the new character of the inter-communal relations in 1859: "The Ishmaelites [Muslims] and the Jews do not hate each other: on the contrary, they love each other; but towards the uncircumcised [Christians] the Muslims are filled with hate."⁹⁹ A year later a Christian of Aleppo wrote a letter to an Arabic journal in Paris saying, *inter alia*: "As for the evildoings of the Jews and their hatred towards the Christians — this is not surprising. But the surprise is that the Muslims prefer the Jews to the Christians."¹⁰⁰

It can be concluded that during the mid nineteenth century, while the gulf between Muslim and Christians grew wider, Muslim-Jewish relations were

⁹⁴ F. O. 78/444, Young to Ponsonby, No. 11, Jerusalem, 11 June 1841.

⁹⁵ *Kitāb al-Aḥzān fī Ta'rīkh al-Shām wa-Lubnān* (MS No. 956. 9, K. 62 KA, AUB) p. 125; F. O. 78/1121, Finn to Clarendon, No. 11, Jerusalem, 11 September 1855, in Hyamson, I, 238.

⁹⁶ *Kitāb al-Aḥzān*, p. 125; F. O. 78/447, Werry to Bidwell, Damascus, 21 August 1840.

⁹⁷ See, for example, Mikhā'il Mishāqa, *Al-Jawāb 'alā Iqtirāḥ al-Aḥdāb*, (MS No. 956.9, M 39 JA, 48532, AUB), p. 309; F. O. 78/714, Timoni to Palmerston, No. 5, Damascus, 30 April 1847.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ A. Ya'ari, *Masa'ot Shilah Tzfot*, Jerusalem, 5702 (1942), p. 19.

¹⁰⁰ *Birjls Barts*, Vol. II, No. 32 (1860).

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improving. Whereas for the Christians this was catastrophic and caused partial emigration, for the Jews of Syria this was an opportunity to consolidate their position and to advance socially and economically; and for the Jewish population in Palestine it was an opportunity to considerably increase its numbers through immigration from Europe and to become an important element in the country.

11. JEWISH SCHOOLS UNDER FOREIGN FLAGS IN OTTOMAN PALESTINE*

by KURT GRUNWALD

I

The prominence accorded to education in modern thought on economic development and growth, and the importance assigned to it as an "infra-structural investment", provide the justification, if any is needed, for the interest of an economic historian in the story of the introduction of modern education in Jewish Palestine over a century ago. This story, coinciding as it does with the period which saw the rise of imperialism, seems in many respects to be part and parcel of its history, though the motivation of educational development may have been entirely different. The Age of Imperialism is, indeed, a complex, multi-coloured fabric, many of whose different threads have still to be carefully studied. Though this period and the label of imperialism attached to it now carry overtones of opprobrium, the student of history analysing the threads of this fabric will sometimes hesitate to join in the general censure.

The recent eviction of the Peace Corps — a purely humanitarian, idealistic organization — from certain African countries is a case in point. The injection of modernization into a society resisting change will usually produce a reaction which will be more violent if the injection is given by what is considered a foreign element.

This was also the experience of the men who sponsored modern education among the Jews in Palestine, or Southern Syria, as it was called in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

II

Since the early nineteenth century foreign missionary schools began to be established in the various parts of the Ottoman Empire, a development favoured by institutions peculiar to the country, i.e., the system of *millets*, the far-reaching autonomy granted to the minority groups, national or religious, and the capitulations, giving special rights to citizens of foreign states. This development was aided by the backward state of local education,

* Dedicated to Professor Alexander Dushkin on his eightieth birthday, September 1970.

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consisting largely of *medreses*, the native schools, mainly for boys, attached to the local mosques. Only in 1869 was a system of secular primary schools introduced, followed somewhat later by the establishment of secondary schools, while during the eighties and nineties a number of institutions of higher learning were added, primarily to provide trained personnel for the army and administration. It was only in 1900 that the University of Istanbul was opened. The slow pace of this development encouraged outside initiative, particularly after 1856, when, following the Crimean War, Turkey became a member of the Concert of Europe and moved closer to the West, while the Eastern Question became a preoccupation of European diplomacy for decades to come.

Was it merely a coincidence that we see at this juncture the opening of the first Jewish schools in Jerusalem by foreign philanthropists? It will remain a moot question whether and to what extent this development was prompted by the "Zeitgeist", the newly awakened interest in Turkey, or by the example of the mission schools and the danger they represented. (It must also be remembered that improved communications had brought Jerusalem closer to the Jewish communities of Europe.) We can imagine the impact on an impoverished population of the mission schools, providing, as they did, free education and, often enough, also free meals and clothing, if we look at their numbers. The *Statistics of World Missions, 1914*, records the number of schools in the Ottoman Empire in 1912 as follows:¹

	<i>No. of Schools</i>	<i>No. of Pupils</i>
Ottoman Government	36,230	81,226
Armenian	803	133,100
Greek (community)	1,830	184,568
Jewish	—	—
Syrian	—	—
French (Catholic)	550	59,414
British	178	12,800
Continental (German, Danish, Italian, Russian)	38	3,500
American	675	34,317

Monroe, in his article on education in Turkey, emphasizes that the American institutions, open to all faiths, were purely humanitarian and not prompted, as others, by political or economic ambitions. They did not go out for proselytes (but did not refuse them). Though the original name of the American University of Beirut, i.e., Syrian Protestant College (est. 1820),

¹ Quoted by Paul Monroe in E. G. Mears, ed., *Modern Turkey*, New York, 1924, p. 135.

may be considered as having a certain missionary motivation, it must be admitted that numerous Jewish students, like Muslims from all over the Middle East, enjoyed the facilities of this institution, without being exposed to any proselytizing efforts. Robert College and the Women's College at Istanbul were two other institutions of higher learning set up by the Americans in Turkey, while the French established St. Joseph's College in Beirut at the apex of their widely spread network of primary and secondary education based on the curriculum of French schools.

In the previously quoted table (in which the figures for the government schools seem to be questionable), no figures are given for Jewish schools, the subject of this paper.

III

In 1840 Adolphe Crémieux, a leading figure in French Jewry, twice Minister of Justice and president-to-be of Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU) in 1860, joined Sir Moses Montefiore on a trip to Damascus to intervene there on behalf of the Jews accused of ritual murder. On his way home Crémieux saw the abysmal conditions under which most of Middle Eastern Jewry were living and came to the conclusion that proper education was the chief means of improving these conditions, with training being given in trades and agriculture to make the community productive and self-supporting. Montefiore, who had visited Palestine in 1827 and again in 1839, was thinking along similar lines and was planning to take some action in this direction. In the following decades other distinguished Jewish visitors to Turkey and Palestine arrived at the same conclusion. Baron Hirsch, looking for personnel for his Oriental Railways in 1871, was shocked at being unable to find Jews qualified for lower administrative or simple technical jobs. He endowed AIU with a million francs for the purpose of opening schools for Jews in European and Asiatic Turkey so as to remedy the situation. At about the same time the famous Jewish historian, Professor Heinrich Grätz, and a few years later Mr. Samuel Montagu (later Lord Swaythling) on an enquiry mission (1873) on behalf of Anglo-Jewry, saw the path to salvation in a proper education, leading to productive employment. Though not as sophisticated as today's economists in emphasizing the role of education in economic progress, they expressed the same idea in plainer language. The realization of these ideas was not a simple matter. Britain's Consul in Jerusalem, Finn, in a report to the Earl of Clarendon dated 1 January 1858, described the difficulties experienced in introducing new educational institutions in Jewish Jerusalem:

Sir Montefiore who was here last summer for the fourth time, exerted himself in promoting education and mechanical employments

for the poor of the Jews — as yet the benefit is not very apparent, through their own fault — his institutions however still remain in existence, such as a girls' school and a weaving establishment — and I doubt not that they will in time produce beneficial results. Upon the piece of ground purchased near the city, the proposed hospital and alms-houses, are not yet commenced, neither do I find Jews employed in cultivation of the soil there: but a cottage is built, and an expensive windmill will soon be completed.

The difficulty experienced by Sir Moses in promoting European education among the Jews of Jerusalem, has equally affected the intention of the great Jewish families of Paris and Vienna: for all have been obliged to modify their plans on account of the fanaticism of the Rabbinical authorities, who will not suffer their people, especially in the holy city, to "learn the ways of the heathen." Sir Moses was even excommunicated by some of the synagogues, and insulted by the populace in the street. A Dr. Frankl of Vienna, a man of considerable Jewish and other learning, came here in 1856, provided with large sums of money for establishing schools and rich presents to pacify the synagogues — the Austrian Consulate lavished its means of authority and display on his behalf, but they merely succeeded in establishing a Talmud school, and that for the Sephardim only. The Ashkenazim prohibited the members of their synagogues under penalty of excommunication from even passing along the street of the new school to this day. A similar opposition was made to the schools attempted by the French Jews about three years since, aided by the influence and presence of the French Consul.²

No wonder that progress under such conditions, if possible at all, must have been slow. Still, the efforts alluded to by Consul Finn in his report had not been in vain. One of Finn's successors, Consul Noel Temple Moore, in a *Report on Education in the City and Liwa of Jerusalem*, dated 12 December 1885, i.e., almost three decades after Finn's first report on the subject, was able to record some positive achievements. Here is what he has to say:

Jewish School. Although the Jews constitute the majority of the population of Jerusalem education amongst them is in a very backward condition. They possess at Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Hebron 88 schools attended by 1924 boys and 360 girls, but the great majority of them cannot be called even primary, the subjects of study being confined to the Bible and Talmud, and Commentaries thereon. In a few the elements of Arabic and French, and of arithmetic, are taught.

² Hyamson, I, 258.

Fortunately for the cause of the Jewish secular education in this country, within recent years a few schools on ordinary principles have been established. a) Foremost amongst these ranks the school of the "Alliance Israelite" of Paris, a superior and excellent institution under efficient direction. The number of pupils is 150, comprising boarders and day scholars. The teaching staff is composed of 2 Hebrew, 3 Arabic, 2 French and 1 English masters: 1 mechanician, and 7 masters for teaching arts and trades. The course of study includes Hebrew, Arabic, French and English; general useful knowledge; the elements of science; drawing; technical instruction in mechanics, smithery, locksmiths' work, carpentry, turnery, carving and shoe-making. b) German Jewish Orphanage, 16 boarders and 18 day scholars; elementary instruction, and Hebrew, Arabic and German taught. c) Eveline school for girls, 160 pupils; subjects taught — Hebrew, French, needle-work, embroidery.

Near Jaffa the "Alliance Israelite" maintain an agricultural school — a large and handsome establishment under efficient management and supplying a real desideratum for the Jewish population. There are 50 pupils, all boarders. The instruction consists of the Hebrew, Arabic and French languages; agriculture; gardening and trades. This institution is becoming largely self-supporting.

All the above enumerated Jewish institutions and schools are maintained by various associations in Europe; from endowments made by their founders, the income of legacies, and donations and collections made in Europe; in some instances small fees are paid by some of the pupils.³

A comparison between the two reports not only reveals the progress, in both quantity and quality, which had taken place over the thirty years, but it indicates that the place of well-meaning but dilettantish philanthropists had been taken by organizations better equipped to deal with the many administrative and educational problems.

Nor should one forget that steady immigration had changed both the numerical strength and the structure of the *yishuv*. The nonagenarian Montefiore, on his sixth and last but one of his pilgrimages in 1874, had been sensitive to the possible consequences of these changes when he wrote in his lengthy report on this visit: "A great struggle might possibly in some future arise, even in Jerusalem, between the progressist party — those who did not come to the Holy Land for religious motives, but from reasons connected with special circumstances — and the strictly conservative party,

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-429.

whose sole object in coming to Jerusalem was the preservation of their religion."

The story of the individual efforts in the educational field under these changing circumstances, and their institutional evolution during the period between the two consular reports and thereafter, thus deserves our special attention.

IV

At this juncture, a word seems to be in place on those organizations already referred to, which, as we shall see, eventually took over the responsibility for the schools: the Alliance Israélite Universelle (AIU), the Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA) and the Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden.

The Alliance was founded in 1860 for the purpose of defending Jewish civil and religious rights and liberties wherever they might be in danger, of aiding the victims of disasters befalling Jews, and of providing vocational and general education for Jews in backward countries. Its extensive network of schools in North Africa and the Middle East, with their strong French flavour, still catered to 47,500 pupils in 1957, 4,256 of them in Israel. Its first undertaking in this country, the Agricultural School at Mikve Israel, celebrated its centenary in 1970.

The Alliance was originally planned as a global organization with branches everywhere, but local and/or political conditions made the formation of independent sister organisations advisable in several countries. Thus in 1871 the Anglo-Jewish Association was established and soon found a major project in the Evelina de Rothschild School in Jerusalem. In 1873 the Israelitische Allianz, first set up in Vienna as a branch of the Paris organization, under Austrian government pressure became an independent institution though closely collaborating with its elder sister. And finally, in 1901 the Hilfsverein (i.e., Jewish Aid Society) was founded on the scanty membership of various local Alliance branches. In addition to a great number of philanthropic activities, it maintained an important network of schools in Palestine and the Balkans. The question of using German as a language of instruction in the sciences at the newly founded Technicum in Haifa led to the "language war" with the Hebraists in 1912-1913, a chapter in Palestine history which is now under re-examination.

When the need for setting up an independent German central aid organization was decided upon, its leader, Dr. Paul Nathan, went to Paris to assure the friends there at the Alliance that no political motives had influenced that decision. France's chief rabbi, Zadok Kahn, gave it his blessing, advising that that form of organization be chosen which would best serve the common purpose. And the purpose was the same as the French, the British

and the German organizations, i.e., to help Jews wherever they were in need of it: *Kol Israel Haverim*.

But there was a fine, subtle distinction between the various organizations. The respective use of French, English or German, if not always as the language of instruction then as a second language, the observance of certain foreign-national, patriotic holidays, and the close contact with a protecting consulate, made these schools, and their sponsoring organizations abroad, willy-nilly, part and parcel of the elements which constituted the "spheres of influence" so characteristic of pre-1914 Turkey. They conformed to a pattern that was not of their making, a pattern that was not yet visible in the fifties when Montefiore and the other founding fathers laid the corner-stones for a system of secular education in Palestine.

V

On his first visit to Palestine, in 1827, Montefiore had found in existence, only one Talmud Torah school in Jerusalem. On his third visit, in 1848, he established a weaving school, for which he imported the looms from England and engaged a master instructor from Germany. The school, which seems to have started operating only some years later, did not survive for long. In order to encourage agricultural pursuits Montefiore bought land near Jaffa and planted the first Jewish orange grove (the present "Montefiore quarter" in Tel Aviv).

In 1855, on his fourth visit, he established a girls' school where, in addition to reading and the prayer book, needle-trades and embroidery were taught.

There was apparently less resistance to a girls' school, as Jewish tradition does not insist on the study of the Holy Scriptures by women. Moreover, the Sephardic Jews, who formed about two-thirds of the then Jewish population but were less vociferous than the fanatics among the Ashkenazim, were favourably inclined toward secular education. And as Sir Moses paid a subsidy to the parents of the girl pupils, 144 applications were received for enrollment, but only 25 could be accommodated. Though Sir Moses was extremely gratified by this initial reponse, the actual performance of the school was far from satisfactory.

Dr. L.A. Frankl, who had come to Jerusalem in 1856 to establish a boys' school (Lâmel School), on visiting the Montefiore School found twenty-one girls in one room, a few of them occupied with some needlework, the others squatting idly on the floor, waiting for the teacher who was busy in the adjoining room with another six girls. Their ages were eight to ten, and some were already brides.

Not much different were the conditions in another girls' school, which Albert Cohen, the representative of the Paris Rothschilds, had established

about the same time or somewhat earlier, and with a similar curriculum. Here Dr. Frankl found three girls in one room and five in another. Cohen had also started a trade school for boys on the premises of a certain craftsman. Here the Sephardic boys received instruction in Ladino in one room and the Ashkenazim in Yiddish in another. This school does not seem to have survived for long. Nor do the two girls' schools appear to have been much of a success. But in 1863-1864 the two schools seem to have been merged into one for fifteen girls, which became the beginning of the Evelina de Rothschild High School⁴ which has survived to this day.

Cohen succeeded in interesting the Rothschilds in the school and in 1867, following the death of his wife, Evalina, the Viennese Rothschild, Ferdinand, took the school under his patronage, and, as a memorial for her, gave it her name.

By 1880 the school had grown sufficiently to require larger premises and moved out of the Old City. In 1892 the Anglo-Jewish Association took the school under its wing, but the Rothschilds continued their annual grant. A Mrs. Behar (a relative of the principal of the AIU schools?) became headmistress, and French the language of instruction, with Hebrew as a second language. The school expanded further, and in 1895 the house of the banker Frutiger (at present the Ministry of Education's headquarters) was acquired. In 1899 Miss Annie Landau was sent from London; she soon became the principal of the school (a post which she held for 46 years) and a prominent figure in Jerusalem society. In 1901 English replaced French as the language of instruction, giving the school its specific character henceforth (even when Hebrew replaced it), until 1953, when the school became incorporated into the network of Government religious schools. By 1914 the number of pupils had reached 450.⁴

VI

The Lâmel School: To mark Emperor Franz Josef's 25th birthday, on August 18, 1855, Elisa Hertz-Lâmel established a foundation of 50,000 florins, the income of which was to be used for the establishment and main-

⁴ The stencilled history of this school (Hebrew, Jerusalem, no date, [1963?]) starts out by saying that in 1863 Sir Moses Montefiore and Albert Cohen visited Jerusalem and decided to open a small school for 15 girls in the Old City. Now we know that Montefiore did not visit Palestine between 1857 and 1866, and we know of his and Albert Cohen's earlier endeavours in this field. Thus the account given in the above quoted pamphlet can only be interpreted as referring to a merger and reconstruction of the two schools on a more modest scale in accordance with the availability of suitable instructors. Cf. also Norman Bentwich, *The Evelina de Rothschild School, Jerusalem, 1864-1964*, London, 1964.

tenance of a "Kinderbewahranstalt" (i.e., an institution where children spend the whole day at study and play) predominantly, but not exclusively for the children of Austrian Jews in Jerusalem. The latter at that time numbered about 1,700 in a Jewish population of about 5,700, the great majority of whom (over 3,000) were Sephardim (total population: 17,000).

At the donor's request, Dr. Ludwig August Frankl (later knighted as "Ritter von Hochwarth"), a well-known Viennese Jewish physician, scholar and poet, came to Jerusalem in 1856 on a protracted visit to set up the institution. His travelogue, *Nach Jerusalem*, (Leipzig, 1858) contains what is still one of the best descriptions of the social conditions prevailing at that time among the Jews in Palestine. His reception by those whom he was to serve was, to put it mildly, not cordial. The "Austrians" in Jerusalem, i.e., those hailing from Hungary and Galicia, actually constituted the vociferous minority of fanatics who opposed any modern, secular education. Frankl was maligned, vilified and even physically threatened by them, so that the Austrian consul and the Turkish governor had to intervene. Some of their posters and pamphlets, preserved in Frankl's book, bring to mind more recent *Kol Kore's*, i.e., posters produced by their not less aggressive spiritual heirs.

Supported by the Sephardic Rabbis and a small group of Ashkenazim (Nissim Back), Frankl succeeded in opening the school in the presence of the governor and consuls. The Austrian consul, through whom the periodic payments were transmitted from Vienna, was also to serve as the chief supervisor of the school. Of the forty pupils at the opening, half of whom also received free clothing and food, only a few (twelve?) were "Austrians", and then only for a short time. Due to a lack of suitable instructors the school differed in its cleanliness and its neat uniforms, but little in its curriculum, from the customary Sephardic elementary schools, except perhaps that it included a foreign language, namely Italian, later replaced by German.

The school maintained an undistinguished existence for over twenty years. The Austrian consuls did not concern themselves too much with its educational results until a new consul, Strauss (ca. 1880), came forward with constructive criticism.

Strauss' report coincided with a new initiative taken in Germany. Professor Heinrich Grätz, after his visit to Jerusalem in 1872, called in a pamphlet for additional aid in the field of education. His call eventually resulted in the establishment of the Jewish Orphanage, an institution which opened in 1881 with four pupils. Backed by the leading rabbis of Europe, though bitterly opposed by the fanatics, the institution developed favourably under Dr. Herzberg in Jerusalem and under a committee presided over by Rabbi

Dr. Mordehai Horowitz in Frankfort on Main. In 1887 an agreement was reached between them and the Viennese committee of the Lāmel School on a merger of the two institutions. Headed by Ephraim Cohen-Reiss, a Jerusalemite trained in Germany and England, the new institution became the basis on which the impressive network of over thirty educational institutions was built up, particularly after 1901 when the Hilfsverein took it under its wing.⁵ (The fact that Cohen-Reiss was a pioneer in introducing Hebrew as language of instruction was quickly forgotten in the "language war" of 1912.)

The Lāmel School, still a landmark of old-new Jerusalem, enjoyed the backing of both the Austrian and German consuls, and exhibited the portraits of both emperors, whose birthdays were observed. After the conquest by Britain the schools were sequestered and handed over to the new Jewish authorities in 1918.

VII

The Alliance School: The Jewish Orphanage had the advantage of being able to send its pupils for vocational training to the workshops of the Alliance School which had opened in 1882 (1880?). The establishment of this institution was due to the recommendations of a commission headed by Mr. Samuel Montagu, which was sent by AJA in 1875 to advise on the methods for improving the social and economic conditions of Jerusalem's Jewry. These recommendations had been endorsed by an international conference of AIU meeting on the occasion of the Paris World Exhibition that same year. The funds for acquiring the land for the institution (25 dunams, now a most valuable holding in the centre of Jerusalem) were provided by the Rothschilds, Moccatta, Montagu and Baron de Hirsch's widow.

Though banned by the fanatics, who had smashed the windows of the new school building, the new school faced somewhat less hostility from the Ashkenazi section of the *yishuv*, as it was considered primarily a Sephardic institution. And Nissim Behar, its principal, a Jerusalemite who had graduated from AIU's teachers' college in Paris, proved to be an excellent administrator with a great gift for public relations. He also introduced Hebrew as the language of instruction, though it was replaced by French under his successor.

There had been some doubts as to the viability of the school, due to the failure of a similar venture some years earlier. The reference is to the school started in 1867 by Joseph Krieger, a local dragoman of the French Consulate.

⁵ They included a teachers' seminary attached to the Lāmel School, elementary and high schools for boys and girls, kindergartens, etc., in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Safed, Tiberias, Beirut, Rehovot and Katra (Ekron), as well as the Technicum in Haifa as an institution of higher learning.

In spite of the hostility of the fanatics (which at one time had led to the intervention of the Pasha) the school had prospered for a while and had been favoured by the Ottoman officials for the education of their children, but in the end, in 1870, it had had to close down due to hostile pressure. But Behar knew how to weather the initial storms and the new Alliance School soon became a popular institution to which the Arab notables, the Khālidīs and Ḥusaynīs, also sent their children.

Over the next twenty years or so a network of fifteen schools was opened for boys and girls in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Safed and Tiberias. Most important among them, however, was the trade school in Jerusalem with its workshops for forging, metal casting, mechanics, carpentry and masonry, as well as for weaving and dyeing. For young girls embroidery classes were added.

The pioneering services of AIU in the field of education in agriculture and in industrial arts will always have their place in the history of the *yishuv*. The impact of its institutions on the economic development of the country can hardly be overrated. Nor has there been a proper evaluation of the impact of the three organizations discussed here and their educational leaders on the shaping of the new *yishuv*. This is an aspect outside the scope of this paper.

This, then, is the story of how modern, secular education was introduced into the Jewish community in Jerusalem and Palestine in the latter half of the nineteenth century — a story full of dramatic incidents, of a struggle against what seemed almost insurmountable odds, but a story ultimately of complete success. Contributing not a little to this success were the changes in the composition of the *yishuv*, the secular element being strengthened by the increasing immigration from Russia as well as the rise in authority of the more tolerant Chief Rabbi Salant (1816–1911).

The schools enjoyed the protection of the respective consuls, as well as of the Turkish authorities, who seemed more apprehensive of Zionist elements among the teachers than of a *pénétration pacifique* through educational institutions under foreign flags. They apparently were not afraid of a "cultural imperialism" as are some young nations today who see it embodied in foreign institutions such as the British Council, the Centre Française or the libraries of the U. S. Cultural Centers. It remains an open question whether this was due to the indolence of a moribund régime or was the expression of an inner self-assurance, in spite of political and military weakness, on the part of a nation which in its political philosophy, though not always in its actions, had shown a rarely equalled tolerance toward minorities and foreigners.

12. THE AGRONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE OLD COLONIES IN PALESTINE (1882-1914)

by DAN GILADI

I. Introduction

The rebirth of Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine, beginning in the late nineteenth century, must be seen in relation to the conditions existing in Palestine at that time.

The enormous difficulties of the new settlement venture and its quantitatively insignificant achievements must be viewed and evaluated against the background of a declining régime, an underdeveloped country lacking a modern economic infrastructure, and a primitive and sometimes hostile Arab population. Moreover, the régime opposed the Jewish endeavour from the beginning and obstructed the work of settlement and building. This work thus proceeded under most unfavourable conditions. Extraordinary exertions were required in order to achieve relatively meagre results. The customary charge, that the establishment of the colonies involved the waste of huge sums of money and that the new settlements were too expensive and economically inefficient, should therefore be viewed somewhat critically. Considering the particular conditions under which they operated, they deserve greater understanding of their weaknesses and limitations.

Certain characteristics of the settlement venture can be discerned. There were rapid, far-reaching changes made in crops and the type of agriculture. At least some of the colonies showed great dynamism. However, the lack of agricultural knowledge and experience of the settlers, mostly town-bred and unused to physical work, was a severe handicap. This was partially offset by the absence of rural traditions, which made for greater flexibility. There was considerable dependence on foreign finance as the colonists had little capital of their own. The main provider of capital was Baron de Rothschild, whose way of doing things affected the whole settlement effort, impressing it with the stamp of his personality.

II. *Establishment of the First Colonies (1882)*¹

The earliest arrivals of the "First Immigration" founded the colonies of Rishon Le-Zion, Zikhron Ya'akov, Rosh Pina and Petaḥ Tikva (the latter was re-established after the failure of a previous attempt launched in 1878 by people from the Old City of Jerusalem). The settlers, mostly middle-class family men, strove to become farmers living off the yield of their land, which they understood literally in the sense of growing their own food. Having no agricultural know-how and no one to guide them, they took the neighbouring Arab villages as their models. This was the root of the problem: Europeans, people of Western cultural habits, tried to adapt themselves to a form of life and economic activity congenial to the established local population. The crucial question was whether they would be able to content themselves with the low level of income dictated by conditions of rural settlement in those days. In all the early colonies, the settlers immediately began to grow field crops. According to several testimonies, the work was carried out on a cooperative basis, without dividing the land among the settlers. The reasons were apparently practical and technical, not ideological. The results were of course pitiful, *inter alia*, because the land was neglected and a substantial investment was required to increase its fertility, while the settlers lacked the necessary funds. What little money they had brought with them from abroad barely sufficed to purchase land (which had gone up in price owing to the increased demand), to bribe government officials and, with luck, to build modest dwellings. A few months after the establishment of the colonies, their very existence was in danger and their future nebulous.

The number of families per colony cannot at first have exceeded a few dozen, since a farm unit based entirely on field crops required an area of at least 200–300 dunams, and the land it was possible to acquire for any colony did not exceed a few thousand dunams. This was of importance in the case of isolated settlements surrounded by Arab villages, whose inhabitants were sometimes antagonistic to the newcomers.²

III. *The Rescue of the Colonies by Baron de Rothschild and the Introduction of Plantation Farming*³

When their emissaries asked the Baron for help, the colonies were on the verge of collapse. Help arrived slowly, as the Baron gradually took them

¹ K. Nawratzki, *Die Jüdische kolonisation Palästinas*, München, 1914, pp. 120–209; A. Ruppin, *Three Decades of Palestine*, Jerusalem, 1936, pp. 1–14.

² D. Trietsch, *Jüdische Emigration und Kolonisation*, Berlin, 1923, pp. 79–83.

³ Y. Margalith, *Le Baron Edmond de Rothschild et la Colonisation Juive en Palestine*, Paris, 1957, Chs. 3–5.

under his wing, placing them in the charge of a ramified staff of officials.

The Baron's administration (1883-1899) may be viewed from different angles: (1) It was a system of tutelage, stifling all initiative and independence in the farmers and turning them into humble recipients of doles, subservient to the officials and their agents. (2) It meant the introduction of a way of life contrary to the pioneering spirit of the founders, adversely affecting the morale and work ethos of the youth. (3) It brought an immediate change in the agricultural physiognomy of the colonies by the introduction of new crops and work methods. It is this latter aspect that interests us here.

The officials included, *inter alia*, agronomists and horticulturists, whose philosophy was in complete disagreement with the existing situation. Their main object was to base the economy of the colonies upon plantations, especially vineyards for the production of wine for export. This meant a radical switch from extensively cultivated field crops to vine cultures requiring a much larger outlay and comparatively greater manpower. Within a short time, the area of most of the colonies in Judea and Samaria was covered with vineyards; the grapes were processed at up-to-date wineries in Zikhron Ya'akov and Rishon Le-Zion, and the Baron assumed responsibility for the marketing of the wine. Most of the farmers contented themselves with the safe income of the vineyards and developed no other crops. Nor did the very low price of fresh produce from the neighbouring Arab villages encourage them to grow their own food.

It would be a mistake, though, if, as is usually done, we believed the efforts of the officials to have been confined to viticulture. The many agronomists and other experts employed by the Baron tried to strike out in various directions, making numerous attempts to find suitable crops. The fact that most of these attempts did not succeed does not detract from the energies spent.

Most of the experiments were made on land held and managed directly by the officials, and not on the lands of the farmers, who did not display much initiative. Among the crops they sought to launch were mulberry trees for the manufacture of silk, jasmin and other perfume plants, cotton, sugar cane, tea, and various fruit trees. In this respect, the activity of the Baron's experts may be regarded as a laboratory essential to the advancement of a backward country.

The change wrought in the colonies by the money and know-how of the Baron's administration was also a quantitative one. Since plantations require less land, it became possible to increase the number of farm units and thus the population. The help extended to institutions providing services (synagogues, schools and clinics) meant a further addition of

families and an increased proportion of non-farming "residents" (*toshavim*) as against farmers (*ikarim*).

The administration acquired additional land in the vicinity of the colonies, thus enlarging their area and further increasing the number of settlers and "residents". It also purchased land in other regions, which became the basis for future settlement.

IV. ICA, the Settlement of Lower Galilee and the Transition to Field Crops⁴

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the Baron transferred responsibility for the colonies to the Jewish Colonisation Association (ICA). One of the reasons for this rather surprising step was his disappointment with the economic results of his venture. Indeed, after about fifteen years and an enormous expenditure of capital and know-how, the colonies were still not firmly established and continued to be dependent on the administration and its moneys. The Baron also seems to have been sensitive to the sharp criticism levelled against him in various quarters.

The transfer to ICA was an important turning-point in every respect. Of special relevance to our subject are changed concepts of the form of management and the desirable type of agriculture. The apparent failure of the plantations, which were dependent on the prices of exports, led to the conclusion that Jewish settlements should be based on field crops for their own consumption. An opportunity to try out this new approach was the settlement of Lower Galilee; the colonies established there were intended for a comparatively small number of settlers (20–30), each of whom was to have some three hundred dunams of grainland. No less important for the fate of the colonies was the decision to scrap the administration system and grant them independence. Within a short time, they developed organs for almost complete internal autonomy — intervention from above, by the management of ICA, being confined to economic matters. This switch-over, which at first seemed a calamity to the settlers, made an important contribution to the consolidation of the colonies, both economically and socially. But it should not be forgotten that the foundations of what was built in the early twentieth century were laid by the Rothschild administration,

The ICA colonies were sparsely populated and employed little hired labour, mainly during the harvesting season. Their way of life was much simpler than that of the plantation colonies in Judea and Samaria. They supplied little to urban markets, since much of their produce was used

⁴ A. 'Ever-Hadani, *Hamishim Shnot Hityashvut ba-Galil ha-Tahton*, Tel-Aviv, 1956, Chs. 2, 3, 6, 15.

for their own consumption. Their income was so low that they had to forgo fellahin, and their output was not much higher than that of the latter. In short, the ICA colonies in Lower Galilee resembled typical villages in countries of low development, and the settlers led lives similar to those of typical peasants. In agrarian matters, they were not remarkable for dynamism; hardly any changes were made in them.

V. The Plantation Colonies in Judea and Samaria

Unlike the Galilean colonies (and the small field-crop-growing colonies in Judea), the large colonies in Judea and Samaria underwent far-reaching changes. Inability to sell part of the wine prompted a revision of agricultural policy. Moreover, some vineyards were seriously affected by phylloxera, and the stricken French vines had to be replaced with American ones resistant to that pest.⁵ It was decided to uproot a considerable proportion of the vineyards, in some colonies more than fifty per cent of the planted area. Instead of grapes, they grew almonds, which were not sensitive to disease and found markets abroad. Some colonies went in for citrus growing on a fairly large scale. Monoculture gave way to diversification. Where it had been possible to buy additional land, cereals were grown besides plantations.

The most typical instance of the new spirit in the plantation colonies following their emancipation from the Baron's administration was the transition to self-management of the wineries and the marketing of the wine. In 1907, under an agreement between the Baron and ICA, on the one hand, and the wine-growers' cooperative, on the other, the latter assumed full responsibility for the wine business, and within a few years it appeared that the change had been for the good — the crisis in the industry had passed. The settlers' initiative also expressed itself in the establishment of cooperatives for marketing citrus fruit (Pardes, 1900), insuring cattle, etc.

This development was accompanied by an increase in the non-agricultural population of the colonies: craftsmen, teachers and clerks, and other service workers. Towards the end of the period, after the new plantations began to bear fruit, the position of some of the farmers improved to the point of affluence. They were completely independent, although they continued to receive aid from ICA in the form of grants for the maintenance of public institutions. A revolution occurred also with regard to the self-management of all internal affairs; a high level of autonomy was achieved, encompassing

⁵ A. 'Ever-Hadani, *Toldot Agudat ha-Kormim* (Anniversary Book), Tel-Aviv, 1967, Ch. 3.

all spheres of life, though manifestations of internal dissension were not absent.⁶

VI. *The Problem of Jewish Labour*

During the "First Immigration" the problem of Jewish labour as an ideological issue did not arise, since an organized labour movement did not exist and the workers strove to become farmers themselves; they not infrequently reached their goal with the help of the Baron, ICA and in a few cases the *Hovevei Zion*.⁷

The problem arose at the beginning of the "Second Immigration", the declared aim of which was "the conquest of labour." Since then this issue has not disappeared from the agenda of the *yishuv*.⁸ The insistence of the workers on all-Jewish labour derived from ideological principles they had brought with them from the Diaspora and was in several respects divorced from reality. First of all, there were far too few Jewish workers. Had the farmers employed only Jews, the agricultural economy would have collapsed within a short time. Moreover, most of the work was seasonal, and part of it especially suited for women and children. Not all, perhaps not even a majority, of the Jewish workers were mentally and physically equipped for adjustment to working conditions dictated by the existing primitive methods of cultivation. The low income of the farmers and the way in which the proceeds of the sale of the grape crops were received added to the difficulty of employing Jews. There was thus a clash between actual conditions, which necessitated the employment of Arab in addition to Jewish labour, and the principles of the labour movement.

VII. *Kastina — Be'er Tuvya*

In the year 5647 (1886/7), several Jewish families from two townlets in Bessarabia asked Baron Rothschild to help them settle in Palestine. The Baron agreed, and each family deposited 1,000 roubles in cash with his officials.

A year later, the group immigrated, but it appeared that the land had not been bought. The newcomers stayed provisionally in Jaffa, eating up the meagre funds they had brought with them. This provisional stay lasted seven months. The officials eventually acquired an area of 4,000 dunams some 12 kilometres south of Gedera, at a place which administratively

⁶ M. Burstein, *Jewish Self-Government in Palestine*, Tel-Aviv, 1934; D. Yudilevitz, *Sefer Rishon le-Zion*, Tel-Aviv, 1940, pp. 412-413.

⁷ A. Böhm, *Die Zionistische Bewegung*, Berlin, 1935, I, 422-426.

⁸ The journal *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* represented the workers' case. The journal *ha-Herut* represented the farmers' case.

belonged to the Gaza District. But before the group had had time to settle down there, its relations with the officials ran into a severe crisis. As Smilansky reports,⁹ the settlers wished to become regular farmers immediately, with private initiative and ownership of the land and the agricultural stock. The officials, however, said that they must first pass a transition period as workers under expert supervision and guidance. The officials suggested that they work the land jointly for several years as labourers of the Baron and that only then should the land be distributed among them. The settlers did not like this proposal at all. They regarded it as a disavowal of everything the Baron's officials had promised them abroad and contended that it was a plot to enslave them. They refused to sign the contracts presented to them by the officials. Following a bitter wrangle — and after the matter had been much noted in the press,¹⁰ most of the Bessarabians despaired. Twenty families received their money back and left the country.

Only five families accepted the officials' conditions, and together with twenty unmarried workers, settled on the allotted land.

The work was hard. The wage was low, and the officials did not trouble to provide the settlers with work animals in sufficient numbers to make things easier for them. There was, moreover, a serious water shortage. Under these circumstances, all the single workers soon left. Two years later, the five families also gave up, and Kastina was abandoned for the first time.¹¹

The officials leased the land to the neighbouring Arabs. At a certain stage, part of it was allotted to the farmers of Gedera as an addition to their own land, but owing to the distance between the two localities this measure proved useless, and Kastina remained desolate.

In the mid-nineties, the Russian *Hovevei Zion* decided to establish a "model colony" from which those wishing to continue the settlement effort would be able to learn. Their plan rested on three principles: (1) the colony was to be based on field crops and not, like the Baron's colonies, on plantations; (2) it was to be operated by self-labour and not by hired labour; (3) it was to be run by experienced farmers, people who had already shown their mettle and were prepared to live under austere conditions.

Hovevei Zion offered to buy the Kastina land from the Baron, and he sold it to them on very favourable terms.

A "committee of experts" was formed which selected the future settlers from among all those who had expressed willingness to join. At the first stage, twenty-four families were selected. In the autumn of 1896, they

⁹ M. Smilansky, *Perakim be-Toldot ha-Yishuv*, Tel-Aviv, 1938/9, pp. 82–85.

¹⁰ See *Havatzet*, No. 7 of 5749 (1888/9), p. 9.

¹¹ A. Druyanov, *Ketavim le-Toldot Hibat Zion ve-ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz-Israel*, II, 429, 438, 540, 610.

settled on the land and the place was again given its historical name, Be'er Tuvya. Lewin-Epstein reports that the main criterion for the selection of the people was the number of able-bodied adults in the family, large families being preferred.¹² The families were given plots ranging from 180 to 300 dunams. They were provided with work animals and implements and awarded a monthly allowance of 35 to 57 francs, depending on the size of the family, until they would be self-supporting. The agronomist Bregin was put in charge of the colony as an expert and technical instructor.

Again the settlement did not get into its stride. There were troubles from the very beginning. The land, impoverished as a result of prolonged cultivation by Arabs and lack of fertilizer, did not reward the efforts spent on it; the harvest of the first year was disappointing. Although reasonable yields were achieved in several subsequent years, this was not sufficient to put the farmers on their feet, and the situation deteriorated steadily. In the year 5659 (1898/9), a clash occurred with Arabs from a neighbouring village, in the course of which one of the Arab attackers was killed.¹³ Bregin, who was charged with the killing, fled the country, and the colony became involved in a lengthy lawsuit, at great loss of time and money. At the same time, the water problem was felt most acutely: it was impossible to grow vegetables and base the economy on mixed farming.

In his booklet *Kastina*, Israelit mentions several other reasons for the colony's failure.¹⁴ He asserts that it suffered from a serious lack of pasture land, which prevented it from keeping large herds of livestock and, indirectly, from obtaining the fertilizer vital to the fields; moreover, taxation was heavy, and the few farmers were powerless against the harassing collectors. Other inflictions mentioned by him were frequent, serious diseases of cattle and poultry and the undue inflation of communal expenses.

Israelit charges that the founders of the colony were not sufficiently careful in selecting candidates, so that the settlers were people of low standard, without ideals. The last point raised by him is the exodus of the young people, which proved to be the final blow. When the youngsters grew up and married, they suddenly found their parents' homes too small. The parents were unable to give them part of their land, and as additional land was not available, the young people were forced to leave the colony. In this way, Be'er Tuvya was emptied of its young generation, and a mood of despondency seized the settlers. It appeared that they no longer worked

¹² Halevi Lewin-Epstein, *Zikhronotay*, Tel-Aviv, 1931/2, pp. 294-302.

¹³ B. Dinur (ed.) *Sefer Toldot ha-Hagana*, Tel-Aviv, 1954, Vol. I, Part I, p. 74.

¹⁴ E. Israelit, *Kastina*, n.p., 1912, pp. 10-18.

hard, at they had done as first; they began to have their lands tilled by Arab ploughmen, who received part of the crop in return.

As stated, the position of the settlers worsened constantly. Things came to such a pass that they had to borrow money from Arabs at seventy per cent interest, after all possibilities of obtaining loans from Jews had been exhausted. They of course had no prospects of extricating themselves from this situation; Israelit writes that only financial liabilities prevented the colony's being abandoned by its inhabitants. In addition, as a result of the low morale, many quarrels broke out among individual settlers.

Aḥad Ha'am and Yehoshua Eisenstadt saw the root of the evil in the paternalistic methods of *Hovevei Zion*, which repeated the very mistakes that had been made in the Baron's colonies.¹⁵ The farmers relied on subsidies and did not take full advantage of the opportunities given them to consolidate their farms.

In 1912, another attempt was made to improve the situation. The Palestine Land Development Company acquired 1,000 dunams from settlers who had left, and allotted this land for cultivation to a workers' group that had previously been at Hūlda. The arrival of these young people revived the colony and hopes arose for its regeneration. At the same time, some more farmers agreed to leave; the Jewish National Fund paid them compensation and added their land to that of the group. A loan for the latter was received from the Ezra Company.¹⁶

But the group did not hold out very long, any more than did numerous other workers' groups in those days. Its members began to disperse. At the outbreak of the First World War, Kastina was a pitiful, shrinking place.

To sum up, this was an attempt to operate a settlement under conditions which held no prospect of success from the outset. The establishment of a small settlement based solely on field crops, with overhead expenses out of all proportion to the net income, was the product of immature thinking. Moreover, cultivation methods were conservative and the settlers lacked the initiative and flexibility that were to be found in some of the other colonies. This is why the story of Kastina is one of disappointment and failure.

VIII. *Petaḥ Tikva (1878-1914)*

The story of Petaḥ Tikva is a success story, first and foremost thanks to the initiative, energy and resource of its settlers, who, under very unpromising

¹⁵ Aḥad Ha'am, *Ha-Yishuv ve-Apiltropsav; Ha-Shiloah*, 5682; J. Barzilai (Eisenstadt), "*Mikhtavei Eretz-Israel*," published in *Ha-Magid*, 1893-1895.

¹⁶ Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem: Jewish National Fund files.

conditions, built up a soundly based, thriving colony, the largest Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine.¹⁷

The geophysical conditions were favourable compared with those of most of the other veteran settlements: fertile land, with opportunities to acquire additional areas as the place developed; water in abundance; proximity to the trading centre and port of Jaffa. The history of the colony during that period may be divided into three phases.

A. *First Gropings (1878–1887)*

The earliest settlers, from the Old City of Jerusalem, built their houses in 1878 by the swampy, germ-infected Yarkon river. They began to grow cereals (wheat, barley, durra) and legumes, i.e., the crops usual in Arab agriculture, in keeping with their aim "to bring forth bread out of the earth." The attempt failed after diseases had broken out among the settlers. Some died and the others returned to Jerusalem.¹⁸

Upon the inception of the "First Immigration" (1882), a group from Bialystok took over the Petaḥ Tikva lands and re-established the settlement, in cooperation with some of the original settlers. They settled near the village of Yahud so as to be further away from the Yarkon swamps, and thus had a long way to go to get to their fields. The main crops were again *falḥa* (field crops). It is interesting to note that the settlers decided of their own accord to engage an agricultural instructor, and that one of them tried to establish a small-scale spinning and weaving home industry. These actions show the initiative and daring of the settlers, their readiness to seek more appropriate modes of operation, without being wedded to existing patterns. Lack of know-how, lack of funds and various reverses compelled them to apply to the *Hovevei Zion* Committee for help, but the help they received was minimal, and the situation was very bad indeed. At the same time, individual attempts were made to introduce plantations: vineyards, almond orchards and the first citrus groves. This may have been due to the example of the Baron's colonies. At any rate, the first steps were taken by independent farmers.

B. *The Era of the Baron (1887–1900)*

In 1887, the Baron assumed patronage of the colony. As in all his colonies, the management passed to his officials. The local committees lost their status, and agricultural instructions were given from above. It should be noted,

¹⁷ D. Weintraub, M. Lissak, Y. Agmon, *Moshava, Kibbutz, Moshav*, Ithaca, New York, 1966, pp. 32–46.

¹⁸ M. Smilansky, *op. cit.*, I, 17–23.

however, that the extent of interference by the officials was less than in the other colonies under the Baron's patronage, especially as only twenty-eight families were directly affected, while the others retained a certain measure of independence.¹⁹

The change found its main expression in the extensive planting of vineyards, covering thousands of dunams. In addition, olives, almonds and citrus fruit, as well as mulberries for the rearing of silkworms, were planted on a smaller scale. The agronomist Haim Cohen-Reiss, who worked for the Baron, undertook various experiments in plantations. The plantations were not, as in other colonies, established at the expense of field crops; rather, the area under cultivation was enlarged by the purchase of additional land, so that a mixed-farming economy was able to develop.

At the end of the period, a crisis occurred in viticulture, owing to over-production and a drop in prices. The winery at Rishon Le-Zion, where the Petah Tikva vine-growers took their grapes, reduced its prices upon the Baron's instructions. The new policy consisted in uprooting, with payment of compensation. More than half of the vineyards were uprooted, and citrus and almond trees were planted instead.

When responsibility for the colonies passed to ICA (the Jewish Colonisation Association), Petah Tikva, too, came under the latter's charge. However, its rapid consolidation, due mainly to the success of the plantations, as well as the settlers' striving for independence, soon enabled it to cast off this tutelage.

C. Independence (1901-1914)

The characteristic feature of Petah Tikva at the beginning of the twentieth century was the rapid growth of the colony, which attracted many families, both of settlers and of "residents", and of various occupations. Its speedy development was the result of private investment by immigrants and by farmers who ploughed back their profits, together with money they borrowed from banks. The main industry was citrus growing. About half of all the citrus groves planted in the country by Jews were in Petah Tikva (about 5,000 out of about 10,000 dunams at the end of the period). The income from the export of citrus fruit was the source of the farmers' affluence.

The almond industry, also export oriented, yielded a handsome income. Viticulture recovered after a prolonged crisis, and the vine-growers of Petah Tikva joined the Carmel Mizrahi Vine-Growers' Syndicate upon its foundation.

¹⁹ Y. Ya'ari and M. Charisman, *Sefer ha-Yovel li-Melot Hamishim Shana le-Petah Tikva*, Tel-Aviv, 1929, Chs. 26, 27, 35.

The first agricultural cooperative in Palestine, the "Pardes" society for the marketing of citrus fruit of the Judean colonies, was founded in Petaḥ Tikva in 1903.²⁰ It also concerned itself with procuring material for work and obtaining credit, and its activities expanded. A cooperative for the marketing of almonds, "Ha-shaked", was also established. Preparations were made for the construction of a large waterworks to irrigate extensive areas. The *falḥa* lands continued to expand; only vegetables were bought from neighbouring Arabs, as they were very cheap and it was not worthwhile to grow them.

On the eve of the First World War, the colony reached a peak of prosperity. The population exceeded 2,000, and the general mood was one of building and brisk activity. Production in 1913 included 400,000 boxes of citrus fruit, 500 *kantars* of almonds and 1,500 *kantars* of grapes.²¹ Other fruits grown were olives, figs and pomegranates. There were 5,000 dunams of *falḥa*, as well as a dairy industry. Experiments in perfume production from flowers were unsuccessful.

In conclusion, Petaḥ Tikva, known for its conservatism and social rigidity, reflected in struggles between the young and the old and between workers and farmers, distinguished itself on the economic plane by a spirit of development and innovation. The same farmers who did all they could to retain control of the expanding colony, even if this meant excluding the other inhabitants from the direction of affairs, displayed remarkable flexibility and adaptability in everything relating to economic progress.

IX. Metulla

The lands of Metulla were bought by the Baron from neighbouring Druzes. The colony was intended for sixty veteran labourers and sons of farmers, half of them family men, the others unmarried. Each settler received 150 dunams of land, a cow and work animals, as well as a fixed monthly monetary allowance, calculated per person. During the early years, the settlers lived in the old Druze huts under extremely difficult conditions; new houses were built for them only after seven years.²²

It soon appeared that part of the land was not cultivable, so that each settler was left with less than 100 dunams for grain crops, which barely sufficed man and beast for their own needs, especially as the method of cultivation was modelled on that of the neighbouring Arab fellahin and crops per unit of area were meagre. A further difficulty was the shortage of

²⁰ A. 'Ever-Hadani, *Sefer ha-Yovel Shel Agudat "Pardes,"* Tel-Aviv, 1950, pp. 22-48

²¹ S. Tolkovski, *La Colonisation Juive en Palestine*, Paris, 1915, p. 14.

²² S. Feiglin, *Zikhronot Ish Metulla*, Haifa, 1954, Ch. 1.

water, which had to be brought in buckets on donkey-back from a nearby spring. In particular, there was no chance of raising irrigated crops, and the colony, therefore, had to be based entirely on field crops and the livestock reared on natural pasture.

The fields on high ground did well, but those in the valley, where the soil was heavy and fertile, were liable to be flooded by rainwater. Attempts at drainage failed, and the seeds decayed every now and then. Harvesting in the uphill fields was difficult because of the many stones strewn about. The observance of religious precepts as to "gleanings, the forgotten sheaf and the poor man's share" also caused great losses to the farmers. But worst of all was the damage inflicted to the crops by the depredations of the neighbours and the inroads of their flocks. The harassment of the settlers — including some killings — did not cease until ICA had compensated the former inhabitants of the village with considerable sums of money, over and above the price of the land that had been paid to its owners.

Moreover, even in good years, when surpluses remained in the barns, the net income, after payment of taxes and sundry debts, was paltry because of market prices. At the end of summer, the markets of Southern Syria were flooded with cheap goods by merchants from Transjordan, Ḥawrān and Golan. In consequence, the farmers of Metulla had to sell their surpluses, if any, at the price of Arab produce in the area, and their income, therefore, was no higher than that of their neighbours. But for the help of the Baron and later the ICA, who bore the communal expenses (guarding, health, education, religious institutions) and also assisted individual settlers, they would not have been able to hold out. Even after they had received considerable assistance, their position was very difficult, so that it is hardly possible to speak of real progress.

One of the instructors in the colony was young Aaron Aaronson. He suggested a combination of plantations and field crops, but the ICA management rejected his suggestion, maintaining that it involved excessive expenditure and that the settlers must be modest and get used to austere conditions.²³

An attempt was also made to work the hillside land of Tel Ḥai. As the distance from the colony was great, the settlers who had undertaken that work had to dig caves into the hillside and live there for several years with the work animals. Some of them died of yellow fever, and the attempt failed. The land was later leased to one farmer, who worked it with the help of Arabs.

The adversities of nature with which the settlers had to contend included mice, locusts and a scorching east wind.

²³ E. Livne, *Aaron Aaronson, ha-Ish ve-Doro*, Jerusalem, 1968, pp. 22–26.

Throughout that period, experiments were made with various crops, some of which did well from an agricultural point of view, but were not able to materially change the situation of the farmers. The agronomist Dan Brill unsuccessfully tried to plant prickless cacti as cattle feed. He successfully grew turnips, but owing to the small number of cattle there was no use for the comparatively large crops.

In 1900, tobacco of a high-quality European variety was first grown. The crops were better than expected, but unexpectedly they had to be handed over to the government, which had granted an export monopoly; the price paid by the local cigarette factories was very low, so that the hoped-for salvation again did not come. The government's unfavourable attitude was also reflected in the way it exacted the tithe in drought years, in complete disregard of the financial position of the farmers.

After 1900, when the Galilean colonies had been placed in the charge of ICA, an attempt was made to consolidate Metulla by transferring some of the settlers elsewhere, thereby enabling those remaining to work areas of land sufficient for their livelihood. Despite the opposition of some of the settlers, who feared a reduction in the number of inhabitants for security reasons, twenty families were transferred to Lower Galilee, and the land was re-divided among the forty remaining families, each receiving 300 dunams.²⁴

In 1901, a new industry, small-cattle breeding, was introduced. Each settler received fifteen head, but the stock was destroyed by hoof-and-mouth disease. Attacks by neighbours continued, and outlying fields were neglected in consequence. An attempt was made to grow mulberry trees for silk production, but these dried up for lack of water. ICA completed the construction of the settlers' houses, but beyond that carried out no other development work, so that the colony continued to be based solely on *falḥa*. Direct monetary assistance to settlers also ceased, and they were compelled to take loans at high interest from local merchants.

After Brill, a gardener served at Metulla, continuing agricultural experiment. *Inter alia*, he encouraged the settlers to grow vegetables, and there were some good crops, but again there was no market because of competition by neighbouring villages, which sold their produce extremely cheaply.

When the settlers realized that neither the lands taken over from their former fellow settlers nor other newly acquired lands had saved them, some of them lost faith in the future. Some left the colony, others no longer displayed any initiative; there were those who barely managed to keep from starving. Enslavement to moneylenders was an added tribulation.²⁵

²⁴ I. C. A. (Jewish Colonisation Association), *Rapport de l'Administration Central, Année 1912*, Paris, 1913.

²⁵ Z. Hayot, *Be-Yisud Metulla*, Haifa, 1968, Ch. 1.

In conclusion, twenty years after its foundation, Metulla was still a "problem colony" most of whose settlers were not adequately established and, in part, lived from hand to mouth, dependent on loans from usurers.

Harassment by neighbours, the absence of markets for surplus produce and the attitude of the authorities handicapped the settlers, and numerous agricultural experiments were unable to remedy the situation. The lack of economic success led to many dropouts and internal strife. The Baron and later ICA spent large sums on a water-works and drainage, but not in a way which would ensure a viable economy; e.g., water was not brought from the spring in adequate quantities to enable irrigation, and the drainage of the Marj 'Uyūn lands in the fertile valley also failed. Much money was thus invested without sufficient know-how and method, and the returns were correspondingly poor.

When Metulla was founded in 1896, it was said that the Baron intended to establish an agricultural colony which would have none of the defects critics had found in the older colonies, so that it might serve as a model for other colonies that individuals or companies might want to set up in the land of our fathers. The reality we have depicted did not come up to the Baron's expectations.

13. DOCUMENTS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN PALESTINE AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF THE YOUNG TURKS (1908-1909)

by DAVID FARHI

I

Reporting to O'Connor, the British Ambassador in Istanbul, on 16 November 1907, E. Blech, the British Consul in Jerusalem, expressed the view that "there is but slight foundation for the apprehensions of a prominent Turkish official here, who, when it was mentioned to him recently that there were said to be nearly twelve million Jews in the world, exclaimed 'Good Lord! they are not all coming to Palestine, are they?'"¹ This spontaneous reaction seems to have conditioned the attitude of the Ottoman administration to the challenge of the new Jewish settlement in Palestine during the last two decades of the nineteenth century.

By that period, the Ottoman government had its hands full with many communal-national movements threatening the integrity of the Empire. The Ottoman Jews did not figure among the "communities-would-be-nations." They constituted a community spread over the entire Empire, and were as loyal to the state as could be expected of *gâvurs*. But the Jewish immigrants from Russia and Rumania were different. They maintained their status as foreign nationals and thus were protected by the Capitulations. Unlike Ottoman Jews, they bought land and settled on it. Moreover, they spoke about reviving the glories of the ancient Jewish past. This could endanger Ottoman sovereignty in the Holy Land,² provide further cause for the intervention of the Great Powers in its affairs, and unsettle the *status quo* in the holy places, a development which, three decades earlier, constituted a *casus belli* for a major European war in which the Ottoman armies participated. Furthermore, Jerusalem was a holy place to Islam

¹ Public Record Office, Foreign Office, 371/356, File 40321. This quotation appears in a detailed report on the Zionist movement, in which Blech tries to prove that only the "fanatics" believe in the feasibility of building a Jewish state. It is interesting to note that a copy of the report was forwarded to Lord Rothschild, but the above quoted words were omitted.

² The Ottoman used an Ottomanized version of the Muslim term *Arâzî-yi Muqaddese*. See *Ott. Doc.*, p. 39. On the developments of the various terms used to denote the Holy Land, see the article by Y. Porath, *infra*, Parts I and II.

which the Jews might endanger. Acting upon these considerations, and even before the local Arab population had time to react to Jewish immigration, the Ottoman government prohibited the settlement of Jews (at first only foreign subjects, but later on Ottoman subjects as well) in Palestine, and the purchase of land by them.³

As early as 1882, the Ottoman government issued a decree prohibiting Jews from Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria from settling in Palestine. Jews would be accepted as immigrants elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, provided they acquired Ottoman nationality and obeyed the laws of the land. To prevent the settlement of Jews arriving in Palestine as pilgrims, regulations were issued to allow pilgrims a limited period of one (and later three) months stay, after which they had to leave the country. These regulations constituted an infringement on the capitulatory rights of the Great Powers, who protested with varying degrees of zeal to the Ottoman government, and instructed their consuls in Palestine to protect their subjects. The Ottoman government thus found itself confronted by foreign intervention on behalf of the Jews.⁴

Ottoman provincial application of these regulations lagged behind the declared policy of the central government, because of the intervention of the consuls and the venality and inefficiency of some of its officials.⁵ Sometimes officials, both in the *vilāyet* of Beirut responsible for the northern part of the country, and in the *mutasarrıflık* of Jerusalem, tended not to be enthusiastic about applying the restrictions, and even showed signs of favouring the Jewish settlers.⁶

³ The interplay of the Ottoman administration, Arabs and Zionists before World War I, has lately attracted the interest of scholars. See N. Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914," in A. Hourani (ed.), *Middle Eastern Affairs*, No. IV, *St. Antony's Papers* No. XXVII, Oxford, 1965, pp. 77-108; Y. Ro'i, "Ha-'Emda ha-Tziyonit Klapei ha-'Aravim, 1908-1914" [The Zionist Attitude towards the Arabs], *Keshet*, XLII (Winter, 1969), pp. 153-159; Porath, *infra*, Part IV; Y. Yehoshua, "Tel-Aviv as Seen by the Arabic Press During the First Years of its Existence (1909-1914)," *Hamizrah Hehadash*, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (1969), pp. 218-222 (in Hebrew). So far the central Ottoman policy has not been extensively explored. This article will attempt to supply some relevant Ottoman documents to elucidate the creation of this policy during 1908-9.

⁴ Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 80, 82-83, 86. Cf. C. R. Atılhan, *31 Mart Facılası*, Istanbul, 1936, pp. 43 ff. Atılhan's writings are within the well established tradition of the contemporary critics of the Young Turks, both at home and abroad, who accused them of being "stooges" of the Freemasons, Jews and Zionists. This attitude was embraced by some Europeans, Turks in opposition, Ottoman Greeks, Armenians and Arabs. See D. Farhi, "Yehudei Saloniki ve Mahapekhat ha-Turkim ha-Tze'irim" [The Jews of Salonica and the Young Turk Revolution] in M. Bnayahu (ed.), *Toledot Yehudei Yavan* (in press).

⁵ Blech to O'Connor, *loc. cit.*; Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁶ The *mutasarrıf* of Jerusalem, Ahmed Reshid Bey, removed because of Arab complaints

II

Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II took a personal interest in the question of Jewish immigration to Palestine. When on 28 June 1891 a memorandum was submitted to him on the subject, he is reported to have written the following remarks:

... The memorandum should be returned. It is not permissible to take a course which, by accepting those who are expelled from every place to the Imperial Countries,⁷ might result in the creation in the future of a Jewish government in Jerusalem. It is necessary that they should be sent to America, and in that manner, they and their like should not be accepted, and should immediately be embarked on ships and sent to America. On these things and their ensuing details the Council of Ministers should reach a serious and decisive resolution, and present it to Me ... Why should we accept those whom the civilized Europeans refused and expelled from their countries?

Seven days later 'Abdülhamîd instructed his Military Supervising Committee: Acceptance of status as Ottoman subjects and settlement of these Jews is most harmful, and since it might raise in the future the issue of a Jewish government, it is imperative not to accept them. Deliberate on it, upon these lines, and submit today, and quickly, this decision to Me ... The Grand Vezir should be informed by a secret letter ...⁸

As the emigration of persecuted Jews from Russia continued, 'Abdülhamîd appears to have reconsidered the matter. The Jews were a loyal element to the state, and they harboured a deep hatred for Russia. Would it not be a promising scheme to settle these emigrants from Russia in Eastern Anatolia, enlist them with the Ottoman Jews in the Army, and thus strengthen the ties between these areas (then inhabited by disloyal Ar-

by the end of 1906, was openly in favour of Jewish immigration. See Acting Consul Freeman (Jerusalem) to Barclay (Istanbul), 27. 12. 1906, F. O. 371/345, 3807; Cf. Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁷ *Memâlik-i Shâhâne*, a current term for the Ottoman territories, used in the official parlance.

⁸ Atilhan, pp. 43-44. One wonders if the Sultan was not, among other things, reacting to the petition of some Jerusalem notables sent to him on 24 June 1891, although 4 days is too short a span for the petition to have arrived at Istanbul and to have been presented to the Sultan. The Porte reacted by renewing its restrictions. See Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 86. On the Sultan's attitude see also the evidence of his Chief Secretary, Taḥsîn Paşa, *Abdülhamîd ve Yıldız Hatıraları*, Istanbul, 1931, p. 252. See also Hüsameddin Ertürk, *İki Devrin Perde Arkası*, Istanbul, 1964, pp. 44-47, quoting Captain Debreli Zinnun, who served with the unit responsible for guarding the ex-Sultan in his exile in Salonica, to whom the ex-Sultan talked about the subject. This attitude is widely quoted in the Turkish literature on 'Abdülhamîd.

menians) and the Sultanate, and prepare them better for defence against Russia? In April 1893, 'Abdülhamîd presented this offer to the Chief Rabbi, Moshe Levi. The latter brought the matter before the Rabbinical members of the *millet* council, which passed a resolution approving the enlistment of Jews in the Ottoman Armies, provided suitable arrangements would be made for the observance of their religion during their service. The Sultan passed this resolution to the Council of Ministers, which rejected it on the grounds that it might create political complications with the other non-Muslim communities.⁹

Abdülhamîd's negative attitude continued through the nineties.¹⁰ But by the turn of the century, he seems to have had second thoughts. The financial situation of the Empire was worsening, and this gave room to further encroachments on Ottoman sovereignty by the Powers. On the other hand, in spite of the imposed restrictions, Jews were immigrating to Palestine. It was under these circumstances that Herzl came to Istanbul and was received in audience on 17 May 1901. Nothing much is known of this audience, except that Herzl was decorated with the *Mefidiye* 1st degree.¹¹ Even less is known through standard Zionist literature about Herzl's second audience with the Sultan. By June 1902, Herzl was again in Istanbul and he applied for an audience through the Chief Rabbi, Moshe Levi. Suspicious Abdülhamîd made his *ser-şarîn* (chief chamberlain) inquire why Herzl, although he was an Austrian subject, did not apply for an audience through the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Baron de Calice. The Chief Rabbi replied that Herzl had not done so because "he wanted to be informed as to the sincere and Royal thoughts and intentions towards the nation (*millet*) to which he belonged."¹² The Sultan granted the Chief Rabbi's request, and received him, together with Herzl, unofficially. Herzl requested a private

⁹ Abraham Galanté, "Abdul Hamid II et le Sionisme," *Haménora* (Janvier-Mars 1933. Stambul), pp. 14-16, quoting a private file kept by the grandson of the Chief Rabbi. Following quotations of this source are based on the same file. Cf. Atılhan, *op. cit.*, p. 43, who believes that the Chief Rabbi approached the Sultan, on this date, concerning immigration, but that his proposals were turned down.

¹⁰ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 87. In an interview which I had in Istanbul (21.1.1965) with Dr. Sami Günzberg, the Sultan's dentist, who seems to have played a certain role in introducing Herzl to the Sultan, he maintained that, "The Sultan was inclined to help Herzl, but Herzl associated with 'undesirable people'. The Sultan passed on a message through me, to the effect that he had to reject Herzl's request, since he feared that the masses would be aroused." Günzberg would not explain who the "undesirable people" were.

¹¹ Galanté, *op. cit.*, pp. 3, 11. The famous Hungarian Jewish orientalist, Vambéry, is reported to have arranged that Herzl be received in audience.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 4, doc. C. *Millet* here means also a religious community in the Ottoman sense of this term.

interview, but the Sultan made him put his offer forward there and then. Herzl's offer was bold and clear. On behalf of the Zionist Movement, he offered to pay any requested sum to the Imperial Treasury if Jews, now persecuted in certain countries, would be allowed to immigrate to Palestine. Palestine would be given a status similar to the status of Crete (not that of Egypt or Samos), which actually meant that although it would remain a regular *vilāyet*, it would have a local assembly, special civil and penal codes, a local militia, and the right to use its national language as an official language alongside Turkish. The Jews would maintain unconditional loyalty to the Sultan and the State. 'Abdülhamîd, after some consideration, replied, in what Professor A. Galanté defined as "*un oui négatif*":

The great confidence which I have in the Jewish nation, does not prevent me from rejecting your proposal. It is probable that it will be accepted when I shall consult my Council of Ministers on this subject, which, if it finds it just, will prepare the means by which to give it a practical form. Are you satisfied with my answer?¹³

Herzl was satisfied. After he was given permission to publish the answer, he left Istanbul. Then the Sultan made it clear to the Chief Rabbi that he regarded his intervention in the matter as an infringement upon the loyalty expected from a leader of an important Ottoman *millet*.¹⁴ In spite of the harsh language used by the Sultan to the Chief Rabbi, it might be of interest to remark that according to the evidence of his Chief Secretary, Taşın Pasha, the Sultan wanted to send Beḥor (Yehuda Ashkenazi) Efendi, a distinguished high-ranking Ottoman Jewish official, to Herzl, to further discuss his offer, but his intention did not materialize.¹⁵ Describing the whole affair in retrospect in a conversation with Dr. Aṭıf Hüseyn, the Sultan leaves us with the impression that he was not so sure about his outright rejection of Herzl's offer. 'Abdülhamîd told Hüseyn:

They [the Zionists] have a goal in our country. They want to purchase land in the area of Jaffa and Jerusalem. I think that now they can purchase. There was an editor of a paper published in Vienna. He was a Jew. He was a man of knowledge. Now he died [referring to Herzl]. Some time ago, the rich Jews sent him to me as a delegate. They wanted to purchase land in the neighbourhoods of Jaffa and Jerusalem, and to

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 9. The fact that a second audience did take place is corroborated by Glünzberg as well.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 10-13.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13. Galanté is of the opinion that 'Abdülhamîd made up his mind categorically against any agreement with the Jews.

settle Jews from all parts [of the world] there. They really wanted to create a government there. Their offer was to take full responsibility for the state's Public Debt. It is a good thing, since there exists a danger that if a day will come when we will not be able to pay our debts, the finance of the state will be taken under the control [of the Powers]. I then put forward some conditions to them. Afterwards this man died, the revolution broke out, and the matter remained incomplete.

On hearing this, Dr. Atif exclaimed:

How come? Jerusalem is a holy place for all the religions: Islam, Christianity and Judaism. How will other states consent to that?

The Sultan replied:

The power of money can do anything. They are not going to create a government today; it is a preliminary stage. It is an aim and a hope. They will commence their work now, and after many years, even if it will be a thousand years they might be successful in their aim; and I think they will be.¹⁶

III

Meanwhile, Jewish immigration continued, and by 1907 the British Consul in Jerusalem estimated, somewhat exaggeratedly, the number of Jews in Palestine as 100,000 in a population of 400,000–450,000.¹⁷ Arab reaction to the Jewish settlement, both on the village and the city level, became more active, although a clear and consistent political pattern had not as yet emerged.¹⁸ The local Ottoman administration felt somewhat cornered by

¹⁶ E. Z. Karal, *Birinci Meşrutiyet ve İstibdad Devirleri (1876–1907)*, Ankara, 1962, p. 486, quoting a manuscript by Dr. Atif Hüseyin, kept in the library of the T. T. K. Cf. Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 87, who thinks that 'Abdülhamid used Herzl merely as a foil to other financiers, who were submitting projects for the consolidation of the Ottoman debt. The above mentioned evidence points to a different interpretation, but a fuller clarification of the matter needs more extensive research into the Ottoman Archives.

¹⁷ F. O. 371/356, Blech to O'Connor, 16 November 1907, *loc. cit.*; cf. much lower estimates quoted by Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 80, and Ro'i, *op. cit.*, p. 167, n. 11.

¹⁸ Compare somewhat different interpretations in Mandel, *op. cit.*, *passim*, and Porath, *infra* pp. 367ff.; Ro'i, *op. cit.*, p. 158, quotes the director of the branch of the Anglo-Palestine Co., in Jaffa, Z. Levontin, as reporting that "the hatred towards the Jewish Community is increasing daily under the guidance of the *mutaşarrıf* of Jerusalem and the *qa'immaqām* of Jaffa. The local Christian Arabs raised an anti-Semitic band under the leadership of a certain Anşın Qassar (?), and they have been trying, with all their power, to molest Jews." One should stress that Levontin was under the impression that the *mutaşarrıf*, 'Ali Ekrem Bey (the son of the poet, Namık Kemal) adhered carefully to the letter of the law concerning Jewish immigration. Ekrem Bey was very much aware of the significance of Zionism and Jewish settlement. On the role of Christians, see Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1918–1929*, London, 1973, *passim*. On the *qa'immaqām*, see *infra*, Document 1.

stern and recurrent orders from the capital, emerging Arab reaction which might cause disturbances, and pressure by the consuls of the Powers (especially the Russian consuls) to protect their subjects.¹⁹ Moreover, their removal from office was an ever present danger. A vivid description of the feelings prevailing among these provincial Ottoman officials, is contained in a petition submitted to the Sultan by the *qā'imaqām* of Jaffa, Mehmed Âşaf ibn As'ad, on 16 April 1908 (Document I).

The *qā'imaqām* wrote his petition after he had been summarily removed, supposedly through the influence of the Jews acting through the Russian Embassy. The *qā'imaqām* tells us that he had seen long provincial service with many *valis*, and then he had been appointed *qā'imaqām* of Beersheba, during the delicate period of border disputes with Egypt, where he performed important services.²⁰ Then he was appointed *qā'imaqām* of Jaffa (although he believed he should have been a *mutaşarrıf* by then). He immediately took action against Mr. Brill and Mr. Frank, the representatives of the Jewish Colonisation Association. They dared to correspond with the authorities as the representatives of all the Jews in Palestine, a position which the authorities could not recognize, since the Ottoman Jews were represented by their official communal leaders, and the others were illegally settled foreign subjects. As'ad's petition is couched in terms of reproach and suspicion of the Zionists, which suggests that he expected this to please the Sultan, whose favour he was seeking. One should also note that he uses the term *Filisfin*, which did not appear among the Ottoman administrative divisions. In his petition, *Filisfin* stands for the territorial entity over which the Jews had "mischievous aspirations."

The incidents he refers to took place on 17 March 1908 (see Document I), and were on such a scale that they aroused wide interest in the European Jewish press, which compared them with the Russian pogroms. But Dr. A. Ruppın, who by then had opened the Palestine Bureau representing the Zionist Organization, thought that this outbreak carried no political character. It was only the kind of friction that could be expected in a country inhabited by different kinds of populations.²¹

Âşaf's petition did not pass unnoticed. Although he was not reappointed as *qā'imaqām* of Jaffa, as he requested, the situation described in his petition was brought before the Council of Ministers, which passed a decision,

¹⁹ R. Lichtheim, *She'ar Yashuv*, Tel-Aviv, 1954, p. 204.

²⁰ On that dispute, see Rüşdî, *'Aqaba Mes'elesi*, Istanbul, 1326 A. H.

²¹ Ro'i, *op. cit.*, p. 158. A fuller report on this incident is to be found in an unpublished D. Phil. thesis by N. Mandel, Oxford University 1965, p. 12a, based on Zionist and British documents. Mandel shows that Zionist-Jewish pressure was employed to bring about the removal of Âşaf Bey.

on 4 May 1908, to appoint a committee from its members. This committee was to propose ways and means to prevent Jews from using the pilgrim's *permis de séjour*, valid for three months, for a permanent settlement. It seems that again the Council of Ministers was not able to take strong action to enforce its regulations. Yet, Ottoman representatives abroad received a reminder to abide by their instructions to issue visas good for three only months to Jews travelling to Palestine.²²

IV

The Young Turk revolution (23 July 1908) started a new era in the history of the Ottoman Empire. A "freedom fever" swept all over the Empire, and its subject peoples came alive with new hopes and new aspirations. The Jews were not slow to join the general trend. In Salonica, a city with a Jewish majority, the Jews flung themselves into the new stream with the enthusiasm of new converts.²³ The Jews in Palestine followed suit, but with different aims in mind. In his autobiography, the late Supreme Court Judge Gad Frumkin writes in retrospect:

Clearly, I regarded that matter [the Young Turk Revolution] mainly from the national-Jewish angle. What ought to be our role, as Jews, in the liberation movement of the various peoples living in the Ottoman Empire? Would we know how to take advantage of the opportunity and achieve the right to live an autonomous life and be free of foreign intervention in our internal affairs...? And most important, would the Jewish community in Palestine be able to safeguard the freedom of movement and action which it badly needs for the work of revival and reconstruction? Would we be able to free ourselves from the many restrictions on immigration, purchase of land and establishment of settlements, to which, as Jews we were subjected above the political restrictions imposed on all the subjects of the Empire? I decided to call on the Jews to participate equally in the new realities...²⁴

Later on, reacting to the challenge of the new situation, some of the leading Palestinian Zionist youth decided to study in Istanbul, in order to be able to take an active part in Ottoman politics and to struggle to achieve their national goals. Frumkin; David Ben-Gurion, later Prime Minister of Israel,

²² Baş Bakanlık Arşivi (hereafter, BBA), *Meclis-i Vükela Zabıtnameleri*, Vol. CXIX, 4.5. 1908; circular by Tevfik Paşa to the Ottoman representatives abroad (24.5.1908), Ottoman Foreign Office, A/346, no. 72148130, as quoted by Mandel, *loc. cit.*

²³ See *supra*, n. 4.

²⁴ Gad Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet bi-Yerushalayim*, Tel-Aviv, 1954, p. 145. In the festivities organized in Jaffa after the Revolution, the Zionists raised the blue-white flag and called on the Jews to participate in the elections so that their representatives could present their demand for autonomy in Palestine in Parliament. See, Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

Izhak Ben-Zvi, later President of Israel; David Remez (Drabkin), later Minister of Communications; Moshe Sharet (Shertok), later Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and many others went to Istanbul for their higher education.²⁵ Ben-Zvi defined his aims thus: "We must understand that a new era has emerged in Zionism. The centre of our activities must be transferred under the pressure of reality, to the East ... We should negotiate with the Ottoman government and parliament"²⁶

By September 1908, the Zionist Organization established a permanent bureau in Istanbul under the cover of a small banking firm, the Anglo-Levantine Banking Co., purchased from a local Jew. Dr. Victor Jacobson, a Russian Jew, was appointed to direct it. He immediately established contacts with the leaders of the Ottoman Jewish community and the Jewish members of Parliament who, though non-Zionists, promised to help. Jacobson subsidized a paper in French, *Jeune-Turc*, co-edited by a Jew from Palestine, Šami Hochberg, and a leading Turkish journalist, Celal Nuri [İleri]. He was also successful in making some useful acquaintances among the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress.²⁷ The Zionists also made a special effort to propagate Zionism among the well-established Ottoman Jewish communities in Salonica and Istanbul, an attempt which sometimes created a furious strife between the Jewish liberal-Ottomanist orientation and the Zionist orientation, and even caused the intervention of the Committee of Union and Progress against the Zionists.²⁸

²⁵ Frumkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 156–157. Later on, a "Society of the Ottoman-Hebrew (sic!) students in Istanbul" was established. The society, with Frumkin as president and Ben-Gurion as treasurer, tried to establish contacts with both Turkish and Arab nationalists. They made a special effort to approach the *dönmes*, and in a special arrangement, a *dönme* teacher of Turkish was sent to teach in the first Hebrew College of Tel-Aviv, Herzlia.

²⁶ Y. Ben-Zvi, *Zikhronot Vereshumot Mehane'urim 'ad 1920*, [Memoirs and Writings from Youth until 1920], Jerusalem, 1965, pp. 135–140.

²⁷ Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 149; Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 191–191, 198–199, 200–203; Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 93; J. 'Uziel, "Ha-Tnu'a ha-Tziyonit ve-Irguneha," in *Saloniki 'Ir va-'Em be-Yisrael*, ["The Zionist Movement and its Organizations," in *Salonica — a Mother-City for the People of Israel*], published by the Institute for the Study of the Jews of Salonica, Jerusalem-Tel-Aviv, 1966, pp. 109–126. Jacobson maintained close connections with Dr. Nâzım, a leading behind-the-scenes leader of the CUP.

²⁸ Ben-Zvi, *op. cit.*, pp. 135–140; 'Uziel, "Tnu'ot Hevratot," [Social Movements], in *Saloniki 'Ir* ..., pp. 128–129 describing the struggle between the two orientations within the Jewish community of Salonica. Vladimir Jabotinski, one of the leading Zionist leaders toured Salonica and Istanbul in a propaganda campaign for Zionism; see 'Uziel, "Ha-Tnu'a ha-Tziyonit ..." p. 109. Jabotinski believed that Ottoman Jewry was an "ideological *tabula rasa*." They should be nationally reoriented to play an equal part with other nationalities in the multi-national Ottoman Empire, but remain politically faithful to it. See Ze'ev [Vladimir] Jabotinski, *Ne'umim* (speeches) (1905–1926), Jerusalem, 1947, pp. 53–55. The CUP branch in Jerusalem refused to accept Jews who did not renounce their Zionist

After the revolution, Young Turkey (both government and party) had its hands full with a wide range of pressing problems, and the questions of Jewish immigration and the purchase of land by Jews do not seem to have ranked high among them.

Lichtheim, who visited Istanbul in April 1911, described the position of the Jews in the new régime thus:

Some of the speakers for Young Turkey studied in the schools of the Alliance in Salonica.²⁹ Many Jews supported the Turkish revolutionary committee both morally and materially.³⁰ There were some Turkish Senators and M.P.'s who were members of that Committee. The Chief Rabbi, Haim Nahûm Efendi, a graduate of the Alliance Schools and a skilled politician, maintained very close relations with the Committee. The Jewish situation in Istanbul was then, generally speaking, not uncomfortable. But the Ottoman government feared the Arabs and did not regard itself strong enough to maintain a pro-Jewish policy for any length of time.³¹

Local Arab opposition to Jewish immigration gained strength after the revolution, but it became more vociferous in the capital only after the counter-revolution known as the *31 Mart Vak'ası* (the incident of 13 April 1909).³² When Jacobson sounded out the Young Turk leaders on Zionism he found that, although they were not averse to Jewish immigration into the Ottoman Empire at large, they were suspicious of Zionism as a national movement that might lead to separation.³³

Yet, Kâmil Pasha's government, which was in office until 14 February 1909, does not seem to have taken any discernible action to reactivate or strengthen the existing regulations concerning Jewish immigration. We hear

affiliations. See Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 92. CUP in Salonica took action against Jews who participated in the IXth Zionist Congress. See 'Uziel, *loc. cit.*

²⁹ These include Tal'at Bey (later Pasha and Grand Vezir) and M. P. Dr. Rıza Tevfik (nicknamed 'Filozof'), a CUP member who later broke with the party. Tevfik used to appear at Jewish gatherings and address them in Ladino full of Bible quotations in Hebrew. In a meeting of the graduates of Alliance in Salonica after the Revolution, he praised the role of the educated Jewish youth in the Revolution and attributed it to the spirit of liberal education of the Alliance. See *Bulletin de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, No. 33 (Paris, 1908), pp. 41-42. On Tevfik's attitude to Zionism, see *infra*.

³⁰ A CUP member from Manastir, Muhiddin Evren, who used to be very close to the famous Jewish CUP M.P. from Salonica, Emanuel Carasso (Karasu), told me in an interview in Istanbul (25.1.1965), that the rich Jewish families of Salonica used to contribute large sums to the Party, either voluntarily or otherwise. (He mentioned especially the Allitanis and Modianos.) This was corroborated in an interview with Carasso's son-in-law, Sami Hayrel (23.12.1964).

³¹ Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

³² Yehoshua', *op. cit.*, pp. 218-219; Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 94; Ro'i, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

³³ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

nothing about the committee of members of the Council of State which was appointed before the revolution to deal with that subject.

The Jews in Palestine were anxious to take an active part in the new constitutional life and to participate in elections, but they were confronted by many difficulties. Many of them were "illegal settlers" and foreign subjects, and thus could not vote.³⁴ Jerusalem presented a special difficulty. Franchise was limited according to the Elections Law³⁵ to payers of *vergi* (property tax). But according to an established custom, Jerusalemites dwelling within the walls of the Old City were exempted from *vergi*, and thus technically lost their right to vote. This matter was brought before the Cabinet, which decided, on 16 September 1908, that Jerusalemites dwelling within the walls and having possession of real estate, should be allowed to vote.³⁶ But non-Muslims in Jerusalem were pressing again to widen the franchise, claiming that whoever paid *bedel* (an exemption-tax from military service) should be allowed to vote. This demand was rejected.³⁷ Thus the number of Jews who had the right to vote was very small and fell short of electing a Jewish M. P. for Jerusalem. The Jews were not successful either in returning the "moderate" Arab candidates they were supporting.³⁸

As tension grew between the Young Turk administrators and officers and the traditionalist notables in the Arab provinces before, during and immediately after the counter-revolution *31 Mart Vak'asi*, the Jews of Baghdad, who were regarded as supporters of the New Order, were attacked.³⁹ This resentment of the traditional notables had a stronger impact in Palestine, where the CUP (Committee for Union and Progress) government was being accused of ignoring Jewish immigration. The authorities were afraid of attacks on non-Muslims in general, and Jews in particular, and the *qā'imāqām* of Tiberias allowed the Jews to arm themselves.⁴⁰

³⁴ Ben-Zvi, *Zikhronot*, p. 140.

³⁵ The elections were actually held according to a draft of the Elections Law, which was passed by the First Ottoman Parliament, but not ratified by the Senate, before 'Abdülhamid dissolved the Parliament. This was legalized by an *irade*. See Sa'id Pasha Hâfirân, *Istanbul*, 1327, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 459.

³⁶ This did not help the Jews of Jerusalem much, since many of those living in the Jewish Quarter within the walls were rentees of Muslim land-owners. BBA, *Meclis-i Vükela*, Vol. CXX.

³⁷ BBA, *Meclis-i Vükela*, loc. cit.

³⁸ Ro'i. *op. cit.*, p. 159. But Jewish M. P.'s were returned for Salonica, Izmir, Baghdad and Istanbul.

³⁹ Lowther, *Annual Report 1908*, PRO, F. O. 371/768, 7053.

⁴⁰ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 93. Cf. reports of Rössler (Jaffa), dated 3.5.1909, and 18.5.1909, in I. A. B. Q. (Türkei), Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes in Berlin, im Politischen Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes in Bonn, 134/25a. I am grateful to my colleague A. Carmel (Univ. of

While this was happening, the Jews in Istanbul, and more so those in Salonica, took an active part in the quelling of the counter-revolution. A Jewish volunteer unit participated in the Army of Operations, which advanced on the capital to restore the Young Turk régime, and wealthy Salonica Jews helped to finance it.⁴¹ The Jewish M. P. for Izmir, Nissim Matzliah was brave enough to stand up in Parliament and admonish the members for their vacillating attitude, while Parliament was at the mercy of the mutineers.⁴² With the dethronement of 'Abdülhamîd II and the accession of Mehmed V Reshâd, following the *31 Mart Vak'ası*, a new phase in the history of Young Turkey emerged. This phase was characterized by more overt and direct involvement of the army under the leadership of Mahmûd Shevket Pasha in politics, by a drive of the young civilian leaders of the CUP to assume ministerial status and executive responsibility, and by an upsurge of the nationalistic activities of the non-Turkish national groups, exasperated by the centralizing and unifying policies of the CUP. Against this background, the Zionists, backed by the officially recognized leadership of the Jewish *millet* and reassured after they had been praised for their part in quelling the counter-revolution, made a new effort to persuade the Turkish government to abolish the restrictions on Jewish immigration to Palestine.⁴³ The Ottoman Jewish community did not automatically follow this line, and the supporters of the liberal-Ottoman orientation were active in criticizing it.⁴⁴ The Arabs, on the other hand, through their representatives in Parliament and the administration and through their press, published in Palestine, Syria, Egypt and Paris, raised the issue of the Jewish settlement in Palestine, and criticized the CUP government for its vacillating attitude towards it. Some Arab papers supported the criticism of certain European circles inimical to the CUP, and of the Turkish Opposition. They accused the CUP of serving the interests of Jewry and Freemasonry. This propaganda had clear anti-Semitic as well as neo-Islamic undertones, the former aspects being adopted also by some Greek and Armenian papers.⁴⁵

Haifa) for these references. See also meeting of the Council of Ministreon, 26 May 1909, where the *mutaşarrıflık* of Jerusalem was classified among the provinces in which a "reactionary" movement started, but the local authorities managed to quell it without the help of the central government. BBA, *Meclis-i Vükela*, Vol. CXXVIII.

⁴¹ Kâzım Nami Duru, *İttihad ve Terakki Hatıralarım*, İstanbul, 1957, p. 40.

⁴² Yunus Nadi, *İhtilal ve İnqilâb-i 'Othmânî*, İstanbul, 1325, pp. 110-111.

⁴³ See D. Farhi, "Yehudei Saloniki ...," and sources quoted therein. On the activities of the Chief Rabbi and the Jewish M. P.'s, see *infra*.

⁴⁴ See articles by Ottoman Jews against Zionism quoted in the Jerusalem paper *Haḥerut*, 6.7.1909, 25.10.1909, etc.

⁴⁵ On the attitude of the Arabic press, see Yehoshua', *op. cit.*, *passim*; Mandel, *op. cit.*, *dassim*; *Haḥerut*, 14.7.1909, 23.7.1909. On the Greek and Armenian press, see *ibid.*,

Young Turkey, both government and party, was embarrassed by this situation. It was thus forced to decide on a complicated and touchy subject. By May 1909, a policy was emerging. The President of the Ottoman Parliament, and a leading CUP member, Ahmed Rıza Bey, told the Chief Rabbi, Haim Naḥūm Efendi, to whom he paid a courtesy visit, that the Ottoman government was ready to support Jewish immigration to all parts of the Ottoman Empire, since the Jews were friends of Turkey.⁴⁶ In early June, Naḥūm Efendi, accompanied by the Jewish M.P. for Baghdad, Sason Efendi, were received by the commander of the Army of Operations, Maḥmūd Shevket Pasha, and by Ahmed Rıza. The former spared no words to praise the role of the Jews, and especially the Jews of Salonica, in defending constitutionalism. The latter said that: "... he and his friends never doubted the loyalty of the Jews to the Fatherland [the Ottoman Fatherland!] and to freedom. The Jews in foreign lands who will want to come to the Ottoman Empire with the intention of earning their living by hard work and contributing to the glory and success of the common Fatherland will be received with due respect."⁴⁷

Naḥūm Efendi also sounded out the Minister of the Interior, the ex-Grand Vezir Ferid Pasha, the Albanian, on the abolition of the three-month limit for the *permis de séjour* imposed on Jewish immigrants to Palestine. At about the same time, the Arab M.P. for Jerusalem raised the issue of Jewish immigration in the Ottoman Parliament.⁴⁸ Thus the government could not avoid the issue any longer, and on 20 June 1909 it was taken up by the Council of Ministers (Document II).

The deliberation in the Council was based on several reports forwarded by the *mutaşarrıf* of Jerusalem, describing the revival of nationalist and communal aspirations in Palestine after the revolution, and the dangers to the interests of the state caused by the residence of 50,000 foreign-subject Jews in the *mutaşarrıflık*. The *mutaşarrıf* demanded also that the *qazā* of Nazareth be placed again under the *sanjak* of Acre, which formed a part of the *vilāyet* of Beirut.⁴⁹

11.6.1909; for Albanian and Greek anti-CUP propaganda using anti-Jewish themes, see N. Nicolaidès, *L'Empire Ottoman, Une Année de Constitution*, Bruxelles, 1909, pp. 148-156, and Basribeğ de Dukagzin, *Le Monde Oriental et la Problème de la Paix*, Paris, 1919, pp. 13-14, 16-17, 23-28.

⁴⁶ *Haḥerut*, 28.5.1909.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.6.1909.

⁴⁸ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁴⁹ The *qazā* of Nazareth had to deal with an active movement of land purchase and settlement of Jews. The *qā'imāqām* happened to be Shukrī al-'Aslī, later an M. P., who was executed with other Arab nationalist leaders, during the First World War. Both as

The Cabinet instructed the Ministry of the Interior to take all the necessary legal measures to prevent the settlement of Jews "in the places which are considered to be the 'Land of Palestine'", thus not only in the *mutaṣarrıflık* of Jerusalem, but also in parts of the *vilāyet* of Beirut. But again the decision was lacking in implementation. The Ministry of the Interior was to receive a résumé on the the subject, typically enough since purchase of land was also involved, from the Director of the Imperial Cadastre, and only then would it act.

Rumours that the government was preparing a new law were circulated⁵⁰ and both Jews and Arabs tried to put more pressure to bear on the government. In early June Naḥūm Efendi presented an official *taqrır* to the Ministry of the Interior on the question of the *permis de séjour*.⁵¹ The CUP tried again to explain to the non-Zionist Jewish public, both in Turkey and abroad, that although Turkey would welcome immigration of persecuted Jews to all its territories, these immigrants should not concentrate in Palestine. An Ottoman parliamentary mission visiting Europe, headed by Dr. Rızā Tevfīq, and including two Jewish M.P.s, Sason and Matzliah, the Arab M. P. Bustānī, the CUP M.P. Midḥat Shūkrū, and the CUP representative, Captain İsmā'īl Junbalāt, visited N. Leven, the President of the Alliance in Paris (15.7.1909). Dr. Rızā Tevfīq, after praising the role of the schools of the Alliance, alluded to the Zionist movement and said: "It is prudent not to encourage that agitation. Turkey means to maintain its ports open to all those persecuted, who want to come ... But it will not tolerate a movement that will cause the creation of a 'Jewish Question,' which does not exist today, and which it is in the interests of the Jews not to provoke."⁵²

When the mission, which included the M.P. Ṭal'at Bey (later to become Minister of the Interior and Grand Vezir), was entertained at a party by the Zionists in London, it warned against any separatist or autonomist schemes concerning Palestine.⁵³ The visit caused a scandal when the mission returned to Istanbul and one of its members, Ebüzziya Tevfīq, wrote vehement articles against the Jewish financiers of Europe who entertained them with the intention of exploiting the Ottoman Empire. In response, Matzliah raised the matter in Parliament and attacked Ebüzziya in the press.⁵⁴

qā'imāqām and as an M. P. al-'Asālī was very active against Zionism. See Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

⁵⁰ *Haḥerut*, 12.7.1909, quoting an Istanbul French paper, *L'Aurore*, backed by Dr. Jacobson; cf. Lichtheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-203.

⁵¹ *Haḥerut*, *loc. cit.*

⁵² *Alliance*, 1909, pp. 49-50.

⁵³ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁵⁴ *Haḥerut*, 30.8.1909.

Late in July, Dr. Rizā Tevfîq wrote an article addressed to the Jewish people, which was also published in a Jewish paper in Jerusalem. In this article he defends Judaism against the attacks of its enemies, but warns the Jews against creating a "Jewish Question" in the Ottoman Empire. Jews could immigrate to the Ottoman Empire and improve their social condition, but they must not concentrate only in Jerusalem, which should remain a common centre for all religions.⁵⁵

The government and the CUP were by then worried by the communal-nationalistic activities which had spread considerably after the revolution. The activities of Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian and Arab societies were regarded as an imminent danger to the unity and the existence of the Empire. A draft of a "societies' law" prohibiting the constitution of a society on national, racial or religious grounds was being prepared.⁵⁶ In these circumstances, Zionist aspirations for an autonomous status in Palestine were regarded as a danger, the more so, because they further alienated the active Arab leaders whose national consciousness was awakening. Thus, the government decided to facilitate the Ottomanization of "illegal immigrant" Jews,⁵⁷ and to make a new effort to prevent Jewish immigration and purchase of land.

The Minister of the Interior, Ferîd Pasha, came under heavy criticism by the CUP in Parliament and in the press because of his objection to the CUP's demand to appoint parliamentary under-secretaries, and thus pave the way for wider participation of the CUP in ministerial responsibilities. On 7 August 1909, Ferîd Pasha resigned, and Tal'at Pasha, the most important CUP civilian leader, was appointed Minister of the Interior.⁵⁸ On 5 September, the Council of Ministers deliberated again on Jewish immigration to Palestine, and especially on the purchase of land (Document III). This time the CUP was directly represented by Tal'at as Minister of the Interior. The decision passed by the Council exhorted the Ministry of the Interior to quickly prepare the long awaited regulations concerning the prevention of Jewish settlement and purchase of land in Palestine; meanwhile all real-estate transactions concerning foreigners (including German settlers) were frozen until the regulations were promulgated. This time the Ministry of the Interior acted swiftly, and on 28 September 1909, in a circular to the *vâlîs*, the Hamîdian regulations were reactivated.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 30.7.1909.

⁵⁶ Lowther to Grey, forwarding Ryan's report on the Parliament, 24. 9. 1909, PRO. F.O. 371/761, 325/36622.

⁵⁷ *Haşeret*, 23.7.1909.

⁵⁸ Ali Fuad Türkgeledi, *Görüp İyittiklerim*, Ankara, 1951, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁹ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

V

By taking this step, the Young Turk régime followed the policies of the former *Hamidian* administration concerning Zionism. Until the First World War, neither the Zionists nor the Arabs let up their conflicting pressures on the Ottoman government, though with little success. The CUP régime, hard-pressed both at home and abroad, maintained a lukewarm dialogue with the Zionists concerning Jewish settlement in Palestine, while the Arabs and the Turkish "liberal" opposition became more and more critical of the government's vacillating attitude. The CUP and the Zionists became more aware of the Arab factor in the equation, the former telling the latter that they would have to reach an agreement with the Arabs.

The *Hamidian* government formulated a policy prohibiting the immigration of Jews into Palestine immediately after the flow started, its policy being based on general Ottoman political considerations. However, by the turn of the century, 'Abdülhamid was more prone to listen to Zionist offers. The Young Turk revolution raised Zionist hopes for a change of policy, but it also raised Arab opposition to it. The mirage of Jewish influence on the Young Turks haunted both the Zionists and the Arabs, just as it had haunted the Turkish opposition: A Turkish officer, who had seen service in Palestine, writes:

During the Constitutional period which followed the administration of 'Abdülhamid, the Zionists managed to penetrate Palestine through the influence of several Jews who figured among the ranks of the CUP and as a result of the financial situation of the period. In this manner, the pioneers who had penetrated the area, were naturally followed by a profuse invasion of immigrants... This point is a claim which is widely reiterated in some books. The future historian will be able to verify the truth by basing himself on the documents.⁶⁰

Writing in retrospect during the First World War, V. Jabotinski, who played an important role in turning the Zionist Movement from Germany and Turkey towards Britain and its allies, says:

For thirty-three years we tried to evoke among the Turks a sympathy for the idea of the settlement of Jews in Palestine. We tried to be their friends, and we truly liked them. We always supported them from the depth of our hearts and wished them well. Our Zionist dream was never connected with separatism. We always believed that we would be given the opportunity to develop in Palestine in tranquility and freedom, under Turkish sovereignty. This was not a pretension, but a true feeling which all of us shared, including myself.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Şerif Gûralp, *Yahudiler Filistin'e Nasıl Döndü?*, İstanbul, 1956, pp. 93-94.

⁶¹ Jabotinski, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

It is true that the freedom of political activity prevailing after the revolution helped the Zionists to reorganize in the Ottoman Empire, to propagate Zionism among the Ottoman Jewish community, and even to rally the support of its leadership. It is also true that the Zionists had easier access to the leaders of Young Turkey than they had to the leader of Old Turkey, 'Abdülhamîd. Moreover, after the period covered by this article, some leaders of the CUP, under the dire need for foreign financial and political support, were ready to lend a listening ear to Zionist offers. But, basically, the Young Turks were as reluctant as the Old Turks to create a new "national question" which would provide new ground for foreign intervention and further alienate the Arabs. As for the implementation of the restrictions, once they were reactivated, the Young Turks were roughly as efficient as the Old Turks had been. Zionist enthusiasm was based on the expectation, shared by many contemporaries, that the Ottoman Empire would develop into a liberal and supernational Empire, but history took a different turn.

DOCUMENT I

Mehmed Âsaf bin As'ad qā'imaqām of Jaffa, to 'Abdülhamîd II, 3 Nisan 1324 (16 April 1908).⁶²

Since two foreigners, Brill and Frank, being the representatives of Baron de Rothschild and the mischievous Zionist Society,⁶³ were corresponding with the Government, signing their letters as the representatives of all the Jews in Palestine, and numbering them, and since the Government used to write official answers to them, I reported it to the *mutaşarrıf*, and I caused it to be stopped. Moreover, in short, I prevented many of their intrigues, the enumerating of which would cause headaches to Your Highness, and I did not leave any room for their mischievous aspirations concerning Palestine.

As a result of this situation, since they knew that the removal of the *mutaşarrıf* from Palestine, or at least of Your Slave, in whatever way, would endow them with a position of great influence, and would constitute a terrible warning for the *qā'imaqāms*, that would be appointed, they elaborated an invention.

⁶² BBA, Yıldız, Perakende Evrakı, 289/1. My attention was drawn by Dr. N. Mandel to a translation of the protocol mentioned in this petition in Encl. to No. 18 to Blech (Jerusalem) to Barclay (Constantinople), dated March 3, 1908, in F.O. 195/2287. This protocol gives a more detailed account of the incidents in the same spirit as the *qā'imaqām*. The Ottoman officers who prepared the protocol took great pains to prove that they had taken no action against the Jews involved in the incidents which could be considered as an infringement on their capitulatory rights.

⁶³ They were actually the representatives of ICA, and not of the "Zionist Society".

They succeeded in the "known incident",⁶⁴ which they caused when hundreds of youths gathered in their clubs. Thus on that evening, six young Jews from amongst the "Nihilists"⁶⁵ of Russia, daggers in their hands, stabbed a Muslim sitting in his shop, in fifteen places, and immediately ran back to their club opposite the shop. Your Slave told the officers of Police: "Call the Russian Dragoman and put your hands on the offenders."⁶⁶ They left a guard at the door and they brought the offenders out with the help of the *qavvās*. When they took them to Government House, and the offenders were shouting: "Are there no Jews left?" [Jews] from the second club attacked the Imperial Soldiers and officials, and made an effort to free the offenders, but they could not succeed. On the other hand, they started shooting at the Imperial soldiers from the first club. At this juncture, since news was brought again to Your Slave, he immediately hurried out and settled the matter. And whilst it was feared that a grave incident, God forbid, was about to happen because of the impertinence of the Jews and the excitement of the Muslims, under the shadow of the Protector of the Caliphate,⁶⁷ it was prevented from spreading. But, since the Jews mixed with the inhabitants and the soldiers and dared to shoot, it happened that two of them were wounded by revolver shots, as is thought by the majority, by the relatives of the wounded Muslim. Eight others were beaten with sticks. One of the gendarmes was wounded by a dagger, and two policemen and soldiers were wounded by sticks.

Already on that evening I heard that they had created these police incidents, which might happen anywhere, with the purpose of enlarging them afterwards. Therefore, immediately, a protocol was prepared including a description of what had happened, it was signed by the officials present and by the Russian *qavvās* and Dragoman, a copy of which is hereby enclosed, and the Russian Consul wrote to his Embassy. It was submitted to the *mutaṣarrıf*, in an open telegram, that on account of the incident, some of the intriguers, even if only five or ten of the Jews who were refused residence, should be deported from the "Imperial Countries."⁶⁸ But the aforesaid persons, since they comprehended the danger of the results, increased their

⁶⁴ Incidents between Arabs and Jews in Jaffa in March, 1908, See above, in text and n. 21.

⁶⁵ Thus were the young socialist "pioneers" from Russia called by the Western-educated foreigners and Jews. The Palestinian Christian-Arab press called them "anarchists" (*ṣawḍawīyyūn*). See Yehoshua', *op. cit.*, p. 219.

⁶⁶ Since they were Russian subjects thus protected by the Capitulations.

⁶⁷ *Khilāfependāh*, one of the honorary titles of the Sultan.

⁶⁸ *Memālik-i Shāhāne*, a regular term to denote the Ottoman Empire, used in official parlance.

machinations against this Servant still more, and thus, by applying a thousand devices, caused the removal of Your Slave from there.

Your Slave is the faithful slave of our Sire, the Imperial, the Powerful, the Graceful, the Gracious, and I trust that I shall be employed under the Imperial Shadow, if not here, then somewhere else. But, since the fact that the Jews became accustomed to dismiss *qa'imaqāms* and *mutaşarrıfs* will cause difficulties to the officials to be appointed, and strengthen the Jews extraordinarily, which can suggest to them impudences which require caution, and since their mischievous aspirations are known to H.M. the Defender of the Book, I dare to submit this, according to the duty of servitude....

Finding refuge in the mercy and imperial superiority of the Greatest Benefactor, I dare to request the favour of Your imperial guidance by ordering to allow either the renewal of the appointment of this Servant, even temporarily, in order to exalt and eternalize the influence and glory of the Imperial Government, more than my own, in the eyes of the Jews, or giving me a *mutaşarrıflık* with promotion. ...⁶⁹

DOCUMENT II

*Decision of the Ottoman Council of Ministers, 7 Hazirān 1325 (20 June 1909).*⁷⁰

Several memoranda sent earlier and also lately by the Ministry of the Interior, including also reports by the *mutaşarrıflık* of Jerusalem, were forwarded, and read [before the council] and a discussion as to necessary action took place.

[The reports state that] in the sphere of administration in Jerusalem, problems were encountered because after the declaration of the Constitutional régime, some classes of the population dared to try and obtain the aspirations and political and religious interests they had nourished since times past. It is superfluous to explain the effect that will result on the State and its interest, from the residence in the *livā*⁷¹ of 50,000 souls belonging to the Jewish community,⁷² which have demonstrated an extraordinary inclination and devotion to settle and reside in Jerusalem without accepting the name or status of subjects. [The reports stress also] the establishment and

⁶⁹ In July, 1908, Âşaf was indeed appointed as *qa'imaqām* (and not *mutaşarrıf*) of Jebel-i Bereket (Adana). He was arrested after the riots between Turks and Armenians in the *vilāyet* of Adana in April, 1909. See Mandel, as quoted in n. 21.

⁷⁰ BBA, *Meclis-i Vükela*, Vol. CXXIX.

⁷¹ Synonymous with *sanjak*.

⁷² *Jemā'at-l Müseviyye*. *Jemā'at* is a Tanzimat term denoting a religious community which replaced *millet*, a word which by then already meant "nation".

reform, on a large scale, of the present system of regime. [They add that] the *qazā* of Nazareth, formerly belonging to the *sanjak* of Acre and which was later annexed to [the *livā'* of] Jerusalem, taking into consideration its distance from the centre of the *livā'*, should be reconnected to Acre as it was before.

It was understood that although the State had earlier, several times, passed decisions and referred them to the relevant authorities, regarding the prevention of Jews from settling in the Land of Palestine,⁷³ and the restrictions which should be imposed on those coming from abroad, these decisions were not implemented as they should have been, and that the newly arriving Jews were extending their residence permits. Earlier, the Director of the Imperial Cadastre,⁷⁴ As'ad Efendi, had been entrusted with the task of gathering the various documents concerning this subject to be found in the Sublime Porte and the Council of State, preparing a résumé after studying them, and commenting on them.

It was decided to submit to the Sultan for the issuing of His Imperial Decree⁷⁵ the following: The Ministry of the Interior should be notified that after the "position paper"⁷⁶ which will be written by the above mentioned, will be received, it should prepare and forward measures that would make absolutely certain that Jews would be prevented from settling in the places that are considered to be the Land of Palestine, by means of a law, with the necessary legal articles and the explanatory *exposés*. And since it is understood, according to the reason given, that as long as it will be connected with Jerusalem, its proper administration can not be safeguarded, the *qazā* of Nazareth is to be connected and annexed to the *sanjak* of Acre, as it had been before.

Signatures: Hüseyn Hilmi Pasha and his Cabinet.
(Minister of the Interior Ferid Pasha)

DOCUMENT III

*Decision of the Ottoman Council of Ministers, 23 Ağustos 1325 (5 September 1909).*⁷⁷

Two memoranda sent by the Ministry of the Interior with reference to the taking of necessary action concerning two communications, were read [in the Council]: [one] by the *mutaşarrıflık* of Jerusalem dealt with the question, whether the procedure of asking for an Imperial Decree and

⁷³ *Arz-i Filliğin.*

⁷⁴ *Defter-i Khâqânî.*

⁷⁵ *İstizân.*

⁷⁶ *Mûdâla 'a-nâme.*

⁷⁷ BBA, *Meclis-i Vükelâ*, Vol. CXXXI.

acting upon it, whenever foreign subjects, in Jaffa or Haifa,⁷⁸ who want to take possession of lands apply to the [Government], should be continued or not; [and the other] by the *vilāyet* of Beirut asking what action should be taken concerning the acceptance of bids by the Germans and Jews of Haifa for unoccupied lands,⁷⁹ given in auction to bidders there.

Since it was understood that the Ministry of the Interior had earlier been instructed and notified by a decision of the Cabinet to prepare and forward a project of regulations⁸⁰ dealing in general with the question of whether Jews should or should not settle and acquire possession of land in the Land of Palestine and its ramifications, therefore the communication, by way of an answer, to the above mentioned Ministry is that this decision is reiterated and that it should instruct the [communicating] authorities to postpone auctions and transfer of unoccupied lands in the Land of Palestine, until these regulations⁸¹ should be prepared, ratified and enforced, as well as the communication, in that sense, to the Administration of the Imperial Cadas-
tre — where deliberated upon [and decided].

Signatures: Hüseyn Hilmî Pasha and his Cabinet
(Minister of the Interior Tal'at Pasha)

⁷⁸ It seems to be a technical error of the official preparing the protocol, since Haifa belonged to the *vilāyet* of Beirut.

⁷⁹ *Arâzî-yi maḥlûla*.

⁸⁰ *Lalḥa-yi Nizâmiye*. Cf. *supra*, Document II.

⁸¹ *Nizâmnâme*.

14. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JEWISH POPULATION OF PALESTINE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS BEFORE WORLD WAR I

by ISRAEL KOLATT

I

The Jewish community of Palestine before World War I presented a strange paradox. It was a community that constituted the centre of traditional Judaism, of organizations and philanthropists in the emancipated countries, and of the Jewish national movement; at the same time it was the most divided Jewish community in the world. Not only did it fail to establish an organization uniting the Jewish population of the country as a whole, but even unification of the individual local communities was achieved with the greatest difficulty, and in Jerusalem not at all.¹

This paradox was apparent not only in the internal social structure but also in the external political status of the *yishuv* (the Jewish community of Palestine). This community represented a fairly large concentration of population. It numbered 80,000 to 90,000, i.e., about 14% of the total population of between 600,000 and 700,000 — a higher percentage than was to be found in any other country. The administrative division of the Ottoman Empire increased the importance of these concentrations of Jews: they constituted about one quarter of the population in the *sanjak* of Jerusalem, and there were considerable numbers of them in the towns in the interior of the country, i.e., Jerusalem, Tiberias and Safed. A smaller proportion was to be found in the coastal cities. The Jews numbered 45,000 among a population of 80,000 in Jerusalem; 5,000 out of 8,000 in Tiberias; 7,000 out of 15,000 in Safed; 12,000 out of 50,000 in Jaffa; and 3,000 out of 20,000 in Haifa.²

Its size notwithstanding, the Jewish community was of little importance politically at a time when institutions for autonomous government on a regional basis were being developed. The reason for this lay in the small number of Jews who were Ottoman nationals, and in the absence of an all-

¹ M. Burstein, *Self-Government of the Jews in Palestine*, Tel-Aviv, 1934; V. Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban et Palestine*, Paris, 1896; The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, *The Annales*, Vol. CLXIV (November, 1932).

² A. Ruppin, *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel*, Berlin, 1919, pp. 9–53.

embracing Jewish organization concerned with the political representation of the Jews.

In various quarters the division of the Jewish community was the subject of bitter complaint. For the nationally conscious Jews, both among the immigrants from Europe and among the Sephardim, it signified the triumph of particularist interests and attachments over awareness of the unity of the Jewish people as a whole. Young intellectuals who had grown up in Palestine blamed it for spoiling their chances to exploit the possibilities of representation in the municipalities, the law courts, etc., which the Ottoman Government permitted even before 1908. The "Practical Zionists", who placed greater value on creating facts in Palestine than on diplomatic activity, saw the organization of the *yishuv* as a means of strengthening its potential for independent economic activity as well as developing its talent for independent administration. However, some of them, in common with veteran local leaders, feared that an overall public organization might arouse the suspicions of the government and of the other inhabitants of the country. In addition Baron de Rothschild and his administration were sympathetic toward this tendency for small-scale secret activity.

In spite of the compelling reasons for organizing the Jewish population of Palestine before 1914, division was so deeply entrenched in the social character of the *yishuv* that it was impossible to eliminate it through internal developments within the community; the external forces connected with the events which occurred in the Ottoman Empire and the constitutional changes introduced after 1908 set in motion the process which eventually led to the overall organization of the *yishuv*. In 1914 this process had not yet achieved its aim, and such unification as had been effected was only partial. After the First World War the social structure of the *yishuv* was a hindrance to its overall organization. In the twenties and thirties the political parties finally organized themselves in response to external challenges and established a national organization of the Jews in Palestine, recognized by the British Mandatory.

The constitutional framework of the Ottoman Empire had always lent itself to comprehensive Jewish organization. The régime recognized the Jewish *millet* as a unit within the Empire and the *Millet Law* of 1865 granted fairly wide judicial powers to the rabbinical authorities. The *hakkām bashī* represented the Jews before the authorities in many matters, including matters of personal security.

Yet the *millet* framework did not unite the Jews of Palestine. It applied, of course, only to Ottoman subjects, whereas most of the Jews who immigrated from Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century did not accept Ottoman nationality. The authorities continued, therefore, to view the Sephardic

community as the officially recognized Jewish community. It alone had official government authority, while all the other Jewish organizations were of a voluntary nature. In addition to the fact that the constitutional framework limited the *millet* to Ottoman subjects (thus only the Sephardic community), the Jewish *millet* was not restricted to Palestine alone. However, after 1841 the Sephardic chief rabbi of Jerusalem (the *Rishon le-Zion*) was appointed *hakhām bashī*. Yet the *millet* included all the Jews of the Empire and, as such, the Jews of Palestine were a factor smaller in number and political importance than were the Jewish communities of Constantinople and Salonika. While the Jews of Jaffa and Jerusalem participated in electing officials of the *millet* institutions, the number of electors which they sent to the electoral body was quite small.³

The great majority of Jews who immigrated to Palestine up until the 1880's later continued to retain their previous nationality or even adopted consular protection in Palestine; they felt greater security in the protection of foreign consuls and were glad to be relieved of the obligations imposed upon Ottoman nationals. In 1908, before the Revolution had taken place, an attempt was made to organize all the Russian Jews in one association, following a quarrel between Jews and Arabs in Jaffa.⁴ The Jews might easily have split into separate groups under the protection of the different consuls.

There were various lines of division among the urban Jewish community. The Jews were divided according to their ethnic background, the languages they spoke (Yiddish or Ladino), their rabbinic courts, and the form of their prayers. The Sephardim established one overall organization which included, at first, all the institutions of the "Oriental communities." This overall organization began to split when concentrations of various specific Eastern communities grew.

The Oriental communities broke away to form separate courts and synagogues, even while they continued to support their joint charitable institutions. In the nineteenth century the Maghrabls of North Africa, the Bukharians and the Georgians had broken away from the Sephardim. In 1907 the Yemenites also broke away and set up their own law court, despite the fact that they too were subjects of the Empire.⁵

The Ashkenazim were divided into *kolels*, which were organized according

³ D. Ben-Gurion and Y. Ben-Zvi, *Eretz-Israel*, New York, 1918; G. Frumkin, *Ha-Irgun ha-Rishmi shel ha-Yehudim be-Turkiya u-Zkhuyotav*, Central Zionist Archives (CZA), A 199/18.

⁴ *Ha-Zman*, 17.7.1908.

⁵ N. D. Freiman, *Sefer ha-Zikaron ha-Yerushalmi* (Jerusalem), Year I, 5673 (1913).

to country of origin and sources of monetary support. This division was crossed by another division — between Ḥasidim and their opponents.

In 1866 the General Committee of the Ashkenazi community was established. This was an overall organization above the individual *kolels*, which took care of general needs. It was possible to consider the General Committee as a nucleus for comprehensive organization of the Jewish community in Jerusalem after 1908. The Ashkenazim constituted a majority within this community and therefore their organization was of importance to the *yishuv* as a whole. The General Committee was called "Kneset Israel" and represented the entire community to the authorities.⁶

This many-sided division, which combined feelings of affinity based on place of origin and custom with strong material interests, prevented the formation of a united community; attachment to the ethnic community was stronger than the attachment to the *yishuv* as a whole, and so no common language could be found among the various ethnic groups. This division prevented unification of the urban Jewish community both in the four holy cities — Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias and Safed — and in the new communities.

II

The "new *yishuv*" carried with it the idea of national unity, but it lacked organizational unity from the very beginning.

The new settlement was not the result of a comprehensive organization or programme. The first settlements were founded by various associations and individuals. There was, however, a connection between Rumanian settlers and the "Central Committee of the Organizations for the Settlement of Palestine" which was established in 1882. At the same time, the Russian settlers were connected with organizations and leaders in Russia up until the founding in 1884 of the "Moses Montefiore Association", a body which organized the *Hovevei Zion* and began to serve as a moral force for the new settlers.⁷

But from the start these bodies did not put forward a comprehensive national program, just as they were lacking a practical economic program. They did not consider the means for organizing the new *yishuv*, nor its relationship to the government, the local population and the existing Jewish

⁶ A. B. Rivlin, *Toldot ha-Yishuv ha-'Ivri ba-Me'a ha-19*, Tel-Aviv, 5726 (1966); B. Z. Gat, *Ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz-Israel, 1840-1881*, Jerusalem, 5723 (1963).

⁷ Y. Klausner, *Hibat Tziyon be-Romanya*, Jerusalem, 5718 (1958); Y. Klausner, *Be-Hit'orer' Am*, Jerusalem, 5724 (1964); Y. Klausner, *Mi-Kattowitz 'ad Basel*, Jerusalem, 5725 (1965). These books give a general description of the discussion which follows.

community. They had clearer ideas concerning the social structure of the *moshavot* (agricultural settlements), as is reflected in the by-laws of these settlements.

The first organization which the new immigrants tried to establish in 1882, "The Pioneer Committee of Yesud ha-Ma'ala", was intended only for the purchase of land and for the organization of social life in the newly formed settlement and not for the determination of more comprehensive orientation. This organization did not last long; when immigration ceased it came to an end. Thus it is only from the general conduct of the settlers that it is possible to understand the principles which guided them.

The first agricultural settlers probably did not want to receive Ottoman citizenship. Despite attempts to win the Sultan's favour for Jewish settlement in Palestine, the settlers felt more secure under the protection of the consuls. The settlers did not establish a principle of territorial separation from the existing Arab community; the settlement of Rosh Pina was even established next to the Arab village of Ja'unl and requested its assistance.⁸ It was clear that socially this was a separate Jewish community — its members could be Jews only, and the by-laws of the *moshavot* (i.e., agricultural settlements, pl. of *moshava*) even established a certain amount of traditional Jewish character for life in the settlements.

Clearly the project of settlement required a great deal of social unity, a more far-reaching unity than that of the religious Jewish community. The organization of the *moshavot* was on a voluntary basis; however, the very conditions of settlement caused the individual to be greatly dependent on the community and thus made it possible for the community to impose its will on the individual. Yet the by-laws of the *moshavot* that were formulated in the beginning of settlement were not put into practice until the beginning of this century, since for economic reasons most of the *moshavot* were forced to seek the protection of Baron de Rothschild and his organization; therefore, they achieved social independence only in the late nineties.

Attempts by individual Jews to settle in Arab villages (such as the family of Jacob Chertok in 'Ayn Siniyya) or in large estates (such as Reuben Lehrer in Wādī Ḥanīn) were not successful because of the need for a community in which public life and educational facilities could be had.⁹ The colonies did not wish to secede from the old Jewish urban *yishuv*; on the contrary, they required their services, their Rabbinical Courts (at least until the Jewish Magistrate's Court was established in Jaffa in 1909) and their health services.

⁸ D. Shuv, *Zikhronot le-Velt David*, Jerusalem, 5697 (1937).

⁹ M. Smilanski, *Nes-Tziyona, 5643-5713* (1883-1953), Nes-Tziyona, 1953.

The first immigrants were helped by the members of the old *yishuv* in purchasing land for settlement; nonetheless, they dissociated themselves from the old *yishuv* and its quarrels. Z. D. Levontin intentionally avoided making contacts with the Jerusalem community, as well as with the members of the *Tehiyat Israel* society who wished to buy land for Jewish settlement; on the other hand many members of the *yishuv* were critical of the unorganized and unplanned wave of immigration of 1882 — not only because of their values, but also for practical economic reasons.

More comprehensive thought on the *yishuv* as a whole is evidenced at the time of the visit by Ze'ev Kalonimus Wissotzky, the envoy of *Hovevei Zion* to Palestine in 1885.¹⁰ During this visit, it became clear to Wissotzky that the existing *yishuv* was numerically larger as well as economically and politically more important than the handful of settlers from the new wave of immigration and that it was the responsibility of *Hibat Zion* to concern itself with the economic development of the old *yishuv* as well as its social organization. He paid attention to the unification of the various communities and felt that the Sephardic community's aid to the settlement project was important because of its deep roots in the country and its close relationship with the authorities. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda also considered this communal unity as a sign of the triumph of nationalism and political training.

Yet Wissotzky was careful not to locate the Executive Committee of *Hovevei Zion* in Jerusalem, the centre of the existing *yishuv*, preferring Jaffa; this headquarters of *Hovevei Zion* was to become a gathering place for the leaders of the new *yishuv*.

The concept of communal unity, which was intended to prevent at least the division of the urban Jewish population, did not materialize before 1908. Intellectuals and merchants from the ranks of the *yishuv* succeeded only in establishing small groups in the cities to take the initiative in filling public functions. It was thus that Shim'on Rokaḥ founded *Bnei Zion* and *'Ezrat Israel* in Jaffa in 1887; in the late eighties and early nineties groups were formed in Jerusalem and Jaffa to work for communal unity and to provide services.¹¹

In the late nineties the *Bnei Israel* group was founded in Jerusalem for communal unity;¹² in 1904 the Young Jerusalem Society was founded in another attempt to overcome communal division.¹³ Later the *Bnei Yehuda*

¹⁰ Z. K. Wissotzky, *Tzror Mikhtavim*, Warsaw, 5659 (1899) — letters sent to important people on the question of the *yishuv* in Palestine, especially letter 70.

¹¹ S. Ben-Zion, "Mi-Shnat 5600 'ad Yisud ha-Shkhuna ha-Yehudit ha-Rishona," A. Druyanov (ed.), *Sefer Tel-Aviv*, Tel Aviv, 5696 (1936), I, 20–31.

¹² A. M. Luncz, *Luah Eretz-Israel le-5658*, Jerusalem, 5658 (1898).

¹³ A. M. Luncz, *Luah Eretz-Israel le-5665*, Jerusalem, 5665 (1905).

society was founded for the economic advancement of the *yishuv*.¹⁴ These groups of young intellectuals, merchants and professionals had little power. They thought in terms of Jewish unity as opposed to communal division and relied upon elected institutions rather than bribery and attempts to win the favour of the authorities.

In 1891 they succeeded in founding a united community of Ashkenazim and Sephardim in Jaffa: "And there shall remain no traces of 'Ashkenazi' and 'Sephardi'; only 'Jew' with no qualification whatsoever and [we shall] act for the good of the entire community."¹⁵ Hebrew was chosen as the spoken language of the Committee. But the community split and was only reunited in 1909.

The groups of merchants and intellectuals who met in Jaffa were composed of members both of the old *yishuv* and of the new *yishuv*. They initiated the founding of new residential neighbourhoods, such as Neve Tzedek and Neve Shalom, based on economic and social considerations. Their purpose was to escape from the rising rents in Jaffa and to create the special cultural character of a Jewish neighbourhood. Such considerations as economic self-sufficiency and avoiding on principle payment of rents to Arab landlords did not yet figure in their thinking as they would later when Aḥuzat Bayit was founded. They did not even desire to be distinct from the Jewish community of Jaffa, a phenomenon which appears at the time of the founding of Tel Aviv. On the contrary, the founders of Neve Tzedek and Neve Shalom were active in the communal services of Jaffa and in the founding of the community.

It is possible to say that this represents a transition from traditional society — in which the religious communities lived in separate neighbourhoods and maintained separate organizations as defined by laws — to a national society which was coming into being and which consciously insisted upon cultural and economic separation. The German neighbourhoods were, incidentally, an additional stimulus in the transition from one stage to the next.

There was no common forum for the discussion of general problems of the *yishuv*; in the nineties these questions were brought up in the press and served as a stimulus to action by men of initiative and small societies. The Executive Committee of *Hovevei Zion*, "The Society in Support of Jewish Farmers and Artisans in Syria and Palestine", served, from 1890, as a body for bringing matters to discussion despite the fact that it lacked the authority to compel or enforce its decisions. In the mid-nineties members of the

¹⁴ *Ha-Havatzelet*, 5667 (1907); G. Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet bi-Yrushalayim*, Jerusalem, 5716 (1956).

¹⁵ Druyanov, *op. cit.*, I, 20-31.

moshavot and various other organizations, both workers and leaders, met together. The strongest force in the *yishuv* between the years 1883 and 1900 was the administration of Baron de Rothschild, which acted according to its own considerations and felt no need for public debate or public movements. It also tried, insofar as it could influence affairs, to bring about the unification of the urban communities, but its efforts were in vain.

The *Hibat Zion* movement, from the start, was not successful in uniting the various ethnic communities. A split occurred between the new and the old *yishuv*, a split which was not yet obvious in the eighties, as it was to become in the nineties.¹⁶ The idea of settlement (known as the "*yishuv* idea" in that period) was a point of controversy within the old *yishuv*, and it could be assumed that some of the members of the old *yishuv* would aid the new settlers. The precedence given to the new idea over the dispute between "orthodox" and "enlightened" in Europe gave hope that the innovators and orthodox could come to terms. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, for example, demanded even before the mass immigration, that the disputes with the *haluka* trustees be postponed for the sake of "the renaissance of Israel." The make-up of the *Hibat Zion* movement itself, which included many orthodox members, allowed for the possibility that peace could reign in the Palestinian *yishuv* through co-existence and reconciliation between one community based on prayer and study while living off the *haluka* and another community of productive rural and urban settlers. The existence of an agricultural Jewish *yishuv* in Palestine would revive traditional Judaism in Europe as the religious settlement acted as a centre and symbol for it.

The distinction between the old *yishuv* and the new *yishuv* is not a clear one and contains elements of ideological identity in addition to practical reality. Members of the new *yishuv* viewed the old *yishuv* as a non-productive community living off the *haluka* — although a large number of them supported themselves through productive labour. On the other hand, not a few members of the new *yishuv* were themselves observant Jews, among them even some who were against the new schools, which were the outstanding symbol of the new *yishuv*. Furthermore the Sephardic Jews could not be included in either group.

To be more precise, we can speak of the old *yishuv* in terms of its representation by the "*Kolel* Committee" which was established in 1866 and which was considered the spokesman of the Ashkenazi community. Similarly, we can speak of the new *yishuv* in terms of its representation by the Executive

¹⁶ Y. Klausner, *Mi-Kattowitz*, tells of the relations between the old *yishuv* and the new *yishuv*.

Committee of *Hovevei Zion*, which began to act as its representative from the time of Wissotzky's visit to Palestine in 1885, while it began to function officially only in 1890, when *Hovevei Zion* was approved by the Russian government as "The Society in Support of Jewish Farmers and Artisans in Syria and Palestine" and when Ze'ev Tiomkin became its chairman.

Relations between these two elements were stormy. In 1885 the *Kol me-Hekhal* was published, condemning the idea of agricultural settlement and pointing out its failures, while praising the way of life and activities of the existing *yishuv*.

The *shemita* year (the sabbatical year in which the land lies fallow) of 1888–1889 saw a harsh controversy between the extreme orthodox and the moderates. A delegation representing *Hovevei Zion* was sent to Palestine to smooth out the difficulties. In 1890 the members of this *Hovevei Zion* delegation led by Rabbi Shemuel Mohilever undertook not to disturb collections for the fund of Rabbi Me'ir Ba'al ha-Nes, while the heads of the Ashkenazic *kolels* promised to aid the "yishuv idea."¹⁷

Relations once again took a turn for the worse, following the dispute over the issue of the new education in the cities and colonies and following the conflicts among the *Bnei Moshe*. Yehiel Mikhal Pines' break with the Executive Committee of *Hovevei Zion* and his ever closer relations with *Koliel* Committee circles is evidence of the growing schism — but also of the existing ties between the two sides and the transition from one to the other. The crystallization of the social character of the new colonies in the course of their development increased the distance between the two sides. Social contact between young men and women was customary in Rehovot and Rishon Le-Zion but was considered sacrilege in Petaḥ Tikva; the question of performing plays from the Zionist, Russian and even European repertoire was a serious one. The orthodox saw this as a new version of "Hellenisation" within a *yishuv* whose purpose was to uphold the faith which was being questioned in the Diaspora. An additional factor in the dispute between *Hovevei Zion* and the old *yishuv* was the constant attacks by Ben-Yehuda's newspapers upon the split between Sephardim and Ashkenazim, a split which destroyed all possibility of national unity. The Ashkenazim saw this as a plot to undermine their economic advantages as well as outside interference in the affairs of their community.

In 1894 matters came to a severe crisis due to the slander by members of the old *yishuv* against Ben-Yehuda; they said that he had incited a rebellion against the Turkish authorities. This led to his arrest, followed by a bitter dispute, both in Palestine and in the Diaspora, between supporters of the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 400–401.

two *yishuv*s. Nonetheless, in 1895 renewed talks between the two sides began. Both sides feared that the dispute would give the Palestinian *yishuv* a bad name in Jewish circles. Out of this common concern both sides arrived at an agreement which, though it was only a "non-aggression pact", recognized the right of each side to exist and expressed the will for co-existence. On certain issues there were points which crossed the lines of the dispute: the old *yishuv*'s opposition to Baron de Rothschild and the concern of some of their spokesmen (such as Y. D. Frumkin, editor of *ha-Havatzelet*) for workers, which were consonant with stands taken by the new *yishuv* at the beginning of the century.

Some members of the old *yishuv* participated in the *Yishuv* Assembly in Zikhron Ya'akov in 1903 and continued to participate in the *Histadrut Eretz-Israelit*; even Yeḥiel Mikhal Pines again became active in this movement for some time.

The immigration which began to arrive in Palestine at the beginning of this century strengthened the liberal leanings within the *yishuv*; thus, it might have deepened the differences between the two *yishuv*s. Yet it appears that the political reaction to the 1908 Revolution caused renewed *rapprochement*, and the economic crisis in the old *yishuv* in 1910–1911 even encouraged the leaders of the new *yishuv* to come to its aid.

The quantitative strength of the old *yishuv* gave it objective national value when elections to government institutions were held after 1908; its orthodoxy and social structure were disturbing, and the new *yishuv* was torn between recognition of the value of the old *yishuv* and fear of its growing influence.

III

As a result of the increased importance of the community's numerical strength after the restoration of the constitution in 1908, the new *yishuv* realized that the schism undermined their political position. Even members of the old *yishuv* began to be aware of the fact that, in view of the political situation in Palestine, a large unified community was preferable to a small divided one. Yet, as we shall see later, these realizations were not enough to bridge the huge gap between the various organizational bodies.

Political activity in government institutions, which was an important factor in encouraging the overall organization of the *yishuv* in the period following 1908, had played a rather limited role in this respect prior to the Young Turk Revolution. However, by the late nineties A. M. Luncz, in his *Luah Eretz Israel*, had already drawn the attention of the Jewish public to political opportunities which they were not exploiting. Because of the Jews' split into separate communities, the *ḥakhām bashī* was unable to represent

them all; the authorities recognized the Sephardim and Ashkenazim as separate communities, each one with its own *mukhtār*. The Jews did not even take sufficient advantage of their right to place representatives in the *majlis idāra* (Administrative Council).¹⁸

Similarly the correspondent of *ha-Shiloah*, Yehuda Grasovsky, wrote in 1897 that the lack of unity among the Jews of Jaffa was their downfall; despite the fact that "every community in Turkey has the right to send one representative to the courts and one to the City Council, to choose a *ḥakhām bashi* to represent it before the government, and to seek justice for its members; in Jaffa there is none of this."¹⁹

As the stratum of local-born intellectuals who knew Turkish and Arabic increased, more attention was given to the political opportunities which they had not exploited. The contact of the new settlers with the government also made them aware of the need for proper Jewish representation, which would not rely only upon the political influence of Baron de Rothschild or the Alliance, or upon bribery.

Me'ir Dizengoff organized a group of leaders from various communities and established a committee which was intended to prevent discrimination against Jews, just before the 1908 Revolution. In addition to Dizengoff, its members included Antebi, Rokaḥ, Sapir, Yellin, Eisenberg and Y. D. Drori (Bar-Drora).²⁰

The demand to ensure rights through participating in the representative institutions of the Empire was an innovation, especially coming from the new *yishuv*. The means of approaching the government which had previously been customary were through the traditional legal channels: the *ḥakhām bashi*, who officially represented the Jewish community and was a member of the Administrative Council, and people close to the authorities, who acted through persuasion and bribery. All these did not rely upon Jewish public activity or representation in public institutions, but rather upon official representation and secret activity.

The new *yishuv* relied heavily upon ties with the consuls of European states in matters of security, land purchase, building, etc.; Baron de Rothschild's officials and, later, the ICA (Jewish Colonisation Association) were able to exert influence on Imperial and local authorities, by means of the French Foreign Office. This fact alone granted them (especially Baron de Rothschild's administrators) a respected position in the eyes of the local authorities. As far as those authorities who conducted the affairs of the

¹⁸ A. M. Luncz, *Luah Eretz-Israel le-5655*, Jerusalem, 5655 (1895).

¹⁹ M. D. D. (Y. Grasovsky), *Ha-Shiloah*, 5657 (1897) I, 349-356.

²⁰ Y. Ya'ari-Polskin (ed.), *M. Dizengoff, Hayav u-F'ulotav*, Tel-Aviv, 5686 (1926), p. 40.

yishuv were concerned, Herzl's activities were irresponsible publicity and pretension which even caused harm to the existing *yishuv* — a state of mind which is understandable in light of 'Adbülhamid's absolute and suspicious rule.

The internal growth of the *yishuv* gave rise to open public organizations even before the change in the Ottoman régime in 1908. The attempt to organize the *yishuv* in 1903 and the founding of workers' parties in 1905–1906 preceded the change in the mood in all of Palestine. These organizations did not arise out of the political circumstances of Palestine itself, yet the changes which had taken place in the state of affairs gave justification, after the fact, to their existence.

The first attempt to unite the entire *yishuv* was made in 1903, not out of an awareness of an external political need nor through the initiative of the traditional *yishuv*. It was rather an attempt which arose out of the economic and social crisis which occurred in the *yishuv* with the transfer of the administration of the *moshavot* from Baron de Rothschild to the ICA in 1900. The farmers in the *moshavot* were angered that the transfer was carried out without asking their opinion, and they proposed an alternative of independent administration in place of bureaucratic supervision. This principle of self-organization, which was preached especially by Aḥad Ha-'am, was transferred from the agricultural *yishuv* and applied to the *yishuv* as a whole, at all levels. Thus organizations of craftsmen and workers were established in 1900. The organization of professional groups, ethnic communities and local congregations was intended to prevent the collapse of the *yishuv* by emigration. Its purpose was to show the supporters of political Zionism, who claimed that without prior legal guarantees there was no chance for the Palestinian *yishuv*, that the community had the strength to survive on the basis of self-organization and pooling of its own resources. The idea of organizing the *yishuv* did not arise in Palestine alone; it was also the result of initiative and influence by the members of the Odessa Committee, who sent a delegation led by Menahem Ussishkin and Alter Druyanov to Palestine in the summer of 1903.²¹

During that summer, the *Histadrut Eretz-Israelit* was established, with the goal of creating a cover organization for all the bodies of the new *yishuv*, which were divided along local, communal and professional lines. The aims of the *Histadrut* were defined as follows: "to unify all the Jewish forces, both material and spiritual, in Palestine in order to enlarge and develop the quantity and quality of the Hebrew elements in Palestine."²²

²¹ CZA, A 24, Ussishkin Archives. See also the press of the period, especially *Ha-Trofe*, summer of 1903.

²² The regulations are in the Ussishkin Archives, CZA, A 24.

To fulfill this goal, a many-branched organization was set up, based on a regional structure with central institutions; the function of this organization was to concern itself with arranging the public affairs of the Jewish communities in Palestine and with the economic development of the *yishuv*. It was intended to serve as an intermediary between the *yishuv* and the Jewish institutions working on its behalf. Representation before the government was secondary in the plans of this organization.

The *Histadrut* wished to distinguish itself from those involved with the *haluka*. However its regulations limited membership to those who earned their living "not only from charity"; thus an absolute division was impossible.

This first organization of the *yishuv* did not succeed in striking roots or in establishing its authority over the heterogeneous *yishuv*. It was built on a voluntary basis, and potential candidates did not join it. It did not co-ordinate funds and did not become an authority in questions of economic development and services.

After two years of existence, an attempt was made to change the basis of the organization to one of collective representation of the units comprising it, and not on the basis of direct personal membership. This was an admission of the advantages of local communal authority, especially that of units of different ethnic communities. This method, however, did not succeed in saving the *Histadrut*.

The establishment of the *Histadrut* brought up a new issue for the *yishuv's* leadership; this was the problem of the damage caused by the very fact that an all-embracing organization existed openly. Supporters of the system of secretive Jewish activity in Palestine — both those who feared the government and those who began to fear the Arabs — made it difficult to sustain a public organization of the *yishuv*.

The failure taught the leaders of the *yishuv* a bitter lesson. It became clear to them that it was not enough to establish the need for an overall organization, but that it was also necessary to examine whether or not social conditions were ripe for such an organization.

The break-up of the *Histadrut Eretz-Israelit* left a void in the life of the *yishuv*. This void was felt in a period in which people began to come in large numbers to Palestine (1905–1906), much more as a result of conditions in Russia and in the Zionist movement than as a result of conditions in Palestine. The collective effort to broaden the economy and bring about social organization seemed even more necessary in this period. Urgent public problems, such as the settling of new immigrants and, especially, concern for workers, demanded a solution.

While the attempt at overall organization was failing, the independent

organization of the *moshavot* grew stronger, becoming more and more independent under the supervision of the ICA. The transfer of administration of the wineries at Rishon Le-Zion and Zikhron Ya'akov to a farmers' cooperative in 1906 and the development of cooperative marketing and credit organizations were evidence of the potential which lay hidden in organizations.²³

At the same time the need for consultation between the various elements of the *yishuv* was felt. In answer to this need the Palestine Council was established through the initiative of the office of the Committee in Odessa in 1907. This council was founded on the basis of representation of various bodies — representatives of the Zionist Organization and *Hovevei Zion*, as well as companies for land purchase such as *Ge'ula* and the wine marketing company Carmel, and professional organizations.²⁴

This system gave wide representation to the Zionist Organization. The Actions Committee was represented by two members and the Anglo-Palestine Bank by two members; while the Odessa Committee, the *Ge'ula* and Carmel companies, the Teachers' Union, and the Union of Craftsmen, Merchants and Farmers were each represented by one member. The Union of *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* also participated in the council and additional members could be added by majority vote. Five members of the council were chosen to be its Actions Committee. The goal of the council was defined as co-ordination of the activities of the various bodies of the *yishuv*.

The council met quite frequently. It intervened in the question of Jewish labour, prevented the importation of workers from Egypt, and criticized Ruppin's plans for the establishment of the Palestine Land Development Company. Its meetings were secret, and the press was excluded from them.

The Young Turk Revolution in July, 1908, caused rapid changes in the political orientation of the *yishuv*. Its spokesmen and leaders were forced to make an evaluation concerning their relationship to the Empire and their activities within it. Both the position of the existing *yishuv* and the chances of advancing the Zionist project were dependent on this. The Sephardic intelligentsia, who knew the languages of the Empire and participated in its political life, were most enthusiastic about the new freedom; they declared with enthusiasm their loyalty to the Empire and their readiness to serve in its army. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda and his newspapers saw the revolution as "steps towards salvation" and hoped for unhindered Jewish development within the boundaries of a constitutional empire, through solidarity with its various peoples. He urged repeatedly; "Jews, be Ottomans."

²³ A. 'Ever-Hadani, *Toldot Agudat ha-Kormim*, Tel-Aviv, 1967.

²⁴ Burstein, *op. cit.*; *Doh ha-Ya'ad ha-Zmani li-Yhudei Eretz-Israel*, Jerusalem, Tishri, 5681 (September-October, 1920).

The "practical" Zionists claimed that the revolution had shown the correctness of their views; in a constitutional empire no Zionist achievement could be gained through diplomatic activity in Istanbul, but rather through the strength of a *yishuv* existing in Palestine. They hoped that a constitutional régime would abolish the limitations on immigration and land sale. On the other hand, they were doubtful that it would be possible to achieve charter rights which would give the Jews preference over other inhabitants.

As far as the existing *yishuv* was concerned, it was clear that the stress which had been put on the *moshavot* would be transferred, at least partially, to the cities; it would be up to the Zionist elements of the *yishuv* to organize the Jewish community in its entirety and to advance national awareness; they were glad to find out that there was no contradiction between "working for the present" (*Gegenwartsarbeit*) in the communities and "working for the future" of Palestine, a contrast which perplexed Zionists in Europe.

The hopes which were placed in the revolution were accompanied by fears. Members of the old *yishuv* feared compulsory conscription and social developments which would encourage secularization, while nationalist elements feared lest over-enthusiasm for a constitutional Ottoman Empire would turn into enthusiasm for Ottoman nationalism. The Sephardim were suspect for defining themselves as "Ottomans of the Mosaic Faith."

In spite of these fears it was generally recognized that it was necessary for as many as possible to obtain Ottoman citizenship and for the Jews to be active in official institutions. The very existence of a separate Jewish organization for political activity was opposed to the outlook of some of the Sephardim; everyone was divided on the issue of whether to reveal or disguise the political content of Zionism.²⁵

IV

The Young Turk Revolution was not only a subject for speculative analysis of its possible effects on the *yishuv* and on Zionist aspirations; it also raised practical questions of organization and political representation. The most burning issue was that of participation in elections to the parliament in Istanbul and relations with the political organization of the Young Turks, the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP); moreover, there were basic problems of the organization and status of the *yishuv*. These problems were

²⁵ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, Tamuz-Av, 5668 (July-August, 1908); Y. L. [Yosef Luria], "Be-'Ikvei ha-Konstitutzia ha-Turkit," *Ha-'Omer*, Vol. I (5669 [1909]), Part II, pp. 47-60. For the status of the Jews in Palestine in the beginning of 5669 (1908-09), see *Ha-'Olam*, Vol. 1 (5669); M. Dizengoff, "Bifnei ha-Mishtar be-'Hdash," *Ha-'Omer*, Vol. II (5669 [1909]), Vol. II, pp. 15-25.

clarified only in the six years between the Revolution and the outbreak of the First World War.

Besides the expectations and suspicions of the members of the new and old *yishuvs*, Ashkenazim and Sephardim, as a result of the Revolution and its after-effects, it was clear that the legal status of the Jews had changed due to the Revolution. The *millet* was no longer the only framework for legal representation of the Jewish community, and the *hakhām bashi* was no longer its only certified representative before the authorities. The influence of the local intermediaries who frequently acted by means of bribery was now placed in doubt. In the long run it was likely that the influence of the consuls would also decrease.

In place of the traditional patterns of activity which, while they continued to exist, ceased to be the exclusive or even primary patterns, participation in the general institutions of the Empire and the election of representatives to the parliament in Istanbul began to rise in importance.

The theoretical issue of Jewish identity in the Empire took on practical significance for the Jews who were Ottoman subjects: should Jews choose their representatives as a Jewish entity or should they conceal their identity and join Ottoman political groups?²⁶

Officially, there was no certified Jewish body which would activate the Jews at the time of elections to institutions of the Empire, and which could coordinate their stand. Most Ottoman Jews belonged to the Sephardic community; however, communal affiliation was not synonymous with Ottoman citizenship. Therefore, the communal institutions did not consider political functions the role of the community. Furthermore, in 1908 the community was divided over the issue of electing a Chief Rabbi — the *Rishon le-Zion* and *hakhām bashi*. They were divided between the supporters of Rabbi Jacob Meir, who represented those educated by the Alliance, the more progressive elements in the community, and conservative circles, who preferred Rabbi Panijel.²⁷

²⁶ On the revolution and the condition of the Jews, see Asaf, *Hit'orerut Ha-'Aravim be-Eretz-Israel u-Vritatam*, Tel-Aviv, 1967, I, 42; Asaf, *Ha-Yahasim bein 'Aravim vi-Yhudim be-Eretz-Israel, 1860-1948*, Tel-Aviv, 1970, pp. 56-57; P. Alsberg, "Ha-She'ela ha-'Aravit bi-Mdiniyut ha-Hanhala ha-Tziyonit lifnei Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona," *Shivat Tziyon* (Jerusalem), 5715-16 (1955-56); N. Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine; 1882-1914," *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 17; Y. Ro'i, "The Zionist Attitude to the Arabs, 1908-1914," *MES*, Vol. IV (April, 1968).

²⁷ On the split in the Sephardic community, see M. D. Ga'on, *Yehudei ha-Mizrah be-Eretz-Israel be'Avur u-va-Hove*, Jerusalem, 5688 (1928); M. D. Ga'on, "Ha-Herut," in D. Judelevitz (ed.), *Kovetz Ma'amarim le-Divrei Yemel ha-'Itanut be-Eretz-Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 5696 (1936), Vol. II.

Yet more than being an internal Jewish question of self-organization, the issue was primarily one of the nature of overt Jewish identification. When the Revolution broke out, it was revealed that there existed in Jerusalem a secret cell of the CUP among Turkish officials. After the Revolution a branch of the party was established in Jerusalem. The positive response of Jewish subjects of the Empire to the Young Turk Revolution was expressed in their affiliation with the CUP in Jerusalem.²⁸ Gad Frumkin was a member of the local committee, and David Yellin and Zalman Frumkin joined with him. This positive attitude towards the CUP became problematic when the negative stand of their leaders towards any national organization became apparent. As will be shown later in this article, the members of the new *yishuv* were wary of the younger generation's attraction to a new Ottoman loyalty; they feared that they would not stand up to the test of choosing between loyalty to the *yishuv* and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, both the changes which had taken place in the Empire and the elections to the parliament in Istanbul forced them to try to consult with elements outside the Jewish camp. This was the position of the young members of the old *yishuv* who had joined the CUP. Aharon Eisenberg, a colonist from Rehovot, took a similar stand, and under his auspices these young people contacted the new *yishuv*.

In a letter to the President of the Zionist Organization, David Wolfson, Eisenberg wrote of his visit to Jerusalem at the time of the proclamation of the constitution. He met with the chairman of the CUP and was even present at one of their meetings and heard their views. He was convinced of their willingness to accept Jews into their ranks and even to recognize non-Zionist settlement groups. In spite of this, he realized that they were strongly opposed to any reconciliation with Zionism. Eisenberg proposed, nonetheless, to work with the Young Turks with the assumption that within the framework of a constitutional régime, the Zionists would be able to carry on their work without special rights. Strengthening the country against foreign forces seemed to him a worthy goal for the Zionists as well — a goal common to both they and the Young Turks. He hoped for a certain amount of Jewish independence in the future. "We must now know how and in what way to 'sweeten' the political sting of Zionism and how to cover up this point 'until the end of days.'" According to Eisenberg, in his letter to Ussishkin, Wolfson did not question this stand.²⁹

It is dubious whether the Zionist leadership of the time put much hope in

²⁸ Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet*, Ch. 7.

²⁹ Letter from Eisenberg to Wolfson dated 23 Av 5668 (20 August 1908), enclosed in his letter to Ussishkin, CZA, A 24/64.

political activity in Palestine — however, Eisenberg represents one orientation of the members of the *yishuv* in light of the Revolution: preference for the Young Turks rather than a European Power and the emergence of a Jewish force within the framework of the régime “until the end of days.”

This policy of concealing Zionism was not shared by all those supporting affiliation with the CUP. Albert Antebi, David Yellin, Aharon Eisenberg and Malchiel Mani were elected to the Jerusalem committee of the CUP after they declared that they were not Zionists. But Dr. Isaac Levi and Eliezer Ben-Yehuda refused to make such a declaration and were therefore barred from membership in the committee; Ruppin supported the stand of the latter. Among the former, however, there were both non-Zionists and secret Zionists. The issue of concealing Zionism stirred up a fierce public debate in the *yishuv*.

New Zionist immigrants feared assimilation as Ottomans and distrusted any Jewish communal organization led by non-Zionists. In *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* Joseph Aharonowitz warned Dr. Isaac Levi that he was the representative of the Jewish people and not the representative of the “Ottoman nation,” and that freedom interested Zionists only insofar as it could enable them to become strong and to be “the vast majority in Palestine.”³⁰ (Dr. Isaac Levi, however, did not deny his Zionism, preferring to resign from the CUP; he worked in the Jerusalem branch of the Anglo-Palestine Company.)

Mordechai Ben Hillel Hacohen was more determined than Aharonowitz in his reservations about political activity, and he wrote “there was great fear in our hearts lest Ottoman assimilation come and wreak havoc in the camp of Israel.”³¹ The chronicles of *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* relate that Mordechai Ben Hillel spoke at Beit Ha-'am in Jaffa on Zionism and the constitution, and in the ensuing discussions many people opposed his speech.³²

In opposition to the stand of the Zionist leaders against Ottoman assimilation was the unconventional stand of Itamar Ben-Avi, son of Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, during the period of the counter-revolutionary attempt in April 1909. Itamar Ben-Avi was in favour of Jewish nationalism in Palestine, but questioned the uniqueness of the international Jewish context of this nationalism. He claimed that Jews paid more attention to the Jewish world and Zionist interests than to Ottoman affairs and constitutional development. He demanded that the Jews consider Kurdish riots against Armenians at that time a matter concerning them as much as pogroms against Jews; his call also contained a kind of hidden accusation that the Zionists were not

³⁰ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, Tamuz-Av, 5668 (July-August, 1908).

³¹ M. Ben-Hillel Hacohen, *Olami*, Jerusalem, 5688 (1928), p. 155.

³² *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, Tamuz-Av, 5668 (July-August, 1908).

loyal enough to the Revolution and the peoples' movement, preferring the absolute rule of the Sultan.³³

The discussion on whether to reveal or conceal their identity was the subject of a conference of Ashkenazim and Sephardim held in Jaffa on 30 August 1908. The majority opinion was that Jewish demands should not be concealed. It was also agreed that Jews should cooperate with the Muslims "who treat us with respect and trust, not our eternal enemies [the Christians]." It was claimed that this cooperation would give the Jews one out of the four representatives of the *sanjak* of Jerusalem to the Ottoman parliament.³⁴ (In fact there were only three.)

Thus Jews with voting rights in Jerusalem joined together at the initiative of Dr. Levi as the "Union of Ottoman Jews", as distinct from participation in the CUP.³⁵ However, both internal and external problems attended the Jews' participation in the elections to parliament in 1908. The Union lacked funds. It was supported by representatives of the large Jewish societies in Palestine which, whether Zionist or not, felt that Jewish representation in the parliament in Istanbul was important. These societies did not represent Palestinian Jewry and some of them were not Zionist. The Odessa Committee and the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization constituted the Zionist element. However, the Alliance, the *Hilfsverein* and the Anglo-Jewish Association also participated in the committee.

The Jews were also divided along personal lines, between Albert Antebi, who represented the Alliance Israélite Universelle, and Dr. Isaac Levi.

In the indirect elections the Jews suffered defeat when only 4 Jewish electors were chosen, as opposed to 140 Muslim and 30 Christian electors. The Jews had decided on the candidacy of Dr. Levi in a meeting of the elections committee led by Ruppin in October.³⁶ They tried to cooperate with Muslim candidates, despite their insignificant weight in the electoral college, but were unsuccessful. The Muslims proved unfaithful — and no Jew was elected.³⁷

The "Union of Ottoman Jews" continued to act to protect the rights of Jews until around 1914, yet its funds, authority and influence were slight.

There was almost unanimous realization that parliamentary representation for the *yishuv* was essential; however, there was no unanimity on the issue of *yishuv* organization and political activity. Many of the Zionists saw

³³ I. Ben-Avi, *Ha-Tzvi*, XXVth Year, No. 103 (13 Iyar 5669 [4 May 1909]).

³⁴ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, Elul, 5668 (August-September, 1908); *Ha-Zman*, 15.8.1908.

³⁵ *Ha-Havatzelet*, 24.8.1908. See also *Ha-Ahdui*, 5763 (1913), Nos. 38, 11. *Ha-'Or*, 5 Shvat 5673 (13 January 1913).

³⁶ Cf. Alsberg, *op. cit.*

³⁷ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 5669 (1908-09); Asaf, *Ha-Yahasim*, p. 57.

the importance of the new régime not in terms of participation in the government, but rather in terms of freedom for Zionist activity for which they had always hoped. While the members of the *yishuv* valued organization, the Palestine Office seems to have felt that the focal point should be expansion through land purchase, the founding of cooperative settlements and farms to train workers, and the encouragement of all branches of the Jewish economy; the organization of the existing *yishuv* was a secondary matter.

The master plan which Ruppin designed in 1907 — and which he probably continued to hold to even in the period when the Palestine Office was active — stressed the concentration of Jews in various sections of the country in order to become the basis of self-government rapidly. It is likely that the same principle guided him in his desire to concentrate Jews in certain urban areas as well.³⁸

V

Following the reinstatement of the constitution, there was a revival of the movement to organize the *yishuv*. Among those who immigrated in 1905–1906, there were many who were active in this movement. An attempt was made to give the Palestine Council a representative and authoritative character. This attempt failed.³⁹ Once again it became clear that it was impossible to set up an all-inclusive union without first organizing the basic units, especially the urban *yishuv*. New settlements in the towns along the coast were easier to organize than the “Holy Cities”. In 1909 a united community in Jaffa was organized after the failure of 1893. The Jewish community in Haifa began to organize. Attempts to unite the large community in Jerusalem were spurred by several factors—encouragement from the Chief Rabbi of Constantinople, Rabbi Haim Nahûm; economic difficulties; problems of Jewish rights at the Western Wall; and initiative taken by nationalist Sephardim — but all these failed. The Judean *moshavot* tried as early as 1907 to set up a representative body. In 1909 they tried to form a unified organization for collective representation in an all-*yishuv* organization, should one arise. They feared domination by majority rule and thus worked only for a federated organization. The *moshavot* felt themselves “the most important part, from the standpoint of a normal economic national existence,”⁴⁰ and refused to let their qualitative superiority be

³⁸ A. Ruppin, *Shloshim Shnot Binyan be-Eretz-Israel*, Jerusalem, 5697 (1937), pp. 1–8 (“Avtonomiya Yehudit be-Eretz-Israel”).

³⁹ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 5669 (1908–09), No. 8.

⁴⁰ A. M. Freiman, *Sefer ha-Yovel le-Korot ha-Moshava Rishon le-Zion*, Jaffa, 5673 (1913), II; 108.

assimilated in a quantitative majority. After the failure to set up an overall organization, the founding of an organization of *moshavot* was postponed as well until 1913. However, a process of democratization began with the extension of the franchise within the *moshavot* themselves.

The failure of the attempt to expand the Palestine Council brought about its demise and, in its place, the "Permanent Executive Committee" became the co-ordinating body of the *yishuv* along with the Palestine Office, which gained in authority. In the "Permanent Committee" were represented active organizations and leaders of the *yishuv*.⁴¹ The Magistrates Court was founded in 1909 in conjunction with the Palestine Office.⁴²

A series of external affairs repeatedly brought to the fore the problem of organizing the *yishuv*. The war in Libya and the Balkan Wars brought up the question of the future of the Empire. The strengthening of the Arab movement, the growth of separatist trends and the sharpening of the Arab opposition to the Jews exacerbated the problem of relations with the Arabs.

The development of independent ruling institutions, the *Vilāyet* Law and the authority of the *majlis 'umūmī* of Jerusalem led the Jews to re-evaluate the importance of participation in local government.

In the light of these developments, the question of the position of the Jews and the future of Zionism was raised in political and ideological discussions. The conclusion arrived at in these discussions was that the Jews should remain loyal to the Ottoman Empire, on the assumption that it would develop in the direction of regional self-government in spite of pan-Ottoman and centralist tendencies. Independent regional government would make it possible for national units to develop. The alternatives of breaking up the Empire with European colonial rule or Arab rule were considered less desirable. Some felt that Arab opposition was limited to Christian Arabs, and the popular assumption was that by explaining the advantages of Jewish settlement and stressing the common interests of Jews and Muslims, Arab opposition could be appeased. However, both those with an orientation towards the CUP and those with an orientation towards the Arabs — as well as some of those who were undecided — saw the need for organizing the Jews and activating the *yishuv* politically.

Based on this they initiated a program of propaganda for accepting Ottoman citizenship (in spite of conscription) and began organizing the *yishuv*. Receipt of Ottoman citizenship was favoured by the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization⁴³ in spite of the fact that it was likely to

⁴¹ On the Palestine Office which was opened in April, 1908, see A. Ruppin, *Pirkei Hayay*, Tel-Aviv; 1968; II, 44.

⁴² Magistrates Court — *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 5669 (1908–09), No. 10.

⁴³ J. Thon, in *Die Welt*, 1909, No. 8. Ruppin to Warburg 24.9.1991, CZA, Z3 1447.

have adverse effects on relations between foreign consuls and the *yishuv*. The organization to be set up would have to secure the Jews representation in Ottoman institutions as a defence against Arab incitement while, at the same time, speeding up the pace of the *yishuv*'s development. Two alternatives seen by Jewish leaders made it imperative that the *yishuv* organize itself: the first, increasing European economic influence and the quickened development of the country after the Balkan Wars, and the second, intensification of the Arab nationalist movement in Palestine. The *vilāyet* or *millet* structures seemed to Zionist leaders likely to lead towards fulfillment of the Zionist goal by providing it with a legal framework.

After 1908, the activities of the labour parties, *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* and *Po'alei Zion*, began to be felt: from the beginning, these were not organizations which focused their activities on the question of the political régime, but rather on issues of the place of Jewish labour in the Jewish economy, the rise of a class of labourers and the creation of a Jewish majority. Their orientation was ideological rather than pragmatic. Their main interest was not Palestine, but rather the masses of Jewish youth and the Jewish proletariat. However, the combination of ideological assumptions with political realities led the two parties to begin to consolidate their stands in this matter. *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* was close to the thinking of the practical Zionists; therefore, it gave priority to the *yishuv*. The Young Turk Revolution in 1908, as has already been mentioned, seemed to justify this approach.

In the fourth meeting of *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir* which took place in September 1908, one of the leading speakers, Naḥum Tversky, stated that henceforth political activities should be directed towards Palestine and not primarily towards diplomacy in Constantinople and bribery; the lesson to be learned from this political change, he maintained, was that Jewish settlement should not be scattered throughout the Ottoman Empire outside of Palestine, as a few of the leaders of the *yishuv* had advised following the continuously changing suggestions of the Ottoman government. In the new political circumstances, the creation of a Jewish majority became increasingly more important.⁴⁴

Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir should, according to Tversky, devote itself to the organization of the *yishuv* in the committees of the cities and *moshavot*. The organizing of the *yishuv* was intended to lead toward a Jewish majority and activate it when it arose. These suggestions were met with a measure of scepticism. There was a suspicion that they would divert attention from the "true work" which was agricultural work.

Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir remained loyal to the Ottoman régime until the First

⁴⁴ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 5669 (1908-09), Nos. 2, 6.

World War. It regarded every political alternative as something that diverted attention from the task facing the Jewish community in Palestine, i.e., to increase the population and the number of "labour posts."

From the beginning *Po'alei Zion* put great stress on the question of political régime, in keeping with its Marxist tradition. The Ottoman revolution appeared to them as one step on the path toward the organization of the proletariat — both Jewish and Ottoman together — and the creation of a social-democratic party.

The Marxist ideological assumptions led the members of *Po'alei Zion* to prefer elements involved in the realities of Palestine over those working only with an ideological construction. They considered the old, relatively large, *yishuv* a possible means of developing the *yishuv* as a whole.

The *Po'alei Zion* in Palestine, as well as the world organization of *Po'alei Zion*, opposed the idea of separatism from the Ottoman Empire which began to be current in the Arab movement. They remained loyal to the stand adopted by many parties of the Second International, supporting multinational states and demanding only national autonomy within them. They insisted upon the organization of the *yishuv* so that it could participate as a unit in the Empire. Division between classes was included in national association.⁴⁵

Po'alei Zion demanded democratic organization of the *yishuv*. Here they confronted a paradox inherent in their position in the community. Any democratic organization would give minimal representation to *Po'alei Zion*. Yet according to their theory, they believed that they would succeed in influencing the "labour masses" to their way of thinking. As opposed to the settlers of the *moshavot*, who were leary of any organization which relied upon personal affiliation, the members of *Po'alei Zion* were willing to accept the risk. They had less to lose, and their theory assured them that they would profit from such action in the future. Their forceful demand for Ottoman citizenship had, therefore, three-fold significance: it stressed their loyalty to the Empire as opposed to the European powers; it sought to remove the representational powers from the Sephardim; it attempted to include the Jews as an active part of national politics and to achieve positive results in the elections.

VI

The disappointment with the reforms which had been expected as a result of the Young Turk Revolution and growing Arab opposition perhaps gave

⁴⁵ For the resolutions of the VIth Congress of *Po'alei Zion* in Jaffa, 14–15 Nisan 5670, see Y. Ben-Zvi, *Po'alei Zion ba-'Allya ha-Shniya*, Tel-Aviv, 1950, p. 220.

rise here and there to thoughts on an alternate régime to the Ottomans. The British consul was quick to report on these moods.⁴⁶ It can be said, however, that the principal trend in the *yishuv* was not for an alternative, but rather for striking roots within the Empire. The Young Turk Revolution served as if to integrate the Ottoman Empire into the process of liberation and democratization in the world as a whole. The ideas which had been prevalent in the pre-Zionist and Zionist world since the 1870's, dealing with land purchase in the Empire and breaking away from Ottoman sovereignty in one way or another, seemed to the Zionist intelligentsia ideas from an earlier era, before the era of democratization, peoples' freedom and, especially, freedom of the Eastern peoples.

The acceptance of Ottoman citizenship seemed to the members of the *yishuv*, therefore, a sign of striking roots in the country and of Palestinian Jewish national awareness. In addition, ties with the foreign consuls divided the Jewish *yishuv*, whose members were citizens of different countries. National unity demanded one citizenship which would express their roots in the country.

The position of Menashe Meirowitz, an immigrant of the *BILU* days and leader of the farmers of Rishon Le-Zion, is perhaps representative. He saw the end of the Balkan War as a good omen for granting rights of independent rule to the provinces of the Empire and to the peoples living therein. He stressed, therefore, the need for accepting Ottoman citizenship. The indifference of some of the *yishuv* leadership to this kind of action was, in his eyes, proof that they had not yet burned their bridges behind them.⁴⁷

The political outlook of the *yishuv* was, to a certain extent, different from that of the Zionist Organization. It gave a new aspect to the question of the relationship of the *yishuv* to Zionist leadership.

The question of relations between the Zionist Organization and the *yishuv* had existed even before the Young Turk Revolution. The fact that Zionist policy and activities in Palestine were determined by leaders abroad was harshly criticized by Zionists in Palestine. The *yishuv* felt itself denied the right to have a say in matters which primarily concerned it. Its leaders could claim that the Zionist Organization was no better than those other Jewish societies which refused to consult them and which treated the *yishuv* as their protectorate.

In spite of this, the Zionist Organization could maintain that the existence of a visible Zionist organization was likely to arouse the Ottoman government against the *yishuv*. It was for this reason that the Zionist Organization

⁴⁶ Hyamson, II, 580, Doc. 460, 29.1.1913.

⁴⁷ *Ha-'Or*, 2 Heshvan 5673 (13 October 1912) and 9 Tevet 5673 (19 December 1912).

seemed not to encourage organization of the *yishuv*. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda considered this as a Zionist Organization trusteeship over the affairs of the *yishuv*. He refused to recognize it as a better trustee for the *yishuv* than was he himself. He refused to rely upon it, because he felt that he better represented the interests of the *yishuv* and its security problems. For this reason the members of the *yishuv* presented the need to organize the community among the rest of their demands in the various Zionist Congresses.⁴⁸

Dr. Jacob Bernstein Cohen maintained as early as the Ninth Congress in 1909 that the existing *yishuv* must be organized, although his argument was based on internal Jewish considerations: he feared that a change in the régime in Palestine would lead to Arab-Turkish assimilation, signs of which he had already discerned among both Sephardim and Ashkenazim.⁴⁹

The principal demands of the Palestinian representatives at this Congress were representation for a member of the Executive Committee in Palestine, unification of all acting institutions, and participation of the various local Zionist factions in directing Zionist activity.

At the Eleventh Congress in 1913, David Yellin demanded, in the name of the representatives from Palestine, preparatory steps towards the overall organization of the *yishuv*. He wished to ensure that Jews obtained as many official positions as possible and that they be properly represented in the institutions of the Empire.

There was also an internal aspect to the demand for organization of the *yishuv*. He demanded that a Palestine Office exist not only in Jaffa but also in Jerusalem, the centre of the existing *yishuv*, and that a council be established in both offices which would consult local leaders.⁵⁰

The Odessa Committee was more aware of the independence of the *yishuv*, and its leaders, such as Menahem Sheinkin and Dr. Haim Hissin, worked within the framework of *yishuv* movements for self government.

VII

The tendency of members of the *yishuv* to act within the framework of local government, exhibiting there the strength of the local Jewish community, did not bear fruit. The Jews were defeated in the elections held in Palestine in the years immediately before World War I. These defeats did not deter them from wishing to participate in local Ottoman institutions.

⁴⁸ *Ha'Or*, 16 Nisan 5671 (14 April 1911) and 2 Tevet 5672 (23 December 1911).

⁴⁹ *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des IX. Zionisten-Kongresses in Hamburg 26-30/12/1909*, Köln, 1910, pp. 230-236.

⁵⁰ *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des XI. Zionisten-Kongresses in Wien 2-9/9/1913*, Berlin, 1914, pp. 239-240.

Instead, they were driven by the situation to accept citizenship, to organize themselves and to increase their political activity.

In the years 1910–1912 it seemed that the Jews had a good chance of winning the elections in the *sanjak* and city of Jerusalem. In 1910, elections were held for the Jerusalem municipality. Six hundred Jews, six hundred Muslims and three hundred Christians voted for the ten members of the municipality. The number of Jews among the voters was relatively small, because of the property requirement for obtaining the right to vote. A large number of Jewish holdings were registered under a few names, and thus their true owners did not have the right to vote. Ben-Yehuda carried on a propaganda campaign in his newspapers, and three Jews were elected: David Yellin, Raḥamim Mizraḥi and Joseph Elyashar.⁵¹

In February 1912, five Jews were elected to the Chamber of Commerce, which consisted of twelve members. In the same month the Jewish lawyer Yom-Tov Ḥakham was appointed judge of the Supreme Court in Jerusalem.⁵²

In 1912, elections to the parliament in Istanbul were held; these involved the Jews in difficult decisions between the CUP and the Liberal Union.

From the beginning the Jews tried to offer David Yellin as a candidate for representative. The Jews had 13 electors and Yellin received 16 votes. This was interpreted as meaning that all the Jews and even some of the non-Jews voted for Yellin. The number of votes, however, was not enough. After the failure of the Jews to elect a candidate of their own, they were forced to decide between the candidates of the CUP or those leaning towards the Liberal Union. In effect, the Jews had no choice, as the latter were their sworn opponents. The CUP was aware of this and therefore did not trouble themselves to appease the Jews.⁵³

As a result of these elections, the more basic dilemma which the Jews faced became evident: they wanted provincial autonomy, but those elements supporting decentralization were their enemies.

In June 1913, elections to the *majlis 'umūmī* were held in the *sanjak* of Jerusalem. This institution was established in Palestine as a result of the *Vilāyet* Law. It was intended to give rather wide authority to a popularly elected body. While the *majlis idāra*, the appointed body which had hitherto served as the governor's council, was not abolished, the new body was to carry out many of the functions which it had formerly done. In the appointed body the Jews were represented by the *ḥakham bashī*, while in the elected body their representatives were dependent on their constituents.⁵⁴

⁵¹ *Ha-'Olam*, 27.1.1910.

⁵² *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1911.

⁵³ *Ha-'Abdut*, 23 Iyar 5672 (10 May 1912); *Ha-'Olam*, 5.3.1912; No. 56.

⁵⁴ *Ha-'Olam*, 24. 6. 1913; 1.7.1913.

According to the Electoral Law, elections were indirect. Each 12,000 inhabitants could choose one elector. The electoral college was identical with the electors to parliament, plus the members of the municipality; the right to be elected to the *majlis 'umūmī* was not theirs alone but also that of all citizens, including those who were members of neither the electoral college nor the municipality. The number of electors in the Jerusalem *sanjak* was fifty, in addition to ten members of the Jerusalem municipality. The *majlis 'umūmī* had thirteen members. Four members were allotted to Jerusalem, four to Gaza, three to Jaffa and two to Hebron.

The Jews had thirteen electors and hoped that they would be able to elect one of them as a representative from Jerusalem to the *majlis 'umūmī*. To carry out this aim they needed twenty-three votes. The Jews, however, were late in organizing for the elections, and when the time came they were not united. They were divided into two groups: one group, considered nation-alistic, led by Dr. Isaac Levi and David Yellin, and one group affiliated with the Alliance, led by Albert Antebi. Antebi tried, it seemed, to win through co-operation with the Muslims, and only later appealed to the Jews. In the end, three Muslims and one Christian were elected. Antebi received one vote less than was needed to be elected.

The Jewish defeat in the elections caused a stir within the *yishuv*. It became apparent to the Jewish public that it was not internally united and that it was isolated from the other communities. There was widespread suspicion that not all the Jewish electors had voted for Jewish candidates and that too few non-Jews had voted for them, resulting in total defeat.⁵⁵

As a result of the elections the Jews remained without representation in the regional administrative apparatus and, of course, were also left out of its Executive Committee (*enfümen-i vilāyet*), consisting of four members, which was supposed to continue its activities between sessions: supervision of the governor's actions and participation in preparing the budget, as well as executing it.

The *majlis 'umūmī* exhibited signs of considerable activity during the years in which it functioned. The Jews began to fear that they were liable not to benefit from its positive activities and, furthermore, that the *majlis* was liable to become an obstacle to Jewish development in Palestine.⁵⁶

The Executive Committee of the *moshavot* in Judea was alert to the development of the *majlis 'umūmī* and translated and published the minutes of its meetings from the official journal which appeared in Jerusalem:

⁵⁵ N. Tversky, "Le-Matzavenu ha-Politi ba-Aretz," *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 5673 (June 1913), No. 35.

⁵⁶ *Ha-'Olam*, 1914; No. 22 (18.6.1914).

al-Quds al-Sharif. The journal appeared in Turkish and Arabic only, and this fact increased the Jews' feeling of alienation.

The *majlis* dealt with questions of agriculture, education, public works and law, attempting to advance the *sanjak* in these areas; in one of the meetings a proposal fraught with danger for the Jews was made — to prohibit the sale of land in those cases in which the seller would retain fewer than 200 dunams. This proposal, the likes of which had been discussed previously in the Arab press, was liable to endanger Jewish land purchases. It was an example of the negative possibilities inherent in the development of self-government.

Matters relating directly to the *moshavot* were also discussed in the *majlis*. The issue of repairing the road from Jaffa to Gaza, which was brought up in the *majlis*, concerned them directly, because the new road would pass through the *moshavot*. Aaron Eisenberg from Rehovot and Menashe Meirowitz from Rishon Le-Zion participated in the meeting that dealt with this issue, and the *moshavot* agreed to pay the cost of repairing the road.

In 1914 the Jews suffered an additional defeat. In April, elections were held to the parliament in Istanbul. This time the number of Jewish electors even declined. However, the elections to parliament brought an indirect gain for the Jews. Two members of the *majlis 'umūmi* were elected to the parliament in Istanbul, thus leaving places for David Yellin and Albert Antebi; yet there was widespread fear that new elections to the *majlis* would be held which would endanger the position of the Jewish representatives who had just taken office as substitutes.⁵⁷

The Jews had not seen the end of their defeats in the elections to the *majlis 'umūmi* and the parliament. In June 1914, elections were held to the Jerusalem municipality, in which the Jews had formerly been rather well represented. This time the number of Jewish electors dropped from thirteen to eight. The decline was explained by the failure of Jews to become citizens and by their indifference. In addition, they were divided internally; in the past, all the Jewish electors had been united, while the others were divided along religious lines. This time the internal split among the Jews hurt their chances for electing a Jew to the municipality. This series of defeats spurred the Jews on to organize their community.⁵⁸

VIII

The initiative for organizing the *yishuv* came from the Palestine Office, which co-ordinated Jewish policy in Palestine, and from Israel Belkind.

⁵⁷ *Ha-'Olam*, 30.4.1914.

⁵⁸ *Ha-'Olam*, 29.5.1914.

In autumn, 1913, thirty people met in Jaffa and decided to establish the "Society for the Organization of Jews in Palestine". A committee was chosen to carry out this aim, and the Society opened branches in Jerusalem, Haifa and Gedera. According to its members, a growing number of people joined the Society.⁵⁹

The Society's actions were indicative of the magnitude of the obstacles which stood in the way of organizing the *yishuv*. There were many differences of opinion concerning the scope of the organization and its policy. Settlers of *moshavot* insisted on organizing the cities and the agricultural settlements separately, as opposed to an all-inclusive organization. These settlers did not believe that a unified organization would protect their interests. Thus they demanded that, instead of requiring direct affiliation with the organization, and the democratic election of its leadership, the basic cells — committees in towns and *moshavot* — be organized first, and that they constitute the overall organization.

These and other difficulties prevented the emergence of an all-inclusive organization. The Sephardic Jewish intelligentsia, therefore, took upon itself to carry out some of the functions which would have come under the jurisdiction of an overall organization; and they founded an organization called *ha-Magen* (the defender). This organization was intended to obtain rights for the Jews in the new political institutions of the Ottoman Empire and to respond to any accusations in the Arabic press. The Sephardic intelligentsia still put their trust in the traditional relations between Jews and Arabs and believed that they would be able, through appropriate publicity, to overcome attacks in the Arabic press, which they considered the work of a small minority. The activities of this organization, whose centre was in Jaffa, paralleled, to a certain extent, those of the "Society of Ottoman Jews" in Jerusalem.⁶⁰

The concept of organization aroused the Judean *moshavot* to establish a regional organization. In 1907 and 1909 attempts were made to set up a union of Judean *moshavot*. These attempts did not succeed; but at the end of 1913 the situation changed. The same arguments which had been raised for community-wide organization of the Jews in Palestine applied equally well to the *moshavot*. They felt the need to strengthen their position *vis-à-vis* the government, as well as in provincial institutions, and against verbal and physical Arab attacks. They wished to unite their forces for self-defence both in "the press and in reality." They also felt that the rural *yishuv* was

⁵⁹ A. R. Elmaleh, *Eretz-Israel ve-Suriya bi-Ymei Milhemet ha-'Olam*, Jerusalem, 5688 (1928), Vol. I; *Ha-Herut*, 1.1.1914; 5.1.1914; 8.1.1914; 23.1.1914.

⁶⁰ Elmaleh; *op. cit.*, I, 55.

more exposed to violent attacks than was the urban *yishuv*, and, therefore, they were in greater need of unity. They took it upon themselves to take a greater share in managing relations with the Arabs and thus came into conflict with *ha-Shomer*. In 1913 *ha-Shomer* ceased to guard the large Judean *moshavot* due to disagreements over strategy in dealing with the Arabs.

The attempts to unite the *yishuv*, as well as the need for representation before the authorities and defence against external threats, served as an incentive for overall organization of the agricultural settlements. In 1913, as in 1909, the *moshavot* wanted the overall organization of the *yishuv* to be based on federation and not on the basis of individual affiliation; for this reason they wanted the organization of the *moshavot* to precede community-wide organization.

The internal economic and social development of the *moshavot* also served as an incentive to overall organization. They were faced with problems of paying taxes, animal insurance, credit and security. The *moshavot* also needed an authority higher than that of the individual settlement, which would be able to pass judgment in personal and public internal disputes, in which local authorities did not have the competence to judge.

For these reasons representatives of the Judean *moshavot* met in the fall of 1913 and decided to establish the "Union of Judean *Moshavot*".⁶¹ They forbade appeals by individual *moshavot* to the government and decided upon unified representation. They chose Albert Antebi to represent them in the *sanjak* of Jerusalem. In spite of the opposition of certain urban groups to his high-handed tactics, the *moshavot* considered him the best representative of their interests.

In the winter of 1913-1914 the Palestine Office also took the initiative for uniting the *yishuv*. Dr. Jacob Thon convened the standing committee of the Palestine Office, in which leaders of the *yishuv* and representatives of the *moshavot* participated and proposed general lines for the overall organization of the *yishuv*. Until then, the various elements of the *yishuv* had been represented before the Palestine Office by the Permanent Committee which arose out of the ruins of the Palestine Council.

Thon's plan was based on both public representation and representation of those institutions which operated in Palestine. The *moshavot* and workers' unions were supposed to elect one representative for each hundred inhabitants or workers. Institutions, such as the Executive Committee of *Hovevei*

⁶¹ Documents concerning the Union of Judean *Moshavot* and the discussions of the Permanent Executive Committee from the CZA were published by Israel Kolatt, *Ha-Moshavot ha-'Ivriyot 'Erev Milhemet ha-'Olam ha-Rishona* (Source Material for a Seminar) Akademon Press, Jerusalem, 5728 (1968); in which all the deliberations can be found. See regulations of the Union of *Moshavot*, *Ha-Herut*, 16.12.1913.

Zion, the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization and the ICA were to be represented by two representatives each. Thon envisioned a council of sixty representatives from Judea alone. This council was to meet twice a year; a twelve-member standing committee would be chosen from its members and would meet once a week. The areas in which the organization was to work would be: civil defence, i.e., defending Jewish rights before the authorities; "regulation of internal affairs," i.e., a supreme authority for *yishuv* society; and "education of the *yishuv*."

Thon's proposal met with the same obstacles as other programs for organizing the *yishuv*. Representatives of the *moshavot* insisted that the unified organization be built upon existing communal units.

On the other hand, Rabbi 'Uziel, the *ḥakhām bashī* of Jaffa, who took part in the consultation, demanded centralization of the economic affairs of all ethnic groups in both cities and *moshavot* under one committee. He suggested that political affairs be divided between two committees — one in Jerusalem, the other in Jaffa.

Rabbi 'Uziel also proposed an alternative course of action in the elections, one which would detach the Jews from the territorial units to which they belonged. He proposed a *curia*, that is, a fixed number of delegates representing Jews throughout the Empire in the Ottoman parliament. The significance of such a *curia* would be cooperation with CUP and isolation from the local population among which the Jews lived.⁶²

The improvements which took place in the political status of the Jews in Palestine before the war were not brought about by the local administration or by the Jews themselves. These improvements were in three areas: certain concessions concerning immigration and possibly land purchase as well; recognition of Jewish settlements as municipal units; and perhaps even increased attention to security. All of these were brought about by the actions of the central government in Istanbul and by its appointed governors, due to the efforts made there by the Zionist Organization or the *ḥakhām bashī*.⁶³

Immediately after the Revolution in 1908, efforts were made towards abolition of the "red card." (All Jews entering Palestine had to deposit their passports with the authorities in exchange for a red card which obligated them to leave the country within three months.) They were unsuccessful until late 1913. Even then it was not certain whether the card had been

⁶² The proposal of the *curia* also in *Ha-Ahduṭ*, 3 Ḥeshvan 5673 (14 October 1912). The Shenkin proposal can be found in *Ha-Ḥerut*, 26.1.1914.

⁶³ Hyamson, II, 583, Doc. 463, 21.12.1913; *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1915; "Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to the XIIth Zionist Congress," *Palestine Report* (London), 1921, pp. 7-11.

abolished on principle or merely because it proved ineffective. Nor was it certain that its abolition was final.

There were contradictory reports concerning interference in the purchase of land by Jews. Due to the fact that the prohibition was merely an administrative one, there was room for changes in policy and for a variety of different policies. It was clear, however, that the authorities did not encourage the purchase of land by Jews.

The official designation of the *moshavot* of Rishon Le-Zion and Rehovot as Ottoman municipal units in 1912 improved their legal status. From a Zionist viewpoint, it was possible to consider this an attempt to integrate Jewish settlements into the Ottoman administrative apparatus. The Zionist press expressed the fear that the *hakham bashi* and *mukhtâr* would replace the elected representatives of the Jewish community and blur its national character.⁶⁴

IX

The fact that the *yishuv* leaders and spokesmen rallied around the principles of accepting Ottoman citizenship, engaging in local political activity and forming an overall organization was not entirely compatible with the ideas of the Zionist Actions Committee in Berlin. The "language war" over the issue of the language of instruction in the Technion in Haifa, however, testified to the strength of Zionism in Palestine. The impetus for the growth, strengthening and security of the *yishuv* was not especially evident in its internal organization.

Arthur Ruppin, director of the Palestine Office of the Zionist Organization, feared increasing European activity in Palestine after the Balkan War and felt that the principal Zionist activity should be land purchase. In national policy, he stressed the territorial concentration of the Jews and the closed Jewish economic sector more than overall organization.

Before the war, the Zionist Actions Committee wished to re-examine the usefulness of Zionist activity in Palestine; to carry out this aim, it sent a distinguished delegation among whose members were Naḥum Sokolov, Leo Motzkin and Julius Simon. This delegation visited Palestine in spring, 1914; however, it did not manage to present its report before the outbreak of the war.

The last meetings of the Zionist Actions Committee and of the Inner Actions Committee were dominated by growing concern for the *yishuv* in the face of Arab opposition. The Zionist leadership reacted in two ways: it

⁶⁴ H. Chernowitz, *Ha-'Olam*, 12.2.1913.

attempted to secure the immediate well-being of the *yishuv*, while considering long-term relations with the Arabs.⁶⁵

Faced with Arab attacks and rising tension during a murder trial in Rehovot, the Actions Committee decided to set up a "political fund" to cover exceptional expenses, security and legal expenses.

Another step was even more far-reaching. This was an appeal to European Powers for guarantees to the Jewish settlements in case of a major attack upon them. This course of action was contrary to the policy of accepting Ottoman citizenship; the latter was customary among members of the Palestinian Jewish community.

On the other hand, the Zionist leadership sought ways of coming to terms with the Arab population. The official public stand of the Zionist leadership fostered the belief that basically the Muslim Arabs approved of Jewish settlement, realizing its economic and cultural value. There was also a belief that the Muslims preferred Jewish settlement to the expansion of Christian property. The improved conditions in Arab villages located near Jewish settlements and the activities of the Banks in the cities were concrete evidence of this.

In 1914 it seemed that the Arabs were demanding even more: they wanted Jewish schools opened to them and Arabic taught in them. They also demanded support for the fellahin. This demand was not rejected as unreasonable. It was merely stressed that as long as Zionist organization did not constitute a large society with legal authority, it did not have power to do this.

X

In conclusion it may be said that the issue of organization of the *yishuv* before World War I was a question of external confrontation and orientation and of internal cohesion.

The traditional political framework presented the Jews as a religious *millet* represented by the *hakkām bashī* or as coming under the protection of various consuls. As active citizens of the Ottoman state after 1908, the Jews were divided between the orthodox and those educated by the Alliance, who denied Jewish nationalism, on the one hand, and the younger generation of Jewish nationalists and Zionist immigrants who came to Palestine after the eighties, on the other hand.

Active Jewish participation in the institutions of the Empire and in

⁶⁵ Meeting of the Inner Actions Committee of 21.5.1914, CZA, Z3 537; Meeting of the Actions Committee and its Decisions, 7-8.6.1914, CZA, I2, 24, VI.

provincial institutions, as well as confrontation with growing Arab opposition, made it incumbent upon the Jews to accept Ottoman citizenship and to work for overall Jewish organization. In addition to the Zionist idea, Arab opposition gave impetus to a separate Jewish identity within the framework of the Empire and discouraged the development of ideas, such as had been expressed in 1908 in certain circles of the *yishuv*, that the Jews were "Ottomans of the Mosaic faith." The Sephardic community also began to stress more and more its national identity.

Both the outlook of the local community and that of the Zionists led the *yishuv* towards attempts to strengthen and assert itself within the framework of the development of the Empire. A European alternative was considered less convenient, while Jewish self-government appeared an impossible dream.

The Jews were confronted with several dilemmas in the framework of the Empire — they could appear as Ottoman subjects within the areas in which they lived and hope that they would be able to succeed in electing their candidates to Imperial institutions. Possible cooperation with Muslims was likely to help them. However, it was also possible to consider the chances of representation through a Jewish *curia*, which, instead of electing representatives regionally, would elect them according to a number allotted by the central government. This would increase the significance of collaboration with the whole Jewish community in the Empire.

The development of local government could be interpreted in various ways from a Jewish standpoint. The elimination of hindrances to Jewish development could increase their numbers and permit them to make use of local and regional government. However, in reality, the trend towards decentralization strengthened the Arabs, even those Arabs who were hostile to both Turks and Jews.

All political activity compelled the Jews not only to become Ottoman citizens but also to work together as a unified group. The attempts to distinguish between Jewish unity *vis-à-vis* the outside world and the internal structure of the *yishuv* were only partially successful. The variegated structure of the *yishuv* and the contradictions between the different ethnic communities and between the old and new *yishuvs*, as well as between agricultural and urban settlements, prevented unity. In addition, there was tension between the members of the *yishuv* and the representatives of Jewish organizations abroad which were active in Palestine. This tension was an additional factor which hindered the establishment of an organization based on direct personal membership. Even the establishment of a federated organization, for which agreement could have been obtained, was prevented because of the differences within the *yishuv*.

The political defeats of 1913 renewed the desire for unity in the *yishuv*; however, this did not go beyond the establishment of regional organizations by the *moshavot* of Judea and the Galilee. In these circumstances, the policy of the Zionist Executive Committee was justified in considering that the advancement of the *yishuv* lay not in the existing *yishuv* but rather in that *yishuv* which would emerge in the future, and that the basis of its policy should be external political activity rather than the organization of the present *yishuv* and political activity within the Ottoman Empire.

PART THREE

THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE DURING THE LAST CENTURY OF OTTOMAN RULE

15. CHANGES IN THE RECRUITMENT PATTERNS AND CAREER-LINES OF OTTOMAN PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATORS DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by JOSEPH S. SZYLIOWICZ

I. Introduction

Not too many years ago a famous political scientist, Carl Friedrich, looking at the relationship between political science and history came up with the following jingle:

Political science without history has no root.

History without political science bears no fruit.

Regardless of their cultural value, these two lines, I submit, contain a profound insight and, I further submit, that if we consider the general field of Middle Eastern studies, we find few roots and less fruit. It is perhaps fortunate that none of us is engaged in raising fruit trees professionally.

I am certain that it is not necessary to convince the reader that political scientists are, on the whole, lacking in historical perspective. To a large extent, however, this void is due to the simple fact that many matters of concern to scholars dealing with the contemporary scene have been largely ignored by historians. Many of these issues are directly related to one of the overriding phenomena of our time: the struggle by the countries of the non-Western world to modernize.

For those of us who are concerned with various aspects of modernization, particularly in the Middle East, an understanding of the structural changes and functional developments that took place in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire is clearly vital. For such analysis we should be able to turn to the historian, but, if we try to do so, we encounter serious lacunae. No less a scholar than Professor Bernard Lewis has recently pointed out that:

What is still lacking is good solid research on 19th century history conducted by the tried and tested methods of critical historical scholarship, using both Western and Middle Eastern sources and not governed by the desire to prove the virtue or villainy of persons, parties, sects, or nation. There are such works, produced both in the Middle East and elsewhere, but their numbers are still lamentably few.¹

¹ Bernard Lewis, "The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," *MES*, April, 1965, pp. 284-285.

The lack of solid research largely accounts, I suspect, for the popularity of what I shall call the "*Hadīth* Fallacy," that is the acceptance of and passing on of unproven assertions by one scholar after another. Let me demonstrate this point with an illustration taken from a political scientist who has tried to find roots. In his sophisticated study of the members of the Grand National Assembly, *The Turkish Political Elite*, Professor Fredrick Frey discussed the educational background of the deputies. To place his research in perspective he described the impact of modern education upon the society and argued that the nineteenth century could be understood in terms of a struggle between the graduates of the *medreses* and the graduates of the modern schools. In his words:

On one side were the "modernists" influenced by Western-oriented secular education... Grimly opposed... in mentality and in action was the other part of the educated elite — the *medrese*-trained intellectuals...²

This summary would, I suspect, be readily accepted by the majority of scholars concerned with such problems; yet we possess neither detailed studies of the functioning of the modern schools that were established in this period nor of the *medreses*. As a result, not only can such statements best be considered as assertions that remain to be proven, but tangential evidence suggests that further research will probably demonstrate that they serve to simplify and distort a complex phenomenon. One detailed and insightful study of the religious institution has demonstrated that at least during the decades of Selīm III and Maḥmūd II many of the leading '*ulamā*' were not only supporters of, but active proponents of reform.³ Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, similar research has not been carried on for the rest of the nineteenth century, though it is known that many members of the '*ulamā*' were innovators, particularly in the educational field, and that the Young Turk movement apparently enjoyed a considerable amount of support from their ranks.

The lack of fruit produced by historians, however, is not merely a function of neglect; it is also due to an ignorance of contemporary social science interests stemming at least partly from the different epistemological bases of these disciplines and techniques. I have argued elsewhere that elite analysis represents a very valuable tool that would enable us to critically scrutinize many existing "*isnāds*" and would greatly enhance our under-

² Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite*, 1965, pp. 37-38.

³ Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman '*Ulema*' and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Maḥmūd II," *Scripta Hierosolymitana*, 1961.

standing of the processes of change in the nineteenth century.⁴ What is especially surprising about the willingness of historians of the Middle East to write history without detailed attention to the lives of individuals is, of course, that the method was, in fact, pioneered by historians, notably Sir Lewis Namier.

The utility and applicability of the prosopographic method to the Middle East has been vividly demonstrated by Professor Norman Itzkowitz, who has, by tracing the background and careers of Ottoman statesmen, forced a reappraisal of the well known thesis concerning the composition of the ruling institution and the causes of its decline. He has demonstrated that even an *isnād* which includes such authorities as Lybyer and Gibb and Bowen, can be wrong, by showing that religious criteria did not dominate recruitment into the ruling institution. Hence the argument that changes in recruitment patterns, in the eighteenth century, led to the decline of the Empire by permitting free-born Muslims to enter the ruling institution is at best an oversimplification.⁵

Yet his research remains a pioneering effort; unlike historians in other areas almost every scholar concerned with Ottoman studies has ignored recent developments in the social sciences. Of course, it can be argued that, given the quality of most work produced by those who have attempted to apply new techniques and concepts to the analysis of historical experience, such neglect is highly desirable. Nevertheless, the fact that their studies have often been marked by serious violations of logical or statistical principles does not negate the utility of these approaches. Similarly, the fact that they do possess great potentialities does not mean that these new methodologies and conceptual approaches are equally applicable to all historical problems. What is especially unfortunate, however, is that even in those areas where social science scholarship is most relevant, Ottoman historians have tended to ignore it or to utilize it in a very superficial manner.

Rather than attempting to apply rigorously the conceptual and methodological tools that have been developed in the social sciences and that can fruitfully be applied to historical materials, many historians have limited their borrowing to the existing jargon and have seldom advanced beyond nomenclature. I must confess that the thought has occurred to me that one may draw a parallel between the attitudes of the Ottomans towards Western technology and those of historians to the social sciences, but the important point is that not only has methodology been ignored, but concepts have

⁴ J. S. Szyliowicz, "Elite Recruitment in Turkey: The Role of the *Mülkiye*," *World Politics*, April, 1971.

⁵ Norman Itzkowitz, "Eighteenth Century Ottoman Realities," *Studia Islamica*, 1962.

been utilized without any attempt to explore their meaning or ramifications or to operationalize them in any systematic manner.

A recent book, entitled *The Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East*, which consists of the papers presented at a seminar held at the University of Chicago in 1966, illustrates this point well. It is true that, as the authors note, modernization is not an easy term to define and that a considerable debate has been underway for some time among social scientists concerning the ways in which the concept can be operationalized. Despite such problems, however, "modernization", in the social sciences, is considered as referring to a specific phenomenon and is not regarded as a synonym for change. Yet, this volume indicates no attempt by the editors or by the members at the conference to define or operationalize the concept in any meaningful way. Rather, we are provided with the usual heterogeneous collection of more or less valuable, unrelated articles and with an assumption that everything that changed in the Middle East in the nineteenth century can be considered as marking a part of the beginnings of modernization.

In any discussion of "modernization" in the Middle East, special attention is usually accorded to the bureaucracy in general and to the bureaucratic elite in particular. Yet the ensuing generalizations are based on very sparse data for few studies have focused upon the development and functioning of Ottoman bureaucracy during the nineteenth century. It is difficult to find such elementary data as structural changes over time or its growth, let alone more refined information concerning changes in internal procedures and decision-making.

Lack of data, however, has not prevented a large number of scholars from writing about the role of the bureaucracy and about such subjects as patterns of recruitment, training and promotion, and rates of mobility and the structures through which mobility could be achieved, or from generalizing about the ways in which different patterns of recruitment have affected the functioning of the bureaucracy — both in the centre and in the provinces — by the appointment of personnel incapable of performing their tasks, or about the ways in which recruitment from different social strata affected the political outlook of the bureaucratic elite towards reform and change in general.

One recent essay by a noted historian summarized succinctly the relationship between education, bureaucratic leadership, social strata and change in the nineteenth century. Professor Stanford Shaw has written:

... the products of these (modern) schools emerged in control of the Ottoman system following the Crimean War. However, there were important elements in their backgrounds and characters which limited their success. First of all, they were themselves children of members of

the older Ottoman ruling class; their parents and relatives and they themselves depended on great estates and revenues which would be wiped out if the Tanzimat reforms were carried to the logical conclusions. For this reason, few of them were able or willing to introduce the drastic social and economic changes needed to bring ultimate success to their program. Second, as a result of their education in modern European ways, the "Men of the Tanzimat" were far more distant from the mass of the people than the older Ottoman rulers ever were ... They felt that so long as their goals were justified, the interests and desires of the older ruling class and also of their subjects need not be considered ... It was only when the Tanzimat produced a new generation of 20th century reformers not directly tied to the older ruling class that significant reform was possible. This new generation consisted mainly of men from relatively modest families who rose through the army and the civil schools created by the Tanzimat. Since they and their families had little vested interest in the old order, they were much more willing to make radical changes than were the "Men of the Tanzimat." It was men such as these who... became known as Young Turks.⁶

Although it is difficult to understand how the "Men of the Tanzimat" could ignore the interests and desires of the older ruling class when, because of their membership in that class "few were able or willing to introduce the drastic ... changes needed....," I suspect that most of the other statements in this quotation would be readily acceptable to most historians. Yet, the data necessary for the empirical verification of such assertions are simply not available at present. We do not know the extent to which the "Men of the Tanzimat" were "children of members of the older Ottoman ruling class," or the extent to which they were dependent upon "great estates and revenues which would be wiped out if the Tanzimat reforms were carried to the logical conclusions," or of the degree to which they were replaced by "men from relatively modest families."

To answer such questions, one must have recourse to detailed studies on many aspects of Ottoman society in the nineteenth century, but, as we have noted, few such studies are available. Particularly lacking, in my view, has been a detailed analysis of the backgrounds and career patterns of those persons who comprised the social core groups in the nineteenth century and after; with such data one could seek systematic answers to such fundamental questions as the following:

⁶ Stanford Shaw, "Some Aspects of the Aims and Achievements of the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reformers" in Polk-Chambers, pp. 36-37.

1. What were the characteristics of the social core group in the Ottoman Empire? By what criteria was membership attained and maintained? What were the patterns of recruitment and advancement? What changes occurred with the advent of modernity?

2. Who were the persons in important decision-making positions within the Ottoman Empire? What was the social, economic and educational background of these persons within the bureaucratic, military, and religious hierarchies?

3. What influence did the graduates of the new schools have upon the affairs of the Ottoman Empire? What role did modern education and Western exposure actually play in determining patterns of recruitment and promotion within the administration during this period?

To answer such questions, one must combine a historical perspective with an awareness of contemporary social science. But, without such answers the "Hadith Fallacy" will flourish and *isnād* after *isnād* will become ever more encrusted with illustrious names.

Methodology

This paper represents a preliminary attempt to deal with such questions, particularly as they relate to Ottoman provincial administrators who served in the Middle East. It is part of a study begun in 1968–1969 when the author carried out field research gathering whatever biographical data was available concerning the bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.⁷ Two major Ottoman sources, the *Sijill-i 'Othmāni* and its *Zeyl* (unpublished) were combed for information concerning the social and educational backgrounds and career patterns of important officials. As a significant starting date the abolition of the Janissaries (1826) was selected, and data on all important administrative and religious officials (as well as military officers who occupied high civil positions) from about 1820 onwards was gathered. Within this period the following criteria for inclusion were established: (1) All military officers with rank of *ferik* or higher who held a civilian post, (2) All religious dignitaries who reached *qādī* rank, (3) All civil servants who reached the rank of *ula-i evvelī* or *ula* for the earlier period.

Because of the importance of the two sources that were utilized, let me discuss them briefly. Most of you are, I am sure, familiar with the *Sijill*, written by Mehmed Surreyya (1845–1908), which consists of four volumes of

⁷ The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Social Science Research Council and of the Graduate School of International Studies of the University of Denver in carrying out this research. In preparing the data for this paper he was greatly assisted by Mr. Jay Green of the university's Computer Center.

451 pages, 442 pages, 621 pages, and 906 pages, respectively. The *Ottoman Register* or *Register of Ottoman Celebrities* was prepared in 1308 A.H./1890 by Mehmet Sureyya Bey, a member of the high commission on education, and was later published by the Imperial Printing Office in Istanbul by permission of the Ministry of Education.

The Register is organized in chronological order according to the Arabic alphabet. It contains biographical data on all state celebrities from Ertuğrul's arrival in Anatolia in 630 A.H./1232 to 1308/1890. The work begins with a list of the Ottoman rulers and their families, alphabetically and chronologically arranged. The biographies of important personages follow this introduction. Each biography contains information on the subject's character, occupation, wealth, service to the state, children, positions held, often by level and location, family background, ranks, titles, education, publications, usual and unusual promotions and reasons for appointment, dismissal, or exile, etc.

Following its publication, Mehmet Surreya compiled an addendum which included corrections of mistakes, additional information for the persons included as well as new biographies to bring the Register up to 1922. Unfortunately the manuscript was destroyed during the Cihangir fire. Zeki Pakalın subsequently undertook the task of revising and updating the *Sijill* to include biographies of those who had died between the time of its completion and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Several years were devoted to this task by Mr. Pakalın, who produced an extensive manuscript in the Ottoman script. This work is now to be found in the library of the Turkish Historical Society which has taken the original notebooks and organized them alphabetically in nineteen volumes. I might add that the nineteenth volume was originally not to be found but was uncovered following further inquiries on our part. It is obvious that a great deal of effort was expended and that a wide variety of sources (listed for each biography) were consulted. The same criteria concerning inclusion were utilized for the biographies selected from this work.

Despite their value, it must be noted that these works do possess more or less serious deficiencies. It is obvious that the *Sijill* was prepared so as not to offend the reigning Sultan, 'Abdülhamid II, a fact that merely reinforces a caveat that is obvious to all who have utilized Ottoman biographical sources, namely that problems of omission, distortion and reliability are frequently encountered. Dates often comprise a major problem area, especially birth-dates and dates of entry into the administration, which are frequently omitted. A second major gap concerns the limited data that is usually available concerning family ties. Information concerning the fathers of only a portion of all subjects is available, some data is available concerning offspring,

and practically none concerning wives and female relatives. A last major problem area involves ethnic and religious background; as we shall see when ethnic origins are discussed, very few subjects of non-Turkish Muslim background are included. To what extent this was due to the bias of the authors, it is difficult to say. Finally, the absence of explicit criteria for the inclusion and exclusion of subjects by the authors of the source works means that we must assume that all important personages were, in fact, covered in one or the other source. Because of such deficiencies no attempt was made to use sampling techniques, and all data concerning *every* subject who met our criteria was recorded. In this manner it was hoped to strengthen the reliability of the findings that would be produced by the study.

The available information for each subject was transferred to biographical data sheets and a coding system developed to permit each career event to be coded separately. This involved making an extensive inventory of the positions occupied by the subjects and breaking these positions down into types and levels. This proved, of course, to be a very difficult task in view of the large numbers of individuals involved, the wide variety of positions that they held and, above all, the fundamental changes in the bureaucratic structure of the Ottoman Empire that took place during the nineteenth century. Positions were created and abolished, councils proliferated and withered, titles for the same positions were changed frequently and the posts themselves rose and declined in importance.

Nevertheless, a list of the most significant positions, covering the period from 1810 onwards, was prepared. This list was checked carefully with several well-known experts on the Ottoman and Turkish bureaucracy and revised accordingly. By and large, a consensus existed, and the disagreements that arose tended to be of minor nature, i.e., whether a particular post should be placed in the level three or level four category. This list was then used as the basis for the coding so that the complete career record of each subject was preserved in detail, and information concerning the kind of position, the level of the post, its location, salary and so forth, coded. Information concerning dismissals, promotions, awards of medals, salary increases, and so on was also considered as event data. Background variables concerning place of birth, educational background, family background, etc., were coded on a separate card. Thus, the number of cards for each subject varies depending upon the amount of data available and ranges from three to fourteen, but usually runs to about eight or nine.

The biographical data was coded in accordance with these procedures by five undergraduate students in Turkey under the author's supervision. One of the research assistants who had helped extract the original data was used as a resource person. Coder reliability was checked by the author on a

random basis for each individual, and a very low margin of error was uncovered. Upon returning to the U.S. the data were punched onto cards.

To tabulate the data a special program had to be devised at the University of Denver Computer Centre which would permit the handling of a discrete number of cards for each subject. Essentially, various ALGOL programs were developed to place the cards on tape, to reorganize the data according to the Western calendar and to permit scanning of the data for the time periods specified and for the kinds of breakdowns with which we are primarily concerned in this paper.

Thus, all religious personages were omitted and the remaining administrators divided into those who served in the central administration only and those who served in the provincial administration. The latter group was subdivided into those who had been appointed to the Middle East and those who had not. Three time periods are used in this study: prior to 1839, 1840-1876, and 1877-1908, in accordance with the obvious historical eras. The criteria for inclusion in any time period was the date of the first dated event in the subject's career. This is used because dates of entry into the administration were not available for all subjects, especially in the earlier group. Accordingly, it is assumed that those with no entry date might be wrongly assigned by between five to fifteen years, but that these cases would be distributed randomly into the broad categories that are used so that errors will sort themselves out evenly for each category. This, in fact, proved to be the case. A program of only those subjects for whom a dated first event was available was run and the results compared with those obtained for the total population. The difference was negligible. A B5500 computer was utilized.

The most important weakness of this study, however, stems not from missing data, but from the inadequate time that proved, for various reasons, to be available for data tabulation and analysis. To write, check and run the appropriate programs to handle the data proved to be a far more time-consuming process than had been anticipated, and it was impossible to prepare the data for complete and detailed analyses of some of the variables that will be discussed below, especially when different perspectives suggested themselves in the course of preparing this paper. As I shall show later, for example, it would have been extremely desirable to have utilized a different time breakdown, to complement our analysis, when discussing certain issues, and to have studied the backgrounds of those persons who actually achieved elite positions within the different time periods with which we are concerned. Through such a study, it would be possible to bring greater clarity to the process of change that occurred during the nineteenth century and, I suspect, to further validate some of the conclusions contained below. Unfortunately, time limitations did not permit the execution of such a

program prior to the preparation of this paper, so that many of the hypotheses that were generated by this study await further testing and refinement.

What we attempted to do, therefore, was to examine in a preliminary way the major characteristics of the provincial Ottoman administrator in the nineteenth century, basing our trend analysis upon the patterns of recruitment that existed in different time periods. We shall describe the factors which characterize those who served in the Middle East and elsewhere and show how these factors changed during this period. Of major interest are such variables as geographic origin, formal education, Western exposure and social background. We shall, wherever appropriate, distinguish between those who served in the Middle East, those who served in other provinces and those who served only in the central administration, often on the basis of whether they entered the bureaucracy prior to 1839, between 1840 and 1876, or between 1877 and 1908. These three periods are referred to as Periods I, II and, III, respectively. A simple statistical test, Yule's Q, was sometimes computed to ascertain the degree of association between two variables and to facilitate comparisons over time.

II. The Administrators and Their Origins

The total population consists of 1,023 persons, of whom 302 worked only in the central administration. There were 721 provincial administrators, 380 who served in the Middle East and 341 elsewhere. The first distinction that can be drawn between these three groups, especially between central government employees and those who served in the provinces, is found in an examination of the titles that they possessed. Although 39% of the former enjoyed the title "Pasha", 72% of those who served in the Middle East and 65% of the other provincial administrators had such a title. And, when these are analysed for each group over time, a significant trend quickly appears: the percentage of persons in the provincial administration with a "Pasha" title declines markedly from about 90% to 45% while the proportion of "Pashas" in the central administration declines only slightly from a much lower base. At the same time, the prevalence of the "Bey" title increases markedly over time, for all three groups. The percentage of persons with an "Efendi" title follows an inconsistent pattern within each group but is far higher in each time period for the central administrators. (See Table 1.)

The reasons for these trends are somewhat unclear and may reflect changes in the use of these titles during the nineteenth century as well as the regularization of the civil service, especially the provincial administration, during this period.

What is also intriguing is the fact that among the provincial administrators, those assigned to the Middle East are, in each period, characterized by a

TABLE 1

	Central Administration			Non-Middle East			Middle East		
	I (- - 1839)	II (1840-1876)	III (1877-1908)	I (- - 1839)	II (1840-1876)	III (1877-1908)	I (- - 1839)	II (1840-1876)	III (1877-1908)
Paasha	42%	38%	37%	87%	59%	38%	90%	72%	48%
Bey	20%	22%	36%	6%	26%	39%	2%	20%	50%
Efendi	38%	40%	26%	7%	15%	13%	8%	9%	2%
N =	(64)	(157)	(81)	(94)	(226)	(60)	(100)	(180)	(61)

(Note: Percentages in all tables will often not add up to 100 because of rounding)

higher proportion of persons with a "Pasha" title than those who are not. This difference may well reflect the great degree of importance attached to the Arab provinces by the Porte. Not only did control of the holy places bring great prestige to the Ottoman rulers but the pilgrimage also represented a valuable commercial institution. From a strategic viewpoint too, these provinces were of great concern in view of the grave threat to the very existence of the Empire that had been posed by Muḥammad 'Alī. Thus, for strategic, economic and cultural reasons, the government made every effort to re-establish and maintain its control over the area.⁸

That Middle Eastern administrators comprise a high level group is also indicated by a breakdown of the level of the position held by these men while they were serving in the Middle East:

TABLE 2

<i>Position Level</i>	<i>I</i> (— 1839)	<i>II</i> (1840-1876)	<i>III</i> (1877-1908)	<i>Total</i>
Very High (<i>Vallī</i>)	14%	24%	16%	21%
High (<i>Mutaṣarrıf</i>)	57%	34%	37%	40%
Other	29%	42%	47%	40%
N =	(92)	(221)	(62)	(375)

A look at the birthplace of these subjects, gives us further insight into their character, and into the process of change that was taking place. A recent study of social patterns in the Ottoman Empire indicates the importance of geographical distribution as well as the influx of provincials into the bureaucracy during the last decades of the nineteenth century:

Toward the end of the nineteenth century the further modernization of Turkey brought with it a further change in the structure of the bureaucracy; a pyramid with a somewhat narrow base was transformed into one with an increasingly wider base. To staff the lower and middle echelons of the bureaucracy, new western-oriented schools were created. Since tuition was free and room and board were provided in addition, a number of provincials flowed to these schools. These provincials came mainly from the stratum of the lesser *ayan* and *eşraf* and a few prosperous peasants ... But the alignment was still the traditional alignment of the countryside against the metropolis ... The students of the military-medical academy, for example, were aligned into two hostile groups of "provincials" and "city boys."⁹

⁸ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 30-31.

⁹ Şerif Mardin, "Historical Determinants of Social Stratification: Social Class and Class Consciousness in Turkey," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1968, p. 139.

Our data do not reflect such a trend, perhaps because few of the provincials who entered the bureaucracy at this time achieved a high position by 1908. Rather, as the following table (Table 3) indicates, the number of important officials born in Anatolia decreases over time. Generally, Istanbul is the birthplace of the largest number, followed by Anatolia and the Balkans. Except for Period I, when Anatolians constitute the largest group, persons from Istanbul dominate the bureaucracy. This is especially true of the central administration where they are never less than half of the total in any period. Furthermore, the percentage of administrators born in Istanbul rises sharply between Periods I and II for all branches and then drops off slightly during the reign of 'Abdülhamîd II. If residence in Istanbul is taken as an indication of official background these results indicate that a shift in recruitment patterns in favour of persons with such connections took place during the Tanzimat. The decline during 'Abdülhamîd's reign probably reflects the expansion of the bureaucracy and his different recruitment policy.

Anatolians comprise the second largest group, but the percentage of persons born there declines steadily over time for each branch, except for a slight rise in their representation in the central administration during Sultan 'Abdülhamîd's reign. This trend probably reflects the narrowing circle of recruitment which seems to have occurred in this period. Why they should be more numerous than any other group in Period I, however, remains unclear and deserves further study to determine, if possible, the stratum from which they are drawn. It might be possible, in this manner, to illuminate the question of how many persons of *a'yân* and *ashrâf* background became high level administrators in this period and after.

Persons born in the Balkans comprise the third largest group; those from Arab countries the fourth. The representation of the former fluctuates unevenly over time; that of the latter increases steadily, though the total obscures the fact that the number of persons born in the Middle East accounts for about 11% of all administrators assigned there prior to the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II and then doubles to 23%. Their numbers also increase in non-Middle Eastern provincial administration, where they account for 11% of the total in the last decades of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, practically no increase occurs in the percentage serving within the central administration, where persons born in the Arab Middle East remain the smallest group, accounting for only 7% in Period III as compared to about 5% in earlier periods.

Such points are brought out more clearly if we examine the branch of service of persons born in the different locations. (See Table 4)

One trend that emerges once again is the preference of those born in Istanbul for the central administration. In each period the percentage of persons

TABLE 3

	I (— 1839)			II (1840-1876)			III (1877-1908)			Grand Total
	ME	NME	CA	ME	NME	CA	ME	NME	CA	
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	
Istanbul	26%	22%	50%	37%	46%	59%	45%	36%	50%	41%
Balkans	15%	37%	10%	18%	17%	10%	15%	23%	15%	19%
Arab Countries	11%	—	5%	12%	2%	7%	8%	23%	7%	13%
Anatolia	37%	39%	32%	27%	33%	20%	27%	16%	31%	25%
Other (Russia, Cyprus, etc.)	11%	2%	3%	5%	2%	4%	5%	2%	3%	2%
N =	(46)	(49)	(22)	(168)	(114)	(99)	(341)	(56)	(60)	(161)

ME = Middle East; NME = Non-Middle East; CA = Central Administration.

TABLE 4

	Istanbul			Balkans			Arab Countries			Anatolia		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total
Middle East	36%	36%	30%	26%	52%	42%	83%	69%	60%	40%	45%	24%
Non-Middle East	32%	30%	25%	67%	33%	39%	—	7%	23%	44%	36%	37%
Central Administration	32%	34%	45%	7%	15%	29%	17%	24%	18%	16%	19%	39%
N =	(34)	(172)	(67)	(27)	(58)	(31)	(6)	(29)	(22)	(43)	(103)	(38)

from Istanbul serving in provincial administration is less than the percentage for any other group, usually by a considerable margin. In the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamid II, however, the difference, especially between persons born in Anatolia and those coming from Istanbul, narrows appreciably.

The extent to which persons born in the Middle East serve there is also evident. The percentage, however, declines steadily over time; however the shift that takes place is not in the direction of the central administration, but rather towards service in other provinces of the Empire. The fact that the percentage of Middle Easterners who enter the central administration actually declines during the reign of 'Abdülhamid II is somewhat surprising in view of that ruler's known emphasis upon the area. This shift, however, may well reflect 'Abdülhamid's policy towards the Arab provinces and their inhabitants. Though he attached great importance to the area and surrounded himself with religious leaders of all sorts from these parts upon whom he showered honours and rewards in order to enhance the appeal of his Pan-Islamic policy, he seems to have possessed a rather low opinion of the inhabitants and to have been reluctant to place Arabs in important governmental positions or to promote them to high office in the central administration.¹⁰

The available data on the ethnic background of the administrators reflect a similar bias. Though extremely limited (only 86 persons in all are of non-Turkish-Muslim background, a very small percentage which may well reflect inadequacies in the source books), it is clear that Arabs comprise only a small fraction of the non-Turkish elements to be found in the central administration, and that the overwhelming majority entered the bureaucracy in the second half of the nineteenth century. The overall representation of various minorities in the provincial and central administration is presented below:

TABLE 5

	<i>Provincial</i>	<i>Central</i>
Arab	14%	4%
Greek, Armenians	40%	36%
Europeans	14%	11%
Dönmes	8%	26%
Others (Kurds, etc.)	24%	23%
N =	(58)	(28)

¹⁰ Tahsin Paşa, *Abdül Hamit Yıldız Hatıraları*, Istanbul, 1931, p. 25.

III. Social Background

Questions of geographic origin relate directly, as we have suggested, to one of the major issues that still requires extensive study concerning the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire research on the mobility and stratification patterns that obtained in this period. Information concerning the social background of our population bears directly upon this issue, and by looking at such items as fathers' title, occupation and affiliation with major families, it is possible to refine commonly held views such as those cited earlier concerning the extent to which an "aristocracy" did in fact control the destiny of the Empire in the nineteenth century.

Two separate variables can be isolated for analytical purposes. First, the extent to which the subjects were scions of important families or possessed some tie with such families, that is, families which had previously established themselves as dynasties and which, it has been shown, had, by the end of the eighteenth century, apparently come to monopolize most of the high level positions within the state. This trend resulted in a "hardening of the career arteries" thus reducing the possibilities for advancement open to the many members of the Ottoman group who were not affiliated with such dynasties.¹¹ To what extent these families were able to maintain their grip upon the state apparatus during the nineteenth century is one of the key questions on which our data can be focused. A second and related dimension, the actual position held by the father, can serve to provide further insights into this issue. The relationship between important position and major family tie may vary drastically depending upon the degree of mobility that is possible within a society, so that it is important to determine how many persons who did not possess any connection with an Ottoman house did, in fact, achieve a high level position in different periods. By looking at this information, it might be possible to identify the degree to which the established families of the Empire were able to maintain their near-monopoly of state office in this era.

To analyse the available information in these terms, the career success achieved by the fathers of the subjects had to be assessed. Two possible indicators suggested themselves, the father's "Pasha" title and the actual position that he occupied. Because of the limited numbers for whom such information was available, it was decided to combine these two items by taking all those who were known to occupy a high or very high level position in the administrative, religious, or military hierarchies as well as all others for whom no specific career data was available but who were known to have a "Pasha" title. In this manner, a subgroup, subjects with "very successful

¹¹ Itzkowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

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fathers," was created which could serve as the basis for later analysis. The results of these tabulations are presented below:

TABLE 6

	<i>I</i> (— -1839)	<i>II</i> (1840-1876)	<i>III</i> (1877-1908)
% of Subjects with Fathers Possessing a "Pasha" Title	11%	17%	14%
% of Subjects with Fathers Occupying High or Very High Level Positions	10%	18%	14%
% of Subjects with "Very Successful Fathers"	15%	25%	26%
N =	(262)	(575)	(315)

By any of the three indicators it appears that the proportion of subjects with important fathers increases markedly during the Tanzimat era; then, during the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II, this group either declines a little or levels off. If these indicators do provide an accurate index of social background, one may therefore conclude that the circle of recruitment into the administration narrowed appreciably in Period II and remained the same in Period III, and that the high level officials were able to entrench themselves solidly within the state apparatus and to at least secure their offsprings' access to relatively important positions within the administration, during the second half of the nineteenth century.

An analysis of the subjects who did not have successful fathers corroborates these findings and illustrates these trends even more vividly. By tabulating those persons for whom either no information whatsoever concerning the father is provided or only the fact that he possessed an "Efendi" title (probable indications of his lack of importance) together with those fathers who are known to have occupied a low level official position of some sort, we can establish a subgroup of subjects whose fathers were not important personages. This group comprises 70% of Period I subjects, 52% of Period II, and 49% of Period III. In other words, these figures indicate that over two-thirds of all subjects who entered the bureaucracy prior to 1839 were *not* the progeny of successful fathers, and that this percentage declined sharply during the Tanzimat and then fell a little more during the reign of 'Abdülhamîd. This pattern is practically the reverse of that obtained by our examination of those subjects who did possess successful fathers. Thus, the trends between Periods I and II appears to be definitely towards a lessening of opportunities for mobility, which remain limited in Period III.

The second aspect of the subject's background that was studied, his connection with an Ottoman house, further illuminates the process of change that occurred in this era. To determine whether the subject was a member of a well established family that could trace its lineage for several generations, several indicators such as *zāde* titles, references to *hānedān*, *ūmerā*, *celebi*, etc., were utilized. Altogether, 253 subjects came from such families, 28% of the total population in Period I, 22% in Period II, 23% in Period III. Rather surprisingly, therefore, it appears that the importance of these families actually declined in the first half of the nineteenth century, an era when, as we have seen, the proportion of subjects whose fathers were important officials was increasing.

This conclusion is reinforced by a further refinement of our categories. It is possible, of course, that a subject may have a father who is both very successful and at the same time a member of a major family. Accordingly, our subjects were divided into three groups, those who were members of a major family and who also had successful fathers, those who were members of an important family but who did not have successful fathers, and those who were not members of a major family but whose father was successful. The results are given below:

TABLE 7

	I	II	III
Member of Major Family with Successful Father	8%	8%	11%
Member of Major Family Only	20%	14%	12%
Successful Father Only	7%	17%	14%

The same trend is now highlighted even more clearly. The percentage of subjects who were affiliated with a major family declines by about a third, while the percentage of subjects whose fathers had become important members of the state apparatus without the benefit of family ties more than doubles. Thus, we can conclude that the mobility, patterns obtaining in the Empire underwent a considerable change at the beginning of the nineteenth century. That the change took place in that period is indicated by the fact that, since we are discussing father's mobility we must assume we are dealing with time periods approximately thirty years prior to the subject's date of entry into the bureaucracy, or roughly 1800, 1830 and 1860. In this period the formerly hardened career arteries suddenly softened and permitted a significant number of persons who did not meet the former criteria to rise to positions of power and influence within the bureaucracy and thus enter the

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political elite. In other words, the pattern of social change in the nineteenth century was far more complex than is usually acknowledged, and though formerly entrenched families remained important, they were unable, especially in the first decades of the century, to prevent the emergence of new elements (probably from the lower bureaucrats in view of what we know concerning the functioning of the Ottoman system) to positions of power and influence. Thus, the reigns of Selīm III and especially Maḥmūd II, appeared to have been marked by greater mobility and an enhancement of opportunities for advancement within the state apparatus for those who could meet the new criteria that were now operative.

In short, although further research, particularly within specific careers, is clearly necessary, I am suggesting that two changes in patterns of occupational mobility occurred within the Ottoman Empire in the first part of the nineteenth century. First, a shift within the system that enabled persons who did not meet the criteria for success that obtained toward the end of the eighteenth century, especially affiliations with an Ottoman house, to rise to high level administrative positions thus creating a new social core group that was to control the apparatus of state during the Tanzimat era. Second, an amalgam of first generation achievers and members of established families coalesced into a new elite that re-established control over the mobility structures existing within the state, especially within the bureaucracy, so that career arteries, after a brief period of softness, hardened once again to a condition resembling that which had existed in the late eighteenth century and remained that way even during the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamīd II.

That this was indeed the case is also reflected in the results obtained by tabulating the father's success level against major family ties, over time. Since we are dealing with the fathers and not the subjects, we must again allow for about a thirty year time differential. (See Table 8.)

TABLE 8

	I (— 1839)		II (1840-1876)		III (1877-1908)	
	<i>Successful Fathers</i>	<i>Other Fathers</i>	<i>Successful Fathers</i>	<i>Other Fathers</i>	<i>Successful Fathers</i>	<i>Other Fathers</i>
Major Families	54%	24%	33%	19%	44%	16%
Other Families	46%	76%	67%	81%	56%	84%
N =	(41)	(211)	(142)	(433)	(55)	(160)
	Q = .580		Q = .354		Q = .599	

This table indicates that around 1800 fifty-four per cent of all successful fathers were connected with major families and that the degree of association between the two variables was a high one, .580, but that by 1830 it had dropped to .354 as the percentage of successful fathers who were also members of major families declined markedly. Between 1830 and 1860, on the other hand, the level of intensity of the association rose sharply once again until it exceeded that which had obtained in 1800. This is precisely the result that one would expect if this period were in fact characterized by a renewed decrease in opportunities for career mobility to those unable to meet the ascriptive criteria that were dominant once again.

Finally, it should be noted that these findings correspond neatly to the cultural changes that characterized the period under consideration. The urgent need for persons with new skills and talents that has been recognized by every historian who has written about this era was in all probability met mainly by recruiting persons who were not affiliated with entrenched families to engage in such innovative and un-Ottoman behaviour as learning Western languages and acquiring a modern education. Once these persons came to fill positions of power and influence within the state, it is likely that they would ensure that their offspring, too, would engage in similar innovative behaviour and acquire the necessary prerequisites for future success. And, once the formerly dominant families recognized the importance of Western exposure as a criterion for career mobility and elite membership, they too may have moved to protect their own position within the society through similar measures. That this was indeed the case we shall demonstrate when we discuss the relationship between family status, father's success and Western exposure over time.

IV. Education and Western Exposure

Questions of modern education relate not only to the issue of elite recruitment and training but to broader questions involving the efficacy and ability of the provincial administrators. As is well known, the need for qualified provincial administrators, which was largely spurred by the manpower needs of the state, was an underlying cause of the educational reforms of the nineteenth century. In fact, it is widely accepted that a fundamental reason for the failure to implement the many attempts at provincial reform characteristic of the nineteenth century was the lack of officials trained in modern techniques and possessing modern attitudes. As the noted historian Professor E. Z. Karal has written:

In order for the provincial administration to function in line with [the new] legislation... it was necessary to have provincial administrators and civil servants well versed in this legislation... it was not easy

TABLE 9

	Central Administrators			Middle East Administrators			Non-Middle East Administrators		
	I	II	III	I	II	III	I	II	III
	(— 1839)	(1840-1876)	(1877-1908)	(— 1839)	(1840-1876)	(1877-1908)	(— 1839)	(1840-1876)	(1877-1908)
Percentage of Administrators with at Least a Secondary Education	13%	38%	72%	5%	31%	78%	5%	31%	64%
TOTAL N =	(64)	41% (157)	(81)	(94)	32% (236)	(60)	(100)	29% (180)	(61)

to find supervisors and civil servants who could implement them nor was it easy to train such people....¹²

It is therefore important to look at the educational qualifications of the provincial administrators and to determine to what extent, if any, these changed in the course of the nineteenth century. We have tabulated the percentage of administrators who acquired a modern education of at least secondary level by branch and time. (See Table 9.)

In terms of overall patterns, persons serving in the central administration tended to have a higher level of formal education than those serving in the provinces. 41 % of the former have at least a secondary education as compared to 32 % of those serving in the Middle East and 29 % of the non-Middle East administrators. These overall figures, however, distort trends over time, notably the growing level of formal education for all administrators, especially during the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II. Few differences are evident between the growth rate in the formal educational levels of the different branches of service; the rate at which persons trained in modern schools were recruited increases at about the same speed for all.

While the quality of the training and its relevance to actual conditions obtaining in the provincial and central administrations can be criticized, it does appear that the Ottoman government successfully worked to ensure that its officials would meet certain educational qualifications, and that from about 1850 onwards, a significant percentage of administrators received a modern education. The rapid increase that occurred during the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II is especially noteworthy, as is the fact that in this period, Middle Eastern administrators were better trained than those serving in other regions or even in the centre itself, perhaps reflecting that area's importance in the ruler's eyes and consequently indicating a rational appointment policy whereby the best trained officials were assigned there.

Three schools dominated, the training provided at the higher levels, the *Mülkiye*, the military institutions, and the law school, accounting for about 85 % of the university level graduates. Their contribution to the provincial and central administration are summarized in the following table:

TABLE 10

<i>Name of School</i>	<i>Provincial Administrators</i>	<i>Central Administrators</i>
<i>Mülkiye</i>	30%	16%
Military Schools	37%	25%
Law	21%	23%
Technical Schools (including Military)	12%	36%
N =	(135)	(83)

¹² Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Ankara, 1962, VIII, pp. 318-19.

Somewhat surprising is the importance of the graduates of the military schools in both administrations, especially in the provincial administration; a slight decrease in their importance becomes apparent towards the end of the nineteenth century. Further study is needed to determine the extent to which this group consists of military officers who filled administrative positions connected with military affairs only. From 1877 onwards, the *Mülkiye* rises swiftly to prominence and account for a major percentage of the provincial administrators. This was due mainly to the personal interest of 'Abdülhamîd in that institution and its graduates. He requested information, including biographies, on all candidates for such positions as *qā'imaqām* or *mutaşarrıf* and would often check to ensure that they were, in fact, *Mülkiye* graduates.¹³ Somewhat surprisingly the largest percentage of central administrators are graduates of such institutions as the medical and engineering schools; persons trained in technical subjects account for about a third of all central government employees. Whether these subjects filled specialized or general administrative positions also remains a topic for future study.

Another dimension from which the rise in educational qualification in the nineteenth century can be studied is through an examination of the kinds of persons who obtained such an education. Such an analysis would bear directly upon some of the hypotheses presented earlier concerning the kinds of persons who engaged in innovative behaviour in the nineteenth century and the relationship between such behaviour and career mobility. Results are shown in the following table:

TABLE 11

	I (— 1839)	II (1840-1876)	III (1877-1908)
% of Sons of Very Successful Fathers who Possessed Secondary or Higher Level Training	2%	29%	58%
N =	(41)	(142)	(55)
% of Sons of Major Families with such Training	3%	24%	56%
N =	(74)	(129)	(50)
% of Remaining Population with such Training	10%	36%	79%
N =	(147)	(304)	(107)
% of Total Population with such Training	7%	31%	68%
N =	(262)	(575)	(212)

¹³ Tahsin Paşa, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

It is evident that of our elite groups, neither the subjects who are connected with an Ottoman house nor the subjects who are sons of very successful fathers flocked to the new schools to any greater degree than the rest of the population. In fact, the converse is true and, though over time the percentage of each group receiving a modern education increases significantly, elite subjects continually lag behind the others, though sons of successful fathers enroll to a greater degree than those with major family ties. From these calculations it appears that the modern schools of the Empire enrolled large numbers of persons from undistinguished backgrounds throughout the nineteenth century.

A possible explanation of this phenomenon may be that education was not directly related to career success and that sons of elite fathers did not need a formal modern education to achieve high position. To test this hypothesis, education was tabulated against career success with the following results:

TABLE 12

	<i>I</i>		<i>II</i>		<i>III</i>		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Ed.</i>	<i>Uned.</i>	<i>Ed.</i>	<i>Uned.</i>	<i>Ed.</i>	<i>Uned.</i>	<i>Ed.</i>	<i>Uned.</i>
Successful	47%	48%	44%	34%	50%	30%	47%	37%
Unsuccessful	53%	52%	56%	66%	50%	70%	53%	63%
N =	(15)	(247)	(180)	(395)	(132)	(83)	(327)	(725)
	Q = .030		Q = .197		Q = .398		Q = .160	

Although the overall strength of the association is not particularly strong (.160), trend analysis indicates a significant shift in the direction of a stronger association. In other words, during the nineteenth century, a modern education became increasingly associated with career success, though this finding applies only to the highest positions with the Empire. No relationship existed for second level positions either overall or in any particular time frame.

This measure of education, however, may well overlook competence in what is usually accepted as having been so vitally needed in the Empire, knowledge of a European language. Such ability is usually accorded the most prominent place among the criteria for elite membership. In Professor Lewis's words: "The new elite of power came not from the army, not from the ulema, but from the Translation Office and the Embassy Secretariats."¹⁴ Although it was not feasible at the time to test this statement empirically to

¹⁴ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1961, p. 118.

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determine precisely how many members of the administrative elite had served in these posts prior to being appointed to a high level post, it was possible to assess the importance of knowledge of a foreign language. First, we shall examine the degree to which administrators did know other tongues.

Altogether twenty-five per cent of all administrators spoke a European language. Another sixteen per cent was acquainted with such languages as Greek, Armenian, Arabic and Persian. French was by far the most popular, being spoken by forty-two per cent of all those who knew any foreign language; six per cent spoke German, eight per cent English and six per cent various other European tongues. Among non-European languages, Arabic was the most common, being spoken by fifteen per cent of the total; six per cent knew Greek or Armenian and seventeen per cent spoke such tongues as Kurdish and Persian.

Knowledge of a European language was not distributed evenly among the three groups. About half of all persons who served in the Middle East knew a foreign language, as compared to 44% of those in the central administration and only 31% of those serving outside the Middle East. To a large extent however, the high ranking of the Middle East is explained by the large number of Arabic and Persian speakers in that group. The prevalence of persons who spoke such languages among the Middle Eastern administrators is, of course, eminently reasonable and once again suggests that appointment policies to provincial administration were highly rational. If we limit ourselves to knowledge of a European language we find that those serving in the central administration led all the rest — 32% as compared to 27% in the Middle East and only 18% for the non-Middle Eastern administrators. (See Table 13.)

TABLE 13

<i>% of Administrators Speaking:</i>	<i>Central Administrators</i>	<i>ME Administrators</i>	<i>Non-ME Administrators</i>
French	20%	18%	14%
German	4%	3%	1%
English	5%	3%	2%
Other European	3%	3%	1%
SUB TOTAL	32%	27%	18%
Greek, Armenian	3%	2%	2%
Arabic	4%	9%	5%
Persian, Other	5%	10%	6%
TOTAL	44%	48%	31%
N =	(302)	(380)	(341)

That so many persons who knew a foreign language served in the Middle East is rather surprising, especially if one assumes that the demand for persons who knew a foreign language in the central administration was as great, as is usually considered to have been the case. Under these conditions, the appointment of persons who spoke European languages to the Middle East is difficult to explain. One possible hypothesis to account for this phenomenon is that, due to the growing intrusion by European powers into the Middle East in the nineteenth century through their businessmen, merchants, missionaries and foreign consuls, the Ottoman government preferred to appoint administrators to this area who could communicate with such persons. If this was indeed the case—and it would be interesting to learn whether the archives contain documents from Ottoman administrators in the Middle East requesting that persons who knew French be appointed there or else complaining about the problems of communicating with foreigners — then once again it appears that appointments to provincial positions were made on the basis of rational criteria. Another possible explanation that suggests rational personnel policies is that, if we equate efficiency and ability with knowledge of a foreign language, the Porte, which considered the Middle East an area of great importance, may well have assigned their most able officials there.

The fact that a person is known to have spoken a European language is but one indication of exposure to European influences. Accordingly, a new subgroup, those with Western exposure, including all those who knew a European language or had studied or lived in Europe, was established and used as the basis for further analysis. And, just as in the case of formal education, a tabulation was undertaken to determine whether the sons of successful fathers or those subjects affiliated with an Ottoman house had greater access to such skills than the rest of the population. The results are indicated below:

TABLE 14

	<i>I</i>	<i>II</i>	<i>III</i>
% of Sons with Very Successful Fathers with Western Exposure	5%	32%	29%
N =	(41)	(142)	(55)
% of Sons of Major Families with Western Exposure	8%	20%	30%
N =	(74)	(129)	(50)
% of Remaining Population with Western Exposure	13%	19%	22%
N =	(147)	(304)	(107)
% of Total Population with Western Exposure	10%	22%	26%
N =	(262)	(575)	(212)

From this table, it is evident that the degree of Western exposure increased sharply over time, though the rate of increase slowed down in the last period. In contrast to the data on formal education, sons of elite families did not continually lag behind the total population. Only in Period I was the percentage of sons of successful fathers smaller than the total, and by Period II, they far exceeded all other groups. Sons of major families, on the other hand, surged ahead only in the last period. This difference between sons of successful fathers and those of major families is very intriguing, and one may hypothesize that those fathers who had achieved high rank were the most aware of the utility of Western exposure and, therefore, saw to it that their sons enjoyed such an advantage. The likelihood of such a hypothesis being valid is enhanced by the fact that, as we have suggested earlier, it is probably on the basis of their own innovative behaviour, such as learning a Western language, that these fathers achieved their own high position. The major families, on the other hand, did not react as quickly and, though the percentage of their children with such experience increased sharply between Periods I and II, it did not increase at the same rate as those with successful fathers; however, between Periods II and III, it continued to climb while the percentages in the other categories fell slightly. In the end no distinction remained between these groups, which both surpassed the percentage of the remaining population with such exposure. It may well be, therefore, that many members of the major families were slower to realize the advantages that accrued to a person who possessed such skills, but once the lesson had been learned they, too, took steps to ensure that their offspring would possess these advantages.

If such considerations are indeed valid, Western exposure should associate strongly with career success and this, in fact, proved to be the case. (See Table 15.)

The intensity of association is, overall, almost double that obtaining for modern education, and is strongest in Period I when there is no relationship between modern education and success. Though it declines a little in Periods II and III, the association remains at about the same level. Like education, however, the importance of this attribute is limited to the highest positions in the state; a far more modest relationship, both overall and in each time frame, exists for second level positions.

It seems, therefore, that Western exposure was an important criterion in determining an individual's access to high office, especially prior to 1839. Though it remained an important factor throughout the century, the weakened association suggests a decline in its importance. Further research to specify the particular high positions with which Western exposure is related in different periods, as well as to ascertain the time sequence

TABLE 15

	<i>I</i> (— 1839)		<i>II</i> (1840-1876)		<i>III</i> (1877-1908)		<i>Total</i>	
	<i>Exposed</i>	<i>Unexposed</i>	<i>Exposed</i>	<i>Unexposed</i>	<i>Exposed</i>	<i>Unexposed</i>	<i>Exposed</i>	<i>Unexposed</i>
Successful	70%	46%	49%	33%	54%	38%	53%	38%
Unsuccessful	30%	54%	51%	67%	46%	62%	47%	62%
N =	(27)	(232)	(130)	(445)	(55)	(160)		
	Q = .439		Q = .307		Q = .321		Q = .299	

between exposure and promotion to elite positions, would obviously be most desirable.

V. *Fathers and Sons*

Earlier we suggested that a decrease in mobility appears to have occurred between Periods I and II, and that career opportunities were restricted during the Tanzimat era as the new bureaucratic elite monopolized access to the higher positions. To check the validity of this hypothesis, tabulations between the subject's level of success and our elite subgroups through the three periods were run. Success was defined in terms of filling the highest positions within the state. The results are indicated below. (See Table 16.)

This table indicates a rather surprising finding, namely that no overall relationship exists between a subject's success and his father's importance, and only a slight one exists between the subject's success and his affiliation with a major family. Trend analysis reveals that a shift does occur between Periods I and II by both measures, towards the greater importance of the father and the family, but the magnitude of the change is not as large as was expected. Nor is the intensity of the association by either measure particularly significant.

As a check on this surprising finding a second definition of success was established. All subjects who possessed a "Pasha" title were arbitrarily defined as successful, and similar tabulations were carried out between the new success measure and family background and father's success. These results also indicated only a modest relationship between the subject's success and his background. Again, however, there was a shift between Periods I and II towards a stronger association between subject's success and family ties and subject's success and father's success.

Two explanations suggest themselves for these unusual results. Firstly, it may well be that, if we examined the backgrounds of those who actually occupied high level positions during specific periods, we might obtain more definite relationships. Even such a finding, however, would not negate the *overall* weak association that we have uncovered, which indicates that other factors besides ascriptive criteria played a role in determining appointments to the highest posts of the Empire. This relates to the second explanation, namely that the validity of the historian's warning to beware of "single factor" explanations must always be kept in mind by social scientists. In other words, the complexities of social organization in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire simply do not permit us to "explain" the realities of the changes that occurred by looking at any one independent variable. What is obviously needed is multivariate analysis to determine the inter-relationship between several independent variables, such as education,

TABLE 16

	I (— 1839)			II (1840—1876)			III (1877—1908)			Total
	Son of Major Family	Other Subjects		Son of Major Family	Other Subjects		Son of Major Family	Other Subjects		
Successful	51%	47%		42%	36%		48%	41%		
Unsuccessful	49%	53%		58%	64%		52%	59%		
N =	(74)	(188)		(129)	(346)		(50)	(165)		
	Q = .090			Q = .120			Q = .149			Q = .128
	Son of Successful Father	Other Subjects		Son of Successful Father	Other Subjects		Son of Successful Father	Other Subjects		
Successful	41%	49%		40%	36%		44%	42%		
Unsuccessful	59%	51%		60%	64%		56%	58%		
N =	(41)	(221)		(142)	(433)		(55)	(160)		
	Q = -.158			Q = +.077			Q = +.043			Q = -.050

Western exposure and family ties, and our dependent variable of career success. Time limitations, unfortunately, did not permit such tabulations to be completed prior to the preparation of this paper. Such an analysis should hopefully provide insights into the changing role of achievement criteria in promotion and appointment policies during the nineteenth century.

While ascriptive criteria did not determine appointments to the highest positions, they did influence to a significant degree, as was pointed out earlier, the recruitment of persons of different backgrounds into the administration. This is evidenced by an examination of a second dimension of the relationship between fathers and sons, the career choices of the sons of elite fathers. Essentially, sons with major family ties and successful fathers tended to choose the central administration and, though the relationship is only a moderate one overall, it increases steadily in favor of the central administration over time and is most pronounced during the reign of 'Abdülhamîd. By looking at the sons of successful fathers in terms of their fathers' affiliation with the religious, military and administrative hierarchies, however, we can note some interesting differences within this pattern. It is clear that the children of important '*ulamâ*' families are well represented in the central administration in Periods I and II. Sons of high level administrators are also found in such positions, but the trend over time is the reverse of that evidenced by the religious families. In Period I they fill provincial positions, but by Period II a definite swing has taken place in favor of the central government, and this swing continues to increase in intensity during the reign of 'Abdülhamîd II. This trend may well reflect the tightening grip of the new administrative elite over appointment and recruitment policies discussed above.

If we examine the father's occupation without regard to his position level, the extent to which administration is a family occupation becomes evident. Both overall and in each time frame, the overwhelming majority of subjects are the sons of administrators; their representation rises from 54% in Period I to 61% in Period II and then remains constant in the last decades of the century. Even more pronounced is the percentage of administrators' sons in central positions, which increases from 50% in Period I to 66% in Period II before declining to 56% after 1877. These data probably reflect a narrowing of the circle of recruitment as well as the different recruitment policies that marked Sultan 'Abdülhamîd's reign. (See Table 17.)

A similar trend is also indicated by the number of persons of non-official backgrounds (merchants, tradesmen, professionals, farmers) recruited to the central administration. Their share fell between Periods I and II from 18% to 8% and subsequently recovered to the former level. Altogether, the percentage of persons of non-official backgrounds fluctuates slightly from

TABLE 17

Occupation of Father	I (— 1839)			II (1840-1876)			III (1877-1908)			Grand Total
	ME	NME	CA	ME	NME	CA	ME	NME	CA	Total
Administrative	58%	75%	50%	54%	53%	66%	70%	60%	56%	61%
Religious	20%	10%	33%	24%	13%	14%	9%	15%	15%	13%
Military	16%	5%	—	10%	20%	12%	9%	4%	13%	10%
Other	6%	10%	18%	13%	12%	8%	12%	22%	17%	17%
N =	(31)	(20)	(22)	(112)	(81)	(73)	(33)	(27)	(54)	

13% in Period I to 10% in Period II to 17% in the last period, and accounts for 12% of the overall total. To what extent this group consists of persons of *a'yān-ashrāf* background is one of the key questions that awaits further research, especially the development of indicators to permit the accurate identification of this stratum.

Overall, their representation differs little from sons of religious personages, who comprise, by a narrow margin, the second largest group overall. The representation of members of religious families, however, declines over time, especially between Periods I and II, from 24% to 14% of the population. The reasons for this drop are somewhat unclear, for it does not indicate that religious leaders attempted, as is usually believed, to place their sons in administrative careers once they became aware of the significance of the Tanzimat reforms for the future of their own institution. Our data suggests that many of the important '*ulamā*' families did place their sons in such positions, but that since they did so at a very early date, during the first decades of the century, this is not a Tanzimat phenomenon. In Period I, for example, they account for about one third of all civil servants for whom we have data, a percentage that drops markedly in Period II. Further research is needed to identify the kinds of religious families involved, as well as to specify the degree to which they continued to place their sons in religious careers during the nineteenth century. The career patterns followed by the sons of different occupational groups over time also require analysis.

As far as the Middle Eastern administrators are concerned, the only aspect that differs from the overall pattern is the fact that the representation of administrators' sons increases in the reign of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II, while the percentage of sons with such fathers serving in the other provinces remains constant and declines somewhat in the central administration.

VI. Conclusion

At the outset of this paper, I suggested that social science concepts, approaches and methodologies could fruitfully be applied to historical problems. I trust that I have demonstrated how one particular methodology can illuminate the pattern of administrative elite recruitment as well as its relevance to some fundamental issues of the nineteenth-century Ottoman scene. Let me therefore conclude by briefly pointing out how social science concepts might also contribute to a further refinement of our understanding of the functioning of provincial administration in the nineteenth century.

At several points in this paper I have suggested that rational criteria may well have determined the allocations of manpower to provincial posts in the Middle East and that, if one can judge by such indicators as formal education and knowledge of Western languages, qualified people — at least in nine-

teenth-century terms — were sent out as administrators. It is, of course, very simple to pick out examples of poorly educated, badly prepared, half-westernized individuals, but such an approach ignores the continuing and serious attempts by so many rulers and reformers to achieve change within the provincial administration as well as their projects to improve the efficiency and quality of the administration as a whole. That many of these efforts were unavailing, that the numerous structural reorganizations, changes in personnel policies, attempts through sending out investigators and countless directives to eliminate abuses did not produce optimal results is, of course, obvious, but cumulatively they did produce significant changes in the course of the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, at present, we do not possess the data to evaluate the extent to which the qualifications of the civil servants were upgraded and improved or the administration transformed into a more effective and efficient institution because, with the exception of a few studies, notably the one by Professor Ma'oz, cited earlier, we lack in-depth analyses of the functioning of the provincial administration in this period.

If Ottoman provincial administration, and especially the impact of reforms upon it, is to receive the attention that it deserves, social science concepts and approaches will have to be utilized in the analysis. It would be necessary, for example, to identify the formal and informal goals that characterized the organization, the ways in which specific structures and institutions functioned, the distribution of formal and informal power, the role of control and leadership, and the ways in which decisions were actually made and implemented. It would also be necessary to trace the ways in which these variables changed during the nineteenth century. One likely result of such research would be the revision of many of our rather simplistic notions about Ottoman provincial administration, such as the role of corruption or the impact of frequent changes of personnel as primary reasons for its inefficiency and ineffectiveness.

Any assessment of the manner in which personnel changes affected the functioning of the administration must include a determination of the real role of various officials in the decision-making process as well as their length of stay in office. In other words, it is important to analyze empirically not only the patterns of tenure that characterized different posts in different provinces at various times, but also the relationship between those offices and the distribution of power within the institution. Students of public administration have emphasized time and time again the degree to which a bureaucratic structure possesses a life of its own that cannot be shaped or controlled easily from the top, and Professor Ma'oz has cogently demonstrated how little real power the *vālī* actually wielded in Syria and Palestine

at mid-century. If the governors were relatively powerless, what difference would frequent shifts make in the life of the organization? It may well be, for example, that the shifting of governors in the Empire had about as much impact upon the administration of any province as the frequent cabinet shuffles of the French Third and Fourth Republics had upon that bureaucracy. Such a conclusion would pose far more questions than it would answer.

If data on the decision-making process within the provincial service were available, we could also assess more adequately the second major area that has usually been decried and identified as a causal factor undermining the efficiency and legitimacy of the administration—corruption. Any student of this phenomenon would be well advised to remember that social science scholarship has demonstrated that corruption can best be viewed not as aberrant and immoral behaviour but rather as another form of political influence which fills the void created by limited interest structures and institutional channels and which serves for the aggregation of demands and for their transmission to decision makers. To put it another way, there are both costs and benefits attached to this phenomenon, and in terms of social change, corruption possesses both functional and dysfunctional aspects. In some cases its functional aspects may well outweigh the damage that corruption can wreak upon the political system, but the extent to which this may in fact have been the case in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire remains a point for empirical investigation.

Such studies, however, can only be carried out by historians who are sensitive to methodological and conceptual developments in the social sciences. Thus, I have come full circle, for, as I stated at the outset, this is unfortunately true of far too few scholars. Yet, if historical research is to be truly applicable to the mainstream of contemporary concerns — and in this age can it really afford not to possess such an orientation — then historians must be as sensitive to our interests as we to yours. For if we social scientists are to gain that historical perspective that is so vital a part of our scholarship, we must turn to your discipline for assistance. Without your insights the kinds of findings that I have discussed in the body of this paper will remain merely a tentative and preliminary statement. It must be tested against the experience that those of you who are expert in this period can provide and, hopefully, infuse with your wisdom as well. That is why I have welcomed the opportunity to present my preliminary findings. Hopefully social scientists and historians will have increasing opportunities to interact and, develop a common perspective that will enable us to better understand the relationship between past and present. Out of such interaction may come the opportunity to demonstrate how false are those two *hadiths*: that social scientists lack historical perspective, and that historians lack relevance.

16. LOCAL LEADERSHIP AND EARLY REFORMS IN PALESTINE, 1800-1834

by MORDECHAI ABIR

I

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Palestine was still not a distinct administrative entity. The *pashalik* of Sidon, the capital of which had been transferred to the town of Acre, consisted of the Galilee, the northern half of the Palestine coast and a good part of Lebanon. The coastal plain from Jaffa to beyond Gaza, although it was attached in 1807 to Sidon, was considered a separate administrative unit. The mountain range of central Palestine, from Jenin to beyond Hebron, was also considered a separate administrative unit,¹ but this region was usually attached to the *pashalik* of Damascus.

The erosion of Ottoman authority in Syria since the seventeenth century had grave effects in Palestine. Law and order continually declined, the Bedouins could not be contained, the population diminished and agriculture and commerce greatly suffered. The rich and relatively unprotected coastal plains of Palestine, the Valley of Jezreel (Marj Ibn 'Āmir) and the adjacent lower Galilee were the first to fall prey to the Bedouins. They were also the areas which suffered most from the greed of the Ottoman governors, because of their accessibility and proximity to the Ottoman centres of power on the coast. Consequently, throughout the eighteenth century the villages of the coastal plains and the near-by valleys either shrank in size or were abandoned altogether.² The areas immediately

¹ Each *pashalik* was subdivided in this period into several *livā's* or *sanjaks*, at the head of which was a *mutasarrif*. However, Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Nablus were considered independent *livā's*. The *livā'* was in its turn divided into several *qazās*; at the head of each was a *qā'imaqām*. The *qazā* was once again divided into several *nāhiyes*, each made up of a number of villages. At the head of each *nāhiye* was a *muditr*. *Annals*, p. 17, n.2; *Mufaṣṣal* I, 275, n.1 and I, 310; 'Awra, pp. 77-8, 86-7; Ihsān al-Nimr, *Ta'rikh Jabal Nāblus wa-l-Balqā'*, Damascus, 1938, I, 243-244. It is unclear, however, whether the administrative division mentioned above covered, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, all parts of Palestine or only those under the direct control of the different pashas.

² C.F. Volney, *Travels to Syria and Egypt in the Years 1783, 1784 and 1785*, London, 1787, II, 93-94, 331-8, 408-12; Burckhardt, p. 334; A. E. C. Lindsay, *Lindsay's Letters*,

adjacent to the Ottoman administrative centres on the coast were an exception. Here the population was at least protected to some extent by the Ottoman garrisons. Moreover, in some cases the indigenous population was replaced or replenished by Egyptian and Maghribi Bedouins and descendants of other auxiliary forces brought into the country by various governors. This, for instance, was the case of the area of Gaza and of the area around Acre. The Galilee was settled by the Hawwāra, descendants of Albanians and Janissaries and Bedouin tribes, especially in the eighteenth century, after the power of the Mutawālīs was broken.³

The mountain areas of Palestine, especially the mountain range between Jenin and Hebron, were relatively thickly populated.⁴ The mountains were more difficult to penetrate and easier to protect. Furthermore, it seems that since the seventeenth century the leadership of the Nablus, Jerusalem and

London, 1839, II, 303-304; Public Record Office. Foreign Office 78/283, pp. 188-190, Campbell, Alexandria, 23.8.1836.

³ S. Refaeli, *Millhamot ha-Falaḥim be-Eretz Israel be-Matayim Shana ha-Aḥronot* ..., Jerusalem, 1909/10, p. 231; As'ad Maṣṣūr, *Ta'rikh al-Nāṣira*, Cairo, 1924, p. 70; Burckhardt, pp. 322, 340; E. Robinson and E. Smith, *Biblical Researches in Palestine*, Boston, 1838, II, 90, 340, 378; *Maḥfūzāt*, I, 275, No. 790. See names of heads of the rebellion against the Egyptians in Safed in 1834; R. Cattani, *Le Règne de Mohamed Aly d'après les Archives Russes en Egypte*, Roma, 1933, II, 334, No. 141B.

⁴ An Egyptian census taken about the end of 1833 shows that the number of villages and the number of eligible taxpayers (males above the age of 14) in central and southern Palestine was as follows:

<i>District</i>	<i>No. of Villages</i>	<i>Males Above 14</i>
Jerusalem	121	7,319
Gaza	62	6,916
Jaffa	14	1,466
Lod	11	1,041
Ramla	42	2,043
Hebron	14	1,855
Nablus	202	15,795
TOTAL	466	36,435

It was reckoned that there were four non-payers to every taxpayer. F.O. 78/263, No. 7, Farren, 30.1.1835. According to another British consular source (Consul Werry in Aleppo in J. Bowring, *Report on the Commercial Statistics of Palestine and Syria*, London, 1840, pp. 3-4) there were 47,434 taxpayers in the administrative regions of Jaffa, Jerusalem and Nablus and 65,660 in the administrative region of Sidon. However, of the latter 38,494 lived in Mount Lebanon and we assume that about 5,000 lived in the Lebanese coastal towns of the *pashalik* of Sidon. If we accept the figure of four non-payers to every taxpayer we have about 250,000 people in the Jaffa, Jerusalem, and Nablus regions and about 110,000 in the Galilee and the northern part of the coast.

Hebron districts was to a very large extent replaced by a new wave of Turkoman, Kurdish and above all Arab Bedouin chiefs. These chiefs together with their followers migrated or were banished to the mountains of central Palestine from Syria and Transjordan. Taking advantage of the decay of the Ottoman government and the weakness of its officials in the entire region, they made themselves the representatives of the Ottoman authority in the area and took upon themselves many of the functions of the government.⁵

The power and success of the new class of chiefs stemmed mainly from their having assumed the two most important functions of government in the period. The first of these was collection of taxes, and the second protection of the population and preservation of law and order in their respective areas. Being tax farmers of the Ottoman government, they enriched themselves at the expense of the population. They were also able to strengthen their authority over subordinate chiefs and the fellahin, because it was they who determined the amount of taxes which each village paid.⁶ However, even if the local chiefs exploited their "subjects", at least they succeeded, in the mountains, in preserving a measure of security which enabled the population to carry on everyday life.

No less essential to the preservation of authority of the mountain chiefs was their military power. Most chiefs had a small standing army made up of their kinsmen. In the Nablus district the local aristocracy was organized in a *sipāhī* unit, but it appears that by the first quarter of the nineteenth century this unit was of little consequence.⁷ Far more important was the ability of the chiefs to call to arms every able-bodied farmer in the area under their command. The mountain fellahin, all of whom possessed firearms, were always willing to participate in a good skirmish. Thus, when the occasion arose the subordinate chiefs mobilized their followers and joined their leaders. In most cases the local militia was used in the internal struggle for power in the area or for protecting the mountains from Bedouin incursions. From time to time the chiefs were also required to bring their armies to the assistance of the Ottoman government.⁸ On the other hand, there were cases in

⁵ See for instance al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-6; al-'Awra, pp. 305-6; Haydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, *Ta'rikh al-Amīr Bashīr al-Kabīr*, n.p., 1932, I, 110; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 253, 302.

⁶ On the system of taxation and its collection in the Nablus area, see al-'Awra, pp. 306-307.

⁷ It seems that a *sipāhī* unit or at least the remnants of a *sipāhī* unit existed in Jerusalem as well. However, this unit was made up of foreign elements and was of no consequence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Al-'Arīf, pp. 352, 356. On *istmārs* in the Jerusalem area see *Uṣūl*, I, 36, No. 9.

⁸ Usually in order to protect the Damascus *ḥajj* caravan. However, it was not unusual that they were also requested to take part in military expeditions in adjacent areas. Al-

which the militia was employed against Ottoman governors who tried to infringe upon the autonomy of the mountain districts.⁹

II

Officially the district of Nablus was governed by two *mutasallims*, one of Nablus and one of Jenin. In reality, at the beginning of the nineteenth century the government of the district was in the hands of eight or nine prominent families from which the *mutasallims* were usually drawn. It seems that in the area of Nablus, the power of the local chiefs and their organization was nearer to classical Ottoman "feudalism" than in any other place in Palestine. The more important chiefs and their kinsmen were the masters of *iqṭā's* and *tīmārs*. They were recognized as *sipāhis*, collected the taxes and regularly performed military service when accompanying the Damascus *hajj* caravan.¹⁰

The history of the region of Nablus in the eighteenth century was dominated by a continuous struggle for the position of *mutasallim*, for the ownership of *iqṭā's* and *tīmārs* and for the leadership of the district. The Ottoman pashas, to whose government Nablus belonged, took regular advantage of these rivalries in order to preserve whatever authority they had in the region. But their intervention in the affairs of the area was in most cases restricted to intrigues and to building up dissension, because of the fact that most chiefs met any serious threat to their position by closing their ranks and uniting to repulse the enemy.¹¹ Moreover, the leaders of the Nablus district exploited, on their part, the long-standing rivalry between the pasha of Damascus and that of Sidon for control of the area. The pashas, therefore, left things as they were so long as the local chiefs paid their dues, fulfilled their duties and did not exceed their authority. Once a year the pasha or one of his chief officers came to the mountains of central Palestine to receive the taxes due from the *mutasallims* and the sheikhs. On this occasion he treated the chiefs with great consideration and confirmed them in their

Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 82, 84-5, 255-6; al-Shihābi, *op. cit.*, I, 110; al-'Awra, pp. 82, 315, n. 1.

⁹ Al-'Awra, p. 305. Also regarding the "feudal" armies: F.O. 78/243, No. 8, Farren, 29.5.1834.

¹⁰ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 301, 411; *Mahfūzāt*, I, 144, No. 384; al-'Ārif, p. 310. Al-Nimr uses the terms *iqṭā'* and *tīmār* without distinction. See, for instance, al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 230, 234; al-Shihābi, *op. cit.*, I, 110, claims that the district of Nablus was divided into six *muqāṣa's*.

¹¹ Al-'Awra, p. 111; Burckhardt, p. 342; F.B. Spilsbury, *Picturesque Scenery in the Holy Land and Syria*, London, 1803, p. 22; al-Shihābi, *op. cit.*, I, 110; F.O. 78/215, Farren, 4.1.1832; Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābi, *Ta'rikh Amad Basha al-Jazzār*, Beirut, 1955, pp. 102, 106, 108.

positions and in their estates. Matters were usually settled amicably after some polite bargaining, but if the pasha exceeded in his demands or was disrespectful to the local chiefs he could find himself in a most dangerous situation.¹²

Formally, the chiefs of the Nablus district, as elsewhere in the country, were divided into two coalitions, Qaysī and Yamanī. The importance attributed by some writers to this division is, however, somewhat exaggerated, because in most cases loyalties did not depend on allegiance to these coalitions, or even on blood affiliation, but rather on contemporary interests. When faced with the necessity, each chief did not hesitate to ally himself with those who were previously his enemies. Moreover, some of the families in the Qaysī camp were in fact splinters of families in the Yamanī camp or vice versa.¹³

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Qaysī coalition of the Nablus district was led by four families: Nimr, Jayyūsī, Qāsim al-Aḥmad and 'Abd al-Hādī. The first two attained a position of leadership earlier, but their power had been waning since the end of the eighteenth century. The two upstart families, those of Qāsim al-Aḥmad and 'Abd al-Hādī, were growing in importance. The more prominent in the Yamanī coalition were Jarrār and the Ṭūqān families, and one rung below them came the al-Ḥājī Muḥammad and Ṣādiq Rayyān families.¹⁴

The Nimr family had migrated to Palestine and settled in the region around the town of Nablus (Mashāriq) by the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Nimrs had produced a good number of governors who held the *mutasallimīyyas* of Nablus, Jerusalem, Lod and Ramla. They were also prominent in Transjordan and Damascus.¹⁵ The Nimrs, it seems, were allied with the 'Aẓms¹⁶ of Damascus, and the decline of that family at the end of the eighteenth century affected the position of the Nimrs in Nablus. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, they had lost their power to the Ṭūqāns and to the Jarrārs.

The Ṭūqān family, probably of Turkoman origin,¹⁷ reached the Nablus area via al-Ṣalt in Transjordan at the end of the seventeenth century.

¹² Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 92; al-'Awra, pp. 221, 306; al-'Ārif, pp. 310, 360; Burckhardt, p. 342.

¹³ Al-'Awra, p. 306; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 130-131, 246-247.

¹⁴ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-127, 130-134, 249; al-'Awra, pp. 289-290; Refa'ī, *op. cit.*, p. 11; Burckhardt, p. 342. The leading families in Nablus were allied and related to Qaysī or Yamanī tribes who lived in the peripheral areas of the mountains and in Transjordan.

¹⁵ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72, 94, 97, 109-110.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 92, 99-102, 107, 109-110.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

They managed to oust the veteran Jayyūsī family from the government of Banī Ša'b region in the southwestern part of Nablus and they also achieved some prominence in Damascus and Transjordan. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, they had become the most influential family in the Nablus district. But it is evident that they owed their position of power to some extent to the Ottoman authorities, and especially to the pashas of Sidon with whom they always cooperated.¹⁸

The northern part of the Nablus district (Hāritha) was controlled by the Jarrār family, who had migrated to Nablus from Transjordan at the end of the seventeenth century. The Jarrārs held from time to time the *mutasallimiyas* of Nablus, and at the turn of the eighteenth century they were so powerful that they were even able to resist the attack of Jezzār Pasha. For all that, by the beginning of the nineteenth century a lesser branch of the family, the 'Abd al-Hādīs, was quickly rising in importance. After gaining control of the eastern Sha'rāwiyya they allied themselves with the Qaysī coalition and began to compete with the older branch of the family for leadership in the Nablus mountains. In this they were helped by the pasha of Sidon, naturally enough in view of the fact that their centre of power was near Acre, the pasha's seat, while their rivals, the Jarrārs, were always closer to the pasha of Damascus.¹⁹

Jamā'in, the southern region of Nablus, was controlled by the house of Ghāzī, which had immigrated into this area at the end of the seventeenth century or the beginning of the eighteenth century. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the main branch of the family, led by Qāsim al-Aḥmad, was at the head of a coalition which resisted the efforts of the Ṭūqāns to establish their power over all of Nablus. From Jamā'in they began to expand their influence into the southwestern part of Nablus (Mashāriq al-Baytāwī), an area which was controlled by the al-Ḥājj family.²⁰ At the same time the lesser branch of the house of Ghāzī, led by Šādīq Rayyān, allied itself with the enemies of their brethren, the Yamanī coalition.²¹

III

The district of Jerusalem began at Sinjil, north of Ramallah, and ended half way between Bethlehem and Hebron.²² The villages of the district were

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 178–181, 231–232.

¹⁹ *Ibid* pp. 130–134, 237, 247–249; al-'Awra, p. 304.

²⁰ Also immigrants from Transjordan. Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 131–134, 196–204, 248.

²² Unfortunately, we do not have for the Jerusalem area a source such as Ihsān al-Nimr's *Ta'rikh Jabal Nablus wa-l-Balqa'*, which includes a wealth of documents from private archives. 'Arif al-'Arif's *Al-Mufaṣṣal fi Ta'rikh al-Quds* has little or no information on

divided into six groups, according to their legendary ancestors, or according to Arab tribes who settled in the area.²³ But the main division in the rural area of Jerusalem, as elsewhere, was between the Qaysis and Yamanis. Nevertheless, affiliation to either camp depended on circumstances and on the power of its leaders. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Yamanī camp, led by the Abū Ghūshes of the village of Qaryat al-'Inab, was far stronger than the Qaysis. The authority of the Abū Ghūshes was recognized from al-Bīra, near Ramallah, to Bethlehem and as far west as the plains between Ramla and Bāb al-Wād. Consequently the Abū Ghūshes controlled the main avenues from the coast to Jerusalem and enjoyed substantial revenues from the *ghafr*, which they collected from pilgrims, travellers and merchants. Even the churches of Jerusalem paid heavily to them, because they had an interest in the safety of the roads leading to the Holy City and because of the influence of the Abū Ghūshes in Jerusalem itself.²⁴ The Qaysī party in the vicinity of Jerusalem was led by the Banī Samḥān, who lived in the village of al-Rām. The Banī Samḥān controlled only the eastern range of the Judean hills from Sinjil to al-Bīra or beyond, an area which was frequently subject to incursions of the Bedouins from the nearby desert.²⁵

It seems that the chiefs of the Jerusalem district were not as strong as the chiefs of the Nablus area, nor did they enjoy the same standing and privileges. They were not attached to the *sipāhī* unit of Jerusalem and probably rose to power in consequence of the decline and corruption of the latter. They did not possess *īmārs* or *iqṭā's*, nor were they the masters of "castles". In fact there is evidence that representatives of the governor collected the taxes directly from the villages of the districts.²⁶ It is, nevertheless, evident that at

social relations in the area of Jerusalem and especially in the rural area. It is influenced by contemporary political considerations and is deficient in primary material.

²³ K. M. Bazili, *Sirla i Palestina pod Turetzkim Pravitel'stvom*, St. Peterburg, 1875, II, 232; Mrs. Finn, "The Fellahs of Palestine," *PEFQS*, 1879, p. 34. There are indications that a good number of the inhabitants of the Jerusalem area were Bedouins, who settled in the district in the last centuries.

²⁴ *Annals*, p. 38, n. 1; Z. Vilnay, *Toldot ha-'Aravim ve-ha-Muslemim be-Eretz-Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1931-32, p. 263; L. Demoiseau, *Voyage en Syrie dans le Désert*, Paris, 1883, pp. 259-261; G. Douin (ed.), *La Mission du Baron de Boislecomte ...* (hereafter: *Boislecomte*), Le Caire, 1933, p. 255; J. S. Buckingham, p. 172; F.O. 78/283, pp. 187-190, Campbell, 23.8. 1833.

²⁵ M. Asaf, *Ha-Aravim taḥat ha-Tzalbanim, ha-Mamlukim ve-ha-Turkum*, Tel-Aviv, 1940, p. 52; W. R. Wilson, *Travels in Egypt and the Holy Land*, London, 1824, p. 192; Robinson, *op. cit.*, II, 82.

²⁶ See, for example, al-'Ārif, pp. 274, 309-310, 359-360. According to Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 304-5, the *mutasallim* of Jerusalem farmed the *mīrī* of the district.

at least the Abū Ghūshes enjoyed some sort of official recognition and autonomy because of their power and because they were the guardians of the avenue to Jerusalem from the coast.²⁷ Moreover, part of the area which they controlled lay between the *pashalik* of Sidon and the *livā* of Jerusalem, which was usually under the command of the pasha of Damascus. The Abū Ghūshes were, therefore, able to exploit to their advantage the rivalry between the two pashas. However, as the area under their command was adjacent to the Ottoman centres of power on the coast, the Abū Ghūshes were more aware of the power of the pasha of Sidon and the possibility of his interference in their affairs. Hence, they tended to cooperate with this governor. On the other hand the Banī Samhān, who controlled part of the main avenue from Damascus through Nablus to Jerusalem, were more prone to cooperate with the pasha of Damascus and with the Qaysī element in the Nablus region.²⁸ At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the governor of Sidon was often ordered to deputize for the weak pasha of Damascus, and consequently he became responsible for the central mountain range of Palestine. The Abū Ghūshes cooperated with the authorities in the the preservation of law and order in Jerusalem and in its rural area. On their part the Sidon authorities helped the Abū Ghūshes to subdue their adversaries.²⁹

IV

The town of Jerusalem had, in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a population estimated at between 11,000 and 25,000. Jerusalem was radically different from all the other towns in Palestine. In the first place it was holy to Muslims, Christians and Jews. More than half of the population of Jerusalem were *dhimmis*, and the town had a small permanent community of Franks.³⁰ Jerusalem was different also in that it was not an urban centre of a rural community. The important families of the countryside did not live in the town, nor did they dominate its affairs, as was, for instance, the case of Nablus. Jerusalem's inhabitants were not farmers who cultivated the nearby

²⁷ *Annals*, p. 38, n. 1.

²⁸ Refaeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4; al-'Awra, pp. 77, 81, 86-89, 290; al-'Ārif, p. 361; *Upūl*, p. 200, No. 539; J. Madox, *Excursions in the Holy Land, Egypt, Nubia*, London, 1834, II, 235-240; *Annals*, pp. 36-39.

²⁹ W. Turner, *Journals of a Tour in the Levant*, London, 1820, II, 266, n. 279; Refaeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4; al-'Awra, pp. 88-89, 290; *Annals*, p. 39; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

³⁰ Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 263; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 126; Buckingham, p. 261; Spilsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 37; T. R. Joliffe, *Letters from Palestine*, London, 1820, p. 101; Bazili, *op. cit.*, II, 232; Society for Christian Knowledge, *Three Weeks in Palestine and Lebanon*, London, 1833, p. 101; Marie Joseph De Geramb, *A Pilgrimage to Palestine, Egypt and Syria*, London, 1840, p. 300; Robinson, *op. cit.*, I, 420 and II, 23-24.

fields, and only a small fraction of merchants and craftsmen served the needs of the rural population and depended upon them for their livelihood. The *dhimmi* communities of Jerusalem lived on gratuities from abroad and were partly engaged in trade and crafts connected with the pilgrimage. The Muslim community of the town was made up of two important elements. The first was the non-Arab Muslims, descendants of the Janissaries and other Ottoman functionaries and soldiers who had settled in the town over the centuries. The other element was made up of Arab merchants, tradesmen and especially '*ulamā*' and religious functionaries. This last group, consisting of *qādis*, *muftīs* and *naqibs* whose title was *efendi*, was commonly called the "*Efendiyyāt* of Jerusalem."³¹ Hence it is evident that the Muslim community in Jerusalem was even more conservative and religiously fanatic than anywhere else in the country.³²

Throughout its history under the Ottomans, Jerusalem had known periods in which it had been a relatively important administrative centre. By the turn of the eighteenth century, however, its importance had greatly declined.³³ The town was garrisoned by only a few score of soldiers, and it was the seat of a *mutasallim* appointed by the pasha who had command of the area. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the authority of the *mutasallim* was quite limited. Frequent rebellions occurred in Jerusalem and in the surrounding area, and even the authority of the pasha was frequently ignored.³⁴

Far more important than the *mutasallim* was the *mollā qāḍī*, who was appointed from Constantinople and who in fact governed the town. The *mollā qāḍī* was helped by a *dīwān*, made up of the *muftī*, the *naqib al-ashraf*, the guardian of the *Haram al-Sharif* and a number of other dignitaries.³⁵ The religious oligarchy of Jerusalem appointed, against payment, the religious

³¹ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 267, n. 1. See also al-'Ārif, p. 360; F. O. 78/243, No. 15, Farren, 1.7.1834.

³² See for instance al-'Ārif, pp. 272, 356-359 (disregarding al-'Ārif's interpretation of events), 361; *Annals*, pp. 22-23, 30, 44, 48; Geramb, *op. cit.*, pp. 255, 322. See also below.

³³ Al-'Ārif, p. 272.

³⁴ Al-'Awra, pp. 88-89; *Annals*, pp. 34-36; Madox, *op. cit.*, II, 235-240; Refaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 2; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 271-272.

³⁵ Al-'Ārif, pp. 310, 352, 355, n. 4., 358; Joliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Spilsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 37; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 319; Buckingham, p. 527; *Mahfūzāt*, I, 134, No. 360; A. Forbin, *Travels in Greece, Turkey and the Holy Land in 1817 and 1818*, London, n.d., pp. 137, 153. Although the *mollā qāḍī* was in many cases a Turk it seems that in the first decades of the nineteenth century he was in most instances a member of one of the more important families of Jerusalem. See, for instance, al-'Ārif, pp. 274-275. The other heads of the religious oligarchy of the town were appointed by the pasha who was in command of Jerusalem. Joliffe, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

functionaries in the other towns of the country.³⁶ They also controlled the extensive *waqfs*, which constituted the endowment of the *Haram al-Sharif* and other Muslim institutions and charities of the town.³⁷ Besides the *jizya* collected in the name of the sultan, the notables of Jerusalem exacted payment of different kinds from the *dhimmi* communities, institutions and controllers of the holy places.³⁸ The many pilgrims who visited Jerusalem were also the subject of numerous exactions which enriched the Muslim aristocracy in Jerusalem and the surrounding area.³⁹ Notwithstanding the economic advantages derived from the Christians and the Jews, the Muslim community of the town oppressed the *dhimmis* and treated them, and especially the Franks, with great hatred and contempt.⁴⁰

The struggle for control of the key positions in the religious hierarchy of Jerusalem was always very bitter, since these were the source of profit as well as of power and honour. As elsewhere, the *Efendiyyāt* of Jerusalem grouped themselves in Yamanī and Qaysī coalitions, allied with the Yamanī and Qaysī chiefs of the rural areas. While the Yamanīs were led by the Ḥusaynī family, the Qaysīs were led by the Khālidiīs. This division in the religious oligarchy of Jerusalem was consistently exploited by the Ottoman authorities in order to tighten their control over the town and to restrain the autonomous tendencies of the local notables. Although appointments to the different religious offices were sold to the highest bidder from among a group of old Jerusalemite families, there was always a certain amount of Ottoman intrigue in the making of these appointments. It seems that at the turn of the eighteenth century and in the first decades of the nineteenth century the Khālidiīs were more cooperative with the authorities and thus were favoured by appointments to the highest offices in Jerusalem and even in Istanbul.⁴¹ But as a result of the decline of the power of the Empire, and especially that of the governor of Damascus, the *Efendiyyāt* and the other conservative

³⁶ F. O. 78/283, No 29, pp. 221–2, Campbell, 23.8.1833; *Uṣūl*, II, 9, No. 69; *Annals*, p. 44.

³⁷ *Mahfūzāt*, II, 377, No. 3318; II, 489, No. 3868.

³⁸ *Uṣūl*, I, 87, No. 36; I, 131, No. 60; *Mahfūzāt*, I, 188, No. 495; II, 341, No. 3108; II, 391, No. 3399; *Annals*, pp. 22–23, 57; Demolseau, *op. cit.*, 263; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 319; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 162.

³⁹ *Annals*, pp. 22–23, 30, 48; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 188; *Mahfūzāt*, II, 4; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 176–177, 196, 203.

⁴⁰ Al-ʿArif, pp. 356, 358–361; Y. Montefiore, *Yehudit (Bikur Moshe Montefiore be-Eretz-Israel bi-Shnat 5599)*, London, n.d., p. 266; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 398–399; *Annals*, pp. 22–24, 55. The Muslims were especially sensitive regarding the dress of the Europeans. Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 123; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 157, 203.

⁴¹ *Asaf*, *op. cit.*, p. 279. A Khālidi was *qaz'asker* in Anatolia at the turn of the nineteenth century. Al-ʿArif, *op. cit.*, p. 273, also pp. 274–275; *Mahfūzāt*, I, 189–190.

elements in Jerusalem attempted to gain a far greater measure of autonomy than they had ever possessed in the past. In this they were further encouraged by the attempts at reform of the sultans and their representatives in Syria and Palestine.⁴²

V

The district of Hebron (Jabal al-Khalīl) began half way between Bethlehem and Hebron and stretched to beyond Zāhiriyya, on the way to Beersheba. Administratively it was connected either to the district of Jerusalem or to that of Gaza, but because it had always been a difficult and rebellious area, by the beginning of the nineteenth century Ottoman officials were a rare sight in Hebron. Prudently, the *mutasallim* of Hebron was usually appointed from among the local notables.⁴³ The district included fourteen villages with about 8,000 people. But to this number could be added about 10,000 people who lived in the town of Hebron, because the town was nothing but a collection of villages with a municipal centre. These villages or "quarters" reflected the strong tribal character of the population of the area as a whole, their inhabitants being in most cases descendants of tribes who were banished or who had immigrated there from Transjordan in the previous centuries.⁴⁴

In the Hebron district, as elsewhere in the mountains of central Palestine, the real power lay in the hands of the more important families. The strongest among these was the 'Amr family, centered around the village of Dūra. The 'Amrs, as many of the other inhabitants of Jabal Khalīl, settled in the area at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Another important group of families was the descendants of the Tamīlīs from Transjordan. They were settled mainly in the villages which made up the town of Hebron, or in the adjacent area.⁴⁵ While the 'Amrs were considered to be the head of the Yamanī faction, which was by far the strongest in the Hebron district, the Qaysīs drew their power mainly from the town of Hebron itself and from the villages of Zāhiriyya and al-Burj. Although Hebron suffered greatly from the continuous incursions of the Bedouins from the outlying areas, both factions were allied with these Bedouins. The incursions of the latter and the incessant battles between the Qaysīs and Yamanīs, unhindered by the Ottoman 'authorities,' brought ruin and depopulation to this previously rich region.⁴⁶

⁴² See below.

⁴³ Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 260-261; Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 253; C. L. Irby, *Travels in Egypt and Nubia, Syria and Asia Minor During the Years 1817 and 1818*, London, 1823, pp. 342, 345.

⁴⁴ Volney, *op. cit.*, II, 324-326; Burckhardt, pp. 381, 405; Robinson, *op. cit.*, III, 3; Refaeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 16-17.

⁴⁵ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86. The al-Majālī family in Transjordan is related to the Tamīlīs.

⁴⁶ See n. 44 above.

VI

The mountain range of central Palestine long served as a bone of contention between the pashas of Sidon and Damascus. Jezzār Pasha, who wanted to unite the whole of southern Syria under his government, became the master of Nablus and Jerusalem during the periods in which he held the *pashalik* of Damascus. But although he managed to establish direct control over most of the country, he met with partial failure in the area of Nablus.⁴⁷ When Jezzār died in 1804, Sidon alone was given to his closest assistant and *mamlūk* Sulaymān. Sulaymān and 'Abdullāh Pasha, who succeeded him, not only considered themselves the "descendants of Jezzār," but they also followed the latter's policy.⁴⁸ In 1807, having suppressed the rebellion of the governor of the *livā's* of Jaffa, Lod, Ramla and Gaza, Sulaymān was appointed *mutaşarrif* of these districts.⁴⁹ By this time he was considered the strongest governor in Syria, both because of the large army left to him by Jezzār and because he was able to rule Sidon without interruption. On the other hand, the pashas of Damascus in the first decades of the nineteenth century were always weak, because their appointment was for only a year. During their short period of government, they were either troubled by the incursions of the Wahhābīs or were expected to organize and accompany the Damascus *hajj* caravan. Sulaymān was, therefore, repeatedly ordered by the Porte to deputize for the governors of Damascus and to quell rebellions which occasionally broke out in the mountains of central Palestine.⁵⁰

In 1809 the *pashalik* of Damascus was given to Sulaymān. One of his first acts was to reappoint Mūsā Ṭūqān, previously a staunch ally of Jezzār, as governor of the Nablus district and to furnish him with a strong contingent of soldiers. Another of Sulaymān's henchmen was appointed *mutasallim* of Jerusalem, and Ibrāhīm Abū Ghūsh was confirmed as Shaykh al-Jabal of the Jerusalem district. The Ṭūqāns and the Abū Ghūshes were always willing tools in the hands of the pasha of Sidon, and Sulaymān hoped that his authority in Nablus and Jerusalem would be firmly established by them.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Al-Shihābī, *Jazzār*, p. 101; al-Shihābī, *Bashīr*, I, 110; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-160; Mikhā'il al-Dimashqī, *Tārīkh Ḥawādith al-Shām wa-Lubnān min Sanat 1197 ilā Sanat 1257*, Beirut, 1912, pp. 14-16; Burckhardt, p. 342; Spilsbury, *op. cit.*, p. 22; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 271-272.

⁴⁸ See, for instance, al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 185. 'Alī Pasha, whose son 'Abdullāh Pasha was brought up by Sulaymān as his heir apparent, was Jezzār's *mamlūk* and Sulaymān's friend. Al-Shihābī, *Jazzār*, pp. 305-307, 309.

⁴⁹ He was also in command of Jerusalem and Nablus but these were given to the pasha of Damascus. Al-'Awra, pp. 77-90; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-185; al-'Ārif, p. 274.

⁵⁰ Al-'Awra, pp. 77-89; al-Dimashqī, *op. cit.*, p. 72; al-Shihābī, *Jazzār*, p. 193; Refaeli *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵¹ Al-'Awra, pp. 128-129, 135-136, 290; al-Shihābī, *Jazzār*, p. 193; Refaeli, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Although by 1811 Damascus was taken from Sulaymān, the governors of the province, replaced nearly every year, chose to leave Sulaymān's men in their positions and continued to rely upon Sulaymān's support in controlling central Palestine.⁵² Thus, the influence of the governor of Sidon in Nablus and Jerusalem was far greater than that of the governor of Damascus.

During the last years of Sulaymān's life, the government of Sidon was in fact in the hands of 'Abdullāh, Sulaymān's heir apparent.⁵³ This ambitious young man was even more determined than his master to establish direct control over Nablus, Jerusalem and Hebron. He did his best, therefore, to undermine the power of those chiefs and notables who were willing to cooperate with him.⁵⁴ However, his policy created resentment in Jerusalem, and met with opposition in the area of Nablus.⁵⁵

Sulaymān died in 1818, and 'Abdullāh inherited the government of Sidon, Jaffa and Gaza. In fact, however, he was, for a time, in virtual control of all of Palestine. This situation changed when Darwish Pasha was appointed governor of Damascus in the first part of 1819. The new pasha was unwilling to relinquish central Palestine to 'Abdullāh. Hence, when some notables of Nablus complained about the high-handedness of 'Abdullāh and his representatives, Darwish was only too happy to replace the governors of Nablus and Jerusalem. Following the inevitable clash between the two pashas, Darwish informed the Porte that 'Abdullāh had kept Sulaymān's treasury for himself and warned the central authorities of the ambitions of this governor. Darwish's cause was supported in Istanbul by some of the disaffected notables of Jerusalem and chiefs of Nablus.⁵⁶ These feared the ambitions of 'Abdullāh and hoped that Darwish would not infringe upon their established rights. At the end of 1821, after 'Abdullāh invaded Darwish's territories and persistently evaded handing over Sulaymān's treasury, the sultan ordered the pashas of Adana, Aleppo and Tripoli to aid Darwish, and Acre was put under siege. However, owing to the Greek rebellion and Muḥammad 'Alī's intercession on his behalf, Maḥmūd forgave 'Abdullāh

⁵² Al-'Awra, pp. 289-290, 304-305, 341-342; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 203-204, 266, 279; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-205.

⁵³ Al-'Awra, pp. 304-305. According to Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 113, Sulaymān was 68 years old in 1815.

⁵⁴ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-205; al-'Awra, pp. 221-224; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 272.

⁵⁵ Al-'Awra, pp. 289-290; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-208; Turner, *op. cit.*, II, 273; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁵⁶ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 215-216; al-Shihābi, *Jazzār*, pp. 302-308, letter of 'Abdullāh Pasha to Muḥammad 'Alī; Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 201-203; D. Mackworth, *Diary of a Tour Through Southern India, Egypt and Palestine in the Years 1821 and 1822*, London, 1823, p. 303.

and appointed him to the *pashalik* of Sidon. Jaffa and Gaza were taken from him.⁵⁷

VII

The situation in Jerusalem seriously deteriorated as of 1818, after the death of Sulaymān Pasha. In 1819, the Greek Orthodox community in Jerusalem began to rebuild the church of the Holy Sepulchre, which had been burnt to the ground in 1808. Permission to do so had been received from the Porte. Notwithstanding the sultan's firman, the Janissaries and some other traditional elements among the Muslims of Jerusalem were determined to prevent the rebuilding of the church. They besieged the *mutasallim* in his house and demanded that the building of the church be stopped. Moreover, in an attempt to secure their position in Jerusalem, they also demanded that the citadel be garrisoned by them rather than by the soldiers sent by the pasha of Damascus. The *mutasallim* requested that they await his answer for a few days, to enable him to consult with his master, the pasha. The rebels agreed to await the answer of the pasha regarding the garrisoning of the citadel, but at the same time they attacked the Greek Orthodox patriarchate⁵⁸ and the workers employed in the building of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. When the governor of Damascus was informed of the events in Jerusalem he quickly marched to the town, and arrested the rebels, who were later executed by the *mutasallim*.⁵⁹

Following the Greek rebellion in 1821, the Christian population of Jerusalem was disarmed, forced to wear black, and to work on the fortifications of the town. The Muslim population of Jerusalem, agitated by its leaders as well as by the authorities, armed itself and attacked the Greek Orthodox patriarchate. The town was in a state of complete anarchy, and the situation continued to deteriorate to the extent that the whole Christian population was in danger. The Ottoman authorities in Istanbul, having been informed of the explosive situation in Jerusalem and fearing the consequences, hurriedly instructed the *qāḍī* and the *Efendiyyāt* of Jerusalem to pacify the Muslim population, threatening to take direct action should anything happen to the *ra'āyā*. For a time peace returned to the town, but tremendous sums of money were extorted from the Christians. In 1823, the

⁵⁷ Al-Shihābī, *Jazzār*, pp. 309, 315; Anṭūn Katāfākū, *Futūḥāt Ibrāhīm Bāshā al-Miṣr fī Filasṭīn wa-Lubnān wa-Sūriyya*, Beirut, 1927, p. 32; al-'Ārif, p. 359; Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 249; India Office Archive. Factory Records. Persia and Persian Gulf, Vol. XLVI, Farren, 21.5.1831. Vol. XLI, Barker, Alexandria, 1.8.1827; al-Shihābī, *Bashār*, II, 66-7; F.O. 78/122, despatch from 29.9.1822; *Annals*, pp. 27, 30.

⁵⁸ When Napoleon besieged Acre the same elements interned all the Greek Orthodox community in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Al-'Ārif, *op. cit.*, p. 272; *Annals*, p. 28.

⁵⁹ Al-'Ārif, *op. cit.*, pp. 356-357.

Muslims of Jerusalem were again about to attack the Christians, on news of a Greek naval attack on Beirut. However, the agitation stopped when information arrived concerning the departure of the Greek ships.⁶⁰

Darwish Pasha was replaced in 1822 by Muṣṭafā Pasha, who had previously been the pasha of Aleppo. Shortly after taking over the government of Damascus, Muṣṭafā demanded far heavier taxes than had been the custom in the past. Consequently, from 1823 to 1826 the areas of Nablus and Jerusalem were in a state of perpetual unrest and rebellion. In 1825 Muṣṭafā Pasha led a large army to the Nablus region, installed his own man as a *mutasallim* and collected the taxes due from that district. He later proceeded to Jerusalem, and although at first the population attempted to avoid paying the new taxes, they were finally compelled to pay what the pasha demanded. However, shortly after Muṣṭafā Pasha and his army departed for Damascus, the rebellion broke out once again. The *mutasallims* of Muṣṭafā Pasha were driven out of Jerusalem and Nablus. This time the townfolk and the *Efendiy-ya't* of Jerusalem joined the fellahin and their chiefs in the rural area. The Jerusalemites, probably led by the traditional military elements, garrisoned the citadel, guarded the gates and refused to obey to orders of the central authorities.⁶¹ Hence, towards the end of 1826 'Abdullāh Pasha was ordered to quell this rebellion. Having secured the cooperation of the Abū Ghūshes, his army advanced to Jerusalem, surrounded it and began to bombard the town. Because of the damage and loss of life caused by this bombardment and the shortage of food in the town, the rebels surrendered. 'Abdullāh, on his part, agreed that the taxes be reduced to what they had been in the past, and that all those involved in the rebellion be pardoned.⁶² Thereafter, Maḥmūd instructed 'Abdullāh to quell rebellions in the area and to deputize for the pasha of Damascus whenever the necessity arose.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 358–359; *Annals*, pp. 17–29.

⁶¹ Although al-'Ārif claims that the rebellion in Jerusalem was anti-Turkish and that the rebels wanted all the foreign elements, Muslims and non-Muslims, to leave the town. Their leaders did not belong to the prominent Arab families of the town. The names and titles of these leaders rather create the impression that they were of non-Arab descent. This impression is further strengthened by al-'Ārif's claim that the rebels were trained in the use of all types of firearms including artillery (p. 361). It is also indicative that this stage of rebellion happened just after the Sultan crushed the Janissaries in Istanbul. Also: *Annals*, pp. 30–39; Madox, *op. cit.*, II, 235–240; R. R. Madden, *Travels in Turkey, Egypt, Nubia and Palestine*, London, 1829, II, 297–298, 315; Vilnay, *op. cit.*, II, 229; al-Shihābi, II, 66–67; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

⁶² Al-'Ārif, *op. cit.*, 358–9; *Annals*, pp. 39–42.

VIII

After crushing the Janissaries in 1826, Sultan Maḥmūd II was free to press forward with his long-planned reforms of the army and of provincial administration, as well as with reforms in several other fields. Aware of the spiritual influence of the *'ulamā'* Maḥmūd was careful not to antagonize them by direct action. Nonetheless, by a series of administrative measures he was able to deprive them of their financial and administrative autonomy, thus weakening their political power.⁶³ It is true that between 1826 and 1831 the sultan could not possibly have spared the large military force necessary for implementing his reforms in Syria.⁶⁴ However, there are indications that Maḥmūd issued orders, at least to the pashas of Damascus and Sidon, to carry out the reforms, or at least some of them, in the areas under their command.

Already at the beginning of 1827, Maḥmūd ordered the governors of Damascus and Acre to reorganize the system of taxation, if not to abolish altogether the *tīmārs* and *iqṭā's* in the parts of Palestine which they governed.⁶⁵ He also ordered them to recruit (at least in Palestine) soldiers for the new modern army which he was trying to organize along western lines. At this time, he instructed the population to change the traditional head-dress for the new headgear which he wanted all his subjects to wear. These orders caused great consternation among the population and disturbances broke out in the mountain areas of Palestine.⁶⁶ The pasha of Damascus was unable or unwilling to enforce the new orders. However, 'Abdullāh cooperated with his master and implemented his orders in the areas under his command.⁶⁷ He not only began to recruit soldiers for the sultan's new army, but he himself began to organize units of the *niẓām-ı Jedīd* and took to wearing their abhorred European-style uniforms.⁶⁸ Moreover, by 1830 soldiers of the new army of Sultan Maḥmūd were reported in several coastal towns of the *pashaliks* of Sidon and Tripoli.

⁶³ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 3-4.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11; 'Izz al-Dīn, p. 34.

⁶⁵ Al-Nimr thinks that the Ottoman government attempted in the first decades of the nineteenth century to establish direct control in the Nablus area and to change the traditional "feudal" arrangements. This attempt he compares to what the Ottomans tried to accomplish about a century later in Jabal al-Drūz, Asir, Najd and Yemen. Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 235-237; Madden, *op. cit.*, II, 297-298, 315; al-'Ārif, pp. 275, 354; *Annals*, p. 55.

⁶⁷ Madden, *op. cit.*, II, 298; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 235; *Uṣūl*, I, 36, No. 9.

⁶⁸ Maṣṣūr, *op. cit.*, p. 70; A. Sammarco, *Il Regno di Muhammed Ali, Documenti Diplomatici Italiani Inediti*, Cairo, 1931, Vol. VIII, No. 26, Laurella, Beirut, 17.8.1831; Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (France). *Turquie Consulats Divers*, I, 159, Beirut, 28.2.1831.

The dissatisfaction of the sultan with the inaction of the governor of Damascus, and the cooperation and submissiveness of 'Abdullāh, probably gained the latter between 1827 and 1830 the government of the *pashalik* of Tripoli and the *livā's* of Gaza, Jaffa, Jerusalem and Nablus; in spite of the fact that 'Abdullāh had been a rebel in the past and was not rich enough to "buy" these appointments in Istanbul.⁶⁹ Moreover, in 1831 the new governor was sent to Damascus with orders to not only implement the reforms in the taxation system, but also to recruit a thousand soldiers for Maḥmūd's new army.⁷⁰ When the pasha tried to carry out his orders, a rebellion broke out in Damascus and the governor was killed by the inhabitants.⁷¹

When Maḥmūd gave Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron to 'Abdullāh, he probably hoped that this strong pasha would be able to crush the resistance of the local chiefs and re-establish Ottoman authority in these traditionally semi-autonomous areas. The chiefs of Nablus knew exactly what to expect from 'Abdullāh and were unwilling to recognize his authority. They were confirmed in their fears when 'Abdullāh began to appoint his own officers to the governments of Nablus and Jerusalem and took severe measures against chiefs who did not comply with his orders. Many of the local notables were arrested, and the head of the strong Jarrār family, who led the resistance to 'Abdullāh, was besieged in his "castle" in Şanūr. The other chiefs, although they were forced to submit to 'Abdullāh, secretly aided the rebels and attacked 'Abdullāh's soldiers. Even the Ṭūqāns, 'Abdullāh's traditional allies, who were at first ready to cooperate with him, joined the rebels once it became clear that 'Abdullāh was about to replace Ṭūqān's officials with his own men. Finally, when 'Abdullāh became convinced that his army was unable to take Şanūr, he agreed to a compromise. The Jarrārs were granted *amān*, and one of the family was appointed *mutasallim* of Nablus. But Şanūr was surrendered and demolished.⁷² Shortly afterwards, Jarrār was replaced by Qāsim al-Aḥmad. But even he was replaced at the end of 1831 by one of 'Abdullāh's officers; and his ally, Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī, was held under arrest for a short period in Acre. By this time it was clear that it was only a matter of time before the privileges held by the Nablus nobility would be completely abolished.⁷³

⁶⁹ According to al-ʿĀrif, p. 30, 'Abdullāh was given the *pashalik* of Damascus as well, in 1831. *Ibid.*, pp. 275, n. 1, 359. Also, Persia and Persian Gulf, Vol. XLVI, Farren, 21.5.1831; al-Shihābī, *Bashtr*, I, 110; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 239–240; *Annals*, p. 55.

⁷⁰ F. O. 78/206, Farren, 13.10.1831.

⁷¹ Quşantın pp. 33–34; F. O. 78/206, No. 5 and No. 6 from 1831.

⁷² Al-Shihābī, *Bashtr*, I, 120–5; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–244.

⁷³ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 244–245, 248; *Boislecote*, p. 224; *Annals*, p. 55, n. 3; F.O. 78/283, No. 29, pp. 187–190, Campbell, 23.8.1836; *Uşul*, I, 46, No. 14.

In the Jerusalem district the resistance to 'Abdullāh's government was not apparent, because the Abū Ghūshes still believed themselves to be the allies of 'Abdullāh. Moreover, the pasha was careful not to antagonize the religious oligarchy of Jerusalem. But the 'ulamā' and other traditional elements of the town were not unaware of the new winds blowing from Istanbul and of 'Abdullāh's innovations in the coastal towns. Moreover, 'Abdullāh's *mutasallim* took complete command of the town and the nearby area with the help of a large Albanian garrison.⁷⁴ The Jerusalemites had also not forgotten the heavy hand of 'Abdullāh, when he crushed their rebellion in 1826. Hence, although the oligarchy of Jerusalem reconciled itself to the authority of the *mutasallim* out of fear of his strong master, it resented the change in the balance of power in the town.⁷⁵

Thus, on the eve of the Egyptian invasion (November 1831), 'Abdullāh Pasha had nearly succeeded in consolidating his control over the mountains of Palestine. His own trusted lieutenants replaced the previous governors in the various administrative centres of the country.⁷⁶ Once his government was properly established, he began to persecute the more important chiefs of the district of Nablus.⁷⁷ In the last months of 1831, it was rumoured that 'Abdullāh was about to break the power of the Abū Ghūshes.⁷⁸

In the eighteenth century the pashas concerned with the government of Palestine were usually weak and in most cases unable to enforce their authority over the chiefs of the mountains of central Palestine. The mountains themselves afforded a measure of protection against Ottoman intervention. However, an important factor contributing to the success of the local chiefs in preserving their semi-autonomous status was the fact that Palestine was not one administrative unit. Consequently, the leaders of the mountain areas were also able to exploit the rivalry between the Ottoman governors over mastery of their area. This situation began to change from the time of Jezzār. He and the pashas who succeeded him in the government of Sidon, enjoyed uninterrupted tenure in their *pashalik* and had at their

⁷⁴ 'Abdullāh was brought up as an observant Muslim and disliked Christians, a fact which gained him some popularity. *Annals*, pp. 28–29, 55, n.3; Maṣṣūr, *op. cit.*, pp. 67–69; Boislecote, pp. 220, 224; Katāfākū, *op. cit.*, p. 31; Maḥṣūẓāt, I, 133, No. 360; Uṣūl, I, 24, No. 2; *ibid.*, I, 36, No. 9 and I, 53–61, Nos. 18–21.

⁷⁵ When the first opportunity presented itself they got rid of him. *Maḥṣūẓāt*, I, 133, No. 360. That the 'ulamā' were aware and feared the reforms of Maḥmūd implemented by 'Abdullāh is evident from the use of the fact by Ibrāhīm Pasha in his correspondence with them just after his army landed on the Palestine coast. *Maḥṣūẓāt*, II, 22, No. 1169 and II, 166, No. 2181; *Turquie Consulate Divers*, I, 144, Beirut, 31.1.1831.

⁷⁶ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 245; Boislecote, p. 224.

⁷⁷ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 243–245; Boislecote, p. 224; *Annals*, p. 55, n. 3.

⁷⁸ *Turquie Consulate Divers*, I, 184, Beirut, 16.4.1831.

disposal a relatively strong army. Profiting from the weakness of the pashas of Damascus and from the struggle for power among the chiefs of Nablus and Jerusalem, they gradually extended their control into these areas. By the beginning of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the local leadership of the mountain districts was no longer able to manoeuvre between the Ottoman governors. It was also becoming more and more evident that the Ottoman government intended to do away with local potentates and to establish a strong and centralized administration in all the districts of Palestine.

IX

The invasion of Palestine and Syria by the army of Muḥammad 'Alī in November 1831 was at first not regarded as something out of the ordinary. Egyptian armies had penetrated the area several times in the eighteenth century. Moreover, the first decades of the nineteenth century were marked by a number of rebellions of Ottoman governors in Syria and Iraq against the Sublime Porte. The "feudal" chiefs of central Palestine, as well as other leaders from neighbouring areas, witnessing the erosion of their own authority in the last years prior to the arrival of the Egyptians, in fact welcomed the invasion.⁷⁹

The Ṭūqāns, who fell out of grace during 1831 and had to escape from 'Abdullāh's vengeance, went as far as al-'Arīsh to welcome the Egyptians. The majority of the notables of central Palestine, however, rendered their submission to Ibrāhīm Pasha shortly after the arrival of the latter at Acre. It was not long before Ibrāhīm realized the intricate situation in the mountains. His new allies, the Ṭūqāns, were hated by most of the chiefs as a result of their attempt to monopolize the government of the Nablus district and of the support which they had rendered to 'Abdullāh Pasha in his efforts to establish direct rule in the mountains. The Ṭūqāns were, therefore, sent away from the area, and Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī, who served as the intermediary between the Egyptians and the other chiefs of Nablus, became Ibrāhīm's favourite. From this time onwards, he attached himself to the Egyptians and was considered their most faithful ally in the area. The *mutasallimtiyyas* of Jenin and Jaffa were given to his sons, while that of Nablus was given, on his advice, to Qāsim al-Aḥmad's son. Although the older and more prominent families were ignored in the administrative appointments, they were nevertheless confirmed in their old privileges and were entrusted with all the

⁷⁹ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 235, 250–251; F.O. 78/206, No. 6, Farren, 12.11.1831; Sammarco *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, No. 46, Rosetti, Alexandria, 22.11.1831; Katāfākū, *op. cit.*, p. 39. They must have been aware at this time or shortly afterwards of the fact that Maḥmūd abolished the old system of *timārs* and *sipāhīs* altogether. See Ott. Reform, p. 78.

functions of government in the areas under their command.⁸⁰ Consequently, when Ibrāhīm's army swept into Syria in the beginning of 1832, it was already accompanied by irregular troops from the area of Nablus.⁸¹

The relations of the Egyptians with the religious oligarchy of Jerusalem were somewhat more complicated. Months before the departure of the Egyptian expeditionary force for Palestine, Muḥammad 'Alī had promised the European consuls that should his army take Syria, the Christians would be treated favourably "in a way that they have never been treated in the past". Above all, he had promised to abolish all the irregular payments and exactions levied on the Christians and Jews in the Jerusalem district.⁸² This he did in order to gain the support, or at least the neutrality, of the European nations in his inevitable clash with the Porte.

A small Egyptian regular unit entered Jerusalem in December 1831. Thus, the population of the town was brought face to face with the abhorred *nizām-i jedīd*, its "European-style" uniforms, bayonets⁸³ and military music. To make matters worse, the commander of the Egyptian troops informed the Muslim notables of Ibrāhīm's wishes that they should stop all the exactions from the pilgrims and from the Christian and Jewish *ra'āyā*. Although he declared that Ibrāhīm was ready to compensate them for their financial losses, the whole matter came as a great shock to the leaders of the district.⁸⁴ At this time 'Abdullāh's Albanian garrison was still holding the citadel of Jerusalem, and there were hardly any Egyptian troops in Jaffa. Consequently, the notables of Jerusalem disregarded Ibrāhīm's instructions and continued to run the affairs of the town as they had in the past. They appointed their own *mutasallim*, ignoring Ibrāhīm's reappointment of 'Abdullāh's *mutasallim*. Messengers from the Ottoman authorities who arrived at the beginning of 1832 found ready ears in Jerusalem, and the Abū Ghūshes, who stood to lose substantially from the abolition of the *ghafr*, even threatened to expel the Egyptians from Jerusalem and Jaffa.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ F.O. 78/206, No. 6, Farren, 12.11.1831; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, pp. 250, 253; *Mahfūẓāt*, I, 128, No. 342; *ibid.*, I, 142, No. 348; *ibid.*, I, 185, Nos. 483, 484; *ibid.*, I, 186, No. 486; *ibid.*, I, 201, No. 543; *Uṣūl*, II, 34, No. 87; V. Monro, *A Summer Ramble in Syria*, London, 1835, I, 264; *Turquie Consulats Divers*, II, 338, Beirut, 22.10.1833; Cattaul, *op. cit.*, I, 448, Lavison, Alexandria, 22.11.1831.

⁸¹ G. Douin, *La Première Guerre de Syrie*, Le Caire, 1831, p. 121; F.O. 78/213, British Consul in Tripoli, 15.2.1832; F.O. 78/315, No. 4, Farren, 11.5.1832.

⁸² A.E. Egypte, *Alexandrie et le Caire*, Vol. II, 1830-1832, Cairo, 19.5.1831, Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

⁸³ The bayonets were not only a departure from the classical Muslim scimitars, but also resembled the shape of a cross.

⁸⁴ Douin, *op. cit.*, pp. 79, 83, 94, 98-99; De Geramb, *op. cit.*, p. 99; *Annals*, p. 64; *Mahfūẓāt*, I, 188, No. 495.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 188, No. 495; *ibid.*, I, 138, No. 375; *ibid.*, I, 185, Nos. 483, 484; *ibid.*, I, 186;

The repeated failure of Ibrāhīm's attack on Acre in the first months of 1832 created a widespread impression in Palestine that the Egyptians would fail to take the town. Messengers from the pashas of Syria visited the chiefs of Palestine, and they helped to spread the rumours that Sultan Maḥmūd was preparing a very large army to drive the Egyptians out of the country and that the *Sheykhūlislām* was about to declare a *jihād* against the "infidels", Muḥammad 'Alī and his son Ibrāhīm.⁸⁶ The ruler of Egypt was so worried about the Ottoman authorities' use of religious agitation against him that he mobilized the support of the Sherif of Mecca.⁸⁷ He also thought it imperative to gain the support of the Syrian '*ulamā*' and to not provoke excessively the notables of Jerusalem, especially as Egyptian manpower resources were at this time stretched to their limit. Consequently, the affairs of Jerusalem were left to drift for a while. However, with the arrival of large reinforcements of Egyptian irregulars in April 1832, the mufti of Jerusalem, together with other notables, was "persuaded" to come to Ibrāhīm's camp near Acre, and Qāsim al-Aḥmad, the Nablus chief, was later appointed *mutasallim* of Jerusalem.⁸⁸

Acre fell at the end of May 1832, and Ibrāhīm's victorious army, accompanied by local auxiliaries, swept once again into Syria. In the coming year Ibrāhīm was continuously involved in battles with Ottoman armies. He penetrated deeper into Anatolia and was forced to empty Syria and Palestine of Egyptian troops.⁸⁹ The administration of Palestine and Syria was left altogether in the hands of Ibrāhīm's local allies. Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī became, in fact, governor of the whole of Palestine.

X

The chiefs and religious notables of Palestine reached the height of their power in the year between the end of 1831 and the end of 1832, and es-

No. 486; *ibid.*, I, 189-190, No. 499; *Persia and Persian Gulf*, Vol. XLVII, Farren, 2.5.1832, Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 137, despatch from 7.3.1832.

⁸⁶ *Maḥfūẓāt*, I, 185, Nos. 483, 484; *ibid.*, I, 186, No. 486; *ibid.*, I, 188, No. 495; *ibid.*, II, 26, No. 1211; *Turquie Consulats Divers*, I, 403, 7.6.1832; Sammarco, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, No. 79, Constantinople, 28. 5. 1832.

⁸⁷ F.O. 78/213, No. 20, Barker, 23.2.1832; No. 21, Barker, 10.3.1832; No. 23, Barker, 29.3.1832; Sammarco, *op. cit.*, IX, 29, Acerbi to Metternich, 4.2.1832 and p. 85, from 22.2.1832; A.F. Egypte, Alexandrie et le Caire, Vol. II, 1830-1832, p. 227, Alexandria, 24.2.1832; *Maḥfūẓāt*, II, 184, No. 2289.

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, I, 189-90, No. 499; *ibid.*, I, 237, No. 671; *ibid.*, I, 253, No. 724; De Geramb, *op. cit.*, pp. 263, 289, 294.

⁸⁹ F.O. 78/215, No. 13, Farren, 11.10.1832; Ṭannūs al-Shidyāq, *Akhhbār al-A'yān fī Jabal Lubnān*, Beirut, 1859, pp. 207, 214; *Maḥfūẓāt*, I, 128-9, No. 342; *ibid.*, I, 283, No. 820.

pecially in the months that followed the conquest of Acre. In fact, they were the true masters of the country. Ibrāhīm was far away with his army his instructions were ignored with impunity, and the revenues from the taxes of the country were not remitted to the Egyptian treasury. In the area of Jerusalem, matters reverted to what they had been in the past. The payment of *ghafr* and all other exactions were enforced, pilgrims were mistreated, and the *ra'āyā* were kept in their place.⁹⁰ However, even though the autonomy which the local leaders achieved was greater than ever, it is doubtful whether the population fared any better in this period than in the past.

The situation began to change at the beginning of 1833, after Muḥammad 'Alī appointed Muḥammad Sharif Bey as civil governor of the whole of Syria (in the last months of 1832). Soon after his arrival, Sharif Bey embarked upon the reorganization of the government of Syria, trying to build up a centralized and strong administration along Egyptian lines. One of his first acts was to abolish the various *pashaliks* of Syria and to merge them into one administrative unit, with its centre in Damascus.⁹¹ Each local governor at least in theory, was not, directly responsible to Sharif Bey. It was hoped that with time the central authorities would establish a greater degree of control over the activities of the different *mutasallims*.⁹²

Moreover, by the beginning of 1833, Ibrāhīm was urgently in need of funds. The Egyptian treasury was completely empty. In spite of the economic revival, revenues from Syria were very small, mainly because of maladministration.⁹³ Consequently, Sharif Bey appointed a senior official to supervise all the financial matters of his government, and representatives of this official were sent to the different administrative centres. These representatives, it was hoped, would gradually take over the financial responsibilities from the local governors and would ensure that the tax revenues would reach the central treasury.⁹⁴ Finally, the government of Syria decided to levy on the whole population, with the exception of 'ulamā and foreigners, a new tax called *farda*, to be paid by every male above the age of 14, according to his means.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Monro, *op. cit.*, I, 121–122; *Uṣūl*, II, 4, No. 66; *ibid.*, II, 33, No. 86; *ibid.*, II, 41, No. 96; *Maḥfūzāt*, II, 63, No. 1494.

⁹¹ A. De Lamartine, *A Pilgrimage to the Holy Land...*, London, 1837, I, 328–9. Only Sidon comprising most of Palestine preserved some of its autonomy until the beginning of 1834. 'Izz al-Dīn, p. 132; *Maḥfūzāt*, II, 89, No. 1680.

⁹² F.O. 78/215, No. 14, Farren, 31.12.1832; F.O. 78/283, No. 29, Campbell, 23.8.1836, pp. 191–3; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 131–134.

⁹³ F.O. 78/283, No. 18, Farren, 13.7.1836; *Maḥfūzāt*, II, 179, No. 2197.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 63, No. 1494; *ibid.*, II, 243, No. 2590; *ibid.*, II, 486, No. 3849.

⁹⁵ F.O. 78/243, No. 14, Farren, 29.6.1834; F.O. 78/263, No. 7, Farren, 30.1.1835; Lindsay, *op. cit.*, II, 280; Monro, *op. cit.*, II, 60–61; al-Shidyāq, *op. cit.*, p. 215; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 146–147.

It should be pointed out that the trade of Syria which had greatly declined by 1831⁹⁶ had in the meantime undergone an impressive revival. In the first place, vast amounts of money were spent by the Egyptians in Syria, but no less important was the fact that the relative justice and security afforded by the Egyptian authorities enhanced the activities of local entrepreneurs and foreign merchants.⁹⁷ There was also a marked rise in the number of European pilgrims reaching the Holy Land, and subsequently the revenues from this source grew as well.⁹⁸ It is true that the cost of living had been rapidly rising since the Egyptian conquest, but so had the price of agricultural products and the wages of workers and artisans.⁹⁹ Thus the overall value of the taxes (in cash) declined, and it is doubtful whether even with the *farda* they exceeded, at this stage, the level of taxation exacted by the chiefs and previous rulers.¹⁰⁰

In Palestine the reforms and the instructions of Sharif Bey were at first ignored by the local governors and chiefs, but they aroused great apprehension. Nonetheless, after the return of Ibrāhīm to Syria in about the middle of 1833 the apprehension fast grew into a general disillusionment regarding the possibility of a *modus vivendi* with the Egyptian régime. In a meeting between Ibrāhīm and some of his local allies, at the head of whom were *Amīr* Bashīr and Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī, held immediately after the return of Ibrāhīm from Anatolia, he informed his allies of his intention to integrate the local chiefs and their armies with the Egyptian administrative machinery and army. The chiefs were also warned to pay up all the arrears in taxation and to obey Sharif's instructions.¹⁰¹

With adequate military forces at their disposal, the Egyptians vigorously implemented the reforms of Sharif Bey in the second part of 1833. Governors and notables who persisted in their disobedience were dismissed or punished. Law and order was preserved with an iron hand. The taxes were farmed out

⁹⁶ M. Sabry, *L'Empire Egyptien sous Mohamed Ali* ..., Paris, 1930, p. 344, according to Barker, 7.7.1831.

⁹⁷ F.O. 78/243, Farren, 7.2.1834; F.O. 78/283, Campbell, 31.7.1836, pp. 233–235. That Syria enjoyed prosperity during the first years of the Egyptian conquest can be easily deduced from the rapid rise in the importation of consumer goods from Europe. Bowring, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–30, 37–45.

⁹⁸ *Annals*, p. 71; Qusṭanṭīn, pp. 95–6; Cattai, *op. cit.*, pp. 99–100, No. 38; Bazili, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁹⁹ F.O. 78/283, Campbell, 31.7.1836, answers to questions Nos. 17 and 18.

¹⁰⁰ 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 135–6, 151–2. An Austrian thaler, which in 1824 was worth eight piasters, was exchanged in 1836 for twenty piasters. F.O. 78/283, No. 18, Campbell, 13.7.1836.

¹⁰¹ *Turquie Consulats Divers*, Vol. II, 1832–33, pp. 276–278, Beirut, 30.8.1833; F.O. 78/229, No. 4, Farren, 12.6.1833.

to the highest bidder, and their collection was enforced with the help of Egyptian troops.¹⁰²

In the Jerusalem area the heads of the Abū Ghūsh family, who continuously ignored the instructions of the Egyptian government, were arrested in the middle of 1833 and were sent to work in labour gangs in Acre.¹⁰³ Their subordinate chiefs and followers in the Bethlehem area, who refused to pay the new taxes, were harshly punished by Egyptian troops dispatched by Ibrāhīm¹⁰⁴ Qāsim al-Aḥmad, the *mutasallim* of Jerusalem, who displeased the Egyptian officials, was dismissed; and although his son, who was removed from the *mutasallimiyya* of Nablus, was appointed in his place, the real power in Jerusalem rested in the hands of the commander of the Egyptian troops.¹⁰⁵

The one chief who cooperated with the Egyptians without reservation and who thus benefited from the new situation was Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī. He was appointed *mudir* of Sidon. One of his sons became *mutasallim* of Nablus, another of Jenin, and another of Jaffa. His relations with Ibrāhīm and the role which he played in this period were in many ways similar to the relations of Mūsā Ṭūqān (and his family) with Sulaymān Pasha and especially with 'Abdullāh Pasha, and the role which he played in their period.¹⁰⁶ Consequently, the Nablus chiefs, who feared the monopolization of the government by one family serving as a tool for the centralization policy of the Egyptians, began to plot against the Egyptians together with the chiefs of the Jerusalem area.

The religious oligarchy of Jerusalem and the '*ulamā*' of Palestine as a whole were, to say the least, completely unenthusiastic about the new Egyptian government from the start. Traditionally, they were attached to the sultan, the Caliph of Islam, and the judicial and religious hierarchy of the Empire. Thus, they were favourably predisposed to the religiously intoned propaganda against Muḥammad 'Alī which Istanbul kept putting out.

¹⁰² *Turquie Consulats Divers*, Vol. II, 1832-33, p. 275, Beirut, 30.6.1833; p. 276, Beirut, 10.8.1833; *Persia and Persian Gulf*, Vol. 49, Farren, 25.9.1833; F.O. 78/229, Farren, 22.6.1833; *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 243, Nos. 2588, 2590; Linsday, *op. cit.*, II, 288; *Katāfakū*, *op. cit.*, p. 27; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 137, 158-9; Monro, *op. cit.*, I, 264; F.O. 78/293, Consul Werry to Palmerston; Montefiore, *op. cit.*, pp. 252, 256, 265.

¹⁰³ Lamartine, *op. cit.*, II, 2-9; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 158-159.

¹⁰⁴ F.O. 78/229, Farren 22.6.1833; *Turquie Consulats Divers*, Vol. II, 1832-33, p. 275, St. Jean d'Acre, 30.6.1833.

¹⁰⁵ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 252; *Usūl*, II, 82, No. 118; *ibid.*, II, 95, No. 125; *ibid.*, II, 134-135, No. 146; *ibid.*, II, 131, Nos. 146-148; *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 336, No. 3072; Manṣūr, *op. cit.*, pp. 70-71. The *aghās* of the Hawwāra who ruled lower Galilee were treated similarly.

¹⁰⁶ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, p. 251; *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 166, No. 2184.

To be sure, the religious notables were aware of the sultan's own reforming activities and were greatly dissatisfied with the changes and reforms in Palestine and Syria. However, if at first they might have been inclined to view the Egyptian invasion without hostility and possibly with glee, they changed their minds shortly after the arrival of the Egyptians in the country. The Egyptians, unlike Maḥmūd, presented a clear and present danger. The 'ulamā' of Palestine were confronted with Egyptian *niḡām* troops and revolutionary attempts at reform soon after the arrival of Ibrāhīm in Palestine. From the start, the 'ulamā' were given reason to believe that the Egyptian "new order" would undermine the financial and administrative powers which they enjoyed and the near autonomy which they had achieved in the administration of Jerusalem. Ibrāhīm's instructions regarding the *ra'āyā* and the Franks, and Sharif Bey's attempts at centralization were received with hostility, but were ignored. However, when from the middle of 1833 these instructions were implemented by force,¹⁰⁷ the Jerusalem leadership found itself in a completely subordinate position to Egyptian officials and without the substantial revenues previously derived from its special position. Not less serious was the fact that the traditional relationship between Muslims and *dhimīs* in Jerusalem and all over the country was completely disrupted, and Franks were in many cases even more privileged than Muslims. Finally, by the end of 1833 the Egyptian authorities began to establish a secularized judicial system. This system not only caused the *Sharī'a* courts to lose a substantial part of their revenue, but it also deprived them, and the 'ulamā' connected with them, of most of their power and authority.¹⁰⁸ Thus, the religious leadership of Palestine, if it was not directly involved in the revolt planned against the Egyptians, at least gave it its blessing.

XI

By the beginning of 1834, the population of Palestine enjoyed a measure of security, law and order far beyond what it had known in the past.¹⁰⁹ It has already been pointed out that there was a general revival in the economy of Syria and that the heavier taxation levied by the Egyptians was counter-balanced to some extent by the decline of the value of money and by the great rise in the price of agricultural produce and wages. Moreover, the Egyptians facilitated and encouraged the cultivation of lands previously

¹⁰⁷ Lamartine, *op. cit.*, II, 2-9; Bazili, *op. cit.*, p. 138; Qusṭanṭīn, p. 96.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 56; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 135-8; Lindsay, *op. cit.*, II, 302-303, according to Consul, Farren; *Mahfūzāt*, II, 336, No. 3077; *ibid.*, II, 359, No. 3207; *ibid.*, II, 363, No. 3234; *ibid.*, II, 376, No. 3313; *ibid.*, II, 457, No. 3713; F.O. 78/283, No. 28, Campbell, 23.8.1836.

¹⁰⁹ Bazili, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 192-193; Monro, *op. cit.*, II, 12-14; Lindsay, *op. cit.*, II, 302-303; Qusṭanṭīn, p. 96.

abandoned owing to insecurity. Large-scale experimentation in the field of agriculture was also undertaken by the authorities in order to improve, diversify and increase agricultural output.¹¹⁰ In fact, this policy was implemented in many cases in a most inconsiderate and tyrannical way, causing great hardships to the population.¹¹¹ Thus, even the improvements initiated by the authorities were rejected and disliked by the people. The Muslim population objected above all, however, to the change in the status of the *ra'āyā*, a matter which caused the strongest possible reaction. "The Syrian mussulmans ... deeply deplore the loss of that sort of superiority which they all individually exerted over and against the other sects."¹¹² This feeling was further aggravated by the *farda* levied on Muslims, Christians and Jews alike and considered by the Muslim population to be a form of *jizya*.¹¹³

The Egyptian reforms, and especially the centralization policy of Sharif Bey, completely undermined the authority of the Palestine chiefs over their clients and gradually diminished the dependency of the government on their services. Those notables who were left in office became in reality mere officials in the Egyptian administrative machinery. The Egyptians maintained law and order, protected the population from the Bedouins, provided justice in their own courts of law and collected the taxes through tax farmers, whom they selected themselves. Thus, the "feudatories" and the chiefs became completely superfluous. Already in 1833, the chiefs of Palestine realized their great mistake in preferring the strong Egyptian government to the relatively weak and decentralized Ottoman authorities. This became evident when Ibrāhīm began to enforce Sharif Bey's reforms, and the 'Abd al-Hādīs, though they were made the sole representatives of the Egyptian administration in Palestine, were nothing but obedient officials of Ibrāhīm. By then the chiefs of Palestine understood that a *modus vivendi* between the old régime and the Egyptian "new order" was impossible.

The final and desperate break of the Palestine chiefs with the Egyptian government occurred in the first half of 1834, when the Egyptians insisted that each chief supply a list of his followers and kinsmen, in numbers deter-

¹¹⁰ Bazili, *op. cit.*, p. 193; Sabry, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-342; Robinson, *op. cit.*, III, 167; Monro, *op. cit.*, II, 34; Cattai, *op. cit.*, I, 40-41, No. 18; *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 243, No. 2588; *ibid.*, II, 264, No. 2696; *ibid.*, II, 274, No. 2744; *ibid.*, II, 287, No. 2811; *ibid.*, II, 294, No. 2840; *ibid.*, II, 307, No. 2905; *ibid.*, II, 326, No. 3015; *ibid.*, II, 345, No. 3133; *ibid.*, II, 346, No. 3139; *ibid.*, II, 389, No. 3393.

¹¹¹ Especially as many farmers were called up for long periods of forced labour together with their beasts of burden. Monro, *op. cit.*, II, 34; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 159-160; F.O. 78/243 Campbell, 3.7.1836, answers to questions Nos. 17 and 18.

¹¹² F.O. 78/283, No. 29, p. 242, Campbell, 23.8.1836.

¹¹³ Qusṭantīn, pp. 77, 90-91.

mined by the Egyptians, to be conscripted into the Egyptian army. In fact, the conscription of Syrians had been decided upon by Muḥammad 'Alī as early as 1832, because of the shortage of manpower in Egypt. However, the implementation of the plan was postponed at the request of Ibrāhīm, in view of the unstable situation in Syria and his awareness of the strong opposition that such a measure would arouse. By the beginning of 1834, however, after the greatly reduced Egyptian army had returned to Syria, Ibrāhīm agreed to implement a plan of gradual conscription and disarmament in Syria and Palestine.¹¹⁴ The new Egyptian measure would have broken the backbone of the "feudal" military power, and would have literally deprived the chiefs of their last weapon. Consequently, the Palestine chiefs and notables, Qaysīs and Yamanīs alike, with the exception of the 'Abd al-Hādīs, followed by their more than willing clients, rebelled against the Egyptian government in May 1834.

Palestine and Syria had often known oppressive rule by various pashas. When Ottoman authorities went too far, and especially when they infringed on local privileges, spontaneous revolts had often occurred in different parts of the country. The rebellion of 1834 was something different. It had the blessing of the 'ulamā', it was general, and the most bitter rebellion of all, as the chiefs of Palestine were convinced by now that the Egyptian reforms were about to eliminate them as a class. In the Hebron district the rebels were led by the 'Amrs. Around Jerusalem and Bethlehem the leadership was in the hands of the Abū Ghūshes and the Samḥāns, who were supported by some of the Nablus chiefs. In the Galilee, the Aghas of the Hawwāra joined forces with the remnants of the local leadership in the area. On the coast, the main towns were besieged by Bedouins, helped by some of the important families of the surrounding villages. However, the most determined of the rebels were the chiefs of the Nablus district and their followers, who were led by Qāsim al Aḥmad and his sons.

Had it not been for the lack of co-ordination among the rebel chiefs and their disunity even in the face of the common enemy, they might have driven the Egyptians out of Palestine. Even so, it took most of Ibrāhīm's army and the presence of Muḥammad 'Alī himself, with whatever reinforcements he could muster in Egypt, to crush the rebellion of the Palestine chiefs, which seriously threatened the continuation of the Egyptian government in the whole of Syria.

¹¹⁴ F.O. 78/243, No. 8, Farren, 29.5.1834; F.O. 78/263, No. 7, Farren, 30.1.1835; Cattai, *op. cit.*, I, 57-58, No. 23B; 'Izz al-Dīn, pp. 152-3; *Mahfūzāt*, II, 95, No. 1720; *ibid.*, II, 110, No. 1821; *ibid.*, II, 114, No. 1852; *ibid.*, II, 397, No. 3433; *ibid.*, II, 462, No. 3755; *Annals*, p. 78; Qusṭanṭīn, p. 99.

17. THE ADMINISTRATION OF SYRIA AND PALESTINE UNDER EGYPTIAN RULE (1831-1840)

by YITZHAK HOFMAN

I. Provisional Administration

In the middle of June 1832, Ibrāhīm Pasha entered Damascus at the head of the Egyptian army, accompanied by Amīr Bashīr and his followers.¹ The battles of Homs, Bailān and Konya which followed completed the conquest of Syria by the Egyptians.²

During the siege of Acre, and throughout the period of conquest in general, Ibrāhīm had been careful not to harm the civilian population, being guided by a policy of gaining popularity among them. Ibrāhīm forbade his soldiers to loot property from the citizens of Acre; those who disobeyed were punished and ordered to return everything they had stolen.³ He adopted a policy of paying liberally for supplies delivered to the army,⁴ and tried by his actions to gain the friendship of the citizens and to convince them that they would improve their lot through cooperation. He pursued the

¹ Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, *Lubnān fī 'Ahd al-Umarā' al-Shihābiyyīn*, Beirut, 1933, III, 863. Ḥaydar Aḥmad al-Shihābī, *Ta'rikh al-Amīr Bashīr al-Kabīr*, Lubnān, 1933, II, 70 A. Katāfakū, *Futūḥāt Ibrāhīm Bāshā*, Beirut, 1937, pp. 27-28; Qusṭanṭīn, p. 55. F.O. 78/215 (Farren's letter to Palmerston reporting Ibrāhīm's entry into Damascus); G. von Olberg, *Geschichte des Krieges zwischen Mehemed-Ali und der Ottomansichen Pforte in Syrien und Klein Asien in den Jahren 1831 bis 1833*, Berlin, 1837, p. 103; E. B. B. Barker, *Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey, etc.*, London, 1876, II, 188; and P. Mouriez, *Histoire de Méhémet-Ali, Vice-Roi d'Egypte*, Paris, 1858, VII, 211.

² The Battle of Homs on 9.7.1832; the Battle of Bailān on 30.7.1832; the Battle of Konya on 21.12.1832 (see Olberg; *op. cit.*, who gives maps and dates of battles at the end of his book). And see also G. Rosen, *Geschichte der Türkei, 1826-1856*, Leipzig, 1866, I, 162 and H. J. S. Lammens, *La Syrie*, Beyrouth, 1921, II, 154-155.

³ *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 31, Doc. 1251, 27 Muḥarram 1248 A.H./26.5.1832. Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 58. Katāfakū, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26, states that Ibrāhīm's soldiers sacked Acre for seven days but that Ibrāhīm later punished them severely. Many citizens of Acre joined the Egyptians after the fall of their town. And see M. D. Hogg, *Visit to Alexandria, Damascus and Jerusalem during the Successful Campaigns of Ibrahim Pasha*, London, 1835, I, 193, who gives the same account. Ibrāhīm gave orders, as soon as the siege had been lifted, to repair the houses in Acre and to check the state of the walls, in order to encourage the inhabitants to return (Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 60).

⁴ Ḥaydar, *Lubnān*, III, 842-843.

same policy in Damascus, where he showed compassion, patience and understanding and provided security of life and property, making sure that this was constantly maintained.⁵

In behaving with moderation towards the population of the conquered areas, Ibrāhīm was fulfilling both the request and the command of his father Muḥammad 'Alī, who, in one of his letters to him, pointed out that the inhabitants should be assured of their security and tranquility, this being "one of the most important elements in a war of conquest."⁶

Furthermore, Ibrāhīm and his army appeared as liberators of the people from the yoke of the pashas and their oppression, and as the bearers of an easier and non-arbitrary régime. In his propaganda Ibrāhīm made use of the desire of the people who "... gémissaient sous la cruelle domination de tyrannaux vivant d'extortions et de rapines. Ibrahim ne manqua point de faire virbrer le mot magique de délivrance..."⁷

On the whole, the inhabitants of Syria welcomed the Egyptian invasion with open arms.⁸ Even Hamont, one of Muḥammad 'Alī's severest critics, mentions that the invading army was received as an army of liberation: "Les Syriens appelèrent les soldats égyptiens, leur libérateurs."⁹ Thus, the inhabitants of Jabal Nablus, with the memory of their blood feud with 'Abdullāh Pasha still fresh in their minds, were hoping for a change in their situation and cooperated with the Egyptians even before the fall of Acre.¹⁰ The positive attitude of the population towards the Egyptians went even beyond the frontiers of Syria. A few months after the capture of Damascus, inhabitants of the province of Anatolia demonstrated their sympathy with Ibrāhīm's army when it reached the Taurus (via Adana), and attacked and repulsed the

⁵ Katāfākū, *op. cit.*, p. 27; Qusṭanṭīn, pp. 53–61.

⁶ *Mahfūẓāt*, I, 269, Doc. 780, 19 Dhū al-Qa'da 1247 A.H./15.8.1832. In previous conquests the Egyptians did not treat the local population with the gentleness they employed towards the Syrians. The cruelty of the Egyptians during the conquest of Sudan, for example, is well known. H. Dehérain, *Le Soudan Egyptien sous Mehemet Ali*, Paris, 1898, pp. 90–91, describes the Egyptian campaign there as "extrêmement cruelle."

⁷ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, VII, 210.

⁸ H. Guys, *Relation d'un séjour de plusieurs années à Beyrout et dans le Liban*, Paris, 1847, II, 224, notes "L'enthousiasme que les habitants de la Syrie manifestaient à l'arrivée des Egyptiens ..." Rustum disagrees with this view, and argues with Sabry, basing his opinion on Ibrāhīm's letters to his father, in which he gives expression to his disquiet at the distrust of the Egyptians on the part of the Muslims in certain areas of Syria (A. J. Rustum, *The Royal Archives of Egypt and the Origins of the Egyptian Expedition to Syria, 1831–1841*, Beirut, 1936, p. 45).

⁹ P. N. Hamont, *L'Egypte sous Méhémet-Ali*, Paris, 1845, II, 384.

¹⁰ E. de Cadalvène et P. A. C. E. Barrault, *Histoire de la Guerre du Méhémed-Ali contre la Porte Ottoman en Syrie et en Asie Mineure (1831–1833)*, Paris, 1837, p. 67. A. F. Prokesch-Osten, *Krieg des Vice-Königs von Aegypten, etc.*, Stuttgart, 1844, p. 32.

Ottoman garrisons at Külek Boğazi and Ulu Kishla at the beginning of October 1832.¹¹ The sympathy with which the Egyptians were received derived from the inhabitants' awareness that "any change should be welcomed as an improvement."¹²

With the coming of the Egyptians, changes did indeed take place in the Syrian régime. Two periods in the organization of the administration can be discerned: the first, very brief, which lasted from the end of 1831 until 21 November 1832, namely, until the arrival of Muḥammad Sharif in Damascus; and the second, which started after the latter's arrival and continued until the disintegration of the Egyptian government and its withdrawal from Syria at the start of 1841.

During the first period, which lasted for a year, there were no substantial changes in Syria's administrative rule. On the whole the previous order was maintained and continued as in the period prior to the siege of Acre. When the siege started, Ibrāhīm guaranteed that there would be no disruption in the administration, and ordered the *mutasallims* and *qādīs* of the towns of Tyre, Sidon and Beirut to retain their posts.¹³

He behaved similarly with officials in other places, most of whom remained at their posts. On 20 November 1831, Ḥannā Bahṛī¹⁴ wrote to the *bashmu'āwin*¹⁵ informing him that Sheikhs Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī, 'Abdullāh Jarrār and others wished to retain their positions as *mutasallims*.¹⁶ Some two months later, on 23 February 1832, there came notification from Ibrāhīm

¹¹ On Külek Boğazi, see J. V. Parry, "Bozanti," *EI*², I, 1280. Ulu Kishla is situated on an important crossroad between Külek Bogazi and Ereğli, and see W. M. Ramsay, "Cilicia, Tarsus and the Great Taurus Pass," *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. XXII (1903), pp. 357ff, and especially pp. 371 and 405. See also F. Taeschner, *Das Anatolische Wegenetz*, etc., Leipzig, 1926, I, 138, n. 1 and Tafel 14 and 15.

¹² Rosen, *op. cit.*, I, 156 and 158. For the enthusiasm with which the inhabitants of Carmenia received the Egyptian conquerors, see Mimeaut's letter to Sebastini from Alexandria dated 27.8.1832 (G. Douin, *La Première Guerre de la Syrie, etc., 1831-1832*, Le Caire, 1931, I, 312. See also *ibid.*, p. 367.

¹³ Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 13.

¹⁴ Ḥannā Bahṛī accompanied Ibrāhīm when he set forth to invade Syria and entered Acre with him (*ibid.*, II, 31; also Qusṭanṭīn, p. 75).

¹⁵ *Bashmu'āwin* is the title of the head of Muḥammad 'Alī's Bureau in Egypt. He is very frequently mentioned in the exchange of letters between Egypt and Syria (see *Mahfūzāt*, all volumes). J. Deny, *Sommaire des Archives Turques du Caire*, Le Caire, 1930, p. 95, defines his position as follows: "... les mou'avin du vice-roi étaient sous les ordres d'un aide-principal, bach-maouin qui eut plus tard le titre de pacha."

¹⁶ *Mahfūzāt*, I, 128-29, Doc. 342, 14-15 Jumādā II 1247 A.H./20.11.1831. The request of the above sheikhs to leave them in their posts is not an idle one, since Ibrāhīm dismissed a number of *mutasallims* appointed by 'Abdullāh. Some of those dismissed were sent to Egypt. (Ḥaydar, *Lubnān*, III, 840; Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 29 and 37).

that the Amīr Bashīr was appointed *mudīr* in Lebanon with limited authority.¹⁷ In the same document Ibrāhīm expressed his view that it was necessary to appoint strong personalities to the position of *mutasallim*, proposing, therefore, the appointment of Aḥmad Agha, *ra'īs albundūqiyya* (commander of the fusilliers), as *mutasallim* in Nablus.

In the middle of January 1832, Ḥannā Baḥrī suggested to the *bashmu'āwīn* appointing 'Abdullāh Jarrār and Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī to Jabal Nablus "for the benefit of the administration there,"¹⁸ whereas Muṣṭafā Berber, the Ottoman *mutasallim* of Tripoli, who handed over the town to the Egyptians, was left in his post as a reward for his act.¹⁹ The trend here can be seen clearly: not to upset the sense of security of the inhabitants, to retain holders of key positions and to win them over to cooperation with the invader.²⁰ As a result of this approach cooperation was forthcoming, not only from the population at large, but also from the heads of local government, men of understanding and influence. It is true that at this time Egyptians, both military and civilian, were already being appointed to administrative positions, as in Acre and Damascus, but only very few of the previously influential people and office holders were removed from their positions. In the above period Damascus (which fell on 14 June 1832)²¹ became capital of Syria,²² and civilian and military governors were appointed to the town. The former was Aḥmad Bey al-Yūsuf and the latter Aḥmad Bey.

The reasons motivating Ibrāhīm at that time to leave local leaders in power wherever this was possible and to free his army for the struggles

¹⁷ *Mahfūzāt*, I, 176, Doc. 459, 19 Sha'bān 1247 A.H./23.1.1832. Ḥaydar says that in appointing Bashīr, Ibrāhīm was carrying out the orders of his father. (Ḥaydar, *Lubnān*, III, 833 and 834; Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 29.)

¹⁸ *Mahfūzāt*, I 176-77, Doc. 462, 20 Sha'bān 1247 A.H./24.1.1832. For details on the Jarrār family, see M. Barīk al-Dimashqī. *Ta'rikh al-Shām*, Lubnān, 1930, pp. 63, 71; for details of Sheikh Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī, see Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 68-69. At the start of the Syrian campaign, the Egyptians succeeded in winning over the notables, unlike in the Sudan, where the Egyptians did not take the trouble to do so (Dehérain, *op. cit.*, p. 196).

¹⁹ Ḥaydar, *Lubnān*, III, 821. G. Douin (ed.), *La Mission du Baron de Bioslecome, L'Egypte et la Syrie en 1833*, Le Caire, 1927, p. 299. And see also F. Charles-Roux, "La Domination Egyptienne en Syrie, 1833-1840," *Revue d'Histoire des Colonies*, Vol. XXVII (1933), p. 189, who says: "Le principe qu'il (M.A.) adopte consiste à laisser ou à donner une part d'autorité aux auxiliaires locaux qui l'ont aidé à conquérir le pays."

²⁰ *Mahfūzāt*, I, 169, Doc. 780, 19 Dhū al-Qa'da 1247 A.H./20.4.1832. In the middle of January, 1833, Muḥammad 'Alī advised Ibrāhīm to set up a *majlis shūrā* in Konya, which would deal with the affairs of the region and publish suitable proclamations, which would satisfy the inhabitants and encourage them to obey the authorities. *Ibid.*, II, 219, Doc. 2466.

²¹ See above, n.1.

²² Douin, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

yet to come with the Ottoman forces are clear, and one could agree with Boislecote, who wrote: "Le principe qu'il adopta fut de confier la défense du pays aux influences qu'il avait été assez heureux ou assez adroit pour réunir en sa faveur et qui lui avaient si efficacement aidé à soumettre la Syrie."²³

In this period the support of a substantial section of the population, and the influence of Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī, Muṣṭafā Berber and Amīr Bashīr, together with their friends, was sufficient to maintain order in Syria and thus to release the Egyptian army for actions against the army of the Sultan. Relatives of Sheikh Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī were given control of the Nablus hills, Jaffa and Jerusalem; relatives of Amīr Bashīr took over Sidon, Beirut and other towns in Lebanon.

A few months after Ibrāhīm's entry into Damascus, Muḥammad Sharif Bey (and later Pasha) was appointed governor-general of Syria (*ḥükūmdār*).

II. Stabilization of the Administration

With the appointment of Muḥammad Sharif Bey as governor-general, the second period in the administration of Syria by the Egyptians began.

At this stage, two approaches to the conduct of the administration in Syria are discernible. The first is that of Ibrāhīm, who wanted to free himself from the burden of everyday management of the Syrian region. The second is that of his father, who was unwilling to release Ibrāhīm from carrying this burden. Ibrāhīm was anxious to set up two authorities: one military and one civil. Accordingly, he requested his father, on 23 June 1832, i.e. only ten days after he had entered Damascus, to appoint a civil governor in Syria.²⁴ Muḥammad 'Alī, however, was as yet reluctant to accept his son's view, since he felt that it was necessary to keep a military government in Syria.²⁵ Yet, on 22 July Ibrāhīm repeated his request to appoint a civilian governor-general in order to release him for military activities, justifying this request on the grounds that his health had been impaired by the war.²⁶

Over four and a half months went by before Muḥammad 'Alī decided to send a governor-general to Syria of the stature of Muḥammad Sharif Bey, former governor of Upper Egypt and his son-in-law.²⁷ The new governor

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

²⁴ *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 29, Doc. 1233, 24 Muḥarram 1248 A.H./23.6.1832.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 35, Doc. 1287, 2 Ṣafar 1248 A.H./1.7.1832.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 52, Doc. 1415, 23 Ṣafar 1248 A.H./22.7.1832.

²⁷ F.O. 78/215; Farren's letter to Palmerston dated 27.10.1832. See also M. Mashāqa, *Mashhad al-A'yān fī Ḥawādith Suriyya wa-Lubnān*, Cairo, 1908, p. 100. Muḥammad Sharif was chosen for his post on the recommendation of Ibrāhīm Pasha, who suggested appointing him head of the administration in Syria. *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 89, Doc. 1860, 3 Rabi' I 1248 A.H./26.12.1832.

arrived in Damascus on 21 November 1832 to take up his post, reporting on this by letter²⁸ to Muḥammad 'Alī on 26 December 1832.

With the completion of the Egyptian conquest, and after the agreement of Kūtahya,²⁹ the division of Syria into *pashaliks* was cancelled, and thereafter the country was divided into a number of *eyālets*, i.e. regions, as follows:

*The Eyālets and their Governors*³⁰

- a. Damascus — Muḥammad Sharīf Pasha
- b. Aleppo — Ismā'īl Bey
- c. Tripoli — Muṣṭafā Berber
- d. Adana and Tarsus — Aḥmed Menikli Pasha
- e. Sidon and Palestine Jerusalem and Nablus — Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī

The position of Lebanon (the coastal strip between Tripoli and Tarsus, and eastward to al-Biqā') remained unchanged. Amīr Bashīr held the Lebanon on lease against a yearly tax of 1500 purses.³¹

All these regions, including Lebanon, were incorporated into one province, namely, Syria — called *Barr al-Shām*, and sometimes also *'Arabistān* or *Bilād al-'Arab* — which was placed under the civil rule of the *ḥükümdār*, Muḥammad Sharīf Bey.

It seems that Perrier's view of Muḥammad Sharīf as being completely

²⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 207, Doc. 2413, 3 Sha'bān 1248 A.H./26.12.1832.

²⁹ The town Kūtahya, up to 1833, had a local pasha. It was considered to be the capital of an *eyālet* in Anatolia. In the middle of April, 1833, a kind of agreement was made there between the Sublime Porte and Muḥammad 'Alī to cease hostilities. Muḥammad 'Alī was confirmed as lessor of the Syrian *pashaliks* (in addition to Egypt) and that of Crete, while Ibrāhīm was confirmed as lessor of the holy towns. He was also given the post of *muḥaṣṣil* (general lessor) of the Adana region on 3 May. In fact, Ibrāhīm (and not Muḥammad 'Alī) was the lessor of Adana, which remained, so to speak, a separate unit not officially attached to Muḥammad 'Alī's area of rule. The names of Muḥammad 'Alī and Ibrāhīm, which had been crossed out of the *tevlhāt* (the list of appointments and promotions published in Constantinople every year on the holy day of Küçük Bayram, at the beginning of the month of *Shawwāl*) since the invasion of Syria, were once more included (on 14.5.1833) in this list, and see *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. L (1839), "Papers relating to the Arrangement made between the Porte and Mehmet Ali in 1833." See also Olberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 226, 229; Cadalvène et Barrault, *op. cit.*, p. 92; F. Mengin, *Histoire de L'Egypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed Aly*, Paris, 1823, p. 56; Barker, *op. cit.*, II, 197; A. G. Politis, *Le Conflit Turco-Egyptien de 1838-1841 et les Dernières Années du Règne de Mohammed Aly*, etc., Le Caire, 1931, p. xiii.

³⁰ Cf. this division with the division of Syria into *pashaliks* at the time of Volney.

³¹ Anton Laurin, *Syrien, Tharsus und Adassa in Jumus, 1836*, Österreichisches Staatsarchiv. See also Douin, *Première Guerre*, I, 382. Frequent changes have occurred in the value of the purses.

independent and not subordinated to Ibrāhīm in certain matters should be considered with some reservations ("Son autorité était en quelque sorte en dehors des attributions d'Ibrahim");³² since, in Muḥammad 'Alī's letter to Muḥammad Sharif dated 23 Muḥarram 1253/29.4.1837, he stated explicitly that in all matters concerning Syria's internal affairs Sharif should consult with Ibrāhīm, and in everything pertaining to external affairs, with the writer himself (i.e. with Muḥammad 'Alī).³³

It appears, therefore, that the highest authority in both the administrative and the military areas, was vested in Ibrāhīm. He was the supreme commander (*ser'asker*)³⁴ of the armed forces and head of the civil administration.

I shall return later to a discussion of Ibrāhīm's administrative duties and the extent of his intervention in administrative staff arrangements functioning in Syria. For the moment, it is sufficient to state that Ibrāhīm regarded it as his duty to intervene in and to supervise the administration of Syria. Sharif's independence derived to a considerable extent from the fact that Ibrāhīm was preoccupied with his military duties, which were his chief concern and to which he devoted most of his time, thoughts and energies. He was therefore unable to deal systematically and consistently with civilian affairs.

In the view of both Sultan Maḥmūd II and Muḥammad 'Alī, the Kūtahya agreement was provisional and non-binding, rather like an armistice: "La convention de Kutahya ne pouvait guère être qu'un armistice ..." ³⁵ Since the agreement did not recognize Muḥammad 'Alī's claims to hold Syria except in the manner customary at the period of the pashas, namely, by a yearly appointment, and since the Sublime Porte had the power, even if only in theory, to cancel the above arrangement whenever this seemed desirable

³² M. F. Perrier, *La Syrie sous le Gouvernement de Mehemet-Ali*, Paris, 1842, p. 53.

³³ *Maḥfūẓāt*, III, 231, Doc. 4970, 23 Muḥarram 1253 A.H./29.4.1837.

³⁴ *Ser'asker* is the old Ottoman title which used to be granted when necessary to army commanders, e.g., in a case of a campaign to put down a revolt. M. D'Ohsoson, *Tableau Général de L'Empire Ottoman*, Paris, 1787, III, 387. During the time of Maḥmūd II the title changed its meaning. It was given to the Minister of War and Commander of the Armed Forces of the Ottoman Empire. Similarly, the *ser'asker* was responsible for public safety, police duties and so on. Between 1827-36 the title was carried by Husrev Pasha (B. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London, 1961, p. 79). It is almost certain that the changed meaning of the title in the Ottoman Empire considerably influenced its being granted permanently to Ibrāhīm.

³⁵ E. Gouin, *L'Egypte au XIXe Siècle, etc.*, Paris, 1847, p. 425. And see F. Mengin, *Histoire Sommaire de l'Egypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed-Aly*, Paris, 1839, p. 56. See also Armand Lefèbvre, "De la Politique de la France dans les Affaires d'Orient," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. XV (1838), p. 291: "... tous les éléments d'une crise plus ou moins prochaine existent, tous les intérêts sont en présence et dans l'attente."

(by omitting the names of Muḥammad 'Alī and Ibrāhīm from the *tevhāt*),³⁶ it follows that a situation was created whereby Syria officially came under a kind of joint Ottoman-Egyptian rule: Ottoman in theory, Egyptian in practice.

The Sublime Porte surrendered its right to station garrisons in the principal towns. The Sultan appointed the mufti, and the Sublime Porte appointed the *qādī*. The Sublime Porte further retained the right to publish firmans on matters of supreme importance, such as those affecting trade and diplomatic relations with foreign powers,³⁷ the status and rights of Europeans, and so on. Syria was obliged to pay a yearly tax to the Sultan. But the effective government of the country was entirely in Egyptian hands. They ruled the country through a concentration of the main authority in the hands of an Egyptian elite, on the one hand, and the institution of numerous councils³⁸ (*dīwān* or *majlis shūrā*), on the other. The Egyptian ruling group in Syria consisted of the following four people, all of whom came from Egypt:

Ibrāhīm Pasha — *ser'asker* — Head of the Military Government, who made decision in civil administrative affairs.

Muḥammad Sharīf — *ḥükümdār* (Governor-General).

Sulaymān Pasha — Chief of Staff.

Ḥannā Baḥrī — General Financial Supervisor.

All the above had control over the whole of Syria in their specific fields. Immediately below them in the hierarchy came the following positions, whose authority was limited to a region or large town:

- a. The *qā'imaqām* (sometimes also called *mudīr*) — Military Governor.
- b. The *mutasallim* — Civilian Governor of a region or a town.
- c. The *mubāshir* — Chief Accountant.

III. The Four Members of the Ruling Group and their Functions

A. Ibrāhīm Pasha — Commander in Chief

Ibrāhīm, *ser'asker*, supreme commander of all armed forces in Syria, both regulars (*niḡām*) and irregulars (*bashi bozuk*), came directly under his father,

³⁶ Mouriez, *op. cit.*, VII, 232. Rosen, I, 177. See also above, n. 29.

³⁷ Muḥammad 'Alī gave permission for a British Consulate to be opened in Jerusalem at the request of Col. Campbell to him in the year 1837, but made this conditional on the agreement of the Sultan, who was the legal ruler. The Sultan's firman was received in July, 1838. See *Br. Interests*, p. 31. (Up to that time, foreign nationals, and even consuls were not permitted to reside permanently in Jerusalem. See *ibid.*, p. 32.)

³⁸ The centralized régime, together with the *majlis* and the *dīwāns* in Egypt are discussed at length in J. H. Kramers, "Khediw," *EI*¹, II, 945. See also A. B. Clot-Bey, *Aperçu Général sur l'Égypte*, Paris, 1840, II, 183 and Deny, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34, who indicates Muḥammad 'Alī's habit of personally checking every matter, and concentrating everything in his own hands. And see *ibid.*, pp. 108–109 on the various Councils.

Muḥammad 'Alī. His main authority was rooted in the complete trust which his father had in him,³⁹ in his strong personality and his brilliant military achievements.⁴⁰ As *ser'asker* he carried out his father's instructions in direct military actions against the Sultan's army, in repressing the revolts which occurred in Syria during the period of Egyptian rule, in the manpower recruitment carried on in Syria, and in disarming the population. All these were eminently military activities. The British Consul, Farren, mentioned in his letter to the British Foreign Office that power in Syria was effectively in the hands of Ibrāhīm; the Syrians and the Arabs (i.e. Bedouin) were afraid of him because the military power was concentrated in his hands.⁴¹ And yet, by virtue of his personality and authority, Ibrāhīm was also supreme head of the civil administration in Syria, to which he devoted considerable attention. It appears that, as a result of this, his personal relations with Muḥammad Sharīf, civilian governor of Syria, were very unsatisfactory.⁴² Muḥammad 'Alī himself decided that Ibrāhīm should "look into the internal affairs" (see n. 33) of Syria. About a year after the conquest of Syria, Muḥammad 'Alī advised his son to be independent, to act in accordance with his own judgment and to make the best decision in each case, without taking into consideration at all the possible reactions of his father.⁴³ And indeed, whenever Ibrāhīm was not overburdened with his military duties and could get away from guarding the dangerous northern frontier, where most of the army was stationed, and from Antioch, where he had built himself a palace to live in, he used to deal with problems of the civil administration. In this connection, the following facts are instructive:

1. In a letter to Ḥusayn Pasha, director of Muḥammad 'Alī's bureau in Alexandria, Ibrāhīm pointed out the slackness of the administration in *Barr al-Shām* (Syria), and laid the blame for this on neglect of duty by the officials who gave their personal affairs priority over public welfare. He stated that Baḥrī Bey did not take his duties in Damascus seriously, that the

³⁹ Madden thinks there were differences of opinion between Muḥammad 'Alī, who favoured the industrialization of Egypt, and Ibrāhīm, who was mainly in favour of improvements in agriculture (R. Madden, *Egypt and Mohammed Ali*, London, 1841, p. 15).

⁴⁰ The subjugation of the Wahhābīs, the completion of the conquest of Sudan, his victories over the Greeks at Morea; and last but not least, his victories over the Ottomans in Syria and Anatolia. (The long drawn-out siege of Acre somewhat clouded Ibrāhīm's military glory, but the lightning conquest of Syria and the defeat of the Ottoman armies in a number of battles not only restored him to his former glory, but even made him appear greater.) See also K. Hron, *Aegypten und die Aegyptische Frage*, Leipzig, 1895, pp. 115-116.

⁴¹ F.O. 78/243, Farren's letter from Damascus to J. Backhouse, dated 23.11.1834.

⁴² Perrier, *op. cit.*, p. 53. See also *Mahfūẓāt*, III, 68, Doc., 4350.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, II, 197, Doc. 2353, 21 Rajab 1248 A.H./14.12.1832.

majlis al-shūrā there was not performing its tasks, that affairs had been piling up for a year and a half without being dealt with, and that he had ordered the members of the *majlis* to remain in session and not to leave until they had finished all outstanding business. He also indicated shortcomings in the administration of Sidon, and commented that he would spend the winter season in that area in order to deal with its affairs. He then proposed the appointment of Sharmī Efendi as the person most capable of dealing with civil affairs, unless his father should select someone else, since he himself was unable (in his then feeble state of health) to deal with both military and civil affairs at one and the same time.⁴⁴

2. At the end of September 1838, Werry, the British Consul in Damascus, who had taken over from Farren, wrote that during his visit to that town Ibrāhīm paid most attention to checking the civil administration. Many officials were demoted or discharged from their posts, and one of Muḥammad Shārf's assistants was sentenced to five years in Acre jail. He appeared personally at the *majlis al-shūrā* and did not permit its members to leave until all the accumulated matters had been dealt with.⁴⁵

In Perrier's view, Ibrāhīm dealt with the civil administration only when he considered it desirable, and whenever it was inconvenient for him he acted as *ser'asker* only: "Ibrahim Pacha s'occupait de l'administration civile, quand il le jugeait à propos et à son avantage: lorsqu'il ne lui convenait pas de rendre une justice qui pouvait lui devenir onéreuse, il n'était que généralissime ou seraskier."⁴⁶ This opinion, although expressed by a well-informed authority, seems to be insufficiently founded, since the examples quoted above prove, in my view, that Ibrāhīm, to the extent that he was free from his military preoccupations, took a clear and firm stand in administrative matters, even in cases where this brought him into direct conflict with the administrative bodies concerned.

Ibrāhīm dealt directly with many other administrative matters,⁴⁷ such as public and road safety, improvements in the fields of agriculture, activities in the quarries and mines, the speedy transportation of timber to Egypt,

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, III, 417-418, Doc. 5496, 18 Jumādā II 1254 A.H./8.9.1838. Later on Husayn Pasha notifies the agreement of Muḥammad 'Alī to this recommendation: *Ibid.*, III, 435, doc. 5518: 16 Jumādā II 1254 A.H./6.9.1838.

⁴⁵ F.O. 78/341, Letter from Consul Werry in Damascus; 28.9.1838. *Mahfūẓāt*, III, 297; Doc. 5184, 26 Sha'bān 1253 A.H./25.11.1837.

⁴⁶ Perrier, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

⁴⁷ Contrary to the opinion of many observers who praised Ibrāhīm's qualities as an administrator (cf. Mengin, *Histoire Sommaire*, Jommard's Introduction, pp. xix-xx; also Hron, *op. cit.*, p. 121) Katāfākū, *op. cit.*, p. 67, maintains that Ibrāhīm was not suited to be an administrator. However, one should notice that Katāfākū is not an objective witness; he was not on good terms with the Egyptians, particularly not with Ibrāhīm.

improvement of sheep strains, settlement of Bedouin, and so on. On occasion he had to use military means to effect administrative tasks, such as mobilization, and disarmament of the civil population.

B. Sulaymān Pasha⁴⁸ — Chief of Staff

Sulaymān Pasha was Colonel Sève, the French officer who converted to Islam and organized the Egyptian army on French lines. He was the highest ranking officer in this army, Ibrāhīm's right hand in the invasion of Syria and later, and had the personal trust of both Muḥammad 'Alī and Ibrāhīm. There seems to be no clear-cut and specific definition of Sulaymān's tasks, but it is evident that they went far beyond the confines of the purely military. One of his chief non-military tasks was to mediate between the foreign consuls and other Europeans and the local authorities.⁴⁹

Sulaymān Pasha's position as mediator between the foreign colony and the local government of Syria clashed directly with the *ḥukūmdār's* authority, but I did not find evidence of complaints from the latter about this state of affairs. It seems, therefore, that Muḥammad Sharīf's tolerant attitude towards this task of Sulaymān Pasha derived from an awareness of Sulaymān's strong position with both Muḥammad 'Alī and Ibrāhīm.

C. Muḥammad Sharīf — The *Ḥukūmdār* (Governor-General)

As stated above, Muḥammad Sharīf was sent to Syria by Muḥammad 'Alī to take up the post of *ḥukūmdār*⁵⁰ (governor-general) in accordance with the demand of Ibrāhīm, who regarded it as essential to appoint a special person to deal with administrative matters in Syria. Sharīf Pasha had qualifications which fitted him for this position: a) his previous administrative experience as governor of Upper Egypt; b) his exceptional and

⁴⁸ Sulaymān Pasha received special attention from the many travellers who visited Egypt and Syria, and also from those consuls who generally mentioned him in favourable terms: See also an article by Lermier, "Voyage du Duc de Raguse," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, Vol. XI (1837), p. 752. Similarly: E. de Cadalvène et P.A.C.E. Barrault, *Deux Années de l'Histoire d'Orient, 1839-1840*, Paris, 1840, I, 168-180; E. de Salle, *Pérégrinations en Orient ou Voyage Pittoresque, Historique et Politique*, Paris, 1840, I, 204; M. D'Armagnac, *Nezib et Beyrout, Souvenir d'Orient de 1833 à 1841*, Paris, 1844, pp. 77-78; Hamont, *op. cit.*, II, 50-51; Guys, *op. cit.*, II, 244; Mouriez, *op. cit.*, IV, 241-243.

⁴⁹ *Mahfuẓt*; III; 296, Doc. 5182, 25 Sha'bān 1253 A.H./24.11.1837. M. Sabry, *L'Empire Egyptien sous Mohammed-Ali*, Paris, 1930, pp. 383-385; Perrier, *op. cit.*, p. 69, says that Sulaymān Pasha was "... chargé spécialement des relations avec la France." And see Sulaymān Pasha's letter of 1.5.1839 to Vice-Consul F.H.S. Werry in Aleppo, signed "Chargé des Affaires Européennes" (*Levant Papers*, Vol. I, (1841), pp. 49-50).

⁵⁰ This title was also given to the Egyptian governors in Sudan (i.e., Khūrshīd Pasha), and remained until the end of their rule there. Titles in Sudan and Syria were as a rule not the same, R. Hill, *Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881*, London, 1959, p. 23.

uncommon ability to mobilize manpower for army service.⁵¹ Muḥammad Sharif made his headquarters in Damascus, the capital of Syria.

A short while before Ibrāhīm's entry into Damascus, the Sultan's governor there, Selīm Pasha, was murdered by a raging mob, and the town, which was well known for its unrestrained and religiously fanatic population, became the site of disturbances and revolts. Consul Farren described the state in Damascus on the eve of its capture, in the following words: "Damascus remained in a state of anarchy and confusion."⁵² It is no wonder, therefore, that Damascus submitted to Ibrāhīm's army without any opposition. On the contrary, many of the inhabitants regarded him as a saviour, who would rescue them from the wild mobs.⁵³

When Muḥammad Sharif reached Damascus on 21 November 1832, he found there Aḥmad Bey, who had been appointed by Ibrāhīm as *vālī* (governor) of Damascus. Only eleven days after his arrival in Damascus, that is, on 2 December 1832, Muḥammad Sharif sent a circular letter to the *qādī*, to the head of sherifs, and to the Governor of Aleppo in which he announced that he had been appointed *hükümdār* by Muḥammad 'Alī, and by virtue of this appointment they should now realize "that all applications to government departments have been transferred to us."⁵⁴ Muḥammad Sharif concentrated much of the administrative and legal power in his own hands. Although he did not intervene in "local Damascus army arrangements and confined himself to his civilian administrative duties," the army nonetheless recognized his authority as governor and: "... in that capacity not only yielded him obedience, but shewed him great respect."⁵⁵ One of the important restrictions to his authority was the provision that he must receive from Ibrāhīm confirmation of death sentences.

Perrier described Muḥammad Sharif's powers as follows:

Le gouverneur de la Syrie, Chérif-Pacha, résidait à Damas... et avec les pouvoirs les plus étendus; il avait sous son commandement toute la Syrie, depuis les frontières d'Egypte jusqu'à celles des pachaliks d'Alep et de la Cilicie.

Son autorité était en quelque sorte en dehors des attributions d'Ibrahim. Chérif-Pacha était fort jaloux de son pouvoir... sa parenté avec Méhémet-Ali lui donnait l'espoir de l'impunité.⁵⁶

⁵¹ Douin, *La Première Guerre*, I, 264 (Mimeaut's despatch to Sebastini of 24 September 1832). See also G. Hanotaux, *Histoire de la Nation Egyptienne*, Paris, 1936, IV, 53.

⁵² F.O. 78/206, Farren from Beirut, to Palmerston, 12.11.1831. In the above despatch Farren says that Selīm Pasha had been killed in an explosion when his house was set on fire.

⁵³ Quşanşın, pp. 53-57.

⁵⁴ *Uşul*, II, 51, Doc. 99.

⁵⁵ Vieusse de Marmont, *The Present State of the Turkish Empire*, London, 1839, p. 265.

⁵⁶ Perrier, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

Laurin pointed to the existence of differences of opinion between Muḥammad Sharif and the *ser'asker*, and added that Ibrāhīm had the upper hand.⁵⁷

The above descriptions by Perrier and Laurin correspond, in general, to descriptions found in the despatches of British consuls to the British Foreign Office. Campbell, the British consul in Alexandria, wrote the following about Sharif Pasha as an introduction to his report to Palmerston:

His conciliating and dignified manner mixed with a natural but reasonable severity rendered him a very fit person to contend with a fanatical populace of Damascus and great credit is due to his measures for the security and tranquility as well as the entire and open religious toleration which is now enjoyed in this city.⁵⁸

The British consul general in Syria, Farren, whose office was in Damascus and who was therefore the closest foreign observer of Sharif Pasha, defined his position and wide powers as follows: "... the present political arrangements of the country, whose local authorities are now all under the direction and control of Sheriff Bey as Governor General of Syria at Damascus."⁵⁹

Thus, although Sharif Pasha appointed the financial comptroller general, Ḥannā Bahrī, as head of the *majlis shūrā* in Damascus,⁶⁰ he personally took part in the work of the *majlis* and regarded himself as one of its members.⁶¹ Hence he was familiar with all that went on in the administration in Damascus and in the whole country, since the Damascus *shūrā* was also the Supreme Court of Appeal for the whole of Syria, and important matters were brought up before it, as explained below.

C. Ḥannā Bahrī Bey — General Financial Supervisor

Ḥannā Bahrī, an Armenian Catholic, member of a Homs family, was the only local non-Muslim to reach such a high position. He concentrated in his

⁵⁷ Laurin, *op. cit.*, states that "Cherif Pascha selbst standt mehrmals auf dem Punkte mit Ibrahim Pascha uneinig zu werden, und seine Stelle zu verlieren." See also *Mahfūzāt*, IV, 206, Doc. 6000, no. 7, 19 Jumādā II 1255 A.H./30 August 1839: Ibrāhīm writes contemptuously to Muḥammad Sharif regarding the funds (needed by the government).

⁵⁸ F.O. 78/283, Campbell's report.

⁵⁹ F.O. 78/243, Farren to Palmerston (from Damascus). Farren's opinion should be regarded with considerable reservations, like Perrier's remarks.

⁶⁰ Sabry, *op. cit.*, p. 348, thinks that Ḥannā Bahrī was the chairman of the *shūrā* in Damascus. Rustum seems to be correct in his comment in Doc. 3721 in *Mahfūzāt*, II, 459, in which he says that Ḥusayn Efendī al-Murādī was the mufti of Damascus as well as the "supervisor" of the *majlis*. In this case, it may be that Ḥannā Bahrī was supervisor of the *majlis* in a general way, and was the higher authority for the ratification, of its decisions. See Deny, *op. cit.*, p. 106, who says that in the administrative vocabulary of the Egyptians the *nāṣir* meant: "*chef de bureau*."

⁶¹ *Mashāqa*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

hands the financial affairs of both civil and military rule in Syria, and by virtue of his position had a decisive role in administrative matters in general. Together with every *mutasallim* or civil governor of a town or region, there was a *mubāshir*, chief accountant; and all the *mubāshirs* were responsible to Ḥannā Baḥrī, and were required to submit an account of income and expenditures to him. This gave him a thorough knowledge of the financial situation in every area, the conditions of tax collection, customs, wages to employees, military expenditure and so on. By supervising the functioning of the most important *majlis al-shūrā* in Syria from his headquarters in Damascus, he was able to follow closely the general administration of Syria. He was thus, in effect, both the advisor of Ibrāhīm and the *hukūmdar*. During Muḥammad Sharīf's absence, Ḥannā Baḥrī deputized for him. As general financial supervisor he was in close contact with foreign consuls and merchants; and with his excellent diplomatic ability, he successfully mediated between them and the authorities in the many matters under dispute, such as customs, immunity of consular employees, claims of European merchants against local merchants, and so on.

Perrier, in describing Ḥannā Baḥrī, said:

Hanna Bahri-Bey était à la tête de l'administration financière, et dirigeait également la haute comptabilité civil et militaire. Cet homme, Arménien d'origine, doué d'une grande souplesse... and continues: On croirait difficilement jusqu'à quel point il avait réussi à capter la confiance d'Ibrahim Pacha, et surtout du vice-roi...⁶²

Though a Christian, he won the greatest personal respect. When he entered the *majlis* in Damascus, the court honoured him by rising, and although he was by no means a military man, he was granted the military rank of *mīr liwā*.⁶³ He was also the first non-Muslim to receive the title "Bey".

The four central figures in the Syrian administration, Ibrāhīm Pasha, Sulaymān Pasha, Muḥammad Sharīf and Ḥannā Baḥrī Bey, maintained a direct correspondence with Muḥammad 'Alī and received orders directly from his office, either from Muḥammad 'Alī himself or from his *bashmū 'āwin*. This practice allowed Muḥammad 'Alī to maintain a more effective direct and personal supervision over Syrian affairs, and it may be assumed that it strengthened the position of Ibrāhīm's colleagues in government in that country. There was also an exchange of letters between Ibrāhīm, on the one hand, and Muḥammad Sharīf and Ḥannā Baḥrī, on the other. This correspondence reflects some problems in the field of administration, in general, and financial administration, in particular. However, it is not

⁶² Perrier, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-55.

⁶³ Quṣṭanṭīn, p. 80, line 4 below.

clear to what extent Muḥammad 'Alī intended to restrain his son Ibrāhīm through this direct and regular contact with the administrative heads in the conquered areas.

Even though each of the four administrative heads mentioned above had a well-defined function, from time to time there occurred some overlap in dealing with various affairs. This was apt to lead to disputes between them, and indeed a few such disputes are mentioned in the sources. It may be, however, that the extent of the arguments was greater than I have been able to trace in the documents at my disposal. One fact which deserves special mention is that the four major functionaries, and all the administrative personnel in Syria, received salaries in accordance with those in Egypt.⁶⁴

IV. Duties of the *Qā'imaqām* (or *Mudīr*), the *Mutasallim* and the *Mubāshir*

A. The *Qā'imaqām* (or *Mudīr*) — Military Governor

The *qā'imaqām* was the supreme commander of a region, and, as such, had both civilian and military duties, such as maintaining public safety, carrying out the instructions of the central authorities in these spheres, effecting mobilization orders, disarming the population, and similar tasks. The *qā'imaqām* was superior to the *mutasallim*, a fact which was reflected in his much higher salary. The office of *qā'imaqām* was generally reserved for Egyptian military personnel. For example; Aḥmed Meniki Pasha, Ismā'īl Bey, his brother Muḥammad Bey, and 'Amr Bey — the *qā'imaqāms* of Adana and Tarsus, Aleppo, Beirut and Damascus, respectively — were all Egyptians.

B. The *Mutasallim* — Civil Governor of the Town

The office of *mutasallim* was a civil one and reserved for local Syrians, such as, for example, Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Hādī and his son Sulaymān in Hebron, Qāsim al-Aḥmad and Jabr Abū Ghūsh in Jerusalem, Muṣṭafā Berber and Yūsuf Aghā Sharif in Tripoli, Aḥmad Bey Yūsuf in Damascus, Ibrāhīm Siyāf (followed by 'Abdullāh Babilsī) in Aleppo, and the Amīr Bashīr al-Shihābī in Lebanon. (Although the official title of the Amīr Bashīr was *mutasallim*, he ruled over an entire zone, and not over a town, like the other *mutasallims*.)

Perrier, in discussing the *mutasallim*, said:

Chaque ville de la Syrie avait un gouverneur ou mutsellim, recevant

⁶⁴ R. Cattau, *Le Règne de Mohammed Aly, etc.*, Roma, 1931-35, II, 2, 64 bis 24, Duhamel's despatch to Nesselrode of 13 June 1836: "Tous les fonctionnaires publics en Syrie sont rétribués. Chérif Pacha jouit d'un traitement annuel de 3,000, les Mudris de 360, le Musselims de 60 bourses." ("Bourse" is the French name for *kts*; the value of the *kts* was 500 *Kurūsh*.)

les ordres du gouverneur général. Ce mutsellim empiétait continuellement sur les attributions du cadî; car il rendait souvent la justice et remplissait la plus grande partie des fonctions des anciens juges de paix en Europe. Le mutsellim était spécialement chargé de la surveillance, de l'administration de la ville et de presque tous les détails, qui sont du ressort des conseils municipaux en France...⁶⁵

C. *The Mubāshir — Chief Accountant*

The *mubāshir* was at the bottom of the hierarchy of the leading officials. There was an official with this title in every *mutasallim's* office, whose duties were to supervise tax collection of all kinds and to keep the books in the area controlled by the *mutasallim*. He was also paymaster and controller of expenditures. As head of tax collections, he had to make regular reports to the general financial supervisor in Syria, Ḥannā Bahrī. Perrier wrote the following about the holder of this office:

...il avait sous ses ordres un secrétaire du gouvernement, appelé el mubacher qui cumulait en même temps les fonctions de saraf (caissier ou receveur). Le mubacher était chargé, sous sa responsabilité personnelle, des comptes d'administration de la ville et de la recette des contributions directes et territoriales, soit du ferdé et du miri. Ces employés, qui, en Syrie, répondaient aux mallems, cophtes d'Egypt, étaient ordinairement choisis dans la classe des chrétiens rayas, parce qu'il est plus facile de trouver parmi ceux-ci les connaissances de comptabilité que l'on exige: ils étaient, du reste, placés sans garantie ni cautions, et recevaient un minime traitement, suffisant à peine à leur entretien...⁶⁶

Duhamel described the functions of *mubāshir* as follows:

Quant à la partie financière, elle se trouve entièrement entre les mains des Chrétiens, parmi lesquels on choisit tous les écrivains. Un écrivain en chef, ou moubachir se trouve auprès de chaque Mousselim pour percevoir les impôts et faire les paiements. Ces moubachirs relevant directement de Hanna Bahri Bey, qui est également chrétien...⁶⁷

Although the occupation authorities tried from the outset to give a civilian character to the government in Syria, the percentage of military men at the head of the government was very high. The Egyptian army also dealt frequently with civilian or semi-civilian duties, among them police duties, road cleaning by soldiers with a low health rating, guarding some of the

⁶⁵ Perrier, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

⁶⁷ Cattai, *op. cit.*, II, 2 bis 64, Duhamel's despatch to Nesselrode; dated 13 June 1836.

main traffic arteries (such as the highway between Damascus and Beirut), guarding the government posts, and so on.

V. *The Administrative Establishment*

The establishment and methods of administration were a source of great great worry to Muḥammad 'Alī and to the top echelons of government in Syria throughout the period of occupation. In the régime of pashas which preceded the Egyptian invasion, Syria did not possess a full-fledged and experienced civil service, and the Egyptians found only a few trained clerks. Furthermore, not all these were considered fit for service by the Egyptians. Similarly, the Egyptian system of administration involved the creation of a clerical establishment (mainly accountants), most of which was brought from Egypt.⁶⁸

The Egyptian clerks did not find it easy to get used to the new and different conditions existing in Syria. Administrative systems in the various regions were not uniform: also, there was a tremendous difference between the populations of Egypt and Syria. The establishment met with difficulties which caused administrative delays. In order to overcome these difficulties, the authorities in Syria periodically demanded extra personnel from Egypt, since most of the clerks were inhabitants of Syria and were not as efficient in their work as Egyptian clerks. There were even some among them who knew nothing about accountancy, and were employed in this area for lack of any alternative.⁶⁹ From time to time there were reorganizations in the administration which resulted in discharges and changes in the positions of personnel at various levels of the administrative hierarchy.⁷⁰

Muḥammad 'Alī tried to improve this situation, and intended to found a special department in Egypt "to which there should be appointed a man who is familiar with the cases of Syrian administration and the technical terms employed there, so that he may advise his superiors (in Egypt) and guide them through his specialized knowledge." However, Muḥammad 'Alī gave up this idea because he understood that "the systems of administration

⁶⁸ *Mahfūẓāt*, II, 251, doc. 2629, 19 Ramaḍān 1248 A.H./9.2.1833; *ibid.*, II, 256, Doc. 2662, 24 Ramaḍān 1248 A.H./14.2.1833; *ibid.*, II, 509, Doc. 3967, 27 Dhū al-Qa'da 1250 A.H./17.3.1835.

⁶⁹ See the defensive of Ḥannā Bahrī to complaints of arrears in the accounts. *Ibid.*, IV, 265, Doc. 6099, 4 Ramaḍān 1255 A.H./19.11.1839. One of the reasons which Muḥammad Sharīf gives for the budget not having been ready to send off starting from 1252 A.H./1836-37 was the lack of clerks with a basic knowledge of accountancy. *Ibid.*, IV, 66, Doc. 5818, Rab' I 1255 A.H./May-June, 1839.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 446, Doc. 3658, 28 Rab' II 1250 A.H./3.9.1834; *ibid.*, III, 321, Doc. 5285, 27 Dhū al-Qa'da 1254 A.H./11.2.1839; *ibid.*, II, 509, Doc. 3967, 27 Dhū al-Qa'da 1250 A.H./27.3.1835.

in use in the numerous regions of Syria differ, and it is doubtful if any one man could be familiar with them all" — and he therefore preferred the creation of "a small bureau in Syria which would deal with the numerous documents being received in connection with regions and *iltizāms*, and send a summary of its conclusions to Egypt."⁷¹ Among the many difficulties of the administration were the differences deriving from the different systems of calculation current in the various parts of Syria. Some regions kept their accounts according to the *hijrī* calendar and others according to the Gregorian calendar. Thus it was essential every year to make the transfer (*tahwīl*) from the *hijrī* to the Gregorian dates.⁷²

In addition, the administration was upset and its stability disturbed by the mobilizations that were carried out from time to time among those clerks who were fit for military service.

Another serious administrative problem was caused by differences of language. Clerks brought from Egypt were generally familiar with Turkish,⁷³ and their work was carried out in that language, whereas the language of the major part of the local population was Arabic. Documents sent between government headquarters in Egypt and Syria were in Turkish.

As shown above, the authority of the higher officials was not properly defined, and the same holds true for the more junior personnel. As a result of this, the number of sections dealing with government affairs multiplied, with consequent delay, complication and lack of clarity in work procedures.⁷⁴

Guys pointed to bureaucracy in the administration which wasted time: "... mais telle était l'organisation de l'administration égyptienne que pour

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, III, 40, Doc. 4201, 3 Jumādā I 1251 A.H./28.8.1835; *ibid.*, III, 40, Doc. 4202, 3 Jumādā I 1251 A.H./28.8.1835.

⁷² See *ibid.*, II, 486, Doc. 3849, 15 Sha'bān 1250 A.H. /17.12.1834 with reference to accountancy methods in Syria. *Ibid.*, IV, 66, Doc. 5818. The financial year customary in Egypt was in accordance with the Coptic calendar and not according to the year of the *Hijra*; S.J. Shaw, *The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798*, Princeton, 1962, p. xxvii. This also contributed to the difficulties in coordination between Egypt and Syria.

⁷³ Administrative matters in Egypt were carried on in Turkish (Hamont, *op. cit.*, I, 396). See also Deny, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-158, who says that only a small minority of documents were in Arabic because the language of the country was Arabic and it was impossible to avoid using it from time to time. Bowring, in his report on Egypt, states that Arabic was displacing Turkish and that the tendency was to appoint Egyptians (instead of Turks) to responsible positions. See also Hamont, *op. cit.*, I, 87.

⁷⁴ Katafākū, *op. cit.*, p. 38 says that the Egyptians left nearly all the officials in their positions regardless of their suitability. In d'Armagnac's opinion, *op. cit.*, p. 102, Ibrāhīm replaced nearly all the officials: "... Ibrahim les changea presque partout ..." Evidence indicates that the truth was somewhere in the middle; some officials remained and some were dismissed.

obtenir d'en être secondé, il fallait passer par une filière de formalités, dont le principal effet était une perte de temps..."⁷⁵

Ibrāhīm fought against the corruption which was rife among the personnel. He accused Ḥannā Baḥrī of taking bribes. In his letter to the *bashmu'āwin*, Ḥusayn Pasha, Ibrāhīm complained of the anarchy in Syria and laid the blame for this on the fact that clerks looked after their personal interests and neglected the interests of the public. He found the Damascus administration rotten. In another, previous letter (to Sāmī Bey), he accused people in Syria of a tendency to offer bribes and employ flattery.⁷⁶ Guys claimed that the main source of trouble in the administration was the faith that Muḥammad 'Alī put "à des hommes pervers." The shortcomings of the Egyptian administration were numerous: the administration was not ashamed to go back on its promises; did not take the trouble to finish something which it had started; had no consideration for people; avoided responsibility when convenient; never allowed the treasury (fisc) to be touched, but when something terrible happened, shouted aloud; always protected its agents; the nature of this administration was, in brief; "un vrai machiavélisme en action."⁷⁷

It follows from the documents that the means adopted by the heads of the government in Syria only slightly improved the administrative set-up, which was not accepted by the inhabitants because of its inefficiency and faulty standards.

VI. Appointment of Officials and their Promotion

As I have already mentioned, all the higher officials were appointed by the *ḥukūmdār*. He was empowered to transfer them from place to place or to demote them. We do not know what the procedure was for promoting officials in Syria during most of the occupation period. Only towards the end of this period is there a letter with instructions on this subject, sent by Muḥammad 'Alī on 2 February 1838. It appears that up to this time, the lines laid down in this letter were not followed. The essence of the instructions is as follows: there should be no discrimination against clerks in anything relating to a raise in grade and salary; diligent workers should not be kept down and unworthy ones promoted; inquiries should be made into the matter of clerks who have been discriminated against or discharged without

⁷⁵ Guys, *Relation*, I, 51–52. See also pp. 240–41, where the same author points out the bureaucracy (*officieuserie*) characterizing the habits of the clerical staff.

⁷⁶ *Mahfūzāt*, III, 417, doc. 5496, 18 Jumādā I 1254 A.H./9.8.1838; *ibid.*, III, 66, Doc. 4350, 15 Sha'bān 1251 A.H./6.12.1835; De Salle, *op. cit.*, I, 396; J. Kinneer, *Cairo, Petra and Damascus in 1839, etc.*, London, 1841, p. 290.

⁷⁷ Guys, *Relation*, II, 215–221.

justification; salary and grade should be given according to the training and suitability of the clerk: intermediate stages in the grades themselves should be cancelled; a rise in grade must go together with all the allowances customary in that grade, as in the army; in accordance with the recommendation of Muḥammad Sharif, Muḥammad 'Alī will promote suitable clerks, but the salaries of those unfit must be reduced.⁷⁸

VII. Majlis al-Shūrā, or Dīwān al-Shūrā, or al-Mashwara

Only one week after the Egyptians entered Damascus, namely, on 21 June 1832, they founded the *majlis al-shūrā* there.⁷⁹ It is worth noting that the inhabitants of Syria did not regard the *dīwān*, the *dīwān al-mashwara* or the *majlis* as totally new institutions.⁸⁰ Before the Egyptian invasion a *dīwān* functioned in their large towns, though with different composition and powers from those instituted later by the Egyptians.

Consul Barker dealt at considerable length with the municipal *majlis* in Syria (in particular with that of Antioch before the Egyptian conquest): "The 'mejlisses' (or councils) of each town, combined with the pashas or Governors to legalize their spoliations by a lying document called 'Mazbata', sent to the Porte signed by all the members of the council, which declared whatever they pleased at the suggestion of the Pacha..." Further, Barker expressed his disappointment with the actions of the *majlis*, saying that after twenty years of constant contact with the council on both public and individual affairs; "... we can with truth declare that we believe it to have been the most baneful and unfortunate concession, on apparently liberal principles, that could have been made to a country just emerging from anarchy as the Empire then was."⁸¹

Barker expressed two wishes: that changes should be introduced in the constitution of the *majlis* so that it should consist of an equal number of Christians and Muslims, and that it should be under "a certain degree of supervision by the European powers."⁸² One of these desires was partly fulfilled later by the Egyptians, namely, the inclusion of Christians in the *majlis* alongside the Muslims.

In founding the *majlis al-shūrā*, the intention of Muḥammad 'Alī and

⁷⁸ *Uṣūl*, III, 321–22, Doc. 5285, 17 Dhū al-Qa'da 1253 A.H./12.2.1838.

⁷⁹ *Mahfūzāt*, II, 27, Doc. 1220, 22 Muḥarram 1247 A.H./21.6.1832; Ḥaydar, *Lubnān*, III, 865; Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, II, 72; Qustantīn, p. 56.

⁸⁰ Ḥaydar, *Ta'rikh*, I, 102–103.

⁸¹ Barker, *op. cit.*, I, 145, 148; E. Lockroy, *Ahmed le Boucher*, Paris, 1888, p. 228, mentions Napoleon's intention of founding a *dīwān* in Gaza: "... une sorte de conseil municipal indigène ..." His plan failed because of the population's lack of understanding there for this institution.

⁸² Barker, *op. cit.*, I, 316–317.

Ibrāhīm was to create an urban administrative authority which would deal with all the affairs of the citizen and the town. The *majlis al-shūrā* was organized as a town council, appointed by the local governor for the purpose of carrying out a series of judiciary, administrative, economic and municipal tasks. Under the existing conditions, the setting up of the *majlis al-shūrā* was a liberal step taken, able to offer the citizen — if it functioned properly — a body with legal standing before which he could bring up his claims and complaints, and receive satisfaction.

The British Consul General in Damascus, Farren, in his reply to Campbell's inquiry about the nature of the judiciary network in Syria (Question No. 10), wrote the following about the *shūrā*: "The great Diwan at Damascus is not however a mere judicial Tribunal but it has the direction of an extreme range of public affairs in the country."⁸³

Werry, the British Consul at Aleppo, replied to the above question of Col. Campbell in greater detail, as follows:

The Shoura is particularly charged with the examination of different claims relating to the government of those of the villages. It also manages and provides for the supplies of provisions. It also fixes the rate to be paid for the supplies for the army and the sale to the population. The Shoura is or ought to be presided by the governor. It comprises of 11 members salaried from Piasters 25,000 to P. 5,000 amounting P. 137,000 (per year). There are three members without salaries and the three salaried clerks. There also also three merchants who examine mercantile affairs.⁸⁴

In every town of 2,000 inhabitants or over, the Egyptians set up a *majlis shūrā* or *diwān shūrā*, whose members were appointed from the leading citizens of the town.⁸⁵ Such a council was headed by the governor or by one of its senior members. Some of the council members received payment, but there were councils whose members were unpaid.⁸⁶ The *majlis* usually had

⁸³ F.O. 78/283.

⁸⁴ F.O. 78/283; and see Ben-Zvi, *Israel*, p. 346, where it is stated that one of the functions of the *shūrā* was to supervise the legal status of the non-Muslims. I did not find this to be so, even though the appointing of non-Muslims to the *shūrā* did represent some improvement in the condition of the minorities.

⁸⁵ 'Izz al-Dīn, p. 135, says that the *majlis shūrā* was set up in all towns with a population of twenty thousand or more. This is incorrect, since *majlises* existed in smaller places as well. Abū 'Izz al-Dīn himself recalls the setting up of a *shūrā* (with twelve members) in Beirut which in those days had a population of some twelve thousand, according to C. G. Addison, *Damascus and Palmyra*, London, 1838, II, 41, and according to Guys, *Relation I*, 224, the population of Beirut varied between fifteen and sixteen thousand.

⁸⁶ F.O. 78/283. In Werry's reply to Campbell (on question No. 10), he quotes a list of prices fixed by the *shūrā* in Aleppo for various items of goods supplied over a period of a year to the army.

an odd number of members, in order to ensure a clear majority in voting.

In Damascus and in other towns, the Christian and Jewish communities had representatives on the *majlis al-shūrā*.⁸⁷

Some of the Europeans who lived in or visited Syria were critical of this institution. Guys, who was closely acquainted with the activities of the *shūrā*, says the following: "... les divans à medgelis méritent d'être connus pour mieux apprécier tout le mal qu'ils produisent. C'était à la vérité une création égyptienne, mais loin de leur subordonner, pour ainsi dire, le pouvoir des gouverneurs ... Ibrahim Pacha les présidait, les surveillait, les contrôlait quelquefois ..." ⁸⁸

Perrier was disappointed with the actions of the *shūrā*. In his opinion its main weakness was the multiplicity of its tasks:

...Cette institution datait seulement de la conquête de la Syrie par Ibrahim-Pacha. Par une mesure de tolérance inouïe jusqu'alors, et dont l'idée fait le plus grand honneur m Méhémet-Ali...

Cette institution, due toute entière à Méhémet-Ali et à Ibrahim Pacha, était éminemment libérale; mais comme toute innovation de ce genre dans un pays si peu préparé à de telles institutions, elle ne produisait aucun bon résultat: avec tant d'attributions, ce diwan n'en remplissait aucune à la satisfaction générale; quant même il eût été bien composé, il n'aurait encore pu le faire, car il était à la fois un conseil de préfecture, un tribunal de commerce, de jurés, une assemblée de prud'hommes et une cour des comptes: on le nommait diwan sciori, c'est-à-dire — assemblée consultative.

Perrier also wrote that in practice an appeal could be made against any decision of a local *shūrā* to the high *diwān al-shūrā* in Damascus, and against decisions of the Damascus *diwān* to that of Cairo, but none dared to do this. With regard to the powers of the *diwān al-shūrā*, he continued as follows:

...Toute affaire qu'un gouverneur de ville ne pouvait prendre sur lui de décider était déferée au diwan sciori, qui donnait son opinion, s'en rapportant ordinairement, pour l'exécution, à Ibrahim-Pacha qui homologuait ou s'y refusait selon son idée, je dirais presque son bon plaisir, quoiqu'on se gardât bien de proposer à son approbation suprême des choses contraires à l'intérêt du gouvernement. Le premier article des

⁸⁷ F.O. 78/215. Farren in his despatch from Beirut to Palmerston dated 20.7.1832, says: "After establishing a municipal government there composed of a council of the most respected Jews, Christians and Turks ..." and see also Quastan'in, p. 56, in which it is stated that the *shūrā* (in Damascus) was composed of twenty Muslim and Christian notables and one notable from the Jewish community.

⁸⁸ H. Guys, *Esquisse de l'Etat Politique et Commercial de la Syrie*, Paris, 1862, p. 48.

instructions de ce diwan portait: Le diwan sciori se pénètrea bien quil doit, avant tout, veiller aux intérêts du miri.

The same source states that the *dīwān al-shūrā* also dealt with the affairs of Europeans, and it frequently occurred that a certain matter would be passed from *shūrā* to *shūrā* until it finally reached Sulaymān Pasha (as I have already mentioned, European affairs were one of the concerns of Sulaymān Pasha).

Summing up his opinion of the *dīwān al-shūrā*, Perrier said:

...En résumé, peu d'ordre avait présidé à la création du diwan sciori: les règles qui lui étaient imposées étaient vagues pour tout ce qui n'avait pas rapport aux intérêts du miri.

Du reste, nous le répétons, tous ces vices radicaux tenaient à la nouveauté de cette institution, encore à l'état d'enfance, mais qui n'en témoignait pas moins hautement des vues grandes et généreuses de Méhémet-Ali.⁸⁹

I have quoted the evidence of Perrier (and of Guys) at some length for two reasons: first, the *shūrā*, in its composition and duties, as founded by the Egyptians, represents perhaps the most important of their innovations in the Syrian administration, and is consequently worthy of special attention. I feel that Perrier and Guys were right in their evaluation of the character and status of the institution under discussion, as reflected in reality. There is no doubt that Muḥammad 'Alī's and Ibrāhīm Pasha's intentions were good, and the idea of the *shūrā* in itself, as a democratic means of municipal government, was a positive one. But between the creation of the institution and its proper functioning, in the conditions prevailing in Syria in the first half of the nineteenth century, there was a vast gap. The change-over from the old Ottoman institutions to the institution of the *shūrā* was too sudden and sharp. There were bound to be conflicts and contradictions between the new body and the older bodies which had not been abolished. Conservative customs found it difficult to absorb such a far-reaching innovation.

⁸⁹ Perrier, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-59.

18. THE CLOSING PHASE OF OTTOMAN RULE IN JERUSALEM

by AREF EL-AREF

I

The Ottoman Turks occupied Jerusalem after defeating the Mamluks at the Battle of Lajjūn in 1517. They evacuated it in 1917 following their defeat at the hands of the British during the First World War. Thus the Ottoman occupation of Jerusalem lasted for four centuries.

I do not propose to survey all the events which occurred during that period: that would call for a lengthy exposition. In any case, I have devoted an entire chapter to it in my book on the history of Jerusalem,¹ which the interested reader may consult. My purpose here is to cast a glance at the history of the Holy City during the closing phase of that period.

At the beginning the Arabs, and especially the Palestinian Arabs, were loyal to the government and the sultan, and were always ready to go to war on behalf of the Islamic faith. They were obedient to their governors and leaders and would follow them into battle unquestioningly. Such was the state of affairs in the early days of the Turkish or, as they preferred to call it, Ottoman occupation.

The Ottoman rulers, however, did not appreciate the feelings evinced towards them by the Arabs and failed to turn their devotion to good account. The situation was further aggravated by the corruption that was rife in Istanbul, the capital.

The Ottoman territories did not make much progress along the path to civilization and advancement under those rulers; for they devoted all their energies to conquest, hatching plots to rid themselves of their enemies, or thwarting conspiracies to overthrow their rule. Those whose reigns were more tranquil divided their time between their cups and their harems. The Ottoman chroniclers tell many a tale of rulers who died as a result of over-indulgence in wine or through succumbing to feminine charms. So far did matters go that, it is said, at one time the revenue collected from a particular province or district would be allocated to one of the sultan's wives or

¹ *Mufasssal*, pp. 263-270; 274-276, 292-384.

concubines, and that such women would appoint the tax-gatherers whose task it was so collect the revenues in question on their behalf.

The Turkish historian, Cevdet, writes:

When the Turks exchanged their nomadic existence for a settled way of life, their leaders failed to take the steps called for by such a transition. Instead, they confined their activities to the pursuit of their personal interests and the satisfaction of their desires. They built splendid palaces in the capital and filled them with furniture and adornments, spending on such luxuries much more than they could afford. They were therefore forced to become corrupt: they sold posts for money, farmed out the country and bestowed fiefs for exorbitant sums.

The corruption that spread throughout the country had its source in the capital. The administration was for the most part in the hands of boorish and unscrupulous rogues. The leading posts were occupied by disreputable characters, including drummers and cooks, who had become the favourites, not only of the rulers, but of the ladies of the court as well. Negroes and eunuchs would make appointments and dismissals at their will.

When signs of resentment at this state of affairs became apparent in any quarter of the realm, the sultans would make efforts to sow dissension between the most powerful personages. This they would do by offering them large stipends. Offices and ranks were offered for sale in Istanbul as though at a public auction. And if such measures proved ineffectual, they would resort to murdering innocent people. They would experience no difficulty in procuring from hypocritical muftis rulings that justified their actions.

II

Such is the picture painted by Cevdet. Now we shall take a look at the revolts that broke out in Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron, in some cases extending to all the towns of Palestine.

First there was the revolt of the *naqib al-ashraf* in Jerusalem, Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī, in 1705; then of Ḥumūr in Hebron a month later; the uprising of the Janissaries in 1808; the two revolts that broke out in Jerusalem in 1821 and 1822, respectively; and the revolt against 'Adbullāh Pasha in Acre in 1824.

We cannot within this limited framework survey all these insurrections in detail. We shall therefore have to content ourselves by devoting a few words to two revolts which involved Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron. The cause in each case was the harsh and oppressive treatment of the population by the *vālīs* and *mutasallims*.

The first of these broke out in Jerusalem in 1825, and *efendis* as well as *fellahin* took part in it. They gained the upper hand and occupied the citadel. Driving out the garrison, they helped themselves to the weapons they found there. The rebels' banners were flown from the towers and walls proclaiming their victory. The Turks and Albanians were driven out of the city as, indeed, were all non-Arabs. The rebels became independent in the fullest sense of the word.

As soon, however, as the news reached the Sultan Maḥmūd II in the following year (1826), he sent the *vālī* of Damascus, 'Abdullāh Pasha, with a force to crush the uprising. This consisted of a thousand men equipped with seven cannons, one of them a heavy piece of the type known as *hāwun* "mortar".

The *kihyā*, the *vālī*'s representative, wanted to drive a wedge between the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Jerusalem, but they stood shoulder to shoulder in their determination to defy the authorities and maintain their independence. He tried to win the Muslims over to his side; but they resisted his persuasions, saying that they had sworn not to abandon the cause of their rebellion, and that they would not surrender to the authorities while a single foreigner remained in the city. They added that, in their view, there was no difference between Muslims and Christians so long as they were all Arabs. They were all ready to die for their native land. They wished to have their independence, and they preferred that to betraying their fellow rebels and submitting to foreigners, be they Muslims or not.

The *kihyā* then ordered fire to be opened on them, and they fired back. There were amongst them men trained in the use of all kinds of weapons. They therefore did not pay much heed to their enemies, despite the fact that they had set their guns up on the Mount of Olives, from which vantage point they bombarded the city continuously. The cannon balls were deliberately aimed at the houses of the leaders and notables, but the inhabitants nevertheless remained firm. The battle went on for a whole week.

The revolt did not subside until the *kihyā* accepted the rebel's terms. These included the annulment of the new taxes and the restoration of the old ones; the granting of permission to the inhabitants of Jerusalem to use arms; a general amnesty; and forbidding the army to interfere in the city's affairs, either political or social.

No sooner was the Jerusalem revolt over than a similar uprising took place in Hebron. This was led by 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Amr, one of the town's most influential citizens. While the Hebron revolt was still in progress, another broke out in Nablus, which was instigated when the Turks sent a Turkish *mutasallim* to take over the administration from the previous holder of that office, an Arab named Ibn Ṭuqān. The latter, however,

refused to obey the *vālī's* command, and the men of Nablus rose up against the Turks with the support of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, Hebron and most of the other towns of Palestine, demanding that the officials be Arabs and inhabitants of Palestine. In 1827 their demand was met.

III

For a considerable period thereafter Jerusalem enjoyed a secure existence untroubled by any upheavals. The administration of the city's affairs was completely in the hands of its elders, and the *vālī* in Damascus would not issue an order without first consulting the sheikhs and other leading personalities and seeking their help and advice. In 1840 the city had an advisory council (*majlis al-shūrā*) consisting of the following members: Sayyid Muḥammad Abū al-Su'ūd, *naqīb al-ashraf* and *'umdat al-mudarrisīn*, President of the Council; Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥusaynī; Sayyid Khalīl al-Khālīdī; Sayyid 'Uthmān Abū Su'ūd; Sayyid Muḥammad Darwish 'Alī Zāde; Sayyid Shākir al-Muwaqqat; Sayyid Najm al-Dīn al-Jama'ī al-Khātīb;; Sayyid Ibrāhīm al-Muhtadī; Sayyid Muḥammad al-Ramlī; Sayyid Jārullāh, Clerk to the Council; Sayyid Rafā, Assistant Clerk to the Council; Khawāja Rone, Representative of the Jewish Community; Yūsuf, Representative of the Armenian Community; Yāqūt Jāsir, Member of the Armenian Community.

The decisions taken by the council at that time (1840) were laid before the *qādī* of Jerusalem, who was then all-powerful. Indeed, he wielded effective control in all matters and was known as *al-ḥākim al-shar'ī* or *al-na'ib*. He was responsible for the running of affairs and for settling the differences arising between people belonging to a variety of sects and communities. He dealt with all such problems, whether in the spheres of religious, civil or criminal law. It is scarcely surprising that he was addressed as "Our lord and master, most learned of scholars, most excellent of latter-day possessors of erudition, and the fountain-head of knowledge and certitude, heir to the lore of the prophets and messengers, proof of the truth to all mankind, foremost amongst honoured protectors, the just, excellent and perfect judge, who distinguishes between the true and the false."

All this is attested to by innumerable judgements delivered by *qādīs* during this period. They had jurisdiction in the following matters (which related to Christians and Jews as well as Muslims):

a. Matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, wills and the custody of minors); the administration of property of orphans; the administration of the estates of religious endowments (*waqfs*); the administration of mosques, *madrasas* and *takiyyas*, including the appointment of preachers, teachers and door-keepers; the supervision of cemeteries.

b. The registration of sales of land and immovable property and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom; the registration of all kinds of companies, sureties, loans and trusteeships and cases involving loans.

c. Criminal cases of all kinds, including assault, uttering insults and abuse, theft and killing; cases involving honour, the stoning and flogging of men and women in the event of the commission of an offence; the control of alcoholic liquors and punishment of drunkards.

d. The supervision of weights and measures; the prosecution of people adulterating oil, *samn* (clarified butter) and other perishable commodities; the fixing of prices of foodstuffs; the fixing of travel fares between Jerusalem and neighbouring towns.²

e. The keeping of statistics, registration of the population, recording of births and deaths and determination of legal majority; the issuing of permits to build, orders for the suspension of building, and settlement of issues arising therefrom between partners and neighbours; the appointment and dismissal of the heads of trades and crafts, e.g., the *muqaddam* of the porters and the sheikh of the guild of skimmers.

f. Acceptance of the conversion of Christians and Jews wishing to embrace Islam and the registration of their conversion; collection of the *jizya* (poll-tax) imposed by the government upon Christians and Jews; the dismissal of the heads of Christian and Jewish communities and their replacement by others; also the supervision of works undertaken by them for the restoration of their monasteries, churches and places of worship.

g. The acceptance of the credentials of consuls and other representatives of foreign governments sent to represent their countries in Jerusalem. It was forbidden for any consul to enter upon his duties before presenting his credentials to the *qādī* of the Muslims in Jerusalem and securing their approval by him, and before receiving two letters from him, one recognizing him as a consular representative, and the other guaranteeing the safety of his life and of the lives of citizens of the country he represented.

IV

In connection with fixing of food and commodity prices by the *qādī* it may be observed that wares were plentiful and prices reasonable, and that it lay within the power of members of all classes to buy them, whatever their level of income. Here are a few prices that caught my eye as I was glancing through some price lists dating back to that period:

² The *qādī* was obliged to make his decisions in these matters in consultation with the *muhtasib*, who was the official in charge of municipal affairs.

THE CLOSE OF OTTOMAN RULE IN JERUSALEM

One <i>rotl</i> ³ of mutton.....	15 <i>paras</i> ⁴
" " " goat's meat	13 "
" " " beef	8 "
" " " flour ⁵	6 "

The price of a single *qintar* of grapes was fixed at 3 *kurūsh*.⁶

In one instance, one man bought 190 head of sheep and goats from another for 285 *asadi* piastres. This means that a single head cost $1\frac{1}{2}$ piastres.

The price of a bride at this period, as I have read in the lists of the religious court in Jerusalem,⁷ ranged between 3 and 30 piastres, and only occasionally rose to more than 60. Half was payable cash down, and the other half was deferred until death or divorce, whichever occurred first.

Generally speaking, the people lived in prosperity, comfort and security. There was nothing to disturb the even tenor of their existence, either in Jerusalem or in the other towns of Palestine. There was no radio or television, nor were there newspapers, and people heard very little news, and then only occasionally. In spite of what had happened before, they held their heads high, and the entire administration was in the hands of the Muslims and their *qādī*, who, as we have already noted, wielded unlimited power.

V

At first the thought of seceding from the Ottoman Empire never entered the minds of the Palestinians. All they wanted during the latter period of Ottoman rule was reform. The Arabs had high expectations of the 1908 revolution in Turkey that brought about the downfall of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II. The Unionists uttered the slogan "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity."

But the position soon underwent a radical change. The Arabs' hopes were dashed, and they began to feel that, while the Young Turks might pay lip service to the cause of promoting racial harmony and Ottoman unity, they were in fact conspiring against the other races and trying to humiliate them. And indeed the Young Turks made every effort to strengthen the Turkish element by fostering the idea of Turanian nationalism.

It was then that signs of discord between Turk and Arab began to make

³ One Turkish *rotl* consisted of 12 *okas*. One *oka* was the equivalent of 250 grammes.

⁴ A *para* was a Turkish coin of small denomination. The word is of Persian origin and means a part, i.e., the fortieth part of a *kurūsh* (piastre). In other words, a *kurūsh* is the equivalent of 40 *paras*.

⁵ See *sijill* No. 44, p. 350, of the year 1562.

⁶ The word *kurūsh* (in Arabic, *qirsh*) is Turkish. Its original form is *ghirsh*, and some say it is of Latin origin. The Turks struck their own coins of this denomination for the first time during the reign of Sultan Süleymân (1687), and it comprised the one hundredth part of a Turkish Pound.

⁷ List No. 255, p. 130, of 1774.

themselves manifest, and that the first stirrings of a desire for independence on the part of the Arabs became articulate. A number of Arab societies were formed: in Istanbul, Paris, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad. They bore such names as "The Society for Arab Brotherhood", "The Society of the Covenant", "Youth", "The Literary Club",⁸ "The Qaḥṭān Society", "The Arab League", and so on. Each of the societies had a branch in Jerusalem.

The Turks adopted severe repressive measures against the societies and their members, but these merely had the effect of increasing the Arabs' detestation of the Turks and strengthening their desire to achieve independence for their country. When, therefore, Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī, the Sherif of Mecca, unfurled the banner of the Arab Revolution in the Ḥijāz in 1915, many of the members of those societies answered his call⁹ and enlisted in the ranks of the Arab Revolutionary Army. Prominent amongst them were those who had been active while serving in the Turkish Army. They began leaving their units, singly and in groups, in order to join the revolutionary forces and fight for the freedom of their country. But, while they were pursuing this course to achieve their aim, they were taken by surprise by the British occupation and the establishment of the Jewish National Home.

⁸ The writer of this article belonged to that club and was elected a member of its committee.

⁹ The present writer was at that time a prisoner-of-war in the hands of the Russian army; being an Arab nationalist he had to escape from prison in Siberia in order to join the Arab Revolutionary Army.

19. SULTAN 'ABDŪLḤAMĪD AND THE ARMENIAN PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM

by BISHOP SHAHE AJAMIAN

I

The Imperial Edict, of 25 July 1888, the second imperial *berat* sent to the Patriarch Haroutiun Véhabédian, confirmed him in his functions as Patriarch of Jerusalem, after his appointment in an earlier *berat* as Patriarch of Constantinople. These edicts represent two landmarks in the evolution of the relations between the Sublime Porte and the Armenian *millet*.¹

Until 1839, the year of the promulgation of the *Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane*, the Armenian community under Ottoman rule had been administered by the Patriarch of Constantinople, invested by the government with the powers of an absolute leader, responsible only to the government. He chose his advisors from among the *amiras*, high-ranking functionaries of the Ottoman administration. He enjoyed the privileges and authority with which Sultan Maḥmūd II had invested the Armenian Bishop of Bursa, Hovakim, when he invited him to Byzantium and proclaimed him Patriarch and spiritual leader of all the Armenians in his Empire, in 1461, eight years after the conquest of Constantinople.²

It was not the Armenian Church, but rather the Turkish sultan, who created and established the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople. His objective was probably not, as certain people think, the establishment of a rival patriarchate to the Greek Patriarchate and the division of the Christians into opposing blocs. It would be more realistic to seek the explanation in the very concept of *millet*, a religious community organized around the political-religious authority of its spiritual leader. In his anxiety to rule the Christians and Jews of his empire according to their religious laws and national traditions, the sultan tolerated, even encouraged, the creation of a "state within a state," by acknowledging the religious leaders as leaders of the community, representing the government to the community in its civil

¹ The originals of the two firmans are in the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

² A. K. Sanjian, *The Armenian Communities in Syria under Ottoman Domination*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965, pp. 31-35.

affairs, and representing the community before the government in matters of religion and education, and in personal status.

Thus, the Patriarch collected the taxes and imposts in the name of the government, judged every criminal or civil offense, had his small police force and his prison. His authority within the community was unlimited.

The bishops enjoyed the same temporal and spiritual rights in their respective dioceses: they reflected the patriarchal authority, but were not responsible to the local administration in matters of civil law; they communicated with the central administration via the mediation of the Patriarch. The geographical limits of the patriarchal jurisdiction grew with the Empire, finally including the two Catholicossates of Cilicia and Aghtamar, as well as the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

This system of governing the minorities by means of their spiritual leader was not unique to the Armenians; Muḥammad II had already invested the Greek Patriarch Gennadius II of Constantinople with the same powers over his co-religionists and had given the Jews the same liberties in administering their communal life. He had grouped the Christians into two *millets* only: the Calcedonian Orthodox under the authority of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, and the anti-Calcedonians, called monophysites, i.e., the Armenians, Syrian-Jacobites, Copts and Abyssinians, under the authority of the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople.

Thus, the civil register of every Ottoman subject had to mention his religious affiliation, and every Christian or Jew had to have recourse to his religious leader in all cases; even in order to obtain a passport for travel, a certificate of good conduct signed by the Patriarch was necessary.

The Patriarchate of Constantinople was set up, therefore, in the great administrative centre to govern the religious and civil life of the churches, schools and courts, not only of the Armenians of Constantinople, whose number reached 150,000 from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, but those of the Ottoman provinces, whose number, at the beginning of the century, surpassed two million.

Despite the protection of the Sublime Porte, which made the Patriarch of Constantinople the indisputable authority, conflicts, grievances, dissensions and centrifugal movements did not fail to rise up against this authority within the community, as well as between the Patriarch and his non-Armenian subjects. The Catholicossate at Sis, which continued to administer the Diocese of Cilicia, considered itself independent and had recourse to the good offices of the Patriarch of Constantinople only in extreme cases. The Catholicossate of Aghtamar acted even more independently in its far-off province of Van. The Patriarchate of Jerusalem adapted itself to this system without difficulty and found a *modus vivendi* with the Patriarchate of Con-

stantinople, of which it was in constant need; its finances depended upon the pilgrims who came from Turkey, the recruitment of its clergy depended on the Armenian monasteries of Turkey, and its rights and privileges in the holy places depended on the protection of the Sublime Porte. This is why the Patriarchate of Jerusalem always delegated a representative, called *vekil* (curate) at Constantinople to coordinate the relations between the two Patriarchates, and had recourse to the Patriarchate of Constantinople for maintaining the status of its Patriarchate in the holy places, especially in case of conflict with the other Christian communities.

II

This situation lasted nearly four centuries until the first political tremors which appeared in the form of a liberation movement of the Christian provinces under Turkish domination, at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Among the Armenian minority, this movement reached the level of armed revolution only after the massacres of 1896 and 1908. It had begun under the name of "the Armenian question" on a more ideological "basis" due to the need for reform in the Armenian provinces and the concession of a constitution permitting the Armenians to manage their affairs according to democratic principles.

At the beginning, the Armenian revolutionary movement was directed against the absolute authority of the Patriarch and his *amiras*, the governing class. It was a social movement within the community, initiated by the *esnāf*, artisans and merchants, who, supported by the intellectuals, divided the community into two opposing groups: the partisans of reform, who demanded a new constitution, on the one hand, as opposed to the conservatives, on the other. The latter consisted primarily of the ruling class of high-ranking officials and Armenian bankers, who controlled a considerable portion of the economy of the state.

The promulgation in 1839 of the *Hatt-ı Sherif of Gülhane*, which guaranteed Ottoman subjects individual rights, without distinction between races and religions, sanctified the ideology of the Armenian constitutionalists and brought about their victory, but without putting an end to the opposition of the conservatives. Since the latter refused to sit in a mixed assembly with the artisans, the Patriarch Hagopos tendered his resignation in 1840. The crisis lasted for another twenty years and gave rise to some violent scenes, especially in those provinces in which the Armenians saw the constitution as a promise of salvation from the Turkish yoke.

The Tanzimat laws of reform promulgated by the government in 1856 compelled the conservatives to accept the principle of a popularly elected assembly to administer the affairs of the Patriarchate. A group of young

intellectuals returning straight from the barricades of Paris in 1848 had kindled imaginations with ideals of democracy and freedom, of universal suffrage and of the right of the people to self-determination. A constituent assembly prepared and presented to the government a first draft of a constitution in 1857. It was rejected as being too liberal. A second draft, presented in 1860, was accepted by the government on 24 May 1860, but was promulgated only three years later, after it had been changed, especially in the preamble, which was a direct translation of the principles of the French constitution of 1848.³ The Patriarch, formerly an absolute ruler (*bash millet*), became a constitutional monarch, the president of an elected National Assembly.

Thus, the application of the revolutionary principles of democracy, liberalism and constitutionalism to the government of the Armenian community created a bizarre situation. Within a system of absolute rule, in which the sultan was also the religious leader (Caliph), a defenseless minority defiantly brandished the very negation of the principles of absolute despotism. This profound incompatibility of the principles of government festered with political complications as a result of the Russo-Turkish Wars and the Balkan revolt. However, despite the ups and downs in the relation of the Armenians with their government, the constitution was applied until its suspension in 1892.

According to this constitution, the National Assembly was composed of 140 delegates, of whom 20 ecclesiastical dignitaries were elected by the clergy of the capital, 40 lay deputies were elected by the Diocese and 80 deputies were elected from Constantinople and its suburbs. The National Assembly reserved for itself the right to elect the Patriarch of Constantinople and of Jerusalem (but not the Catholicos of Cilicia and of Aghtamar), to elect the electors of the Catholicos of Etchmiadzin and to appoint an Executive, several committees and, in general, to act in the electoral and legislative assembly. The Patriarch presided over the Assembly and the Executive and checked that the constitution was being carried out.

In the constitution of 1863, the government saw to it that clauses were included giving it the right to depose an undesirable Patriarch, to ratify newly elected officials and to refuse the Assembly the right to hold extraordinary sessions if the Sublime Porte did not find them necessary. The government also demanded that the Patriarch be an Ottoman subject.

The life of the constitution was not easy during the following years, especially in 1877, when the Patriarch Nercès Varjabédian, without referring

³ A. Saroukhan, *The Armenian Question and the National Constitution (1860–1910)* (in Armenian), Tiflis, 1912, appendix, pp. 20ff.

to the National Assembly, personally took the initiative of going to San Stefano and bringing the matter of reforms in the Armenian provinces into the international arena.

Grand Duke Nicholas had taken up residence at San Stefano with an Armenian, Arakel Bey Dadian. On the eve of the signing of the Russo-Turkish peace treaty, the Patriarch Nercès presented himself to the Grand Duke and secured a promise that Russia would guarantee the reforms promised by the Turkish government, and that this guarantee would be mentioned in the peace treaty. This was Article 16 of the treaty of San Stefano.⁴

Nearly the same week another prelate approached the Commander of the Russian Army, Ghougassof, also an Armenian, at Erzurum, to reply to the accusation of having given refuge to a high-ranking Turkish official in the Archbishopric itself. His name was Haroutioun Vehabedian. This bishop replied to Ghougassof by asking him how long the Russian army was planning on staying in the Eastern provinces.

Thus two political trends were delineated: one supported bringing "the Armenian question" before the world for judgment and, encouraged by the example of the Balkans and of Greece, obtaining not an independent Armenia, but, like Lebanon, a free internal administration under a Turkish mandate, guaranteed by the Great Powers. The other, more realistic, stressed the internal character of reform, realized the dangers of internationalizing the "Armenian question" and emphasized the fact that the Armenians, unprepared for an uprising against the Turks, could not count on external promises. This group wanted to discuss the question of reforms directly with the Turkish government and to preserve its nature as an internal affair.

But it was the first group which dominated, and the delegations leaving for the Western capitals secured a guarantee from the Conference of Berlin that an article (61) would be included in the treaty, proposing to the Turkish government a better administration over the Armenian provinces.

The strong personality of Patriarch Nercès Varjabedian, his relations with the Turkish government, which were, in spite of all difficulties, friendly, and his persuasive eloquence succeeded in restraining the thunder of Sultan 'AbdŭlhamĪd, and Armenian affairs continued their normal course along constitutional lines.

The premature death of Patriarch Nercès in 1884 created a great void: he had raised hopes and had given the Armenians a consciousness of their

⁴ G. Tournayan, *The History of the Eastern Question and Guide to the Armenian Question* (in Armenian), London, 1905, II, 518-519.

nationalism. He had created a national renaissance movement which was difficult to control, for a minority which had suffered for five centuries and which, suddenly awakened, was searching own for its way.

Discreetly, the government suggested a moderate personality, and the National Assembly elected this same prelate of Erzurum, Archbishop Haroutioun Vehabédian. In spite of his known inclinations and his confessed conservatism, the government denied him its support from the beginning. The imperial firman which put him on the Patriarchal throne limited the prerogatives of the Patriarch and of the National Assembly. For the first time, this firman mentioned the various government ministers to whom the Patriarch must refer in his administrative activities.

Patriarch Haroutioun assumed his functions for only eight months because, in the same year, he was elected Patriarch of Jerusalem by this same Assembly. But the latter beseeched him to continue to carry out his responsibilities at Constantinople for the next three years. It was only on 25 July 1888 that he received the famous firman appointing him Patriarch of Jerusalem according to the traditional forms and formulas.

III

Articles 17-23 of the 1863 constitution regulated the affairs of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. These were rejected by the Congregation of St. Jacques, which refused to consider itself as a simple monastery and to accept the principle that "monasteries are the property of the nation. Supervision and control of their administration and their finances belong to the nation."

Two years of negotiations brought about a revision of the articles concerning the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. According to these revised articles, the Patriarch would be elected by the National Assembly having its seat at Constantinople. The Congregation of St. Jacques would present the Executive Committee with a list of seven candidates; of these, three would be presented by the Executive at the National Assembly, which would elect one of them after having obtained government approval of the candidates. The Patriarch would direct the affairs of the Patriarchate, assisted by a synod which would distribute the different functions of the Patriarchate among the members of the Congregation. Only the Great Sacristan would be elected by the General Assembly of the Congregation. The Patriarch and the synod would have to present an annual report of their activities to the National Assembly of Constantinople.

This rule by the National Assembly never came into effect in Jerusalem. True, the Patriarchs were elected by the Assembly, a synod was created, but the affairs of the Patriarchate were managed by the Patriarch, and his responsibility to Constantinople was purely formal.

And this corresponded perfectly to the views of Sultan 'Abdŭlḥamīd and his government. The election of Patriarch Haroutioun gave him the chance to restore patriarchal authority in its traditional form, modelled after the absolute form of the sultan's government.

According to the firman of 25 July 1888 which appears at the end of this article, the Armenian Patriarch became once again the supreme authority of the non-Calcedonian Christian communities and his seat at Jerusalem was declared once more: "the seat of the Armenian Patriarchate of the Holy Sepulchre, of Jerusalem, Gaza, Tripoli, Nablus, of the Abyssinians, of the Copts and of the other nationals." The National Assembly is mentioned only once at the beginning as an electoral body whose election "was examined and approved by our Council of Ministers." The Patriarch assumes his position "according to the ancient religious customs and laws" and not according to the articles of the constitution: he is the absolute master in his domain, "no one is able to remove from his hands the churches and monasteries ... no one can oppose the reparations executed by a *setvā sherif* and Imperial *irāde*." His authority is related directly to the Sublime Porte, rather than to the local government. This imperial decree delegates to the Patriarch an absolute authority over his clergy, who can not even perform marriage without the written authorization of the Patriarch. He alone can grant divorce, is the sole inheritor of the clergy's possessions, has the right to carry arms in his journeys, and pays no customs duties or taxes. Furthermore, as he is not at all dependent upon local jurisdiction, the governors, police and courts have no hold on him, even if he decides to imprison a prelate. "And according to the ancient custom, police officers cannot seize his sceptre, the horse he rides, or his servants" ... "Abyssinians, Copts, Syrian Jacobites and his co-religionists and the Armenian prelates of the convent of St. Jacques will recognise the Patriarch as their superior and will always address him in everything concerning his role as Patriarch. The property of the Patriarchate is the property of the Patriarch as long as he lives."

The Imperial edict does not mention a synod or an assembly, at Jerusalem or at Constantinople, to which the Patriarch would be responsible. He is the absolute master in his domain, independent of the local government, invested by the Sublime Porte with an absolute "sultanate" over his community and responsible only to the central government.

This firman is also the last to be granted by a sultan to an Armenian Patriarch of Jerusalem. And as the irony of fate would have it, it was the sultan called "the red" by the Armenians because of the massacres and deportations which characterized the last years of his reign, who, after fifty years of constitutionalist groping, re-established, by this imposing document, the legal power of the patriarchal sceptre.

Against a background of revolutionary events which we have outlined, and at the moment when the national and cultural renaissance had begun to spring forth in the Armenian community, this firman is important as a reminder of the magnitude of Ottoman power. This is why we are bringing it to the attention of historians as a text of exceptional importance.

**FIRMAN DATED 19 DHU AL-QA'DA 1305,
SENT BY THE SULTAN TO THE PATRIARCH HAROUTIOUN,
ON THE OCCASION OF HIS ELECTION TO
THE SEAT OF PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM**

The Seat of the Armenian Patriarchate of the Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem, Gaza, Tripoli, Nablus, of the Abyssinians, the Copts and the other Nationals: having fallen vacant and the nomination of a titular head having become necessary;

The beneficiary of this Imperial *berat*, Artin Efendi member of the Congregation of Mar Yacoub and the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople having been elected according to legal dispositions, and his election having been brought to our cognizance by the two *mazbatas* drawn up and presented by the Religious and Lay Councils; this election has been examined and approved by our Council of Ministers who, having drawn Our Imperial Attention to this matter, has obtained permission to publish our *irāde* so that it may be carried out.

The Personality in question, having become, as he is described above, according to the ancient religious customs and laws, Patriarch of the Armenian population of Jerusalem and the places connected thereto, these nationals, great or small, must not, in all those places coming under the jurisdiction of his Patriarchate, swerve from these just orders relating to their religious laws.

No one is allowed to remove from his hands the churches and monasteries which, since antiquity, have been in his possession in the places belonging to his Patriarchate.

No one is allowed to intervene in or oppose the reparation of these holdings, executed by a *fetvā sherif* and Imperial *irāde*.

And if the Patriarch brings legal action before the *sharī'a* court, the trial must be brought before the *Sheykhülislām*.

And contrary to ancient custom, he will not be interfered with when, in all places belonging to the Patriarchate, he dismisses and expels from their churches and monasteries such priests as merit punishment in accordance

with the prescriptions of their religious laws, and whose beards will be shaven off and who will be replaced by other priests.

And the priests of the towns and villages will not be allowed to perform marriages between persons who cannot, according to their religious laws, make such contract, without there being an authorization for it and an act by the aforementioned Patriarch.

And if, in all the places subordinate to the Patriarchate, a woman deserts the conjugal hearth, or if a husband abandons his wife or wishes to take another, no one else may interfere or meddle in this sort of matter except the Patriarch or his representatives.

And in all the places under the jurisdiction of the Patriarch, the *beyt-ul-māl*, the *qassām*, the *mūtevellis* and others, no interference is allowed when a prelate or monastic (known as a *marabet*) dies and his belongings are taken by the Patriarch.

And everything which deceased prelates, priests, *marabets* and others of the Armenian population have bequeathed to the poor of their churches or to the Patriarch will be legal and the evidence in this case by Armenian witnesses will be valid before the *sharī'a* court.

And the Patriarch, in order to go about in dangerous areas in safety, will have the right to change his dress and carry arms; and no intervention will be made in this matter by the police authorities.

And the *qādīs* and the *nā'ibs* will not be allowed to interfere and impose a fine if, in the questions of marriage or divorce or other litigious religious questions which may arise between two people, the Patriarch reconciles the parties by mutual agreement, or, if necessary, compels them to give an oath according to their religious customs or punishes them by pronouncing the sentence of excommunication against them.

And no one may interfere if the Patriarch punishes and interdicts certain prelates who, not belonging to any monastery or church, wander from place to place and cause scandals, and, if those in charge of the monasteries and churches appropriate for themselves the dues which belong to the Patriarchate, the Patriarch alone will examine their accounts.

And, in contrast to the past, there will be no interference or opposition on the part of the *qādīs*, *nā'ibs* and others, to the representatives of the Patriarch or those close to him, in any place where they come and go, to collect alms from all those who give out of their own free will.

And when it becomes necessary, by decision of the *sharī'a*, to imprison a prelate, priest or *marabet*, this imprisonment will be carried out through the mediation of the Patriarch.

And according to the ancient custom, police officers may not touch his sceptre (*āṣā*), the horse he rides or his servants.

And wherever he goes, no one will be allowed to inconvenience him by imposing his services on him by force.

And, in accordance with the Imperial rescripts, delivered and promulgated by the previous Sultans to those who have become Patriarch of Jerusalem in the past:

The Holy Sepulchre, Bethlehem, the Grotto of the Nativity and the North Gate of the Grotto, and the Monastery of St. Jacques, and Dayr Zaytūn, the Prison of Christ, and Nablus belong to him and his followers of long standing, namely:

Abyssinians, Copts, Syrian Jacobites and his co-religionists and the Armenian Prelates of the Monastery of St. Jacques, will recognise the Patriarch as their superior and will always address him in everything concerning his role as Patriarch.

And the functionaries will not be allowed to set themselves against the exercising of his functions and prerogatives in the churches and monasteries and other places of pilgrimage where, from olden times until today, they say their devotions, and on the tomb in the middle of the Holy Sepulchre, and the lamps near the door, and the censers which they light there and which are in their possession.

And no bishop or priest possessing a *berat* will be recognized by the officials and will be opposed, if he does not have the permission of the Patriarch.

And no one will be imposed as interpreter to the Patriarch without the consent and decision of said Patriarch.

And, contrary to ancient custom, neither the Patriarch alone nor the prelates who are with him will be hindered, wherever they may go to collect alms, by customs officials, for any object which is not liable to taxation.

And no one will be allowed to convert forcibly to Islam anyone of the Armenian population without the consent of the Patriarch.

And the vineyards, gardens, mills, cultivated lands, houses, shops, fruit and forest trees, sacred springs (*ayazmas*) which have belonged to their churches since ancient times, and objects and animals which were likewise given in *waqfs* to their monasteries and their fellow Abyssinian, Syrian-Jacobite and Coptic nationals; and the churches in Jaffa, Ramla, in Jerusalem and environs, of which former Patriarchs became the masters, in whatever manner it may have been, are also, and shall remain as long as he lives, the property of the Patriarch, who is confirmed in his rights without anyone being allowed to interfere or oppose him.

And no one shall be allowed to interfere with or oppose this Imperial firman.

Done 19 Dhū al-Qa'da 1305
25 July 1888.

20. THE POLITICAL AWAKENING OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS AND THEIR LEADERSHIP TOWARDS THE END OF THE OTTOMAN PERIOD*

by YEHOSHUA PORATH

I. Introduction: The Religious Status of Jerusalem and Palestine in Mediaeval Islam

The sanctity of Jerusalem, and consequently of Palestine, in Islam — a principle no one contests today — did not develop in a straight, undeviating manner. Muḥammad at first designated Jerusalem as the direction Muslims turn in prayer (*qibla*), but when he discovered that the Jews of the Hejaz did not intend to abandon their faith and to accept his message he did away with facing Jerusalem and established Mecca as the *qibla* of the Muslims. It would certainly be correct to conclude that the abrogation of Jerusalem's status as the *qibla* did not add to its prestige and holiness in Islam.¹

However, the opposite occurred with respect to the geographical sense of the verse: "Glory be to Him who made His servant go by night from the Sacred Mosque [of Mecca] to the farther Mosque [*al-Aqṣā*] whose surroundings We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs."² Although at first there were contradictory explanations as to where *al-Masjid al-Aqṣā* was located (some put it in Heaven rather than Jerusalem), after a short period the opinion prevailed that *al-Masjid al-Aqṣā* was situated in Jerusalem, and it was there that Muḥammad's miraculous ascent to Heaven (*al-mi'rāj*) took place. The belief that Jerusalem would be the scene of the resurrection of the dead at the End of Days also became standard.³

A well-known tradition (*ḥadīth*) of the Prophet ordained that "the saddles [of the riding beasts] shall not be fastened [for setting out for pilgrimage] except for three mosques: the Sacred Mosque [in Mecca], my mosque [in

* This article is the introduction to my book entitled *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1918-1929*, which was originally prepared as a Ph.D. dissertation under the supervision of Prof. G. Baer of the Hebrew University. The Hebrew version of this book was published in 1971 by the Israel Oriental Society and the Institute of Asian and African Studies of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem; the English version, by Frank Cass, London, 1974.

¹ H.Z. Hirschberg, "Mekomah shel Yerushalayim ba-'Olam Ha-Muslemi," *Yerushalayim*, Vol. II (1949), pp. 55-60.

² *Koran*, 17,1 (N.J. Dawood's translation).

³ See n. 1.

Medina] and al-Aqṣā mosque [in Jerusalem].” The purpose of the *ḥadīth* was to prevent pilgrimages to traditional holy sites, but it was understood *a posteriori* as an approval of Muslims making pilgrimages to Jerusalem and Medina just as they would to Mecca.⁴ There were, however, earlier *ḥadīths* which cast doubt on this, and there were therefore ‘*ulamā*’ who doubted Jerusalem’s sanctity and the permissibility of going there on pilgrimage (*hajj*). These *ḥadīths* prove that in the first half of the second Islamic century some of the ‘*ulamā*’ shrank from recognizing Jerusalem’s sanctity and equality of status with Medina. They were apprehensive lest Jerusalem become a rival to Mecca and thus draw pilgrims away from the latter. They were, in fact, successful in preventing Jerusalem from attaining equal status with Mecca, but not in preventing its being considered a holy place worthy of pilgrimage, though of inferior status. This is shown by the fact that the *ḥadīths* which denied the sanctity of Jerusalem or cast doubt upon it were not included in the canonical collections of *ḥadīth* literature. In this way from the middle of the second century A.H. the concept of the sanctity of Jerusalem was accepted in Islam. The ‘*ulamā*’ tried, after Jerusalem’s status was secured beyond doubt, to prevent the imitation there of rites of prayer connected with the pilgrimage to Mecca; they declared such imitation to be *bid’a* (illegal innovation), but in this, too, they failed. The common folk prevailed, transferring to Jerusalem prayers and usages which were originally meant for Mecca alone.⁵ The building at this time of the magnificent Dome of the Rock by the Umayyad Caliph ‘Abd al-Malik ibn Marwān during this period strengthened still more the position of those who sanctified Jerusalem.

Palestine is mentioned only once in the Koran and then by the designation “the Holy Land” (*al-Arḍ al-Muqaddasa*), the connection being Moses’ words to his people on their entrance to the land.⁶ This designation continued to appear in early Muslim literature and there developed the Muslim conception of the sanctity of the land owing to its being the land of the Prophets and the site of divine revelation. Without a doubt the establishment of Jerusalem’s holy status contributed to the development of the conception of the entire land as sanctified. The mystical current in Islam made a most important contribution to this development. It is very probable that some of the Muslim mystics had close ties with Jewish circles and absorbed Jewish traditions, since there are traces of Rabbinic traditions in the Muslim

⁴ M.J. Kister, “You shall only set out for three mosques — A Study of An Early Tradition”, *Le Muséon*, Vol. LXXXII (1969), pp. 173–174.

⁵ See *ibid.*

⁶ *Koran*, 5, 21: “Enter, my people, the holy land which Allah has assigned for you. Do not turn back, or you shall be ruined” (N. J. Dawood’s translation).

literature on this subject. The sanctity of the land and of Jerusalem in Christianity, the Christian pilgrimages, and the churches and monasteries which were built in the country also influenced the Muslims, both directly, as an example to be imitated, and indirectly, as a possible danger to the status of Islam in the land, a danger which must be nipped in the bud.⁷

It seems, then, that in the course of the eighth and ninth centuries Jerusalem's status in the Muslim view more or less crystallized. However, this conception of Jerusalem as a holy city apparently became weaker in the tenth and eleventh centuries. In any case we shall see that the Crusader conquest of Jerusalem in 1099 did not arouse much of a storm in the Islamic community.

It is likely that the growing Shi'i-Ismā'īlī influence during this period was responsible for this; however, it is also extremely probable that we have here evidence of the fact that the sanctity of Jerusalem had not yet become axiomatic or universally accepted. There is evidence that the Jerusalem cult was common primarily among natives of the area of Palestine and perhaps in certain parts of Syria as well. In any case the "Eulogies of Jerusalem" literature (*Faḍā'il al-Quds*) was produced in those days solely by Jerusalemites.⁸

Of much significance is the fact that the Crusader conquest of Jerusalem was at first regarded by the Muslims as but another link in the chain of political vicissitudes and military conquests which the city had undergone,⁹ without any religious significance being attributed to the city's fall. To them the war against the Crusaders was an additional stage in the long struggle with Byzantium, a struggle which was intermittently halted by peace treaties and to which no religious importance was then attached.

The factor that changed this indifferent attitude and began fostering the conception of the sanctity of Jerusalem and the necessity of liberating it again was Zangi, the ruler of Mosul-Aleppo, and his son and successor Nūr al-Dīn, about half a century after the time of the Crusader conquest of the city. These two strove to remove the Frankish-Crusader presence, and Jerusalem therefore became the major goal of their activity. This development was rooted in two factors: (1) the fact that Jerusalem was the capital of

⁷ S.D. Goitein, "The Sanctity of Jerusalem and Palestine in Early Islam", in his *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*, Leiden, 1966, pp. 135-148.

⁸ The discussion of the status of Jerusalem on the eve of and during the Crusades is based on E. Sivan, "Le caractère sacré de Jérusalem dans L'Islam au XII-XIII siècles," *Studia Islamica*, Vol. XXVII (1967), pp. 149-182, and his *L'Islam et la Croisade*, Paris, 1968, pp. 119-120.

⁹ In 1070 the Turkoman ruler Atsiz conquered Jerusalem from the Fāṭimids who, in their turn, recovered the city in 1098.

the Crusader kingdom, and (2) Zangi's desire to enhance his *jihād* with deep religious significance. To do this he exploited the depth of religious sentiment for Jerusalem, arousing it from its slumber and struggling to win it adherents. With the aid of his propaganda apparatus, he emphasized Jerusalem's importance in Islam as the city in which were located the al-Aqṣā mosque and the site of Muḥammad's ascent to Heaven (*mī'rāj*) and which was situated at the "hub of the universe." Zangi's son Nūr al-Dīn went still further, stressing that for the sake of liberating Jerusalem it was necessary to unite all Syria and to activate it towards this end. These official propaganda efforts were accompanied by a flowering of the "Eulogies of Jerusalem" (*Faḍā'il al-Quds*) literature, which had first appeared at the end of the eleventh century but had then remained absent until approximately the middle of the twelfth century.

Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn pursued these aims more vigorously, and when he succeeded in retaking Jerusalem in 1187 this development reached its climax. The reconquest was described as having deep religious and historical significance, and its echoes were heard throughout the Islamic world. The continuation of the struggle against the Crusaders strengthened this phenomenon even more, and it was thus that the "Eulogies of Jerusalem" literature reached its height.

This policy bore fruit. Jerusalem's sanctified status was accepted throughout the Islamic world and making pilgrimages there (*ziyāra* and not the term *hajj*, which is reserved for pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina only) became common. Thus when Jerusalem was again lost by the Muslims in 1229, they reacted severely, and there were numerous appeals for its recapture. The difference between this reaction and the indifference with which the first Crusader conquest of Jerusalem had met demonstrates how great was the variation in Jerusalem's holy status in Islam.¹⁰

Following the Ayyūbids' reconquest of Jerusalem in 1245 they expressed their special relationship to the sanctified city by cultivating the Jerusalem mosques, fostering pilgrimages to the city, etc.

The Mamluks, the Ayyūbids' successors, did much in this area. Being aware of the possibility that the Crusades might be renewed, they did all in their power to give the city a Muslim character. They saw to the restoration of the al-Aqṣā mosque, set up a system of conduits for bringing water into the city, and founded academies (*madrāsas*) and Sūfī monasteries,¹¹ although these institutions were little famed.¹²

¹⁰ Sivan, *L'Islam*, p. 145 ff.

¹¹ E. Ashtor, "Sefer 'Aravi 'al Shivḥey Yerushalayim," *Tarbitz*, Vol. XXX (1961), p. 209.

¹² Hirschberg, *op. cit.*

This honoured and sanctified status which was Jerusalem's was not restricted to the city alone. It gradually began to be understood as applying to the entire "Holy Land" — and it is worth inquiring what the precise geographical area of this "Holy Land" was. It seems that in general the term comprised the entire area from the Euphrates in the north to the Hejaz, Aqaba and the Sinai desert in the south, and from the desert in the east to the Mediterranean in the west. What is more, the term "Holy Land" was gradually forgotten, and the name that was used to denote this area was *Shām*. Alongside the literature of "Eulogies of Jerusalem" (*Faḍā'il al-Quds*) there developed the literature of "Eulogies of *Shām*" (*Faḍā'il al-Shām*) and not "Eulogies of *Filasṭīn*"; and within the "Eulogies of *Shām*" an honourable place was taken up by "Eulogies of Jerusalem."¹³ Nevertheless, there were traditions (*hadīths*) which restricted the territorial sense of the "Holy Land" to *Filasṭīn* alone and which applied the name *al-Arḍ al-Muqaddasa* to *Filasṭīn* and *Urdunn* (Jordan) only.¹⁴

II. *Filasṭīn as an Administrative Unit during Muslim History*

The Arabic name *Filasṭīn* was derived from the Latin *Palaestina*, the name that the Romans gave to Judea after they had subdued the last Jewish revolt in 132–135. The Roman-Byzantine government divided *Palaestina* into three units: *Palaestina Prima*, comprising Judea and Samaria and the southern part of the eastern side of the Jordan Valley; *Palaestina Secunda*, including the Jordan Valley, eastern and central Galilee and the northern part of the eastern side of the Jordan Valley; and *Palaestina Tertia*, covering the southern part of Transjordan, the Negev and Sinai.

The Arab-Muslim conquerors of Palestine basically preserved this administrative division of the Roman-Byzantine periods. The area *Palaestina Prima* became, more or less, *Jund Filasṭīn*, i.e., the military district of *Filasṭīn*, while *Palaestina Secunda*, together with western Galilee, became *Jund al-Urdunn*, i.e., the military district of the Jordan.¹⁵ The district (*jund*) of *Filasṭīn* continued to exist until the Mongolian invasion, although its area increased in the tenth century, extending to Amman in the east and the Gulf

¹³ See, for example, the boundaries of the Holy Land in Muḥīr al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī, *Kitāb al-'Uns al-Jalīl bi-Ta'rīkh al-Quds wa-l-Khalīl*, II, 430; S. D. Goitein, "The Sanctity of Jerusalem"; Sivan, "Le caractère sacré" and his book, *L'Islam*, pp. 63–65. It might well be the identification of *Shām* with the "Holy Land" sprang from the Koranic verse which mentioned the term Holy Land. This verse cited Moses' command to the Children of Israel to enter the Holy Land, a territory which had been defined in the Bible in an almost identical way with the Muslim definition of *Shām*. (For the Biblical definition, see Genesis 15:18; Deuteronomy 1:7 and 11:24; and Joshua 1:4.)

¹⁴ Cf. Sivan, "Le caractère sacré" and Sivan, *L'Islam*.

¹⁵ See the maps in the *Hebrew Encyclopaedia*, VI, 423 and 446.

of Aqaba in the south. However, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the term *Filasṭīn* was neglected and the territory was known by the combination *Al-Quds-Sāhil* (Jerusalem-Coastal Plain).¹⁶

Under Mamluk rule the area of the former *Jund Filasṭīn* was divided into several districts (Der'a, 'Ajlūn, al-Balqā' and Banias in Transjordan, and Nablus, Qāqūn, Jerusalem, Hebron, Ramla, Lod and Gaza in Palestine) which were included in the greater province (*niyāba*) of Damascus. In the fourteenth century Hebron was annexed to the Jerusalem district and Lod and Qāqūn and on occasion Gaza as well — to Ramla.¹⁷ The former unit of *Filasṭīn* disappeared from the administrative division. Nevertheless, it seems to us that this name was retained to denote the former area of *Jund Filasṭīn*.¹⁸

The Ottomans, like the Mumluk, did not re-establish the *Filasṭīn* district. The area of this former district was divided into three *sanjaks* (districts) — Gaza, Jerusalem and Nablus (the latter was sometimes divided into the Nablus district and the Lajjūn district) — which were included in the Damascus *pashalik* (province). (Galilee, i.e., the Safed district, was also included in the Damascus province at first, but from 1613, and in particular from 1660, it formed part of the Sidon province.) The two *sanjaks* were sometimes united under one governor. Thus, for example, the *sanjaks* of Gaza and Jerusalem were amalgamated in 1525, and in 1533–1539 one governor ruled the *sanjaks* of Nablus and Safed. From the second half of the sixteenth century the districts of Nablus and Gaza were sometimes annexed to Jerusalem. The same was done in the 1850's.¹⁹ Thus it appears that despite the division into several districts, a larger district was sometimes established, which approached the former area of *Filasṭīn* of the Arab-Muslim conquerors. The original Arab-Muslim name of *al-Arḍ al-Muqaddasa* (the Holy Land) was also preserved in the Ottoman language (*Arāzi-i Muqaddese*).²⁰

It is possible to discern additional phenomena in both the administrative and the social spheres which helped to create contacts between the Jerusalem *sanjak* and the neighbouring *sanjaks* (Nablus and Gaza). The area of juris-

¹⁶ D. Sourdel, "Filasṭīn," *El*², II, 911; Sivan, *L'islam*, p. 64.

¹⁷ *Hebrew Encyclopaedia*, VI, 480.

¹⁸ Towards the end of the Mamlūk period, Muḥīr al-Dīn described the subdistricts included in *Arḍ Filasṭīn* and gave the following names: Ashkelon, Gaza, Jerusalem, Jericho, Hebron, Nablus; i.e., an area approaching that of the Roman *Palaestina Prima* and the *Jund Filasṭīn* of the Arab-Muslim conqueror. See Muḥīr al-Dīn al-Ḥanbalī, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 422–423; B. Lewis, "Eretz Yisrael ba-Yovel ha-Rishon la-Shilṭon ha-'Othmani 'al pi Pinkesei ha-Karka'ot ha-'Othmaniyim," in H. Z. Hirschberg and B. Mazer (eds.), *Eretz Yisrael*, Book 4 (1956), p. 171.

¹⁹ *Ott. Doc.*, pp. 41, 45, 47–48; U. Heyd, "Yehudei Eretz Yisrael be-Sof ha-Me'a ha-Yud Zayin," *Jerusalem*, Vol. IV (1952), pp. 173–184; B. Lewis, *op. cit.*, pp. 170–187.

²⁰ *Ott. Doc.*, p. 39; *Ott. Reform*, pp. 33, 117; James Finn, *Stirring Times*, London, 1872, I, 160–162.

diction (*qazā* in Turkish and *qaḏā'* in Arabic) of the Jerusalem *qāḏī* was not identical with the geographical area of Jerusalem *sanjak*, but larger than it. It is very possible that this phenomenon resulted from the status of Jerusalem as a holy city, but whatever the reason, there is evidence that the Jerusalem *qāḏī*'s jurisdiction extended over the *sanjaks* of Gaza and Nablus and reached Haifa; he appointed representatives (*nā'ib*) to fulfil judicial functions there, even though this was not a permanent arrangement.²¹

It should be noted that at the beginning of the twentieth century a new, modern expression was given to the senior status of the Jerusalem court as compared to other law-courts in the country. In 1910 a court of appeal was established in Jerusalem (prior to this date all appeals had been submitted to the court in Damascus). It is interesting to note that the jurisdiction of this new court of appeal included the Nablus district.²²

In the military sphere as well there was cooperation between the *sanjaks* of Jerusalem and Nablus. The feudal army of *sipāhīs* was organized in every *sanjak* within the framework of *alāy*, headed by a commander (*alāy beyi*) chosen from among the *sipāhīs*. In addition to their imperial tasks the Jerusalem and Nablus *alāys* were required to protect the pilgrims, and it appears that this common task often led to a situation where the tasks of the Jerusalem *alāy* were carried out by residents of Nablus.²³

Popular religion and the worship of saints also contributed to the development of ties between the various sections of southern and central Palestine up to the Jezreel Valley. The religious life of the Arab population of the country involved many pilgrimages to the tombs of saints and sanctuaries and the holding of celebrations and festivals there. These were generally local celebrations, each village or region having its own tombs and sanctuary, though in several cases these tombs were more widely renowned (e.g., Nabi

²¹ Ott. Doc., p. 42, 47; Heyd, *Yehudei Eretz Yisrael*, p. 174; Ben-Zvi, *Israel*, p. 185 (acc. Evliya Çelebi); Amnon Cohen, *Eretz Yisrael ba-Me'ah ha-Shmone-'Esre — Defuseli ha-Shilḥon ve-ha-Minhal*, Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem 1969, p. 145; Ihsān al-Nimr, *Ta'rikh Jabal Nāblus wa-l-Balqā*, Part II: *Akhwāl 'Ahd al-Iqtā'*, Nablus, 1961, p. 120-122. For cases in which a *qāḏī* and not a *nā'ib* of the Jerusalem *qāḏī* resided in Nablus, see Ott. Doc., pp. 118, 143. Ihsān al-Nimr also speaks of this (al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 529). In the opinion of Ben-Zvi, the annexation of additional areas into the sphere of jurisdiction of the Jerusalem *qāḏī* was dependent on his abilities (see Ben-Zvi, *Israel*, p. 85).

²² Yūsuf al-Ḥakīm, *Dhikriyyat al-Ḥakīm*, Part I: *Sūriyya wa-l-'Ahd al-'Uthmāni*, Beirut, 1968, p. 216.

²³ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 204-206, 527-528. In 1568, identical orders were sent to the *alay beyis* of Safed, Jerusalem and Gaza. The *alay bey* of Nablus was the only one who did not receive such orders. It is very possible that this attests to the fact that in that period command over the *alays* of Nablus and Jerusalem was in the hands of one man (see Ott. Doc., p. 70).

Šālīḥ in the Ramla region, and Nabī Hāšim in the Gaza region).²⁴ But the outstanding event was the celebration of al-Nabī Mūsā, i.e., the annual pilgrimage to the mosque which, according to Muslim-Palestinian tradition, is located on the site of the tomb of Moses near Jericho. This celebration, which was apparently initiated in the days of Šalāḥ al-Dīn, attracted celebrants from all over southern and central Palestine and even from the north of the country.²⁵ Thus, each year, delegations from Hebron and the south of the country met with Jerusalemites as well as inhabitants of Nablus and the rural areas of the hills of Judea and Samaria, each delegation under its own banners; the celebrations lasted for a whole week. The annual recurrence of this event, and the importance of the festival in the popular religion of Palestinian Muslims undoubtedly created a sense of contact between the various parts of the country.

The social order which existed in the rural regions of Hebron, Jerusalem, Nablus and the Carmel bore marked resemblance to the régime which developed in Mount Lebanon in the period of the Emirate of the Ma'nids and Shihābīs,²⁶ so that uniformity of the social régime does not necessarily distinguish the *sanjaks* of Jerusalem and Nablus from the adjacent regions. One of the characteristics of this social order, however, was of wider integrative significance: the splitting of the population into two camps: Qays and Yaman.

This division has attracted the attention of many writers, who have devoted detailed descriptions to this subject. The struggle between these two camps lasted for centuries and was only ended in the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman administration underwent a process of basic change and modernization.²⁷ For the subject in hand, it is important to note that this split divided the population of the Palestinian Mountains (excluding Galilee) in such a way that the Yamanīs of the hills of Hebron, Jerusalem and Nablus stood against the Qaysīs of those areas and quite often the members of one of these camps were rallied from all over the mountain region to fight the other camp. This phenomenon should certainly not be underestimated, and should be regarded as an important factor in the creation of contacts and ties between the various regions of the country.

Christianity and its institutions played a very important part in the Arab

²⁴ The worship of tombs and saints in Palestine has been described in a most interesting fashion by T. Canaan, *Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine*, London, 1927.

²⁵ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 330; T. Canaan, "Mohammedan Saints and Sanctuaries in Palestine," *JPOS*, Vol. VI (1926), p. 117; Finn, *op. cit.*, I, 204, 238.

²⁶ Further on in this article, we will return to the question of the social order.

²⁷ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 404–405; R. A. S. Macalister and E. W. G. Masterman, "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine," *PEFQS*, 1906, pp. 43–44.

concept of *Filasṭīn*. The importance of Jerusalem and the Holy Land in Christianity are too well known to necessitate discussion. But it is important to emphasize that the status of the Holy Land found important institutional expression. The jurisdiction of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem — possibly the oldest and most important Christian institution in Palestine — extended over western Palestine and Transjordan. It should be remembered that this patriarchate has existed without a break since the Roman period, and apparently, from the very beginning, held authority over the three Roman districts of Palestine: *Palaestina Prima*, *Secunda* and *Tertia*. The Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, re-established in 1847, and the Anglican bishop of Jerusalem, first appointed at the end of 1841, also held authority over the whole of Palestine.²⁸

It is not surprising, therefore, that among the Christian population of Palestine, the concept of *Filasṭīn* was of significance. In 1913 Khalīl al-Sakākīnī, one of the leaders of *al-Nahḍa al-Orthodoksiyya* (see below) published a booklet by the name of *al-Nahḍa al-Orthodoksiyya fī Filasṭīn*. Since he was dealing with the affairs of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate in Jerusalem, it is clear that for him the term *Filasṭīn* corresponded to the area over which the authority of the patriarchate extended, i.e., Palestine and Transjordan. On page 12 of his booklet he differentiated clearly between *Filasṭīn* and Syria.

Two years previously the two brothers al-ʿIsā (Yusuf and ʿIsā Dāʿud) had founded the paper *Filasṭīn* in Jaffa. They too were leaders of *al-Nahḍa al-Orthodoksiyya* and their paper dealt extensively with the affairs of the Orthodox patriarchate in Jerusalem. They made extensive use of the term *Filasṭīn* as a territorial denotation, although not always with the same meaning. There are cases in which it is difficult to grasp the exact intention: in many cases it is clear that, for the editors, *Filasṭīn* is identical with the *sanjak* of Jerusalem, but in other cases they are obviously referring to all or most of Palestine. In any case it is clear that the names Syria or *al-bilād al-Sūriyya* refer to the *vilāyet* of Damascus and in rare cases to the *vilāyet* of Beirut as well, but never to Palestine.²⁹

This concept of *Filasṭīn* as a special area, which does not form part of

²⁸ On these Christian institutions see *Br. Interests*, pp. 48–57. James Finn defined, in the 1850's, the territory under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem according to the Roman administrative division of Palestine: *Palaestina*, *Pheonicia* (corresponding to *Palaestina Secunda*), *Idumea* and *Arabia Petraea* (corresponding to *Palaestina Tertia*). See Finn, *op. cit.*, I, 30.

²⁹ *Filasṭīn*, 26.8.11, 13.3.12, 27.7.12, 25.1.13, 2.8.13. It should be noted that from the second half of the nineteenth century, the term *Sūriyya* was reintroduced as the name of the area which till then had been known in Arab geography as *al-Shām* or *Barr al-Shām*.

Syria, is found elsewhere. During the First World War, in 1915–1916, a young Jerusalem Muslim kept a diary in which he described his actions and emotions and the events of the period. He described conversations with other young Jerusalemites regarding the war and the future of the Ottoman Empire. The fate of the Arab countries under Ottoman rule was the central subject of these discussions. It is apparent from these conversations that the existence of *Filasṭīn* as an area on its own, not forming part of a wider area, was taken for granted, side by side with Syria and Egypt.³⁰

Together with the contribution of historical-religious factors (both Islamic and Christian) to the consolidation of the concept of *Filasṭīn*, a later factor was that of Zionism. We shall later discuss the negative attitude which developed among the Palestinian population towards Zionism. In this context it should suffice to say that this factor deeply affected the development of the consciousness of the distinctive identity of *Filasṭīn*, even before the First World War, but especially after it.

Prior to the First World War, modern Jewish settlement extended over all of Palestine from Galilee in the north to the Judean plain in the south. The negative Arab reaction encompassed all parts of the country: Galilee, Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem. *Al-Karmil*, the Haifa paper, like *Filasṭīn*, the Jaffa journal, conducted a propaganda campaign against Zionism and thus created a new factor integrating the various *sanjaks* of Palestine. It is no accident that one of the outstanding cases in which *Filasṭīn* employed the term *Filasṭīn* to denote the whole of western Palestine was in connection with its anti-Zionist stand. On the same occasion the paper called for the establishment of “a patriotic (*waṭaniyya*) Palestinian society” to be composed of the notables of Nablus, Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, and Gaza, to engage in the purchase of state land (*mudawwara* land), before this was done by the Zionists.³¹

We can therefore conclude that at the end of the Ottoman period the concept of *Filasṭīn* was already widespread among the educated Arab public, denoting either the whole of Palestine or the Jerusalem *sanjak* alone. We have already noted that the social régime in Palestine during the Ottoman period and even earlier closely resembled that of the Emirate of Mount Lebanon, but without an *amīr*. The area extending from Mount Hebron in the south to the Jezreel Valley in the north was divided into subdistricts (singular: *nāḥiye*), headed by local sheikhs.³² These subdistricts preserved

³⁰ Anonymous manuscript No. AP. Ar. 8° 46, in the National and University Library, Jerusalem, pp. 1, 51, 126, 142.

³¹ *Filasṭīn*, 12.7.13 and 2.8.13.

³² Exact details of these *nāḥiyes* and the families of sheikhs who ruled them are to be found in Muḥammad ‘Izzat Darwaza, *Al-‘Arab wa-l-‘Urūba min al-Qarn al-Thālith*

their identity for generations. They were interconnected by alliances according to the division into Qays and Yaman. Life and the social order were generally similar. In some, at least, there were special judicial arrangements based on rural custom and trial before the sheikhs according to established procedure.³³ Some of the sheikhs of these subdistricts were Bedouin tribal chiefs and may have achieved their status through the sedentarization of their tribe in a certain territory.³⁴ The status of the sheikhs emanated first and foremost from the fact that they were the tax-farmers (*multazims*) of their regions.³⁵ This task was hereditary within the family, though it did not necessarily pass down from father to son, and there were cases in which the functions was transferred from one sheikh's family to another, in another village.³⁶

The sheikh needed the annual approval of the Ottoman governor for his status. This approval was granted through the despatch of a cloak (*khul'a*) to the sheikh, and the ceremony was carried out simultaneously with the determining of the sum of the annual tax to be paid by the subdistricts in that year.³⁷ The sheikhs had military forces at their disposal, mobilized at times of need (generally for battles between the Qays and Yaman camps) from among the fellahin.

The Ottoman restoration in Palestine in 1842 led to the commencement of efforts on the part of the Ottoman authorities to undermine the status and strength of the *nāhiye* sheikhs. The *Hatt-i Sherif* of Gülhane (1839) announced the abolition of the tax-farming (*iltizām*). It is true that the attempt to abolish this custom bore fruit only at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth,³⁸ but the character of the *iltizām* began to undergo a change. When the Ottoman government first tried to abolish the *iltizām* (1839) it soon discovered that it was not capable of introducing the direct collection of taxes by officials. Therefore the *iltizām* was restored three

ḥattā al-Qarn al-Rābi' 'Ashar al-Hijri, Damascus, 1959, Part II, pp. 132-291; Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 183-186, 404-427; B.A. Macalister and E. W. G. Masterman "Occasional Papers on the Modern Inhabitants of Palestine," Part I, *PEFQSt*, 1905, pp. 352, 356; *ibid.*, Part II, *PEFQSt*, 1906, pp. 35-37; Finn, *op. cit.*, I, 226-243. See also *Ott. Doc.* pp. 67, 96 and *Ott. Reform*, p. 113-122.

³³ Mrs. Finn, "The Fallahheen of Palestine," *PEFQSt*, 1879, pp. 38-40.

³⁴ *Ott. Doc.*, p. 99, n. 10.

³⁵ Darwaza, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 141.

³⁶ Mrs. Finn, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

³⁷ Macalister, *op. cit.*, Part I, *PEFQSt*, 1905, pp. 334, 345-346.

³⁸ George E. Post, "Essays on the Sects and Nationalities of Syria and Palestine," *PEFQSt*, 1891, pp. 106-107; S. Bergheim, "Land Tenure in Palestine," *PEFQSt*, 1894, pp. 197-198.

years later,³⁹ with some modifications. In the past the Ottoman governor had been in charge of the leasing of *iltizām*. With regard to the *nāhiyes* of Palestine this entailed the annual confirmation of the right of the sheikhs to collect their *nāhiye* taxes. An innovation was introduced whereby the leasing of taxes and control of their collection was entrusted to the *majlis al-idāra* of the district. According to Gad Frumkin, who, at the end of the Ottoman period, worked as a lawyer in the finance department of the Jerusalem District:

The authority of the *majlis idāra* included, *inter alia*, the leasing of the tithe and other taxes, which the government did not collect directly, but leased to whoever paid the highest price, in return for a sum determined in advance which the lessee paid into the treasury. Whatever the lessee succeeded in collecting from those obliged to pay taxes went into his own pocket. He collected the tithe in kind or in ready money from the fellahin with the aid of the gendarmes who went out to the villages with him or with his emissaries.⁴⁰

It seems to us that in areas adjacent to Jerusalem and possibly even Mount Nablus, this system gradually led to the weakening of the status of the *nāhiye* sheikhs, and to the removal of the function of tax collection from them and its transfer to urban notables. We believe that the village sheikhs were not able to stand up to the competition of the urban notables for this position and abandoned the function, which was taken over by the urban tax-farmers, who collected the taxes directly from the fellahin. It should be remembered that these notables manned the *majlis al-idāra* and utilized it as an instrument for strengthening their position and influence. The result was that towards the end of the Ottoman period a situation arose which strengthened the urban notables at the expense of the rural sheikhs.⁴¹ In addition, from 1840 onwards, the Ottoman authorities conducted a vigorous campaign to restrain the military power of the sheikhs, who were also deprived of their judicial powers. They were gradually brought within the framework of Ottoman administration, becoming *mukhtārs* of the villages, appointed by the authorities. As a result of this systematic policy the power of the rural

³⁹ G. Baer, "The Evolution of Private Ownership in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent," in C. Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914*, Chicago, 1966, p. 82.

⁴⁰ Gad Frumkin, *Derekh Shofet bi-Yerushalayim*, Tel-Aviv, 1954, p. 110. On Frumkin's role in the Jerusalem District Administration, see p. 187 of his book.

⁴¹ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, 261-262, states this unequivocally. See also Omar es-Saleh el-Barguthy, "Traces of Feudal System in Palestine," *JPOS*, Vol. IX (1929), p. 70.

sheikhs was reduced and at the end of the nineteenth century only few vestiges of their former administrative powers remained.⁴²

In contrast to the decline of their administrative powers, the social status of the sheikhs and the *nāhiyes* was preserved to a large extent. At the end of 1920 Sheikh 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Abū Ghūsh was regarded not only as head of his family and village, but also as the leader of the twenty villages of the *nāhiya* of Banī Mālik, and the sheikhs of the adjacent *nāhiya* regarded themselves in similar fashion.⁴³ Three years later, the villages of the Ramallah sub-district were ordered to establish police stations at their own expense (in accordance with the law for the prevention of crime) because of the proliferation of robbery in the area. The population of the region rallied for action against this governmental step. Their spokesmen were the *mukhtārs* of the villages, and their organization for the submitting of protest petitions was carried out according to the traditional division into *nāhiyes*.⁴⁴

At the end of the twenties and beginning of the thirties there were still traces of this division. In 1929, when the Executive Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress organized a monetary appeal for the Arabs wounded in the riots and tried to extend the fund-raising to the rural areas, it did this through the village sheikhs and again according to the traditional division into *nāhiye*.⁴⁵ The participation of the fellahin in the celebrations of al-Nabī Mūsā continued in the thirties to be organized according to this division, the villagers taking part in the event under their various banners.⁴⁶

This preservation of the subdistricts augmented the political power of the sheikhs who headed them, and made them a factor in the struggle for leadership among the Palestinian Arab public.

The gradual decline in the scope of the authority of the rural and sub-district sheikhs did not leave a vacuum. The sheikhs were replaced by a growing social element — the urban notables (*a'yān*). In the eighteenth century this stratum had already consolidated its strength and status in Ottoman society. The decline in the power of the central government, the weakening

⁴² *Ott. Reform*, pp. 117, 120, 121-122; Macalister, *op. cit.*, Part II, *PEFQSI*, 1906, pp. 46-50; Barguthy, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁴³ Report of Beshwer, assistant to the Director of Public Security, 18.1.21, Israel State Archives (henceforth ISA), Archives of the Chief Secretary, File 157; the petition of some 150 notables to the Governor of Jerusalem regarding the appointment of the Mufti of Jerusalem, 21.3.21. *ibid.*, File 245.

⁴⁴ Petition of protest of the *mukhtārs* of the *nāhiye* of Banī-Zayd el-Shimāliyya to the Chief Secretary, 14.7.23, *ibid.*, File 158.

⁴⁵ Protocol of the meeting of the Committee for Collecting Contributions from the Villages, 25.11.29, ISA, Files of the Arab Executive, No. 3098.

⁴⁶ A.H. Cohen, "Seder ha-Tahalukhot bi-Yemei Nabi Musa, 22.4.32-29.4.32", Zionist Archives (henceforth ZA), S/25, File 3070.

of the *sipāhi* system, the degeneration of the Janissary force and the struggle waged between its imperial sections (those who continued to be regarded as "servants of the Porte") and the local units (*yerliyya*) — all these factors greatly weakened the authority of the central government and its representatives (the *vālī*-governor) in the various provinces. This development enabled local factors — local ruling dynasties, Bedouin tribes and urban *a'yān* — to come to power and reach decisive positions of influence, and sometimes also of control.⁴⁷

The increase in the power of the urban *a'yān* stratum was accelerated in the nineteenth century. With the commencement of the Tanzimat process and the Ottoman restoration in Syria, the Ottoman authorities sought ways of intensifying the affiliation of this class to the government and of making them partners in the efforts to advance the government. They established councils in the various districts (this step may have been taken in accordance with the precedent established by Muḥammed 'Alī's régime), which advised the governor, and in which the local *a'yān* were represented, together with the chief district administrative officers.

But the main result of this innovation was the exact opposite of that anticipated by the authorities. The local *a'yān* stratum succeeded in converting the council (*majlis*) into their own instrument. Through the council they exerted influence over local administration and checked the *vālī* when the latter tried to introduce reforms liable to affect their status. The power of the *vālī* to face up to this stratum was limited. He was appointed for only one year, while the *a'yān* were local residents well acquainted with district affairs. It is doubtful whether the *vālī* could have grasped district administrative problems without their experience and knowledge. This policy was employed so as to prevent the *vālīs* from becoming too strong, thus threatening the status of the central government in the provinces, but the result turned out to be the very one feared by the authorities: the weakness of the *vālīs* meant that the central authority was also weak. The central government appreciated this and in 1852 endeavoured to correct the situation by considerably increasing the powers of the *vālī*, but this step was apparently taken too late, since the local elements were already too strong.⁴⁸ The strength of the local *a'yān* decreased slightly after this, but it nevertheless remained one of the important factors in frustrating the reform attempts of Aḥmed Shēfiq Midhat, the reform-minded *vālī* of the Syrian (Damascus) *vilayet* in the years 1878–1880.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ A Hourani, "The Fertile Crescent in the Eighteenth Century," in his *A Vision of History*, Beirut, 1961, pp. 35–70; A. Hourani, "Ottoman Politics of Notables," in Polk-Chambers, pp. 41–68. ⁴⁸ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 34–38, 87–107.

⁴⁹ Shimon Shamir, "The Modernization of Syria: Problems and Solutions in the Early Period of Abdülhamid," in Polk-Chambers, pp. 351–382.

The influence of this stratum over local administration was also strengthened by the fact that it filled many of the local administrative posts. Members of this class, from which emerged the *'ulamā'* and various religious functionaries, were the first to acquire relatively modern education in the new schools of the empire, and therefore only from this stratum, or mainly from them, was it possible to recruit candidates for the new administration in the Tanzimat period.

The abolition of the hereditary *iltizām*, formerly in the hands of the subdistrict sheikhs, and its replacement by the leasing of taxes to whoever paid the highest price, greatly contributed to the strengthening of the status of the urban *a'yān*. Because of their wealth, they could compete with the subdistrict sheikhs and win the *iltizām* rights. But along with the economic factor was that of their status in the new Ottoman administration. The leasing of taxes came under the authority of the administrative council (*majlis al-idāra*) of the district and the *a'yān* undoubtedly exploited their influence at these councils so as to obtain *iltizāms* for themselves.⁵⁰

This development is closely tied up with the result of the faulty implementation of the Ottoman Land Law of 1858. The entrusting of the implementation of the law to the local administration, under the control of the *majlis al-idāra*, made a mockery of the intentions of the legislator. Instead of strengthening the state's rights over the *miri* land and the rights of the cultivators, the *a'yān* succeeded in registering large stretches of land in their own names. Lands, the taxes from which were leased to the *a'yān*, were now registered in their names. The heavy debts incurred by the fellahin and their fear of registering their rights in the land registers were to the advantage of the urban notables.⁵¹

As a result of these processes, the urban *a'yān* attained a firm status in the civil and religious administration of the Empire, as well as extensive land property. A considerable number of the senior district administrative posts were in the hands of the various local élites, and quite a number of the members of this class attained senior positions in the Ottoman administration outside their own areas. For example: 'Abd al-Laṭīf Ṣalāḥ of Nablus was First Secretary of the Senate at the end of his Ottoman career;⁵²

⁵⁰ Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 110; al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 262.

⁵¹ See previous note and M. Assaf, *Hitt'orerut ha-'Aravim be Eretz Israel u-Vrithatam*, Tel-Aviv, 1967, p. 37; Baer, *Economic History*, pp. 80-90; Paul J. Klat, "The Origins of Land Ownership in Syria," *Middle East Economic Papers*, 1958, pp. 51-66. Lists of the big land-owners in Palestine in the years 1918-1920, which contain a large number of urban notables, are to be found in the Zionist Archives, S/25, File 7433. See also A. Granovsky, *Ha-Mishṭar ha-Karka'i be-Eretz Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1949, pp. 34-37, 50-62, 68-79.

⁵² See biographical note in Zionist Archives, S/25, File 4022.

Aḥmad Ḥilmī 'Abd al-Bāqī served as director general of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank in Syria and Iraq;⁵³ Muṣṭafā al-Khālidi of Jerusalem served as commander of the Beirut police, chief prosecutor, and eventually as a judge in that town's court of appeal.⁵⁴ 'Arif Pasha al-Dajānī of Jerusalem held various positions in the Ottoman administration and attained the post of district governor (*mutaṣarrıf*);⁵⁵ As'ad al-Shuqayrī of Acre was a member of *sheykhūlislām's shar'ia* "inquiries committee" at Istanbul and, during the First World War, was mufti of the Fourth Army (which fought on the Egyptian-Palestinian front under Jemāl Pasha,);⁵⁶ and Mūsā Kazım al-Ḥusaynī, who rose from a relatively humble position in the administration through the post of subdistrict governor (*qā'imaqām*), district governor to governor of Yemen.⁵⁷ The establishment of the Ottoman parliament also helped the *a'yān* to strengthen their position, since all the representatives of the Palestinian district were members of this class and thus won an additional source of political and social influence.⁵⁸

The supremacy of the *a'yān* is clearly evident on examination of the social realities of life in the various Palestinian towns at the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth. In Jerusalem the most prominent families were the al-Ḥusaynīs and al-Khālidi, the Nashāshībīs then undergoing a process of social and economic advancement and gradually taking the place of the Khālidi. The Khālidi family mainly fulfilled important functions in the field of religious affairs, and its sons traditionally held the position of head clerk of the *Sharī'a* court in Jerusalem.⁵⁹ At the beginning of the twentieth century two of its sons were prominent and respected religious dignitaries: Sheikh Khalīl al-Khālidi, who was later to become President of the *Sharī'a* Court of Appeals in Palestine and Sheikh Rāghib al-Khālidi, founder of the Khālidiyya Library. But the members of this family apparently did not fit in well with the new Ottoman administration; their numbers dwindled, and their influence was weakened as a result.⁶⁰

The al-Ḥusaynī family held the position of mufti of Jerusalem from the

⁵³ A.H. Cohen, "Me'ora'ot November bi-Tzefon ha-Aretz," 1.12.35, *ibid.*, File 4224.

⁵⁴ Ibrāhīm al-Sayyid 'Isā al-Miṣrī, *Majmaa'al-Āthār al-'Arabiyya*, Damascus, 1936, p. 124.

⁵⁵ *Mitr'at al-Sharq*, 12.5.27.

⁵⁶ See title page of As'ad al-Shuqayrī's booklet, *Al-Risāla al-Marfū'a ilā Ashāb al-Jalāla wa-l-sunaww Muluk al-Muslimin wa-Umard'ihim wa-Ūlī al-Ḥāl wa-l-'Aqd*, Acre, 1936.

⁵⁷ *Al-Jāmi'a al-'Arabiyya*, 26.3.34; Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

⁵⁸ A list of candidates for the 1912 elections in the Jerusalem District is to be found in *Filasṭin*, 10.2.12. The 4.5.12 issue of the paper reported the results of the elections.

⁵⁹ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 405.

⁶⁰ Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

mid-nineteenth century. A municipality was established in Jerusalem in 1864, and many members of this family held the post of mayor, although the Khālīdīs or 'Alamīs sometimes served in this position as well.⁶¹ In the 1880's Salīm al-Ḥusaynī held this position, and in the second decade of the twentieth century his two sons, Ḥusayn Salīm al-Ḥusaynī and Mūsā Kāzīm al-Ḥusaynī, followed in his footsteps.⁶² Members of this family also held high posts in the Jerusalem district administration, as subdistrict and district governors, and in the central government administration at Istanbul.⁶³

By holding this position the al-Ḥusaynīs were able to win national status. The mufti of Jerusalem was the central personality at the al-Nabī Mūsā celebrations,⁶⁴ and we have already noted that the significance of this event was countrywide. Furthermore, the close ties of the al-Ḥusaynī family with this annual event was emphasized even more by the fact that members of this family were the traditional administrators of the *waqf* for the al-Nabī Mūsā mosque near Jericho.⁶⁵

The Nashāshībī family advanced in status only in recent generations. 'Uthmān al-Nashāshībī, who was a rich property-owner, was elected to parliament in 1912,⁶⁶ while Rāghib al-Nashāshībī served as Jerusalem District Engineer and in 1914 was also elected to parliament.⁶⁷ Members of this family also served on the district administrative council.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the status of these families was firm and that the district governor was obliged to seek them out and to organize district matters in accordance with their wishes.⁶⁸ In the 1850's, the British Consul, James Finn, described their status as follows: "It should be mentioned that a close corporation of Arab families, not recognized by law, but influential by position, usurped all the municipal offices among them."⁶⁹ Fifty years later the situation remained unchanged and the Jerusalem District Governor in 1906–1908 resented it and tried to change it. He described the status of the families by saying:

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 283; Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is my Country — The Story of Musa Alami*, London, 1969, p. 29.

⁶² Asher Druyanov, *Ketavim le-Toldot Ḥibbat Zion*, Odessa, 1919, Part I, p. 770; *Filasṭīn*, 31.1.12; Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

⁶³ Druyanov, *op. cit.*, I, 769–770; Frumkin, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

⁶⁴ Al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, p. 330; Canaan, *op. cit.*, p. 117 ff.

⁶⁵ 'Abdullāh Mukhlīṣ and Ya'qūb Abū al-Hudā to the High Commissioner, 25.10.23, ISA, CS, File 189, *Mitr'at al-Sharq*, 7.6.24.

⁶⁶ *Filasṭīn*, 8.5.12.

⁶⁷ Frumkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 102, 285.

⁶⁸ Druyanov, *op. cit.*, I, 770. On other functionaries in the local administration drawn from the local nobility, see Document No. 13, 1908, ISA, Archives of 'Alī Ekrem Bey (governor of the *sanjak* in 1906–08).

⁶⁹ Finn, *op. cit.*, I, 180. See also p. 181.

There are various influential people and notables here who have won riches and fame through interfering with the rights of other people... Because of their superiority over the Arab [Bedouin?] inhabitants, most of whom are primitive, the Jerusalem notables have always been renowned for their many revolts against the government... When Ra'ūf Pasha was appointed governor of Jerusalem he introduced a method of abolishing the domination of these parasites over the masses and of making clear to these wielders of influence in the district, bearers of the names of Ḥusaynī, Khālidi, Nashāshībī and Dā'udī [Dajānī], what their limitations were...⁷⁰

In Nablus, which was also the capital town of a district, the local families also enjoyed special status. For generations the sons of these families held prominent traditional positions in the army and administration of the district and the Empire, but it seems that with the reforms in the Empire their participation decreased. This conservative town apparently did not succeed in adapting itself to new needs with the same rapidity as Jerusalem. Of the sons of Nablus families, we find only Amīn 'Abd al-Hādī serving as subdistrict governor outside his home district.⁷¹ Nor do we find any evidence to show that the Nablus families influenced local district affairs to the extent that prominent Jerusalem families did.

The prominent Nablus families were split into camps. The source of the split lay in the division into Qays and Yaman, but after the Egyptian conquest in the 1830's the split took on a new political significance. The Yamanī faction, headed by the families of 'Abd al-Hādī and Nimr, supported the Egyptian régime and served as governors under it, while the Qays faction, headed by the Ṭūqān family, led the rebels.⁷² This new alignment made itself felt in the names of the two rival factions: the pro-Egyptian faction named itself *Dār al-Masrī*, and the other, *Dār al-Bey*, apparently after the title of Bey borne by the Ṭūqān family. This division and these names were preserved till at least the second decade of the twentieth century.⁷³

The situation was similar in the subdistrict towns of Gaza and Jaffa. There too we find that the important local positions (mayor, local mufti) were held by members of the prominent families who succeeded in gaining control over wide stretches of land.⁷⁴ If we recall that the coastal plain was

⁷⁰ Letter of 'Alī Ekrem, governor of Jerusalem District, to the Ministry of the Interior, Document No. 11, ISA, Archives of 'Alī Ekrem Bey.

⁷¹ *Filasṭīn*, 10.2.12.

⁷² See details of the affair, al-Nimr, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 417-426.

⁷³ According to reports in the Zionist Archives, L/4, File 276 IV.

⁷⁴ The families of Abū-Khaḍrā', Shawā and Bayṭār of Gaza and Jaffa are prominent in the lists of big landowners in Palestine at the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, which are to be found in the Zionist Archives, S/25, File 7422.

sparsely populated in the nineteenth century, and the methods of land registration in desolate areas where no claimants were to be found, was lax, we will understand how this development occurred.

The stronger position of the Jerusalem *a'yān* families apparently resulted from the special status of the Jerusalem *sanjak*, based on the sanctity of the Holy City. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the *qādī* of Jerusalem wielded extensive judicial authority. In this period there were also cases where the Jerusalem *sanjak* was elevated to the level of *eyālet* (province) or at least a special *sanjak*, independent of the province governor. The formal expression of this was the appointment of a district governor on a higher level (*mutaşarrıf*) to head it.⁷⁵

In the 1850's, after the Crimean War, this higher administrative status was made permanent. It was then determined that the governor of the Jerusalem *sanjak* would no longer be subordinate to the governor of the Sidon or Damascus provinces, but would be directly under Istanbul, so that the *sanjak* would in fact be an *eyālet*.⁷⁶ It was decided that the governor of this district would bear higher rank than the ordinary district governor,⁷⁷ and when, in accordance with the Ottoman *vilāyet* law of 1864, "general councils" (*majlis 'umūmī*) were set up in the new *vilāyets* over the "administrative councils" (*majlis idāra*), a "general council" was also established in Jerusalem.⁷⁸

We believe that this administrative development, rooted in the international interest in Jerusalem and the dispute between various Christian sects over rights to the Holy Places, constitutes the background for the rise in the status of the prominent Jerusalem families.

The equalization of the status of Jerusalem to that of Damascus, for example, also equalized the status of the notables of the two cities and awarded the Jerusalem notables seniority over the prominent families of Nablus and other Palestinian cities and towns. The fact that in Jerusalem there developed a class of notables with high social and administrative status, accustomed to a large extent to independent management of their district affairs, exerted considerable influence over the development of events in Palestine even after the Ottoman period.

III. Political Trends among the Palestinians on the Eve of World War I

The existence of the Arabs, subjects of the Ottoman Empire, as a group with their own specific identity, is by no means a new phenomenon. The existence

⁷⁵ Ben-Zvi, *Israel*, p. 99.

⁷⁶ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 33, 122.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* An ordinary district governor was a pasha with one or two *sūgh* (horse-tails), while the governor of the Jerusalem district was a pasha with three *sūgh*, known as a *mushir*

⁷⁸ *Filasfin*, 28.5.13.

of linguistic differences within the Empire, the consciousness of common origin from Arab tribes and the special status of the Arabs in Islam — all these contributed to the fact that despite the common Muslim identification, the differentiating factors between the various Muslim ethnic and linguistic groups were not forgotten. The new moods which began to be felt at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century were based on the attribution of subjective ideological and political significance to these objective differences. From the moment that demands for political rights based on these objective factors began to be voiced, it was possible to say that the transfer from Arab consciousness to Arab nationalism had begun.

This change,⁷⁹ which was far-reaching though limited in scope, occurred first and foremost in Damascus and Beirut, and in student and intellectual circles in Istanbul, Cairo and Paris. We are particularly interested in the role of the Palestinians in this development in its main centres, and the extent to which it found an echo in Palestine itself.

The total number of members of Arab nationalist societies on the eve of the First World War was infinitesimal — 126 members and another 30 who joined either on the eve of the war or during the war itself. Of these, according to C.E. Dawn, there were 22 Palestinians in the first category and 10 the second.⁸⁰ According to our calculations, there were only 24 Palestinians.⁸¹ In any case it is clear that the number was very small, and that most of them were young.

Together with these young men, who were active members of the nationalist societies, there were others who supported the activities of these groups. When the Arab Congress was held in Paris in 1913, many residents of Arab

⁷⁹ It is not our intention to analyse the growth of Arab nationalism in general within the framework of this paper.

⁸⁰ C. E. Dawn, "The Rise of Arabism in Syria," *MEJ*, Vol. XVI (1962), pp. 148–149. Dawn was referring to members of the Decentralization Party and the *al-'Ahd and al-Fatāh* societies.

⁸¹ We have drawn up our list according to Amin Sa'id, *Al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubra*, Cairo, 1934, Part I, pp. 7, 8, 11, 46; Muhammad 'Izzat Darwaza, *Ḥawā' al-Ḥaraka al-'Arabiyya al-Ḥaditha*, Sidon, 1950, Part I, pp. 27, 30, 31, 33; Al-Qā'id al-'Amm li-l-Jaysh al-Rābi', *Iqāḥāt 'an al-Masā'il al-Siyāsiyya allatī Jarra Tadāqluhā bi-Diḥwān al-Ḥarb al-'Urft bi-'Aleiyh*, Istanbul, 1916, pp. 49, 66, 119–121; *Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabi al-'ali 'Awwal*, Cairo, 1913, pp. 4, 5, 15–16; Tawfiq 'Ali Barū, *Al-'Arab wa-l-Turk fī al-'Ahd al-Dustūrī al-'Uthmānī*, Cairo, 1960, pp. 307–308, 310, 319, 321, 505. We have included in it three Palestinian Members of Parliament, who were prominent in their struggle for Arab rights in the Empire, as well as the members of *Al-Muntadā al-Adabi*. However, members of the society *Al-Ikhā' al-'Arabi al-'Uthmānī* were not included because their society had adopted the Ottomanist ideology and among its founders there had been those who had explicitly rejected the Arab nationalist trend.

countries sent telegrams and letters of support. Of the 387 names which appeared as signatories of these expressions of support, 130 were Palestinians,⁸² but several of these have already been included as members of the societies.

It is very possible that the small number of Palestinians in the general Arab nationalist movement results from the fact that few Palestinians were then residing in the geographical centres of the movement. Therefore, to complete the picture, it is necessary to examine the extent to which the movement had branches or support within Palestine itself.

Some time before the commencement of the cultural and national-political awakening of the Arabs, it was possible to sense the hostile attitude of the population towards the Ottoman authorities. James Finn, the British Consul in Jerusalem in the 1840's and 1850's, noted that a large proportion of the local population hated the Turks, regarded the Turkish Caliphate as a fraud and distorted the title of *khān* into *khā'in* (traitor in Arabic). Nevertheless, he believed that the sense of loyalty to Islam and its rulers was stronger than any other emotion.⁸³ It is our view that the hostile attitude towards the Ottoman authorities should be partly attributed to the natural opposition of a population lacking political consciousness towards any authority and partly to the negative reaction of the Muslims to the innovations of the Tanzimat period, rather than to political motivation.

The first political manifestation of opposition to the Ottoman régime was discernible in 1905 in Negib Azoury's book,⁸⁴ in which he demanded independence for the Arab nation and the restoration of the Caliphate to a son of the Arab Quraysh tribe. Azoury was a Lebanese Maronite who had served in the Jerusalem district administration until his exile to Paris. His book was published there and it is doubtful whether it had any great effect in Palestine. Nevertheless, one should attribute importance to the fact that Azoury tried to smuggle into Palestine the manifestos of his organization "*La Ligue de la Patrie Arabe*" established in Paris, and that after the 1908 revolution he was permitted to return to Palestine and, very possibly, continued to disseminate his ideas there.⁸⁵

Whatever the significance of Azoury's activities, there can be no doubt

⁸² Details of these telegrams are to be found in *Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabi*, pp. 26, 122, 123, 164, 166-168, 188, 197, 199, 210.

⁸³ Finn, *op. cit.*, I, 215.

⁸⁴ N. Azoury, *Le réveil de la Nation Arabe dans l'Asie Turque*, Paris, 1905.

⁸⁵ Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914," in A. Hourani (ed.), *St. Anthony's Papers*, No. 17 — *MEA*, No. 4, London, 1965, pp. 91-92. An extremely detailed study on Azoury's book is that of A. Hürmoni, "Ha-Tenu'a ha-'Aravit u-Megamoteha," *Ha-Shiloah*, Vol. XV (1905), pp. 377-390.

that it was not his ideas that set the tone before 1908, when the Young Turk Revolution broke out. Until that date there were very few manifestations of Arab nationalist attitudes, and Azoury was exceptional in this respect. G. Antonius attributed this silence to the repressive régime of 'Abdülhamîd II, who resisted any attempt to undermine his all-powerful authority over the Empire. But this explanation disregards the other side of 'Abdülhamîd's policy — the return to Muslim orthodoxy following the period of modernization of the reform-minded politicians who preceded him. The Tanzimat policy aroused discontent and opposition among the Muslim population of the Fertile Crescent, and it is almost certain that the reversal of this policy softened this discontent and strengthened loyalty to the Empire. It should be recalled that it was these very Arab countries which were the main beneficiaries of 'Abdülhamîd's policies in the sphere of the nurturing of Islam, its institutions (mosques, etc.) and the '*ulamâ*' (some of whom, particularly Syrian Arabs, reached the peak of the ruling hierarchy). It is not surprising, therefore, that this period is fondly remembered by the members of the Muslim social élite in Jerusalem.⁸⁶

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and particularly the introduction of firmer methods of government and the manifestations of their Turkish nationalist policies from 1909 onwards changed this picture and created the first snowball of Arab opposition to the Ottoman régime, which gained strength in the second decade of the twentieth century.⁸⁷

The governor of the Jerusalem district, 'Ali Ekrem Bey (the son of Namik Kemal) apparently sensed the desire for change and feared that the introduction of the constitution might be exploited for raising extreme radical demands. He wrote that "the declaration of the constitution and its implementation have gradually begun to arouse feelings of independence among the Arabs. This idea is at present silent and secret, it is true, but according to all the events now happening here, the press and other phenomena, one can feel that the people throughout Syria are tending in this direction."⁸⁸ Elsewhere he wrote: "It is my opinion that the concept of freedom will lead here to regrettable misuse. The corrupt gangs of notables, who regard the ignorant local population as their prey, will regard the idea of freedom as an important means of disobedience and revolt, to the extent that the state will be obliged to despatch military force to educate the people of the Jerusaem

⁸⁶ See Furlonge, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-33, 47, on the prevailing mood in the 'Alamî family.

⁸⁷ M. Smilansky, "Moshevetenu be-Eretz Israel," *Ha-Shiloah*, Vol. XXVI (Shevat-Tammuz, 1912), p. 180.

⁸⁸ 'Ali Ekrem Bey to the Minister of the Interior (no date), Document No. 3, ISA, 'Ali Ekrem Bey Archives.

and the Syrian regions.”⁸⁹ In order to anticipate this danger he recommended that the district governor and the senior officials should always be appointed from among the Turks and not the Arabs.⁹⁰ This *mutaşarrıf* was extreme in his diagnosis of the situation and appears to us to have gone too far.

The main manifestations of this development in the Fertile Crescent were the reform societies (*al-İslāh*) which were established in the various towns (especially in Beirut) and which demanded the introduction of a considerable decentralization of rule, the transferring of authority to the indigenous population and the safeguarding of the status of the Arabic language in local administration and education. These societies were connected with the Decentralization Party established in Cairo. They were not extensive in Palestine, nor was support for their ideas widespread. There were branches of the Decentralization Party in Nablus, Jenin, Tūl-Karm and Jaffa⁹¹ but not in Jerusalem. This geographical concentration of those demanding Arab rights in the Nablus district is also confirmed by an examination of the identity of the Palestinians who took part in the Arab nationalist movement outside Palestine. Most of these also came from Nablus, and most of the telegrams of support for the Arab Congress in Paris came from this district. The Beirut papers took note of this fact and attacked the Jerusalemites for their non-support of the reform movement.⁹² It seems to us that the strong status of the Jerusalem élite, its important role in the administration of district affairs and the integration of its sons in the general Ottoman administration resulted in the fact that among this group loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and to its accepted beliefs was stronger than in other districts of Palestine.

Further evidence of the mood of the Arab population in Palestine in that period can be found in the sympathy won by the “Liberty and Agreement Party” (*Hürriyyet ve İ'tilâf* — *Entente liberale* in common French parlance),⁹³ which constituted the opposition to the autocratic administrative methods and centralized policies of the Young Turks. It is true that this was not an Arab nationalist party but an Ottoman liberal party. Nevertheless, one cannot disregard the fact that it united the political circles of non-Turkish elements in the Empire, and that in its demands for decentralized policies it resembled the Decentralization Party and other Arab reformers.

⁸⁹ Same to same, Document, No. 11, *ibid*.

⁹⁰ See n. 10.

⁹¹ *İqâhât*, pp. 119–121; *Filasṭîn*, 16.10.12.

⁹² *Filasṭîn*, 22.3.13.

⁹³ F. Alsberg, “Ha-She’ela ha-’Aravit bi-Mediniyut ha-Hanhala ha-Zionit lifnei Milhemet ha-’Olam ha-Rishonah,” *Shivat Tzion*, Vol. IV (1955–56), p. 169; Arthur Ruppin, *Pirkei Hayay*, Tel-Aviv, 1968, Part II, p. 189.

In summing up all these manifestations it seems to us that they were the exceptions to the rule. Very few of the Palestinian Arabs were then attracted by the new ideology of Arab nationalism. Of great interest, in our view, is the fact that Tawfiq 'Alī Barū's book, the most detailed study of the development of Arab-Turkish relations in the years 1908–1914, mentions hardly any reform or nationalist societies in Palestine towns. The difficult situation during the First World War and the suppressive measures employed by Jemāl Pasha changed the attitude of the population towards the government and gradually also towards the Ottoman régime itself.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, there were no manifestations of revolt in Palestine during the First World War, and even if there were signs of discontent, they did not reach the stage of active opposition to the Ottoman régime.⁹⁵

There were also positive expressions of this trend towards loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. As'ad Shuqayrī, the Acre district representative in the Ottoman Parliament in 1912–1914, opposed the decentralizing trend and the struggle for Arab rights and remained loyal to the Ottoman-Muslim Empire to the bitter end.⁹⁶ Shukrī al-Ḥusaynī of Jerusalem, who also reached high rank in the Ottoman administration, took up this stand as well.⁹⁷

Al-Karmil, the Haifa paper, tended to support the reform and decentralizing movement. On the other hand, *Filasṭīn*, which was published in Jaffa, opposed it vehemently, and reflected Ottomanist ideology, supporting the partnership of all citizens of the Ottoman Empire in one united state, with full equality for members of all religions and nationalities. The paper opposed the demands for a decentralized régime and for the strengthening of the powers of the administrative councils in the *vilāyets*, since it regarded such a step as weakening the unity of the Empire and providing opportunities for foreign intervention in its affairs. Therefore, it specifically expressed its disapproval of the liberal opposition and the outlandish expressions of the decentralizing and reform movement and Arab nationalism: the activities of Sayyid Ṭālib, *naqīb al-ashraf* of Baṣra, the Beirut Reform Society and the

⁹⁴ Manuscript AP. Ar. 8° 46, pp. 13, 42, 48, 55, 64, 79, 126, 181; Palin Report, p. 5, Public Record Office, F. O. 371/5121. See the balanced and intelligent report of Captain Brenton, the British Intelligence Officer, "The Effect of the Sharifian Movement on the Military Situation in Palestine," Jerusalem, 23.2.21, ISA, CS, File 163.

⁹⁵ In his memoirs, Jemāl Pasha did not mention any activities hostile to the Turks carried out in Palestine, and spoke only of Beirut in this context, stressing the loyalty of the Jerusalemites to the Jihād appeal and to the Ottoman Empire (See Djemal Pasha, *Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman, 1913–1919*, New York, 1922, pp. 206–207).

⁹⁶ Tawfiq Barū, *op. cit.*, pp. 376, 379, 508, 543; *Al-Karmil*, 22.10.24, 25.10.24.

⁹⁷ Tawfiq Barū, *op. cit.*, p. 541; *Filasṭīn*, 24.5.13.

Paris Congress. On the other hand, it supported the rule of "The Committee for Unity and Progress" and its ideology.⁹⁸

One of *Filasfīn's* arguments against the reform movement was the fear that their leadership might provide the Zionists with opportunities for infiltrating Palestine and gaining further control over it.⁹⁹ This argument, voiced in 1913, did not appear out of the blue, but was the result of the development of the hostile attitude to Zionism which commenced at the end of the nineteenth century.

Modern Jewish settlement in Palestine, from the end of the 1870's, brought to Palestine a new and hitherto unknown type of Jew. In place of the Jews of the old *yishuv* (community), closed within their own districts and within themselves, there began to appear new Jews, who broke out of the boundaries of the old settlement areas and the traditional way of life. The educated Arab public took note of this development and of its significance. Settlement on the land created considerable problems with neighbouring villages and sometimes with former tenants, and the conservative local population regarded the Jews as trespassers. Reaction to the new phenomenon was at first primitive and non-political but over the years it took on the form of conscious opposition to the Zionist project.

The purchase of land by Jews created ample opportunities for dispute with Arab fellahin. The Jewish purchasers were not acquainted with local customs regarding freedom of pasturing after the harvest, and when they tried to prevent such pasturing, disputes broke out. When land was purchased from owners out of disregard or insufficient concern for the tenants, disputes arose which did not die down for years.¹⁰⁰ But these controversies were not of a political nature — similar disputes occurred among the Arab villagers themselves — and they certainly did not prevent the local Arabs from selling land to the Jews at extremely high prices. In 1908, 'Alī Ekrem Bey, the *mutaṣarrıf* of the Jerusalem District, recommended that the Jerusalem *qādī* always be appointed from among the Turks and not the local Arabs, since the *qādī* was a member of the committee controlling land transfer, and there was need for a non-local man would truly fulfil the government instructions against the transfer of land to Jews.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ *Filasfīn*, 13.3.12, 23.3.12, 17.4.12, 21.9.12, 5.10.12, 16.10.12, 20.11.12, 28.12.12, 25.1.13, 12.2.13, 3.5.13, 24.5.13, 13.8.13.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 19.4.13.

¹⁰⁰ Details of these affairs can be found in Assaf, *op. cit.*, 13–15, 16; Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 84–85; Yehuda Slutsky *et. al.*, *Sefer Toldot ha-Haganah*, Tel-Aviv, 1956, Vol. I, Part I, pp. 93–110; Druyanov, *op. cit.*, I, 670–671, 763–764; A. Cohen, *Israel ve-ha-'Olam ha-'Aravi*, Merhavia, 1964, pp. 68–69.

¹⁰¹ Draft of 'Alī Ekrem's cable to the Office of Sheykhülislām, 7.7.1907, ISA, Archives of 'Alī Ekrem Bey. See also evidence of H. M. Kalavriskiy, who was then engaged in

The first political expression of opposition to Zionism came in 1891. In the spring of that year a number of Jerusalem notables sent a petition to the central government in Istanbul demanding the prevention of further immigration of Jews and purchase of land by them. They claimed that the Jews were taking land out of the hands of the Muslims and gradually taking over control of local commerce.¹⁰² Many years were to pass before this phenomenon was repeated. This does not mean that the apprehension regarding Zionism disappeared, but it seems that the scope of its activities in Palestine, on the one hand, and the level of political consciousness, on the other, were too weak to arouse oppositionary public activity. In a private letter, Yūsuf Diyā' al-Khālidi, speaker of the Ottoman parliament in 1876, expressed his estimation that in the theoretical sphere Zionism was just, but for the sake of the peace and tranquility of the inhabitants of *Filasṭin* it would be better if its efforts at implementation were ceased.¹⁰³ In the preface to his book, Negib Azoury also expressed his fears, which now read like a veritable prophesy, on the consequences of the implementation of the Zionist ideal:

Two important phenomena, of identical character but nevertheless opposed, which till now have not attracted attention, are now making their appearance in Asian Turkey: these are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent efforts of the Jews to re-establish, on an extremely large scale, the ancient Kingdom of Israel. These two movements are destined to struggle continuously with one another, until one prevails over the other. The fate of the entire world depends on the result of this struggle between the two peoples, which represent two contradictory principles.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, that until 1908, manifestations of political anti-Zionist attitudes were sporadic and non-systematic.¹⁰⁵ Real public activity with an anti-Zionist spirit commenced only after the Young Turk Revolution.

This revolution ushered in the era of the Arab press in Palestine which became the standard-bearer in the struggle against Zionism. Prominent

settlement activities in the Galilee (H. M. Kalavrisky, "Ha-Yehasim Bein ha-Yehudim ve-ha-'Aravim lifnei ha-Milḥamah," *She'ifoteinu*, Vol. II (1931), p. 54.

¹⁰² *Ha-'Or*, 27th of Nisan, 1891; Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

¹⁰³ Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

¹⁰⁴ Azoury, *op. cit.*, p. v of preface (quoted in A. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, London, 1962, p. 279 and Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92).

¹⁰⁵ While he was governor of the Jerusalem District, 'Alī Ekrem Bey did his best to carry out governmental orders regarding the prevention of Jewish immigration to his district. The material in his archives does not include even one piece of evidence to the effect that he was under pressure of the local public to carry out this policy. His motives were Ottoman and his apprehensions were directed against the creation of a new minority problem in the Empire.

roles were played by *al-Karmil* in Haifa and the Jaffa paper, *Filasṭīn*, both belonging to Greek Orthodox owners.¹⁰⁶ When the Arabs began to fight for their national rights, they began to regard Zionism as "an enemy who in the future will usurp them in an area which they believe to be purely Arab."¹⁰⁷ This press turned its gaze towards the Jewish immigrants, who were evading the regulations of the Ottoman authorities and remaining in Palestine, and demanded of them that they fulfil their obligations.¹⁰⁸ *Filasṭīn*, which was hostile to the Arab nationalist trend, severely criticized the Arab Congress in Paris for not taking an unequivocal stand against Jewish immigration.¹⁰⁹

The activity of Najīb Naṣṣār, editor of *al-Karmil*, found an echo in Syria and other places, and several of the leaders of the Arab awakening (Shukrī al-'Asālī of Damascus, for example) took the matter to heart and made it an important part of their political careers. Najīb Naṣṣār even published an anti-Zionist book, thus publicizing this stand.¹¹⁰

The introduction of parliamentary life in the Ottoman Empire also provided an important platform for the expression of the anti-Zionist attitude. Prominent in expressing this stand were Sa'īd al-Ḥusaynī and Rawḥī al-Khālīdī, two of the three representatives of the Jerusalem district in the Ottoman parliament in 1908-1912. They exploited this platform to explain the dangers of Zionism and the need to prevent its implementation in Palestine.¹¹¹

On the eve of the elections to the Ottoman parliament in 1914 Rāghīb al-Nashāshībī, who was a candidate and was elected by the largest majority, declared that "if I am elected as a representative I shall devote all my strength day and night to doing away with the damage and threat of the Zionists and Zionism."¹¹² The other candidate elected, Sa'īd al-Ḥusaynī, promised to fight against the sale of land to Jews.¹¹³ In his talks with Jewish leaders Sa'īd al-Ḥusaynī claimed that his anti-Zionist attitude resulted only from

¹⁰⁶ Short summary in Assaf, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-47. See also Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 94. On the development of the Arabic press in Palestine, see article by N. Malul, "Ha-'Itanut ha-'Aravit be-Eretz Israel," in Dr. A. Zifroni *et. al.* (eds.), *Sefer ha-Shana Shel Eretz Israel*, Vol. I (1923), pp. 274-276. See also Y. Yehoshua, "Tel-Aviv bi-Re'i ha-'Itanut ha-'Aravit be-Hamesh ha-Shanim ha-Rishonot le-Hivasdah," *Ha-Mizrah he-Hadash*, Vol. XIX (19 69), pp. 218-227.

¹⁰⁷ Kalavrisky, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

¹⁰⁸ *Filasṭīn*, 16.9.11, 25.1.13.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 9.7.13.

¹¹⁰ Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-97; Y. Ben-Hananya, "Sifrut 'Aravit Anti-Zionit," *Ha-Shiloah*, Vol. XLIII (1925), pp. 273-274.

¹¹¹ Some of their declarations appear in *Ha-Ahdut*, 25 Adar 1911, 28 Iyar 1911, 5 Sivan 1911. See also Alsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 168; Tawfiq Barū, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-283.

¹¹² *Ha-Ḥerut*, 30.3.1914.

¹¹³ Assaf, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

his desire to be popular "and out of consideration for Arab public opinion."¹¹⁴ It is possible that these remarks cast doubt on the sincerity of the speaker, but they certainly confirm that there existed anti-Zionist Arab public opinion, which candidates for the Ottoman parliament had to take into consideration if they wished to be elected.

If we examine the arguments voiced against Zionism at this stage, we can understand the fears which developed and the reasons for opposition to this movement. The land disputes between Jewish settlements and Arab villages and tenants, though intrinsically lacking in political significance, constituted an important factor in consolidating opposition to Zionism among the politically minded public.¹¹⁵ The very fact of land purchase by Jews for settlement purposes and their ability to pay extremely high prices for this land aroused fear of their seemingly unlimited economic power.¹¹⁶ The readiness of the Jewish purchasers to employ various means for overcoming the obstacles placed in their path only strengthened these fears.¹¹⁷ This development created a firm basis for a radical anti-Zionist attitude: the land disputes aroused anti-Zionist political echoes among the educated urban élite, and as the anti-Zionism of the urban intellectuals increased, they began to organize the villagers for acts of opposition and sabotage against the purchase of land by Jews.¹¹⁸ Thus the seeds of hostility to Zionism fell on fertile ground and were destined to sprout forth in years to come.

Another aspect which, objectively speaking, lacked political significance, but which in time contributed to the development of opposition to Zionism, was the social difference between the local population and the Zionist immigrants, particularly as regards the status of women and the relationship between the sexes. We have in our possession a report of a discussion conducted by several young and educated Muslims in Jerusalem in 1915 regarding Zionism. Their only complaint against Zionism was that when the Zionists wished to settle some matter in government offices, they sent beautiful women to represent them and thus won priority.¹¹⁹ This phenomenon of women going out in public and visiting offices was a complete innovation in Jerusalem in 1915. This disregard for convention, and other

¹¹⁴ Alsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

¹¹⁵ See article of Sheikh Sulaymān al-Tāji al-Fārūqī on the dispute between the settlement of Rehovot and the village of Zarnūqa, *Filasṭīn*, 30.8.13; Kalavrisky, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-4.

¹¹⁶ *Filasṭīn*, 9.2.13.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 28.5.13.

¹¹⁸ Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

¹¹⁹ Manuscript AP. Ar. 8°46, p. 29. It should be noted that this is the only place in the diary in which Zionism is mentioned.

such innovations which increased with the growth of Jewish immigration, greatly contributed to the hostility towards Zionism.

Zionist policy began to take on a political character in the eyes of the Arabs even before the First World War, and fears of Zionism took a political slant. From time to time anti-Zionist arguments with an economic basis were still voiced, such as the increase in prices resulting from Jewish immigration,¹²⁰ but the political aspect gradually prevailed. Zionism began to be interpreted as the efforts of the Zionists to tear away part of the body of the Ottoman Empire and turn it into a Jewish state.¹²¹ The Jewish self-organization set up in the new Jewish settlements, the establishment of voluntary courts for civil matters without recourse to the Ottoman courts, the raising of the Zionist flag, the setting up of the Zionist Bank (Anglo-Palestine Corporation), the development of a separate educational network — all these factors were presented as evidence that the Jews were seeking to establish their own governmental framework, in accordance with biblical prophecies.¹²²

These propaganda activities were accompanied by the commencement of political organization with the aim of preventing the implementation of Zionism. At the end of 1910, an association was established in Haifa, the aim of which was "to take forceful steps to persuade the government to prohibit the sale of land to Jews."¹²³ In 1911 as well, there is information regarding the existence of such an association in Haifa. The moving spirit behind it was Najīb Naṣṣār, editor of *al-Karmil*, and Muslims also joined his organization, which was active in the northern towns. His aim was "to organize an economic boycott against the Jews, not to sell to them and not to buy from them and not to rent them houses."¹²⁴

At the same time a similar organization was set up in Jaffa with the name "The Patriotic Ottoman Party" (*al-Ḥizb al-Waṣanī al'Uthmānī*). "We do not deny," one of its members wrote, "that the main reason for its establishment is the feeling of its members and founders that the country is in danger and that a flood threatens to engulf it and has almost put an end to its political and economic life, and that threat is the Zionist Organization."¹²⁵ The leader of this party was Sheikh Sulaymān al-Tājī al-Fārūqī, who was then the outstanding Muslim spokesman against Zionism.¹²⁶

¹²⁰ *Filasṭīn*, 29.5.12.

¹²¹ *Filasṭīn*, 20.11.12, 28.12.12.

¹²² Tawfīq Barū, *op. cit.*, p. 282–284; Mandel, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–96, 97–98; *Filasṭīn*, 25.10.13.

¹²³ *Ha-Ḥerut*, 2 Ḥeshvan, 1910.

¹²⁴ *Ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 4 Elul 1911; *Ha-Ḥerut*, 23 Tammuz 1911.

¹²⁵ *Filasṭīn*, 20.9.11.

¹²⁶ Y. Yehoshua, *op. cit.*

In July 1913, the leaders of the opposition to Zionism in Haifa and Jaffa tried to convene a conference in Nablus of representatives of all Palestinian towns so as to organize the struggle against Zionism and against the purchase of land by Jews.¹²⁷ This attempt failed, but the very fact that there existed the desire to raise the struggle to a higher level attests to the intensification of anti-Zionist consciousness. The fact that the Ottoman authorities did not carry out the regulations aimed at hindering Jewish immigration created resentment among the population.¹²⁸

At the same time it should be reiterated that these views were limited to a narrow stratum of urban intellectuals. The very fact that the bearers of the anti-Zionist standard in the press were then Christians (Najīb Naṣṣār and the two al-ʿIsā brothers) undoubtedly limited the effect of their propaganda. Furthermore, not all the anti-Zionist circles had reached the same extent of opposition to, and hatred of, Zionism which they later developed. *Filasṭīn* sometimes wrote with admiration and esteem, and not without a touch of envy, of the achievements of Zionism. The renaissance of the Hebrew language won the admiration of the editors, as did the agricultural achievements of the Jewish settlements, as demonstrated at the agricultural exhibition at Rehovot.¹²⁹ When news of the Beilis trial reached Palestine, *Filasṭīn* reacted in unequivocal fashion, rejecting any possibility that the blood-libel could be true,¹³⁰ even though it should be noted that several days later the same paper did not hesitate to publish a poem with anti-Semitic overtones.¹³¹

Was the development of the anti-Zionist attitude inextricably tied up with the consolidation of Arab national consciousness, or was this attitude also common to all those circles in the Palestine Arab public which remained indifferent to Arab nationalism? It is true that *al-Karmil*, the first paper to raise the standard of opposition to Zionism and the most extreme in its attitude, leaned slightly towards those elements which supported the decentralizing reform trend, which later turned gradually into the Arab nationalist stand, but *Filasṭīn*, which supported the unity of the Ottoman Empire and of its centralized administration, also opposed Zionism, although with less bitterness and without clear anti-Jewish undertones, out of considerations of Ottoman patriotism.

¹²⁷ *Filasṭīn*, 12.7.13, 2.8.13; Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹²⁸ Muḥammad al-Qalqālī, editor of *Kawkab*, to General Allenby, 29.9.18, PRO., F.O., 882/14.

¹²⁹ *Filasṭīn*, 27.7.12, 1.8.12, 3.5.13.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 22.10.13, 25.10.13.

¹³¹ The poem contained the two following verses: "How can we rest when the meanest and lowest of nations is competing with us in our country, Jews who are not proud, but who have all the money in their hands" (*Filasṭīn*, 8.11.13).

On the other hand, it may be stated that those members of parliament from the Jerusalem district, were extremely active anti-Zionists, Rawḥī al-Khālidī and Saʿīd al-Ḥusaynī, supported the reformist and decentralizing trend of the Arab members of parliament. This should not surprise us, since among the Arab societies outside Palestine, opposition to Zionism was much more widespread than among those circles which preached the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Shukrī al-ʿAsālī, one of the most prominent leaders of the young Arab nationalist movement in Syria, was a systematic and violent opponent of Zionism, both in the period when he held office as the *qāʾimaqām* of the Nazareth subdistrict and after, when he was elected to the Ottoman parliament.¹³² A study conducted in 1914 by Dr. Nissim Malul revealed that Arab papers in Syria and Egypt (but not in Palestine!), which supported the demands for reform and decentralization of administration, displayed much greater opposition to Zionism than those supporting the "Committee for Union and Progress." If we divide these papers into four categories: Muslim decentralistic, Christian decentralistic, Muslim "Unity", and Christian "Unity", we find that the frequency of opposition to Zionism in these groups is 78 %, 33 %, 16 % and nil, respectively.¹³³

It therefore emerges that outside Palestine there was an obvious connection between the awakening of Arab nationalism and opposition to Zionism, while in Palestine itself opposition to Zionism was common to the two political trends which fought for mastery of the Arab public: the Arab nationalist and the Ottoman Unity trends.

¹³² Alsberg, *op. cit.*, p. 165; Slutzky, *et. al.*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Part, I, pp. 225-7; Tawfiq Barū, *op. cit.*, pp. 282-4.

¹³³ N. Malul, *op. cit.*, pp. 439-450.

PART FOUR
FOREIGN ACTIVITIES

21. THE QUESTION OF THE HOLY PLACES IN OTTOMAN TIMES

by CHAIM WARDI

I

Holy places are sites to which a numinous significance is attached; where "sacred events", theophanies, occurred; where the timeless erupted into time, the transcendent into the "world." Such places remain, as it were, impregnated with the divine; they conserve supernatural virtues. They are "holy" objectively, not because we happen to hallow them. In holy places miracles are expected to occur: healings, illuminations, conversions. No wonder that they become the goal of visitations, the object of desire, means of political manipulation. Priesthoods will inevitably try to make them their exclusive possession, governments will claim them whether to flatter their subjects or to achieve other, less holy, purposes.

Christianity, a religion based upon *historical* sacred events, very early evolved a profound and tenacious attachment to its holy places. Paramount among them were those connected with the fundamental "mysteries" or sacred happenings, such as the Incarnation and Passion, the Resurrection and Ascension. These holy places contributed to the fashioning of the character and moulding of the destinies of the Church of Jerusalem. Owing to them, the rather unimportant town of Aelia was singled out by Emperor Constantine for great designs; and its bishop was given a place of honour at the Council of Nicaea. Through his "donation" to the Church of Aelia — the sumptuous basilicas — Constantine actually predetermined the course of its history: it became *the* Church of the Holy Places, one mainly devoted to liturgy and waiting on pilgrims. Jerusalem became the shrine of the Empire, the Holy City of the Oecumene and subsequently of the entire Christian world. The bishops of Jerusalem were naturally aware of the "oecumenic significance of their see" and also of their debt to the Emperors. In fact, they generally sided with them and supported their ecclesiastical policies. So they did at the councils of Constantinople, Ephesus and Chalcedon. At Chalcedon, Bishop Juvenal, in turning away from his former ally, the Monophysitic Patriarch Dioscoros of Alexandria, not only followed the ambition of raising his see to the rank of a Patriarchate but also obeyed the voice of a profound instinct advising him to remain within the orbit of the

Oecumene governed by the Emperor. His turn of wheel produced far-reaching effects: the Church of Jerusalem became a "Melkite" Chalcedonian enclave in a Monophysitic East, a centre of world Christendom rather than a national Church or a shrine of the nationalistic Monophysitic world. In this forcible separation from the Syrian East is probably rooted the fact that Palestine as such never evolved nationhood and never achieved statehood. Statehood, in fact, had always to be brought to this area by people from abroad.

Only twice did the Church of the Holy Places take a clear stand *against* the Emperors of Constantinople: in the monothetic and in the iconoclastic quarrels. In the first, probably because the Emperor was no longer in a position to defend Palestine against the Muslim invaders; in the second, because iconoclasm implied opposition to the very idea of holy places. The cult of icons and that of holy places follow indeed similar trends of thought. In both of these cases Jerusalem turned to the Popes of Rome: a most significant and — one is tempted to say — most natural course. If so, why then did Jerusalem — when the schism between Rome and Constantinople occurred — drift into and persist in the fold of the East, instead of joining the West and becoming the shrine of a more active and expanding Christian world? More than one reason might be adduced. One, however, has to be stressed within the context of this story: the Crusaders, who from the outset seem to have viewed the Church of Jerusalem as a schismatic one, actually forced it away into the fold of Constantinople. Jerusalem had from of old been an autocephaly; the Crusaders turned it into a dependency of Rome. They installed on its throne a Latin Patriarch; they overbearingly subjected the local to the Latin clergy; they wrested the holy places from their hands. In a word, they opened the Question of the Holy Places.

Salah-al-Din took advantage of these grave, though probably unavoidable mistakes. When he allowed an Orthodox Patriarch to resume possession of the holy places in Jerusalem, he not only redeemed a debt or promise to his Byzantine and Georgian friends but also drove a wedge between Orthodox and Catholics, thus inaugurating the classical Muslim policy towards the Christians of the Levant. He made his Palestinian Orthodox subjects see for themselves that with regard to the holy places they had but little to gain from a Latin return. The subsequent developments in the Near East — the conquest and sack of Constantinople, the establishment there of a Latin Empire and Patriarchate, the forceful Latinization of Byzantine lands — all these could only make the Orthodox of Jerusalem feel happy to be under Muslim rather than Latin rule.

European initiative in the Near East came to a relative end in the last decades of the thirteenth century. Significantly enough, the Byzantine and

Muslim *reconquistas* were carried out almost simultaneously: Michael Palaeologos regained Constantinople in 1264; Antioch fell to Baybars in 1268; Tripoli to Qalawun, three years later. By the end of the century the Holy Land was again under Muslim sway and the first phase of the Question of the Holy Places, as posed by the Crusades, came to a close.

II

A new Question of the Holy Places, of a different character and different contents, arose in modern times. Historians, with some justification, are wont to place its beginnings in the middle of the sixteenth century. However, the scene of the drama was already set in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The year 1187 marks the withdrawal of Latin clergy from Jerusalem and Bethlehem; and though they returned there in 1229 (as a result of Frederick II's diplomatic Crusade), they were again dislodged in 1244. For about ninety years thereafter, no Latins officiated in the historical sanctuaries, which apparently remained — under sufferance — in possession of the Orthodox Patriarch. Surely, in keeping with old political wisdom, the latter enjoyed no exclusivity: rights of worship had also been assigned to other Christian groups, both subjects of the Mamluks and foreigners (Copts and Jacobites, Armenians and Ethiopians, Georgians and Serbians). Western Christendom would naturally not resign itself to this exclusion and after many endeavours, with the help of diplomacy and money, eventually succeeded in 1333 in gaining readmission to the Holy Land.

It was a modest return: no longer of crusading and triumphant churchmen but of simple monks, followers of the *poverello* of Assisi, who a hundred years before had already realized that preaching to the infidels was perhaps more important than conquering them. The Franciscan Friars were to remain in the Holy Land. In a comparatively short lapse of time they succeeded in consolidating their position and expanding prodigiously. Shortly before the arrival of the Ottoman Turks, they were already in possession of the principal sanctuaries: of the most important portions of the basilicas of the Resurrection and Nativity; of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and the Grotto in Bethlehem; of the Church of the Tomb of the Virgin. How did they manage to achieve such brilliant results? Not all details are known. But we know that they were better educated and better disciplined than the Orientals; that they knew the value of title deeds and archives; that they had means at their disposal and used them to good purpose; and, finally, that they enjoyed the protection and support of Catholic polities with which the Mamluks entertained profitable commercial relations. Occasionally they even enjoyed the support of the Orthodox Patriarchs of Jerusalem. The

Georgians, who in the fifteenth century were the principal spokesmen of Orthodoxy in Jerusalem, tried to check Latin expansion, but surely they were no match for the Franciscans.

III

After the annexation of Palestine to the Ottoman Empire, the Church of Jerusalem came under the purview of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which in the meantime had rallied from disaster, consolidated itself and reappraised its policies. Dissatisfied with the situation in the holy places, it proceeded first of all to tighten its grip on this Church which, owing to historical vicissitudes, appeared to be weakened and uncertain of its course. One of the monks sent there, Germanos, succeeded in ascending the Patriarchal throne; he reorganized the Patriarchate in such a manner as to ensure that in the future only people steeped in Byzantine tradition would be elected to the leading posts in the hierarchy. This was neither a non-canonical procedure nor a wily usurpation, as later writers have anachronistically alleged. It was a manifestation of the general policy of the Constantinople Patriarchs, who as heads of the *millet-i Rûm* endeavoured by "Hellenizing" to strengthen their Church in bondage. Once they had reorganized and disciplined their Patriarchate, the Patriarchs of Jerusalem opened a series of attacks against the Franciscans with the object of recovering the sanctuaries which in their view had belonged to them *ab antiquo*. At first the struggle was pursued in Jerusalem itself, but soon it was taken to Constantinople, where highly placed personages could offer support: the Oecumenical Patriarch and the so-called Phanariotes to the Greek monks, the Venetian and especially the French ambassadors to the Franciscans. The struggle was carried on by means which today would appear shocking but were then usual in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere: by pulling strings, bribing officials, offering gratuities to vezirs and even sultans. Throughout the sixteenth century, the Franciscans seem to have maintained their acquired supremacy and — according to a contemporary traveler, Pietro della Valle, 1616 — remained *padroni principali del tutto*: they were definitely better backed and, besides, possessed well-kept archives which enabled them to produce firmans, *berats* and *hujjas* issued to them by former Muslim rulers.

IV

The Greeks, for some time, seem to have failed to realize the expediency of producing documents in support of their claims; but it dawned upon them very soon. In 1630, when received in audience by Sultan Murād, Patriarch Theophanes of Jerusalem already had with him the so-called '*ahdnâme* of 'Umar. This document purported to have been issued in 636 by 'Umar ibn

al-Khattāb and given to Sophronius, the "Melkite", (that is Orthodox or Chalcedonian) Patriarch of Jerusalem; it granted him security of person and sanctuaries, immunity from taxation, freedom of worship and pre-eminence over other Christians who might come on pilgrimages. The French ambassador to Constantinople, Comte de Césy, had it proclaimed as spurious. It is difficult to say whether the invalidation referred to the document as such or to the very fact of such a "covenant" ever having been concluded between the Caliph and the Patriarch. In the latter case it would be a somewhat uncharitable act implying an attempt to destroy the basis of Palestinian Christians' claim to be *dhimmis*. However that may be, four years later, in 1634, when again received by his sovereign, Patriarch Theophanes had with him — apart from a nice present of 40,000 sequins — three even more recent documents: a *hatt-ı sherif* of Mehmed the Conqueror issued in 1458, a firman by Selim I of 1517, and a firman of Süleyman I of 1526 — all of them referring to the '*ahdnāme*' of 'Umar and confirming the privileges mentioned in it. In the face of such weighty evidence Sultan Murād IV issued a firman in favour of the Greeks, granting them the Church of the Nativity and most sites in the Church of the Resurrection. A year later a Greek deacon by the name of Gregorius "confessed" in the presence of several Catholic ambassadors in Constantinople to having fabricated the documents. Pope Urban VIII demanded the intervention of the Catholic Powers, especially of France and Venice. Under the pressure of those two Powers, the Sultan annulled the firman of 1634 and — against a payment of 26,000 piastres — restored to the Latins their former rights. This, however, did not prevent the Greeks from obtaining in 1637 a further firman in their favour and, in 1638, an official confirmation of the authenticity of the older firmans, previously declared to be forgeries. As a matter of fact, between 1625 and 1637, Murād IV issued no less than twelve firmans, each contradicting its predecessor. Obviously, he was not very much concerned with historical truth or the authenticity of documents. He considered the holy places the property of the State and felt free to assign them in temporary use to the highest bidder. Since there was always a higher bidder, he must have felt a pleasant perplexity as to whom to leave the holy places on a more or less permanent basis.

In the middle of the seventeenth century, yet another contest took place in Jerusalem and in Constantinople: one between Greeks and Armenians. The latter were interested in taking over the possessions and sacred sites of the Ethiopians (non-Chalcedonians as themselves) no longer in a position to maintain them, and also in establishing or re-establishing themselves in the Basilica of Bethlehem. They nearly succeeded. Patriarch Paissios, however, assisted by the gifted and influential Phanariot Panayoti Nicoussios, obtained

a firman against them and for some time even occupied the Armenian Convent of St. James. About the same time the Greeks took over the possessions of their impoverished co-religionists, the Georgians.

The end of the century saw a second dramatic clash between Greeks and Latins. This time the Latins were victorious. In 1688, Turkey suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the united forces of Austria, Poland and Venice and, after the loss of Belgrade, the Sublime Porte felt the need of a *rapprochement* with France, the traditional rival of Austria. In these favourable circumstances the Ambassador of Louis XIV, Castagnères de Chateauneuf, procured a re-examination of the claims of the contending parties and as a result Süleymân II (1687-1691) issued a firman by which the rights of the Franciscans were reconfirmed. They thus re-entered into possession of the two cupolas over the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, half of Golgotha, the Stone of Unction, the Grotto of the Nativity and the keys to the Grotto and Basilica of Bethlehem. They further received the privilege of celebrating on the Sepulchre itself and other prerogatives. The firman of 1689/90 is of the greatest importance; its contents were to be enshrined in later agreements and especially in the famous Capitulations of 1740.

V

After this Greek defeat, Patriarch Dositheos II, who governed the Church of Jerusalem from 1669 to 1707, appealed for help to the Tsar of Russia, then Peter I. The Franciscans in their turn — to better ensure their hold — appealed to Leopold I, Emperor of Austria. It meant the handing over, by both parties, of an internal question of the Ottoman Empire to hostile foreign Powers. Both Leopold I in Carlowitz, 1699, and Peter I in Constantinople, 1700, intended to have stipulations regarding the holy places included in their treaties with the defeated Sultan Muṣṭafâ II. Characteristically enough, it was the Greek diplomat Mavrocordato, another highly gifted Phanariot in the service of the Sultan, who foiled their intentions. Patriarch Dositheos (who also was a well-known historian) was grievously disappointed with the policy pursued by his compatriot and continued to entertain the Tsar with requests of intervention. He pointed out, *inter alia*, that the Armenians, too, were supported by a foreign sovereign: the Shah of Persia.

In the 1730's, the Ottoman Empire made a mild political recovery; it was mainly due to the efforts and diplomatic skill of the French ambassador, Marquis de Villeneuve, the chief architect of the Treaty of Belgrade of 1739. His reward was the Capitulations of 1740, which gave France the protectorate over the Catholics in the Ottoman Empire. Since this document did not seem sufficiently explicit with regard to the holy places, a successor

of Villeneuve, Comte de Vergenne, secured from 'Uthmān III a further firman in favour of the Latins, based upon the Capitulations. In this firman of 1756, the Sultan reconfirmed the Latin's right of possession of the Sepulchre, the cupolas and the space beneath, the seven Arches of the Virgin, and half of Golgotha, as well as of the sanctuaries of Bethlehem with their keys. Finally, in January 1757, a letter from the Grand Vezir Mehmed Ragheb Pasha (a statesman, scholar and even a poet), practically recognized the right of the Franciscans to the Tomb of the Virgin. This was the last and most signal of Latin victories.

On the eve of Palm Sunday 1757, the Orthodox in Jerusalem rebelled, stormed the Basilica of the Resurrection, destroyed there Catholic vessels, lamps and decorations, and laid siege to the monastery where the Franciscan Friars had taken refuge. In the course of the riot a few people were gravely wounded. Patriarch Parthenios hurried to the capital and through the good offices of Ragheb Pasha brought the matter before the Sultan. This time — it was the eve of the Seven Years War, when France no longer was in a position to assist the Ottoman Empire in its struggle with Russia — 'Uthmān III issued a *hatt-i sherif* in favour of the Greeks: he ordered that all holy places wrested from them in 1690 be promptly returned to the "ancient" owners. On this most important document the situation prevailing to the present day is based.

No wonder that half a century later, in 1808, when the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was gutted by a fire started in the Armenian quarter, it was the Greek Patriarch who won permission to rebuild the edifice at the expense of "the Greek Nation." In the East, the privilege of reconstruction is deemed both a mark of lawful possession and a precedent for future claims; however, since only part of the church was in Greek possession, this privilege aroused fierce opposition in Latin and Armenian circles. The struggle with the Armenians raged for some time and eventually was concluded by a compromise; the Latins, owing to the efforts of the French ambassador, obtained firmans in 1811 to the effect that their former rights would not be impaired by the Greek reconstruction; however, from that time on a Greek monk was permanently to guard the *édicule* of the Holy Sepulchre.

VI

In the nineteenth century, the Question of the Holy Places was definitely removed from the halls of the *diwān* and carried into the international arena: it became an instrument of power politics. The first to put it to such use was Tsarist Russia; Prussia and Austria followed suit; then came Germany and Italy. Russia was drawn into the matter at the beginning of the

eighteenth century; she took it up with force in the following century. But already in the days of Catherine II, Russia made great strides in that direction. With the treaties of Küçük Kaynarji (1774) and Ainali-Kavak (1779), she obtained the right first of "speaking up", then of "intervening", on behalf of the Ottoman Orthodox, a right which later was construed as meaning a protectorate parallel to that enjoyed by France. Neither Turkey nor the European Powers ever recognized this protectorate; but Russia carried on her "panslavic" policy with much perseverance and thereby penetrated into Palestine through the establishment of an Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem. The purported aim was to strengthen Orthodoxy in the Holy Land; but this no longer implied strengthening the Greek clergy. On the contrary, Russia endeavoured to undermine their position, perhaps in order to substitute Russian clergy for them. To achieve this aim, her agents encouraged the Arabic-speaking element of the Orthodox community to claim participation in the governing of the Church. The design was imperialistic, broadly conceived, far reaching: the goal, in fact, was the "solution" of the Oriental Question, that is the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was thus bound to clash with those Powers that were still interested in the preservation of that Empire.

The clash occurred in the middle of the century. A trivial event caused the avalanche to begin: a Latin star was removed from its place in Bethlehem and the Franciscans accused the Greeks. The representative of Napoleon III in Constantinople seized the occasion to reopen the question of Latin rights in the holy places, which had been curtailed by the firman of 1757 in patent violation of Article 33 of the Capitulations of 1740. The Ottoman government was inclined to comply with this request. At this point the Tsar vigorously intervened and, invoking Küçük Kaynarji, demanded both the maintenance of the *status quo* in Jerusalem and the recognition of the Russian protectorate over the Ottoman Orthodox. These then included more than twenty million Ottoman subjects in the Balkans and the Near East. At the advice of the British Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, the Porte yielded in the matter of the holy places — by issuing the two famous firmans of 1852 and 1853 enjoining the maintenance of the *status quo* — but refused the protectorate as incompatible with Ottoman sovereignty. France acquiesced, Russia did not; and in 1854 the Crimean War broke out.

Russia lost that war. The *status quo*, nevertheless, was maintained and endorsed by international conferences. European statesmen became convinced that the Question of the Holy Places was a Pandora's box, better left alone. To postpone its solution indefinitely seemed the best possible solution. The Catholic world, it goes without saying, was deeply grieved; the more so

because the "status" had never been defined and the fluidity of the situation gave place to irksome and occasionally grave incidents. Deep in their hearts, however, even Catholics knew that there was no way out. They therefore devoted themselves, through the newly re-established Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem, to the furthering of other Catholic interests in the Holy Land. Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, it was clear to all: as long as Turkey kept Palestine and Russia protected Orthodox interests, no other solution for the Question of the Holy Places was in view.

APPENDIX

Attached to this article is a copy of a letter sent on the 30th of October 1850 by Sir Stratford Canning (later Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) to Mr. James Finn, British Consul in Jerusalem. The letter also mentions M. Emile Botta, French Consul in Jerusalem. It purports to be no important document shedding new light on our subject; just an "illustration" or rather an ornamental vignette. To many readers it may bring back old familiar names and faces.

No. 4

Confidential

Sir,

Therapia

30th October, 1850

Referring to your dispatch No. 19 of this year, addressed to Viscount Palmerston and communicated to me in copy, I have to inform you *confidentially* that the French Legation at this Court, supported by the Legations of Belgium, Spain, Portugal and Sardinia with the acquiescence of Austria as to the object, though not as to the form, of proceeding, is engaged in urging the Porte to put the Latins in possession of those portions of the holy buildings at Jerusalem, which they accuse the Greeks of having usurped and consigned to ruin. I have reason to believe (sic!) that your colleague M. Botta assisted actively in reviving the prosecution of this claim which appears to have lost nothing of its interest as an object of party contention, and nothing of its difficulty as an object of diplomatic negotiation. The line which I have hitherto followed respecting this tempest-tossed and often shipwrecked question, is one of impartial observation and occasional inquiry. Any information afforded by your local position, and obtained without interference in the merits of the question, will be acceptable to me.

Etc. Etc.

Stratford Canning

22. "THE RESURRECTION OF OUR EASTERN BRETHREN" (IGNATEV); RUSSIA AND ORTHODOX ARAB NATIONALISM IN JERUSALEM

by DEREK HOPWOOD

I

Ever since the first Easter, Jerusalem has been in the eyes of Europe a profoundly Christian city. In a sense history itself began with the Crucifixion and Resurrection, and those events as historical facts took place in Jerusalem. Consequently, it has become synonymous in Christian thought with all that is essential to Christian belief — Jerusalem is the beginning and end of faith. But the city itself as a physical entity has merged with a mystical conception bearing little relationship to reality. It is therefore unnecessary for most Christians to visit the city for them to know it as an intimate experience. Nevertheless, it has been considered in European thought as the physical centre of Christendom (and so of the world), a place of pilgrimage, a place, by right, of primary interest to the West. This interest and sense of ownership has persisted through the centuries and all the more so as in 638 the city became and basically remained an Arab city.

In the Middle Ages Europe felt impelled to attempt to wrest physical ownership from the "infidel Saracen" and always there lingered the feeling that in the natural course of events Jerusalem would return to Christian hands. To many, Allenby's entry into the city in 1917 was the culmination of the last Crusade. (Was it a coincidence that the great defeat of the Ottoman army was at Armageddon — the scene in Revelation of the final struggle between good and evil?) But in another sense in later years there existed a certain feeling, at least in the Protestant ethos and on a more superficial level, that it was according to the right ordering of things that the Holy Land was an Arab country and Jerusalem an Arab city. In the popular imagination the Arab peasant on his donkey silhouetted against the stony Judean hills was in the authentic and direct tradition of the Holy Family. Traditional costume for Christmas Nativity plays in England has been the popular conception of "Arab" dress. This may merely be indicative of a lack of concern with the physical reality of the Holy Land, but an oriental, vaguely Arab country has been many Christians' conception of Palestine.

Thus to Western Christendom, Protestant and Catholic, Jerusalem has

been a symbol of hope, of redemption, of the ultimate realities of life. It was all this to Russian Orthodoxy — and more. It was tangible proof of the presence of God, the supreme iconostasis. For the Russian believer, accustomed as he was through the liturgy to a deep reality of God's presence, pilgrimage to the Holy Land, baptism in the waters of the Jordan, Easter in Jerusalem with its reiterated refrain of "Christ is risen — risen indeed!" — these experiences were the very essence of his faith, so much so that the idea developed that Palestine was an extension of Holy Russian territory. "Palestine ... is our native land ... in which we do not recognize ourselves as foreigners ... the [Russian] people instinctively and enthusiastically claimed the Holy Land as their own just as much as Holy Russia."¹ Jerusalem was therefore a centre of the Russian Orthodox Church.

There has also been in Russian history a deep undercurrent of Messianic thought, the belief that Russia was destined to liberate mankind and impose Russian Orthodoxy on the world. Her Byzantine heritage cut Russia off from Western Christendom, and in the nineteenth century the Slavophiles and Panslavs preached the superiority of Slavonic Orthodox culture and the necessity for Russia to remain uncontaminated by the West. The more extreme spirits pushed this to the extent of advocating the conversion of the rest of the world to Slavonic Orthodoxy. In political terms this meant at least the freeing of all Orthodox Christians, and by extension all lands in which Orthodox Christians lived, from Muslim control. Constantinople, the home of Orthodoxy, was central to this vision of Russian hegemony, but Jerusalem and Palestine, the birthplace of Christianity, were to some writers no less central. Dostoevsky believed that the second advent of Christ would occur in a country under the Russian flag, so it is implicit that he had in mind not only Constantinople but also Jerusalem. Thus he foretold that one day Palestine would fall under Russian rule.

While the dreamers dreamed their dreams the politicians had to deal with reality, but none the less it is true that some of those responsible for relations with the Ottoman Empire had ideas influenced by more or less extreme forms of Slavophilism and none, of course, questioned Russia's right to participate in the internal affairs of the Empire. For them it was useful to exploit religious feelings about the Holy Land but they did this with Russian political and diplomatic ends in view. For Russia, Palestine was part of the "Christian East" but it was also a sensitive region of the Ottoman Empire in which the susceptibilities of other Powers had to be taken into account. Russian diplomats, civil servants, churchmen, amateurs — all were drawn

¹ M.P. Solovev, "Svyataya Zemlya i Rossiya," *Soobshcheniya Imperatorskovo Pravoslavnogo Palestinskogo Obshchestva* (St. Petersburg), (hereafter *Soobshcheniya*), Vol. V (1894), p. 286.

into Russia's Palestinian policy, all with mixed motives derived from the shifting patterns of thought which tied Russia to Palestine.

Yet while the Holy Places were an intimate part of the Russian believers' spiritual life there was little knowledge in nineteenth century Russia of conditions in Palestine as a whole, although Dostoevsky, writing, admittedly, during the fervour aroused by the Russian advance on Constantinople in 1878, noted the Russian peasant's almost instinctive knowledge gained mainly from the reports of pilgrims returning from the Holy Land.

Backward, wholly illiterate Russian people, that is the simplest village peasants, are ... fully aware of the fact that the Holy Land and the Local Eastern Christians have been conquered by the Impious Mohammedans, the Turks, and that the Christians in the whole East have been, and are, enduring a hard and difficult life.²

This at least was Dostoevsky's impression. In reality Palestine and its political, religious and social conditions were *terra incognita* to the majority of Russians.

The European powers were drawn into the affairs of Palestine by an amalgam of motives, as a result of policies drawn up by confused men who until the very end of the Ottoman Empire could not positively decide whether their interests in the area were primarily diplomatic, religious or strategic. Their policies were often no more than responses to the moves or supposed threats of others, although not necessarily in the same terms. The problem of identification of motives was especially acute in Russia where the Orthodox Church was firmly under civil control and used as a part of the State apparatus. This meant that even policies of utmost concern to the Church were initiated by lay statesmen whose concern was usually delineated in terms of power politics and Russian prestige. In the political circles of nineteenth century St. Petersburg all depended on strength of personality and access to the Tsar. A strong procurator (the civil head of the Church) or Metropolitan of Moscow could perhaps modify policy but almost always the ideas of the Chancellor or Director of the Asiatic Department of the Foreign Ministry prevailed. The churchmen fought in vain against policies impossible to implement in terms of the existing religious situation in Jerusalem. Thus the record of Russian policy in Palestine is largely (though not entirely) a record of failures and half-hearted attempts.

II

The history of the subject of this article begins in 1844 — it is the history of the struggle of the Orthodox Arabs of Jerusalem to control their church affairs

² F. M. Dostoevsky, *The Diary of a Writer*, trans. B. Brasol, London, 1949, p. 802.

themselves and to replace their foreign hierarchy. It is a part of the history of the growing self awareness of the Arabs in general and of the development of Arab nationalism. It was a movement which some Russians seized upon because they saw political advantage to be gained but which attracted others because they saw an unjust religious situation in need of remedy. Some blundered in, others employed more finesse, but none succeeded.

The Orthodox Arabs of Palestine (perhaps some 20,000 in 1840) belonged to the Patriarchate of Jerusalem which covered the whole of Palestine (I am using the term "Palestine" to mean the area of mandated Palestine) with the addition of one or two towns on the east bank of the Jordan. The faithful were scattered throughout some seventy villages and towns lying between Gaza and Kafr Yasif. The largest concentration of population was in Jerusalem and some fifteen surrounding villages. In the city the Orthodox, both Greek hierarchy and Arab priests and laity, represented about one-twelfth of the total. Nowhere in Palestine, with the possible exception of one or two villages, were the Orthodox in a majority. Towns which had significant Orthodox minorities were Jaffa, Bethlehem, Bayt Jālā, Ramallah, al-Ṣalt and Nazareth.

The twenty thousand Arabs of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem were the heirs of a once flourishing Church who had preserved their faith through twelve centuries of Muslim or Catholic domination. They were all Arabic-speaking Christians who considered themselves true Arabs and strongly denied that they were *al-yūnān al-muta'arrabūn* — Arabized Greeks who had forgotten their native language. There were sharp disputes over the ethnic origins of the Orthodox or Melkite Arabs — disputes which had great point during the later struggles of the Arabs against the Greeks to elect an Arab patriarch. To the Greeks, the Orthodox Arabs were Arabic speaking Greeks, descendants of the Greek colonists of the Palestinian coast. In the words of a Greek newspaper: "There are in Syria a large number of Orthodox Christians, descendants of the Greeks, who still, despite their life among the Arabs, retain their religious traditions ... but who have lost their original language ... [They are] Greeks who speak Arabic"³ (a notable example of the confusion that can arise between religion and race or nationality). The Arabs replied that they were the descendants of the pre-Islamic invaders of Syria who founded the Christian Kingdoms of Ḥīra and Ghassān. They claimed that they had never been Greek speaking and that Greek, although used in the liturgy, had been unintelligible to them. A third argument maintained that the Orthodox Arabs were descended from the

³ S. M. Shabbāda, *Al-Khulāṣa al-Wāfiya fī Intikhāb Baṣriyark Anṭākiya*, Beirut, 1892, p. 36, quoting a Greek newspaper.

Aramaic-speaking Christians of Palestine who had gradually been absorbed into the Arab population after the Muslim conquest and, while remaining Christian, had adopted Arabic as their mother tongue. These arguments were academic as the Orthodox of Palestine felt and believed themselves to be Arab — by race and by tongue, as thoughts had not then turned to questions of nationality.

Although the Orthodox Arabs were of one *millet* and one Church their conditions of life varied considerably from area to area. In Palestine the majority of the population were fellahin and have even been described as serfs in their obligations to their landlords. The fellah and his family cultivated the land and gave up a proportion of the produce to the landlord. In Jerusalem the lives of the Arabs were closely bound up with the affairs of the patriarchate, which provided them with houses and a daily bread ration. Two events had changed the tenor of their lives — the Greek revolt during which the Orthodox Christians of Jerusalem had been persecuted, and the rule of Ibrāhīm Pasha which had given them greater religious and civil freedom.

The Orthodox Arabs, part of the *millet-i rûm*, had lived under a Greek hierarchy in the Patriarchate of Jerusalem for several centuries. To the Ottomans, all Orthodox were *rûm* which meant, roughly, Greek, and the representative of the *millet* at the Sublime Porte was the Patriarch of Constantinople, himself always a Greek. Consequently, until the nineteenth century it was always the Greek point of view which prevailed in the capital, and no one questioned this. Moreover, the Greeks of the Phanar developed certain financial skills and influence which enhanced their position at the Porte. The Orthodox Arabs certainly had no voice in the capital in the earlier part of the century.

The fate of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem since its foundation has always been linked with its political history. Probably sometime during the fourth century there had arisen in Jerusalem the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre — a group of monks for the conducting of services in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The Bishop of Jerusalem was a member, and it is likely that from their number the first patriarch was elected. From that time onwards the Patriarchate and Brotherhood were virtually synonymous. The patriarch was probably elected without regard to race until after the Arab conquest of 638 when Arab patriarchs became the rule. The Church suffered under Crusaders and Seljuks, and it was not until Mamluk rule that greater tolerance was enjoyed. But the patriarchate suffered from a long period of decline and it was ironically another Muslim conquest which saved it from extinction. Under the Ottomans, true responsibility for the Orthodox Church was given to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople and it is no

coincidence that future Patriarchs of Jerusalem were and have remained Greek. The Brotherhood became an exclusively Greek body to which the Arabs had no entry.

Although Greek and Arab controversialists have viewed the dispute over the leadership of the Church of Jerusalem in racial terms, the concept of race had little meaning in the Ottoman Empire until late in the eighteenth century. Religious solidarity was more important than racial pride, but at this period Greek national consciousness began to develop within the Orthodox *millet* until it burst into the Greek War of Independence in the eighteen twenties. Once a large number of Greeks were outside the Ottoman Empire the Orthodox Arabs of Jerusalem began to lose their feeling of corporate identity with the Greek hierarchy, especially with those who now came to them as Hellenes and not as members of the *millet-i rûm*, and in face of Arab opposition the Greeks closed their ranks. This developed to such an extent that a Greek writer could later claim that the Church of Jerusalem consisted only of the Greek Brotherhood, and a British observer saw the Arab members of the Church as a "quantité négligeable."⁴ Yet despite this the patriarch in Ottoman eyes remained the legal head of the whole Orthodox community in Palestine.

III

This situation could only lead to discontent amongst the Arab majority in the patriarchate, but such discontent lacked focus and influential support until Russia took up their cause. The Arabs needed support at two points — in Jerusalem, which local Russian officials could provide, and in Constantinople, where the real struggle took place at the governmental and diplomatic level. It was a minor matter in terms of numbers, but Jerusalem was a sensitive area in the balance-of-power game within the Ottoman Empire, and once Russia stepped in, the Porte and the other Powers could no longer ignore it. The dispute resolved itself in terms of an Arab effort to gain a greater say in the affairs of the patriarchate and eventually into an attempt to elect an Arab as patriarch. As feelings of nationalism developed during the century, so the struggle became more bitter and the Arab demands more extreme.

The first hints of conflict came in 1844 when the Patriarch of Jerusalem died, and the Russian diplomatic mission in Constantinople decided to support the election of a successor who would be both favourable to Russia and independent of the See of Constantinople. In the seventeenth century it

⁴ A. Bertram and H. C. Luke, *Report of the Commission Appointed ... to Inquire into the Affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, London, 1921, p. 16.

had become the custom for the Ecumenical Patriarch to nominate the Patriarch of Jerusalem and for the latter to reside in the capital away from his flock and his see. The Porte would not accept the candidate favoured by Russia but the new patriarch, Cyril, Bishop of Lydda, at least took up residence in Jerusalem and re-established the custom of living in the city and of taking an interest in the affairs of his patriarchate. A Greek historian has written that Cyril was elected "solely due to the intrigues of the Russian mission"⁵ but the election did not usher in Russian domination of the patriarchate, both because of Cyril's obstinate personality and because of the capacity for intrigue of the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre. The patriarch was finally responsible to the Brotherhood and could be deposed by them. A patriarch also needed to tread warily with regard to Russia between the extremes of devotion and opposition. Russia was the chief source of income for the patriarchate yet no Greek was willing to be considered entirely subservient to his financial benefactors. Russians working in Jerusalem had mostly uneasy relations with the Greeks, but continued exasperation led the Russian Bishop in Jerusalem to remark that "an open struggle with the Greeks is senseless and impossible. The solution is to take the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem out of Greek hands and to do this it is necessary to have the support of the Porte. Perhaps we could persuade the Porte that it is dangerous to have one people in control of all the Orthodox inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire."⁶ The writer did not further suggest into whose hands the patriarchates should be given.

A second great nationalist crisis to strike the Ottoman Empire was that of Bulgaria. A symptom of the growing nationalism of the Bulgarian people was the demand that their Church should be freed from the control of the Greek hierarchy in Constantinople. The Bulgarian Church was directly subject to the Ecumenical Patriarch and its Greek bishops were appointed from Constantinople — a situation similar to that in Jerusalem — an Orthodox people subject to a foreign hierarchy. The Bulgarian Slavs were looked upon as brothers by the Russian Panslavs, and Bulgarian Church independence was warmly supported by many Russians not the least of whom was Count Ignatiev, the Russian Envoy in Constantinople. With his well known dislike of the Greeks, and his desire to support Christian separatist movements which would accelerate the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, he plunged into the Bulgarian dispute without any of the reserve that marked the behaviour of more cautious Russian statesmen. He believed that the Greeks were animated only by feelings of nationalism and he determined to oppose them with Slav nationalism.

⁵ C. Papadopoulos, *Historia tes Ekklesias Ierosolimon*, Jerusalem, 1910, p. 706.

⁶ I. T. Titov, *Kirill Naumov*, Kiev, 1902, p. 260.

In 1870 the Bulgarians expelled the Greek bishops and made an ecclesiastical unilateral declaration of independence. This was recognized by the Porte, clearly under Russian prompting and despite strong Greek protests. The Ecumenical Patriarch called a conference in 1872 at which it was voted to declare the Bulgarians schismatic. This was a great blow to Ignatev's self esteem. The only dissenting voice at the conference was that of Patriarch Cyril of Jerusalem, whose deposition was immediately demanded by the other Greeks. Ignatev readily supported his stand and was prepared to do all in his power to encourage Cyril's defiance. Ignatev was a strange diplomat, a man of impulse and impatience rather than of diplomacy, with a strong belief in his own ability to overcome the wishes of others and naturally with an unshakable faith in the rightness of Russia's cause as he interpreted it. He thus tried to bully the Greeks into accepting his policies, but despite the resources under his control he succeeded only in closing their ranks.

His chief weapons were Russian control of the main sources of income of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, his influence with the Porte and the support of the Arab Orthodox population. He miscalculated the importance of all three. Greek solidarity counted for more than money in the final analysis. He greatly overestimated his own influence with the Ottoman government and although he was warmly supported by the Arabs, once again Greek solidarity proved to be too great an obstacle.

After the vote at the conference Patriarch Cyril returned to Jerusalem to dedicate the Russian Cathedral of the Holy Trinity in the presence of Grand Duke Nikolai. The Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre bitterly opposed the patriarch for his pro-Bulgarian stand and immediately began to work for his deposition. Ignatev urged the Russian Consul in Jerusalem, Kozhevnikov, to obtain the support of the Arab population for Cyril. Kozhevnikov was not entirely sure of the Arab position, but gradually a mood of defiance materialized, demonstrations followed, and Cyril was able to write in November 1872 that "the whole of the population of Palestine protests loudly against the actions [of the Greeks] ... and acknowledges us and no one else as Patriarch."⁷ It seemed as if Ignatev had swung the Arabs round to his side, but he had miscalculated the power of the lay population. Both Russians and Arabs were powerless to prevent Cyril's deposition in the same month. What Russia *had* done was to encourage the creation of a conscious Arab Orthodox opinion and to awaken a strong desire for greater participation in the affairs of the patriarchate. The Orthodox Arab national movement dates from this moment. Its echos resounded during the remain-

⁷ *Soobshcheniya*, Vol. XXV (1914), p. 337.

der of the nineteenth century and until the first World War and its problems remain unsolved today.

Ignatev had an ambivalent attitude towards the Arabs and it is clear that his support for them was chiefly to further Russian prestige in the face of Greek and Turkish opposition. It is not too cynical to maintain that a co-operative attitude on the part of the Greeks in Palestine would have led him to abandon the Arab cause. He wrote on one occasion, "I fear that the Arabs will finally milk us dry but that they themselves will not hold out to the end," and on another, in reply to an Arab request for further financial support, "The Arabs have money assigned to them; we cannot distribute it at random. The game is just not worth the candle." His feelings of disillusion grew as Arab demands became more extreme and as their apparent usefulness to him diminished.

The consul on the spot was much more enthusiastic in his support of the Orthodox Arabs and was continuously optimistic in his assessment of the situation. Between 1872 and 1874 Kozhevnikov worked energetically to stiffen Arab resistance by giving them moral support, interceding with the Ottoman governor and attempting to counterbalance the influence of the other consuls. He wrote in 1872, without much apparent justification, "There has appeared amongst the Arabs such a spirit of energy and struggle against the Greeks that the whole country thinks and acts as one man. The Greeks have started all kinds of retaliatory measures ... but the Arabs remain firm."⁸ Such overt support as Kozhevnikov provided, whether really effective or not, certainly aroused the resentment of the Greeks, the Ottomans and the other consuls. The British consul, Moore, wrote of Kozhevnikov's "active part in the differences in Jerusalem" and that the Governor of Jerusalem, Kāmil, attributed "the want of success [in reconciling Greek and Arab] to the continued interference"⁹ of the Russian consul.

Despite Russian efforts, Cyril's deposition was recognized by the Porte at the end of 1872. Kozhevnikov's position in Jerusalem became extremely delicate. The Governor and the Greek Consul both accused him of leading an "Arab revolt" while the Arabs themselves backed by Russia continued to recognize Cyril as patriarch. But Russia's prestige in general had suffered a blow in Palestine. There was a great disturbance in Jerusalem when news of the Porte's confirmation of the deposition was received. A Russian eyewitness reported, "This is a great defeat for the Russians who are not able to walk through the streets because of the mockery and spitting. Russian pilgrims have been beaten by the Turkish soldiers."¹⁰

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁹ Moore to Derby, 16 May 1874 (FO 78/2340).

¹⁰ *Soobshcheniya*, Vol. XII (1901), p. 78.

A new patriarch, Prokopios, was quickly elected and confirmed by the Sultan — a compelling reason for the haste being the desire to avoid Russian pressure. He remained unrecognized by his flock. Immediately after the election an Orthodox Arab delegation left for Constantinople to lay before the Porte complaints that no Arab had taken part in the election and that the hierarchy of their Church was open only to Greeks. The British Consul in Beirut reported that the Arabs regarded the act of the Porte in recognizing Prokopios as “a deliberate insult, which, it is feared, may lead eventually to serious consequences.” The delegation was ill-received by the Turkish authorities who were not prepared to entertain Arab complaints, and it returned frustrated to Jerusalem.

The Arab population in Palestine continued in a state of unrest, encouraged by Kozhevnikov to oppose Prokopios, who accused the consul of “blatant interference in arousing the Arabs against the patriarch.”¹¹ The behaviour of the Arabs became more threatening — it was described by the British Consul as a revolt — and Prokopios had fifteen of the ringleaders arrested. Ignatev was reluctant to support the more excessive Arab aims but believed that conciliation would only be achieved if the Greeks made some “concessions to the just demands of the Arabs.”¹² They were asking for a greater share in the administration of the patriarchate, still a fairly modest request far removed from the more extreme nationalism of later years.

But these demands had now materialized and could not be ignored. In the autumn of 1874 a second Arab delegation travelled to Constantinople and this time, on the advice of Kāmil, the Governor of Jerusalem, the Turkish authorities were more ready to listen. A new constitution for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem was framed which promised the Arab population a greater role in the election of a patriarch. Ignatev admitted that Arab demands were not fully satisfied but believed that the election of a patriarch in accordance with its regulations could not be contested.

Russian diplomacy was now confused. Ignatev thought that the Arabs had achieved enough, and nowhere did he suggest the possibility of an Arab patriarch. He wanted the deposition to be lifted from Cyril and to ensure that the next patriarch was not overtly anti-Russian. The consul on the spot had to bear the brunt of Arab importunities and was more eager to appease them. In any event, the next patriarch was the Greek supported candidate and no attention was paid either to Russian or Arab demands. The nationalist in Ignatev demanded revenge, but the diplomat conceded defeat. The new

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. XXVI (1915), p. 76.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

patriarch, Ierotheos, promised some concessions to the Arabs, a reconciliation was effected in the presence of the Governor, and nothing changed.

IV

The Arab population remained in a state of unrest under Ierotheos but after Ignatiev's retirement at the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 little was heard of it until 1893. During this period ideas were obviously simmering, fostered by Russia which took a great step forward in Palestine by the establishment in 1882 of the Orthodox Palestine Society, a body run by men largely motivated by anti-Greek and pro-Arab feelings. The Arabs were thereby encouraged to restate their former claims to greater participation in the patriarchate. This they did in 1893 in a provocative book — *Lamḥa Ta'rikhiyya fī Akhawīyyat al-Qabr al-Muqaddas al-Yūnāniyya* — written by Salīm Shāḥḥāda, the dragoman in the Russian Consulate in Beirut. Based largely on Russian material, the work was a bold attempt to justify the election of an Arab patriarch — it was an inflammatory pamphlet, a clear call to action, the charter of the Orthodox Arabs of Jerusalem. The Greek patriarchate immediately forbade its circulation. The work was obviously written with Russian help and encouragement as it included a passage from a Russian book not published until the year after the *Lamḥa* had appeared.

The burden of the work was to show that the Patriarchate of Jerusalem had possessed at an earlier period an exclusively Arab character and that the Greeks had eventually usurped all the Arabs' rights. The Greeks' chief desire had been to obtain control of the large income of the patriarchate which rightfully belonged to the Arabs. "Now you know, Arab reader, just how much the Greeks are cheating you of — the lawful possessors of all this!"¹³ The Greek reply was that the theory of the Arab patriarchs had been "intentionally manufactured by the Panslavs."¹⁴

The impact of the *Lamḥa* was not immediate (although with Russian support an Arab was elected patriarch in Antioch in 1899) as 'Abdūlḥamīd's despotism stifled attempts to gain greater freedom. The upheaval of the Young Turk revolution was needed to release latent Arab feelings. The restoration of the Turkish constitution in 1908 was welcomed by many non-Muslim and some non-Turkish Ottomans in the mistaken belief that a new era of brotherhood and equality was dawning. This belief affected the Ortho-

¹³ Salīm Shāḥḥāda, *Lamḥa Ta'rikhiyya fī Akhawīyyat al-Qabr al-Muqaddas al-Yūnāniyya*, Beirut, 1893, p. 47.

¹⁴ *Refutation of the Allegations put forward by Sir Anton Bertram against the Patriarchate of Jerusalem*, Jerusalem, 1937, p. 25.

dox Arabs of Jerusalem no less than anyone else. For them equality meant a greater share in the affairs of their patriarchate. Quickly organizing themselves into a committee and basing themselves on the constitution, forty Arab priests and lay notables presented their demands to the patriarch, Damianos. Article III of the constitution laid down that in each *qazā* there was to be a council of each community to supervise the use of certain revenues and the administration of certain properties. Each council was to be composed of members of the community elected in accordance with regulations which *were to be* drawn up. But the Arabs' demands went far beyond these modest provisos and were consequently immediately rejected by the patriarch on the grounds that they were illegal and premature, this latter because the constitution spoke only of future plans and not of present realities. The Arabs believed this to be no time for technical quibbles and the feelings of at least some of them were well expressed by a young Orthodox Arab, Khalīl Sakākīnī: "We are rid of the tyranny of the government but that of the spiritual authority remains."¹⁵ This resentment against an outside and imposed authority, and the ideas expressed in the *Lamḥa Ta'rikhiyya* (reissued in 1909), were clear proof of a growing nationalist sentiment which would no longer be satisfied by trifling concessions on the part of the Greeks. The goal now was complete Arabization of the Orthodox Church in Palestine. The Greeks considered that any concession would be a sign of weakness and would open the way to an Arab takeover.

As the Arabs had set their sights so high their reaction was swift and strong, the more so as the constitution had aroused such expectations. Violence was threatened, church services were boycotted and processions of protest organized. Both sides appealed to the Turkish authorities to intervene to prevent further unrest and bloodshed. The Grand Vezir, Kāmil Pasha, who had been Governor of Jerusalem at the time of the first Greco-Arab crisis, advised the Arabs not to cause trouble in the city since it was a place of pilgrimage and even under the new régime would remain such. Moreover, any change in the *status quo* would be extremely dangerous for the Ottoman Empire. He did, however, order a local investigation and advised Damianos to make some minor concessions. This he refused to do, but the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre was not satisfied with the manner in which he was handling the crisis. They accused him of weakness in the face of agitation and were suspicious of the personal conferences he had held with leading members of the Arab laity. In December 1908 they deposed him.

Once again the reaction was immediate and violent. Newspapers carried letters in which the Orthodox Arabs set forth their views and appealed for

¹⁵ Khalīl Sakākīnī, *Kadhā anā yā Dunyā*, Jerusalem, 1955, p. 39.

help from all Muslims. These letters aroused the population and the Greeks were besieged in the patriarchate and in their monasteries. The movement spread to other areas. An excitable population demonstrated outside the patriarchate in favour of Damianos who they believed had been about to accept some of their demands. To preserve some order the Governor forbade Damianos to attend the Christmas celebrations in Bethlehem which were conducted under the protection of Turkish bayonets by the Greek *locum tenens*. The Russian Consul refused to attend, and paid an official call on Damianos as hundreds of Russian pilgrims ostentatiously kissed his hand.

The Russian position throughout the crisis was again ambiguous. The consul played a key role in offering moral and physical support to the patriarch and in trying to temper the wilder spirits among the Brotherhood. But most Russians were embarrassed by the extreme demands and violent behaviour of the Arabs. Then as now they proved willful protégés. In addition, some Russians feared that their actions were carrying them beyond ecclesiastical autonomy out of the Church and into demands for national self-rule and secular independence. To those Russians chiefly concerned to preserve the Arabs in their Orthodoxy this posed great problems of conscience — how to determine the point at which Arab alienation from the Greek hierarchy became alienation from the Church itself. For a number of Arabs this point was passed; some turned to Catholicism or Protestantism, others abandoned religion completely.

In January 1909 the Porte recognized both the deposition and the *locum tenens*, despite Orthodox Arab opposition, despite professions of Muslim-Christian solidarity in the Assembly in Constantinople and despite Russian pressure. The explanation may be the government's legalistic insistence that there was no formal reason for them to withhold recognition. The Arabs reacted with their by now customary vehemence and occupied the whole of the patriarchate. The Ottoman governor made no attempt to remove them. Unrest spread through the streets of Jerusalem and two Greeks, a Russian woman and a member of the Russian ecclesiastical mission were murdered. The revolt spread through Palestine and was accompanied by more murders and murderous attacks. Four Arabs were killed and a Greek archimandrite was later charged with the responsibility for the deaths of two of them. Damianos declined an invitation to go to Constantinople to discuss his position and the governor dared not coerce him, as the Muslim Arabs of Palestine had expressed solidarity with the Orthodox and it was reported that the Turkish soldiers would refuse to fire on Arab demonstrators. An Ottoman commission of enquiry was met by further demonstrations in Jaffa and Jerusalem. The commission delayed its decision and disputes ran on all sides as to its competence to judge an internal Church dispute. The

Arabs feared that the delay was due to Greek intrigue and threatened further violence. The Turks bowed to this pressure and announced that they could no longer be responsible for the safety of anyone in Palestine if the Greeks did not reinstate the Patriarch Damianos; but they did submit, "having considered the extraordinarily critical circumstances and the disturbances of public order amounting to positive anarchy on account of the rebellious attitudes of the mobs throughout nearly the whole of Palestine."¹⁶ Damianos was reinstated and there was a seeming reconciliation between Greeks and Arabs. The patriarch rewarded the Russian Consul for "his filial disposition and great love" shown towards the Patriarchate of Jerusalem.

The Arabs rejoiced over a victory which was soon to crumble in their hands. Damianos was a Greek and even though he had been restored to his throne with Arab help he felt under no obligation and refused to entertain any real diminution of his authority. The Turkish government itself agreed only to the establishment of a mixed Greek-Arab council which would help to supervise the running of schools and hospitals. A Turkish report rejected all other Arab claims. The Arabs immediately complained of its injustice and of its lack of sympathy with the spirit of the time and the new constitution.

Thus the problem remained unsolved as Palestine passed from Ottoman into British hands and as Imperial Russia faded from the picture. For almost fifty years the Orthodox Arabs had struggled to gain what they believed were their rights. But their interpretation of these rights slowly changed as the vehemence with which they demanded them increased. Their motivation also changed. A relatively innocuous demand for the patriarch to administer the affairs of his flock ended as a call for the election of an Arab patriarch and a pledge "to restore the Arabs' national rights usurped by the Greeks." Russian support at the birth of the movement had been crucial but it is clear that some Russians were bewildered and others alienated by the violent course which it took. Equally, the Arabs once set on the path to independence had no desire to exchange Greek for Russian hegemony. This was the irony, that Russia's help for the Arabs eventually led to their alienation from her. In fact Russia's guidance and her restraining hand were largely ignored when the Arabs took to the street, moved by extreme passions and heedless of the overall good of the Church. Murders on either side committed in the name of religion could never be condoned. But Jerusalem has always aroused extreme passion and where the greatest good has been done so has the greatest evil.

¹⁶ Bertram and Luke, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

23. BRITAIN AND OTTOMAN PALESTINE: AN IMPRESSIONISTIC RETROSPECT

by JACOB C. HUREWITZ

I

The geographic location of Palestine, so close to the main artery of the Empire, became early in World War I a matter of highest concern to the security planners of Whitehall. This anxiety was manifested as early as the spring of 1915, as a result of the negotiation with Russia and France of the Constantinople Agreement and even before its formal consummation. The British Prime Minister on 8 April 1915 appointed a "Committee on Asiatic Turkey", headed by Sir Maurice de Bunsen and comprising representatives from the Foreign Office, India Office, Admiralty, War Office, and Board of Trade, along with Lt. Col. Sir Mark Sykes, Bart., M. P. The Committee was instructed to "consider the nature of British desiderata in Turkey in Asia in the event of the successful conclusion of the war, with special reference to the memoranda on the subject which have lately been drawn up by the Foreign Office, India Office, War Office, Admiralty, and the Defence Committee."¹ The de Bunsen Committee, which held thirteen meetings between 12 April and 28 June 1915, submitted on 30 June a report that proposed four modes of settling the postwar problems of Ottoman Asia and an assessment of each, along with minutes of the Committee meetings and thirty-eight special memoranda — not one expressly related to Palestine. The subject of Palestine did, however, inform the report, and since that report reflected the views of the interested ministries on Ottoman Asia, it guided British diplomats in later negotiations with France and Russia.

In brief, the de Bunsen report, the text of which has been released only in recent years, gives the students of Middle East political history major testimony, unavailable in the past, on the nature of the wartime allied negotiations on the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and particularly on Britain's interest in Palestine. It shows beyond doubt that Britain's procurement of the Palestine Mandate well exemplified the expansion of empire by absentmindedness. This was hardly a case of long-range or premeditated

¹ Cabinet, Ad Hoc Committees (Secret), "Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister. 1915. British Desiderata in Turkey-in-Asia," CAB 27/1.

conspiracy, as has often been contended. It was simply a case of *ad hoc* decision making and diplomatic bungling. There are thus two questions to consider: how Britain became the manager of the Mandate after the war's close, and why this outcome could not be firmly predicted in advance. Let us examine the second one first.

II

Britain's lack of preparation, even after the outbreak of World War I, to entertain the partition of the Ottoman Empire should not astonish us. As late as the Anglo-Ottoman negotiations of 1911–1913, Britain was still busy upholding the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the contracting Ottoman Empire, except where the powers had already breached it, as in Britain's case in Egypt and in Cyprus. Even in Kuwait, Britain acquiesced at least nominally to Ottoman claims of sovereignty, while still insisting on Britain's special relationship to the sheikh, as defined in 1899. The nineteenth-century record reveals that Britain had consistently opposed the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In 1799, Britain explicitly guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Britain never again gave such comprehensive, unilateral assurances to the Sultan. Yet when Palmerston discovered a means of internationalizing the Eastern Question in 1840–1841, the main thrust of the policy was to bind the major powers to the common purpose of keeping the Sultan's possessions intact, wherever possible, and where not, to allow no more than nibbling at the fringes. This was the meaning of the settlement of 1840–1841, which set up a special régime for the Turkish Straits and forced Muḥammad 'Alī back into Egypt, imposing the authority of the Sultan over his vassal and destroying Egypt's capacity ever again to threaten the integrity of the Empire.

This settlement, it should be noted, made it possible for Palestine later to become a separate political entity. Had it remained part of Egypt, as it well might have, the likelihood of later detachment would not have been great. Consider, for example, the present Egyptian reaction to Israel's presence in the Sinai Peninsula, which remained in Egyptian possession at the time only as a matter of happenstance. At the turn of the twentieth century, once the Suez Canal was in operation and Britain discovered its central importance to the Empire, Lord Cromer resisted attempts by the Sublime Porte to reassign the Sinai Peninsula to Ottoman *vilāyets* in Asia, as a means of keeping alive Ottoman legal claims to Egypt, despite the British occupation.

In the Nesselrode Memorandum of 1844 Tsar Nicholas I tried to persuade Britain to join Russia and Austria in thinly veiled plans for the division of the Ottoman Empire. These plans were made even more explicit in the

Nicholas-Seymour conversations of 1853. In both instances, Britain rejected Russian overtures. Britain actually went to war with France on the side of the Ottoman Empire in 1854–1856 to prevent Russian expansion at Ottoman expense. Following the signature of the formal treaty of Paris in 1856, Britain joined Austria and France in a supplementary treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Britain continued to subscribe to the principle, even after the major powers ceased functioning in concert on the Eastern Question as they did after 1878. By then, Britain itself ignored the principle in occupying Cyprus and, a few years later, Egypt.

In Palestine British interests grew steadily, but French and Russian interests bulked far larger and so did their commitments. The Crimean War was touched off — notice that I say “touched off,” not “caused” — by French and Russian rivalry in Jerusalem, with Britain essentially standing aside from that issue. Even after the Crimean War, it was Russia, not Britain, that became the first to procure rights to burst the bounds of walled Jerusalem in erecting the compound that still bears its name. The New City of Jerusalem was thus a Russian invention, and not a British or French one. Finally in the Treaty of Berlin, while Palestine was not mentioned by name, it was French rights in the Holy Places that were confirmed (Article 52). The Congress of Berlin marked the end of the major concert, the handling of the Eastern Question by summitry. Thereafter, the little summit (i.e., the ambassadors of the major powers) at Istanbul kept watch over the cumulative obligations of the European powers.

The first serious wartime consideration of the partition of the Ottoman Empire was the series of *aides-mémoire* and special messages between 4 March and 10 April exchanged by Russia, France and Britain. The series came to be known as the Constantinople Agreement even before the negotiations were completed. In that agreement, Britain revealed a preoccupation with the Ottoman periphery, winning the consent of its allies to sealing off the Arabian Peninsula as a British sphere of influence and consolidating Britain's position in Persia. The initially expressed interest of Russia focused on the possession of the Turkish Straits. Indeed, the Constantinople Agreement was reached on Russian initiative and received its title from the insistence of the Tsar's regime.

Palestine was mentioned only by the French, who laid claim to the territory, as an afterthought of its prior claim to Syria. In a special *démarche* to the assistant Russian Foreign Minister on 15 March 1915, the French Ambassador explained that “it is his impression that Syria ‘includes Palestine.’” The Russians alone bridled at the French claim; the British did not. On the next day, the Russian Foreign Minister cabled the following instructions to the Russian ambassador in Paris:

After arrival at General Headquarters, the French Ambassador informed me of the contents of Delcassé's telegram which asks for consent by Russia to the annexation of Syria and Cilicia by France. [Maurice] Paleologue [French Ambassador at St. Petersburg] explains that in his opinion the French Government refers also to Palestine when speaking of Syria. However, since in this telegram there is no question of Palestine, it would be desirable to elucidate whether the explanation of the Ambassador really corresponds to the view of the French Government. This question appears important to us; for, if the Imperial Government should be prepared largely to satisfy France's desires concerning Syria and Cilicia proper, it is indispensable to study the question with closer attention, if the Holy Places are involved.

III

With these facts in mind, we can now examine the de Bunsen report for the light that it sheds on the official British perception of Palestine early in the war. The interministerial committee made four different proposals on the basis of its inventory of British interests, assessing the advantages and constraints of each proposal for imperial security. These proposals included partition of Ottoman Asia among the three allies, its division into zones of allied interest, the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as an independent state, and the creation of a decentralized system of administration of a sovereign Ottoman Empire.

The de Bunsen Committee's conclusion on Palestine makes it clear that Britain intended to side with Russia against the French claim. The pertinent passage reads:

Still less do the Committee desire to offer suggestions about the future destiny of Palestine, but since that territory has been included within the geographical limits assigned to the British sphere in the two schemes, of partition, and of zones of interest, they desire to repeat that they see no reason why the sacred places of Palestine should not be dealt with as a separate question. They have felt free to deliberate on the assumption that the French claim will be rejected, since they are convinced that the forces opposed are too great for France ever to make that claim good, but for the same reason they consider that it will be idle for His Majesty's Government to claim the retention of Palestine in their sphere. Palestine must be recognised as a country whose destiny must be the subject of special negotiations, in which both belligerents and neutrals are alike interested.²

² *Ibid.*, Para. 96.

The de Bunsen Committee thus advocated, not that Britain seek possession of Palestine but that France be prevented from getting it. For this reason, the Committee endorsed internationalization of the claim.

Nevertheless, recognition of the priority of French claims to Palestine pervades the de Bunsen report. For example, the Committee states that:

The French Government were more precise in announcing their counter-claims to Russia. They demanded Cilicia and Syria, in which latter they included Palestine and the Christian Holy Places, though they did not specify the precise form of their claim — whether annexation or protectorate or sphere of interest. It would appear that Russia is ready to accede to the French claim to Cilicia and Syria proper, but will demur strongly to the inclusion of Palestine.³

Similarly, in the preliminary considerations, the Committee set aside the question of Palestine and the Holy Places of Christendom along with the Armenian question and that of Arabia and the Muslim holy places, "as they are questions which could be discussed and settled in concert with other Powers, even were we going otherwise to disinterest ourselves in Asiatic Turkey."⁴

Under the partition proposal, the de Bunsen report took note that that scheme entails one serious international difficulty:

It removes Palestine from the French, only to include it in the British sphere. Suggestions for the actual settlement of the intricate problem of the sacred places scarcely come within the scope of the Committee's labours, but as regards this particular difficulty they think that His Majesty's Government should be prepared to make no claim themselves to the possession of the Holy Places, and to leave their future to be decided as a separate question, in discussion with those who stand for the national and religious interests involved.⁵

In the proposal for the division of Ottoman Asia into zones of interest, the Committee observed that:

If our Allies are willing to entertain this proposal at all, the real difficulty will be to find the compromise between French and British aspirations. But if, as the Committee hope, we may count on Russian support in return for sympathy for Russian views in regard to Palestine, and if due weight is given to the large and fertile district which, under this course, is left available for France and French colonists, and which does not at present form part of her aspirations, the difficulty should not prove insuperable.⁶

³ *Ibid.*, Para. 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Para. 13.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Para. 37.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Para. 53.

Finally, in the proposal on preserving the Ottoman Empire as an independent state, the Committee concluded that "as regards France, her numerous concessions in Palestine [and elsewhere in Ottoman Asia where some of the major concessions are enumerated] ... would all tend to make such a settlement highly satisfactory."⁷

The de Bunsen report helps us understand why in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and its allies pledged:

That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.⁸

The provision that Palestine become an international zone was clearly adumbrated by the de Bunsen Committee. McMahon's negotiations with Husayn and the Foreign Office negotiations with the Zionists were clearly subordinated to the evolving allied plans. On 30 November 1918 Premier Georges Clemenceau came to London to discuss with Prime Minister David Lloyd George plans for the Paris Peace Conference. The wartime leaders in informal talks agreed that Palestine, roughly defined from Dan to Beersheba, should be placed under a single British administration instead of an international one. On French insistence, however, the grant of Palestine to British custody was to form part of a larger *quid-pro-quo* modification of the Sykes-Picot agreement. This marked the opening of involved and mutually recriminatory negotiations between France and Britain that dragged on until April 1920, before the two powers finally reached an understanding on the details of the modified Sykes-Picot plan, which assigned Palestine to Britain as a League of Nations Mandate. These terms were finally embodied in the proposal for an Ottoman settlement signed by the powers at San Remo in April and by the Ottoman government at Sevres in August.

IV

The allied secret wartime agreements began to become a part of the public record even before the German armistice, thanks to the Bolsheviks, who selectively released agreements of the allies that they found in the Tsarist Foreign Ministry's files, for use as propaganda against Britain and France, imputing the basest motives to imperialism and capitalism. *Izvestia* published the essence of the Sykes-Picot agreement on 24 November 1917, and *The Manchester Guardian* issued it in English translation on 19 January 1918.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Para. 71 d.

⁸ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Princeton, 1956, II, 19.

References to the negotiations leading to the Constantinople Agreement appeared in *Pravda* on 20 December 1917 and in *The Manchester Guardian* on 22 February 1918. Bolshevik action implied that Communist Russia would engage in no such greed and exploitation.

Look, however, at the rhetoric in the Soviet treaty with Persia of 26 February 1921. One could hardly tell from the reading of that instrument that runaway inflation and near bankruptcy made the repudiation of the tsarist special interest in Persia a blessing, a way to win the friendship of a new régime at no real cost to itself. The clever use of Soviet propaganda shines through almost every paragraph of the instrument. It must have been somewhat embarrassing to the commissars in the Kremlin, when the new régime of Colonel Reza Khān — it was his régime already, even though he was only commander-in-chief of the army and minister of war — simply refused to ratify the agreement until the Russians evacuated the province of Gilan, which they had occupied in 1920. But consider Article 14 of the Soviet-Persian Treaty, which stipulates:

The Persian Government, recognising the importance of the Caspian fisheries for the food supply of Russia, promises to conclude with the Food Service of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic immediately upon the expiry of the legal period of these existing engagements, a contract relating to the fisheries, containing appropriate clauses. Furthermore, the Persian Government promises to examine, in agreement with the Government of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the means of at once conveying the produce of the fisheries to the Food Service of Soviet Russia pending the conclusion of the above contract.⁹

Apparently caviar appealed as much to the proletarian palate as it had to the palates of the tsars and the royalists. The contrast with the Soviet-Turkish treaty of the following month from which all rhetoric was omitted, simply reflected the difference in leadership of a nationalist movement fighting to save the integrity of the Turkish heartland of which it was not yet in possession, and of a régime that was less than a week old and had not yet won legitimacy.

To return to Palestine, by the war's end there was no doubt of Britain's deep interest in that territory, so close to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, the jugular vein of the Empire. By then, Britain was willing to accept in Palestine what swiftly hardened into conflicting obligations, promising to help develop a Jewish National Home there without prejudicing the rights of the indigenous population.

⁹ *Ibid.*, II, 92-93.

24. A BRITISH PROJECT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A RAILWAY BETWEEN JAFFA AND JERUSALEM

by ELIAHU ELATH

I

One of the more pressing needs brought into being by the Industrial Revolution and the new upsurge of energy and initiative to which it gave rise in so many spheres of life in Great Britain, was that of finding new means of transportation to reduce the travelling time between Britain and India. True, it was a need that had already made itself felt earlier, both for political and military reasons, especially at the time of Napoleon's aggressive thrust into the Middle East; but the Industrial Revolution gave it added significance, not only in the economic field but in other areas as well. While efforts were being made to integrate new developments into the economic system, various discoveries and technical advances were proving of ever greater practical value, on the one hand leading to a steady growth in the different branches of industrial manufacture, and on the other increasing the possibility — as well as the need — of expanding the markets, both at home and abroad, for the mounting quantity of goods being produced.

The industrial development of England in the first quarter of the nineteenth century highlights the importance of the Indian market for British commerce and for the British economy in general. In the period immediately following England's penetration into India, trade between the two countries had been based chiefly on the sale of expensive, British-made commodities to a small proportion of the Indian population. But after the Industrial Revolution had made its impact on the textile industry — which at that time took the key place in Britain's economy — and cheap cotton goods were being produced on an increasing scale in the British factories, new possibilities for trade with India were opened up for British manufactures and merchants, very soon altering the trade balance between the two countries and underscoring the great importance of the Indian market for Great Britain. One of the more notable results of this development was that the British public began to better appreciate the vital role of India in the continued industrial and commercial prosperity of their country, and to feel more strongly than ever the necessity of defending it against all competitors and against any attempt to undermine Britain's position and interests both in India itself and in the neighbouring regions.

The route to India round the Cape of Good Hope continued to serve the requirements of British-Indian trade. However, as the ties between the two countries grew steadily stronger, with ever larger numbers of Britishers — military personnel, merchants, officials, job-seekers, etc. — travelling to India, the gap between the new tempo of life and the new needs on the one hand, and the conditions of transportation which had remained almost unchanged in their slowness and backwardness on the other, became more and more marked. It was a gap that was felt especially by various government departments and commercial and banking houses in Britain because of the obstacles it placed in the way of their maintaining contact with the administrative authorities and with the customers of those business houses in India, respectively. Because of this gap it became increasingly difficult to conduct affairs efficiently.

The political changes which took place in Britain after the Napoleonic wars at home, as well as in the sphere of international relations, created new and complicated problems for her, particularly in the Middle East. These problems were connected with the defence of the routes to India against the designs of those seeking to undermine her. More than at any other time in the past it was realized that these routes were essential for safeguarding British interests, and that if they were to be effectively protected an improvement in the means of transportation was a matter of urgency. As a result, questions concerned with economics, politics and defence as related to India began more and more to occupy the minds not only of persons in official circles, but also of many others both in Britain itself and in India.

In the background of this search for ways of improving the means of transportation between Britain and India was an invention whose influence had already made itself felt in different walks of life and which had brought about revolutionary changes in British industry, viz., the steam engine. The possibility of using steam power to solve the transportation problem, even if only to a partial extent, had turned the period since the 1840's into one of far-reaching significance because of the developments it had set in motion. At the beginning of the period under discussion the first attempts had been made to use steam power for the purpose of reducing the travelling time between Britain and India and of ensuring regular transportation by sea at all seasons of the year. It should be noted that in the Middle East the steamship preceded the steam-driven train, and that the plans to build a railway in the region came after the attempt to establish a steamship service on the Euphrates. In Britain itself steam navigation had begun to oust the sailing vessel as the train had the stagecoach.

As a result of the stimulus provided by these developments, plans for the opening of communication arteries within the British Empire as a whole

through the use of the new means of transportation were being initiated in various quarters. The fact that the deficiencies in communications between Britain and India had added to the difficulties encountered in suppressing the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857, apart from the problems caused by the backward transportation system in India itself, encouraged men of vision and initiative both in England and in India to consider plans for connecting the two continents by means of a railway stretching from the English Channel to the Indus Valley.

But any plan on so vast a scale and so far-reaching in its international implications not to mention the huge amount of capital that would be required for its execution, was, under existing conditions, doomed to remain in the realm of vision only. As far as more modest plans were concerned, however, the prospects were brighter; even the technical and engineering problems involved in them were on the whole far simpler than those presented by the intercontinental project. This serves to explain how the project for a railway in the Euphrates Valley came to be conceived in the forties.

II

This was one of the few projects, if not the only one being considered at that time, about which a very great deal of material dealing with every aspect of the subject was gathered in England by private individuals, government institutions, and particularly by two parliamentary committees which had been set up for the special purpose of investigating its possibilities. It is true that, from the perspective of our own times, it cannot be said that this material — concentrated in the writings of General Francis Rawdon Chesney, the initiator of the project, and in the three reports of the investigating committees of 1834, 1871–1872 — was as complete and reliable as might have been expected from a scientific study. But considering the conditions under which the investigations were conducted on the spot, and in comparison with other investigations made at the same time in different parts of the region, it can be regarded as a source of important information which had previously been either completely unknown or insufficiently investigated.

The considerable amount of data collected concerning the route to be crossed by the railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf was such as to convince the investigators, and particularly those in the parliamentary committee of 1871 in the two stages of its work, that the project was feasible from the point of view of the physical and engineering possibilities of executing it. The committee even arrived at an estimate of the funds that would be needed to build the railway (ten million pounds sterling).

The British project for the construction of a railway line between Jaffa and Jerusalem entered the scene merely as part of the overall project for a railway between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. However, while one group of Britishers was dealing with matters connected with the larger project in Mesopotamia, Captain William Allen of the Royal Navy was sent to Palestine to look into the problems of transportation between the Mediterranean, the Dead Sea and the Red Sea, and to examine the prospects of using this route as a crossing to India. In his book¹ Allen described the unique geographical situation of Palestine, lying as it does at the crossroads of three continents — Europe, Asia and Africa — and the strategic significance of this circumstance for any country interested in safeguarding the communication routes in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. He stressed the importance for the British Empire, concerned as it was with the defence of India and the approaches to it, of the stretch of land in Palestine lying between the Mediterranean and Red Sea, and arrived at the conclusion that a canal in that area linking the Mediterranean and the Red Sea would prove the most satisfactory way of ensuring that Britain have absolute control of the route to India. On investigating the possibilities of putting this plan into effect, Allen found that Acre had all the advantages for serving as the starting-point of the canal, which would lead from that town through the Jezreel Valley to the Jordan Valley, from there to the Dead Sea and Wadi Arava, ending at the Gulf of Aqaba. Although Allen did not say so explicitly, it is clear that he hoped his "solution" would serve as a counter proposal to de Lesseps' plan for the construction of the Suez Canal, which the British government, and more especially the Royal Navy, regarded with little favour since there was no assurance that Britain would be in direct control of it. Although Allen dealt with the engineering aspects of his plan and did not minimize the difficulties involved, his main attention was focused on the political and military advantages inherent — as he saw it — in the canal, which, he maintained, justified whatever engineering and financial effort its construction might entail. During a tour of the Middle East he visited not only Palestine but also other parts of the region, among them Syria and Mesopotamia, and his book contains interesting passages on these countries and their inhabitants. It is worth noting that in putting forward his scheme for a canal linking the Mediterranean with the Red Sea, Allen was the first of a number of persons who from time to time came up with the same idea, but, as we know, without results.

The Jaffa-Jerusalem railway project became a matter of practical consideration when the overall project for the Mediterranean-Persian Gulf

¹ Capt. William Allen, *The Dead Sea, A New Route to India*, London, 1855.

railway had entered the stage of political activity in London, Constantinople and, in effect, the Middle East itself. The moving spirit in the "Euphrates Valley Railway Company," which was concerned with the execution of the project, was General Chesney, the soldier-explorer who had been, as already mentioned, the first to conceive of the idea of shortening the route to India through the use of steamships on the Euphrates, and, some time later, the idea of a railway through the Euphrates Valley. In September 1856, Chesney and Sir John McNeill left London for the Middle East on behalf of the company, Chesney going to Constantinople to conduct the political negotiations connected with the formal arrangements for the project, and McNeill to Mesopotamia in order to examine the physical conditions bearing on the railway, including the line between Jaffa and Jerusalem.

McNeill was famous as an expert in railway construction. Lane-Pool, in his biography of General Chesney, writes as follows of his (McNeill's) visit to Palestine:

...During the ride to Jerusalem, the party [of McNeill and his assistants] had divided in order to examine two routes; and careful observations were made and levels taken in view of the possibility of carrying the proposed railway from Jaffa. On completion of his tour, McNeill submitted a report in which he "recommended a railway from Jaffa to Lydda only, and thence a macadamised road, which cost £150 per mile against £4,000/4,500 of railroad construction."²

In his conclusions, however, McNeill expressed doubts as to the economic value of the railway, as well as reservations about the prospects of assistance being forthcoming from the Turkish government in making the project financially sound or making land available for building the railway.

III

An interesting chapter in this story is that concerning Sir Moses Montefiore's connection with the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway project. Chesney makes reference to it in his diaries (as published in the above-mentioned biography by Lane-Pool). According to him, Sir Moses was closely associated with the project from its inception, and its failure to materialize was due to the fact that he (Sir Moses) stopped taking as active interest in it after learning that it was regarded by one of its protagonists as a means of spreading Christianity in the Holy Land. This is what he says:

...This project [Jaffa-Jerusalem line] fell to the ground when pretty far advanced in 1856, in consequence of Sir Culling Eardly telling Sir Moses Montefiore, at the close of a meeting at Count Strelecki's house, *that*

² S. Lane Poole, *Life of General Chesney*, London, 1885, p. 430.

making converts was their full expectation. On hearing this Sir Moses took his hat and gave up the affair.³

Whatever it was that occurred at that meeting at Count Strelecki's house, Sir Moses' withdrawal from the project was, it seems, not final. It is not clear from Chesney's diaries how it happened, but while he was living in London in February, 1862, he met Sir Moses daily and discussed with him the question of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway. During the same period a group of prominent and wealthy men organized themselves round Chesney and Montefiore, among them Lord Dufferin,⁴ Lord Clanricarde, Lord Monteagle and the banker, Sir Thomas Fremantle. They succeeded in attracting others to the scheme, and in March of that same year a company was set up for the construction of a Jaffa-Jerusalem railway. Sir Moses Montefiore was elected chairman of the company, and Lord Dufferin, Chesney, Cyril Graham, Thomas A. Hankey and General Sabine were elected directors. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, former British Ambassador to Constantinople, was invited to take the company under his wing but refused to do so for reasons which he gave in a private letter to Chesney, as follows:

... I can hardly doubt its [a railway between Jaffa and Jerusalem] usefulness if practicable. But I have always understood that there are considerable difficulties in the way of its execution, and one cannot help asking whether the traffic would suffice to meet the expenditure.⁵

Anxious to know whether the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway project was likely to be accepted in Turkish government circles and what the attitude of the British representatives in Turkey towards it would be, Chesney privately approached a friend of his, Sir Arthur Slade, at that time an admiral in the Turkish Navy who was close to the Sultan's court and to those wielding influence in the Turkish capital. In a letter to Slade, he described the project for building a railway in the Euphrates Valley as well as the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway project. In his reply Slade was negative on the subject of the latter, giving as his reason the damage it could cause to British and Turkish interests. Because of its special interest I quote Slade's letter below almost in its entirety:

³ *Ibid.*, p. 453. I would like to express my thanks to my friend, Dr. Kurt Grunwald, for drawing my attention to the fact that Sir Moses himself makes no mention whatsoever of this incident in his diaries.

⁴ Lord Dufferin was active as a Liberal in the political life of England, particularly in matters connected with the Irish question. In 1860 he was appointed British representative in the Joint Committee of the powers concerned with ending the crisis in the Lebanon, after which he served as a Junior Minister in various British governments and as Governor-General of Canada.

⁵ Lane Poole, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

... A company which had Lord Dufferin ... and ... you among its members, is pre-assured of its demands being regarded with favour ... by the Porte and by the British Ambassador. I am glad to hear that the idea of the Euphrates line is not abandoned. I would have been pleased if the Jaffa and Jerusalem line had been merged in it; the former will benefit unquestionably both England and Turkey, whereas a similar opinion cannot be expressed respecting the latter. Increased commerce and Arabian civilisation must flow directly from the former, but an increased pilgrimage, a higher class of pilgrims, is all that can be immediately discovered from the latter. About eighty thousand pilgrims, I believe, now annually visit the Holy City, and with the facilities afforded by a railway and a port, that number would probably be trebled, or even quadrupled, before long. There would be a repetition of the Crusades under a milder aspect, and demands for extraterritorial rights would follow. The pilgrims would chiefly belong, as now, to the Roman Catholic Church and to the Eastern Churches, with a sprinkling of Hebrews. Protestants would be too few to influence opinion on the matter. In my humble opinion, your project of the Euphrates line is the best, and all the money that can be raised for railway communication south of the Taurus should be employed there.⁶

This evaluation by an Englishman occupying a responsible position in the service of the Turkish government, and concerned at the same time with protecting British interests while guarding the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, carries echoes of the rivalry between the powers in the Middle East, and of the exploitation of the church for political ends, which was a contributory factor in the hostility between them.

IV

This is not the place to discuss the reasons why the British project for the construction of a railway in the Euphrates Valley failed to materialize, even though the Turkish government granted a concession for its execution. It is true that the failure to build the Jaffa-Jerusalem line was to a large extent due to the circumstances which had brought the larger plan to naught. It must be pointed out, however, that when the Turkish government granted the concession for the Euphrates Valley railway, it refused to grant a similar concession for the Jaffa-Jerusalem line. This was the result of pressure brought to bear on the Turkish government by the French government. Regarding Palestine as part of Greater Syria, i.e., the region traditionally considered their sphere of influence, the French were opposed to any British initiative in the area,

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 454-455.

and it was they, apparently, who stopped the Turks from responding positively to the approach of the British company dealing with the affairs of the railway.

Here I should like to refer to a memorandum drawn up about twenty years after the above events — in September, 1871 — by Thomas B. Sandwith, former British vice consul in Haifa, and submitted by him to a special parliamentary committee which that year was once again investigating the possibility of a railway in the Euphrates Valley. In that memorandum he writes as follows:

... When I was Vice-Consul in Hayfa, during the years 1861–5, the idea was started of making that town the Mediterranean terminum of such a line of railway, which would run in a pretty direct line to Bagdad, through the parallel of about 33° of north latitude. The climate of Hayfa is extremely healthy, and the advantage of such a route would consist in the presence in that town of the safest roadstead on the Syrian coast ... The line would run to the north of Mount Carmel, through the small but fertile plain of Esdraelon, across the Jordan near the south of the Sea of Tiberias, and thence through the great corn-growing district of Hawran, after which, on its way to Bagdad, it would have to face the Syrian Desert ... From the Hawran a branch line could be laid to Damascus ... and thence to Bagdad.⁷

It is interesting to observe that the route which the projected railway between Haifa and Baghdad would have had to cross was partly the route covered by the Hejaz railway built later. It would also seem that plans for the railway between Haifa and Baghdad were drawn up by the British after World War I in accordance with their rights under the Sykes-Picot agreement.⁸

In this survey I have gone into a number of details connected with the British project to construct a railway between Jaffa and Jerusalem. It was a project which did not come to fruition until a French company carried out the idea first put forward by Chesney and his colleagues.

⁷ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1872, No. 534, p. 28.

⁸ L. Stein, *The Balfour Declaration*, London, 1961, p. 264.

25. GERMAN INTERESTS AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY PALESTINE*

by MORDECHAI ELIAV

I

One of the Great Powers which showed a growing interest in Palestine during the nineteenth century was Germany. Striving to strengthen her position in Palestine, she viewed the Jewish community as a faithful support for her policy of increasing the Germanization of Palestine. Just as she fostered German Christian institutions, so Germany supported the establishment of institutions and enterprises under the auspices of German Jewry, protected the interests of immigrants of German origin, and thereby gained a key position in the development of the yishuv (Jewish community of Palestine) in the nineteenth century. From the remnants of the German consulate archives in Jerusalem one learns of the key position of the German consulate among the European consulates in Jerusalem, which, as is well known, played an important role in the life and development of the Jewish community. The activities of the German consulate greatly exceeded normal diplomatic bounds, as such activity among the Jews was considered both a means and an end in itself: a means to serve German interests in Palestine, and an end, the protection of German subjects. As time passed, changes took place in the jurisdiction and scope of this consulate, which had been established in 1842 as a Prussian consulate, became a consulate general of the *Norddeutscher Bund* in 1868, was expanded to consulate of the German Reich in 1871, and was raised to the level of consulate general early in 1914. But its active interest in the Jewish community did not change at all throughout the years. On the contrary, the consulate's activity and intervention

* This paper is mainly based on the remnants of the files of the German consulate in Jerusalem, which have been preserved by chance and are now kept in the Israel State Archives. With the kind permission of Dr. P. A. Alsberg, Director of the Archives, I have prepared a comprehensive publication of documents and letters from those files, relating to the Jews in Palestine, from the foundation of the consulate (1842) to the outbreak of the First World War. This collection, which may be regarded as an important source for research of the history of the *yishuv* (Jewish community of Palestine), has been published (1973) by Tel Aviv University and Hakibbutz Hameuhad: "Die Juden Palästinas in der Deutschen Politik" (2 vols).

increased under the inspiration of the Berlin government and under instructions from the Embassy in Istanbul, and it played an important role as an initiating, assisting, and encouraging factor in various aspects of the Jewish community's life, as part of its attempt to elevate Germany's position in Palestine and the entire Middle East.

The renewed activity of the Great Powers in Palestine from the early 1840's, based on political and religious interests, resulted in the creation of diplomatic missions which could exploit the capitulatory rights in Palestine as well. These rights had placed the Powers in a privileged position in the Ottoman Empire, from the sixteenth century onward, by granting the consuls extensive legal and political authority.¹ As early as the Egyptian conquest, when the administration of Palestine was improved and the non-Muslim population increased, the Powers had aspired to wedge their way into Palestine in order to protect their subjects and compete with one another for the status of protector of Christian interests in the Holy Land, thus increasing their influence in the Ottoman Empire, which appeared to be on the verge of collapse. The Great Powers had never had such an opportune moment to seize control in Palestine as they had in 1840, when the future of Syria and Palestine was placed on the negotiating table; but the result was just the opposite: the European Powers helped strengthen Turkish control in Palestine, and restricted themselves to establishing consulates in the country as privileged strongholds of power under the Capitulations, which were thereafter fully exploited.²

The first to set up a consulate in Jerusalem was England, which had already considered the matter in 1834. In March 1839 the consulate was opened, under a vice consul, W. T. Young, who was promoted to consul in

¹ On the capitulations see: Nasim Sousa, *The Capitulatory Régime of Turkey, its History, Origins and Nature*, Baltimore, 1933; Walter Lehmann, *Die Kapitulationen* Weimar, 1917; Frh. Alfred von Overbeck, *Die Kapitulationen des Osmanischen Reiches*, Breslau, 1917. The German Consul, Dr. Friedrich Rosen, who lived in Jerusalem during his childhood describes in his memoirs the status of the consuls in the following words: "... for after God the consuls were the highest persons in Palestine; even the Pascha was not quite so much revered by the inhabitants." (Friedrich Rosen, *Oriental Memoirs*, London, 1930, p. 9.) A similar view was taken by the British Ambassador in Istanbul in 1859: "Many of the foreign consuls, including our own, have been in the habit of assuming the function of government, of dictating to the pashas arbitrarily the line of conduct to be pursued in internal matters ... [all of which] has gone towards annihilating the power of the provincial Governors (FO 78/1637, cited in *Ott. Reform*, p. 24).

² M. S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question (1774-1923)*, London, 1966; N. Verney/G. Dambmann, *Les puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie et en Palestine*, Paris, 1900.

1841.³ Before his arrival in Jerusalem, he was officially informed, in Lord Palmerston's name, that he was to display special interest in the Jewish population and grant it general protection. The consulate was established in order to strengthen British influence in Palestine,⁴ and, due to the lack of a Protestant community in the country, the Jews were regarded as a reasonable base of operations and counter-balance to the Catholics and Orthodox, whose traditional patrons were France and Russia. Early in 1841, Palmerston proposed the establishment of a British Protectorate for the Jews in Palestine, but this proposal was emphatically rejected. Palmerston was interested in any move which would increase British influence, and this well thought out policy was also forwarded by the activity of the British Mission, which had already served as a bridge-head for the penetration of British influence in Palestine.⁵

The second Power which was hereafter to display an interest in the situation in Palestine was Prussia. The first friendship pact between Prussia and Turkey was signed in 1761 by Friedrich the Great (*Capitulation ou traité d'amitié et du commerce*), out of purely political motives. The two Powers considered themselves allies against Austria and Russia in the Seven Years War. Yet this treaty did not have an immediate effect on Palestine, and only after the termination of Egyptian rule did Prussia arise as an active factor in the country. King Friedrich Wilhelm IV, a man of romantic religious views, who rose to power in 1840, had shown an interest ever since his youth in the position of the Christians in the Holy Land and had supported their missionary ambitions. In discussions on the future of Palestine, he proposed establishing a joint European protectorate over the holy cities in Palestine, while promising national autonomy for the various Christian sects and protection for the Jews. This plan was soon dropped, due to the strong opposition of Austria and Russia, who wished to prevent any increase of Protestant influence in Palestine.⁶ At about the same time, Helmuth von

³ See the introduction in: Albert M. Hyamson: *The British Consulate in Jerusalem (1838-1914)*, 2 vols., London, 1939.

⁴ M. Vereté, "Why was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?" *Zion* (Hebrew), XXVI (1961), pp. 215-237; *Br. Interests*, pp. 31ff.; I. Friedman, "Lord Palmerston and the Protection of the Jews in Palestine," *Jewish Social Studies*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (1968), pp. 14-25.

⁵ The activities of the British missionaries have been extensively described by W. T. Gidney, *History of the London Society for Promoting Christianity amongst the Jews*, London, 1908, Chaps. XI, XVIII, XXII, XXV. See also Tibawi, *op. cit.*

⁶ Lucien Wolf, *Notes on the Diplomatic History of the Jewish Question*, London, 1919, pp. 114-119; N. M. Gelber, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Zionismus*, Wien, 1927, pp. 157-162; A. Hyamson, "British Projects for the Restoration of the Jews," *Publications of the American Jewish Historical Society*, 1918.

Moltke, military envoy to Turkey from 1835 to 1839, made public a plan to turn Palestine into a "buffer state between Turkey and Egypt, preferably under German control."⁷ The plan suggested placing the Holy Land under a sovereign prince, who would be German. While there was little enthusiasm for the proposal, which emphasized, *inter alia*, the importance of Asiatic Turkey as a natural inter-continental land bridge and stressed its strategic importance, von Moltke must still be considered one of the first exponents of Pan-Germanism, and he used Germany's advantages over England and France as an argument in the struggle to gain decisive influence in the Sultan's court.

Through the initiative of British missionary circles in London and of the Prussian diplomat Baron Josias von Bunsen, the road was paved for co-operation between the Protestant Powers to establish a Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem. The Prussian King supported the plan and, in April 1841, Bunsen was sent to London to work for its implementation.⁸

Among his activities was the presentation of a memorandum stressing that "many Jews and Christians in Protestant Germany are longing to settle in Palestine." The Prussian King's envoy was speaking, therefore, in the name of all of Protestant Germany. Negotiations led to an agreement (in August 1841) whereby a jointly financed bishopric would be established in Jerusalem, to be administered by a bishop who would be alternately appointed by the British and Prussian governments, and who would be subordinate to the Archbishop of Canterbury. The purpose of this plan was to turn Jerusalem into an important Protestant religious centre. In the Archbishop of Canterbury's declaration of 9 December 1841, the opening of the bishopric was defined as a step toward *rapprochement* between the Protestant churches, with the conversion of Jews specifically mentioned as a principle aim of the bishopric, as well as the desire to serve as a support for Protestants wishing to settle in Palestine.⁹ The assumption was that a large number of Englishmen and Germans would be attracted to the Holy Land by religious sentiments.¹⁰ It should be noted that the agreement between the two countries

⁷ Moltke published his proposal in the *Augsburger Zeitung* in 1841 (cited by Evans Lewin, *The German Road to the East*, London, 1916, p. 23). For Moltke's reminiscences of his mission in Turkey see: H. von Moltke, *Briefe über Zustände und Begebenheiten in der Türkei, aus den Jahren 1835-1839*, Berlin, 1841.

⁸ See: Frances Bunsen, *Memoir of Baron Bunsen*, London, 1868, I, 593 ff; W. Hochler, *The Jerusalem Bishopric*, London, 1883, I, 25-27, II, 3-19. See also the two recent detailed monographs: W. Höcker, *Der Gesandte Bunsen als Vermittler zwischen Deutschland und England*, Göttingen, 1951; K. Schmidt-Clausen, *Vorweggenommene Einheit (Die Gründung des Bistums Jerusalem im Jahre 1841)*, Berlin-Hamburg, 1965, 90 ff.

⁹ Hochler, *op. cit.*, II, 111-113.

¹⁰ Bunsen wrote in his memorandum that "zahlreiche Juden und Christen im pro-

put the Anglican Church and British interests at a clear advantage, while most of the financial burden was placed on Prussia's shoulders. This amazingly indulgent attitude on part of Prussia caused increasing bitterness, and in the eighties the agreement was nullified, the bishopric became Anglican only, and the German Protestants established their own religious community.

In spite of the opposition of the Catholic Powers and Russia, it was decided to open the bishopric immediately. Michael Alexander Salomon — a converted Jew — was appointed as the first bishop and began his work on 21 January 1842.¹¹ In spite of opposition by the British consulate, he declared upon arrival that his mission was primarily to the Jews. From the beginning, the bishopric and its church, which was called "Hebrew Christ Church," took on an Anglican character. Only a few German Christians belonged to the community, but in the course of time their number increased, so that by the eighties, before their break from the bishopric, they constituted a majority of the community, while most of the "English" members were Jewish converts — the fruit of the Mission's endeavours.¹²

The Prussian government decided not to content itself with a joint religious project and thus took an additional step — establishing an independent consular mission. Upon Bunsen's recommendation, the young orientalist E. G. Schultz was appointed vice consul of Syria and Palestine, on 20 May 1842, with Jerusalem his headquarters.¹³ Shortly after the establishment of the Prussian consulate, additional consulates were opened in Jerusalem; in 1843 by France and Sardinia; in 1844 by the United States (a third Protestant consulate!); and in 1849 by Austria. Russia was, for the time being, the only Great Power which had not established a consulate in

testantischen Deutschland wünschen, sich in Palästina niederzulassen" (Wolf, *op. cit.*, p. 116).

¹¹ Alexander was born in 1798 in Schönlanke (Posen), converted in 1825 at London. The report on him as a candidate stressed: "By race an Israelite, born a Prussian, confession: Church of England, for twenty years Professor of Hebrew and Arabic at King's College." (Bunsen, *op. cit.*, p. 608.) Alexander died suddenly in 1845 and was buried in Jerusalem.

¹² For a detailed description of the formative years of the Bishopric, see the articles by Jean-Michel Hornus, "L'évêché anglo-prusse à Jérusalem (1841-1881) et les controverses autour de sa création," *POC*, XIII, 130-149, 234-258; XIV, 184-207, 307-334; XV, 295-297.

¹³ Ernst Gustav Schultz (1811-1851), orientalist and archaeologist, was appointed in 1838, when he was only 27 years old, as a lecturer for oriental literature at the University of Königsberg. In 1841, while staying in London, he became acquainted with Bunsen, who recommended him for the office. See the obituary in Philipp Wolff, *Jerusalem*, Leipzig, 1857, pp. 204-217.

Jerusalem, but restricted herself to a consulate general in Beirut and a consulate in Jaffa. The establishment of six consulates in Jerusalem in such a short time was a decisive turning point in the position of the non-Muslim population, and in particular aided the progress of the Jewish community, which until then had lived in distress and great poverty. The establishment of the consulates had been primarily intended, of course, for the efficient protection of the Christians against maltreatment and persecution; but, no less than the Christians, the Jewish community profited from the consulates, for it had been their fate to suffer attacks on their person and property throughout the years. They looked forward to the end of persecutions and corruption, when it became known to all that the highly placed consul observed everything, and that any act against his subjects would be punished most severely.

The choice of Schultz as the first Prussian representative was most fortunate; the young scholar had already acquired a reputation, knew Arabic and Hebrew, had charming manners, and was unprejudiced. Schultz began his work eagerly, especially attracting Jews of German origin, who had organized themselves in 1837 as the "*Hod*" (*Holland und Deutschland*) *Kolel*, the first particularist association in the Ashkenazi community. He also assisted the Jewish community as a whole to a great extent, and in a few years the Prussian consulate had become a very influential factor in Jerusalem. In addition to Jews of German origin who benefited from its protection, Jews without citizenship requested the patronage of the Prussian consul. The consul's aim was to increase the number of people under his patronage, and therefore he did not scrutinize the authenticity of documents presented to him by Jews who were not necessarily of German origin. Thus protection was also granted to Sephardi Jews, whose names indicated their origin and who knew no German at all. In the summer of 1841, Schultz was promoted to consul after an extensive visit to Germany, which he also used for an exciting lecture tour on the Holy Land. The scope of the consulate's activities was broadened by the appointment of a consular agent in Jaffa, the Armenian S. Murad, who served in this post for many years and was later promoted to vice consul. Yet Schultz did not last long in office, and died suddenly in 1851.

Actually, the Prussian consulate represented the other Protestant states in Germany and protected the interests of Dutch citizens. The Catholic states — especially Bavaria — were also interested in the Holy Places and in establishing a foothold in Palestine. In 1843 the "Custody for the Holy Land" was revived, and in Bavaria a fund-raising campaign was launched for the benefit of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Austria and Bavaria sent a special delegation to Palestine in 1845. This delegation prepared a detailed program

for purchasing buildings and establishing Catholic institutions for the "*Erhebung des Christentums im Heiligen Lande*."¹⁴ Yet, because of the 1848 disorders, the implementation of this program was postponed. When the Austrian consulate was established in 1849, it took upon itself the task of representing the Catholic states of Germany. This arrangement continued until the creation of the German *Reich*, when the Jerusalem consulate represented all the states of the *Reich*.

II

The consuls who served in Jerusalem from 1852 to 1880 did their best to increase German influence in Palestine. They were apparently chosen most carefully, as their success proves. The second consul, Dr. Georg Rosen, was from the diplomatic service and was also an orientalist who was well known for his scholarly works.¹⁵ Rosen was close to Jewish affairs, as he was a childhood friend of a rabbi and a Jewish newspaper editor in Germany.¹⁶ Shortly before his arrival in Jerusalem, Rosen married a young Jewess, and it was no surprise that during his long service in Jerusalem (1852–1867) he became a true friend of the Jewish community, granting it help in times of distress and aiding its development. He was succeeded in Jerusalem by the well-known scholar, Professor Heinrich Petermann,¹⁷ under whom the consulate was expanded to the representation of the *Norddeutscher Bund*. Although Petermann remained in Jerusalem for only about a year, the continuation of his predecessor's policies was greatly appreciated since he forcefully intervened several times on behalf of his protégés and supported the *yishuv* at difficult times. The fourth consul was Baron von Alten, also a veteran professional diplomat.¹⁸ This consul, who served in Jerusalem from

¹⁴ G. Meinertz, "Ein Jahrhundert Kampf um den Besitz und die Erhaltung der heiligen Stätten," *Das Heilige Land*, Vol. III (1941), p. 243.

¹⁵ Georg Rosen (1820–1891), orientalist and archaeologist, translated Turkish and Arabic books. During his office in Jerusalem, he published *Geschichte der Türkei* (1826–1856), 2 vols., 1866–1867, and a booklet on the Temple Mount. Shortly before his death he worked on a comprehensive study on "Juden und Phönizier," trying to prove their amalgamation and to establish a new explanation for the extent of the Jewish diaspora. His son Friedrich continued the work of his deceased father and published this book in 1929.

¹⁶ Rabbi Dr. Abraham Treuenfels (1819–1879), born in Frankfurt, after 1860 Rabbi at Stettin. He published many studies on Judaica. He founded and edited the *Israelitische Wochenschrift*. On his relations with Rosen see *Israelitische Wochenschrift*, 1872, No. 30.

¹⁷ Julius Heinrich Petermann (1801–1876), Professor of Semitics at the University of Berlin, travelled many times throughout Asia and the Near East and published various books on these journeys.

¹⁸ Karl Viktor von Alten (1800–1879) was a diplomat of the Kingdom of Hanover and its envoy in Russia. After the annexation of Hanover by Prussia, Alten was transferred to

1869-1873, worked strenuously to strengthen his ties with the Jewish community in Palestine and with German Jews who actively supported the *yishuv*. Alten's dynamic personality left its mark on the consulate's activities, which were hereafter greatly expanded. Alten also intervened much more frequently than his predecessors in the internal affairs of the *yishuv*, because of a strong feeling for the Jews; he tried to improve their condition, aid their economic recovery and raise their cultural level. During his term of office the status of the consulate was strengthened since it represented the German *Reich*, which was steadily increasing its political importance in the East, by diligently establishing consular representation in Jaffa and Haifa.

The fifth consul was Baron Thankmar von Münchhausen, who arrived in Jerusalem after having served in the German Embassy in Istanbul.¹⁹ While he distinguished himself by his energy and activeness, he tended, even more than his predecessors, to intervene in Jewish affairs out of a desire to hasten the Germanization of the Jewish community. If Alten acted with moderation and out of true friendship, Münchhausen acted aggressively and almost impatiently. In reading the consulate's documents, written and stylized by the two consuls, one cannot escape the conclusion that Alten was driven by a desire for justice and an honest wish to improve the living conditions of the *yishuv*, while Münchhausen was primarily concerned with German interests in the area. The Jewish community indeed served as an efficient instrument in strengthening these interests, but in his arguments there often echoes a hostile, almost anti-Semitic tone. Yet this approach did not detract from the importance of his work during his term of office (1874-1881), when he was particularly successful in speeding up the modernization of Jewish education.

During these thirty years the German Christian community also developed at a rapid pace — with the active help of the consulate, of course. During Rosen's terms of office a hospice was set up for pilgrims. In addition, health and welfare institutions for the Arab population were established by the religious order *Kaiserwerther Diakonissen*, which began its activities in 1851, and later established a large educational institution for female Arab orphans which was called *Talitha Kumi*. At the same time, the *Syrisches Waisenhaus* for male Arab orphans was established in 1860, directed by the Rev. Ludwig Schneller. The institution derived its name from the orphans who were

the Prussian diplomatic service. Alten was also an archaeologist, one of the founders of the "Deutscher Palästinaverein" and published various studies on Jerusalem in the first volumes of the *Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina Vereins*.

¹⁹ Münchhausen (1835-1909) is mentioned by J. M. von Radowitz, *Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen*, Stuttgart, 1925, I, 235. In 1881 he was appointed to the consulate at Kiev, but after some years left the diplomatic service.

taken in after the massacres of Christians in Syria the same year. At the end of Rosen's term of office, the Templars launched their activities in Palestine. They were eventually to become the centre of German activity in Palestine, and their success in settlement served more than once as an encouraging example to Jewish settlement attempts, especially from the eighties onwards.²⁰

When the law of 16 June 1867 granting foreign subjects "the right to acquire both urban and rural property in all parts of the Ottoman Empire, on equal terms with Ottoman Subjects acquiring lands" was confirmed in June of 1868, the road was open for agricultural settlement by the Germans, who were — and remained afterwards — the only Christians who actively settled in Palestine. On 7 June 1869, Prussia, on behalf of the *Norddeutscher Bund*, signed a special treaty with Turkey, permitting Germans to settle in Palestine. At a rapid pace, settlements were set up — in 1869, in the former American Colony in Jaffa and in Haifa; 1871 — Sarona, north of Jaffa; 1872 — Emek Refa'im, outside the walls of the Old City of Jerusalem; and in the nineties Walhalla near Jaffa and Neuhardtshof near Haifa.

Additional health and welfare institutions were also established in Jerusalem during these years: in 1867 a hospital for lepers (an essential institution since there was no care for lepers in the city); and in 1872 a children's hospital, Marienstift. From the 1860's on, the *Jerusalemsverein* carried out missionary activities among the Arabs, especially in Bethlehem, Bayt Jālā, Hebron, Haifa and Jaffa. With the increase of German settlers, a network of schools was set up in the various cities.

At the end of the 1870's, the German Catholics also renewed their efforts, by establishing the *Palästinaverein der Katholiken Deutschlands*, which was intended to ensure the interests of the German Catholics in Palestine, to build a hospice with a church and school, and to increase missionary activity among the local population. According to the consular report of 1880, the total number of German subjects in Palestine that year reached 1358, of which 702 were in Jerusalem, 414 in the Jaffa area and 242 in the Haifa area. These figures included about 300 Jews (protégés who were not subjects were not included, as explained below).²¹

²⁰ On the development of the German institutions and settlements see: H. Rohde, *Deutschland in Vorderasien*, Berlin, 1916, p. 105 ff; V. Cramer, *Ein Jahrhundert deutscher Katholische Palästina mission 1855-1955*, Köln, 1956; K. Goetz, *Das Deutschtum in Palästina*, Mitteilungen der Deutschen Akademie, München, 1931, pp. 291-337; H. Brugger, *Die Deutschen Siedlungen in Palästina*, Bern, 1908.

²¹ Annual Report of 1880 (I. S. A. File; A XXXIX/4).

III

The consul's activities on behalf of the Jewish community was most varied, mixing humanitarian aims with German interests to strengthen their influence. With Rosen's help, homes for needy families (*Batei Mahseh*) were built in the Old City of Jerusalem. This was the first Jewish venture at building a neighbourhood in Jerusalem in order to ease the housing problem for families of limited means. Rosen saw this project as an important means of increasing German influence, as its founders were German immigrants, and most of the funds for sustaining and enlarging the new quarter came from Germany, through a central committee in Berlin under the direction of Rabbi Ezriel Hildesheimer. From the start, the project was of German character, and the area was even called popularly "*Der deutsche Platz*." By the end of the nineteenth century, the project already included about 100 dwellings, which were given cost-free to needy families, and was considered because of its facilities, cleanliness and order, the pride of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.²²

Rosen also worked toward easing the distress in 1866, when heavy famine and plague were rampant in the city. Under his leadership, a welfare committee was organized by the various consuls. He also assisted the fund-raising campaign for the completion of the central synagogue at the "*Hurva* (Ruin) of Rabbi Yehuda the Pious," and supported the Ashkenazim in their struggle over the right to separate ritual slaughter from the Sepharadim. The Ashkenazim saw their request fulfilled, thanks to the energetic help of Rosen and other consuls.²³

The German policy toward the Jewish community is well reflected in the informative argument between the consul von Alten and the Embassy in Istanbul concerning the scope of German protection over the Jews. The Germans had always followed the practice common among European consulates of giving their protection not only to their own subjects but also to others, who were called *Schutzbefohlene* and who received appropriate documents as *de facto* protégés. In 1866, Dr. Rosen removed certain people from the list of protégés, reasoning that they were not entitled to the consulate's protection because of the uncertainty of their origin; but they appealed the action before the Embassy in Istanbul and the government in Berlin. Some were permitted to remain on the list, and only a small number were removed.

Alten decided to continue the policy of his predecessor, attempting to

²² M. Eliav, *Love of Zion and Men of Hod* (German Jewry and the Settlement of Eretz-Israel in the Nineteenth Century), Tel Aviv, 1970 (Hebrew), Chap. 10.

²³ I. S. A. File: A XXXIII/4 ... "Jüdische Schächtereien" (1867-1913).

restrict the number of people receiving protection to members of the "*Hod*" *Kolel* and those connected with them, i.e., he wanted to make the consular protection conditional upon a Jew's membership in the separate organization of German immigrants, or at least to have their approval. Alten also based his reasoning on the instructions to consuls concerning protection in the Ottoman Empire which states that aside from actual German subjects, *de facto* protection would be given only to descendents of the *Reich* states or to officials of the consulate and their families. He accordingly removed from the list a considerable number of Jews whose German origin was dubious. The Embassy in Istanbul was, however, of a different opinion, since for political reasons it was interested in increasing the number of its protégés as much as possible. Alten was forced to accept its verdict, and returned German protection to the appellants, following direct instructions from the office of the *Bundes-kanzler* (about half a year before the establishment of the German *Reich*) specifically stating "dass die Belassung des Norddeutschen Schutzes an die im Pfortengebiete lebenden Juden ... bei nochmaliger Erwägung der Sache aus politischen Gründen für zweckmässig befunden worden sind."²⁴

According to the consulate's survey of the protégés in Palestine, 21 June 1872, the German consulate was patron to 210 subjects and 987 protégés, as opposed to the 250 subjects and 950 protégés of the Austrian consulate, 180 subjects and 720 protégés of the British consulate, and only 50 subjects and 170 protégés of the Russian consulate. Among the foreign subjects there was a considerable number of Christians, while the protégés in Jerusalem were primarily Jews. Among the protégés of the German consulate there were, however, already a large number of Templars and their followers. It follows, then, that while the German consulate had the largest number of protégés, the Austrians and British exceeded the Germans in the number of Jews under their patronage.²⁵

Alten did much for the development of the *Batei Mahseh* and the "*Hod*" *Kolel*, and even intervened actively in matters of the *haluka* (money collected abroad for sustaining the *yishuv* in Palestine), until he proposed taking supervision of the distribution of funds raised in Germany into his own hands — a proposal which had far-reaching implications even in the minds of those opposed to the *haluka* system.²⁶ When Alten became aware of the

²⁴ I. S. A. File: A XVII/16.

²⁵ I. S. A. File: A XV/1.

²⁶ His memorandum of 10.1.1872 (I. S. A. File: A XXXIII/1) was submitted to the German government, and a copy was sent to Rabbi Hildesheimer, who was very reserved in his answer, rejecting the idea of the consul's interference with a purely internal Jewish problem.

cool response to his proposal, which was no doubt prompted by a *bona fide* desire to eliminate corruption, he withdrew his plan and did not try to interfere in this delicate matter again. Thanks to his recommendation, official German protection was granted to the *Bikur Holim* Hospital in 1871, which was thereafter called *Deutsch-Israelitisches* Hospital. In this matter, as well, the German consul did not want to miss the chance to extend German influence to an additional Jewish institution, and thereafter the German consul acted as patron of the hospital and even intervened occasionally in its administration or appointments to the board of directors.

In December 1870, Alten became famous in the Jewish world because of his forceful intervention in a blood-libel incident which took place in Jerusalem. His immediate action resulted in the clarification of the deliberately false accusation and the punishment of the responsible parties. Leaders of Germany's Orthodox Jewry thanked the consul for his energetic defense, in which he revealed himself as a "einen so edlen, väterlichen Freund, der in dem Kampf für Kultur und Menschenrechte in den vordersten Reihen stehe."²⁷ In honour of Germany's victory over France, and on the birthday of the Kaiser and members of his family as well as other German holidays, special festive prayers were held in the synagogue of the "*Hod*" *Kolel*, accompanied by speeches of the consul and vice consul, who stressed the close ties between the consulate and its protégés. Especially important and interesting are the consuls' activities in the field of Jewish education. Rosen was the first to note the need for new educational institutions, according to the format of European schools. Alten continued this policy, when a programme for establishing a Jewish orphanage in Jerusalem was suggested in 1872. When a committee was set up in Berlin for this purpose, Alten was requested to issue a statement on the pressing need for such an institution, for "Ihr Verdienst um die Förderung und Hebung der sozialen Lage der Israeliten Palästinas ist unter den deutschen Juden so bekannt." Furthermore, his opinion was considered most important because: "Ihr gewichtiges Wort ... besonders nützlich gegen die Angriffe der Ihnen bekannten, unverbesserlichen Partei der jüdischen Fanatiker, welchen normale Erziehung der jüdischen Kinder im Heiligen Lande als verdammenstwert erscheint."²⁸

The orphanage was actually erected only under Alten's successor, Baron von Münchhausen, who also actively supported the project, and another

²⁷ I. S. A. File: A XXXIII/1. This letter was signed by Rabbis Jacob Ettlinger, S. B. Bamberger and Ezriel Hildesheimer.

²⁸ See in detail: Eliav, *op. cit.*, Chaps. 3 and 13. The extensive correspondence on this subject is in I. S. A. File: A XXXIII/1.

educational institution of a decidedly German nature was constructed in Jerusalem. Münchhausen made great efforts to modernize Jewish education, striving for a modern format and German as the language of instruction to serve as a base for increasing Germanization. He also planned to send youths from Palestine to Germany for advanced studies, especially for training as teachers, since he considered this the most efficient way to modernize Jewish education. The consul also tried to persuade heads of families in the "*Hod*" *Kolel* to transfer their children to the modern schools, which had been boycotted by more fanatical circles, and hinted that future protection would be conditional upon the teaching of German. This experiment was, however, unsuccessful: most members of the "*Hod*" *Kolel* continued to give their children a traditional education.²⁹ From the many letters which Münchhausen wrote on questions of education,³⁰ we see how close this problem was to his heart, as he saw in modern education of youth a means "zu frommen Israeliten, aber rechtlichen und tüchtigen Staatsbürgern erziehe," and repeated many times his view concerning the link between modern education and the granting of protection: "Wenn Sie aber den Schutz eines grossen und wahrhaften Culturstaaes geniessen wollen, so mögen sie sich auch dessen würdig zeigen."³¹

When Münchhausen left Jerusalem in November 1881, after seven years of service, he could sum up with considerable satisfaction his efforts in the field of Jewish education. Although he did not succeed in persuading most of his protégés to send their children to a modern school, he did succeed in breaking the barrier of resistance. From the beginning of the 1880's, the number of Ashkenazim desiring modern education for their sons grew steadily, to no small extent thanks to the consul's activities. His ambitions were, however, aimed not at improving education as such, but rather at deepening German influence through it. The orphanage, which was later united with the Lâmel School, paved the way for the growth of the widespread educational network of the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden*, which

²⁹ In their reaction to the consul's suggestion, the leaders of the "*Hod*" *Kolel* stated that there was no need for schools, "as the Consul of Prussia demanded" and added an illuminating remark: "Wollte man dem Willen des Konsuls hierin nachkommen, müsste man so viel Schulen errichten, wie es Konsulate gibt, denn jeder Konsul würde seiner Nationalität besonderen Status geben wollen, und die heilige Stadt erhielte solch eine Aufhäufung von Sprachen, dass am Ende einer die Sprache des andern nicht mehr hören könnte." It seems that the men of the "*Hod*" were well aware of the real intentions of the consul. Their letter was published in the Hebrew newspaper *Halevanon*, XV, No. 50.

³⁰ I. S. A. Files: A XXXIII/2, A XXXIII/3.

³¹ Letter of 14.3.1877 to the Editor of the *Israelit*, published in the newspaper (1877, No. 16).

became an important factor in the twentieth century for the strengthening of German interests in Palestine.

IV

From the 1880's onward, German interests in Palestine expanded and Germany's ties with the Jewish community, notably with German immigrants, grew stronger, especially in the areas of education and religion.³² The sixth consul, Dr. Julius Reitz, also a professional diplomat, was entirely different from his two predecessors in his attitude toward the Jewish community in Palestine. While he also showed great interest in his protégés, protecting them forcefully when necessary, he usually kept to the field of normal diplomatic activity, avoiding initiation of his own programmes as well as intervention in internal affairs. In the four years he served (1882 to the end of 1885) the consulate's economic activities increased, with the participation of members of the Jewish community. The consul's aid to the settlers of Petaḥ Tikva at a time when the Turkish administration was plotting against the settlement is of special note. The German subjects among the Petaḥ Tikva settlers succeeded in spurring the consulate to action, and due to its forceful stand, the Turks ceased to bother the settlement after years of suffering and irritation. The Petaḥ Tikva affair proved that only through the protection of the consuls was it possible to establish and develop Jewish settlement, for "had it not been for the consuls, the Jews could not have been here even one day."³³

Reitz was the first to report on restriction of immigration in Palestine, which increased during the eighties, and displayed great concern that the interests of the immigrants from Germany would not be threatened. This policy was continued by his successor, Dr. Paul von Tischendorf, who stayed in Jerusalem thirteen years (1886–1899).³⁴ This consul, who was renowned as

³² In 1885 the scientific work of the Deutsche Verein für Erforschung Palästinas also started as a counterpoise to the British Palestine Exploration Fund. Both societies served political aims as well, and the German society especially endeavoured to increase German influence.

³³ On the Petaḥ Tikva affair see the special I. S. A. File: BI/139. Reitz even threatened the Pasha of Jerusalem with the personal intervention of Bismarck if the aggression against the colonists did not cease. See also M. Eliav (ed.), *Rabbi Esriel Hildesheimer ... Briefe*, Jerusalem, 1965, p. 192 ff.

³⁴ Paul von Tischendorf was the son of the well-known scholar Constantin von Tischendorf, who published an interesting book on his travels in Palestine (*Aus dem Heiligen Land*, Leipzig, 1862), and became famous as the discoverer of the *Codex Sinaiticus* and other manuscripts of the Bible. Paul von Tischendorf (1847–1915) was an orientalist and a diplomat, and served as a dragoman in Constantinople until his appointment to Jerusalem; he was promoted to consul general in 1898 and after thirteen years of service in Jerusalem became consul general at Algiers.

a scholar and orientalist, greatly aided the activities of German Jews, but, like his predecessor, avoided unnecessary intervention in the internal affairs of the *yishuv*. He safeguarded German interests and the well-being of his protégés carefully, helped in establishing the *Sha'arei Tzedek* Hospital in Jerusalem (founded by German Jews), and fought against all discrimination resulting from prohibitions against entering the country and purchasing land.³⁵ In 1894, he succeeded in obtaining a partial cancellation of laws prohibiting the purchase of land and was thus able to report with satisfaction to the embassy that: "betreffs Grunderwerb seit dem Herbst vorigen Jahres Klagen seitens Reichsangehörigen oder Schutzgenossen nicht mehr zu meiner Kenntnis gelangt sind. In den nicht sehr häufigen Fällen, wo es sich um Käufe von Land seitens deutscher Israeliten handelte, hat die behördliche Umschreibung ohne weitere Umstände stattgefunden."³⁶ As implied in a later letter, the other consuls did not lift a finger in this matter and did not intervene on behalf of the Jewish community. Because they were interested in buying land for the Christian institutions, they strove to rid themselves of unwanted competitors, and to prevent a rise in real estate prices.³⁷ This stand did not escape the *yishuv*, which was grateful to the German consulate for its impartial help.

In February 1899, Dr. Friedrich Rosen (1856–1935), the son of the Second consul Georg Rosen and an almost-native of Jerusalem, was appointed consul. Like his father, he excelled in linguistics and was known as a leading orientalist. Rosen was a distinguished diplomat, who later rose to the high echelons of the German Foreign Service.³⁸ He served almost two years in Jerusalem, apparently not establishing real contact with the Jewish community. In his book *Oriental Memoirs* (London, 1930), between the lines, he accuses the new Jewish settlement and increasing Jewish immigration of modernizing Palestine, which was not to his liking; and he condemns Zionism in general from the viewpoint

³⁵ Correspondence with the Embassy in Constantinople and the Turkish authorities in I. S. A. Files: A XXII/16, A III/14. The questions of immigration and purchase of land are described in detail in the dissertation by N. J. Mandel, *Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882–1914*, Oxford, 1965 (Ms).

³⁶ Letter of 20.4.1894, I. S. A. File: A XXII/Z8. But the prohibition on the purchase of *miri* land was upheld.

³⁷ "... durch Beseitigung des jüdischen Elements als einen kapitalkräftigen Käufers einen lästigen Konkurrenten loszuwerden und das von Jahr zu Jahr zunehmende Steigern der Bodenpreise möglichst zu verhindern" (Report of Tischendorf, 19.6.1897 — I. S. A. File: AIII/15, vol. 1).

³⁸ He stayed in the diplomatic service until the twenties, and was even appointed as Foreign Minister for a few months in 1921. See: Ernst Laubach, *Die Politik der Kabinette Wirth*, Lübeck-München, 1968; H. Müller-Werth, Friedrich Rosen, Wiesbaden, 1969.

of German interests. However, when he was asked about the proposal to establish the *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden* and its plan to set up schools in Palestine, he expressed a favorable view, regarding this plan as a means to prevent the growth of French influence in Palestine and to strengthen the spread of German language and culture, which in his opinion, was on the decline among the Jewish community.³⁹ Under the last consul before World War I, Eduard Schmidt (1901–1916), who had previously served as vice consul in Jaffa, decisive changes were made in Germany's policy toward the Ottoman Empire. The goals of the Kaiser's policy required economic and social penetration in all parts of the Ottoman Empire and strengthening of military ties. Germany became the *Meistbegünstigte Nation* and expansion programmes were planned in all fields through keen competition with the other powers. The "traditional friendship" was strengthened by the official visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine — a voyage which took on great political significance. The powerful growth of German influence in Palestine fitted in well with the general political trends.

To the five settlements founded in the nineteenth century were added Wilhelma (1902), Bethlehem (1906) and Waldheim (1907). These eight settlements contained nearly 1400 inhabitants by 1910. The activities of religious institutions were expanded. The Catholic mission of the *Palästinaverein* opened a series of schools for the non-Jewish population, bought land in in Tabgah and Emaeus and, in 1895, all the Catholics were organized in a general organization, called the *Deutscher Verein vom Heiligen Land*, which succeeded in increasing German Catholic influence in Palestine. Through the arbitration of Wilhelm II, the organization received the holy site of the Dormition on Mount Zion and built there a splendid church, inaugurated in 1910, and near it, a Benedictine monastery. A large hospice named for St. Paul was built in front of the Damascus Gate, and near it, research and scientific institutes. A large number of monks and nuns were engaged in extensive missionary work.

The Protestant institutions also expanded to a considerable extent. In 1894 a hospital was opened in the New City under the auspices of the *Kaiserwerther Diakonissen* who, between 1907 and 1910, also founded an institution on the Mount of Olives know as *Kaiserin Augusta Viktoria-Stiftung*. (During World War I it was argued that this institution was actually established for military purposes, since it, as well as the highly fortified buildings of the Dormition Church and St. Paul's Hospice, overlooked the entire city. *The German Road to the East*, (London, 1916), by Evans Lewin,

³⁹ Letter to the Embassy of 9.8.1900 (I. S. A. File: A III/18).

bears the characteristic subtitle: "An Account of the 'Drang nach Osten' and of Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East.")

Economic activity was also expanded, and the importance of the German Christian community greatly exceeded its numerical strength. It may be credited with considerable progress in mechanizing agriculture, improving transportation, developing crafts, hotel-keeping and light trade, and increasing import and export. Upon the creation in 1897 of the Palästina-Bank as a branch of the "Deutsche Orient-Bank", with a capital fund of 100,000 Marks "zur Förderung der deutschen Wirtschaftsinteressen und zur Beschäftigung mit allen mit ihnen verbundenen Geschäften," a most valuable monetary instrument was added — the first foreign banking institution established in Palestine.⁴⁰

During the Kaiser's visit to Palestine, an observer participating in the visit wrote with exaggeration: "Kein Volk hat so zahlreiche Ansiedlungen im Heiligen Lande aufzuweisen wie das Deutsche, und der Einfluss durch Schulen und Verkehr auf das Volksleben hat bewirkt, dass keine ausländische Sprache in Palästina von so vielen verstanden und gesprochen wird wie die deutsche."⁴¹ Even the French authors Verney and Dambmann pointed out, in their book *Les puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie et en Palestine* (Paris, 1900), that German influence prospered, usually at the expense of French influence. Thanks to the Jews, the German language was very popular in Jerusalem. The various agricultural settlements and religious organizations gave Germany a considerable advantage over her opponents — in short, "les allemands ont augmenté leur influence." A French caricature, published several years later, illustrated that all the Great Powers held on to the old Turkish cow, while only Germany knew how to milk her. Hans Rohde could later note with satisfaction that "Wir Deutschen haben allen Grund, auf dieses Werk stolz zu sein." Rohde also stressed that, in addition to the German settlements, Jewish settlement in Palestine was able to advance German language and culture, and should be granted appropriate attention. Germany's ties with Zionism, he added, are for Germany's benefit.⁴²

⁴⁰ See detailed description by Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-105; Otto Warburg, "Deutsche Kolonisationsbestrebungen im Türkischen Orient," *Altneuland*, Vol. II (1905).

⁴¹ *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898*, Berlin, 1898, p. 45.

⁴² Rohde, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-92. The German vice consul at Jaffa, Dr. W. Brode, wrote in his report, dated 29.2.1912; "Da unter den deutschen Juden (7/10 der gesamten pal. Judenheit) die deutsche Sprache, wenn auch bei vielen nur in der korrupten Form des sogenannten Jargon bekannt ist, so bestehen zwischen ihnen und Deutschland Beziehungen, die noch grösserer Ausdehnung fähig sind." Brode did not distinguish between the small community of German Jews and the large masses of "Ashkenazim" (European immigrants), and considered the whole Ashkenazic community a protagonist of German influence.

Yet this statement was devoid of any basis. Not only were the Jewish settlements far from fostering German interests, but also the policy toward Zionism was undergoing rapid changes. The Kaiser, during his visit, already realized that support for Zionism was liable to hurt relations with the Sublime Porte. The Embassy in Istanbul virtually dictated to Berlin the policy in Jerusalem and that was a policy disassociated from Zionist ambitions. In the consul's reports from Palestine the hostile attitude to the professed nationalistic ambitions of the Zionist movement gradually increased, since these ambitions did not suit German interests. This stand characterized the period of Schmidt's service when, on the eve of the war, the consulate was raised to the rank of consulate general, while the diplomatic missions in Jaffa and Haifa were raised from vice consulates to consulates. These representatives (Dr. Löytved-Hardegg in Haifa and Dr. Brode in Jaffa) strengthened the hostile anti-Zionist stand in their reports, and did not miss any opportunity to make accusations against the Zionist movement and to warn against its ambitions.

At this time, a clear distinction was made between the Jewish nationalist camp and the old *yishuv*. The work of the consulate was characterized by a tendency to strengthen German interests and foster humanitarian and economic projects for the old *yishuv*. The consulate aided the expansion of the educational activities of the *Hilfsverein* in particular, considering it the primary base for future German influence in Palestine. When the "language war" broke out because of the plan to build the Technion in Haifa (1913/14), the consulate engaged in more active assistance in order to save what could be saved. There is no doubt that this assistance permitted the *Hilfsverein* to continue its work, which had been limited because of the opposition of the majority of the *yishuv* with the exception of the Orthodox circles.⁴³

The extent to which the Germans linked their activities in the Jewish community with their broader political aspirations can be seen from the report on the battleship *Goeben*, of 31 May 1913, which specifically states that "Deutschland hat mit dem jüdischen Element in Palästina zweifellos ein Mittel, seine sonstige starke Interessen durch dieses zu vergrössern. Ein deutsch-jüdischer Kulturfaktor in Palästina würde sich bei der politischen Spaltung der Bevölkerung mit Freuden einem deutschen Schutze anvertrauen."⁴⁴

⁴³ See Moshe Rinnot, "Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden" — Creation and Struggle, Jerusalem, 1971.

⁴⁴ In similar form: "Gesetzt, man liesse heute den Landsbewohnern die Wahl, ... dann würde ganz gewiss eine bedeutende Mehrheit die Deutschen erwählen." (J. Böhmer, *Palästina im Lichte der gegenwärtigen Orient Krise*, Stuttgart, 1909, pp. 42-43.

GERMAN INTERESTS AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY

In conclusion, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the German consulate could be proud of its industrious activity in increasing German interests in Palestine, which also included intensive activity on behalf of Jewish institutions and projects. The Jews of German origin cooperated willingly with the consulate, both out of patriotic loyalty and out of the realization that the consulate could help them attain considerable achievements. The Jewish community profited from this activity, as the consulate's works made a valuable contribution to the consolidation and aggrandizement of the Jewish community in the nineteenth century.

26. THE GERMAN SETTLERS IN PALESTINE AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL ARAB POPULATION AND THE JEWISH COMMUNITY 1868-1918

by ALEX CARMEL

1. The Tempelgesellschaft and the Settlement of its Members in Palestine

The *Tempelgesellschaft* (Association of Templars) was an offshoot of the Pietistic movement which arose in Germany in the seventeenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century thousands of Pietists from the Kingdom of Württemberg migrated to Caucasia in the belief that the Day of Judgment was approaching and all true Christians should seek refuge in the East. In order to prevent the further depopulation of his country, the King of Württemberg permitted the Pietists to establish their own autonomous communities within the framework of the Evangelistic Church. The first such community was established in 1819 by Gottlieb Hoffmann in Korntal near Stuttgart. His son, Christoph, the founder of the Templars Association, grew up in this separatist community.

Christoph Hoffmann (1815-1885), who studied theology at Tübingen University, was ordained but preferred to teach at the "Salon" of the Pietistic Paulus brothers in Ludwigsburg. He first became known in 1845 when he engaged in public polemics with the progressive school of biblical criticism in Tübingen. In the same year Hoffmann and the Paulus brothers established the weekly, *Die Süddeutsche Warte*, for the dissemination of their Pietistic views.

In 1848 one of the leading members of the above-mentioned Tübingen group was chosen by liberal circles in the Ludwigsburg region as their candidate for the all-German parliament which was about to be convened in Frankfurt. The conservative circles, consisting mainly of rural elements, chose Hoffmann as their candidate. He won by a large majority and became the district representative at Frankfurt.

Hoffmann regarded the revolutionary tendencies which found expression in the parliament as proof of the fact that the existing church had failed to fulfill its function. He returned to Ludwigsburg and began to advocate the creation of "the people of God" (das Volk Gottes) who would rescue mankind from the anti-Christian spirit. Only one of the Paulus brothers (Christoph) remained loyal to Hoffmann when he intensified his campaign

against the church, but he was now joined by Georg David Hardegg (1812–1879) — a Ludwigsburg merchant who had spent several years in prison for revolutionary activities, and there became deeply religious and attracted to mysticism.

The Crimean War (1853–1856) and the belief that the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of disintegration aroused in Hoffmann the belief that the “people of God” were destined to gain control of Palestine, which had been promised to the Jewish people by the prophets. But this people no longer existed and the “people of God” was its heir and the heir to its land. In 1854 Hoffmann established for this purpose “The Association for the Assembling of God’s People in Jerusalem” (*Gesellschaft für Sammlung des Volkes Gottes in Jerusalem*). Several consecutive drought years in Württemberg intensified the desire for emigration, and during this period the number of the “Friends of Jerusalem” reached some 10,000. But the drought ended; the Crimean War came to an end without Palestine having been evacuated by the Turks; the campaign of the church and the state against the “Friends of Jerusalem” was intensified, and the number of members began to dwindle. In 1858 the heads of the Association visited Palestine and arrived at the conclusion that since the Turkish régime was corrupt and the local population primitive and xenophobic, their plans could only be implemented if tens of thousands of members of “God’s people” settled in Palestine. Efforts to increase the number of their supporters, however, did not meet with success. By the mid-sixties the Association, whose members had been banished from the Evangelistic Church and had established the *Deutsche Tempel* in 1861, was on the brink of dissolution.

In order to prevent this development, Hardegg proposed to the members in 1867 that they carry out their settlement plans despite their small number (3,000, including women and children). Fear that others might steal a march on them (in 1866 a large group of Americans made an unsuccessful attempt to settle in Jaffa); the existence of similar Jewish plans; the hope that their ideals would win wider support in Palestine; and the promise won from Henry Dunant (founder of the Red Cross) that he would endeavour to secure the Sultan’s official approval for their settlement, led the Association members to decide, in 1867, to immigrate to Palestine. The programme was almost cancelled at the last minute because of ideological and practical differences (which were always numerous among the Templars), but the two leaders of the Association disembarked at Haifa at the end of 1868.

In the early days of settlement the security, economic, social and climatic problems were so grave that spiritual matters were neglected, and the Templars did not succeed in winning additional support for their ideals — neither in Palestine nor outside the country. Hardegg left the Association

in 1874 as a result of disagreements with Hoffmann, and several years later Hardegg's supporters, some one-third of the German settlers, returned to the Evangelistic Church. Many of the members of the first generation of Templars (including Hoffmann and Hardegg), whose religious affiliation had been weakened as a result of material problems, died in the 1870's and 1880's. This tendency was strengthened among the young Templars who had not taken part in their parents' struggle against the Evangelistic Church in Württemberg and did not clearly understand the reasons behind this struggle. In place of the concept of "the assembling of God's people in Jerusalem" which could not be implemented (only some 750 Templars had immigrated by 1875, and from then on their numbers grew mainly through natural increase), it was now decided to place the emphasis on improving the situation in the Holy Land and providing a good example for its inhabitants. These aims were implemented through the very activity of the Templars in Palestine, and did not necessarily entail any special religious belief or self-sacrifice — qualities which were quite infrequent in the second generation.

This change in aims made life easier for the settlers since the new aims were more congenial to Turkey and Germany. The Templars' original plan of gaining control of Palestine as "God's people" aroused deep concern in Constantinople and displeased Berlin, which wished to maintain friendly relations with the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish government and the local authorities in Palestine still regarded the German settlers with great suspicion and made life difficult for them, but from the point of view of Germany, the change in the character and goals of the Templars in Palestine constituted a relief. The moderation of the separatist beliefs of the Templars and the return of many of them to the mother church not only reduced the differences of the founding fathers of the Templars with the Württemberg state and church, but also, in time, turned the courageous Schwabians in the Orient into the darlings of public opinion and of the royal court in their homeland. In other parts of Germany public opinion respected and admired the German settlers in Palestine, the pioneers of modernization and Christian culture, who were so bravely facing up to the hostile attitude of the Turkish authorities and the local Arab population.

The Imperial German government was less enthusiastic about the Templars' project in Palestine. From the 1880's onward Berlin endeavoured to improve relations with Constantinople. The Baghdad railway was the axis of the German sphere of influence in the Ottoman Empire, and the other powers were willing to recognize this axis only. Palestine was therefore outside the area of German interests in the Ottoman Empire, and the constant complaints of the German settlers against the local authorities only

made it more difficult for Berlin to win the confidence of Turkey and implement one of the most important aims of German foreign policy. The limited scope of Templarist settlement in Palestine, which in no way constituted a threat to Turkey, together with the support of German public opinion for their project, made it impossible for the Berlin government to disregard the German patriots in Palestine and their problems. In order to safeguard their lives and the property they had accumulated in Palestine, the Templars did everything in their power (and even made considerable concessions with regard to their religious principles) in order to be worthy of the protection and support of Germany. As a result they were awarded protection, and in times of danger German ships were sent to Palestine to protect them. But Germany was unwilling to go any further than this, and refused even to consider governmental support for the settlement project.

During the fifty years of Templar residence under the Turkish régime, seven settlements were established: Haifa, Jaffa (both in 1869), Sarona (1871), Jerusalem (1878), Wilhelma (1902), Galilean Bethlehem (1906) and Waldheim (1907). The three latter, as well as Sarona, were agricultural settlements, and those in Jaffa and Jerusalem were urban, while that near Haifa was agricultural in nature at first and later became mainly an urban settlement. With the exception of Galilean Bethlehem and Waldheim, which did not have time to develop properly before the outbreak of the First World War, the German settlements reached a level of development unparalleled in Palestine. In planning, beauty and organization, they had no equal in the country.

The Haifa settlement was the largest and most successful of the urban settlements. On the eve of the First World War there were some 750 German settlers in Haifa, including several dozen households which had left the town to establish the two Jezreel Valley settlements, the garden suburb of Karmelheim high up on the Carmel (the first residential quarter on the mountain, now known as the Carmel centre) and the smaller settlement of Neuhardtthof (opposite the present-day Tirat ha-Carmel). Sarona (now inside Tel Aviv) was the most prosperous of the agricultural settlements, and was particularly successful in viticulture and the export of wines. In Jaffa the Germans congregated at first in the former American settlement and expanded it, but at the beginning of the twentieth century most of them moved to the Walhalla quarter, which they established in the new northern district of the town — near Tel Aviv. The members of the Jaffa community, like their colleagues in Haifa and Jerusalem, engaged mainly in commerce, trade and industry (the first machine factory in the country was established in Jaffa by the German, Wagner), tourist promotion and various liberal professions. They played a particularly important role in

transport. The Haifa settlers were the first to introduce the wheel-cart into that part of the country, adapted the roads from Haifa to the district capital of Acre and to Nazareth and Tiberias to carriage traffic, and organized a regular passenger service. They were also the first to organize a regular carriage service from Jaffa to Jerusalem, then the most travelled route in the country. The German settlers were also the first to establish hotels on European standards, develop modern industry, utilize motors for irrigation purposes, set up steam-operated flour mills, and, above all, establish settlements which utilized modern methods of cultivation and agricultural equipment, and urban residential areas in accordance with European standards.

II. Relations between the German Settlers and the Local Arab Population

Relations between the German settlers and the local Arab population, whether Muslim or Christian, were generally poor. This situation was practically inevitable, because of the attitude of both the Arabs and the Germans. When Hoffmann and Hardegg returned from a reconnaissance tour in 1858, their conclusion was that not only was the Turkish régime corrupt, but that the local population also constituted a grave threat to the planned Templar settlement. In the first place, they regarded as dangerous the violent hatred of foreigners displayed by the Muslims (who constituted nine-tenths of the country's population), and in the second place, they feared the danger of corruption.¹ The Templar settlement began against this background of xenophobia, which did in fact exist among the Muslims, and the conscious predetermined German policy of remaining aloof from them. Both these attitudes were not conducive to the development of good relations between the two sides without a sincere effort to change them. This effort was not made and the situation in Palestine not only failed to moderate these basic attitudes but, on the contrary, exacerbated them.

The local population soon grasped the difference between the Templars and other foreign residents. The Arabs were not fond of the other foreigners, who were mostly missionaries, but they knew how to derive economic benefit from them without much effort. The Templars were different. Theirs was not a philanthropic project and the Arab labourer was forced to work hard in order to benefit from them. Therefore the local population regarded the Germans with hostility, unlike their attitude to other foreigners who provided them with livelihood. The local inhabitants soon discovered that the Germans were poor and had arrived without property and with only

¹ See reports of Hoffmann and Hardegg in the *Süddeutsche Warte* (hereafter cited as *Warte*), 23.9.1858, p. 152; 14.10.1858, p. 161.

their own strong and diligent hands. They had abandoned their homeland and their friends with one sole purpose: "to attack the inhabitants of the country like leeches and suck their blood."² And what, asked the *al-Ahrām* correspondent, had happened since the beginning of the eighties? The German settlers had taken over control of agriculture and industry and many of them had become rich at the expense of the local population. And just as in nature the stronger trees attract the strength of the soil, while the weaker trees wither, the local inhabitants were suffering from hunger and some were even being forced to emigrate from their own country because of the Germans. And in fact, the correspondent concluded, anyone comparing the prosperous German settlements with the miserable villages of the starving fellahin, could only be shocked.

The Templars' settlement project was therefore not likely to win the hearts of the indigenous population. Contrary to the hopes of the Germans, their impressive achievements hardly alleviated the hatred of the inhabitants towards foreigners. In fact, the opposite was true. An official Templar Association survey, composed on the eve of the First World War, was unable to evade the conclusion that "the example and achievements of the German and Jewish settlements have, at the most, aroused the envy of the local population without these latter showing any desire to learn from this experience."³ Just as the Templars' activities were almost unable to influence the attitude of the local population, so too the character of the inhabitants was not conducive to changing the original attitude of the Templars towards them. In theory, the Templars continued to regard the main aim of their project in Palestine "to raise the economic, cultural and spiritual standards of the inhabitants,"⁴ but in practice they did little to implement this aim. Their very attitude was such that there was little they could do. Loyal to their first principles, the Templars in Palestine continued to hope that "the German settler will never make contact with the natives to the point of finding ease among them."⁵ Foreign observers soon noted the strong reservations (which were justified according to many of them) of the German settlers with regard to the local Arabs. They, too, were convinced that "our honest, direct and slightly rough Schwabian settler will never feel sympathy towards the Arabs."⁶ The fear of over-fraternization with the local population and of assimilation never left the leaders of the Association. In fact,

² The Cairo daily *al-Ahrām*, 27.6.1898, quoting an article written fifteen years previously.

³ *Warte*, 27.4.1914, pp. 133-134.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.3.1908, pp. 100-101.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 21.4.1883, pp. 8-9.

⁶ *Deutsche Kolonialzeitung* (Berlin), (hereafter cited as *DKZ*), 1884, pp. 83-88.

over the years they appear to have felt even greater concern for the possible evil influences (which were apparently beginning to be felt) of "the naturally impudent and arrogant son of the Orient, whose main characteristic is thievery and beggary and who bows his head only before power and money."⁷ Thus the leaders of the settlers constantly reiterated their warnings against mixed marriages, emphasizing the sad fate of one (sole) German girl who had married a Christian Arab during the Turkish period. "It is better for them to remain spinsters than to be thrown to the rabble."⁸

Even such a typical humanist as Christoph Paulus, one of the fathers of the Templar movement and the successor of Hoffmann as leader of the Association (1884-1890), could not always disguise the revulsion and contempt he felt for the local population. When a joint transport cooperative, owned by Germans, Arabs and Jews, was set up in 1884 on the Jaffa-Jerusalem route, its organization was entrusted to Germans. "One may certainly state", wrote Paulus:

That this just arrangement constitutes the victory of German honesty over the dirty arrangements of the Arabs and the Jews. The establishment of the company was made possible only by the fact that the organization and control of funds was entrusted to a German who is recognized by all the partners to be honest and diligent. Let us hope that this achievement of German integrity will have a positive effect on the local population. This exemplary deed can be regarded as a missionary act since we Templars believe that the people whom the missionaries are addressing must first be turned into human beings and only then into Christians.⁹

It is not surprising that, with such an attitude towards raising the standards of the population, the Templars did not succeed in finding the path to the hearts of the population — a prerequisite for the establishment of good relations. Furthermore, this attitude contained a certain element of self-deception and the deception of others, and the natives of the country obviously sensed this.

On May 18, 1909, against the background of the tension which had emerged in the Ottoman Empire as a result of the attempt of the supporters of Sultan 'Abdülhamid to overthrow the new régime, the German ambassador in Constantinople wrote to the chancellor in Berlin (quoting the German vice consul in Haifa) as follows:

⁷ *Warte*, 27.4.1911, pp. 131-132.

⁸ *DKZ*, 1912, pp. 790-792; Hans Seibt, *Moderne Kolonisation in Palästina*, Jerusalem, 1935(7), I, p. 128,

⁹ *Warte*, 30.10.1884, pp. 1-2.

They believe [the leaders of the German community in Haifa, and the Vice-Consuls in Haifa and Jaffa as well] that in the event of riots [against the Christian population] the fury of the [Muslim] population will be directed first and foremost against the Germans ... Our farmers and artisans are too involved in local affairs and, in the eyes of the Arabs, have already forfeited most of their special status in comparison with other foreign residents. It also looks as if the wealth accumulated by the Germans — which is reflected in the impressive outward appearance of the settlements and their lands — also arouses the blind envy of many. The Germans have not succeeded in winning the liking of local elements mainly because they have always felt themselves to be morally superior to the Arabs and have apparently overemphasized their superior status (*Herrenstandpunkt*) ...¹⁰

The anticipated pogrom against the Christians did not materialize, just as the Germans emerged unscathed from a similar threat in 1877. In the end, only one German settler was murdered throughout the fifty years of Templar settlement under the Turks, and this too was not without an earlier act of provocation. Nevertheless, if after forty years of settlement the Germans could assume in 1909 that they would be the first victims of any violent riots, their relations with the local population were indeed unfriendly. In proof of the claim (which the spokesmen of the Templars sometimes endeavoured to refute or at least to moderate) it is sufficient to recall the programme of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd (which was most acceptable to Germany as well) to divert part of the German immigration to Asia Minor. In the end the plan was turned down by both the German and Turkish governments, and their decision was based mainly on the grave conflict which had been created in Palestine between the German settlers and the local population.¹¹

The Templar settlement in Palestine was accompanied throughout by serious incidents between the Germans and the local inhabitants. These were not of a similar character on both sides, but were equally unpleasant and painful in effect.

The local population schemed against the German settlers from the very first. Hoffmann and Hardegg, on their arrival in Palestine in the winter of 1868/69 and before they had taken up any initiative whatsoever,

¹⁰ The Ambassador Marschall von Bieberstein to Chancellor Bülow, Turkish files in the Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, Bonn (hereafter cited as PA), File 134, Vol. 25a.

¹¹ Memorandum of Kiderlen, of the Political Department of the German Foreign Office, 15.12.1891, PA, File 189, Vol. 1, and Memo of Kayser of the Colonial Department, 28.12.1891, *ibid.*

encountered a population which was "partly suspicious and partly hostile" in Haifa.¹² And those unhappy Templars who, without the approval of the Association, had endeavoured even before this date to settle in the Jezreel Valley, aroused the anger of their Arab neighbours even though they died, one by one, of malaria. Despite the efforts made by the Templars, particularly in the early days of their settlement, to maintain good relations with their neighbours, there were already, in that early period, cases of attacks on settlers and their wives. In Jaffa the settlers were soon forced to build a wall around their settlement, and in Haifa they also took various defensive measures. They were particularly afflicted by continual thieving. From the very beginning the settlers realized that if they did not set up permanent residences near their land "they would be able to sow but not to reap."¹³ Thus, the villagers of Tira, "thieves, robbers, fanatics and untrustworthy"¹⁴ harrassed the German settlers in Haifa to such an extent that they were totally unable to cultivate the large area they had purchased near the village as their main land reserve and the site of a new settlement. This last blow was undoubtedly one of the hardest the German settlers suffered in Palestine. The tension it engendered lasted for many years and reached its height in 1910 when one of the Tira villagers was shot by a German ambush while in the act of stealing. On the following day the villagers killed one of the Germans.

A grave threat to the lives of the German community in Palestine first arose during the crisis of the Balkan War in 1875-1878. The struggle of the Christians in the Balkans to free themselves of the yoke of the Sultan, and the Russian pressure on Constantinople, were interpreted by the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire as an additional attempt by Christianity to overthrow Islam. The fury of the Palestinian Muslims was aroused to such an extent that the German government found it necessary to take an unprecedented step and despatch warships to defend its citizens. The German consul in Jerusalem, Baron Münchhausen who, throughout the crisis, claimed that the main threat was to the German settlers, may have been right in declaring that only the impressive and frequent demonstrations of power by the German warships prevented the outburst of Muslim fanaticism against all the Christians in the country.

The German settlers were also disturbed by the way in which the local population competed with them in the economic sphere. The Jewish community, which was expanding rapidly, played an important part in this increasing competition, but the Arabs were also capable of competing with

¹² *Warte*, 30.10.1873, p. 175.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 18.5.1871, pp. 77-78.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 25.5.1876, p. 83.

the Germans and of taking over fields of economic activity which the Germans had first introduced. Thus the Arabs succeeded in supplanting the German waggoners on the Haifa-Acre route, and, by reducing prices, they caused the shut-down of the large German travel company which operated between Jaffa and Jerusalem. The German craftsmen were particularly affected by this competition. The Arab craftsmen did not pay attention to quality and benefited from the fact that customers were more interested in low prices than in high quality. From the point of view of the Germans this constituted unfair competition. It should be borne in mind that the standard of living of the indigenous population was much lower than that of the Germans, which enabled the local Arabs to make do with less profit.

The considerable improvement which took place in local administration and public security in Palestine towards the end of the nineteenth century deprived the Arab population almost totally of the opportunity to attack the German settlers openly. But the hatred of the Germans engendered among the Arabs, which found violent expression only infrequently and mainly in the form of attacks on German transport, nearly reached the boiling point again during the 1909 crisis. In Wilhelma open clashes even took place. This was at the time of the change of régime in Constantinople, when the bloody riots throughout the Empire and lack of certainty regarding the future led to confusion and undermined the authority of the local government. The slogans of the Young Turks regarding liberty, equality and fraternity were interpreted by the local population "as meaning that they were at liberty to do as they chose without fear of punishment."¹⁵ The Muslim neighbours of the isolated settlement of Wilhelma, who were already profoundly embittered at the success of the Germans on their former lands, tried to exploit the crisis months (March-April 1909). In contrast to their usual thieving habits, they now acted openly and not out of greed. The uprooting of trees in Wilhelma and the grazing of cattle in the nearby village of Rantiya (to which some of the Wilhelma land had formerly belonged) on cultivated land was accompanied by the explicit threat that the villagers would harrass the Germans until they were forced to leave.¹⁶ The tension reached its height with the armed assault of neighbouring Arabs on the German settlement — an event unprecedented in Templar history. Again it seems to have been the German warships which came to the aid of the settlers and prevented bloodshed.

A year later the German settler Fritz Unger was murdered in Neuhardtthof by villagers from Tira. The local population regarded this as justified

¹⁵ Captain von Mann to Kaiser Wilhelm, 18.5.1909, PA, File 134, Vol. 26.

¹⁶ German vice consul in Jaffa to Chancellor Bülow, 23.4.1909, *ibid.*, Vol. 25.

revenge for the death of a young Arab shot on the same spot on the previous day. They were angry at the fact that under the pressure of the unprecedented uproar created by the German settlers, the Turkish authorities had acted with all the force of their fury and cruelty against the village. This reaction aroused great tension in the Muslim population and the country was swept by a wave of acts of hostility against the Germans. The Haifa Arab paper *al-Karmil* initiated a campaign of incitement against the Germans, calling on the population to boycott them and to stop working for them. Once again it was Wilhelma and the two new Jezreel Valley settlements which suffered in particular from their neighbours. In the end the storm died down, thanks to the pressure exerted by the German government on the Turkish authorities to take appropriate steps to defend the Templars.

In contrast to the local population, whose attacks against the Templars were deliberate, the German acts seem to have emanated from the very fact of Templar settlement in Palestine, their beliefs and their way of life. From the outset, their settlement aroused protests regarding dispossession. A bloody clash between Muslims and Christian Arabs in Haifa in 1880, in which the Germans were not involved, was described in the European press as a Bedouin assault on the German colony. According to these papers, the local population was trying to express its protest against dispossession from lands on the Carmel and German encroachment on their sources of income. It was probably the Carmelite monks, the avowed enemies of the Templars, who publicized this distorted version of the truth. In any case we can see that at this early stage the claim of dispossession, however unfounded, already existed. The Templars established their first four settlements on lands which were neither settled nor cultivated by Arabs. The anger of the Arabs was aroused by the fact that neglected lands sold so cheaply to the Germans were turned into settlements which were without equal in Palestine, and that within a short period the price of those same lands rose steeply, to thousands of times their original price. The Arabs, at the sight of the riches accumulated by the Germans on their own former lands, regarded themselves as having been cheated. Against the background of the already prevalent xenophobia it was impossible to root out the feeling of the local population that the Germans had come to evict them and suck their blood.¹⁷

The other claim of the population, i.e., that the German settlers were encroaching on their sources of income, was no more just than the former argument. Even if several Arabs, who had formerly hired out animals for riding, temporarily found their livelihood affected (by the German wag-

¹⁷ *Warte*, 19.8.1882, pp. 1-2.

goners), those same Germans provided hundreds of jobs for the local inhabitants. It should perhaps be noted that the diligent and thrifty Schwa-bian settlers were not the type of employers popular among the local Arabs, who were "lazy as regards themselves, and therefore unreliable as regards others."¹⁸ Unsatisfactory Arab labourers were soon replaced by their employers by better workers. The former then regarded themselves as dispossessed and the latter as exploited, and neither group was likely to feel affection for the stern foreigner who treated them in so cavalier a fashion, and who had built himself a beautiful home and acquired assets they could never attain through their labour. It was true that thanks to this same foreigner many Arabs now had the opportunity of supporting their families while formerly they had almost starved. But because of this foreign settler the Arabs began to aspire to a standard of living with which they had not been formerly acquainted. The non-believers shook them out of their apathy and angered them. In the eyes of the Arab, the Templars had done him an injury by their very settlement.

The claims with regard to dispossession, which arose in the early days of German settlement, were exacerbated and became concrete from the eighties onward. Now that the Germans were beginning to establish themselves, their increased economic activity was bound to affect Arab workshops and enterprises and draw away customers. Just as the Germans voiced protests against the unfair competition of the local population, so too the Arab merchants and craftsmen protested against the foreigners who had come without invitation and were developing the country's commerce and industry without having been asked to do this, while at the same time depriving others of their livelihood. The problem of dispossession was also intensified. In contrast to the first German settlements, Wilhelma, Galilean Bethlehem and Waldheim were set up on lands which were apparently, in the main, cultivated by Arab tenants and on some of which fellahin had lived. The employment of some of these fellahin by the Germans (when they began building their settlements) and a certain concern for their living conditions solved only part of the problem. The fact that many thousands of their fellow Arabs were now working for the Germans throughout the country scarcely comforted those Arabs who had been dispossessed. As was only natural, it was not the many beneficiaries, but the dispossessed few, who raised their voices. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards (the period of the organization of the Zionist movement, which aroused similar problems but on a much greater scale) their voice was exploited by

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.11.1868, p. 183.

Arab politicians, propagandists and journalists against foreign settlers in general, both German and Jewish. But in contrast to the Jewish settlers,¹⁹ the Germans made almost no attempt to conciliate the local Arab population. The fact that they were living under the protection of German power (while the Jews lacked such protection) lent them sufficient confidence to continue living in a place where they were not popular.

As regards the relations between the German settlers and the Arab population, there was almost no difference between Christian and Muslim Arabs. Both communities hated the Germans, and the latter despised both Christians and Muslims. Nevertheless it appears that the predicament in which the Christian Arabs and the Germans found themselves from time to time when Muslim fanaticism was aroused against heretics in general, served as a (not to be exaggerated) conciliatory factor. Proof of the lack of "favouritism" in the attitude of the Germans towards the Christian Arabs is to be found in a serious incident which occurred in Haifa in 1900. Because of the attacks of the Greek-Catholic community against the "Kaiser's wharf" (set up near the German colony so as to enable Kaiser Wilhelm to disembark) the Germans persuaded the local authorities to take drastic steps against the members of this Christian Arab community (the largest in Haifa), who, being under the patronage of the Carmelite monks (supporters of France) were rivals of the Germans in the political sphere as well.

One might sum up by saying that on the eve of the First World War, the Arab, contemplating his German neighbours, was not likely to regard their residence in the country as being of any benefit to him. He was totally unimpressed by their contributions to the advancement of his country, and envious of their riches. And if he was one of those thousands of Arabs who worked for the Germans, he was forced to work hard for his wages, and would not have starved even without them. That same hypothetical Arab undoubtedly thought that his grandfather had been right in 1868 in not welcoming the foreigners. They had dispossessed half their neighbours and were ruling the other half with a rod of iron. The best thing to do was to keep away from them, or to throw them out and take their property. But one cannot end this survey without noting that, despite all this, sincere and friendly relations did grow up, in some cases, between German settlers and local Arabs. Many of the latter learned much from their German employers and improved their standard of living, just as some of the Germans were capable of appreciating the Arab contribution to their own prosperity. Those who behaved honestly and proffered their hand in sincere friendship — both Germans and Arabs — were not generally disappointed. But this was

¹⁹ A. Ruppin, *Pirkei Hayay*, Tel-Aviv, 1968, II, 125.

not an easy step to take. The Arabs did not make it easy, while the Germans were only flesh and blood — as one of the leaders of the Templars put it, in apologizing for the selfish behaviour of the settlers: “Dass häufig mehr getan werden könnte, sei zugegeben” (No one denies that we could often have done more).²⁰

III. Relations between the German Settlers and the Jewish Community

Because of the tremendous and unanticipated changes which took place in the size, essence and aims of the Palestinian Jewish community in the second half of the nineteenth century, the attitude of the German settlers towards the Jews was not stable. During the twenty years preceding their settlement in the country, the Templars often voiced their negative attitude towards the Jews and Judaism in general. This hostile approach, which also disapproved of the new plans of the Jews to rebuild their homeland, was mainly based on religious considerations. This changed as soon as the Templars themselves commenced their settlement project. The hundreds of German settlers who established the first settlements in Haifa, Jaffa and Sarona in 1869–1871 faced such grave problems in Palestine that spiritual matters were temporarily neglected. When the Jews established the agricultural school at Mikveh Israel in 1870, the Germans welcomed the step, and were even more pleased by the establishment of the first real Jewish agricultural settlement at Petah Tikva in 1878, and the later establishment of Zikhron Ya'akov, Rosh Pinah and Rishon Le-Zion (1882). In the realities of the Palestinian situation the old controversy as to whether the country had been promised to the Jewish people or to “God’s people” seemed to lack meaning. The German and Jewish settlers were both small, persecuted, minority islands in an Arab sea and under Turkish rule, and they did not hesitate to cooperate with one another. The situation changed when Jewish immigration began to increase towards the mid eighties. The thousands of new immigrants who had fled the horrors of the Eastern European pogroms not only overshadowed the presence of the German settlers, who till then had been the outstanding European factor in the country, but also began to compete with them in both town and village, in agriculture, trade and commerce. The relationship deteriorated further with the commencement of Zionist activity towards the end of the century. The organized Jewish immigration not only made it clear to the Templars that their original hope of controlling the country had been frustrated, but also aroused the question as to whether there was any future for German settlement in the country. The eighty-five thousand Jews who had assembled in Palestine by

²⁰ *Warte*, 29.2.1928, pp. 27–30.

the eve of the First World War vastly outnumbered the twenty-two hundred German settlers. Many of the Templars blamed Zionism for the slowing down of their progress, and voiced various complaints, not lacking in anti-Semitic content, against the Jews of Palestine. This situation did not improve relations between the Templars and the Zionist movement, whose plans had never been compatible.

From the outset of their public activities in the 1840's, Hoffmann and his supporters had often expressed their opposition to the granting of equal rights to Jews and to their return to Palestine. The question of the right of the Jews to return to their homeland became of practical significance to the "Friends of Jerusalem" when Hoffmann decided that the Holy Land should belong to "God's people."²¹ According to Hoffmann, God had at first intended to give the country to the Jewish people but they had sunk into corruption and sin and no longer constituted the "Holy people." After rejecting Jesus, the Jews had forfeited their right to inherit the Holy Land. It was the Templars who had created a new "Holy People" i.e., "God's people."²² During their tour of Palestine in 1858 the leaders of the Templars found proof of their claim that the Jews were not only unworthy of inheriting the country but also incapable of redeeming it from its barren state. Hoffmann then wrote that the laziness of the (old) Jewish community justified the contempt in which the Jewish people were held in Palestine.

When the Templars decided, after lengthy discussion, to implement their plan and immigrate to Palestine, they were afraid that others might anticipate them in this project. It appears that despite their lack of confidence in the ability of the Jews to realize their own plans to return to Palestine and rebuild the country, it was mainly because of the Jews that the Templars decided to hasten their departure. While Hoffmann and Hardegg were on their way east, the representatives of the Alliance Israélite Universelle were conducting negotiations in Constantinople for the settlement of Jewish farmers in Palestine. This project, on which the Jews pinned great hopes, was described by the Templars as "much ado about nothing" (*I ärmschlagen*).²³

In the first years of their settlement in Palestine (1869), the Templars decided to end the controversy over the right of the Jews to inherit the country. The handful of German settlers soon realized that their main problem was not how to prevent the Jews from taking over control of the country (in place of the Germans), but how to maintain their own settlements in the face of innumerable problems. Under these conditions the Templars realized that it would be to their own benefit if the Jews set up agricultural

²¹ *Ibid.*, 7.7.1853, p. 107.

²² *Ibid.*, 14.7.1853, p. 111.

²³ *Ibid.*, 13.8.1868, p. 130.

settlements as quickly as possible. It would then be possible to present a firmer front against the hostile population and authorities. Through cooperation with the Jewish settlers they would be able to strengthen the economic basis of the German settlements and perhaps alleviate their social isolation. This change in the view of the Templars was expressed, *inter alia*, in their positive attitude towards the Mikveh Israel agricultural school. In the meantime the Jewish movement, which called for the agricultural settlement of Palestine as the first step towards the settlement of the Jewish people in their homeland, was beginning to bear fruit. For the spokesmen of this movement the Templar settlements served as clear-cut proof that the settlement of the country by Europeans was not only potentially possible, but was already being carried out. The leaders of the *Hibat Zion* movement frequently visited the German settlements and consulted with the leaders of the Templars "so as to know how to avoid making the same mistakes they had made."²⁴ When Petaḥ Tikva was established in 1878 the Germans regarded this as "a real step towards the advancement of Palestine."²⁵ And when the settlement was later abandoned not only did they express their regret, but Hoffmann himself now began to support the idea of the return of the Jews to their homeland and advised them not to despair because of this crisis.²⁶ The four years of struggle of the first Jewish settlement were not likely to arouse in the Templars confidence in the abilities of Jewish farmers, nor fear of their competition. Hoffmann's remarks, therefore, were more in the nature of a theory, which in early 1882 could not be regarded as having practical significance. But before long the unexpected happened. Several months later the First Aliyah (wave of immigration) commenced, and by the end of 1882 the Jews had already set up three additional settlements — Zikhron Ya'akov, Rosh Pinah and Rishon Le-Zion. Petaḥ Tikva also began to recover, but none of these phenomena was yet likely to arouse concern in the Templars. On the contrary, the four Jewish settlements were, from the beginning, loyal customers of the German settlers and were very soon revealed to be a useful instrument for the consolidation of the economy of the German settlements. The Germans therefore welcomed their establishment, but began to reiterate the demand that they too be enabled to set up new settlement projects.

Twenty years passed before this request was fulfilled and Wilhelma was set up. Throughout this period the Germans watched, with increasing discomfort, how the Jews were overtaking them and setting up settlements

²⁴ Yehiel Brill, *Yesud ha-Ma'ala*, Mainz, 1883, p. 47.

²⁵ *Warte*, 22.5.1879, p. 7.

²⁶ See his article in *Havatzelet*, 16.4.1882, pp. 185-189.

one after the other. Furthermore, although most of the Jewish immigrants aspired to agricultural settlement, there was a considerable increase (worrying to the Templars) in the size of the urban Jewish community — particularly in Jerusalem and Jaffa, where many Germans lived. The First Aliyah (1882–1903) consisted mainly of two great waves: the first in 1882–1884 and the second in 1890–1891. The attitude of the Germans towards the Jewish community changed for the worse at the height of the first wave, i.e., towards the mid eighties. “The Ashkenazis [i. e. Germans] have begun to display their hostility towards the Jews here too [in Jaffa],” *ha-Zvi* suddenly wrote, and added that this hostility had taken the form of a boycott.²⁷ This hostility, which the correspondent of *ha-Zvi* apparently overestimated, did not last long. The Templar fear “that Jewish immigration would reach tremendous proportions if the Turkish government did not act against it through forbidding the entrance of Jews into Palestine — even if they agreed to accept Ottoman nationality”²⁸ soon passed. At the beginning of 1885 it looked as if the wave of immigration caused by the 1881 pogroms in Russia was dying down.

The motives behind the campaign which the Templars initiated against the Jewish community in 1884 were mainly economic. This campaign, which fluctuated in severity, did not actually cease till the end of Turkish rule. Nor did the economic factors change, even though at the end of the period the importance of the nationalist factor in this network of tense relations increased considerably. We have already pointed out the economic benefits enjoyed by the Templars as a result of the establishment of the first Jewish colonies. It is obvious that not all the German settlers enjoyed these benefits and the number of Templars who benefited from the increase in the urban Jewish population was even smaller. On the contrary, the thousands of Jews who in 1882–1884 settled mainly in Jerusalem and in Jaffa, were regarded as a disturbing element by most of the Templars. The quality of the handiwork of Jewish craftsmen was lower than that of their German counterparts but their prices were also lower, and they won many of the former customers of the Templars. Jewish pedlars and merchants were also satisfied with small profits in order to make a living. Furthermore, the Templars very soon found themselves unable to compete with Jewish farmers as well. From 1883 onwards Baron Edmond de Rothschild aided the Jewish settlements with considerable sums of money. The German farmers began to fear that even if they were several times more efficient and diligent they would never be able to stand up to the competition of Jewish farmers who enjoyed large

²⁷ *Ha-Zvi*, 15th of Tevet, 1885, p. 50; 22nd of Tevet, 1885, p. 53.

²⁸ *Warte*, 22.3.1885, p. 4.

outside financial support. The hopes of standing up to the anticipated Jewish pressure through increasing the scope and durability of the German settlement project were soon frustrated as well. The extensive purchase of agricultural land by the Jews all over the country raised the price of land far beyond the reach of the Templars, and the situation was similar in towns. In addition, the fact that from the outset the new Jewish community did not hide its intention of learning from the German methods, reaching their standard and surpassing them, aroused in the hearts of the Templars the fear that if they did not act rapidly to check Jewish immigration, their enterprise might soon be crushed beneath the wheels of the *Hibat Zion* movement. It should also be noted that just as anti-Semitic elements were reflected in the German claims against the Jews in the mid eighties, so too there was no shortage of unfounded complaints against the Templars, based on the hatred of Germans prevalent among Jewish immigrants from Russia.²⁹

In any case, Jewish immigration decreased and the Germans were pacified. It appears that in the second half of the eighties the moderates prevailed in both camps, and the Germans continued to prosper, *inter alia*, thanks to the plentiful work they found in the construction of the first Jewish settlements. However, the stream of Jewish immigration was renewed with increased vigour in 1890–1891. This new wave apparently brought it home to the Templars that the Jews would, after all, inherit the land. This would happen sooner or later — whether they liked it or not. And when it did occur — and the later the better — the world and the Jews should realize that it was the Templars who had helped bring it about. This was apparently the motive of the German settlers as they reiterated and emphasized that they had been the first to prove that the country was suitable for settlement; that they had served as an example to the Jews; that they had provided the impetus which aroused the Jews to aspire to return home; but that they would also make certain that the Jews would not now dispossess them.³⁰

The Templar demand that the Jews express gratitude towards them as those primarily responsible for the renaissance of the Jewish community in Palestine, together with their attempt to check the development of this community — mainly in self-defence — inevitably led to unstable, inconsistent and often unfair policies with regard to Jews. In fact, it is difficult to define this as “policy” at all. The German settlers had no official policy towards the Jewish community, and opinions were divided on the matter as on many others. What all the various approaches held in common was

²⁹ See, for example, *ha-Zvi*, 5th of Av, 1885, pp. 158–159; *Havatzet*, 3.8.1888, p. 302.

³⁰ *Warte*, 13.11.1891, p. 364; 2.7.1891, pp. 209–210.

the attempt to exploit these so-called "founders' rights" to the renaissance of the Jewish people in their homeland, but they were divided on the steps which they thought necessary to take in order to slow down the pace of Jewish development, or at least to defend the interests of German settlers. None of their approaches was capable of coming to terms with the contradiction at the very heart of their grasp of the situation. This contradiction, which naturally led to many manifestations of hypocrisy, was clearly discerned by the Jews.

It would seem that during the nineties both Jews and Germans accepted the fact that they would have to co-exist in the Holy Land, even without friendship. The Germans found comfort in the fact that they were, despite everything, continuing to prosper; after the panic immigration of 1890-1891 the number of Jewish immigrants was greatly reduced, many of the arrivals later emigrating, and the rate of establishment of new settlements was considerably slowed down. On the other hand, in the course of time the Jewish settlers acquired sufficient self confidence to exist and develop without the blessing of the Templars. In the end, all those concerned (including the Templars) admitted that the outstanding project in Palestine in the 1890's was the Jewish settlement project, and not the four German settlements. Therefore relations between Germans and Jews cooled considerably, the papers of each side virtually ignoring the presence of the other. Both camps employed a policy of "none of your honey, none of your sting" until the Zionist movement emerged and aroused the Germans to real opposition.

When Herzl, in August 1897, called on the delegates of the First Zionist Congress in Basle to approve the programme of the Zionist movement, the Templars in Palestine apparently began to fear that this time they were facing a real and concrete threat. As soon as the Zionist organ *Die Welt* began to appear in June 1897, the Templars became aware (and they could read this in their own language) that this time they were up against an organized Jewish political movement, acting both carefully and thoroughly. Each week the paper's motto reminded them that the main purpose of the Zionist programme — to establish a home for the Jewish people in Palestine — was not only incompatible with Hoffmann's original ideas, but also cast doubt on the profitability of their own continued settlement in the country. The open and declared aim of the Zionist movement, to implement this programme in cooperation with the great powers and with the concurrence of Turkey, must have reminded the Templars almost unbearably of the fact that the Jewish people were about to do what Hoffmann had planned for "God's people" some fifty years before. The son of Christoph Hoffmann now demanded that the great powers immediately insist on the necessary guar-

antees so as to safeguard the interests of Christians in Palestine.³¹

The Zionist Organization did not react to the Templar attacks. These verbal attacks were not accompanied by deeds, since it soon became clear to the Germans that the local authorities were making life so difficult for the Jewish immigrants that there was no need to spur them on. The Turkish attitude, at this stage, therefore satisfied the Templars. Under these circumstances there was no great change in the cool relations which already existed between Germans and Jews in Palestine. The first serious attempt to break the ice and find a *modus vivendi* between German and Jewish settlers was made in 1904 by Professor Otto Warburg, one of the heads of the Zionist Organization and its future president. In a comprehensive article,³² Warburg surveyed, thoroughly, objectively, and not unsympathetically, the history of the Templars and their project, while drawing a comparison between their achievements and those of the Jews. Warburg enumerated the advantages of German settlement, but did not conceal the fact that their project had lost its early impetus and drive. At the same time he stressed that the Zionist movement would not like to forfeit the Templars' settlements and that the Templars would be able to continue to maintain control in various spheres in the future. "If many Templars," Warburg concluded, "are now regarding the expansion of Jewish settlement with envy and hostility, this means that they have not comprehended the advantages entailed for themselves. Because of this superficial outlook they believe that their economic survival is being threatened, while the truth is that an economically flourishing country facilitates a wide spectrum of varied professions and occupations which could not exist in a backward country, or could only survive with difficulty." Apart from his evaluation that the German settlers were beginning to show signs of "physical degeneration" (which he later refuted),³³ there was nothing in Warburg's article to justify the anger of the Templars. On the contrary, the goodwill reflected in his statements should have, and was certainly intended to have, made it easier for them to cooperate with the Zionists in the future in a spirit of mutual respect. Nevertheless the Templars refused the proffered hand both angrily and contemptuously. Dr. Jonathan Hoffmann, one of the leaders of the movement and the son of the founder, took it upon himself to respond to Warburg's article. In his reply, printed in the widely circulated organ of the German nationalists, *Alldeutsche Blätter*,³⁴ the young Hoffmann rightly

³¹ *Ibid.*, 28.4.1898, pp. 129-130; see also issues of 3.2.1898, p. 37, and 21.4.1898, pp. 122-123.

³² *Altneuland*, I (1904), pp. 39-45.

³³ *Die Welt*, 4.1.1907, p. 10.

³⁴ *Alldeutsche Blätter*, 1904, pp. 261-262.

rejected Warburg's claims regarding the physical degeneration of the Templars and their low birthrate, but his other arguments were irrelevant. The Templars did not reject the Zionist peace offer out of logical considerations. They simply could not accept the fact that a representative of Zionism "which is purely Jewish and as such is good only for the Jews and most certainly not for us Europeans in Palestine,"³⁵ had the audacity to reassure them that they had nothing to fear and could continue to live in the Holy Land, as a respected minority in the abode of the Jewish majority.

The Templar attitude towards the Jews took a turn for the worse in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century. Once again there was a great wave of Jewish immigration (the Second Aliyah) mainly as a result of the Kishinev pogroms, which brought some 30,000 Jews to Palestine from Europe before the First World War. In addition, the Templars were concerned by the fact that, after the death of Herzl, those who were in favour of the immediate settlement of Palestine began to dominate the Zionist movement, even though the approval of the great powers, and in particular of Turkey, had not yet been obtained. This mass Jewish immigration and the intensification of Zionist activity in Palestine after 1905 aroused the Templars to a renewed struggle. "Even if the agricultural settlements of the Jews are contributing something to the advancement of the country," wrote the *Warte*,³⁶ "nevertheless the *haluka* is nurturing a lazy rabble ... this system of settlement is an evil and bitter service to the country — but the eyes of the Turkish government will undoubtedly be opened too late." From the beginning of 1908 the *Warte* conducted an increasingly sharp campaign against Zionist activity, led by Fritz Lorch, a Palestinian-born German and former member of the Jaffa community, who had moved to Stuttgart and engaged in journalistic work there. Employing crude language formerly unknown in the *Warte*, Lorch attacked the Jewish competition (supported by Rothschild money) with the German settlers and the disloyalty of the Zionists towards Turkey. David Trietsch, a Jaffa Zionist, attacked Lorch's battle cry (*Kampfruf*), claiming that there was no room for conflict between the Templars and the Zionists, and that in any case many of the German settlers not only did not regard the Zionists as rivals but even maintained close economic ties with them.³⁷ Lorch published a vicious counter-attack against Trietsch and the Zionists in general, reiterating the need for an all-out war against the Zionists who, so he claimed, had become accustomed to the silence of the German settlers but would now have to

³⁵ *Warte*, 15.8.1907, pp. 259–260.

³⁶ *Ibid*, 22.8.1907, pp. 269–270.

³⁷ *Ibid*, 19.3.1908, p. 94; 26.3.1908, pp. 101–102.

become used to a totally different situation. The Zionists, he claimed, were cooperating with Great Britain in bringing about the early downfall of Turkey. They were causing harm to Germany, and since they had flooded the country and aroused the fury of the local population the Arabs no longer had confidence in even the German settlers. But the Germans would not be the losing side in the struggle with Zionism. The long arm of the German government, the Turkish interest which was capable of checking Zionism, and the local Arab population — all these factors would weigh the balance in favour of the Germans. "No, my Zionist friends," Lorch warned, "we Germans in Palestine have three good allies and when the time comes we will know how to utilize them!"³⁸

In contrast to the extreme settlers of Lorch's type, there were, among the Templars, many others who expressed reservations with regard to his ideas, and even more who were indifferent to the controversy since they were making a good living out of the daily contact with the Jewish population and were not interested in steps which could threaten their own prosperity. In light of this mood, and taking into consideration the worsening of their relations with the Arabs, the Templar Association was apprehensive of officially adopting the policy of hostility proposed by Lorch. Nor was the attitude of the German government towards Jewish settlement sufficiently clear. In the event of an open clash between the Jewish and German settlers the German government might decide to support the former. Lorch's policy would then prove bankrupt as would German settlement as a whole. The Templar Association therefore preferred to employ Lorch's statements as a warning for the present.

Throughout this period *Die Welt* displayed a cautious attitude towards the German settlers. The organ of the Zionist movement refrained from entering into controversy with Lorch, and the Zionist arguments against precipitating a clash with the Germans partly resembled those of the Templars. Like the German settlers, the Jews did not lack grave problems of their own. They, too, did not wish to arouse the anger of the German government and were uncertain as to the latter's stand in the event of real conflict between the two camps. Such a conflict would have hindered the efforts of the Jews to operate in as peaceful and quiet a fashion as possible in Palestine. For these reasons in particular the Zionist movement preferred to restrain itself with regard to manifestations of German hostility. At the same time it is clear that many of the Zionists would not have been sorry if the Germans had packed their belongings and moved to German East

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 14.5.1908, pp. 158-159; 21.5.1908, pp. 163-164.

Africa.³⁹ This possibility was then extensively discussed by the Germans, mainly as a result of the effect of Lorch's dire warnings.⁴⁰ In 1911, Lorch headed a new Templar campaign against the Zionist project. The impetus was provided this time by the lengthy deliberations in the Turkish parliament at Constantinople, during which the claim was voiced that Germany was the chief beneficiary of Zionist activity in Palestine. The Templars claimed that in addition to their other faults, the Zionists were now blackening Germany's good name. Lorch, therefore, hastened to declare that not only was there no connection between the German settlers and the Jewish settlers in Palestine, but that the Germans regarded with grave concern Jewish plans to establish a "Jewish Reich with its centre in Jerusalem" and sincerely hoped that Turkey would succeed in restraining these activities.⁴¹ On this occasion, as well, the Jews controlled themselves. Furthermore, on the occasion of the transfer of the editorial office of the *Warte* from Stuttgart to Jerusalem (January 1912), and also apparently out of fear that its influence might thus increase, the organ of the Zionist movement published an article calling on the Templars to display understanding towards the interests which Germans and Jews held in common in Palestine. It stressed the advantages which the German settlers and Germany in general could derive from the Jewish settlers, the majority of whom spoke German and preferred commercial ties with Germany.⁴²

In this period Germany was not only the abode of most of the institutions of the Zionist Organization and its leaders, but also, as the main ally of Turkey, was likely in the course of time, to lessen Turkish opposition to the Zionist project. The Zionists (and above all German Zionists) therefore had a vital interest in the maintenance of good relations with this world power which had often been of service to the Jewish community in Palestine.⁴³

British displeasure at the pro-German tendencies displayed by the Zionists was reflected in *The Times* of London.⁴⁴ The author of an article published there emphasized these tendencies and warned against British support for Zionist activity in Palestine which might not only affect the attitude of the Arab world towards Great Britain but also bring the British in time to the conclusion that "...we had worked 'pour le roi de Prusse' whom we had mistaken for King Solomon."

³⁹ See, for example, *ha-Po'el ha-Tza'ir*, 24.10.1910, p. 6, and compare *ha-Zman*, 14.7.1914, p. 2.

⁴⁰ *Warte*, 16.4.1908, pp. 123-124; *Deutsche Erde* (Gotha), 1908, p. 60.

⁴¹ *Warte*, 18.5.1911, pp. 161-162; 1.6.1911, pp. 169-170.

⁴² *Die Welt*, 13.10.1911, pp. 1083-1084.

⁴³ Mordechai Eliav, "The German Consulate in Jerusalem and the Jews in Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century," *Zionism* (Tel-Aviv), Vol. I (1970), pp. 57-83.

⁴⁴ *The Times*, 28.9.1912, p. 5.

The English Jew, Herbert Bentwich, opposed this standpoint of the *Times'* Constantinople correspondent in a letter to the editor.⁴⁵ There he stressed the Zionist attachment to Great Britain, and regarding the dangers to be anticipated from the Arab world, he claimed that the hostility of the Arab population of Palestine towards the Jewish settlers was mainly the fruit of the efforts of the envious German settlers.

The negative publicity won by the German settlers as a result of this new controversy which extended beyond the borders of Palestine, was apparently one of the factors which led the leaders of the Templar Association to restrain their attacks against Zionism from then on. In the same period, the German settlers made frantic attempts to prevent the Berlin government from sacrificing German interests in Palestine to France within the framework of a settlement among the great powers aimed at solving the problems aroused by the competition between them throughout the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁶ In their search for an ally in their fight against the possibility of a changeover to French rule in Palestine (which they thought would constitute the death-blow to their settlements), the German settlers could no longer ignore the large Jewish community in Palestine. There was general agreement with regard to the fact that the Templar settlements constituted a German stronghold in Palestine, but the central point in the reports of consuls and admirals and in the articles published in Germany was now the weighty Jewish element in the Holy Land which could be exploited for the furthering of German interests. Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the Jewish community was regarded by the German settlers as a weapon to be utilized so as to prove that Germany had too much to lose in Palestine to abandon it to France. It was against this background that, on the eve of the First World War, relations between the German settlers and the Jews improved. This change found expression in articles in the *Warte* regarding Jewish settlement which were favourably received by the Zionist press. It appears, therefore, that in the end the German settlers, however unenthusiastically, decided to accept the strong Jewish presence in Palestine, just as their patrons, the German government, had done.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.10.1912, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Memorandum of Gottlieb Schumacher, member of the German settlement in Haifa, to the Württemberg Foreign Ministry, 9.9.1913, in the Stuttgart-Hauptstaatsarchiv, Cabinet Files IV (*Sects and Visionaries*) E 14 (1585). Schumacher submitted a similar memorandum to the Imperial Foreign Office in Berlin.

27. ITALIAN ECONOMIC PENETRATION IN PALESTINE (1908-1919)*

by SERGIO MINERBI

I

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Italy, having come out of a period of economic depression, was not adequately industrialized in the modern sense of the term; although agriculture in the north of the country achieved results as gratifying as that of neighbouring states, the south, in contrast, could not follow the same pace, due to the poverty of the soil and lack of irrigation.

Italy lacked the necessary raw materials for the development of industry; she did not possess coal and her iron ore resources were poor. The number of railroads could be increased only with difficulty, hampered by the physical realities of the country, which were frequently hostile to man and which therefore rendered the construction of each new line very costly. In the financial sphere, the wars of independence had left the legacy of a huge public debt. In addition, the difference in standard of living between a small stratum of very wealthy people as contrasted with a vast, miserable proletariat provoked grave social tensions. Illiteracy was still quite widespread, and impoverished peasants, in increasing numbers, sought a solution to their problems in emigration.

After 1900, Italy saw a period of relative prosperity, dominated by the liberal reformist policies of Prime Minister Giolitti.¹ The national balance sheet showed a profit between 1899 and 1910, salaries rose appreciably and the mortality rate declined. Thus began an era of greater wealth characterized by confidence in the stability of the state, to which the increased volume of bank deposits bears testimony.

* This article is partly based on a chapter in my book *L'Italie et la Palestine, 1914-1920*, P.U.F., Paris, 1970.

¹ Giovanni Giolitti (1842-1928), one of the most prominent Italian statesmen, was Minister of the Treasury in the Crispi Cabinet (1889-1890); Minister of the Interior in the Zanardelli Cabinet (1901-1903); President of the Council during the period 1903-1914, with the exception of several brief lapses; he left the government in 1914, to return only in 1920.

The new electric power stations and the import of coal contributed to the development of industry, which nevertheless remained at an unequal level of efficiency, due to *étatist* protectionism.

Foreign trade also underwent rapid growth. From 1901 to 1913 imports rose by 61 % and exports by 14 %; thus in 1913 the total value of imports amounted to 3,600,000,000 lire.² The deficit in the trade balance was made up by the earnings of emigrants, tourism and maritime services.

Emigration not only constituted an important source of foreign currency, but also served as a solution for the grave problem of a surplus of manpower. Approximately 500,000 persons left Italy each year to go to Tunisia, Argentina, southern France and, later, the United States. During the single year 1913, 872,000 emigrants were registered; just before World War I, in 1914, 35 million Italians lived in Italy, while 5 or 6 million were scattered throughout the world.

While scanty, this picture of the Italian economy at the beginning of the twentieth century is important in order to understand the policy pursued by Italy in her commercial and economic penetration into Palestine during the period under consideration.

The President of the Council, Giolitti, had been accused of not having faith in the "mission of Italy in the world." Indeed, he thought that, after the sad end of Italy's colonial adventures, terminated by the debacle of Adua in 1896, Italy could not follow an expansionist foreign policy and was obliged to act with great prudence and modesty. In the Mediterranean basin, Italian designs mainly concerned Libya, which seemed to be a natural outlet for Italian emigration, whereas the attention of Italian financial groups was directed towards the Levant, and especially Anatolia.

Italian interest in Palestine was limited and Italy's actions were geared primarily towards thwarting French influence in that country. To this end Italy tried to fully exploit the Catholic religious element. In 1905 an agreement was reached between Italy and France over the protection of their religious institutions in the Levant. Italy thereby hoped to bring an end to the French religious protectorate in Palestine.³

We will confine ourselves in this study to examining Italy's economic penetration in Palestine, mainly on the basis of unpublished documents found in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Archives in Rome.

² Cf. G. Salvemini, *Le Origini del Fascismo in Italia*, Milano, 1961, p. 12.

³ On the problems of the religious protectorate, cf. S. Minerbi, "L'Italie contre le protectorat religieux français en Palestine 1914-1920," *Asian and African Studies*, Vol. IV (1968).

II

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Italian influence in the economic life of Palestine was still very modest, and not comparable to the flourishing commercial transactions which were developed at the time of the maritime republics of Genoa and Venice. In the years 1909–1912, trade with Italy constituted only a small percentage of the total trade of Palestine, whose products were exported primarily to England and Egypt, while imports came principally from Turkey and England.⁴

The Young Turk coup in 1908 and the new atmosphere of commercial and industrial development which seemed to spring from it served as an encouragement for the revival of Italian economic activity in Palestine.

Count Senni, Italian Consul General in Jerusalem, was particularly active during this period and proposed numerous economic projects to his Ministry.

The objective of the Italian government was to favour Italian colonization Palestine so as to offer a new outlet for emigrants. The main points of the program of activity envisaged by Senni are well put in one of his reports, which it is interesting to quote here. In 1909 he proposed the opening in Palestine of a new branch of the Banco di Roma and wrote in this respect:

The greatest field of activity presents itself to the "Banco di Roma", in fact, in Palestine. The mining industry of phosphates and bitumens in which Palestine abounds, the concession of vast areas of arable land along the Dead Sea and the Jordan and in the plain of Sharon which the new régime has taken away from the Sultan's administration and which can greatly serve our emigration, the opening of new lines of communication, the construction of new stretches of railroad and of a port in Jaffa or Haifa, the supplying of water, of light, etc ... are all businesses which respond perfectly to the present awakening of activity and, more important for the real needs of the country, promise the greatest and most secure profit. It will not be superfluous if I remark that the Italian initiative in Palestine is not suspect of having any political aims and finds today, more than any foreign initiative, even favour and sympathy.⁵

In July, 1909, Count Senni discussed this same project in Rome with Signor Pacelli, the cousin of the future Pope Pius XII. During this conversation, Senni emphasized the importance which the financing of agricultural and industrial enterprises in Palestine by the Banco di Roma would have for

⁴ Cf. statistics on Palestine's foreign commerce, based on British consular sources cited in Sokolov, *History of Zionism*, II, p. 397.

⁵ Archivio Storico del Ministero Esteri-ASME (Historical Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome), Casella 40, Fasc. 579, *alde-memoire* in Senni's handwriting, no date.

Italian emigration. Pacelli was interested in the proposition and promised to inform the Director of the Bank in Alexandria.⁶ But, as we shall see, it was only after the end of the war that the Banco di Roma opened branches in Palestine.

Did the Libyan war and the efforts of economic expansion in Asia Minor prevent, perhaps, the realization of this project before the outbreak of World War I?

III

During this period, the building of railroads in the Ottoman Empire attracted the attention of all the European powers engaged in the race for concessions to their political influence and economic benefits. The division of the Ottoman Empire into zones of influence after World War I followed, to a large extent, the lines already drawn by the dividing up of railroad concessions.

In Palestine, where France was very active, the first railroad was built by the "Société de Chemins de Fer Ottoman de Jaffa à Jérusalem" with a capital of 14 million francs.⁷ Several years later, in 1900, the Damascus-Amman-Hejaz railroad was begun, to be completed in 1908. The section Der'a-Tzemah-Haifa was open to traffic in 1905.⁸

In this perspective, it is easy to understand that Count Senni tried to interest his government in a project for developing railroads in Palestine.

In 1908 he sent a report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rome to explain his interest in a new railroad line which would link Palestine with Egypt on one end, and with Syria, via Haifa, on the other. Concerning this matter he wrote:

Palestine seems to be drawn into the sphere of activity of this great commercial centre which is Egypt. When one thinks of the deplorable condition of Jaffa Bay, completely open to the sea, which makes the construction of a port impossible except at the price of huge economic sacrifices; when one notes that in the small bay of Gaza (in the South), where at one single pier, exposed to the moving sands, with a few buildings, about four million tons of grain are nevertheless loaded each year, it is easy to see the importance of opening a direct and

⁶ ASME, Casella 40, Fasc. 579; Letter written by Senni, from Rome, to Levi at the ministry, dated 23.7.1909. The conversation between Senni and Pacelli had taken place the same day and had been arranged by Levi.

⁷ Cf. J. Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-20*, London, 1968, p. 6.

⁸ Cf. Shim'oni, *Medinot 'Arav beYamenu (The Arab States Today)*, Tel-Aviv, 1965, p. 51.

secure railway line from Jaffa to Gaza and, across the fertile plains of the coast, via El-Arish, to the Suez Canal.⁹

Senni thought that railroads would be preferred over boats due to the higher tariffs of the latter and the difficulties inherent in loading. He also thought that this line would be able to attract many tourists visiting Egypt. A corresponding section could link Jaffa to Haifa, where the already existing railroad would be able to link Syria to Palestine and Egypt.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome took the proposition of its Consul General seriously into consideration. It is interesting to note that the dossier was treated by the office of the Director General of Political Affairs. This office contacted the public works company Almagià, one of the most important Italian companies, which had, among other things, built the piers and a breakwater in the port of Alexandria in Egypt. This company decided to send the engineer Ambron to Constantinople in order to try to obtain new contracts. In this context the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tittoni, announcing the arrival of the engineer Ambron to the Italian Embassy in Constantinople, wrote:

The royal government is in favour of important national enterprises securing work for themselves in the Orient because the projects which they will carry out can lead to an increase of our influence in these regions.¹⁰

It is thus clear that the Minister was ready to encourage the activities of Italian enterprises in Palestine, hoping, above all, to thereby increase the political influence of Italy.

For nearly three years the project in question had to be abandoned, due to the opposition of the Anglo-Egyptian government to giving its authorization for the passage of the railroad through Egyptian territory. The Sublime Porte, on its part, refused even to discuss the possible concession of a subsidy per kilometre.

At the end of May 1911, Consul General Senni renewed his proposal in the light of new events. He proposed a line from Jerusalem to Beisan, which would link Jerusalem to Haifa and to Damascus as well as to the principal centres of Palestine (Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin). The consul also suggested requesting from the Ottoman government the concession for

⁹ ASME — Bundle 745/1131 — Letter from Senni to Tittoni, Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 7 November 1908, No. 648/115. Tommaso Tittoni (1855–1931) was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Giolitti Cabinet (1903–1905); Ambassador in London (1906); Minister of Foreign Affairs in a new Giolitti Cabinet (1906–1909); Ambassador in Paris (1910); Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Nitti Cabinet (1919).

¹⁰ ASME — Bundle 745/1131 — Letter from Minister Tittoni to Ambassador Mayor in Constantinople, dated 18 November 1908, No. 67616/1099.

exploitation of the Dead Sea or lands in the Jordan valley, instead of a subsidy per kilometre:

This concession could revive the former project of an eventual Italian agricultural colonization in Palestine, a project in which I have always been interested, considering the definite advantages which our emigrants would have in a country which is almost at the gates of the Empire and which is under the régime of the capitulations.

A second line would leave Jerusalem for Bethlehem, Hebron and Beersheba. The last portion of the railroad, up to the Suez Canal, would thus become indispensable and so the political opposition could be defeated.¹¹

Regarding this matter, the Italian ambassador in Constantinople, Mayor, thought that the new railroad should, above all, provide an outlet for labour rather than for Italian capital:

The project of Italian colonization in Palestine could be accepted by the Turks on the one condition that it would serve as a barrier to German and Zionist colonizations. But neither the government nor public opinion is, in general, in favour of an intrusion of foreigners into the Empire in large numbers.¹²

Grimani, the Italian diplomatic representative in Cairo, was much more skeptical, either because the opposition of the British government seemed to him unchanged, or because, from the point of view of the economic viability, the new project would require a throughgoing study, not only of the railroad, but also of the actual resources of the lands demanded in concession.¹³

The untiring Count Senni raised the question once more in September 1913. According to him, Egyptian policy was going to yield soon to the necessities of progress and to the need for *rapprochement* with the neighbouring Arab states. In the meantime, the Afula-Jenin portions of the Jerusalem line had already been constructed.

Another project was launched in December 1910 to exploit the phosphate deposits at al-Şalt. An Italian firm had been given the concession on 4 August 1910, and in December the engineer Coulant had to go to the premises and build a cable railway to transport the minerals to the Damascus-Amman-Hejaz railway.

¹¹ ASME — Bundle 745/1131 — Letter from Senni to the Minister dated 30 May 1911, No. 338/44.

¹² ASME — Bundle 754/1131 — Letter from Mayor to the Minister dated 14 June 1911, No. 2579/735.

¹³ ASME — Bundle 745/1131 — Letter from Grimani to the Minister dated 11 July 1911, No. 1216/439.

According to the register of costs imposed by the Ottoman government, the concessionaires were to build a railroad about twenty-eight kilometres long which would cost 2,800,000 francs and to build the port of Haifa at an anticipated cost of ten million francs.¹⁴ In the second year of exploitation (1911–1912), 25,000 tons of phosphates would have to be extracted in order to reach 100,000 tons later, after the construction of the railroad and the port.¹⁵

But a more thorough examination of the sites gave a negative result. The purity of the ore was very high (70%–80%), but the reserves were, in contrast, much smaller than anticipated and were not able to provide the desired quantity. This disappointing conclusion was reached after a contract was signed with the German company, Kaiser, for supplying steel columns and cables for the cable railway worth about 300,000 francs.¹⁶

Another element of the Italian presence in Palestine was the opening of a post office in Jerusalem. Russia, France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece and Egypt had long since organized their own postal services in the Ottoman Empire. To increase Italian influence it was decided in Rome to institute a postal service similar to those of the other Powers. The first office was established in 1900 at Tripoli and several others were created in the same year. In 1908 five new offices were suddenly and simultaneously opened: in Salonica, Izmir, Jerusalem, Valona and Constantinople. Turkish opposition was broken and from 21 April 1908 these offices were officially recognized. The Italian post office in Jerusalem was opened on 1 June 1908. Closed on 1 October 1911 because of the Italo-Turkish war in Libya, it was reopened one year later, on 1 December 1912. According to the financial records from the first two years of operation which we have recovered, it can be ascertained that the Jerusalem office made a profit.¹⁷ Its importance, however, was modest: in 1909 its turnover was 15,000 francs, as contrasted with 100,000 francs for the Russian post office and 250,000 francs for the Austrian post office.¹⁸

¹⁴ ASME — Casella 38 — Letter from Mayor to the Minister dated 2 December 1910, No. 4120/1247.

¹⁵ ASME — Casella 38 — Letter from Mayor to the Minister di San Giuliano dated 16 December 1910, No. 4415/1296.

¹⁶ ASME — Casella 38 — Letter from Mayor to the Minister dated 15 March 1911, No. 1195/312 on the contract, and letter from Mayor to the Minister dated 14 June 1911, No. 2582/738, on the disappointing results of Ing. Coulant's journey to Palestine.

¹⁷ ASME — Casella 35, Fasc. 475 — Memorandum, no date; "Notizia sulla istituzione delle poste italiane in Levante."

¹⁸ Cf. L. Buzzetti, "Le Poste italiane in Palestina," *Il Collezionista*, No. 17 (September, 1968).

IV

Of all these projects, the most serious was the creation of a branch of the Banco di Roma in Palestine. The relations between the Italian government and the Banco di Roma were examined in depth in a memorandum prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, probably in 1914,¹⁹ in which it was noted that the Government had only two institutions at its disposal for a possible foreign action: the Banco di Roma and the Banco Commerciale.

The Government's relations with the Banco di Roma were interrupted by the Italian conquest of Libya and by the legal disputes arising from the Bank's activities in that country; the memorandum called for immediate resumption of relations between the government and the Banco di Roma, because it was not opportune to rely upon a single institution and because of its relations with the Church. The Bank would be allowed to extend its activities in Syria, Egypt and Abyssinia. After 1909, as we have seen, the Minister of Foreign Affairs looked with favour upon the establishment of a branch of the Banco di Roma in Jerusalem. Several obstacles however, hindered the realization of this project, and the outbreak of the war delayed it more. It was necessary to wait for the conquest of Palestine by the Allies at the end of 1917. In the meantime there had been disputes between the government and the Banco di Roma. However, in 1918 the Bank was thought to be one of the rare effective means which the government could employ for Italian economic expansion, especially in the Levant.

At the beginning of the postwar period, the Banco di Roma had a pure "Mediterranean vocation," a leaning which could perhaps explain its expansion in the Levant. Although there existed at this time neither marketing studies nor thorough economic investigations which could direct its activity, the Banco di Roma sought to expand itself through the entire Mediterranean basin, as it had already begun to do before the Libyan war. This vague desire, encouraged by the fact that banking organization in the Middle East was still almost non-existent and that there was a favourable opportunity to expand, could explain the motives for the opening of the Banco di Roma branches in Palestine.²⁰

The Bank had in fact decided "since many years" to complete its Mediter-

¹⁹ ASME — Dossier 187. Copy of an undated and unsigned memorandum titled "Il Regio Governo ed il Banco di Roma." On the bottom is written: "copy taken from position 17/50 of the confidential archives of 1914." The memorandum is filed in the same dossier as that in which the following document is found.

²⁰ These observations are based on interviews held in Rome by the author in November, 1966, with Messrs. Cambieri and Picella, of the Management of the Banco di Roma.

anean network by opening new branches in Jerusalem, Beirut and Izmir.²¹ On 17 June 1918, the Board of Directors of the Bank unanimously approved the proposition of the directing committee to open an agency in Jerusalem subordinate to the headquarters in Egypt.²² On the same day the general delegate of the Franciscans in Rome Bernardino Klumper wrote to Count Manzoni to request his intervention in order to "facilitate" the opening of a branch of the Bank in Jerusalem.²³ The coincidence of dates should not be at all surprising as the Vatican controlled the Banco di Roma at this time and it is clear that there existed quite strong ties between the Bank and the church people.

But several days previously, at the request of the management of the Banco di Roma, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonnino,²⁴ had already submitted the problem to the President of the Council Orlando,²⁵ simultaneously informing the Minister of Industry and Commerce and the Minister of the Treasury. Sonnino asked if he should support the initiative by diplomatic channels "without barring the way to initiatives of our other banks."²⁶ Sonnino thus did not want to concede a monopoly to the Banco di Roma and, as we will see later, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in fact also supported other initiatives of this type which had no immediate results.

The Minister of Industry and Commerce, on his part, expressed an opinion which was clearly favourable to the opening of an agency of the Bank in Jerusalem, since it seemed opportune for an Italian bank to intervene side by side with "those of the Allied countries to act in this city where we have considerable interests, and I deem that the Banco di Roma, considering its character and tendency already displayed in its activities in the countries

²¹ Central State Archives (Rome) — Telegram from Sonnino to Orlando dated 21.10.18, No. 15025, in which he transcribes a communication from the Banco di Roma.

²² Archives of the Banco di Roma — Minutes of a session of the Council on 17.6.18. The documents of these archives were most graciously lent by Mr. Picella.

²³ ASME — Dossier 187. Letter dated 17.6.18 from Klumper to Manzoni, at the bottom: "8/6. Galli." Count Gaetano Manzoni was Director General of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome (1913–1920); Carlo Galli was an official of the same directorship, responsible for Palestinian Affairs (January 1918–January 1919).

²⁴ Baron Sidney Sonnino (1847–1922), Minister of Finance in both Crispi Cabinets (1893–1894 and 1894–1896); President of the Council (1906 and 1909–1910); Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Salandra and Orlando Cabinets (1914–1919).

²⁵ Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (1860–1952); Minister of Education (1903–1905); Minister of Justice (1907–1909 and 1914–1916); Minister of the Interior (1916–1917); President of the Council from 29 October 1917 to June 1919.

²⁶ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Sonnino to Orlando dated 15.6.18, No. 8661. Cf. Central State Archives.

of the Orient, is particularly recommended for establishment in this country."²⁷

The Minister of Industry and Commerce relied also on vague interests which were no better specified, concerning the oriental tendencies of the Bank, similar to the "Mediterranean vocation" cited above, but he did not attempt to submit the request to a serious economic study.

The question must have seemed urgent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for ten days after Sonnino's first request, the Under-Secretary of State Borsarelli solicited a response from Orlando.²⁸

The President of the Council finally responded in the affirmative because it seemed to him opportune that Italy should not remain a stranger to the banking activities of Palestine, but he expressed no opinion on which banking institution to choose and advised coordinating the activity with the two economic ministries.²⁹

After the expression of favourable opinion by the Minister of Industry and Commerce, the Minister of the Treasury also gave his authorization "while doubting that the initiative of the Banco di Roma could answer the particular needs of Italian commerce."³⁰

V

While the Italian diplomats endeavored to obtain authorization for opening the new agency in Jerusalem from the British authorities, the idea arose of creating a special Italian banking institution reserved especially for economic expansion in Egypt and Palestine.

During the first day of July, Mr. Soarez, head of the Jewish community of Alexandria in Egypt, came to Rome, where he had a long conversation with Mr. Galli at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Soarez emphasized the economic advantages which England would gain in Palestine and advised the Italian government to intervene by way of suitable agreements with London in order "to claim our legitimate share of influence and public works." He proposed in addition the establishment of a very powerful

²⁷ Central State Archives — Telegram from the Minister of Industry and Commerce to Orlando dated 18.6.18, No. 1154.

²⁸ Central State Archives — Telegram from Borsarelli to Orlando dated 25.6.18, No. 21351.

²⁹ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Orlando to Sonnino dated 27.6.18, No. 516; cf. Central State Archives.

³⁰ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Nitti to the Minister of Industry and Commerce of July 1918, No. 38.369. Francesco Saverio Nitti (1868–1953) was Minister of Agriculture in the Giolitti Cabinet (1911–1914); Minister of the Treasury in the Orlando Cabinet (1917–1919); President of the Council from 23.6.1919 to 15.6.1920.

banking organization for the protection of Italian interests in the Levant, which, however, could not be the Banco di Roma, which seemed to him "not organized to meet these goals."³¹

Manzoni, the Director of Political Affairs, passed Soarez's report to the Minister, adding a note in his own hand in which he emphasized the necessity for the ambassador in London, Imperiali, to define, together with Sykes,³² "the course of action suitable for each of the Allies." Manzoni anticipated soliciting the Banco di Roma to "execute quickly a precise plan of economic exploitation" while also inviting the banking consortium, which had finally been established, to take an interest in the question.³³

Sonnino fully approved Manzoni's proposals, and about ten days later cabled Soragna, head of the Italian Mission to Palestine who was just about to leave Egypt for Jerusalem, asking him for details about the English and French banks operating in Palestine, land purchases by the English and, in a general way, the activities of the English, who had taken a lead in monopolies which might undermine future Italian initiatives.³⁴

But Soragna did not receive the British authorization to proceed immediately to Jerusalem, and in the interim it was Negrotto, in Egypt, who maintained relations with the English military authorities. Negrotto had just visited Palestine and had already pointed out in his detailed report of July³⁵ that two English banks (the Anglo-Palestine and Anglo-Egyptian) and one French bank (Crédit Lyonnais) were operating in Palestine. In the same report he stated that he had already begun proceedings to gain authorization for the Banco di Roma to open a branch "even if for the present it would remain passive."

Following Sonnino's telegram, Negrotto at the beginning of August again raised the problem with General Clayton;³⁶ the latter replied that the principle adopted was that of *status quo* and that the only new bank in Palestine, the Anglo-Egyptian, was concerned exclusively with the

³¹ ASME — Dossier 187 — report by Soarez to Galli dated 11.7.18.

³² Sir Mark Sykes, Under-Secretary in the British war cabinet (1916–19).

³³ ASME — Dossier 187 — *Aide-memoire* from Manzoni to Sonnino dated 25.7.18. On the bottom: "O.K. — Sonnino" "16/VII. Galli."

³⁴ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Sonnino to Meli Lupi di Soragna dated 26.7.18, No. 826.

³⁵ ASME — Dossier 184 — Very confidential letter from Negrotto to Sonnino, from Bulkeley dated 19.7.18, No. 1915. At the bottom: "Galli — 29/8." Lazzaro Negrotto Cambiaso was Italy's diplomatic agent and Consul General in Cairo.

³⁶ Sir Gilbert Clayton, "Chief Political Officer" (1917–1919) of the Egyptian Expeditionary Corps.

military administration. He added that General Allenby³⁷ would cable London to clarify the case of the Banco di Roma which, before the war, had already initiated steps to open a branch in Palestine.³⁸

Ambassador Imperiali intervened immediately in London, but received a negative response from Lord Cecil, who argued the necessity of maintaining the *status quo*, which did not permit the opening of new banks.³⁹

Several days later, Allenby gave a similar reply to Negrotto.⁴⁰

In the meantime, the project launched by Soares in July followed its course. Soares revealed his idea to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and submitted another memorandum on the subject. He proposed creating a new banking organization, to be designated Banco Italo-Orientale, with a capital of 25 million lire and with its headquarters in Egypt.

According to Soares there were good arguments in favour of this project, on which he wrote:

The necessity for participating in the movement of penetration in the Orient, for preparing for the postwar period the wide range of activities which is becoming available to our industry and commerce with the support of the existing flourishing Italian communities, is of an urgent nature. The Bank, in my opinion, should be in full operation before the end of the war and before the destiny of the Near East is definitively decided. The four largest institutions of credit in Italy should take part in the establishment (of this bank) in order to tackle the problem with the maximum force and with the unity which must prevail in all our foreign endeavours.

It is noteworthy that according to Soares, and as others had already proposed, it was possible to exploit the Italian Jewish communities in the Mediterranean in order to expand Italian commercial transactions.⁴¹ Furthermore, by indicating the urgency of taking the lead, he was understandably trying to arouse the Italian rulers who, paralysed by their struggle against the French religious protectorate, were not sufficiently worried

³⁷ Hyman Henry Edmund Allenby, Viscount of Megiddo, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Egypt and Palestine (1917-1919).

³⁸ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Negrotto to Sonnino dated 8.8.18, No. 1730.

³⁹ ASME — Dossier 187 — Letter from Cecil to Imperiali dated 16.8.18.

⁴⁰ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Negrotto to Sonnino dated 31.8.18, No. 1917.

⁴¹ The idea of utilizing Italian Jews in the Mediterranean basin was not new. In February 1918, Manzoni had already proposed action along these lines to Minister Sonnino. Later, in 1919, Italy sent a battleship, "Coatit", to the Mediterranean with Commander Levi Bianchini to win over the Sephardi Jews. Cf. S. Minerbi, *Angelo Levi Bianchini e la sua opera nel Levante, 1918-1920*, Milan, 1967.

about the *de facto* monopoly which England had acquired in Palestine in the economic sphere.

In submitting the Soarez memorandum to Orlando and the economic ministers, Sonnino recalled the difficulties raised by the English at the opening of the branch of the Banco di Roma in Jerusalem, but expressed his opinion to adopt "every Italian initiative, without exception, to develop in the Near East, whilst taking into consideration the position acquired by the Banco di Roma."⁴²

On this occasion as well, the President of the Council asked for the opinion of the economic ministries,⁴³ and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce replied immediately that it regarded "with great sympathy every initiative taken to promote the development of our commercial activities in the East."⁴⁴ However, in this case, as before for the Banco di Roma, there was no strictly economic base which could support the great sympathy of the Ministry.

Several days later the Minister of the Treasury also gave his response, writing *inter alla*:

In principle, I cannot but consider, with the greatest sympathy, every sound initiative to expand activities in the Near East, and in a conference which was held several months ago with the principal bankers of the Kingdom, I most heartily recommended that they examine a banking program to be undertaken in the Mediterranean Basin. I consider it necessary, however, to avoid among the various organizations any competition, from which the national economy can hope no profit.⁴⁵

The general tone seems much more favourable than it was several months before; yet we are unaware of what provoked this change. But despite the declarations of sympathy, it does not seem that the initiative for the new bank had immediate consequences.

While new projects were being discussed in Rome, diplomatic negotiations in London ended in success, and in October 1918 the English authorities finally approved the opening of the branch of the Banco di Roma. General

⁴² Central State Archives — Telegram from Sonnino to Orlando, to the Ministers of Treasury and of Commerce and Industry dated 1.10.18, No. 14081.

⁴³ Central State Archives — Telegram from Flores, Chief of the Cabinet of the Council Presidency to the Ministers of Treasury and of Industry and Commerce dated 5.10.18, No. 1780.

⁴⁴ Central State Archives — Telegram from the Minister of Commerce and Industry to the Council Presidency dated 8.10.18.

⁴⁵ Central State Archives — Telegram from the Ministry of the Treasury to the Council Presidency dated 11.10.18, No. 222824.

ITALIAN ECONOMIC PENETRATION

Clayton cabled the authorization of the military authorities to London in early October,⁴⁶ and simultaneously in London, Graham, of the Foreign Office, confirmed in writing to Prince Borghese, the Italian Chargé d'Affairs, that the authorization was awarded on the sole condition that the Bank transfer to Jerusalem gold reserves proportional to the capital which it wished to grant the branch.⁴⁷

But, as frequently happens, once the greatly desired authorization had been obtained, the feeling of urgency was lost, and after waiting two weeks, Soragna cabled to get the personnel list of the new branch in order to facilitate their entry into Palestine.⁴⁸

In response to pressure by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the management of the Banco di Roma asserted on 18 October that they had already given cabled instructions to the Alexandria branch in Egypt so that the personnel transferred to Jerusalem would leave immediately.⁴⁹ Two months would pass, however, before they arrived in Jerusalem in mid-December,⁵⁰ and we assume that the branch of the Banco di Roma was effectively opened shortly thereafter. In November, 1918, in the meantime, the Board of Directors of the Bank had decided to open several branches in the Levant, including one in Jaffa, subordinate to the Jerusalem branch, and one in Haifa, subordinate to the branch in Beirut.⁵¹

Early in January, 1919, Soragna, in agreement with the Inspector of the Banco di Roma, Catafago, hoped that the Bank would be able to take advantage of the opportunity to put the finances of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate back in order, with political advantages for Italy.⁵² This idea may very well seem to us quite strange, since the Vatican, which controlled the Bank for several centuries, had poor relations with the Greek Orthodox Church.

⁴⁶ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Soragna to Sonnino dated 2.10.18, No. 2214.

⁴⁷ ASME — Dossier 187 — Letter from Graham to Borghese dated 2.10.18. The directing committee of the Bank took action on the English authorization and its condition at its first meeting of 5.10.18. Cf. Archives of the Banco di Roma; protocol of the meeting.

⁴⁸ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Soragna to Sonnino dated 14.10.18, No. 17428.

⁴⁹ ASME — Dossier 187 — Letter by Interdonato of the Central Management of the Bank (and one other illegible signature) to Sonnino dated 14.10.18 (piled also in Dossier 1564). Cf. Central State Archives, telegram from Sonnino to Orlando dated 21.10.18, No. 15025, in which he transmitted the communication of the Banco di Roma.

⁵⁰ ASME — Dossier 187 — Telegram from Soragna to Sonnino dated 15.12.18, No. 29958. At the bottom: "16/XII. Lago."

⁵¹ Archives of the Banco di Roma — Protocol of the Board of Directors meeting of 14.11.18.

⁵² ASME — Dossier 1258 — Soragna's report to Sonnino of 5.1.19.

Interdonato, one of the directors of the Banco di Roma who had gone to Palestine and Syria to open branches there, returned to Rome early in July, 1919. The British were causing difficulties, maintaining that it would be necessary to wait in order to receive the authorization of that Government which would eventually receive the final administration of these territories.

In spite of this, Interdonato opened the Jaffa and Haifa branches in Palestine, as well as many others in Syria at the same time.⁵³ The Jerusalem branch consisted of ten employees and had already taken in 600,000 lire in deposits.⁵⁴

Thus, the Banco di Roma constituted, in the period under discussion, the principal medium and most important manifestation of Italian economic penetration in Palestine.

VI

While distrusting Zionism because of its pro-English attitude, Italy repeatedly sought ways to gain a foothold in Palestine in order to obtain participation in tenders on public works, selling of Italian products and use of Italian means of transport. This trend remained unchanged for decades, and Mussolini himself requested of Weizmann, at their meeting of September 1926, that construction of the port of Haifa be entrusted to Italian companies.⁵⁵ The same kind of requests had already been formulated in 1918, as Weizmann testifies in his autobiography:

In the light of subsequent developments it is easy to understand the deep interest evinced by the Italians in Zionist activities in Palestine even in those early days. Already the Jewish National Home was viewed with a certain jealousy and suspicion as tending to strengthen British influence in 'Mare Nostrum'; and every effort was made to offset this by encouraging Italian participation in Palestine's economic development. It was repeatedly suggested to us that we might make use of Italian firms, Italian workers, Italian supplies for the execution of our preliminary work.⁵⁶

Commander Levi-Bianchini worked towards the same goal from the time of his arrival in Palestine at the end of August, 1918, and it appears that he achieved a first success since, when Weizmann met with Sonnino in Rome in September, 1918, he expressed the desire to immediately purchase six Fiat automobiles.

⁵³ ASME — Dossier 1564 — Handwritten note by Galli, on paper of the General Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 3.7.19.

⁵⁴ Archives of the Banco di Roma — Protocol of a Board of Directors meeting of 5.7.19.

⁵⁵ Cf. Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, London, 1949, p. 456.

⁵⁶ Weizmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 266-267.

The war had not yet ended and special authorization was necessary in order to purchase these vehicles. The Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs Borsarelli, cordially supporting Weizmann's request, emphasized that Jewish colonization projects in Palestine required "great quantities of automotive vehicles, especially tractors."⁵⁷ But, as always, the matter dragged on for a long time, and after several months Weizmann was obliged once again to solicit delivery.⁵⁸

Zionism provoked an important migratory movement towards Palestine, especially from Eastern Europe. It was thus possible to envisage a new source of activity for the Italian Merchant Marine and for the port of Trieste, only recently reunited with Italy. In July, 1919, Galli already reported to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that negotiations were in progress between the Zionists and Lloyd Triestino for a navigation agreement.⁵⁹ One year later the indefatigable Levi-Bianchini wrote from Jerusalem:

It is estimated that there are great possibilities for our ships to monopolize the transport of immigrants to Palestine and to open commercial relations with her and with the Orient.⁶⁰

As a result, Trieste effectively became the principal port of embarkation for Jewish immigrants, thus bringing considerable advantages to the economy of the city.

Soragna worked in a totally different direction: he hoped that the construction of a new Salesian professional school in Jerusalem would contribute to "attracting the attention of the population to Italy and to make them prone to commercial dealings with our country, to accept our initiative, to purchase our products."⁶¹

Soragna's idea was doubtlessly modern, and seems to recall those which today are defined as "technical aid." The idea had a certain commercial advantage. But there, as well, it was a matter of a long-term project and it does not seem that it could have had an important effect on Italian exports.

The results obtained by Italy in the economic sphere in Palestine were, as a whole, quite modest; but it must not be forgotten that, given the fluid

⁵⁷ ASME — Dossier 186 — Telegram from Borsarelli to the War Minister dated 23.9.18, No. 13601.

⁵⁸ Central Zionist Archives — M.Z.M. 2040 — Telegram from Weizmann to Sereni, from London dated 29.10.18.

⁵⁹ ASME — Report by Galli to the Minister dated 31.7.19.

⁶⁰ ASME — Dossier 1567 — Handwritten report by Levi-Bianchini, from Jerusalem, arrived 31.8.20 in Rome.

⁶¹ ASME — Soragna's report to the Minister dated 13.1.19, from Jerusalem.

situation of the time, it was a question of sowing rather than reaping. It was necessary to ensure the future by a policy of creating a presence, especially in the economic and commercial spheres. But the Italian authorities seemed so occupied with problems which would later have to be overcome, such as that of the religious protectorate, that they did not realize, as Negrotto had warned since July, 1918, that the English were in the process of gaining an economic monopoly in Palestine. How can one be surprised at this blindness when until August 1920 the Italians had not noticed that their Allies had shared among themselves all the oil in the Middle East, which was even more valuable?⁶²

⁶² It was only in August, 1920, that Imperiali protested against the Franco-English agreement of San Remo (25.4.20) for the sharing of Middle East oil. Cf., *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, First Series, Vol. XIII, No. 313, p. 342.

PART FIVE

THE IMPACT OF WESTERN CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY ON TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

28. THE INFLUENCE OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY ON THE ECONOMY OF PALESTINE DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by SHMUEL AVITSUR

I

At the beginning of the Middle Ages and during the Crusader period, Palestine, along with the other Middle Eastern countries, was more advanced economically and in quite a few industrial-technological fields (textiles, dyes, glassmaking, oil extraction, water-power utilization) than contemporary Europe. It was only in the late Middle Ages and Renaissance period that Europe started on its great technological stride forward, eventually leaving the East far behind. In the East progress had come to a virtual standstill, with the exception of the adoption of fire-arms and their manufacture; certain of its important industries either contracted (sugar), deteriorated (dyes), or disappeared altogether.

In its first centuries under Turkish rule Palestine was an insignificant imperial province with a small population which, except for the few coastal towns, was concentrated in the hilly inland districts. The Spanish-type textile industry for expensive woollen fabrics established in Safed during the sixteenth century started out vigorously, but had to be closed down one hundred years later because it could not compete with European fabrics.

The Industrial Revolution spread — hesitantly at first — from England, its country of origin, to Continental Europe and North America. The East, however, remained for a long time an object of exploitation: a source of raw materials and, increasingly later on, a market for modern industrial commodities.

At the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century, Palestine supplied the textile industries of several European countries, especially France, with raw cotton, and even exported coarse locally woven fabrics for garments of the negro slaves in the colonies.¹ In addition, a certain amount of grain was exported, as well as olive oil (which eventually became almost a semi-processed product and underwent additional

¹ C.M. Bazili, *Siriya i Palestina pod Turzskim pravitelstvom* (Syria and Palestine under Turkish rule), New ed., Moscow, 1962, p. 243 (Russian).

refining in France to be sold there as Oil of Provence), and a small quantity of soap. Imports consisted of a small number of industrial products and metals.

The influence of post-Industrial Revolution Western technology on the economy and society of Palestine up to the beginning of the twentieth century manifested itself in a number of different ways. Three stages in this influence may be discerned.

II

First Stage: In this stage the market was flooded with foreign-made cotton fabrics which were both cheaper and, in most cases, of superior quality to the local product. The local weavers could not stand up to this flood, being unable to compete in either quality or price. A severe crisis hit the textile centres of Syria — Damascus, Homs, Aleppo — which led to the contraction of the industry and, in certain of its branches to serious deterioration, and in a few cases even to complete liquidation.

The same crisis also hit Palestine, although after a certain delay. This was due to the fact that the locally woven cotton fabrics were chiefly destined for local consumption, unlike Syrian fabrics which, destined for export, had to be competitive in quality and cost; furthermore, they were handicapped by expensive overland transport as contrasted with the cheaper sea freight for the European fabrics.

Local textile centres like Bayt Jālā, Nablus, and later also Hebron and other towns, were either completely ruined and disappeared² or were reduced to the proportions of an ancillary trade furnishing an additional pittance to the hard-hit craftsman now struggling to make a living in other ways. Yet other centres, such as Migdal-Gad and Gaza, as well as isolated workshops in some of the aforementioned places, rode out the crisis by changing their methods. The spinning of locally grown cotton was abandoned and instead English-made cotton yarn was imported. In this way the enormous gap in cost between primitive local hand spinning and European mechanized production was considerably narrowed. The weavers of Migdal and Gaza, offering traditional fabrics which suited the habits, tastes and purses of their fellah customers, were able to compete successfully because of the very low piece-work wages paid, the use of imported yarn and a productive set-up reminiscent of the fifteenth- to eighteenth-century workshops in Europe.

Mechanical spinning and weaving were not introduced into Palestine until the end of the Turkish period, with the exception of a silk yarn factory

² G. Dalman, *Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina*, Gütersloh, 1935, V, 55.

set up in Rosh Pina at the end of the nineteenth century, and a workshop in the Alliance School in Jerusalem.

In a sense, the history of the cotton fabrics was repeated, though on a smaller scale, with several other local products. Yet parallel with this negative aspect of Western technological influence, there was also a positive, or seemingly positive, aspect, namely, the growing demand for raw materials such as cotton and agricultural produce on the European markets. Exports to Europe, especially to France, of wheat and other cereals, including fodders, were increased, except in years of drought, war and epidemics. These exports were, however, overwhelmingly at the expense of the nutritional standards of the local peasant population, which had to pledge part of its harvests to repay debts at exorbitant rates of interest, and meet the crushing burden of taxation. This was burdensome not only because of the high "legal" imposts, but also because of the manner and ruthlessness of the collection. The increase in exports eventually led to an increase in imports, smaller in volume and, as stated, partly at the expense of goods formerly produced in the country.

The steamship, once it appeared, brought Palestine closer to the world market, and eventually integrated it with this market. This process started on a small scale in the 1840's, and by then regular steamship services were making calls, at monthly or twenty-day intervals, at most Mediterranean ports. This made it possible to reach Jaffa from Marseilles or Trieste within twenty to twenty-three days, either directly or by trans-shipping at Izmir or Alexandria.

These steamships, though the first evidence of the European Industrial Revolution that was visibly revealed to the local inhabitants, as yet filled no real function in the country's economy. In the 1840's 1850's, and even at the beginning of the 1860's, most cargos destined for Palestine or sent from it were carried either in small local sailing boats or large European sailing ships. Yet the steamship had a decisive influence in two other respects:

A. *Piracy* — The coming of the steamship finally eliminated Mediterranean piracy, which had its lairs both along the North African coast and on the Aegean islands. Anyone sailing on steamships, which were chiefly intended for carrying passengers, could rest assured that he or she would not be robbed on the high seas, or, worse still, find himself or herself seized and sold into slavery or a harem.

B. *Year-Round Maritime Traffic* — Until the coming of steamship, the winter months were a dead season for the country's harbours. The local sailing boats could not risk the open sea for fear of storms, while for the large European sailing ships there was no sheltered anchorage nor the opportunity to anchor on the open sea and load their cargo with the aid of

lighters. A first attempt to eliminate this dead season was made during the rule of Dāhir al-'Umar, who turned Haifa into the "winter port" of Acre. But above all, it was the steamship that made year-round shipping possible. Only a fierce storm, for instance, could prevent a ship from anchoring off Jaffa and oblige the captain to sail to Haifa, Beirut or an Egyptian port instead.

This period in the country's history also saw the first attempts at economic development, especially in the years of Muḥammad 'Alī's rule (1832-1840). The traditional basis for economic development was agricultural, that is, expanding the area under cultivation. Other projects — never realized — included a central irrigation network drawing its water from the Yarkon springs³ and the building of an inland harbour in the depression of the Jaffa swamps.⁴ Likewise, attempts were made to broaden the energy basis for the processing of agricultural produce by the introduction of windmills (a technological innovation that originally heralded the industrial revolution in Europe, and saw its greatest expansion and development in the period extending from before the invention of the steam engine until some time after it, but later assumed an increasingly marginal function in the energy resources). The windmills involved (the two or three mills built in the eighteenth century existed for a very short period only) were those erected by Ibrāhīm Pasha for his occupation army; the one at the Armenian Monastery in Jerusalem;⁵ and others in the vicinity of Jerusalem,⁶ including the mill on the highest point of the mountain of Bira, near Ramallah. (A reminder of this is preserved in the name of this point, Rās al-Ṭaḥūna, on which the transmitter of the country's first broadcasting station was later erected.) At the close of this period the most advanced windmill for those times was erected in Jerusalem by Sir Moses Montefiore.

There is also mention of an attempt to provide irrigation water for the Jaffa plantations by means of a windmill-driven pump.⁷ Another attempt at technological innovation concerned the small group of American settlers who first worked at Artas and then established their own small colony, Mount Hope, somewhere within the area of present-day Tel-Aviv. This group had brought an American plough to Palestine, intending to use it in their farming. However, they soon discovered that no sufficiently strong animals ("strong teams", as they put it) were available to pull their plough,

³ W.M. Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, London, 1887, p. 52A.

⁴ W.F. Lynch, *Narrative of the U. S. Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea*, Philadelphia, 1849, p. 440.

⁵ *Annals*, p. 131.

⁶ G. Dalman, *op. cit.*, III, 251.

⁷ Lynch, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

the local oxen being too weak for the purpose.⁸ A press for compressing bales of cotton was brought to Haifa and ways were sought to improve the extraction of olive oil.⁹

III

Second Stage: This stage, which started after the Crimean War, reached its greatest momentum at the end of the 1860's and throughout the 1870's, slackening off only somewhat in the 1880's. The opening of the Suez Canal placed Palestine in close proximity to a major artery of world maritime communications. Consignments of goods could now be sent or received quite easily to or from any place in the world, merely by transporting them to Port Said, even in an ordinary sail boat. The first metalled road was built (from Jaffa to Jerusalem) and wheeled transport introduced, though at first for passengers only. The growing and export of cotton declined because of the rapid expansion of the cotton areas in Egypt and, even more, in the United States and other countries, as well as the relatively poor quality of the local cotton. The only reversal of this trend was during the short period of the "Cotton Fever" ("Cotton Famine" in Britain), at the time of the American Civil War (1862-1865), when cotton was once again extensively planted at the expense of other summer crops; but even then the quantity of the harvest, though greatly increased, did not exceed one thousand tons.

Renewed integration with the world market had its negative aspects. The cheap and good quality grain being exported in increasing quantities from the United States, the Balkan countries and Russia was ousting the local hard wheat from the European markets. Insofar as this wheat continued to be bought, it was increasingly used by the noodle and macaroni industry rather than for bread making. The local barley sold abroad went chiefly to the English breweries. At this stage most of the wheat exported came from the Ḥawrān, and was shipped through the the ports of Acre and Haifa. The only grain still of any consequence for export was durra. Increased exports of sesame were also replacing the declining cotton. There were also innovations in the treatment of oranges and lemons for export: formerly sent in baskets by sea to ports in Egypt, Lebanon and southern Turkey, they were now individually wrapped in paper, packed in boxes, and dispatched via Port Said to northern Mediterranean ports, and from there to various markets in Europe.

⁸ E. Robinson, E. Smith, *et al.*, *Biblical Researches in Palestine and Adjacent Regions*, London, 1856, III, 274.

⁹ J. Finn, *Stirling Times*, London, 1878, II, 151.

Less olive oil was exported to France, and the amount extracted for local needs increased; but there was an even greater increase in the quantity of soap produced for export to Egypt, Syria and several regions of Turkey. On the other hand, the use of olive oil for lighting was on the decline and eventually ceased altogether. In its place came a new lamp oil, at first imported from across the Atlantic and later from the Black Sea port of Batum. This new oil, kerosene, was better refined and so more suitable for lamps and, moreover, it was two-and-a-half or even three times cheaper than edible olive oil.

Western or "semi-Western" influences were introduced by Jewish immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe as well as by other immigrants — people of Levantine-Mediterranean origin, and, the German Templars. A first attempt by Zalman Lewin to introduce a steam engine (to be used chiefly for grain-milling) in Jerusalem in about 1864–1865, did not prove successful. This engine was later sold to the Templars who tried to use it for oil extraction and saw milling as well, but this proved unsuccessful. On the other hand the efforts, promoted chiefly by some Jewish immigrants of Russian origin, to introduce "semi-European" improvements in a local industry fared rather better: this was a specially designed treadmill which increased the output of an animal by a third and permitted the use, on a single installation, of several animals, and the simultaneous operation of several pairs of millstones. At this stage the first wind-driven pumps appeared and windmills were again brought into use, although the only one of these to survive for any length of time was operated, in the next stage, in conjunction with a steam-mill and made use of the afternoon breeze.

Horizontal water mills with wooden wheels were also put back into use, technically improved and, after a time, replaced by iron wheels, or turbines. After this, steam mills, which could be operated regardless of the season, were installed, especially in places without running water. Even so, in years of drought the largest of these steam mills, which was in Jerusalem, had to stop working because of the excessive cost of water. The population of the country increased, especially in those towns where the number of people of European origin rose steeply. Instead of the former exports of wheat, white flour was now being imported from Europe.

The removal of restrictions on non-Muslims brought in its wake an increase in building and an inflow of development capital. The granting of religious freedom after the Crimean War stimulated the various Christian denominations and sects to found a large number of churches, monasteries and educational institutions, including agricultural and trade schools, which provided a number of the country's youth, especially those

from the Christian communities, with a modern European education up to the level of a teachers' training college.

IV

Third Stage: During this stage, i.e., the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Western technology of both the earlier, mainly agricultural, and the modern industrial kind was increasingly entering the country and taking root. Templar and Bosnian settlers, and later also Jewish farmers, introduced the scythe which had previously been unknown in Palestine. It was chiefly used for cutting green fodder in dairy farming, a new agricultural branch introduced by the Templars. The latter and, to an even greater extent, the Jewish farmers, introduced the European sod-turning plough. However, this plough showed itself much less suitable to local farming conditions than the native *ard* which makes an open furrow and is non-turning. In addition, the European plough must be used in conjunction with a harrow — an implement previously unknown in Palestine and, moreover, not required for its soil. The failure of this plough, which leads to evaporation of the moisture in the soil, caused the Jewish settler-farmers much embarrassment. A way out was found in 1883, when the "Jewish plough" was first introduced. This implement resembled the traditional native *ard* of the Arab fellah in all ways, except that it was constructed entirely of iron and could be adapted to the soil conditions of various regions. The introduction of the iron *ard* created a silent revolution in agriculture: the first step was the replacing of oxen with horses or mules, since a single horse or a single mule, could perform more work than three or four oxen working in relays or shifts. This was followed by the introduction of the double ("bisoc") and triple *ard*.¹⁰ All these improvements were still based on purely biological energy without any mechanical power assistance. Roller-threshers, called "threshing stones" by the Jewish settler-farmers, which had, at first, stone rollers and, later, wooden and cast-iron rollers, were also introduced. The disc threshers used alongside the traditional threshing sledge were improved. Mechanical threshers, driven by animal or even human power, accompanied by small machines, also appeared. Further innovations were simple, horse-drawn reapers and, later, also mechanical harvesters. Another implement introduced was the *manège* (horsegear), a universal power implement operated by animal power and designed for a variety of functions; in Palestine it was used for special tasks, chiefly ground preparation in orchards.

¹⁰ S. Avitsur, *The Origins of Industrialization in Eretz Israel*, Tel Aviv, 1967, pp. 15–18. See also *The Native Ard of Eretz-Israel; Its History and Development*, Tel-Aviv, 1965, pp. VII-X.

A steam plough operated by a stationary steam engine along a system of pulleys and steel cables also made its appearance.

Blacksmiths began to use mineral coal instead of charcoal: and steam mills started to use coal as a fuel in addition to the usual wood, olive rape and straw, the latter being used to fuel the stationary steam engines.

The first iron presses for oil extraction were introduced, at first, at the Nimzowitz-Feinberg factory in Lydda and afterwards in the khān of Hadera. But the outstanding development was the founding of a number of large industrial plants, including a few on a European scale. These plants, built and financed by Baron de Rothschild, included the silk mill at Rosh Pina, an oil factory, a perfume factory and, above all, the great wine cellars of Rishon Le-Zion and Zikhron Ya'acov. The wine cellars of Rishon Le-Zion could, in fact, be called an industrial complex; their installations certainly exceeded the range of ordinary wine and alcohol producing plants. These installations included steam and internal combustion engines to drive a flour mill, a cooperage and a number of ancillary workshops, as well as pumps for its wells. The wine cellars were also equipped with the country's first electric lights and internal telephones. In addition to the Rothschild enterprises, there were also some industrial plants established by other private individuals. These included the engineering plant with foundry department set up by L. Stein in Jaffa in 1889 and, later on, Wagner's similar plant. Many kinds of equipment, tools and installations were built in these plants, from carts to filter pumps, oil presses, equipment for flour mills, etc. At a later stage, internal combustion engines were also assembled.

The Jewish farmers introduced or revived certain non-irrigated orchard crops, such as grapes and almonds, which were successful, and mulberries, which were unsuccessful. They also introduced fertilizers and better strains of cereals, fruits, etc., and applied more efficient methods which they first adapted to local conditions.

A visible and practical embodiment of the influence of Western technology was the narrow (later standard) gauge railway between Jaffa and Jerusalem. The railway was run on imported coal, then considered the cheapest and most efficient fuel available. (One of the side effects of the operation of this railway was the introduction of the European clock, which replaced the Oriental system of time-keeping; the latter was based on dividing the period from sunrise to sunset into twelve hours, as well as the period from sunset to sunrise, regardless of the seasonal changes between day and night and the actual number of hours by the European clock.)

However, the main development occurred in the one branch of agriculture which had gone beyond the economic limits of traditional husbandry and had become a typical plantation crop, namely, citrus growing. The expanding

markets in Europe, especially in England, led to an ever-greater increase in citrus growing. Yet this increase was hindered by technological limitations. The energy basis of irrigation pumping in the citrus plantations depended on animal power, namely, mules. A mule driving a Persian wheel (*antilia*) was unable to lift any sizable quantity of water from a depth of greater than eight metres; moreover, the costs of pumping were fairly high. Beyond a depth of twelve metres the use of *antilias* was ruled out altogether. The industry was in a state of crisis, because the lack of sufficient ground water at a convenient depth severely limited the expansion of the area used for growing citrus. In fact, this expansion almost came to a halt. A solution was found with the introduction of the internal combustion engine which made it possible to break through the depth barrier and lift up water from any depth in the required quantities, at a low cost. This brought about a genuine, indigenous, industrial revolution and removed the major obstacle to the further expansion of the citrus plantations, which in terms of financial value, would, by the twentieth century, become the country's principal branch of agriculture.

The local invention of a device for filtering the well water permitted the *antilias* to be replaced by suction pumps. This process has not yet reached completion in some Middle Eastern countries, where the development of irrigation farming is held up as a result.

V

Further important progress, going beyond mere blind copying and mechanical adoption of Western technological models, as was the case with the European plough mentioned above, and involving actual original inventions and improvements springing from local needs, had to await the beginning of the twentieth century. This was also the time when the first projects for developing the energy resources of Palestine were being advanced. In most cases, these involved overcoming the country's severe fuel shortage by exploiting its latent water power sources.

At this stage the economic and social disproportions within the country's Arab population grew wider. The class embracing merchants, citrus growers and the industrial entrepreneurs grew in number and influence.

On the eve of the twentieth century, the number of mechanical industrial plants in Palestine — chiefly flour mills operated by steam and internal combustion engines — was greater than in any other region of Asiatic Turkey. Palestine had the highest level of industrialization, especially if one also takes into consideration the mechanical pumping of water; moreover, the educational and cultural standards of its population were, relatively speaking, higher than in any other region of the Eastern Mediterranean.

While at the beginning of the nineteenth century the population of Western Palestine numbered about a quarter of a million, this number had more than doubled by the end of the century, including one hundred thousand inhabitants whose parents or grandparents had not been born in the country. Nine-tenths of these were Jews, the majority from European countries and assimilated to the European way of life which they continued to carry on in Palestine.

A special class of officials of the "Dette Ottomane" came into being. They were chiefly recruited from among the religious and ethnic minorities and were of an educational and social and economic status superior to the ordinary government functionaries. Within the fellah sector, there gradually emerged a group of wealthy individuals who were occasionally able to compete for economic positions against the old feudal class and the new merchants. The basis of collective ownership of village lands (*mushāʿ*) was being undermined, as this institution was becoming progressively more fictitious. There was a greater disposition towards education, religious tolerance, and interest in the phenomena and events of the great world outside, though only rarely did these find any real expression, until the Young Turk revolt at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In summary it may be said that, in the period from the end of the eighteenth century and through the nineteenth century, Palestine, by virtue of an ongoing dialectical process, became a region which showed itself capable not only of absorbing the achievements of Western technology but also of assimilating its principles and adapting them to local conditions; and so once again able to make an independent contribution to the progress of technology as it had done in the remote past.

29. THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CHANGE ON TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PALESTINE

by GABRIEL BAER

I

It would seem that if traditional society in Palestine underwent certain changes during the nineteenth century, this did not happen as a result of economic changes. Moreover, the fact that economic changes were extremely small, not only in absolute terms but also in comparison with neighbouring areas, may be one of the reasons for a smaller degree of social change in specific spheres in Palestine than in other parts of the Middle East.

Except for the increase in orange cultivation in the vicinity of Jaffa towards the end of the period under review, Arab agriculture did not change its traditional character throughout the nineteenth century. German and Jewish settlers introduced some innovations, but subsistence farming continued to be the predominant type of agriculture in the country, and the growing of cash crops was rare. Thus no economic incentive emerged for those changes in the agrarian society which have been decisive in the Middle East in modern times: land was not systematically registered as the private property of its holders in Palestine, and *mushā'*, the communal tenure of the village land and its periodic redistribution, remained predominant (according to some estimates 70% of the land in Palestine was *mushā'* on the eve of World War I). In contrast, these two decisive changes in agrarian society had taken place in Egypt about the middle of the nineteenth century.

II

The impact of the West on industry in the Fertile Crescent during the nineteenth century consisted mainly in the decline of traditional handicrafts as a result of the influx of European goods. This resulted in a serious dislocation of urban society, such as the disruption of craft guilds, emigration, etc. However, this impact was felt less in Palestine than in other parts of Syria because only very few of these traditional handicrafts were concentrated in Palestinian towns. Silk spinning was centered in Lebanon; weaving and other textile industries in the Syrian towns of Aleppo, Homs, Hama

Damascus and some towns in Lebanon; dyeing in Aleppo. Only in the oil and soap industry and in the production of alcoholic drinks was Palestine's share considerable. Even jewellery was produced mainly in Damascus, while Jerusalem and vicinity specialized in inferior *objets de piété*. On the other hand, the number of modern plants established before World War I by Europeans (mainly some mechanical workshops owned by Germans and Jews) was so small that their impact on the local economy and society was negligible.

This might have been one reason for the relatively low level of urbanization in nineteenth century Palestine, compared with Syria and Lebanon. According to official data for 1915 reproduced by Ruppin,¹ the population in towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants constituted one-third of the total population of Palestine, as against 45.6% of the total population of Syria and Lebanon. (It would seem that the figures for Palestinian towns were considerably over-estimated. It may well be that the same is true for the Syrian figures, but it is improbable that the rate of over-estimation for Syrian towns was even higher than that for Palestinian towns; therefore the difference probably represents a real one.) The population of all Palestinian towns of more than 10,000 inhabitants taken together was less than the population of Damascus alone. Before World War I only Damascus and Beirut were supplied with electricity for tramways and light, but none of the Palestinian towns were so supplied.

III

If we take another criterion, namely Palestine's share in the foreign trade of the Syrian provinces, the impact of the West in Palestine was again smaller than in the more northern areas. In 1890 the share of Palestinian ports in Syria's imports was only 7.3%, and in the years 1900–1910 only 21.4% of the annual commerce of Syria passed through these ports, while Palestine's share in the Syrian population was almost 30%.² Beirut and Aleppo were the primary centres for imports in which the large firms were represented; in Palestine (as in other Syrian towns) there were only smaller importers. The same was true with regard to exports: in 1907 and 1908 Jaffa's exports amounted to only about one-fifth of the exports of Beirut and Alexandretta.³ Moreover, even at the end of the period under review,

¹ A. Ruppin, *Syrien als Wirtschaftsgebiet*, Berlin-Wien, 1920, pp. 11–17.

² Dr. George-Samn , *La Syrie*, Paris, 1921, pp. 165–171. For the population figure see Ruppin, *loc. cit.*

³ See C. Issawi (ed.), *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800–1914*, Chicago & London, 1966, p. 279.

observers found that differences in culture and education between foreign and local merchants in Palestine prevented the adaptation to modern commercial institutions by local merchants as a result of their business contacts: no regular bookkeeping or modern management of business offices was known to them and the chambers of commerce that had been established on paper were inactive.

IV

In the sphere of communications, the most important development before World War I was the building of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway (opened in 1892) and the Hejaz railway (opened in 1904). By 1913, Palestine may even have had the greatest length of railways relative to its population in the Middle East: it had more than 600 kilometres of railways per million inhabitants, as against about 500 for Syria and Lebanon, 356 for Egypt and only 199 for Asiatic Turkey.⁴ Nevertheless, the following statement made by Issawi in connection with the relatively high figure for Egypt is at least as true, if not more so, with regard to the even higher figure for Palestine:

... But since almost all the materials and fuel needed for railway construction and operation, as well as the skills, continued to be imported from abroad, the railways had practically no multiplier effect on the local economy. In other words they did not provide a market for the products of local industries, did not encourage technical progress in such industries, and did not lead to any important entrepreneurial or financial innovations.⁵

Since the expansion of the railway net was not accompanied by a similar development in other branches of the indigenous economy, it is not astonishing that it created a glaring contrast with other forms of transport in the villages and towns of the country. Except for military transport or transport in the Jewish and German colonies, there was no wheeled traffic in Palestine — in contrast with Lebanon, where horse carriages were used since the middle of the nineteenth century. Only in the beginning of the twentieth century was a diligence service introduced between neighbouring towns, following the example given by the Jewish colonies near Jaffa. However, riding remained the usual way of transport. As for motorcars, a few were introduced as buses between Jaffa and Nablus early in the century, but the service was soon suspended because of the poor quality of the roads.

⁴ Cf. Ruppin, *op. cit.*, pp. 390–391; C. Issawi, "Asymmetrical development and transport in Egypt, 1800–1914," in Polk-Chambers, p. 394.

⁵ Issawi, "Asymmetrical Development," p. 397.

The economic impact of the West on traditional society in Palestine had three additional channels which may be mentioned under the common heading of population movements: Christian emigration from Bethlehem, Bayt Jālā, and Ramallah to North and South America; Jewish (and some German) immigration from Europe; and pilgrimage to Palestine, mainly from Europe and the United States. All three channels acquired some importance only towards the end of the period with which we are concerned and therefore could not have had a significant impact on traditional society before World War I. We have seen that in many spheres, such as agricultural techniques and crops, mechanized industries, or communications, modern systems and Western achievements introduced by Jews and Germans had apparently not yet influenced traditional modes of production and customs at that time; similarly, it seems that contact with Europeans had not yet changed traditional ways of conducting commerce. However, this is an important and interesting question which should be investigated in detail, together with other problems of the economic history of Palestine, on the basis of archive material which is now available. In any case, one should not consider developments which occurred in the small Jewish and German communities as significant for the level of economic development of Palestine at that time. To judge by various indices, such as the agrarian system, industrial production, urbanization, or foreign trade before World War I, this level seems to have been lower in Palestine than in various other parts of Syria, let alone Egypt, and therefore was certainly not an important cause for those changes in traditional society in Palestine which took place in the nineteenth century.

30. THE EDUCATIONAL IMPACT OF WESTERN CULTURE ON TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PALESTINE

by JACOB M. LANDAU

I

In nineteenth century Palestine, educational innovation and change in its institutional aspect was limited in scope and modest in its impact on traditional society. Whatever reform and progress there were in education applied almost exclusively to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, most (if not all) of the impact of reform and progress was felt only after the First World War, when the British authorities leniently allowed some of the earlier administrative procedures, school curricula and methods of instruction to continue with little modification.

It was the schools themselves, rather than society as a whole, which first felt the impact of a moderate degree of modernization. In this, one may differentiate between the Jewish and Christian communities in Palestine, in more direct contact with the West, on the one hand, and the Muslim majority, less prone to change, on the other. The latter, indeed, was somewhat influenced by regional centres in Cairo, Beirut and Istanbul, to which some students went and from which educators came to Palestine; however, this impact was rather limited, since such educators soon tended to be submerged in their surroundings, at least during the nineteenth century. Perhaps one may get a better perspective by treating each of the various groups separately.

While the Ottoman Education Law of 1869 tried to regulate more efficiently the organization of education,¹ and to enforce better government supervision of state schools, this was not taken very seriously in many provinces, including Palestine. Nonetheless, new state schools, serving mainly — but not solely — the Muslim population, sprang up during the reign of 'Abdülhamîd II. Of these, the *rüşdiyye* schools (a sort of post-primary institution) were the most noteworthy; they were established in the towns, including Jerusalem.² However, the government's control of these schools, also remained lax in subsequent years.

¹ A.L. Tibawi, *Arab Education in Mandatory Palestine*, London, 1956, pp. 128 ff.

² A.L. Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, London, 1969, p. 134; cf. *ibid.*, pp. 168, 182.

A new education law, promulgated by the Young Turks in 1913, attempted to remedy the situation; its effect, however, was cut short by the outbreak of the First World War. But the Young Turks did manage to reorganize the state primary schools, at least in the towns. By 1914, these were already giving instruction in such secular subjects as history, geography and arithmetic and — to a lesser extent — in hygiene, physical science, music and domestic science, in addition to the Koran and the Turkish language (with some Arabic).³ It should be emphasized, however, that village schools — and these formed the vast majority — remained unaffected, continuing to teach Koran and the rudiments of the three R's in a traditional manner. According to Turkish and other reports, quoted by Tibawi,⁴ there were fewer than 17,000 pupils (mainly male) in all schools, urban and rural, catering to Muslim children. Needless to say, this is a very low figure, when compared with the then total Muslim population in Palestine of about half a million.

II

In contrast, most Jewish children in Palestine got some form of schooling, but mostly in traditional institutions: the *heder*, *talmud torah* and the higher level *yeshiva*. All these, in nineteenth-century Palestine, were true copies of the same schools in the countries from which the Jews had emigrated.⁵ Even the language of instruction reflected this fact; it was Ladino, Arabic or Yiddish. There are quite a few reports by pupils who studied during the nineteenth century,⁶ and the overall impression is that the subject matter studied and the ways of imparting it were the same in Palestine as they had been in their countries of origin. Even Sir Moses Montefiore could not persuade these schools to include secular studies in the curriculum.⁷ The full significance of this fact can be gauged if one remembers that as late as 1910, about 90% of all Jewish schoolchildren in Palestine studied in traditional institutions such as these, and only some 10% were enrolled in schools of other types.⁸

The latter schools catered mainly to Sephardi Jewish children and

³ A.L. Tibawi, *Education*, pp. 77–78.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁵ Ben-Zion Gat, *Ha-Yishuv ha-Yehudi be-Eretz-Israel bi-Shnot 1840–1881*, Jerusalem, 1962–63, esp. pp. 203 ff.

⁶ E. Cohen-Reis, *Mi-Zikhronot Ish Yerushalayim*, Tel-Aviv, 1932–33, I, 4, 18–20; G. Frumqin, *Derekh Shofet bi-Yerushalayim*, Tel-Aviv, 1954, Ch. I.

⁷ Cohen-Reis, *op. cit.*, p. 87; Cf. Gat, *op. cit.*, pp. 220–221.

⁸ As computed soon afterwards by Y. Ozerkowaki, "Batel ha-Sefer be-Eretz-Israel," *Ha-Hinukh* (Tel-Aviv), Vol. I, No. 2 (1910), p. 128.

to some non-Jews. The extreme orthodox Ashkenazi Jews fought against the new institutions, since they were sponsored by foreign bodies. Nonetheless, these institutions were of considerable importance, as they introduced foreign languages, with at least some of the cultural content attached to studying them, into Jewish schooling in Palestine. There were four types of educational institutions of this sort, supported, respectively, by philanthropic organizations in Austria, France, Great Britain and Germany.

In 1856, the Lämmel School⁹ was founded in the Old City of Jerusalem with funds donated by a Viennese Jewish lady. This was the first modern Jewish school in Jerusalem: the language of instruction was German, and the curriculum included elements of biology and geography, besides Hebrew and Arabic. Because of the emphasis on German, it attracted many Ashkenazi children, but also not a few Sephardim. Dr. Ludwig August Frankl,¹⁰ the secretary of the Jewish community of Vienna, asked for and obtained the collaboration and protection of the Austrian consul in Jerusalem. This suggests that the Austrian authorities, too, were probably interested in extending their influence.

Due to various pressures, the Lämmel School gradually began to resemble a *heder*, although German and Arabic continued to be taught. Perhaps this was one of the reasons for the foundation, in 1864, of the Evelina de Rothschild School for girls, which taught in French and later, when it was taken over by the Anglo-Jewish Association in 1891, in English. Along with academic subjects, handicrafts were taught. While instruction for girls was not an innovation, the relatively sizable number (235 in 1872–1873) and the emphasis on handicrafts were significant.

III

However, the most important contribution at the time — at least in numbers — was that of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. [This Paris-based organization, founded in 1860, was active in bringing schooling to many of the poorer Oriental Jewish communities, from Morocco to Iran. Simultaneously, the Alliance Israélite Universelle worked enthusiastically for the spread of the French language and culture in these lands. The systematic encouragement and collaboration of French consuls may indicate that France was not

⁹ For whose fortunes see Y. Press, *Me'a Shana bi-Yerushalayim*, Jerusalem, 1964, pp. 87–91.

¹⁰ The second volume of whose book *Nach Jerusalem*, Leipzig, 1858, is an instructive account of the founding of the school and of the situation in Palestine (and particularly in Jerusalem) at the time.

averse to using this as a means of increasing its political penetration. Here we witness, for the first time, *systematic* educational work by a foreign Jewish body in Palestine — not just isolated actions, as those mentioned above.

These activities¹¹ started in 1867, with an attempt to found a school in Jerusalem, which closed down in 1870. But the same year saw the foundation of an agricultural school at Mikveh-Israel, near Jaffa. This represented a two-fold innovation: firstly, a school intended to produce agronomists; secondly, a school combining the study of agriculture and the earth sciences with various humanistic subjects, such as history, Bible and languages.¹² A boys' school was established in Haifa in 1880 and a boys' trade school in Jerusalem in 1882. Boys' and girls' schools (separate, of course) followed in Jaffa, Tiberias and Safed; eleven of the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools were functioning in 1910.¹³ Some of these were vocational schools, teaching handicrafts. All were based on official French attitudes to education; they used French as the medium of instruction and attempted to bring some of the finer points of French civilization within the grasp of their pupils of both sexes. Not less meaningful, the network of the Alliance Israélite Universelle schools in Palestine offered, for the first time, an education based strictly on secular lines.

The *Hilfsverein der Deutschen Juden* was, in certain respects, the German equivalent of the Alliance Israélite Universelle. Founded in 1901, the *Hilfsverein* directed its educational efforts to needy Jews in the Balkans and the Middle East, including Palestine, at the same time that the German Kaiser and his advisers were becoming increasingly interested in that area.¹⁴ While the Alliance catered in French to the Sephardim, in particular, the *Hilfsverein* did much the same in German for Ashkenazi schoolchildren, many of whose parents knew German, or at least Yiddish. The *Hilfsverein* took over the Lämmel School and founded several new schools. Probably one of its most noteworthy decisions was to found in Haifa, in 1907, a technical school, which was to become the Haifa Polytechnic after the First World War. Before long, the organization was maintaining twenty-

¹¹ Narcisse Leven, *Cinquante Ans d'Histoire: l'Alliance Israélite Universelle*, Paris, 1920, II, 209–245; André Chouraqui, *L'Alliance Israélite Universelle et la Renaissance Juive Contemporaine (1860–1960)*, Paris, 1965, pp. 357–365. For its activities in Palestine see also Mordechai Ben-Hillel Ha-Cohen, in *Ha-Hinukh*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1910), pp. 40–49.

¹² See Y. Bekhar in *Ba-Ma'arakha* (monthly, Jerusalem), Vol. X, No. 3 (June 14, 1970), p. 10.

¹³ Ozerkowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 128–129.

¹⁴ See also Press, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–122.

seven schools in Palestine, ranging from a kindergarten to a teachers' college.¹⁵

Influenced, directly or indirectly, by the German government,¹⁶ the *Hilfsverein* schools increasingly emphasized the German language and *Kultur*. One of the subjects that suffered was Hebrew, previously used much more in these schools than in those of the Alliance. A passionate struggle (which cannot be described here) led, in many schools, to the acceptance of Hebrew as the language of instruction in the years immediately preceding the First World War. It had already been used as a vehicle of instruction in some schools in smaller Jewish agricultural settlements, where it had had to compete with French. Now Hebrew was on the way to becoming the acknowledged axis around which Palestinian Jewish education turned, from kindergarten, through elementary and secondary school, to the Polytechnic. This point is stressed here not only for its intrinsic interest, but because it was only one facet of the change in outlook in education and in its modernization. Since new textbooks had to be compiled in almost every field of instruction, the latest available subject matter and teaching techniques were studied, experimented with and adopted in the last years before the First World War.¹⁷

This is even more evident in the Hebrew secondary schools — the first of which was established in Jaffa in 1906 (with only seventeen pupils at the start, quickly increasing to 800), followed by others in Jerusalem (1909) and Haifa (1913).¹⁸ In 1913, there were sixty institutions, with an enrollment of 2,600 pupils, using Hebrew as the sole medium of instruction.¹⁹ The curriculum of these schools was no blind imitation of any European model and strove to blend Jewish and general studies, humanities and science. It compared favourably with curricula in West-European secondary schools and may be considered as the most evident external sign of Western educational impact in Ottoman Palestine. To these secondary schools one may perhaps add schools of art and music. In practically all these institutions, instruction was co educational, a factor of lasting importance in bringing an increasing number of girls into the orbit of direct cultural activity.

¹⁵ Moshe Avidor, *Education in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1957, pp. 17–18; J. S. Bentwich, *Education in Israel*, Philadelphia, 1965, p. 14.

¹⁶ Noah Nardi, *Education in Palestine*, Washington., D.C., 1945, pp. 18–19; *idem*, *Zionism and Education in Palestine*, New York, 1934, p. 26.

¹⁷ This has already been dealt with in some detail. See, for example, Aharon Berman, *Toldot ha-Hinukh be-Yisrael u-va-'Amlm*, revised ed., Tel-Aviv, 1967–68.

¹⁸ Details in Y. Luriya, *Ha-Hinukh be-Eretz-Israel*, Tel-Aviv, 1920–21.

¹⁹ See Esco Foundation for Palestine, *Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies*, New Haven, 1947, I, 53.

Later, the Arab community was to emulate some of these schools (but not the coeducational approach), with the assistance of the British authorities in Palestine.

IV

The education of local Christians proceeded along parallel, if not similar, lines. Of course, to quote one observer,²⁰ Palestine "was not a country rescued from the fetters of ignorance by the foreign missions. Native Christian schools existed before the arrival of the foreigners." Nevertheless, foreigners contributed to the spread of education, as well as adding a Western dimension. As in the case of the Jews, education was to a large degree directed and funded by a number of competing sponsors — in the Christian case, generally by missionary societies. These were attracted to the Holy Land for evident reasons; they increased their activities there, as well as in Syria, after the 1860 riots. There is a fairly extensive literature on Christian work in Palestine, including education, and we can only hint here at some aspects, keeping our main topic in mind.²¹

In the educational sphere, there was ceaseless competition among the various Christian groups. All had a dedicated religious approach and emphasized — among other subjects — the teaching of at least one foreign language: French or Italian (Catholics), English (Presbyterians, Anglicans, Quakers), German (Lutherans), or Russian (Orthodox). Every denomination seems to have had at least one school in Jerusalem, but they also penetrated the countryside in varying degrees. For instance, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Protestants, led by the Anglican Bishop of Jerusalem, Samuel Gobat, maintained schools in Jerusalem (about 90–100 pupils), Bethlehem, Bayt Jālā, Lod, Ramla, Jaffa, Nablus, Shafā 'Amr and al-Şalt, besides several smaller places. There were some near Haifa, also, intended (among others) for the Druze children in the neighbourhood.²² Not all were permanent and some were short lived. Even so, they certainly widened the scope of education — as did many other mission-schools elsewhere in Palestine.²³

The Catholics seem to have been the first, but other missions soon caught

²⁰ Tibawi, *A Modern History of Syria*, p. 141.

²¹ For a brief, but good, description, cf. Geographical Section of Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty, *A Handbook of Syria (Including Palestine)*, London, n.d. [1920], pp. 199–204.

²² *Br. Interests*, pp. 158–159; Cf. E. R. Pitman, *Mission Life in Greece and Palestine*, London, n.d., *passim*.

²³ For a Quaker school, see Rosa E. Lee, *The Story of the Ram Allah Mission*, Manchester, N. H., 1912.

up with them after 1821, when the first American missionaries started working in earnest in Jerusalem. Upon the foundations of the Russian "Palestine Society", Russian educational work increased in scope — based on two languages, Arabic and Russian. Its best-known institution was the teachers' seminary in Nazareth, which opened in 1885–1886.²⁴ According to *The Jewish Chronicle*,²⁵ in 1903 there were 155 schools connected with the Russians (many of them small ones) in Syria and Palestine, with some 15,000 pupils, as compared to 9,000 only three years earlier.

While it is difficult at present to say definitely in which of the church schools the impact of European education was most greatly felt, it would appear that their combined effort was impressive. The fact that some of these educational institutions, such as the German-sponsored Syrian Orphanage in Jerusalem, had their own active printing presses²⁶ may have contributed even further to the European cultural penetration.

There were also foreign secular educational institutions, such as the schools of the German Templars in Haifa (from 1869), near Jaffa (from 1870), and in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Although the Templars settled in nineteenth-century Palestine out of religious convictions, their schools were secular in character. They were intended first and foremost for their own children, as the Templars were great believers in the merits of education.²⁷ However, since the school children were few, schooling was also offered to local people. But not many local people sent their children, as tuition was expensive (compared to the free education in mission schools). A small number of children of the well-to-do, such as the sons of ranking Turkish officials, attended these schools: 21 in 1870; 44 in 1877; 77 in 1916.²⁸

V

To sum up: It is my impression that whatever Western culture was embodied in educational innovations in nineteenth-century Palestine had but very

²⁴ See Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1834–1914*, Oxford, 1969, pp. 44–45, 137–158.

²⁵ Quoted in the *London Globe* of July 10, 1903, p. 20.

²⁶ Details in Ludwig Schneller, *Vater Schneller, ein Patriarch der Evangelischen Mission im Heiligen Lande*, Leipzig, 1925, pp. 114 and *passim*. See also Hans Niemann, *Gedächtnisschrift zum 70-Jährigen Bestehen des Syrischen Waisenhauses in Jerusalem*, Köln, 1930; Hermann Schneller, *Festschrift zum Neunzigsten Jahrestag der Gründung des Syrischen Waisenhauses in Jerusalem*, Köln, 1950.

²⁷ E.g., Christoph Hoffmann, *Occident und Orient, eine Kulturgeschichtliche Betrachtung vom Standpunkt der Tempelgemeinden in Palästina*, Stuttgart, 1875, particularly pp. 62–73.

²⁸ Hans Seibt, *Moderne Kolonisation in Palästina*. I. Teil: *Die Kolonisation der Deutsche "Templer"*, Stuttgart, 1933, pp. 110–112; Karl Imberger, *Die Deutschen Landwirtschaftlichen Kolonien in Palästina*, Öhringen, 1938, pp. 102–107.

limited *immediate* impact on traditional society. This society was either impervious to it, such as practically the whole of the Muslim community in Palestine, which, if at all, was aroused by fears that the Christians were proselytizing their children; or, as in the case of the Jewish traditional community, was aroused to fight against the dangers of secular education. Nevertheless, all the above types of schools afforded the opportunity for children of all communities to meet. This, while nothing new in missionary schools, was rather an innovation for both Muslim and Jewish schools. Previously, the *kuttāb* or the *heder* and *talmud Torah* were always attended, respectively, by only Muslims or Jews. The Ottoman state schools and those founded by Jewish or Christian philanthropic societies, though still having a preponderant number of pupils from one religious community, were open to all and encouraged some enrollment from other communities.

Another feature was the relatively small number of those exposed to a measure of Western impact in one or another of the above schools. The schools themselves were numerous, but most of them were small; many of the village schools consisted of one classroom only. It is likely that the total number of pupils hardly exceeded several hundred each year. While it is impossible to generalize, one gets the impression that for many of these pupils, the extent of their Europeanization was to know a foreign language well, without, however, delving deeply into the civilization it represented. Some of the pupils, indeed, read foreign magazines and newspapers, and even contributed to them personally or assisted in raising their circulation in Palestine. More relevantly, out of those who continued their studies in the secondary schools, some went on to become the leaders of the élite group that made its mark in politics under the British Mandate — people such as the Arab Mūsā 'Alamī or the Jew Moshe Sharett (who graduated from Tel Aviv's first Hebrew secondary school in 1913). Many of the civil servants in British Palestine, both Jews and Arabs, had studied in these schools. The fact that these people had had some taste of Western culture during their formative years was in itself not without significance.

31. THE IMPACT OF WESTERN IDEAS ON TRADITIONAL SOCIETY IN OTTOMAN PALESTINE

by SHIMON SHAMIR

I

In many works dealing with the modern history of the Middle East, the spread of Western ideas in the traditional society of the nineteenth century is directly related to the fact that at that time they became increasingly accessible. Accordingly, dissemination of certain Western ideas in the traditional society of Palestine (namely, the predominantly Muslim Arabic speaking population in the area which later became Mandatory Palestine¹) is said to have taken place as the result of the appearance there of such "modernizing agents" as:

a. Growing numbers of European residents — consuls and missionaries, who were increasingly active in Jerusalem and other towns, mainly from the 1840's; thousands of Jewish immigrants, primarily after the first aliyah in the 1880's; German settlers from the 1860's and 1870's onwards, and European and American immigrants of all sorts who, even though few in numbers, had nevertheless made their presence strongly felt in several Palestinian towns.

b. New schools based on Western models — either missionary and other foreign schools, mainly French, Russian, German, English and American (in Palestine from the beginning of the century); or *rüşdiyye* and the other Ottoman state schools (in Palestine from the Hamidian period).

c. Developments in the field of communications — such as printed translations of European works and, to a larger extent, Western-inspired newspapers. It may be assumed that copies of such newspapers in Arabic, those published by Bustānī, Shidyāq and others, reached Palestinian towns in the 1860's; periodicals in Turkish may have arrived as early as the 1840's.

However, these developments, important as they may have been for the general process of Westernization, could not, by themselves, have trans-

¹ It should be noted that this article does not deal with such minority communities as the Jewish and Armenian ones, which deserve separate treatment.

formed the outlook of a traditional society. To assume a simple cause-and-effect relationship between these developments and the spread of Western ideas is to presume that the latter was a function of access. This presumption sometimes leads to the identification of Westernized schools with cultural awakening, modern press with Western-like public opinion, European town quarters with modern urban life. The result is often an excessive pre-dating of the beginnings of significant change.

Acculturation, of course, is not determined by access. Cultural influences have sometimes surmounted staggering geographical barriers, whilst in other cases they have not been able to cross the narrow alley which separated different quarters in the same town. This has been demonstrated in many ways in Palestine itself, and particularly in Jerusalem. In the technical sense, the local population had had access to Western thought and culture long before the nineteenth century. European travellers, many of them well-known men of letters, frequently visited the country; European merchants, consular representatives, priests and monks resided in several Palestinian towns, and some churches even possessed well-stocked libraries. However, as we know for certain, the mainstream of local society had not been affected in the slightest by these factors. It may be noted that the first printing press appeared in Palestine as early as 1577. It was used by the Jews in Safed for a decade without arousing any curiosity among their Muslim neighbours.²

Culture, according to the late Professor von Grunebaum, is a "closed" system of questions and answers on the nature of man's environment. The door to transformation, or even displacement, will open only when new experience creates intellectual, emotional or organizational needs which cannot be met by the prevailing system.³ Applying this concept to nineteenth century Palestine, it appears that, at that stage, the main effect of the "Westernizing agents" was not the supply of a new set of values and ideas, but rather the creation of those experiences which generated the need for answers. The actual quest for new answers, not to mention their formulation, still loomed in the future.

To traditional society in Jerusalem, the European flags hoisted over consulates and other institutes did not signify the influx of new cultural norms (as was sometimes the case in Beirut) but rather an increasingly disturbing problem. They regarded the presence and activities of the Europeans as a principal factor in the developments which shook the legitimate

² Shmuel Avitsur, *Daily Life in Eretz-Israel in the XIX Century* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1972, p. 326.

³ G.E. von Grunebaum, "The Problem of Cultural Influence," in *Modern Islam*, Berkeley, 1962, p. 13.

foundation of their community and destroyed the traditional relationship between its various component parts. This did not set them on the path towards Western concepts of community, such as nationalism, but, for a long time, merely aroused feelings of confusion and antagonism towards those whom they regarded as the source of all their troubles. These feelings were sometimes manifested in expressions of violence, as in the case of the riots in Gaza and Nablus, in 1856, when foreign flags were torn down.⁴ But in most cases, the reactions of the members of traditional society in Palestine were not manifested in much more than vague undercurrents of hostility. Not only had they not adopted new answers to meet new needs, but, in the nineteenth century, the questions themselves had not, as yet, been articulated.

The same was true for the impact of Western or Westernized schooling. European thought and European sciences, as perceived by Ottoman officials and transmitted in the ambiguous and obscure Tanzimat terminology, could have left only a superficial impression on the minds of state school students. In this respect, the education offered during that period in Palestine by the foreign schools was not, as is sometimes assumed, much more effective.

An examination of a text-book employed by teachers of the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem illustrates this point. The book was used for the instruction of local Arabic-speaking pupils, mainly Christians, but probably some Muslims as well. It is entitled *nadhal 'ulūm wa-mabda' funūn* (which can be freely translated as "an introduction to the sciences") and designated as a "useful and concise explanation of various sciences for refined school-children." It had originally been printed in Turkish and, in 1867, was translated into Arabic and copied by hand by Giovanni Mattia Abussuan, the *turjumān* of the Latin Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Both the original and the translation were bound in one volume.⁵

There is nothing in this book that would suggest to the student the conceptual system implicit in Western science, of which it purports to be a popular presentation. The book suggests a strange symbiosis of both Islamic and Catholic dogmas. It asserts that not every phenomenon can be rationally explained and that the revealed truth of the prophets should also be accepted. Faith in God, it points out, without referring to any specific religion, is the beginning of all wisdom.⁶ Nothing in the book challenges the values of Ottoman society: even the few dates from the post-biblical

⁴ *Ott. Reform*, pp. 226-228; *Br. Interests*, pp. 115-16.

⁵ In the writer's private collection.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Arabic: pp. 3-13, Turkish: pp. 5-14.

period that the student was required to memorize were all connected with the emergence of Islam and the rise of the Ottoman dynasty.⁷

Perhaps it would be correct to say that the greatest impact of this new education on local society was not so much in its message, as in the fact that it was needed at all. In the realities of nineteenth century Ottoman society, the breeding of an urbane *efendi* necessitated an increasing volume of Western knowledge, and often a European language as well. Towards the end of the century, more and more local families began sending their children to foreign or Westernized schools.⁸ This implied that traditional culture was no longer self sufficient, a realization which, for a Muslim, was not only distressing but self contradictory. There is no evidence that, in the nineteenth century, the problems involved in the cultural "attack" on Islam had been articulated by members of the educated élite of Palestine, but by the end of the century they had been discussed in the writings of so many Turkish, Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals that it can safely be assumed that here too these problems were uppermost in the minds of many people. Western-inspired solutions, however, had not yet gained currency.

The impact of the new media could not have been much greater. True, the new publications often propagated a whole set of Western values: constitutional government, political rights, reform and progress; and even in the Hamidian period, when these trends were suppressed, some publications, mainly from Egypt, reached this area carrying the same message. But this is not to say that people in Palestine were actually shedding their traditional concepts of government and society for the newly imported ideas. It would be a mistake to regard — as some contemporary European observers did — the discontent and antagonism in Palestine, which, since the Tanzimat, were occasionally directed against Ottoman governments and governors, as a clamour for constitutional reform. Furthermore, with the turn of the century, the policies initiated by 'Abdülhamid suited well the outlook and aspirations of the local Muslim-Arab élite, and elicited a further identification with the Ottoman state and its ruling dynasty.⁹

⁷ *Ibid.*, Arabic: p. 138, Turkish: pp. 123–124.

⁸ According to Vidal Cuinet, *Syrie, Liban, Palestine*, Paris, 1895, p. 564, the number of foreign schools in the *mutaşarrıflık* of Jerusalem at the end of the century was 101 (compared with 242 governmental Muslim schools) most of them of the traditional type with a total student population of some six thousand (compared with some ten thousand in the governmental Muslim schools). Compare 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Awaḍ, *Al-Idāra al-'Uthmāniyya fī Wilāyat Suriyya, 1864–1914*, Cairo, 1969, p. 268. The figures for the foreign school system might be somewhat inflated.

⁹ Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1971, pp. 14–17.

The new Westernized Turkish-Arabic terminology did penetrate the language of the educated class, but evidently this did not reflect an acquisition of new convictions but rather conformity with a fashionable style or official formulas. For nineteenth century traditional society, the new terminology signified, above all, the confusion and ambiguities of its present life and the growing doubts about the validity of its traditional system.

II

Ottoman rule in Palestine extended into the twentieth century for less than two decades, but it was in this last period that the process of Westernization reached its height. By the end of the period, Palestine had been connected to world centres by a railway system, shipping lines, a telegraph network and improved postal services. The European population of the country had grown considerably. Both cinema and Western drama made their first appearances in Palestine in 1911.¹⁰ As the memoirs and reminiscences of that period tell, it had become a common practice among élite families in Palestine to send their children to foreign schools. For instance, Mūsā 'Alamī went to the Anglican Bishop's School in Jerusalem and to the École des Frères in Jaffa, while Ḥusaynis were educated at the American Colony.¹¹ Young Palestinians in increasing numbers were sent for higher education not only to Darülfünun and other institutions in Istanbul, but also to Western universities in Europe or Beirut. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 initiated systematic indoctrination by the government and facilitated the dissemination of various new ideologies. Some thirty Arabic publications appeared in Palestine from 1908 onwards, in addition to the hundreds that appeared in the neighbouring countries.¹² Most of these were short-lived but a few, like *Filasṭīn* and *al-Karmil*, managed to establish themselves on a sound basis.

It would, therefore, be worthwhile to glance at the situation on the eve of World War I in order to evaluate the cumulative effect of the intellectual influences flowing through these channels. The Palestinian press could serve as a useful instrument for this evaluation. True, the press was not representative of Palestinian society or even the Palestinian élite; for, indeed, the Western-educated Christian editors of the major Palestinian newspapers belonged to a very small fragment of this society. The editor of *Filasṭīn*

¹⁰ Michael Assaf, *Arab-Jewish Relations in Palestine, 1860-1948* (Hebrew), Tel Aviv, 1970, p. 251.

¹¹ Geoffrey Furlonge, *Palestine is my Country*, London, 1969, pp. 33-34; Bertha Spafford Vester, *Our Jerusalem*, Beirut 1950. For the change in policy which enabled Muslims to enroll in missionary schools, see *Br. Interests*, pp. 228-229.

¹² Ya'aqob Yehoshu'a, *Ta'rikh al-Ṣaḥāfa al-'Arabiyya, fi Filasṭīn...* Jerusalem, 1974.

himself, in summing up the first six months of publication, complained that he had been working in a vacuum because, he said, the educated public only formed "some two percent" of the total society and even they did not understand the proper function of public opinion.¹³ Yet, precisely for this reason, the press can be regarded as marking the frontiers of Westernization, and thus serve to indicate the extent of the spread of Western ideas.

The central themes in intellectual life were, as elsewhere: reform, nationalism and the cultural confrontation between East and West.

Of reform, there were lengthy and elaborate discussions. Many recognized that something was wrong with the political and social order, but hardly anyone knew what to do about it, other than demanding *iṣlāḥ*. Yet, as it turns out, the term *iṣlāḥ* implied very different things to those who took part in the public discussion. To some (mainly those writing in *al-Karmil*), it meant decentralization, reformed *majlises* and a more central place for the Arabic language. Others merely concentrated on the need to reform the bureaucracy. Many stressed reform in education: Rāghib al-Khālidī demanded a reform in the management of the *waqfs* so that they could administer a better school system;¹⁴ Bulus Shihāda demanded better textbooks in order to imbue the young generation with the values of freedom, self respect and progress, and thus replace the Turkish values which were characterized, he said, by expressions of false glory, pomposity and hypocrisy.¹⁵

However, the commitment of these Palestinians to the values of reform was much weaker than, say, that of their counterparts in Beirut. When the latter reproached the Jerusalemites for their failure to establish a Reform Society in their town, 'Uthmān al-Nashāshībī answered in *al-Munādi* that the country was at war and no one should aggravate the government at such a time.¹⁶ On another occasion, after about thirty persons had managed to convene and elect a committee of seven to meet and establish the Reform Society, *Filasṭīn's* editor reported that none besides himself showed up for the meeting.¹⁷

The question of the diffusion of nationalist concepts is, of course, much more complex. By that time *waṭan* was a household word and was used by publicists and speech-makers in endless combinations. Terms like *al-ḥayāt al-waṭaniyya*, *al-'āqifa al-waṭaniyya*, *al-mabādī' al-waṭaniyya*, recurred frequently, evidently without fully accounting for their meaning. An examination of the texts of the telegrams and letters of support, sent by

¹³ *Filasṭīn*, 15 July 1911.

¹⁴ *Filasṭīn*, 25 Jan. 1913.

¹⁵ *Filasṭīn*, 15 July 1911.

¹⁶ *Al-Munādi*, 17 Jan. 1913.

¹⁷ *Filasṭīn*, 29 Jan. 1913.

Palestinians to the organizers of the 1913 Paris Congress, reveals that most of them simply repeated the phrases printed on the invitation to the Congress, such as *al-waṭan al-mahbūb*, *islāh* and *ḥuqūq al-‘arab*, without reflecting any clear ideological articulation. (The discussion at the Congress itself proved that this held true for most of the participants as well.¹⁸

The spread of the idea of nationalism was hindered not only by the low level of conceptual articulation, but by the vagueness of modern communal demarcations as well. *Waṭan*, at that point, could mean for local intellectuals the Ottoman territories, the land of the Arabs, Syria, Palestine, or several ambiguous combinations. Consider, for instance, the following passage from an article by Rāghib al-Khālidi:

Has not the time come for us to think of the future of our Palestinian country, of preserving its political equilibrium and strengthening our Arab element, so that we shall be able to survive in this land and Palestine remain in the possession of the Ottoman Empire?¹⁹

This article has them all: Ottoman loyalty, Arabism, Palestinian patriotism and, in other passages in the same article — strong Muslim and anti-Christian undercurrents. It is evident that this ambiguity was typical of the politically minded élite of the time. Even the most Westernized Christian intellectuals had not yet opted for a well-defined national identity. Khalīl al-Sakākīnī, the foremost nationalist in the Orthodox community which was the hotbed of nationalism in Palestine, described in 1913 how weak was nationalist sentiment in the country in his time. He pinned his hopes on the next generation and on emigrés who, he believed, would return to Palestine and spread nationalist ideas.²⁰ In fact, as Professor Kedourie has shown in his study of his diaries, Sakākīnī himself was not sure even of his own national identity.²¹

This was all the more true of the local Muslim community. It is noteworthy that the Palestinians made no considerable contribution to the formation of the pre-World War I nationalist societies. To all intents and purposes, they did not subscribe to Western-inspired nationalist concepts.

Finally, there was the question of the cultural confrontation between East and West. The trauma of that confrontation has been amply discussed, and one illustration may perhaps suffice to exemplify its manifestation in Palestinian society.

¹⁸ *Al-Mu'tamar al-'Arabi al-Awwal*, Cairo, 1913, pp. 163–165, 196–197, 202–230.

¹⁹ *Filastīn*, 2 Apr. 1913.

²⁰ Khalīl al-Sakākīnī, *Al-Nahḍa al-Urthuduksiyya fī Filastīn*, Jerusalem, 1913, pp. 3–4.

²¹ Elie Kedourie, "Religion and Politics: The Diaries of Khalil Sakakini," *St. Antony's Papers*, No. 1, pp. 77–94.

In November 1911, the *qā'imaqām* discovered the theft of some exhibits which had been collected for the founding of a museum in Jerusalem. The editor of *Filasṭīn* commented on this event:

We have abandoned our traditions and adopted European ways, so that now there is not a single European quality that we do not possess. We have adopted all their sciences — even those which strike the chord of heresy. We have adopted their constitutional life — including brawls in Parliament. We have adopted every aspect of their culture — even their vanities. All we lacked was their admiration for the fine arts. Now, thank God, we have proved that we have this too ... We resemble each other like a pair of shoes.²²

Despite the explicit irony of *Filasṭīn's* comment, its undertones should not be ignored. The author appears to be saying that local society was only adopting the external trappings of the West, losing its own heritage in the process, and thus verging on the absurd.

This sense of loss without real compensation dominated the discussion of the cultural dilemma. Evidently, the major development that had occurred up to that point, was the discovery of decline and backwardness. *Inḥiṣāṭ* had become the *leitmotif* in the deliberations of the local intellectuals. Industry and artisanship, wrote Muṣṭafa Nimr, have deteriorated, the educational system is outdated and useless. "All of us, people of the East, are detached from real life; we hold on to fantasies and to repulsive customs. We are weak and humiliated," he concluded, and unless "we awaken we shall be wiped off this world."²³

These are strong words and their sincerity is undoubted. They again highlight the fact that the impact of the West on the traditional cultural system was devastating whilst Western intellectual, ethical and artistic values had not yet offered a satisfying substitute.

²² *Filasṭīn*, 2 Dec. 1911.

²³ *Filasṭīn*, 20 March 1912.

PART SIX

ARCHIVAL SOURCES FOR THE HISTORY OF OTTOMAN PALESTINE

32. THE JERUSALEM *SHAR'Ā* COURT RECORDS: A SUPPLEMENT AND COMPLEMENT TO THE CENTRAL OTTOMAN ARCHIVES

by JON E. MANDAVILLE

I

The study of Ottoman diplomatics has come a long way since the beginnings were made early in this century. There is still further to go, but at least the main archival categories have been identified and the bureaucratic principles and procedures which gave to each its peculiar historiographic value have been described in more or less rough outline. The days when European historians of the Ottoman period could lift their scholarly status and linguistic reputation by padding their narrative sources with a few references to imperial firmans, quoted usually from Aḥmet Refik's articles in the TOEM, are finished and done with. Now historians juggle the *mühimme*, *rû'ûs*, *kilise*, *jizye*, *taḥvîl*, *aḥkâm* and *defâtîr-i khâqânî* with Naima and Rashid and think nothing of it. They approach a document in *siyâqat* as they approach a document in *dîwânî*; thanks to published handbooks and text for both, there is mystery in neither.

The time has come, in short, when studies on the governmental documentary sources for the Ottoman period may with profit be turned to the interrelationships of the documentary types and how they may complement and supplement each other.¹ More to the point of this book, the time has come for historians of Ottoman Palestine to reconsider the relative merits of the documentary types and their interrelationships.

Those of us interested in this region and period are fortunate. The variety of Ottoman documents relevant to our field covers the full spectrum of types, and their chronological runs are nearly as complete as might be found anywhere else in the Empire. Of the many varieties located in the central archives in Istanbul, two in particular have been used heavily by historians of Palestine because of their relatively wide coverage of human activities. These two are the records of the Imperial Council, which are known as the *mühimme* series, and the provincial land survey records, which

¹ No better proof could be found for this than in the studies appearing over the last five years in *Belgeler*, a journal established by the Turkish Historical Society and devoted to research in Ottoman diplomatics.

were called by the Ottomans the *defâtîr-i khâqânî* and are now generally known as the *Tapu* or *Tahrîr Defterleri*. To these central archives must now be added a regional documentary source: the records (*stjillât*) of the *Sharî'a* Court of Jerusalem. Together these three main documentary categories, each leaning upon yet sustaining the others with its peculiar angle, form the tripod upon which the historiography of Palestine must rest.

II

The *defâtîr-i khâqânî* has been thoroughly described elsewhere: I need give only a brief description here. The statistics contained in these land survey registers provided the Ottoman government with the basic demographic and economic information needed to maintain the mixed feudal imperial tax farm financial system. It made clear the tax income potential of each village and district of every province; it allowed the imperial bureau of the treasury to balance its books annually. At the same time, it clearly delineated the legal proprietary status of each productive parcel of land, whether private, trust or state land. The initial registration was done shortly after the particular lands had been absorbed into the Empire. At intervals of ten or twenty years thereafter, new surveys were conducted. Two registers were drawn up for each survey, a smaller one summarizing taxes and demography by district or province (the *ijmâl defteri*) and a larger one giving all details behind the summary (the *mufasssal defteri*). For most purposes it is with the *mufasssal* that the historian is most concerned.

With the publication of Bernard Lewis's pioneering article, "The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands,"² closely followed in 1952 by his monograph *Notes and Documents*,³ the weight of this statistical material was for the first time applied to the history of Ottoman Palestine.

The *mühimme* series is a record of all orders rendered upon decisions taken by the Imperial Council issued to provincial authorities throughout the Empire. It has been used by historians of the Ottoman realm for centuries. Today historians of the East European provinces meet with historians of the North African provinces in the Başvekâlet Arşivi over the *mühimme* series. It is the common documentary element binding Ottoman historical studies together: even in death, the centralized nature of the Empire lives on. Again as in the case of the *defâtîr-i khâqânî* I need not give a detailed description of the *mühimme* series here: it has been done more carefully than I could hope to by others. In this, we of Palestinian historiography are doubly blessed: one of the best studies yet to appear on this source was written by the late Uriel

² In *JRAS*, Oct. 1951, p. 139-155.

³ *Lewis, Notes*.

Heyd and is embodied in the first part of his book *Ottoman Documents of Palestine, 1552-1615* (Oxford, 1960). The documents which make up the main body of this work are all drawn from the *mühimme* series. And again, one need only glance at the sources for the articles of this book dealing with the the first several centuries of Ottoman rule to realize the importance of this series in the historiography of Palestine.

III

The value of the *sijillāt* of the Ottoman *Sharī'a* Courts as a historical source has long been recognized by scholars working in the Anatolian and European provinces. They have scarcely been touched for the Arab provinces, a notable exception being the work of 'Ārif al-'Ārif in his history of Jerusalem.⁴ I have outlined elsewhere a brief description of some of these records, the length of the various series and their contents;⁵ here I shall be even more brief.

The court records acted first as a repository for any document, contractual or decretal, whose legality or authenticity might at some future time be questioned. It also acted as a record of all notarial and juridic proceedings brought before the judge. Thus the court acted as a sort of Public Records Office, at least until the beginnings of the modern bureaucratic apparatus in the nineteenth century, when certain functions were relegated to separate offices.

The typical records of a city court are organized into several series. The largest by far is the ordinary record of all tort, breach of contract or criminal proceedings carried out in court. The *qassām 'ādī* is a registration series of wills and inheritance cases: the *qassām 'askerī* is a similar series dealing with governmental, mostly military, personnel. The *matrukāt* series is a register of property left by deceased persons. Finally, the *awāmir* series is a register of orders to local authorities, including the judge, from various branches of the central government.

Only a full index of a given *sijill* over a reasonable period of time would offer an honest description of the variety of topics covered. To make matters more difficult, the administrative competence of the court changed from period to period, especially after about 1800. Thus, judging by Mr. Layish's description⁶ cases of criminal action do not figure very large, if at all, in the nineteenth century Jaffa records. Yet for the records of sixteenth century Jerusalem they occur frequently indeed. In the earlier periods, in fact,

⁴ *Mufasssal*.

⁵ "The Ottoman Court Records of Syria and Jordan," *JAOS*, 1966, pp. 311-319.

⁶ See *infra* pp. 525.

nearly anything worthy of slightest note was put into the court records, including semi-personal letters to the judge.

How then do these regional archives complement and supplement the historiographically established central archives? Let me take each of the selected central types in turn.

The statistics which make up the provincial land survey registers, as Lewis points out, reflect historical movements "... at a deeper level, and at a slower rhythm."⁷ Yet when writing of events over days, or single years, or even decades, the facts of the tax rolls are of little use unless set into the more precise context of everyday life. Knowing how much tax was assessed is one thing: knowing how the tax was collected and whether it was collected, is quite another and perhaps a little more to the point.

An example from the year 1541 in the Jerusalem court records, one of many of its kind for this year, suggests only part of this problem. In Vol. 8, page 42, an order is registered to the judge of Jerusalem from the governor-general of Damascus. A village near Jerusalem had consistently refused to pay tax shares to the *timariote* of its lands and the administrator of a *waqf* entitled to a tax portion. The judge was ordered to check the land survey register, ascertain that the *timār* and *waqf* claims were correct, take the pertinent documents and a garrison detachment, go to the village and attempt to persuade the villagers to pay. Those who refused were to be jailed, but under no circumstances was bloodshed on the part of either side to be tolerated. A full report was to be made to the governor-general on the results. There are more than enough entries of this sort to show how, and how effectively, the land survey registers were used.

Lewis has noted that the first surveys were mostly incomplete. Keeping in mind the following example, one wonders a little about the effectiveness of the later ones. In 1530, partially as a result of complaints arising from an earlier survey, a team began resurveying the lands around central Palestine. Consider the success of this team in the village of Bayt Jālā: it returned to Jerusalem and complained bitterly of insults and refusals of cooperation. It was claimed, and witnessed by two soldiers who went along, that the villagers said, *inter alia*, "When your sultan finishes with the *farānji* kings, he turns on us!" And they finished up by shouting, "*Kitābatukum mithl al-ḍarṭa min al-ḥimār!*" referring, no doubt, to the survey after survey after survey. We are left in doubt as to the eventual outcome.

For the establishment of certain basic long-term trends as well, the court records are invaluable supplements to the central land survey books.

⁷ Bernard Lewis, "Studies in the Ottoman Archives, I," *BSOAS*, 1954, pp. 469-501.

Population curves based on tax rolls must always be a chancy business, but the non-Muslim population of Palestine, liable for their own peculiar assessments, received careful and frequent scrutiny. Among the entries of the court records dealing with investigations and appointments in the *jizye* administration are found copies of annual *jizye* payments from the towns and districts of Palestine. Fitting these copies into the temporal gaps between the five general land surveys of the sixteenth century, the lacunae of the central *jizye defterleri*, and using them to extend specialized demographic studies into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries where general surveys are lacking, would result in smoother trend lines, more confident in appearance. Some of the figures which I have jotted down suggest this. In the town of Gaza in 1015 A. H., for example, 358 Christian families, 90 Jewish families and 23 Samaritan families paid the *jizye* tax.⁸ Lewis's latest figures for Gaza from the general survey of 963-964 A.H. are, respectively, 338, 81 and 18.⁹ The gradual rise of non-Muslim population recorded by Lewis for Gaza during the first half of the sixteenth century seems to have continued into the seventeenth century. In 1025 A.H., 509 households (no differentiation is made here by religion) paid the *jizye* tax in Gaza and Ramla combined,¹⁰ compared to 504 in 1015 A.H.¹¹ and 483 in 963 A.H.¹² Nablus shows the same slight rise during this period. The size of the non-Muslim population of the city of Jerusalem varies a good deal more than these established agricultural towns. Its people were lent greater mobility by their commercial occupations. As the *de facto* capital of Palestine, Jerusalem's economic and social life was more precariously attuned to political events. The records show 93 Christian and 90 Jewish families paying *jizye* in 975 A.H.;¹³ 60 Jewish in 992 A.H.;¹⁴ 132 Christian and 90 Jewish in 1015 A.H.;¹⁵ 142 Christian and 65 Jewish in 1025 A.H.;¹⁶ 82 Christian and 60 Jewish in 1029 A.H.¹⁷ I have attempted no analysis of the figures in terms of whys and wherefores, but the difference between those given for 961 A.H., the latest general survey used by Lewis, i.e., 303 Christian and 324 Jewish families,¹⁸ and those I have mentioned above for

⁸ Jerusalem *Shari'a* Court Records (henceforth: JSCR), Vol. 81, f. 7A-B.

⁹ Lewis, "Studies," p. 476.

¹⁰ JSCR, Vol. 97, f. 12B.

¹¹ JSCR, Vol. 81, f. 7A-B.

¹² Lewis, "Studies," p. 476.

¹³ JSCR, Vol. 47, f. 37B.

¹⁴ JSCR, Vol. 63, f. 29B.

¹⁵ JSCR, Vol. 81, f. 7A-B.

¹⁶ JSCR, Vol. 97, f. 12B.

¹⁷ JSCR, Vol. 97, f. 89A-B.

¹⁸ Lewis, *Notes*, p. 476.

975 A.H., is certainly striking. Clearly the records need to be taken into account for any extended demographic study.

IV

Much has been made, and rightly so, of the sometimes lengthy prefaces to the *mufaṣṣal* survey registers, the *qānūnnāmeler*. These contain discussions of the taxation and administrative practices peculiar to that particular province at the time of the conquest: they describe for Palestine, in other words, Mamluk practice. In the court records excerpts are often found from these *qānūnnāmeler* quoted in the context of a particular case, which show how the *qānūnnāmeler* actually were used. In Vol. 32 of the Jerusalem records, for example, is found a long entry dated 1549, an excerpt from the Jerusalem *qānūnnāme*. It deals with *qumāma*, the town entry tax charged on pilgrims. The excerpt differs somewhat from the *mufaṣṣal* text;¹⁹ more important, the comments around the excerpt illuminate the actual practice.

In addition, the *qānūnnāmeler* quoted in the records sometimes fill lacunae in those texts available in the *mufaṣṣal* registers.

These are just a few examples of how the *siḡillāt* support the central land registers. What of the *mūhimme* series? The first point to note is that the earliest volume of the *mūhimme* series thus far discovered in Istanbul dates from 1544, followed by 1552, 1553, and so on. That leaves a gap of more than thirty years in imperial firmans, of which twenty are covered in the Jerusalem court records. Equally, there are gaps in the later *mūhimme* series which are filled by the records.

Second, although the *mūhimme* series contains a record of orders issued from Istanbul to Palestine, the effect of the order is seldom obvious save in the occasional brief references to army desertions, the more fully treated episodes of brigandage and uprisings, or the more rare still report of the conscientious Ottoman officer who, acutely aware that his territory teetered on the brink of revolt, sent details to Istanbul and pleaded for help. In the court records, however, we have not only confirmation of the receipt of the imperial firmans but also for each of these orders, dozens more issued by the provincial government, rippling outward from the regional administrative centre to the officers of the districts, showing how the order was actually implemented and with what success.

In some cases, these local orders simply confirm assumptions which have been made on the basis of literary texts or of incomplete or more generalized *mūhimme* entries. Thus the *mūltezime* of the Tiberias development project

¹⁹ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Kanunlar*, Istanbul, 1943, p. 219, No. 11.

proves to be in the records, as Heyd supposed, Doña Gracia Nāsī.²⁰ An order from the governor-general of Damascus to the judges of Jerusalem and Nablus concerning this project was copied into the registers late in 971 A.H. The judges were ordered to facilitate the transfer of certain artisans from Jerusalem and Nablus to Tiberias, twelve in all, to work on the new town walls and aqueducts there. The order was sent at the behest of a certain Dr. Da'ud, who was the bearer of an imperial rescript from Istanbul to that effect, and official representative of a Jewish lady, Grāsī Nāsī by name, who held the *iltizām* on the project worth 1000 *sikke altin* (80,000 akçe).²¹ It might be noted that the original *iltizām* agreement (of 967 A.H.) had been made for 15,000–16,000 akçe, with the understanding that this would be increased ten-fold after ten years.²²

V

Many other central documentary series besides the *mūhimme* and the *defâtir-i khâqānī* are strengthened when used in conjunction with the regional court archives. The *rû'ûs* series, for example, a record of all major governmental appointments, often has gaps which can be filled from the court records. An entry in the Jerusalem records under 1540 and another under 1582 show that the harried bureaucrats of the Empire used them thus for themselves. In both cases a complete list of office-holders in the provinces and districts is requested, with names, dates of appointment and salaries. In the latter order particular emphasis is placed on obtaining the names of office-holders lacking *berats* and the length of time they had held their positions, which gives us perhaps a clearer indication of where the difficulty lay.²³

The appointments themselves become more meaningful in the context of the local orders. The appointment of Farrûkh as *sanjak bey* of Jerusalem in 1602, on the condition that he collect 20,000 gold pieces from the imperial *khâşş* there to cover the annual pilgrimage expenses, seems quite straightforward in the *rû'ûs*. What is not mentioned is that he had letters of recommendation from the former *beylerbey* of Anatolia, Ahmed Pasha, and the governor-general of Tripoli, Yûsuf Sayfâ, and that in return for the appointment he had paid into the Damascus treasury 10,000 gold pieces from his own pocket to cover outstanding debts on the 1601 pilgrimage.²⁴ The *tahvil* series, a record of land grants under the military fief system, can

²⁰ *Ott. Doc.*, pp. 139–142.

²¹ JSCR, Vol. 42, f. 66B.

²² *Ott. Doc.*, p. 141.

²³ JSCR, Vol. 60, f. 89B.

²⁴ JSCR, Vol. 81, f. 8B, 14B, 30B.

better be understood through numerous references to local orders in the court records which led to and followed the *berat*.

There is scarcely a document series in Istanbul relevant to Palestine which cannot be augmented and its cutting edge for historians sharpened through use of the regional archives of the Jerusalem *Shari'a* Court. Let us hope that the cataloging and indexing of these regional series goes forward rapidly. When it is done our tripod, the *defātir-i khāqānī*, the *mūhimme* series and the *siyillāt*, will stand solid, and a more comprehensive interpretation of the materials available for Palestinian history will be possible.

33. THE *SIJILL* OF JAFFA AND NAZARETH SHARI'A COURTS AS A SOURCE FOR THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF OTTOMAN PALESTINE

by AHARON LAYISH*

I

Most of the records under survey relate to the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, while the remainder (all from Jaffa) date from the first half of the nineteenth century, and several of them cover the very first years of that century. The difficulties in deciphering the handwriting or reconstructing unclear passages are considerable. Some of the material is in poor physical condition: the handwriting has been partly obliterated or totally erased, pages are torn or missing and large portions of the *sijill* have been lost in the course of the past 150 years. Most of the material is written in Arabic, but there are also some Turkish documents — Ottoman orders and firmans recorded in the court archives.

The importance of the *sijill* as a historic source is mainly due to the following two factors:

A. The extensive substantive and personal jurisdiction of the *Shari'a* Courts during that period. Their substantive jurisdiction comprised:

1. Civil claims in such matters as contracts of sale and loss of property;
2. The issuing of writs and certificates (*sukūk*) for the purpose of various legal actions.
3. Matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, etc.) and *waqf*. The personal jurisdiction of the courts extended also to non-Muslims, except in matters of personal status of members of other recognized religious communities. In many respects their status equalled that of the contem-

* *Shaykh* Tawfiq Mahmūd 'Asaliyya and *Shaykh* Husnī al-Zu'bi, the *qādis* of the *Shari'a* Courts of Jaffa and Nazareth, have kindly allowed me to study the *sijill* of their courts dating from the Ottoman period for purposes of my research. This is gratefully acknowledged. Tribute is further due to Mr. S. Nawi, Director of the Muslim Division in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

A special effort was made to draw up a list of all the subjects dealt with in these records. For this work of collecting the material I am particularly indebted to Messrs. Nathan Caspi and Boaz Shoshan, two students of the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Hebrew University, who have devoted much time to this project.

porary civil courts. The *sijill* includes writs of appointment for *nā'ibs* (deputy *qāḍīs*), with a full specification of their authorities.¹

B. The second factor is not related to the legal jurisdiction of the courts. The *sijill* served as a kind of official gazette for the publication of orders, regulations, notices, appointments to official posts, changes in the district administration and the like issued by the *wālī* in charge of the district, the district *qāḍī* and other official functionaries, of course also including the Sultān in Istanbul. These announcements always open with the standard formula "recorded by legal sanction" (*quyyida bi'l-idhn al-shar'ī*).

It is accordingly evident that the *sijill* contains a wealth of material which reflects the political, administrative and social conditions of the country at that time. I should like to quote a few examples from several different domains to illustrate the significance of this source. These examples can, of course, by no means be taken as a representative sample.

II

There are several indications of Napoleon's expeditions to be found in a variety of documents. From the civil claim of a Muslim woman from Jaffa against a Christian *dhimmi*, lodged in 1214 A.H./1799, it may be inferred that in the course of the French conquest of the coastal towns, or in the picturesque language of the transcript of the court judgment: "when the covetous French sect, may the curse of God be upon them, attacked the port city" (*lammā hajamat al-ṭā'ifa al-bāghiya al-Faransāwiyya la'anahum Allāh ilā al-iskila*), there were instances of Muslims taking flight and escaping to the hinterland, with the Christians staying behind. At any rate this is what happened in Jaffa. In this case the plaintiff had deposited a case containing money and chattels with a Christian to be kept in trust (*bi-ṭariq al-amāna*) until she would come back. After the French forces withdrew she returned to reclaim the case. The man with whom she had deposited it contended that his house had been looted during the occupation and all his property, including the case deposited with him, had been taken.

Gladder tidings are announced in an order (*marsūm*) of *wālī al-Quds wa-Miṣr wa-ser'asker* dated 1216 A. H. /1801. This order joyously proclaims to the merchants of Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, Gaza and the coastal plain (*al-sāhil*) that "good days have come" and that the Damietta roads in Egypt have again been opened to traffic (after the defeat of the French) and they can again carry on their trade there as in the past.

Evidence of changes in the district administration of the Ottoman Empire with the evacuation of the foreign troops from Egypt is found in an order

¹ See, e.g., Jaffa, *Sijill* 4, p. 10; *ibid.*, *Sijill* 6a, Nos. 127 and 219.

recorded in 1218 A.H./1803. In the order addressed, among others, to the *mutasallims* of Gaza, Ramla and Jaffa, the *vālī* of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli announces that he has received instructions from the sultan about the transfer of the *eyālet* of Egypt, Cairo, Alexandria, Rashīd and Damietta, and the rest of the area to the jurisdiction of the *eyālet* of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. The addressees are requested to rejoice at this announcement and to obey the order.²

Reference to the upheavals in the Arabian Peninsula as a result of the Wahhābī uprising may be found in an order dated 1219 A.H./1804. This order is addressed to the deputies of the *qāḍīs* (*muwwāb*), the *muftī*, the *naqīb al-ashrāf*, the *ketkhudā* as well as to other office-holders, merchants and the rest of the population. It states that severe disturbances have led to the disruption of commerce throughout the Peninsula and issues a call for the purge of the cities of Hijaz of the "covetous" (*bughāt*) and those who have thrown off the yoke of Heaven (*khawārij*; meaning the Wahhābīs), and for the relief of the two holy cities (Mecca and Medina) from the siege they are under. The war against the Wahhābīs is defined as a holy war (*jihād*). The order also contains particulars of personal changes in the district administration as a result of al-Jezzār's death.

III

It is only natural that most of the material should deal with matters of personal status. The decisions and orders handed down by the *qāḍīs* are a first-class source for studying the family structure at that time, both within the narrow context of personal status and in the wider social context of kinship relations (such as endogamous marriage customs), and the regulation of property relations within the family and the clan (*hamūla*) in rural and urban settlements. I shall bring only a few examples of the interesting particulars of various aspects of personal status contained in these documents.

A. In the field of marriage it appears that the marriage of minors was quite common, as was the marriage of women against their will. Thus, a woman from Lod claimed that her brother had compelled her to appoint him as her *wakīl* in order to marry her off to somebody she did not want.³ Another woman who was married to her cousin claimed that she was a minor at that time and did not want the marriage.⁴ A minor was married to two men simultaneously, once by her father, for a high dower, and once by her

² See extracts of the *Sijill* of Jaffa selected by Aḥmad Shawqī al-Kharbūṭī, *Al-Akhhbār al-Islāmiyya* (ed. by Y. Yehoshua), Vol. 7 (1959), No. 1, pp. 16-18 and 22-24.

³ Jaffa, *Sijill* 50, p. 69, No. 16.

⁴ *Al-Akhhbār al-Islāmiyya*, op. cit., Nos. 2-3, pp. 22-23.

brother in an exchange marriage (*nikāḥ al-shirāgh*) whereby he got a wife for himself.⁵

B. It was also fairly common for the dower to be divided into a prompt (*mu'ajjal*) and deferred (*mu'ajjal*) payment.⁶ The rates of dower and maintenance payable (at various times and places) may help to establish certain economic data, such as the standard of living. It also transpires that the payment was made both in money — in local and in hard currency, such as French gold pounds — and in kind, while the woman insisted on her right to the prompt dower as a condition precedent to the consummation of the marriage, and until that date claimed the payment of maintenance.⁷

C. Agnatic relatives (*'aṣabāt*) — the paternal grandfather, uncle and brother — were the ones to be most frequently appointed as guardians over the property of minors,⁸ although occasionally a woman, especially the mother, may also have served in that capacity.⁹

D. As regards divorce, the most surprising finding is the frequency of divorce by mutual consent — the so-called *ibrā'* divorce where there is a mutual waiver of personal rights such as deferred dower and alimony during the waiting-period of a woman after the termination of marriage (*nafaqa 'idda al-ṭalāq*). Particularly surprising is the high rate of cases where the woman initiated the divorce. Sometimes she was even willing to release herself or buy herself off (*khul'*) by making financial and other concessions.¹⁰ It must be noted, however, that we are dealing mainly with an urban population where the woman's status was much higher than in the villages. However, the scarcity of ordinary *ṭalāq* divorces in the *sijill* is probably also due to the fact that prior to the Ottoman family law there was no requirement to notify the courts of such divorces or to have them recorded. In those cases where such divorces appear on the records there was usually an application on the part of the woman demanding her *shar'ī* rights under the divorce.

Suspended divorce (*ṭalāq mu'allaq*) is very rare. There is one amusing case where a woman claimed that her husband had sworn to divorce her on the coming *'id al-aḥḥā*. The husband, on the other hand, who did not want the divorce, claimed that he had sworn to divorce her on Tuesday, and, since the feast fell on a Monday, the divorce was not valid.¹¹

⁵ Nazareth, *Sijill* 26, pp. 4-5, No. 35.

⁶ See, e.g., Jaffa, *Sijill* 50, p. 17, No. 14, and p. 33, No. 29.

⁷ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 29, No. 23.

⁸ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 8, No. 18, and p. 9, No. 22.

⁹ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 10, No. 26, and p. 21, No. 3.

¹⁰ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 2, No. 1, and p. 4, No. 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 74, No. 29.

E. In the field of succession the basic fact to be noted is that women did inherit. The female successors are found to be variously related to the deceased: his widow, daughter, sister, niece and like.¹² Sometimes the woman herself initiated the order of succession.¹³ Various devices to exclude women from the succession may also be noted, such as granting them financial compensation for their waiver to a share in the inheritance.¹⁴

F. Succession is one of the main signs indicating that a woman was in practice entitled to hold property, but it is not the only indication. Sometimes the wife controlled her children's share in the estate of the head of the family by virtue of her having been appointed their guardian. She was, moreover, entitled to leave property to her own heirs.¹⁵ There is ample evidence in the *sijill* of women carrying out various financial and real estate transactions: sales, purchases, the grant and receipt of loans, mortgages, leases and the like. For instance, there is a case of a woman who sold property left to her in her father's will in order to return a debt to her daughter.¹⁶ Another woman lent money to her father and sought to collect it from the estate.¹⁷ Still another woman bought olive trees from her father-in-law in return for the prompt dower she had received from her husband and, since she was not satisfied with the trees, claimed that there was no marriage.¹⁸ Then there is the woman who bought wheat in order to retail it, not to mention many other cases. Women also held registered title (*qūshān*) to their property.¹⁹

IV

Scholars interested in the legal, juridical aspects of the *Sharī'a* Court proceedings may also find ample material in these records on the application of family laws, the *mejelle*, the laws of evidence and the rules of procedure, the consultation of the works of various commentators and the instances where the *qāḍīs* applied to the *muftīs* for their legal opinion (*fatwā*) when the law did not seem sufficiently clear. Thus, the *sijill* contains legal opinions on various questions of personal status, succession, torts involving non-Muslims and the like.²⁰

¹² See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 15-16, No. 39.

¹³ See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 25-26, No. 15.

¹⁴ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 18, No. 46.

¹⁵ See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 51-52, No. 1.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14, No. 35.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17, No. 44.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32, No. 27.

¹⁹ See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 37-38, No. 41.

²⁰ See, e.g., *ibid.*, *Sijill* 11, pp. 81a, and 173a; *Al-Akhbār al-Islāmiyya*, *op.cit.*, No. 1, pp. 20-22.

There also is considerable material on the establishment of endowments (*waqfs*), particularly family endowments, the appointment of administrators (*mutawallī*), the distribution of their proceeds among the beneficiaries and obviously also disputes about the internal management of these *waqfs*, the maintenance or improvement of the property and the like.²¹ The institution of the *waqf* is known to be one of the major devices for evading the Muslim succession laws, and in fact there is evidence of various attempts to deprive women of their share.²² On the other hand, there also are cases where the woman acts as the *mutawallī* of the family *waqf*.²³

There is one interesting case where the *muftī* of Jaffa, *naqīb al-ashrāf*, the *ketkhudā* et al. sued the *mutawallī* of a mosque that constituted a family *waqf*, to carry out the necessary repairs of the ramshackle building in order that prayers and the ritual call to prayer might be conducted there. They argued that they had a standing in the case by virtue of being Muslims, since every Muslim has rights in a mosque. The *qāḍī*, after inspecting the site together with structural experts, ordered the *mutawallī* to restore the mosque as required by the *waqfiyya* (*waqf* deed). The *mutawallī* replied that it was not the mosque that constituted the *waqf* but only some storerooms underneath it, and since they lay in ruins he had no source of income from which he could finance the repairs of the mosque. This came to the attention of the *mutaṣarrif* of Jerusalem, Gaza and Jaffa who was known for his generosity, and he allocated the necessary funds for the repair of the mosque.

Christians, too, made *waqfs* at the *Shari'a* courts and under *Shari'a* law. Thus a Greek Orthodox (*Rūmī*) of Lod dedicated his property to the poor monks of his community at the Jerusalem monastery until the end of all generations, that is, until there were no more poor monks; subsequently to the Christian poor of Ramla and Lod; then to the poor of all the monasteries in Jerusalem; after that to the Christian poor in Syria (*al-diyār al-Shāmiyya*); still after that to all the poor and needy in the *livā'* of Jerusalem; and finally, to the poor and needy everywhere, those closest to Jerusalem being the first in line. The administration and inspection of the *waqf* was vested in the Patriarch of Jerusalem and his successors.²⁴

The non-observance of Muslim religious practices seemed to have been a source of major concern to the sultan. In 1813 he saw fit to address an order to the district governors to see to it that the five appointed prayers be said daily, that the fast of the month of *Ramaḍān* be kept and that the Koran be

²¹ See, e.g., Jaffa, *Sijill* 50, p. 52, No. 3.

²² See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 57, No. 14.

²³ See, e.g., *ibid.*, *Sijill* 65, p. 50, No. 6.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, *Sijill* 50, pp. 4–5, No. 8.

studied at Koran schools specially set up for this purpose. The order contains the sanction what whoever fails to observe these religious commandments is liable to be punished.²⁵

V

Interesting information may also be obtained about the status of the *ahl al-dhimma* (Christians and Jews), especially the Christian communities and churches in Palestine. Thus, the abbots and church fathers of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Ramla and other towns applied to the *qādīs* for permission to carry out repairs and improvements in the churches and monasteries, with the understanding that the buildings would not be expanded or enlarged and that the sole intention was to maintain them according to the previous model.²⁶

Matters of personal status of members of non-recognized communities, that is, of the various Protestant churches, were settled by the *Shari'a* Courts, and under *Shari'a* law. These courts also settled matters of personal status of parties belonging to different — including recognized — communities. There is evidence that the competence of the *Shari'a* Courts was sometimes challenged in such cases. Thus, a Greek Orthodox woman argued that the court had no authority to adjudicate in the matter of a will of a member of her community drawn up before the Greek Orthodox Metropolitan, basing her contentions on the firmans of 1277 A.H./1860 and 1304 A.H./1887.²⁷ The *Shari'a* Court is also found to have held sessions in monasteries in the presence of the abbot.²⁸

Apart from all this, the *sijill* also provides insights into the status of diplomatic representatives in this country. In one case, in 1232 A.H./1816, the *vālī* of Sidon and Tripoli intervened on behalf of the British consul in Jaffa who had claimed a debt from the estate of a Muslim. The *vālī* gave instructions to accede to the consul's request, but the heirs of the deceased appealed to the Sublime Porte. Consequently orders were given to hold a fair and impartial trial under the *Shari'a* law in which the consul would have to prove the truth of his allegations regarding the debt claimed by him. In one of the reports submitted to the Sublime Porte, the authorities and rights of the British consul were defined as follows: issuing trading permits, exemption from the *jizya* (poll-tax) and from the food tax, immunity against arrest, search of personal belongings and the despatch of soldiers to his home, non-interference with the performance of his duties in the course of

²⁵ *Ibid.*, *Sijill* 4, p. 118. See also *ibid.*, *Sijill* 6a, No. 369.

²⁶ See, e.g., *ibid.*, *Sijill* 4, p. 222.

²⁷ Nazareth, *Sijill* 26, pp. 25–27, No. 12.

²⁸ See, e.g., Jaffa, *Sijill* 50, pp. 10–11, No. 27.

travel when instead he should be given full assistance and protection (1228 A.H. /1813).

VI

Regarding the socio-economic relations between Muslims and Christians, a wealth of information may be obtained from the numerous civil cases and other documents contained in the *sijill*. Thus, a Muslim from Ramla is found to have appointed the head of the Christian community of that town as his absolute attorney (*wakīl muṣṭaḡ*) to sell the equipment of his bathhouse, his silo, his livestock and his vegetables in order to repay his debts which had "mounted shamefully" owing to the usurious interest he was charged.²⁹

Dispersed throughout the *sijill* there are valuable pieces of information that may help to elucidate various social aspects of the period in question. We find, for instance, that the customs officer of Jaffa, apart from his fiscal function of collecting customs on goods, was also supposed "to look after the poor and needy." There is even an instance of the customs officer being dismissed for neglecting the social side of his office.³⁰ Then we learn that the office of *mu'adhdhin* at the great mosque of Ramla was hereditary, being held by a certain family there, although the appointment was officially made by the *qāḍī*.³¹

The *sijill* also serves as an excellent source for the demographic structure of the population. It contains evidence of the existence of groups of immigrants from North Africa and from Egypt,³² and mentions families and clans, Bedouin tribes, important officers of the religious establishment (*muftis*, *qāḍis*, *ashrāf*) and of the civilian-military administration (*vālīs*, and lower-ranking officers in the administrative hierarchy). It furthermore contains information about the service of the local population in the Ottoman army, such as orders of succession issued on estates of people who died in service, or maintenance claims of women whose husbands had deserted from the army and were held in prison.³³

The instances I have cited constitute no more than a random sample of the wealth of material contained in the *sijill*. Nevertheless, it seems that this very cursory review should be enough to whet the curiosity of any scholar who is interested in various aspects of the history of Palestine during the last hundred years of the Ottoman régime.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 6, No. 11.

³⁰ *Al-Akhbār al-Islāmiyya*, *op. cit.*, No. 1, pp. 22-24.

³¹ Jaffa, *Sijill* 50, p. 23, No. 6.

³² See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 3-4, No. 6.

³³ See, e.g., *ibid.*, p. 30, No. 25; p. 33, No. 30, and p. 34, Nos. 32-33.

34. THE ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES AS A SOURCE FOR THE HISTORY OF PALESTINE DURING THE PERIOD OF OTTOMAN RULE

by PAUL A. ALSBERG

I. Introduction

The primary function of the Israel State Archives (I.S.A.) is to preserve for future generations the records of the Government of Israel and of the authorities that previously governed the country. In addition to official material the I.S.A. also accepts for safekeeping documentary material of a private or semi-official nature if its origin or content warrants this, or if it can serve to complement the official documents.

The material in the I.S.A. relating to the history of Palestine during the period of Ottoman rule can be divided into three main categories:

1. Official material of the institutions of the Ottoman Government.
2. Material of foreign institutions and organizations in the country, including the consulates of the Great Powers.
3. Material of the British Mandatory Government relating to the system of government in force in the country before the British conquest.

The official Turkish material in the I.S.A. is very meagre, due to the fact that the Turks apparently either removed or destroyed the records when they left the country. Sir Ronald Storrs, Military Governor of Jerusalem in the period immediately after the British took over, recalls in his memoirs that in December, 1917, he was unable to discover any Turkish records whatsoever that could have been of use to him in setting up a smooth and orderly administration.¹

Among the I.S.A. material are five different archive groups — or remains of groups — that call for attention. The first and most important of these is the *Nüfus* registers for the years 1884–1917; the second, the minute books and several registers of the *meclis-i idare* in Jerusalem for the years 1910–1915; the third, fragments of the archives of the *Mutasarrıf* in Jerusalem during the years 1906–1908 when Ali Ekrem Bey held this office, consisting of about only 250 documents, but including some which are most interesting and important, particularly in regard to the immigration and settlement of Jews in Palestine; the fourth and fifth, records of the Notary

¹ Ronald Storrs, *Orientations*, London, 1939, p. 336.

Public in Jaffa from the year 1896, as well as land registers and isolated certificates of registration.

The records of the Notary Public in Jaffa were preserved almost intact in the custody of the Notary, who continued to serve in this capacity during the period of the Mandatory administration. These records open a window, as it were, onto the economic and business life of the country. They include powers of attorney and agreements which were recorded in the presence of the Notary. It must be remembered that the function of the Notary was to authenticate the signatures of the parties involved and of the witnesses who appeared before him, and he had nothing to do with the contents of the documents. It is therefore not surprising that the records themselves are written in many languages — English, French, German and Russian, although most of them are, of course, in Arabic.

As for the rest of the Turkish official documents, their preservation seems to have been more or less fortuitous, and it is difficult to understand why these particular documents were kept and came into our possession. Only in regard to the *Nüfus* registers is there an explanation for this; we have detailed information about a special campaign carried out by the Government health authorities in 1924 to collect the records required for their work in accordance with instructions regarding the registration of births and inoculation of children.² The *Nüfus* registers have continued to be used up to the present, and there are many who turn to the I.S.A. for confirmation of the date of their birth.

More important for research purposes is the non-Ottoman material accumulated as a result of the administrative activities of the various foreign bodies in Palestine, consisting mainly of the files of the German and British consulates and of the German community in Palestine. This material, too, came into the possession of the I.S.A. more or less by chance. The German files, for instance, had been sold as waste paper, and it was only thanks to the alertness of the police that they were saved from destruction by the paper mills. Their suspicions having been aroused by the sight of a truck loaded with old files, the police ordered that the files be examined by experts.

The third category of material — the files of the Mandatory government — is concerned chiefly with concessions in force during the period of Turkish rule, the continuance of which was demanded from the British government, according to the Lausanne peace treaty; with loans to farmers; and with Mandatory legislation, which was based on Turkish laws and ordinances.

² Chief Secretary's Instructions, 21.3.1924, I.S.A., Health Department File E 1/80/2.

II. The *Nüfus* Registers³

I shall begin by briefly describing a number of record groups mentioned above, starting with the *Nüfus* register. As is generally known, at the end of the nineteenth century the Ottoman government introduced registration of the population throughout the Ottoman Empire,⁴ an undertaking in which it relied to a major extent on the population censuses it conducted from time to time. In addition, the law called for a chronological registration of births, deaths, divorces, marriages, changes of address and persons of military age.

In the I.S.A. there are now 463 registers, including some unofficial books used by the *mukhtārs* of the communities. In general, the documents relate to residents of the country who were Ottoman nationals, but a number of them also deal with "foreigners", i.e., nationals of foreign countries as well as Ottoman nationals whose homes were originally abroad, but who lived in Palestine because of their work as senior government officials, as members of religious orders or of the clergy in monasteries and other institutions.

The registers are arranged according to localities — provinces, districts, *Nahiyes*, cities, villages and suburbs — and within each locality according to communities.

The communities themselves are divided into Jews, Muslims and Christians, with a yet further division in the larger centres. In Jerusalem, for example, the Jews are listed not only as Jews, but also as Ashkenazim or Sephardim. The term "Sephardi" applies to all those who are not Ashkenazim, such as Maghrabis and Gurjis. In one instance⁵ there is even a division of the Ashkenazi Jews in Jerusalem into Hassidim and Perushim. The Druze are generally included among the Muslims. In small communities Christians are listed in one book, though generally in separate lists for each sect.

The censuses that are especially noteworthy are those of 1884, 1905, 1911 and 1915. The best known is that of 1905, both because of the quantity of material it includes — most of the records in the I.S.A. refer to it — and its quality, a result of the satisfactory way in which it was carried out as well as of its scope. The registration is not uniform, and in the course of the years the census forms were improved and the registrations made more complete. In the earlier registers, which include information from the year 1879, the forms are defective because they make no provision for receiving enough data and because the census officials failed to record all details asked for. Sometimes they did not note the date and place of birth, as well as other

³ I.S.A. Record Group 39.

⁴ George Young, *Corps de droit ottoman*, Oxford, 1905, II, 242-261. "Loi sur l'état civil, 1902, modifiant et remplaçant la loi sur l'état civil," 1884.

⁵ I.S.A. 39/51.

details which they were meant to supply in the columns designated for the purpose. In the later registers, however, the forms are more complete and are filled in more efficiently.

As far as research is concerned, the *Nāfūs* registers are important primarily for the information they offer in the fields of demography and economics. But they are not all equally important, their value depending on the accuracy with which the census forms were completed.

The registers can be divided into the following three main categories:

A. The Preliminary Register (101 books)

This comprises the census forms on which details were recorded at the time of the census. These details include the name of the village or suburb of the town, the street, the name of the head of the family, his occupation, religion and year of birth, as well as similar details about the members of his household. After all the residents of the place in question are listed there follows a supplementary list of houses; seldom are the names of additional people attached to the households added after the original registration, and in general there is little supplementary information. Certification of the census appears at the end of the list of houses. Generally, the signatories are three bodies: the residents included in the census, who are represented either by the first and second *mukhtārs* of the community, religious functionaries or members of the local committee; the official Commission of Registration, composed as a rule of a chairman, a registration official and a clerk; and the government representative in the district who, as supervisor, added his signature approving the work of the two other bodies (which were subordinate to him) some time after the census had been taken.

B. The Basic Register (225 books)

This includes the most complete of all the census forms, which was used in all the censuses from the year 1905. It would seem that they were copies of the earlier forms filled in at the time of the census itself. The spaces between the items are much wider than in the latter, with room being left for further data to be added in the years after the census. The supplementary information appears at the end of every house, space being left between the entries to list the children born to the household or additional members added to it through marriage in subsequent years. Also, at the end of the original list of houses are added the houses built after the census.

C. Registers of Births, Deaths, Marriages and Divorces (38 books)

The records in these registers are arranged in chronological order, according to the date on which the relevant information was received at the registration office of the province, and not according to the date of the event itself; sometimes the difference between the two dates is considerable.

The exact date of the event is also recorded. In the registration of births, generally the name of the family only is noted and not the name of the child.

In addition to these registers, the I.S.A. also has registers of persons of military age, as well as registers of foreigners and books of the *mukhtārs* which were not kept on the official census forms.

The registers in the I.S.A. apply to Jerusalem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Bayt Jālā, Hebron, Gaza, Ramla, Lod, Rehovot, Haifa, Acre, Shafa 'Amr, Nazareth, Nablus, and the villages in their environs.

III. *The Archives of the Mutasarrif in Jerusalem*⁶

The second record group, of which I shall give a brief description, consists of the archives of the *mutasarrif* in Jerusalem in the years 1906–1908, the period during which Ali Ekrem Bey held this office. The special significance of these documents lies in the fact that they represent the only material in our possession which includes internal government correspondence. The correspondence is between the *mutasarrif* and the government in Istanbul — The Grand Vizier, the Minister of the Interior and the Finance Minister — or between the *mutasarrif* and the governors of the provinces in Palestine — the *qā'imāqāms* in Jaffa, Gaza and Hebron — and the *waqf* and treasury officials. The material includes a number of lengthy and detailed memoranda from the *mutasarrif* to the government in Istanbul, the most important of which deal with the problem of Jewish immigration to Palestine and its influence on the development of the country.⁷ Attached to these memoranda are reports and various letters from the *qā'imāqām* in Jaffa, in which he describes for the benefit of the *mutasarrif* the ineffectiveness of the steps taken to restrict Jewish immigration, and especially the worthlessness of the "red ticket." This ticket was given to Jews on their arrival in Palestine as a permit for their stay in the country for a period of about three months, in exchange for which their passports were taken away from them. One of the reports, for instance, contains some interesting figures showing that there were in Jaffa port at one time 3,478 foreign passports belonging to people whose permits to stay in the country had expired and which had not been returned to them. Of these, 2,274 were Russian, 705 Austrian, 108 American, 99 Rumanian, 77 British, 76 Persian, 56 Bukharian, and the rest French, German, etc.⁸

Many of the documents deal with problems relating to the population in the south of the country and the border with Egypt. The Turkish authorities apparently followed with considerable apprehension the activities of the

⁶ I.S.A. Record Group 83.

⁷ Draft of memorandum to Grand Vizier, June, 1907, I.S.A. 82/21.

⁸ I.S.A. 83/242.

British after the border had been fixed in 1906 at Rafah. In a detailed memorandum,⁹ Ali Ekrem Bey refers to the problems connected with the Bedouin population in the south, and suggests that the lands occupied by them on the borders of the country be registered and the Bedouins thus become permanent settlers. One of the reasons he offers for this suggestion is that "it would be impossible for the British to raise the question of the boundaries and to fix the boundary line if the lands held by the Bedouin were registered." Ali Ekrem Bey writes that the Bedouins did not agree to register their lands for fear of being drafted into the army, and also because they were afraid it would lead to new taxes being imposed on them in addition to the cattle tax. In conversations held with the Bedouin elders, Ali Ekrem Bey succeeded in extracting from them an undertaking that they would agree to the registration of the land on condition that this would not involve special payments on their part. He regarded this undertaking as a very significant achievement for the state, and also for the development of Beersheba as the capital of a large district which could become an important centre of the country.

Many of the documents in the archives of the *mutasarrif* deal with the problem of corruption among the Turkish officials, especially those in charge of the *waqf* and the collections in the treasury, and with questions of public security in the country. For example, after people were murdered in Hebron, Ali Ekrem Bey writes to the *qā'imaqām* in Hebron that he must pay greater attention to the matter of public security, and concludes by stating: "I warn you again that if there are further incidents such as these we shall be compelled to take steps against you in accordance with accepted practice."¹⁰ The possibilities open to the *mutasarrif* of increasing security were apparently very limited, and the only reinforcement which he offered the *qā'imaqām* was the addition of one policeman.

IV. *Files from the Archives of the German Consulate in Palestine*¹¹

The most important collection, and one which deserves a central place in this survey, is that consisting of the files of the German consulate in Palestine between 1842 and 1917. At first the Prussian consulate, it was converted in 1868 into the consulate of the Norddeutscher Bund, and in 1871 into the consulate of the German Empire. But even in the first period, as the Prussian consulate, it in fact represented all the Protestant states in Germany.

The consulate was established in 1842 in close association with England

⁹ I.S.A. 83/22.

¹⁰ I.S.A. 83/248.

¹¹ I.S.A. Record Group 67.

which in 1840 had opened the first consulate in Jerusalem, both countries being interested in the representation in Palestine of the Protestant states. England, it would appear, was interested for political reasons, and Prussia more because of the religious-romantic leanings of the king, Friederich Wilhelm IV. At that time they founded jointly the Protestant Episcopate in Jerusalem in the hope that it would enjoy the same rights as the representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church, which was supported by Russia, and the Catholic Church, which was under the protection of France.

The files in the I.S.A. and the subjects with which they deal indicate three main periods in the development of the German consulate — this quite apart from the differences in approach and activities dictated by the personalities of the various consuls. At the beginning the consulate was concerned chiefly with the furtherance of Protestant interests and the extension of Protestant influence, and with Prussia's standing among the local population. Because of this latter concern it was anxious to serve as a protecting power for as many local residents as possible, and the first German consuls — like their British counterparts — were most liberal in taking foreign Jews under their protection, even if their German origin was highly doubtful. After 1868, when the Templars had begun to settle in the country, the centre of interest shifted, and one of the main concerns of the consulate now was to protect the German settlers and to further the establishment of their institutions. The consuls continued to be active in protecting the interests of the Jews, but this no longer occupied a central place in their programmes. The third period began after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Germany aimed at consolidating her position in the Ottoman Empire and the German consul was concerned with the propagation of German influence in the spheres of politics, education and commerce.

The German files are very rich in material on the history of Jewish settlement in Palestine, and studies based on this material have been or are about to be published by Professor Mordechai Eliav.¹² It should be pointed out, however, that the files reflect the political situation and social and economic life generally in Palestine, and their research value is not restricted to subjects relating to Jewish history. The first Prussian consuls were renowned Orientalists who spoke Arabic and Turkish, among them Ernst Gustav Schultz who held office in 1842–1851, and Dr. Georg Rosen who served between 1852–1867. Both of them appointed consular

¹² See his articles in *Ha-Tziyonut*, Tel Aviv, 1970; in *Bulletin des Leo Baeck Institutes*, Tel Aviv, Nos. 34–44; and in the monthly *Sinai*, Jerusalem. See also his book, *The Jews of Palestine in the German Policy*, Tel Aviv, 1973.

agents in the provincial towns of Palestine who submitted reports to them and guarded German interests in the centres in which they were stationed. These agents worked in Gaza, Nablus and Jaffa, and their reports were written mostly in Arabic or Turkish, and in a few cases in French and Italian; not one of their reports is written in German!¹³ The Prussian consul presented a political report regularly — sometimes every two weeks — to the consulate general in Beirut or to the Prussian ambassador in Constantinople, relying, of course, on the reports he received from the consular agents.¹⁴ Everything of public interest that occurred in the country — disturbances, demonstrations, appointments, changes in the behaviour of the communities or the Government, local quarrels, economic affairs, etc. — all were included in these political reports which have been preserved in good condition in the files. The reports of Dr. Rosen, who occupied his post in Jerusalem for 15 years, are outstanding for the colourfulness and richness of their descriptions. I shall give three small examples.¹⁵

On 6 August, 1862, he writes to the Prussian ambassador in Constantinople that recruitment for the army will, it seems, not be carried out as quietly as might have been expected from the way it began. "All the young people from Hebron area have fled and are now roaming round the edge of the desert under the protection of the Beduin tribes." The army went to Hebron and seized the larger villages in the area. On another occasion, on 25 November, 1863, Dr. Rosen reports on the penetration from across the Jordan of Bedouin tribes who, after carrying out all sorts of hostile acts, reached the walls of Jerusalem, and he states: "In recent weeks the security position has again improved and the present Governor, Khūrshīd Pasha, is paying more attention than his predecessor to the question of security in the country." On 21 April, 1864, Dr. Rosen reports on the internal quarrels in the Greek Orthodox Church and the growing opposition of the Arab community to the Greek clergy. The opposition derived mainly from economic factors connected with the administration of church property, and but for the economic dependence of the population on the monasteries, he writes, the trouble would have broken out before. He also observes that according to a widely held opinion the Russians are now financially supporting the Arab population against the Greek clergy, thus making the revolt against the clergy possible.

The reports submitted by the consular agents in Gaza, Nablus, Jaffa and Ramla include details not only about what was happening generally in

¹³ I.S.A. 67/A VIII.

¹⁴ I.S.A. 67/A III.

¹⁵ I.S.A. 67/A III 4.

these towns but also about the special problems confronting the agent in his efforts to safeguard the standing and prestige of the German consulate. For example, there is a special file about a dispute between the Prussian consular agent in Jaffa and the *qā'imāqām*, who had asked for the confiscation and seizure of a shop maintained by the agent.¹⁶ The same file throws very interesting light on the *qā'imāqām's* relations with the local authorities on the one hand and with the consulate on the other, and on the great influence which the consulate, aided by the intervention of the ambassador in Constantinople, had over the Turkish authorities. When the dispute was brought to an end the *qā'imāqām* was compelled to forego his demands and to return the shop to the agent.

The most important files for the history of Palestine are perhaps those containing instructions which the Turkish municipalities issued between 1848 and 1890.¹⁷ These apply to Jerusalem and seem to be of a purely local character. Nevertheless, they reveal the sort of communications that existed between the local municipal authorities and the foreign citizens, for the government could establish contact with a foreign national only through the consul responsible for his protection. The files thus include notices and instructions from the *mutasarrıf*, acting on behalf of the local municipal institutions, which were handed over to the consul so that he could bring them to the knowledge of his nationals and protégés. These instructions deal, *inter alia*, with arrangements for cleaning the streets, lighting the streets at night, closing the gates of the city in the evening, municipal payments, etc.

One important class of files contains notices and instructions from the authorities in connection with financial and tax matters. Here a distinction must be drawn between notices of a general nature which were brought to the attention of the German nationals, and those connected with the protection of their interests and the payment of certain sums demanded from them. Both types of notices are very instructive about aspects of the administration of Palestine. For instance, there are notices from 1849 onwards about currency conversions and the rate of exchange for Turkish currency in relation to Egyptian and foreign currencies, about paper money as compared with coinage, and about the rate of interest, which was permitted up to one per cent a month.¹⁸ Another file, called "Tithes and Other Taxes", contains only notices which the Turkish authorities handed over to the German consul so that he could inform his nationals and others under his protection as to who was farming a certain tax in a given year, and

¹⁶ I.S.A. 67/B 1 50.

¹⁷ I.S.A. 67/A XXII.

¹⁸ I.S.A. 67/A XXII 5.

remind them that it was incumbent upon them to pay their taxes to him when he approached them together with the *kavas* of the consulate.¹⁹

Of no little importance, of course, is the entire section of legal files, which can be divided into two types: general files dealing with consular law, and private files relating to specific lawsuits. The general file, which was opened in 1853,²⁰ is the more interesting of the two, and much can be learned from it not only about the procedures followed in German consular law but also about specific conditions in the country. According to Prussian law, for instance, the courts had to see to it that the defendant at a criminal trial was represented by a qualified lawyer or by an expert in legal procedure, and on 14 April, 1866, we find the consul writing to his superiors that there are no lawyers in Jerusalem and that it is impossible to find suitable persons fulfilling the requirements laid down by Prussian law for those serving as defence lawyers. He therefore requests permission to appoint as defence lawyers in trials involving a Jew one of the leaders of the Jewish community who represents them in many matters and writes out their requests for them. The experiment apparently succeeded, and every year the special appointment of Rabbi Azriel Selig Hausdorf to serve in this capacity was extended. Similarly, there is much of interest in many of the private files relating to individual lawsuits. These deal with civil matters and private complaints, e.g., libel, land, trustees, etc., in which the two sides are generally Germans; or criminal offences such as murder, forgery, embezzlement, etc.; or personal matters like marriage, divorce, inheritance and wills.²¹ From all this much can of course be learned not only about those involved in the lawsuits but also about social conditions prevailing in the country. Occasionally there was a dispute with the authorities about conditions of imprisonment for nationals of the consulate. The consulate premises contained a detention room which was used not only for purposes of investigation or punishment as required by the consulate but also for the detention of its nationals who were sentenced in the local law courts to short terms of imprisonment. When the sentence was for a long term the consul exercised his right to return the national to his country for imprisonment there instead of in a Turkish prison.²²

Special importance attaches to the files of the German institutions²³ and the affairs of the Templars.²⁴ These files, which represent a considerable

¹⁹ I.S.A. 67/A XXIII 2.

²⁰ I.S.A. 67/A XVIII 3.

²¹ I.S.A. 67/B I-B VI.

²² I.S.A. 67/A XVI.

²³ I.S.A. 67/A XXVIII.

²⁴ I.S.A. 67/A XXXI.

proportion of the files of the German consulate, deal with the relations of the institutions with the authorities, their internal administration and the protection extended by the consul to special activities.

The files for the years just before World War I dealing with business and commercial affairs are of particular significance, since they reflect the extent to which the Germans had penetrated into the economic sphere. From 1880 onwards reports on commercial matters were submitted separately from the political reports.²⁵ Special files dealing with commercial connections and relevant information were opened in the German consulate in 1895.²⁶ Some of them discuss the efforts being made and the negotiations under way for the right to issue tenders in connection with large public works, and to obtain concessions for the supply of water and electricity to Jerusalem.²⁷

Certain files contain official Turkish printed matter — pamphlets, circulars and bulletins — which might be the only extant copies, since it is doubtful whether they were ever collected in a library.

V. Documents from the Archives of the British Consulate in Jerusalem²⁸

The archives of the British consulate in Jerusalem are actually kept in the Public Record Office in London, and only isolated documents which were apparently not considered of value were left in Palestine. These include 14 files and several parcels of documents. Among the former is the daily journal of the consulate between 1849 and 1858,²⁹ and files containing drafts of letters which were sent by the British consulate in Jerusalem to the British consular agents in Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, Sidon and Tyre.³⁰ The consular daily journal sometimes includes very lively descriptions of events. One, for example, describes an incident in which a Jew who walked close by the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was set upon and injured by a crowd, leading subsequently to a trial in the *mejlis*. There are many very brief entries in the daily journal which are most informative about the consulate in Jerusalem in the early fifties of the nineteenth century. For instance, scores of entries are about the sending of mail, with details being given about the way mail was sent or received, about the date of arrival of a ship and the connections with Alexandria and Beirut. Particularly important

²⁵ I.S.A. 67/A XXXIX.

²⁶ I.S.A. 67/A XIX.

²⁷ I.S.A. 67/A XXXIX 20.

²⁸ I.S.A. Record Group 123-1.

²⁹ I.S.A. 123-1/1.

³⁰ I.S.A. 123-1/14 To Consular Agents 1851-1883; 123-1/15 From Consular Agents 1857-1863; 123-1/16 To Consular Agency, Jaffa 1892-1893.

is a small set of three files containing drafts of letters sent by the consulate to the local authorities from 1850 up to 1892.³¹ Most of these letters are written in Arabic and are in fact the only British consular records which apparently do not exist in another form in the Public Record Office in London. Among the material in the I.S.A. are several parcels of letters for the years 1911–1912. These include drafts of letters sent by the consulate to the Embassy in Constantinople and the Foreign Office in London, dealing, *inter alia*, with the Turkish-Italian War and mobilization, with the Bedouin disturbances across the Jordan in 1911, with matters concerning the acquisition of land on the Turkish-Egyptian border in the region of Rafah and the plan to establish a Jewish settlement there.³²

*V Documents of the Templars and the German Community in Haifa*³³

The non-consular German archive material reached the I.S.A. through the offices of the Mandatory government, which dealt with the administration of German property after the outbreak of World War II. It is therefore natural that the documents which were kept relate mainly to legal matters, such as articles of association and regulations, minutes, contracts and accounts. Among the material in the I.S.A., for instance, are the minute books of the Templars from 1877 onwards, although they are not in a good state of preservation and will be unusable until they are thoroughly repaired. The I.S.A. also possesses rules- and minutes-books of the German community in Haifa from the year 1881. Committee meetings were held at least once a month, the discussions revolving around matters of property and taxes, cooperation between the settlers and their organization, mutual help and lack of work, public security and the relations with the local authorities, as well as the ties with the German authorities which financially supported the organization of the community. The minutes reveal much about all aspects of life among the Templars — about the way in which night watches were organized, about the digging of drainage ditches for water for cleaning purposes, about the establishment of a school and the arrangements for teaching, about the construction of roads and the recruiting of men for the carrying out of public works, and many other subjects that illuminate the life of the German settlers and, at the same time, the environment in which they lived.

To sum up, the documentary material kept in the I.S.A. relating to the Ottoman period is far from comprehensive. It does, however, contribute substantial information about the population of the country and the conditions of everyday life, especially about the non-Turkish subjects.

³¹ I.S.A. 123–1/19–20; 22.

³² I.S.A. 123–1/11–12.

³³ I.S.A. Record Group 90.

35. MATERIAL IN THE CENTRAL ZIONIST ARCHIVES CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF PALESTINE DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD

by MICHAEL HEYMANN

I

The Central Zionist Archives hold official archives of the institutions of the World Zionist Organization since its foundation in 1897, archives of institutions and organizations of the Jewish Community of Palestine (the *yishuv*) since the middle of the nineteenth century, and also 300 archives of outstanding personalities who were active in the Zionist Organization and/or on behalf of the *yishuv* during that period.

Thus it is clear that no other historical archives contain such complete documentation of the history of the Jewish Community of Palestine in the last decades of Ottoman rule as do the Central Zionist Archives, although the documentation is not equal for all aspects of life in the *yishuv*. Thus, for example, the documentation of the internal development of the *yishuv* and its relationship with the Jews of the Diaspora is much richer than the documentation concerning the relations between the *yishuv* and Ottoman authorities in Palestine and Constantinople. In this context it should be borne in mind that the Zionist institutions' contacts with the authorities were not generally close ones. For example, the "Palestine Office" in Jaffa, which was founded in 1908 (a few months before the Young Turk Revolution) in order to direct the activities of the World Zionist Organization in Palestine, did not apparently come into contact with Turkish government officials until after the outbreak of World War I. On the other hand, the Anglo-Palestine Company (A.P.C.), the financial instrument of the Zionist Organization in Palestine, whose first branch in Jaffa opened in 1903, attempted from the very beginning to develop relations with the Turkish authorities. In our files there are many interesting documents about loans that the governor of Jerusalem received from the A.P.C. in 1904 and about plans to grant the farming of certain taxes to the A.P.C.; however, these contacts did not continue in later years.

It is clear then that the Zionist Archives contain rich documentation of the following subjects: Herzl's efforts to gain a charter over Palestine or part of it from Sultan 'Abdülhamid; Wolffsohn's visits to Constantinople; the meetings of Dr. V. Jacobson, representative of the Zionist Organization in

Constantinople from 1908 to 1914 with Turkish statesmen; the attempts of Nahum Sokolov to negotiate with Arab leaders concerning the future of Palestine in 1914; the complicated problem of purchase of land in Palestine; the limitations which the Turkish authorities placed on Jewish settlement and the attempts made to abolish these limitations (the "red ticket"); the state of security in the areas of Palestine in which Jews lived; and the relations between the Jews of Palestine and their Arab neighbours.

It is not surprising that the Zionist Archives contain documentation of the problems that the *yishuv* faced with the outbreak of World War I in 1914 as well: the Ottomanization of Jews holding Russian citizenship or their expulsion from Palestine; Jewish service in the Turkish army; the attempts of the Turkish authorities to destroy "autonomous" institutions of the Jews in Palestine; the plague of locusts of 1915; the rise in prices and depreciation of the Turkish currency; the construction of roads and public works (railroads, etc.) caused by war conditions; the aid from abroad, especially of food and money from the United States; the intervention of the embassies of the United States and Germany in Constantinople on behalf of the *yishuv*.

II

The following are a number of topics in the history of Palestine about which one would not automatically assume that information would be found in the Zionist Archives:

Inasmuch as the Jewish community was the most dynamic element in the population of Palestine in the period under discussion, the Zionist Archives contain documentation of many varied schemes for the economic development of Palestine, some of which were carried out, such as the building of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railroad (in the archives of Joseph Navon Bey, who promoted its construction), and many more which were not carried out at that time, such as the building of a modern port at Jaffa, the construction of narrow-gauge railroads connecting Jaffa with nearby settlements; improvements in the water supply and street lighting in Jerusalem and the installation of tramways in the city; the exploitation of the minerals of the country, especially the minerals of the Dead Sea; attempts to establish factories and development of the sources of water.

The growth of Jerusalem, in both area and population from the 1880's onward is documented in the files of the Zionist Archives. There is also information on the operations of the Jerusalem municipality in the years prior to World War I (in the archives of David Yellin, who was a member of the municipal council) and this is perhaps of special interest because the archives of the municipality from that period are no longer extant.

There are also important documents in the Zionist Archives about the holy places of the Jews in and around Jerusalem.

In closing it must be noted that in the reports (which are today in the Zionist Archives) sent from Palestine to the central Zionist offices abroad, there is a fairly detailed coverage of the elections to the Turkish Parliament in the *sanjak* of Jerusalem in 1908, 1912, and 1914. These reports reflect mainly the Jewish viewpoint on the elections, though they also include much information that could be of interest to students of the Ottoman government and will not easily be found elsewhere.

(Research by Rachel Ever-Hadani and Yisrael Philipp.)

37. THE ARCHIVES OF TEL-AVIV-JAFFA AS A SOURCE FOR THE FINAL YEARS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN PALESTINE

by ARYEH SHMUELEVITZ

I. Introduction

Tel-Aviv was founded in 1909, and was under Ottoman rule for a mere eight years. Nonetheless, there is ample documentary material in the Tel-Aviv city archives outlining the last years of Ottoman hegemony. This was a period in which attempts were made to change the character of the régime and to grant equal citizenship to all the Empire's subjects irrespective of race or creed; this was a period of wars which placed considerable economic pressure on the populace; this was also the period in which tensions arose between the Jewish community and its neighbours. All these aspects and many others are reflected in the documents preserved by the city archives.

In this paper, I would like to focus attention on three sources:

A. *The records of the general committee of the Jewish communities of Jaffa.* There are several thick folios of these records in the city archives. They cover the following periods: May 1890–February 1896; September 1912–September 1915; January / February 1916; December 1916–March 1917. These notebooks were hand written by the recorder of the minutes, and are in chronological order. In most cases the record mentions those present at each meeting, the subjects discussed, and details of the discussion and the resolutions passed.

B. *Files of the Tel-Aviv town committee.* These files of documents and letters, dating from the day of the committee's founding, are kept in the city archives. The material is at present being stored and catalogued, with lists being drawn up of the subjects dealt with by the various files and the important documents in each file. This process, though of course of great importance, hardly helps to facilitate the work of the researcher in need of documents on a specific and defined subject. For example, a person who wishes to follow up the relations between the town committee and the governor cannot confine himself merely to studying the file "Relations with the Authorities." He also has to scan other files such as those delineating relations with the agricultural colonies, taxes, music and concerts, etc. (e. g., a special concert was given in honour of Jemāl Pasha.)¹

¹ In 1914 Jemāl Pasha was appointed Minister of the Navy, and later that year was

C. *The collected writing of David Smilanski.* These include articles he sent between the years 1906 and 1914 to several Russian papers such as *Elisbatgrad News* (a daily), *Razsvit* (a weekly, published in St. Petersburg), *Kadima* and *Hebrew Thought* (which were published in Odessa), as well as other publications. In these articles, Smilanski records impressions of Palestinian events in general and those of Tel-Aviv in particular. Some are in manuscript form and others typewritten with the author's own proof marks and corrections.²

In this survey, I wish to draw attention to the contribution these archives can make to furthering the knowledge of two special subjects connected with the Ottoman Empire in its rule in Palestine:³ the pattern of relations between the Jews of Tel-Aviv-Jaffa and the authorities; their relations with their non-Jewish neighbours.

II. *Records of the Jaffa Committee*

The specific value of this source in elucidating the two subjects under discussion lies in the information it provides on the political climate of that period as well as the data it contains regarding the intra-communal discussions and apprehensions concerning actual events. Let us consider three specific events and the way they are reflected in the records. Jewish anxieties and fear regarding their neighbours' intentions are palpable in Record No. 63 of Sunday, 14 Menaḥem Av 5652, which refers to a blood-libel fabricated the previous week, and withdrawn only at the last moment when the child involved was found.

... When the Christian boy was lost, the angry crowd milled around making a tremendous din. If the child had not been found, our houses would have been reduced to rubble within a few hours. Even now the

sent to Syria as commander of the Fourth Army, a post he held until 1917. In this capacity he was responsible for the administration of the entire region, including Palestine.

² On the author and his writings see his books: *'Im Bnei Dori*, Tel Aviv, 1942; *'Im Bnei Artzi ve-'Iri*, Tel-Aviv, 1958. In these books he renders his impressions of various personalities in Palestine, but they contain none of the articles he published in the Russian press on events in Palestine.

³ See the following research papers concerning this period in Palestine: N. Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine, 1882-1914," in A. Hourani (ed.), *Middle Eastern Affairs*, No. IV, *St. Antony's Papers*, No. XXVII, Oxford, 1965, pp. 77-108; idem, "Attempts at an Arab Zionist Entente 1913-1914," *MES*, April, 1965, pp. 238-267. Y. Ro'i, "Nisyonoteihem shel ha-Mosdot ha-Tzioniyim Lehashpi'a 'al ha-'Itonut ha-'Aravit be-Eretz Israel ba-Shanim 1908-1914, *Zion*, XXXII (1967), pp. 201-227; idem "The Zionist Attitude Towards the Arabs," *MES*, IV (1968), pp. 198-242; idem "The Relations between Rehovot and its Arab Neighbours 1890-1914," *Zionism*, (Tel-Aviv) Vol. I (1970), pp. 150-203 (in Hebrew).

crowd is still running wild. The Catholic *mukhtār* has asserted in public that a Jewish "rabbi" in a certain town abroad has converted to Christianity and that he has admitted that the Jews are in need of Christian blood, etc.

In an attempt to remedy this situation, it was decided to correspond with three celebrated Jerusalemites: the *hakām bashī*, Rabbi Joseph Rivlin and Rabbi Jacob Meir.⁴

Somewhat greater decisiveness and resourcefulness were displayed by the committee in connection with the expulsion of a group of immigrants from Persia in 1892 (Record No. 53 of 13 Shevat 5652). The pasha maintained that the reason why Persia was one of the countries from which Jews were not permitted to immigrate to Palestine was the indigence of Jewry and the government's unwillingness to give them charity. Representatives of the Jaffa Committee persuaded the group, who were accommodated by the authorities in two shops in Jerusalem, to move to Jaffa, promising them that they would not be sent back to their country. To the authorities, however, the representatives of the committee gave their word that the Persian Jews would be sent back to Persia. The minutes record the discussion determining the fate of these people, and the decision taken, which was to disperse them throughout Jaffa and the colonies.

The third example I would like to adduce is that of a far more serious situation. At the end of 1912, the Pasha of Jerusalem, under pressure from several Jerusalem Arabs, imposed a ban on land purchase by Jews, including Jews of Ottoman citizenship. The order was issued by the pasha on his own authority and not by the government in Istanbul. This became a well-known and widely published affair at the time. The significance of the Jaffa records lies in the insight they provide into the private doubts the *yishuv* experienced as to how to behave towards the pasha. The Protocols (Nos. 5, 6, 10, Heshvan-Kislev 5673, pp. 14, 16-18, 28) record the entire discussion on the policy to be adopted. The discussion reflects a fighting spirit tempered by reluctance to upset relations with the pasha, and a firm stand upholding the rights of the Jews, since they had done more for the government than the Arabs. The decision finally reached was to send a telegram to the Vezir in Istanbul with a copy to the *hakām bashī* in the

⁴ The *hakām bashī* was chief rabbi of Palestine and his seat was in Jerusalem. The Protocol does not make it clear whether the reference is to the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem or the Chief Rabbi in Istanbul, the capital. Rabbi Joseph Rivlin, known as Rabbi Yoshe, was one of the outstanding leaders of Jewry in Jerusalem. He died in 1897. Rabbi Jacob Meir was at that time deputy to the Chief Rabbi of Jerusalem, Rabbi Jacob Saul Eliachar, and later, in the years 1920-1939, he was Chief Rabbi of the Sephardic community in Palestine.

capital, signed by certain private individuals who were Ottoman subjects. The telegram declared that the pasha's order would effect a division of the citizenry, whereas the need of the hour was for unity among all the sons of the homeland in order to save the honour of the kingdom. The stand taken was resolute and unambiguous, compared with the plea for help and support in connection with the blood-libel affair ten years earlier.

III. Files of the Tel-Aviv Town Committee.

Here can be found material reflecting a wider range of problems involving relations with the authorities and neighbours. Some of these problems were:

1. Relations with the governor, a category embracing such diverse items as an invitation to the governor to attend a special concert given in his honour and the participation of Tel-Aviv residents in the construction of a road bearing the name of the governor Jemāl Pasha (today's Jerusalem Boulevard in Jaffa). Here greater significance is attached to how and why the contacts were formed rather than to the actual facts.

2. The problem of the Jews who preserved their foreign citizenship and their consequent situation with respect to employment or expulsion from the country.

3. Matters of taxes and government loans, including the taxation stemming mainly from the Libyan War (1911) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). All the facts regarding these taxes and loans are undoubtedly known from other sources and other parts of the Empire. But for Palestine as a whole and Tel-Aviv in particular this development takes on certain unique features — i.e. the popular attitude to this subject and the stand taken. For example, in a letter Mr. Ya'acov Shlush wrote on 11.3.1912 to the mayor of Tel-Aviv, Mr. Meir Dizengoff, he explains at length the meaning of a certain kind of internal loan enforced by the Ottoman Empire, and the way this loan whose financing was universally obligatory could be exploited to cover property taxes and other taxes of Tel-Aviv.

4. Criminal cases, such as murders of Jews and the attitude of the authorities to such cases. A noteworthy case at the time when relations between the Jews and their neighbours began to deteriorate is the murder of a Georgian Jew from Petah Tikva, which occurred near Tel-Aviv towards the end of 1911.

The Petah Tikva colony committee appealed to the Tel-Aviv committee for monetary assistance in order to help trace the murderers. The Petah Tikva committee spent about 1,000 francs on the search, and one of the letters in the archives reveals that several thousand more would be required because "obstacles had been placed in the way of the interrogation by certain government officials." The Tel-Aviv committee contributed 200 francs.

5. Relations with the non-Jewish neighbours, about which a great deal of material has accumulated, particularly relating to the period from 1911 onwards when inter-ethnic relations were deteriorating. There are quite a large number of letters analysing the situation, charging the press with incitement against the Jews and calling on the Jews to organize themselves in order to be prepared for any emergency that might arise therefrom. In this context, the Jews were also urged to seek ways of establishing contacts with the Muslim and Christian population, to improve relations with them and curb the wave of animosity. Action was taken along these lines by individual public personalities such as Dr. Shimon Moyal, by commercial organizations such as the actions committee of the "Merchants for Better Relations with the Muslim and Christian Neighbours", and by the agricultural colonies; an example is the request addressed by the association of colonies of Judea to Meir Dizengoff in 1912 to convene a meeting to discuss the appropriate course of action.

6. One of the ways by which equal status with the neighbouring people might be achieved was through becoming loyal citizens with equal rights, citizens regarding the Ottoman state as their homeland. This is particularly evident in Jewish financial contributions to the homeland and in the fact that Jews enlisted in the Ottoman forces. For example, an undated letter from the Chief Rabbinate of Jaffa to the Tel-Aviv committee (probably written in the winter of 1912) contains a plea for the contribution of TL3, as Tel-Aviv's share to the fund totalling TL60, expected from the Jewish population of Palestine, in order to finance the supply of winter clothing for the Ottoman troops. The wording of the reference to the means of contribution is of particular interest:

... In accordance with the request of the local government ... we find ourselves duty-bound to participate to the amount the government has found it right to impose on us — i.e. TL60 — in the preparation of winter clothing for our army that protects the homeland ...

Contributions were collected towards the donation of an airplane to the Ottoman War Ministry in 1914. This produced discord over the efforts made to organize the Jewish *yishuv* for this contribution on the one hand, and efforts concerned with contributions collected and already handed over to the Ottoman Navy by the colonies of Judea and Galilee on the other hand. A letter written by the committee of the Association of Jewish Colonies (in Rishon Le-Zion) on March 18, 1914, suggests transferring the collected money from the Navy to the Air Force; a letter from the committee of Galilee colonies (at Yavniel) dated a week later points out that the Galilee settlements had already made their contribution to the Navy on the occasion of the *vālī* of Beirut's visit to Tiberias, and would find it most

difficult to collect additional money to purchase a plane for the Air Force.

With regard to service in the Turkish army, much material is available on the subject of indemnity payments in preference to military service, though a thorough search has brought to light letters and documents about men serving in the Ottoman army. Material on this subject has been found even in files dealing with those residents of Tel-Aviv who were expelled from the town by the Ottoman authorities and dispersed throughout the country. For example, in the files of persons transferred from Tel-Aviv to Haifa, a letter is to be found written by thirty-five Jewish soldiers of the Ottoman army in Nazareth (Adar 5678) to the Rabbi and Jewish community in Haifa requesting supplies of matzot and wine. Then there is one Mrs. Miriam Brummer, who applied to the committee of Tel-Aviv deportees in Haifa for financial support as her husband, an engineer, was serving with the Ottoman army near Medina and the government had refused to pay her since the Medina area had been captured by the enemy. She writes that she had already applied to Liman von Sanders⁵ but received no reply.

IV. David Smilanski's Articles

These articles were, as already mentioned, published during the period 1906-1914 in the Russian press, some in Russian and others in Hebrew language journals. In the archives, however, we have the author's original manuscripts. I need hardly stress how much more important these are than the Russian translations published in the Russian press, or the versions edited for publication in the Hebrew press in Russia. In any case, as far as I know, neither the published versions nor the originals have ever been used for purposes of research into the last years of Ottoman rule in Palestine. The major value of this source is the insight provided into political developments as well as the information on economic subjects; but its chief importance lies in Smilanski's description of the moods, attitudes and atmosphere prevalent in the country at that period.

At a time of tension and journalistic incitement against the Jews, a Smilanski article dated March 13, 1911, quotes passages from the Arab press praising the Jewish settlements and stating that they brought prosperity to both the government and the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Palestine. While it is not possible to make scholarly use of these passages since they have been quoted second-hand in the article, the author directs his

⁵ Liman von Sanders, a German soldier, was sent in 1913 to head the German military mission to the Ottoman state. He held various commands in the Ottoman army during the First World War. Finally, in 1918, he was appointed commander of the Turkish forces in the Middle East, and led the campaign in Syria and in Palestine.

readers to the newspapers in which these excerpts appeared and to their writers. He also points out which newspaper was most prominent in Jew-baiting: *Al-Karmil*, published in Haifa.

An example of his interest in economic subjects is to be found in the article of 27.7.1906, where he tells of the construction of the first electricity plants in Damascus and Beirut, which were financed by local investors. To assuage the Russian Jews, he scotches the rumours that neither electric lighting nor trams would ever be allowed in the Asian part of the Ottoman empire and adds that what is needed are "people with energy and initiative who know how to run a new enterprise." This plea to the Jews of Russia gives an indication of the prevailing ideas at that time and the current rumours concerning the economic possibilities and conditions of life in the Asian part of the state.

Of his articles on political developments, I have chosen to quote here the one dated 4.5.1909. It deals with the attempted counter-revolution of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II in April 1909, and describes how this event influenced the course of life in Palestine. I think no further explanations are necessary.

People were far less impressed here by the general political events that took place in the capital, and which had such wide repercussions in all the other Turkish provinces. Due to the distance of Palestine from the main centre of action, news of the rebellion on April 30⁶ and of the attempt to rescind the constitution reached us almost at the time as the report that the attempt had been unsuccessful and that the forces of Salonica reached the very gates of Istanbul. There was no cause here for excitement, as the inhabitants knew very little of the danger that was threatening all the lands of Turkey. Some telegraphic reports did arrive concerning the assassination of a deputy and a minister, but no one knew clearly what actually was happening in Istanbul. The citizens were calm; only the local committee of the Young Turks was active — and most vigorously so. The local association "Union and Progress" whose existence is hardly felt in normal times, displayed considerable energy, tact and exceptional ability in these confusing days. It should be noted that, in the life of Palestine, as in the life of the other provinces — at least of the Asian ones — it is not at all noticeable that there is a constitution in the land. All kinds of "freedoms" existed previously to no less an extent than today, and in the government and legal institutions the all-powerful *bakhshish* still reigns supreme, taking the place of all

⁶ The counter-revolution of Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II began on 13–14 April, 1909. The counter-revolution was suppressed and extinguished when Istanbul was conquered by the army on 23–24 April, 1909.

the written and oral laws. The committee of the Young Turks, which at first fiercely condemned the officials who accept bribes, has now adopted an attitude of indifference to these customs of the old régime, and has no intention whatever of interfering with these "internal matters." One gains the impression that this committee is a special institution set up for no other purpose than to safeguard the constitution, lest it should be endangered. It is really astonishing how rapidly the committee (immediately upon receiving the first cabled reports from Istanbul) managed to organize its forces and gain control over the situation. Within a short time, the committee managed to bring the local expeditionary force over to its side. Once it had ensured itself of the army's loyalty, it seized the telegraph service, the post office institutions and the Turkish customs houses. The civilian officials, whether willing or not, gave in to the committee; the same applied to the police which plays a less important role here than it does in the "cultured" countries, but whose value must nevertheless not be entirely dismissed. Once it had gained control in this way over the entire administrative apparatus, the committee became virtual ruler of the land. Perhaps it is due to the talent of this committee that people in Palestine were hardly aware of the fact that the country was going through a political crisis...

Smilanski described the administration under the Young Turks, the changes that did and that did not take place in the administration, and what action they took to seize power in Palestine at the time of the counter-revolution. The author then goes on to describe the celebrations of victory over Sultan 'Abdülhamîd II:

The days of panic were over, and the Young Turks were celebrating their victory. In Jerusalem and in several other cities demonstrations were held in connection with the dethronement of 'Abdülhamîd and the crowning of Muḥammad V; but these are not all reminiscent of the seething demonstrations of July of last year.⁷ The army and representatives of the civilian régime alone participate in them. The citizens — apart from the residents of Jaffa — seem to be standing aside and looking calmly at all the festive ceremonies organized by the Committee. They were aroused to neither active support nor opposition, neither joy nor regret at the "saving of the Constitution" and the change of régime. This indifference may be due partly to the remoteness of the place, as the actual events were hardly felt here at all, and partly perhaps to the fact that the Free Turkey has as yet changed nothing, has done

⁷ On July 23, 1908 the Young Turk revolution took place.

nothing to safeguard the situation of the people, has not yet begun introducing changes in the oppressive system of taxation, or towards improving the administration, etc. The masses hoped that the Constitution would provide for it much more than it has done so far, and there is no doubt that enthusiasm for it has cooled off considerably. People talk a great deal about this topic here, but it is hard to determine the real reason for the local inhabitants' attitude to the recent events.

The first impression gained from a study of the archives is of a people cut off and isolated. They give one the feeling that only the internal affairs of the city and its links with Jewish settlements and other Jewish communities are of importance, while more immediate neighbours and authorities hardly seem to exist. This is most probably due, in part, to the Ottoman *millet* system in which communities enjoyed considerable local autonomy, a system which was preserved to a very large extent despite all the attempts to introduce changes in it.

Despite these first impressions, these files contain ample material portraying the final years of the Ottoman reign in Palestine, as the above examples illustrate. This material is scattered throughout the files and has not been examined nor used for research.

37. THE ARCHIVES OF THE COUNCIL
OF THE SEPHARDI COMMUNITY IN JERUSALEM
AS A SOURCE FOR THE HISTORY OF THE
JEWISH COMMUNITY IN PALESTINE
UNDER OTTOMAN RULE

by ABRAHAM HAIM

I

The archives of the Sephardi Community Council, which contain many and varied documents dating from different periods in the history of the *yishuv*, constitute one extremely valuable source of primary source material. These documents have hardly been exploited at all during recent centuries for serious research into the history of the *yishuv* in Palestine in general and in Jerusalem in particular. In this context, we would like to quote certain remarks made by the late Jewish historian Professor Cecil Roth, in an interview given to the monthly journal of the Sephardi and Oriental communities, *ba-Ma'arakha*:

During the course of my work, I have come to realize, to my own surprise, that Jewish historians have for some reason tended to ignore, or at least neglect, the role played by the Sephardi stream in Jewish history especially since the sixteenth century. From this period on Sephardi Jewry disappeared from recorded history; Graetz for example, says nothing at all about Sephardi Jewry after Shabetai Zvi.¹

Unfortunately, the position of the archives in question has always been that of the "stepchild" of the Community Council. The lack of anything approaching proper care and attention, the neglect and abandonment to which these valuable documents have been subjected, may be ascribed either to a lack of professional manpower capable of putting them to scientific use, or simply to circumstances — the wars, accidents and other ravages as a consequence of which the archives were constantly shifted about and consigned to inappropriate temporary premises. The real catastrophe, however, took place during the 1948 war when the premises of the Council of the Sephardi Community were shelled and much documentary material was destroyed. The late Yitzhak Ben Zvi, who was aware of the importance of the archives, had photographed part of the collection of documents for the use of the Ben Zvi Institute for Research on Jewish Communities in the East.

¹ *Ba-Ma'arakha*, No. 106 (1970), pp. 12-13.

II

The archives house a series of Turkish and Arabic documents dating from the beginning of the Ottoman conquest of Palestine,² the majority of which were issued by judges at the *Sharī'a* Court in Jerusalem (*hujja shar'iyya*), and the rest by the Sultans (*fīrmans*) or provincial and local authorities. The unique value of these documents lies in the fact that they present us with precise and concrete documentary material in a fixed chronological framework, i.e. with precisely the sort of documentation usually so sorely lacking due to the ravages and misadventures which befell the Jewish communities. The documents deal with agreements and contracts drawn up between representatives (*Parnassim*) of the Jewish community (*ṭā'ifat al-Yahūd* or *al-ṭā'ifa al-Mūsāwiyya*) and the Arab inhabitants of Silwān opposite the city walls on the southeast side, and also of other places, concerning the acquisition of land, rights of passage, the leasing of land for cemeteries, etc. Here we see the heads of the Jewish community conducting lengthy negotiations with the custodians of Muslim religious endowments, protecting the rights of their community and representing them in official enquiries conducted by the authorities. On more than one occasion disputes which broke out between the representatives of the Sephardi community and the directors of the *al-Madrassa al-Ṣalāhiyya* endowment³ were resolved in the *Sharī'a* Court in favour of the former. The legal proceedings were mainly concerned with the regularity of the leases taken out on land belonging to the endowment of the *madrassa* and intended for use as a Jewish cemetery, and with the amount of the rents paid for them. The judges passed sentence after examining documents dating from previous periods (including *fatwas* issued by *sheykh-ūl-Islām*) and hearing evidence from Muslim residents who confirmed the leasing of the land in question to Jews for the burial of their dead. These documents go far towards establishing Jewish ownership of the Mount of Olives and its old and new cemeteries. One of the documents concerning the Mount of Olives housed in the archives is an ancient title deed preserved in its original form and dating as far back as 1537.⁴

From time to time the Jews were obliged to go to court to restrain neighbouring Arabs from encroaching on land belonging to a cemetery. A *Sharī'a* Court order dated 1699 prohibits any interference with the Jewish cemetery

² There are also documents written in the *diwānī* script from the Mamluk period — from 872 A.H./1467 and 874 A.H./1469.

³ Originally the Church of St. Anne. Called after Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī who made it into a *madrassa* in 1187. The building is situated not far from St. Stephen's Gate in the eastern wall of the old city of Jerusalem.

⁴ This document appears in Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, *Meḥkarim u-Mekorot*, Jerusalem, 1967, pp. 21–25.

except for the collection of rents legally due. This document concerns three plots situated in the area of al-Jismāniyya (Gat-Shamma) outside Jerusalem, and intended for the burial of the Jewish dead.

Illuminating in this context are certain observations made by Rabbi Gedalya mi-Simyatikh (who arrived in Palestine with Rabbi Yehuda Heḥassid in 1700) regarding burial on the Mount of Olives: "And no dead can be buried without written permission from the *Dayan* of Ishmael, and without giving him something, each according to his means. But the poor are given permission to bury straight away, without any present."⁵ The Rabbi's remarks receive confirmation from a *Shari'a* Court document of 1763 which makes the manner in which the families of the dead were subject to extortion from local authorities quite clear. The same document constitutes further proof, on the other hand, of the antiquity of the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives.

The financial position of the Jewish endowment properties was evidently not always satisfactory, and holders of endowment property fell into debt. A document dating from 1774 includes details of an agreement reached between debtors and the representative of the Jewish endowment, *Hakham Zemah*, regarding annual payments of individual debts for periods up to seven or eight years. The sum of the debt in *arayot*, the name of the debtor, the number of annual payments and the amount payable annually in *arayot* and *pāra* are all tabulated.⁶

Another point which should be made in reference to endowments and property ownership is the following: Ottoman law did not recognize the right of private companies and societies to acquire or hold immovable property in general and land in particular in their own name. They were therefore obliged to register their property in the name of private individuals, thus giving rise to a unique development in the land laws of Palestine — the registration of land in borrowed names. Companies, societies, charitable and cultural institutions, etc. were all obliged to hold their landed property in the names of private individuals, either fictitious or borrowed. Valuable properties were thus registered at the Ottoman *Ṭāpū* in borrowed names. On the death of the persons whose names had been thus used, it became necessary to obtain confirmation from their inheritors, and there are several instances of renunciation of rights to property "inherited" in this manner at

⁵ See *Masa'ot*, pp. 347–348.

⁶ *Arye* — a silver coin of European origin later minted also in the Ottoman Empire; called in Arabic *asadi*, and in Hebrew sources referred to as *arye* because of the figure represented on the coin. *Pāra* — silver Ottoman coin minted from the middle of the seventeenth century.

the *Shari'a* Court. Judicial records of proceedings and decisions include detailed descriptions of the limits of the property in question, the rights of the owners and the obligations of the founders and beneficiaries of the endowments. The tomb of Shim'on ha-Zadik (north of the city walls), for example, was registered in the name of the Chief Rabbi Abraham Ashkenazi (died in 1880).⁷

In addition to the foregoing, there are also orders giving permission for various building activities, such as the construction of a *Talmud Torah*, the fencing of the cemetery, etc. Among the subjects dealt with in documents issued by imperial, local and provincial authorities the following should be mentioned: appeals for cordial relations with the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine, orders in the matter of forged papers levying taxes of 20 *pāra* a head, orders releasing Jews from the payment of naturalization taxes, exemptions in return for single compensation payments, an order prohibiting the levy of unlawful taxes on the Jewish community as a whole and on the rightful inheritors on property left by the elderly deceased, and an order protecting Jews inhabiting *waqf* houses from interference and harassment. Two imperial decrees forbade the courts to handle cases which were fifteen years old. The decrees were issued in answer to requests by the leaders of the Jewish community in Jerusalem concerning this matter.

Worthy of special mention are the 1725, 1733, 1736 orders to the *qāḍī* of Jerusalem in the matter of visits to holy places (including Rachel's tomb), and the 1828 order in the matter of Armenian attacks on Jews and encroachments on land belonging to the Jewish cemetery.

III

An interesting and important group of documents are the dozens of records in *hazi kulmus* script — a script used by Sephardi Jews (especially in North Africa) up to the last generation — which constitute a wealth of information about the organization of the Sephardi community. These records include copies of outgoing and incoming letters and an extensive correspondence (according to serial numbers) with Jewish communities, institutions and individuals, ranging from Bombay and Calcutta in the east to New York and Brazil in the west, and from Moscow and Hamburg in the north to Aden and Tetuan in the south. The correspondence deals with various matters — *Responsa*, endowments, donations from the diaspora and credentials authorizing emissaries and *gaba'im* to collect money. The financial reports of the Community Council (more precisely, the *kolel*) stating the revenues and expenditures of its various institutions, are arranged under various

⁷ Document of 9 *Sha'bān* 1303 A.H./13 May 1886.

headings, in exemplary order, and include the itemization of large and small sums from the payment of rents and outstanding debts to outlay on paper, envelopes, stamps and writing implements on the one hand, and from details of revenue derived from emissaries (*shadarim*), lists of individuals supported by various funds, donations from the heads of the Portuguese Jewish community in Amsterdam, revenue from the *gavila* (a special tax on meat), burial fees and legacies, to *hakhnasat kala* and *ketubot* on the other.

Much can be learnt from these records regarding the size of the poll tax levied on Jews, the title deeds to cemetery plots and their prices, and the funds and endowments founded for the benefit of Torah institutions. Distribution for the benefit of scholars, the poor, orphans and widows, is fully itemized for example, and accompanied by an alphabetic list of the first names of the beneficiaries. Also included in the records is the distribution of the legacy of the *Qā'id* (an aristocratic title literally meaning "officer") Nissim Shamama of Tunis, who donated 200,000 golden francs for a *yeshiva* in Jerusalem which was to be attended daily by scholars selected by the Chief Rabbi and seven other respected members of the community. The sum promised to the Sephardi sector of the community was deposited in the Rothschild Bank in Paris, and the interest arrived in Jerusalem every six months for distribution among fifty scholars studying three hours a day at the "Ma'ase Nissim" Yeshiva.⁸

In summary we may say that the archives of the Council of the Sephardi Community contain a rich and varied collection of documents in Hebrew, Turkish and Arabic which shed much light on the relations of the Jews of Jerusalem with the Ottoman authorities (both secular and religious), on the organization of the Sephardi community and on various aspects of the status of its property.

⁸ Named after Nissim Shamama who was born at the end of the seventeenth century in Tunis, served as the Minister of Finance to the Tunisian government, and spent his last years in Livorno (Leghorn) in Italy where he died in 1873.

38. THE CORRESPONDENCE (1725-1740) OF THE ARMENIAN PATRIARCH GREGORY THE CHAIN-BEARER

by ARA KALAYDJIAN

I

In the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate in Jerusalem there are many unpublished documents which, until now, have not been utilized by scholars. They constitute a rich and highly interesting source of documentary information on the Armenian Patriarchate in particular and on Jerusalem and the Ottoman administration in general.

Among these documents an important place must be given to the letters of Patriarch Gregory the Chain-Bearer (1715-1749), which were addressed mainly to Hovhanness Golod Paghishetzi, the Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople, and which span a period of about 15 years (1725-1740), describing or clarifying some of the most important events of that time.

Gregory of Shirouan (born in Shirouan or Aghouank in 1669) was educated in the famous Armenian Monastery of St. Hovhanness (St. John) Amertol, where he had the good fortune of having as teacher the most renowned clergyman of that time, Vartan Vartabed¹ Paghishetzi.² His classmate was Hovhanness Paghishetzi, later Patriarch of Constantinople. Gregory of Shirouan was elected to the Throne of St. James in Jerusalem in 1715, when he was Prior of St. Garabed Monastery in Daron. Arriving in Constantinople in 1717, he wrote his first Patriarchal Bull on 2 October of the same year, addressed to the members of the St. James Brotherhood in Jerusalem.³

The election of Gregory of Shirouan was a relief for the members of that Brotherhood. Since 1670, the Patriarchate in Jerusalem had been subjugated to the authority of the Constantinople Patriarchate. Both the seemingly

¹ Priest.

² Coming from the town of Pagheah (in eastern Turkey). The Monastery of St. Hovhanness Amertol was situated in Pagheah.

³ The Bull has been preserved and is now kept in the Patriarchal Archives. In it, Gregory appoints Hovhanness Vartabed, better known as Hanna Vartabed, vicar-general. From this date on, Hanna Vartabed became the most trusted assistant to the Patriarch. He died in June 1733. He is the author of a history of Jerusalem, which was first published in Constantinople in 1731.

interminable disputes among the three Patriarchates of Jerusalem (Armenian, Greek Orthodox and Latin), and the ineffective presence of the local government, had brought the Armenian Patriarchate to the verge of collapse. The first years of the eighteenth century saw the unification of the two Patriarchates under Patriarch Avedik (July 1702/1114 A.H.), who resided in Constantinople, in spite of the fact that Jerusalem had its elected Patriarch, Minas of Amit (Dikranagerd). After representations by Avedik to the Ottoman central government in Constantinople, Minas was arrested and the Patriarchate was governed by *nāzirs* or *vekils* (laymen overseers, who were sometimes called *baba*).

Patriarch Minas, who kept a Diary for almost thirty years, describes in detail all these events,⁴ which occurred during the governorship of Gurji Mehmed Pasha. Among other things, Minas described all the details connected with the Arab uprising against Gurji Pasha and his successor, Ismail Pasha, in 1703–1704.⁵

It was especially during those days of virtual anarchy that the debt of the Patriarchate reached the tremendous sum of 10,125 touman,⁶ or 800 purse;⁷ money was borrowed from local Jews and Muslims, who, especially after the death of Minas (24 November 1704), were resolved to receive at least the interest on their money. Unfortunately, the Brotherhood of St. James was not able to meet the demands of the creditors, who, in their turn, felt themselves free to enter the Monastery at will and to carry away anything of value that might come to their notice.

This tragic course of events was suddenly brought to an abrupt stop by Hovhanness Vartabed Paghishetzi, who, while in Constantinople on business, was designated by the Armenian notables of that city to try and relieve the unbearable burden of the Jerusalem debts. Accordingly, Hovhanness came to Jerusalem in 1713 and remained there till 1715. During his stay he worked incessantly, and after giving his guaranty to the creditors, he promised to pay all the outstanding accounts in four years. On his return, he was elected Patriarch of Constantinople (12 September 1715). He assented to the will of the electors only on condition that the two Patriarchates be separated again, because he had concluded that the source of all the

⁴ The manuscript of the "Diary" is kept in the Manuscript Library of the Armenian Patriarchate, Jerusalem.

⁵ D. Savalanian, *History of Jerusalem*, Jerusalem, 1931, pp. 658–662.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 666.

⁷ Barkev Vartabed Vertanessian, "Patriarch Gregory the Chain-Bearer," *Sion*, Oct.–Nov. 1950, p. 309. According to Father Vertanessian, one purse was equal to 500 piasters; in which case, the total sum would come up to 400,000 piasters, a staggering amount of money at that time.

evils had been the unification of the two Seats. A colophon of an Armenian book printed in Constantinople in 1717 mentions that "... the Patriarchate of Jerusalem was separated from that of Constantinople ... for, before this date, and for many years, the two were united. And many wrongs were perpetrated and debts were increased for this reason ... And because of this ... after receiving permission from the Palace ... they separated the two Patriarchates ...".⁸ A few days later Hovhanness presented himself to the sultan in Adrianople where, after receiving the official firman confirming his election, he secured the ratification of the two Patriarchates' separation and the nomination of Gregory of Shirouan to the Throne of St. James in Jerusalem.

Gregory of Shirouan arrived in Constantinople in August 1717, and, after learning the size of the debt, put an iron chain around his neck, swearing that he would unlock it only when all the debts were repaid. It is thus that he came to be known as Gregory the Chain-Bearer.

During his stay in Constantinople he repaid part of the debt, bought new estates for the Patriarchate (*waqf*) and succeeded in receiving from the sultan a firman allowing the Armenians to restore their holy shrines in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. After passing through Aleppo and Damascus, he entered Jerusalem in February 1721.

The colophon of a book published in Constantinople in 1727 mentions: "... And to this date almost all the debts have been repaid and a very small fraction has remained ...".⁹ The last payment, that of 27,764 piasters, was effected in 1728.¹⁰ Till the end of his life (2 February 1749) Gregory the Chain-Bearer endeavoured for the welfare of the Patriarchate. He is buried in the courtyard of the Church of St. Saviour, just outside Zion Gate.

II

In the archives of the Armenian Patriarchate, the letters, Patriarchal Bulls, agreements, deeds and various other documents of Gregory the Chain-Bearer are kept. Among these, the most important are his letters, bound in two separate volumes. On the first page of the first volume (actually on the second page of the first letter 28A/1), Father Amrikian has put this note:

I, Minas Vartabed Amrikian, according to the suggestion and order of Tavit Vartabed Derderian, the newly elected Grand-Sacristan of the

⁸ For additional information on the early days of Patriarch Gregory of Shirouan, as well as on Patriarch Hovhanness Golod Paghishetzi, see this author's book, *Catalogue and Colophons of Rare Armenian Printed Books in the Gulbenkian Library of the Armenian Patriarchate (1512-1800)* (to be published shortly), p. 123. The two Patriarchs sponsored the printing of numerous important religious and historical books in Constantinople.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹⁰ Savalanian, *op. cit.*, p. 698.

Holy Seat, put under one cover the hand-written letters of Gregory the Chain-Bearer, which he had addressed to Patriarch Hovhanness Golod of Constantinople. ... 4 September 1907.

The first volume contains 38 letters (28A/1–28A/38), all of them addressed to Patriarch Hovhanness Golod. On the back page of each letter there is found the address, usually in this manner:

With the help of God let this letter arrive in Istanbul, to the hands of Hovhanness Vartabed, Theologian and Great Patriarch. Let it arrive safely.¹¹

The second volume contains 59 letters (28B/39–28B/97). Of these, 33 were written by Gregory the Chain-Bearer in Constantinople and addressed to the members of the St. James Brotherhood; another 11 were written in Jerusalem and addressed to various people; two are deeds and 13 were addressed to him by different persons (No. 28B/85 was written by Catholicos Apraham of Holy Etchmiadzin in March 1734).

In both volumes the letters have been numbered (1–97), probably by Bishop Asdvadzadour Der Hovhannessiantz during 1880–1890, when he was preparing his work on the history of Jerusalem.¹²

The two main historians of Armenian Jerusalem, Dikran Savalanian and Bishop Asdvadzadour Der Hovhannessiantz, have, most probably, used these letters when compiling their books. But neither writer mentions them specifically. Only once does Savalanian quote from Patriarch Gregory's letters.¹³ On the other hand, Savalanian makes an inexplicable mistake when describing the pilgrimage of Melkon Amira¹⁴ and his wife Khatoun to Jerusalem (13 May 1732), their donations and return (6 April 1733). In spite of the fact that he copied entire paragraphs from Patriarch Gregory's letter¹⁵ addressed to Hovhanness Golod Paghishetzi, Savalanian has changed the names Melkon and Khatoun to *Melidon* and *Nazli*.

The letters addressed to Hovhanness Golod were mainly written over a period of four years (1733–1736), when two problems constitute their major theme: (a) the illness and death of his beloved assistant Hanna Vartabed

¹¹ Vol. I, Letter 28A/2.

¹² Bishop Asdvadzadour Der Hovhannessiantz, *Chronological History of Jerusalem* (two volumes), Jerusalem, 1890.

¹³ Letter dated 6 May 1740; Savalanian, *op. cit.*, p. 732.

¹⁴ *Amira* was the title of those Armenians who, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, had emigrated from the remote provinces of Turkey (mainly from Agen) and settled in Constantinople. In due time they had become bankers and financial advisers to the vezirs and various ministers of the Ottoman government. Till the proclamation of the Armenian Constitution of 1860 in Constantinople, the *Amira* were the final and only authority in every aspect of Armenian national life in Turkey.

¹⁵ Vol. I, Letter 28/A/6.

(11 June 1733) which had a strong negative effect on his health; (b) the disputes between the Armenian and Greek Orthodox Patriarchates (1734–1736) concerning the ownership of the St. James Cathedral in the Armenian Monastery, which, in the long run, forced the Patriarch to pursue his case personally in Constantinople. After years of disputes and trials, a verdict was obtained from the Ottoman courts in favour of the Armenian Patriarchate.¹⁶ Many letters written by Patriarch Gregory in Constantinople and addressed to the members of the St. James Brotherhood, belong to this period (Second Volume of Letters).

III

The letters of Patriarch Gregory the Chain-Bearer have considerable value and are of great interest in many aspects:

a) First and foremost, they are original sources of information concerning a very fateful period in the life of the Armenian Patriarchate in Jerusalem (1715–1750).

b) Second, they describe and explain many events and points in the disputes between the three Patriarchates of Jerusalem. But, what is more interesting, they often speak of the steps taken by the Patriarchates towards a mutual understanding, as well as towards keeping the *status quo* in the Holy Places unchanged.

There are in the Patriarchal Archives copies of the treaty which was signed between Patriarchs Gregory and Hovhanness on the one hand, and Meletios, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch in Jerusalem on the other hand, and which stipulated that all misunderstandings and disputes which might arise would be dealt with in an atmosphere of Christian and brotherly love.

At the same time, Patriarch Gregory had close relations with the Latin Patriarchate in Jerusalem and with Catholics in general. He was a close friend of the French ambassador in Constantinople, and wrote letters, on various occasions, to, among others, King Louis XV of France, the famous Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal De Fleury, and the Council of Cardinals in Rome. Cardinal De Fleury's replies are kept in the archives.

c) On many occasions, Patriarch Gregory describes the workings of the local government, its behaviour and relations with the Christian communities, the laws, customs, administrative procedures etc.

d) Finally, from a purely linguistic point of view, these letters represent a very interesting phenomenon. Their language is a compromise between

¹⁶ These events are described in detail in an unpublished document written in 1832 by Father Melkon in Bolu, Turkey (Patriarchal Archives, No. 22/3).

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Classical Armenian and the colloquial Armenian spoken during the period under discussion. And this in spite of the fact that Patriarch Gregory was a master of Classical Armenian, which is proved by his poems.¹⁷ A detailed study of his language and style would most certainly bring forth some very important new factors regarding the evolution of the Armenian language

¹⁷ Prof. H.S. Anassian, "Literary Writings of Gregory the Chain-Bearer," *Etchmiadzin*, March-April, 1950; also *Sion*, October-November, 1950, pp. 299-307.

39. DOCUMENTARY MATERIAL IN AUSTRIAN AND GERMAN ARCHIVES RELATING TO PALESTINE DURING THE PERIOD OF OTTOMAN RULE

by ALEX CARMEL

I. Austrian National Archives

A. The Archives of the Foreign Office in Vienna

Much material about Palestine, especially from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War I, is preserved in the Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Abt. Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien I, Minoriten-platz 1. In these archives, which contain documents from the foreign office of Austria and Austria-Hungary (henceforth, Austria), material about Palestine is concentrated mainly in two sections.

*A. Consulates 1848–1918 (not embassies) (German: *Konsulate* 1848–1918).*

This section (PA XXXVIII) contains the reports that consular representatives of Austria throughout the world sent to the foreign office in Vienna. These reports were collected in files with each file containing the reports of one consulate for one year.

1. The files of the Jerusalem consulate: 1853, 1855, 1862, 1864–1865, 1867–1869, 1876, 1882–1883, 1885, 1887–1891, 1893–1902, 1904–1917.

2. The files of the vice consulate in Jaffa: 1896, 1905, 1908–1909, 1913–1915.

3. The files of the consulate general in Beirut (which was in charge of the consular agencies of Austria in Haifa-Acre and in Tiberias-Safed, while the other parts of Palestine were under the independent consulate of Jerusalem): 1850–1856, 1858–1861, 1866–1885, 1887–1907, 1909–1918.

These files contain political reports on events which took place in Palestine, on local government, on the activities of the Great Powers in the area, on visits of important persons, etc. Much space is devoted to the problem of the Holy Places and the religious and political conflicts that centered around them.

The number of reports varies greatly from year to year — from a single report to dozens of them. Some reports, which were numbered consecutively by their authors, are missing from many of the files. As the lists of years given above show, many files were lost, and there were surely also years in which not a single political report was sent (especially from Jaffa and Jerusalem) to the Foreign Secretary in Vienna.

Most of the reports were written in German, though some are in Italian and French.

B. Archives of Embassies and Consulates (Gesandtschafts und Konsulats-archive)

This section (AB 217) contains much material that was accumulated in the archives of the embassies and consulates of Austria throughout the world and that was transferred to Vienna, from time to time, to be preserved in the archives of the Foreign Office.

Most of the material on Palestine in this section is from the archives of the Austrian consulate in Jerusalem. These archives were transferred to Vienna in two stages — the smaller part (now in 27 packages of approximately five kilograms each), in 1921, and the larger part (155 packages of the same size), in 1939. The archives of the consulate of Jerusalem cover the period 1843 to 1917.

The first part (that which arrived in Vienna in 1921) is still organized according to its original order. It is marked with the numbers 1 to 27. Over half of the packages deal with administrative and procedural matters. The remainder of the material covers a variety of subjects such as the following: "The Belgian Consulate Affair (1851-1855)"; "The Austrian Hospital Project (1852)"; "The Austrian Printing Press (1852-1867)"; "Hospices for Austro-Hungarian Pilgrims (1853-1870)"; "Travels of Imperial Courtiers (1855-1902)"; "Affaire di Terra Santa (1856)"; "The Rothschild Hospital in Jerusalem (1856-1911)"; "A Jewish Home for Pilgrims and the Poor, Neveh Scholom [sic] (1858-1867)"; "The Lämmel Fund (1862-1917)"; "Kavases (1863-1910)"; "The Political and Economic State of Palestine (1895)"; "Electrical Industry (1898)"; "The Customs House in Jaffa (1906-1911)"; "Military Reports (1906-1914)".

The larger part of the Jerusalem consular archives (those which arrived in Vienna in 1939) was kept previously in the consulate general of Italy in Jerusalem. This portion arrived at the Austrian archives in a chaotic state. About two-thirds of the files were broken up, and parts of them were even damaged by water and eaten by rats. The archivists in Vienna re-organized this large amount of material (about half a ton of documents) in 101 packages chronologically (not by subject) — a solution which naturally is of little aid to those working with it.

The rest of the material that arrived in 1939 is preserved in its original order, divided into 54 packages. Most of these packages deal with administrative and procedural matters; a few, with various other matters.

From this material one may get an idea of the nature of the large part that is not organized (the 101 packages described above), or at least about part

of them. The organized packages cover, among other subjects, the following: "Cholera in Palestine, 1908"; "Jewish Immigration and Residence Visas in Palestine, 1894-1906"; "Population Censuses, 1890, 1900, 1910" (censuses in Austria which obligated the consuls to send a list of subjects under their jurisdiction to Vienna); "Postal Matters, 1910-1911"; "Tables of Ships' Sailings, 1899-1911"; "Attacks on Austrian Mail Coaches [on the Jaffa-Jerusalem road], 1907-1912"; "Turkish Affairs, 1868-1914"; "Military Matters, 1894-1914"; The Consular Exemption from Customs Duties in Turkey, 1862-1915"; "Austro-Hungarian War Films, 1916-1917"; "Economic Files [reports]"; "Penal Matters [arranged by years]".

The Jerusalem consular archives are the main part of this type of material. In Vienna there are also the archives of the Austrian consulate in Jaffa — a total of 32 packages, organized mainly chronologically, covering the period 1853-1917. Five of the packages of the Jaffa archives are organized according to subject, for example: "The Celebration of the Emperor's Birthday [Franz Josef], 1901-1916"; "The Strike, 1908"; "The Change of Qa'immaqāms, 1908-1917"; "The Evacuation of Jaffa, 1917". One package of the material from Jaffa includes the book of correspondence of the Austrian consular agent in Haifa from 1821 to 1827.

The archives of the Austrian consulate general in Beirut seem to contain little material pertinent to Palestine. These archives are composed of a total of 67 packages and another five cartons, from the years 1842 to 1918. The archives in Beirut are already included in a new index which the administration of the Viennese archives has begun to publish on the contents of the archives of the embassies and consulates. According to this index (which had reached the letter "B" in 1970), the Beirut archives contain mainly procedural material. One exception to this rule which concerns Palestine is "The List of [Austro-Hungarian] Subjects who Live in the [jurisdiction of the] Consular Agency of Safed in 1894." It is possible that the three boxes, which contain among other things political correspondence and reports from the years 1842 to 1913, refer partially also to Northern Palestine.

In conclusion, the archives of the Austrian Foreign Office contain a large quantity of material pertinent to the history of Palestine at the end of the period of Ottoman rule. This essay has only covered the two sections in which most of the material is concentrated. Many possibly important early documents are scattered throughout other sections of the archives, for example, in the files of Turkey. It should be borne in mind that Austria was already represented in Palestine before the nineteenth century. In 1770, for example, a vice consul in Acre and a consular agent in Jaffa represented Austria. Evidence of this early activity may be found in the archives of the Foreign Office in Vienna.

Because of the continuing increase in the numbers of Jewish Austrian subjects in Palestine, a large part of the activities of the Austrian consul, and thus of the documentary material, is concerned with the Jewish community. The documents of the Viennese Foreign Office are undoubtedly a valuable source for broadening our knowledge of the history of Palestine, in general, and of the old Jewish community there, specifically. Because of the disorganization of most of the Austrian material, this research will require special labour. However, the relative importance of Austria among the Great Powers active in Palestine — especially since the 1840's — makes it worth the effort.

II. The Political Archives of the German Foreign Office in Bonn

(Politisches archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bonn, Adenauer-Allee 99-103)

In the archives in Bonn there is more material on Palestine during the period of Ottoman rule than in any other archive in the German Federal Republic. The files of the German Foreign Office in Berlin from 1867 (the year that the North German Union was founded) to the end of the German Empire are preserved there.

It is possible to get a general orientation to the material in Bonn, its contents and order, from the catalogue which is available to users of the archive. This catalogue was compiled in England where the documents of the German Foreign Office were transferred after World War II. For years the archivists in Bonn have been working to reorganize the files which were partially taken apart in England for photocopying. Work is also being done in Bonn to organize the archives of German consulates and embassies in the East (insofar as they remained in German possession) to make them available to researchers. This large amount of material is not at present available for use.

Most of the material in the Bonn archives pertinent to Palestine which is available to researchers is concentrated in the section "Turkey" (*Türkel I.A.B.g*). Many documents are preserved in the files of "Prussia" as well (e.g., the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II to Palestine in 1898) and in the files of World War I (WK 11G).

However, most of the material on Palestine will be found in the "Turkish" section. This section contains the current files that accumulated in the Berlin Foreign Office which dealt with the affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Among the hundreds of "Turkish" files (some of which have dozens of volumes) a few deal specifically with Palestine; they can easily be found in the catalogue by their titles: "Disputes over the Holy Places in Palestine" (File 33); "The Complaint of the Russian Government about the German consul in Jerusalem 1872" (file 105); "Protection of the Christians in Pales-

tine" (File 126); "Disputes between Christians and Muslims in Haifa, 1880" (File 140); "Founding a Christian State in Palestine 1888-1919" (File 175e, which is actually the continuation of File 33).

Among other "Turkish" files which do not bear the title Palestine, the following contain valuable material on this subject: "The Christians in Turkey" (File 175); "The Protestants in Turkey" (File 175d); "A Plan to Settle Germans in Asia Minor" (File 189—this also covers Palestine); "The Jews in Turkey" (File 195—photostatic copies of the volumes of this file are found in the Zionist Archives in Jerusalem), and mainly in Files 108 (1874-1877) and 134 (1879-1919) which contain the correspondence between the German Embassy in Constantinople and other German representatives. These last two files contain dozens of volumes. The important File 177, with the misleading title "Lebanon (Syria)" is also composed of many volumes. It contains the correspondence between the Berlin Foreign Office and the German vice consulate in Haifa (which was at times under the German consulate general in Beirut; for that reason this material was included in the "Lebanon" file). File 177 has special importance because the last German vice consul in Haifa, Løytved-Hardegg (whose correspondence alone is found in this file), had great influence in the German Foreign Office. The relatively large number of reports he wrote gives us much information on the German policy toward Palestine in the last crucial years before and during the First World War. Foreign office officials included in File 177 most of the current material that deals with affairs in Palestine after the departure of the last German consul general, Dr. Brode, and the conquest of Jerusalem by the British late in 1917. Therefore this file contains much important material which summarizes German interests in Palestine under Turkish rule in the course of the dealing with the liquidation of these interests (until 1920).

The archives of the Foreign Office in Bonn cover, in effect, the whole range of German affairs in Palestine from the foundation of the North German Union until 1920. The disasters which befell the archives during World War II and after have rendered them incomplete; however, in general, the documents make it possible to follow the development of German interests in Palestine. The archives contain abundant material about German political, cultural, economic and religious (missionary) activities in Palestine, which became more and more diversified during the period of the German Empire; about German-Jewish subjects in Palestine and the problems concerning them; about the activities of the other Powers and their policies; about disputes over the Holy Places; about the population of Palestine and its government; about the periods of crisis in Palestine (mainly during the Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878, and the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and 1909);

about the visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II in Palestine in 1898 and everything related to it; and, of course, about the German-Christian settlers in Palestine (the Templars) whose problems greatly concerned the diplomatic and consular representatives of Germany in Constantinople, Beirut, Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa and the Foreign Office in Berlin.

Those who intend to use the documents of the archives in Bonn are advised to note that the German Foreign Office has an extensive library which also includes many rare periodicals from the period. It should also be noted that due to the large numbers of researchers using the archives in Bonn, one who intends to work there should reserve a place as early as possible in advance.

III. *The Military Archives in Freiburg*

(*Militärarchiv, Freiburg/Br., Wiesentalstr. 10*)

The military archives are part of the archives of the German Federal Republic (*Bundesarchiv*) which are mainly in Koblenz. In 1967 the military archives were transferred from Koblenz to Freiburg, where they are now being reorganized.

Apparently most of the material in Freiburg concerning Palestine under Ottoman rule is concentrated in the naval section (which used to be a separate archive — *Archiv der Marine*). There is also material about Palestine during World War I in the Army section and in the German Air Force section of these archives.

The last generation of Turkish rule in Palestine is covered in Freiburg principally in "political-military reports" which were written by commanders of German ships and fleets which visited Palestine with increasing frequency parallel to the growth of the German Navy and the development of German interest in the Ottoman Empire and the Eastern Mediterranean. These intelligence reports are scattered through the files of the German Admiralty (*Admiralität*); the files of the Cabinet of the Navy (*Marinekabinett*); the files of the Naval Office (*Reichsmarineamt*); the files of the High Command of the Navy/Naval Staff (*Oberkommando der Marine/Admiralstab der Marine*); the files of the Commander of the Cruiser Fleet (*Chef des Kreuzergeschwaders*); the files of foreign bases (*Auslandsstationen*); the files of the Command of the Fleet of the High Seas (*Kommando der Hochseeflotte*), and other files.

At present it is not easy to locate, among the huge quantity of material, the documents pertaining to Palestine. Since the material was returned from England (where it was brought after World War II) the archivists have not yet succeeded in reorganizing it; even the arrangement of a new card index (including a geographical key as well) which has already begun will take many years to complete. This information comes from the archivists them-

selves who, nevertheless, attempt to aid researchers in coping with the present situation.

Meanwhile, use of the documents of the archives pertaining to this subject is dependent on rather detailed prior information, such as knowledge of the names of the ships that visited Palestine and the dates of their visits. Thus it is possible to find at least a portion of the intelligence reports in the ships' logs, which generally included only professional (naval) reports and, only occasionally, reports which are of historical interest.

It may also be useful to know the names of commanders of ships and fleets that visited Palestine, for occasionally their personal files contain copies of the intelligence reports that they sent to their superiors.

The "political-military reports" that were written by the commanders of the German fleet since the 1870's are important for a number of reasons:

A. From the standpoint of quality and scope these are superior to the standard German consular reports, which normally were concerned with current affairs and only rarely surveyed the general situation in Palestine. An outstanding example of this was the report of *Corvetten Captain Graf von Hacke* dated 6 May 1877. (Its number in the archives is RMI/PG/65269.) Among the documents in the political archives of the German Foreign Office in Bonn, the author did not find a single report of a similar quality or scope; moreover, for many years the officials of the Foreign Office based their dealings with Palestine and the elements within Palestine on information given in this report.

Copies, excerpts or extracts of reports written by naval personnel were occasionally put in the Palestine files of the Berlin Foreign Office (and are still preserved in the archives in Bonn); however, it is preferable to use the original and complete reports that are found in Freiburg. In the margins of these reports there are notations which were made by Kaiser Wilhelm II. They are in themselves of great value in understanding German policy in that period.

B. In contrast to the reports of the German consulate general in Palestine, which concentrated mainly on events occurring in Jerusalem and its environs (the state of transportation at that time being such that it was difficult to go to Jaffa and especially Haifa), the reports of naval personnel are noteworthy for their descriptions of occurrences in the coastal plain. This is especially important because the reports of consular agents in Jaffa and Haifa which are kept in Bonn are incomplete.

C. Another reason that the reports of naval personnel are important, is that the latter, unlike the German consuls, did not feel the need to adjust their reports to the taste (and policies) of the Foreign Office in Berlin or the German Embassy in Constantinople. Thus, the great importance of

the German settlers in Palestine is more accurately expressed in the naval reports. The consuls in Jerusalem not only had little contact with the settlers (most of whom lived in the area around Jaffa and Haifa), but they also were not interested in recognizing their importance; this was in accordance with the policy originating from Berlin. This illustrates the real value of the reports of naval personnel: considerations of "high policy" were not always clear to them, and therefore they continually protested that the local Turkish authorities discriminated against the German settlers and that even Germany, their patron Power, neglected them. Undoubtedly the position of the naval officers over the years brought Germany into a deepening involvement in Palestine, beyond the limits which seemed advisable to the Foreign Office in Berlin.

In conclusion, the documents of the archives in Freiburg, even though they are currently difficult to use, form another link in the chain of sources about the history of Palestine during the period of Ottoman rule, mainly from the 1870's onward. They are especially valuable to fill in information about German interests in Palestine, German policy toward Palestine, the mood of the local population (especially their relationship to the Great Powers), the competition between the Powers in Palestine, and the strength of Turkish authority in Palestine (this, while studying the moods of its administrative and military elements.)

IV. The Central Archive of Württemberg in Stuttgart (Hauptstaatsarchiv Stuttgart, Konrad-Adenauerstr. 4)

In these archives there is a relatively small but important quantity of documents relating to Palestine from the middle of the nineteenth century to the end of the First World War.

The Palestinian material in Stuttgart is for the most part related to the sect of the Templars which was organized in the State of Württemberg in the mid-nineteenth century and which, in the late 1860's, began organized settlement in Palestine.

The Württemberg government and its ruling house followed the activities of the Templars with great interest from the beginning—first in Germany and afterwards in Palestine. Most of the Palestinian material is concentrated in two sections:

A. "*Kabinettsakten IV, E 14 (1585) Sekten und Schwärmer 1818–1887*)" (The files of the Royal Cabinet: Sects and Visionaries).

B. "*Acten des Königl. Ministeriums der auswärtigen Angelegenheiten E46–48 (907)*".
(The files of the Royal Foreign Ministry).

As the government followed the activities of the Templars from the beginning of their organization and dealt with matters concerning them, important material about Palestine in that period was collected in Stuttgart: detailed reports by the Templars on their settlement project and the activities of the German settlers to make Palestine bloom; on the general situation in the country; on the problems which arose between the settlers and the government in Constantinople, the Turkish authorities in Palestine, the local population, and the problems between the settlers and the consular representatives of Germany in Palestine.

The attempts of the government in Stuttgart to act on behalf of the settlers in the Imperial Foreign Office and with other elements in Berlin make it possible to view Germany's general policy toward Palestine correctly. This point is of great importance in view of the fact that the Berlin Foreign Office apparently did not dictate policy lines for Palestine (at any rate, the author did not find any such evidence). The policy of Berlin is expressed, therefore, mainly in its correspondence with the Foreign Office in Württemberg. Stuttgart, by pleading the Templars' case, forced Berlin from time to time to explain the reasons for its policy, which did not necessarily satisfy the German settlers in Palestine. From this correspondence between Berlin and Stuttgart (which was partially secret), it appears that the Imperial Foreign Office was prevented from encouraging German settlement in Palestine in order to not cause tensions in the relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire (which was angered by the Templars' settlement) and between Germany and other Powers which were interested in Palestine. For political reasons and in order not to disturb public opinion (which generally supported the Templars), the Berlin government was unable to proclaim this policy openly. Because the Berlin Foreign Office (whose documents are kept today in Bonn) saved only a small part of the correspondence with Stuttgart, the Württemberg archives are important; the documents there make it possible to view the German policy toward Palestine in a proper perspective.

In connection with the Stuttgart archive, mention should be made of the State Library of Württemberg (*Württembergische Landesbibliothek*, Konrad-Adenauerstr. 8) which is next to the archive. There is in this library a complete series of the official organ of the Templars, *Die Warte des Tempels* (1845–1876 as *Süddeutsche Warte*, 1912–1917 as *Jerusalemmer Warte*) from the beginning of its publication to the present. As far as it is known, there is no extant complete series (especially the first volumes from the years 1845–1876, though also volumes from the later nineteenth century) any where else in the world. The weekly issues of the *Warte*, giving information about events in Palestine, form the broadest, most authentic, contemporary source about the

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activities of the German settlers in Palestine because they contain much valuable and, thus far, unexploited material on the history of Palestine. There appears to be no other source for the history of Palestine (particularly in the last third of the nineteenth century) that brought out current information from Palestine with such scope and frequency, without being under the strict censorship of the Turkish authorities (until the transfer of the editorial office from Stuttgart to Jerusalem in 1912). The level of the journalists, their familiarity with what was happening in Palestine and their at least partial command of the Arabic language gave the *Warte* a great advantage over many other sources from that period.

The Württemberg State Library also contains (in section *Cod hist. fol 858*) various documents connected with the beginning of the Templars' settlement in Palestine and especially their ties with Henry Dunant, the founder of the Red Cross, who promised in 1867 to use his influence so that the Ottoman Empire would allow the Templars to settle in Palestine.

40. SOME NOTES ON THE MARSEILLE ARCHIVES AS A SOURCE FOR THE HISTORY OF PALESTINE

by AMNON COHEN

I

In his article "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables"¹ Professor A. Hourani tries to divide Ottoman history into four periods. With respect to the sources he states that in the third period, extending roughly from 1760 to 1860, because of the growing weakness of the central government, Ottoman archives show less and less what actually happened in the Empire. It is then, says Professor Hourani, that European sources become so important, particularly the reports submitted by European diplomats and consuls in different parts of the Empire.

Although we are of the opinion that official Ottoman archives are still of very substantial value to the historians, even for the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we are in agreement with Professor Hourani as far as French commercial archives are concerned. These archives, situated in the *Chambre de Commerce de Marseille* (ACCM),² have up to now been used only to a very limited extent, mainly by Charles-Roux, Masson and Rambert. Although this paper is based on the results of a work dealing primarily with the eighteenth century,³ much of what was established about this period seems to be valid for the preceding centuries as well.

The most important of the Marseille archives are those of the *Chambre de Commerce*; although one should note that some material may also be found in the *Archives Départementales de Bouches-du-Rhône* (ADBR). In the different *échelles* of the Levant (the same is true for Barbary, namely, North Africa) there were flourishing French merchant communities, "nations", which carried on quite a lively correspondence with France. The Marseille archives contain an almost complete series of reports submitted by consuls and vice consuls to either the *Chambre de Commerce* or to the Ministry in Paris (*Série J*). As conditions at sea were not too secure in those days, letters were usually sent in duplicate, one of which, at least,

¹ Polk-Chambers, pp 41-68.

² I wish to take this opportunity to thank the staff in charge of the archives and most particularly Monsieur Rebuffat for their very kind help and most enlightening remarks extended to the author during his research in Winter, 1966, in Marseille.

³ See A. Cohen, *Palestine in the 18th Century*, Jerusalem, 1973.

should have reached Marseille. The continuous flow of orders sent from home (Série B) serves to fill in any missing links. On rare, particularly important, occasions the "nation" wrote to the ambassador in Istanbul, sending some comment on this correspondence to the authorities in Marseille. The "nations" were sent, maintained and supposedly supervised by the *Chambre de Commerce de Marseille*, which explains why they were answerable to Marseille in the first place. Included in their regular correspondence with the *Chambre* were monthly reports on all their expenditures, official and unofficial (Série I). The same series includes, in addition to statistics on the commercial activities of the *échelle*, complete lists of all maritime traffic passing through it and the cargo manifests of these vessels (which should be checked against the *Santé* series in the *Archives Départementales de Bouches-du-Rhône*), giving us a detailed picture of the merchandise. On a higher level there are the annual trade statistics of imports and exports sent by the *Chambre de Commerce* to the Ministry in Paris.

In addition to the above official correspondence there are two types of private correspondence: the first includes letters, notes, etc., which passed between the merchants and their colleagues in other ports and sometimes within the same province (Série J); the second is the recently found and purchased private letters of one of the firms, the *Maison Roux*, exchanged between the main office in *Marseilles* and the merchants situated in *Palestine* and elsewhere (Série L-IX). And last but not least were the long, detailed reports submitted by the official inspectors sent from France to the *Levant* every ten to fifteen years in order to assess and comment on conditions and possibilities in the places they visited (Série J).

These are the main categories of documents to be found in the archives which are of benefit to the student of Ottoman history. Unlike the archives in Paris, those of Marseille are not bound together in impressive volumes. This, however, makes them rather easier to work with; for more subdivisions are possible, and so access to different aspects of the same subject is far easier. Similar to the *Archives Nationales*, documents coming from a given *échelle* are kept together, i.e.: *Acre*, *Jaffa* for *Palestine* and all other main ports and commercial centres (*Aleppo*, for example) in the Empire. Unlike Paris, however, classification by subject is found to be very useful: *Affaires Religieuses*, *Statistiques*, *Etats des Marchandises Envoyées en ... Venant de ...*, etc.

II

At this point it is worth looking into some of the main topics on which one might expect to find useful information in the *Archives de la Chambre de Commerce de Marseille*.

A. Political history (including, quite often, military developments in the *échelle*). The consuls and vice consuls were, of course, interested primarily in financial and economic affairs. But these were influenced, to a very large extent, by political developments in the area. The advent of Ḍāhir al-'Umar and Jezzār, or the Egyptian invasion of Palestine in the early 1770's, for example, had to be reported in detail in order to explain to the *Chambre de Commerce* why imports from that area had fallen off to such an extent. As a result it often happens that one is presented with an "*aperçu général*" (general outlook) of conditions in the area as well as detailed bulletins on the political and military situation; sometimes, as in the case of Abū Dhahab's campaign, these were even submitted daily. Moreover, being the sole official representatives of France in the area, the consuls and vice consuls were supposed to report from time to time to the Ministry of the Navy, which they usually did. While there are a number of reports for the seventeenth century submitted by other European nationals in Palestine, and while for other parts of the Ottoman Empire we have the Levant Company's correspondence, for information on Palestine during the eighteenth century we are limited, as far as official European archives are concerned, exclusively to the French correspondence.

B. The economic sector is another topic dealt with extensively in these archives. We have already mentioned that the French consuls were the main representatives of the King of France in the area. But it should not be forgotten that their primary task was, above all else, to look after their commercial interests. These men were born into a mercantile tradition, and their entire lives were centered around their various commercial enterprises. What is more, their whole community consisted of merchants and businessmen. For these and other reasons, the Archives de la *Chambre de Commerce de Marseille* is a very rich — and up till now unexploited — source of knowledge about the economic history of Palestine and the Ottoman Empire. Statistics concerning the different commodities handled by these merchants have already been mentioned. The importance of these statistics, however, goes beyond the purely commercial, for there is much to be learned from them: for instance, how the population, both in the towns and in the countryside, earned its living. Other aspects of the economic life of the area might be illuminated by information concerning taxation and returns from customs duties levied both on goods and on the local populace, rates of exchange on local and foreign currency and the whole gamut of commercial transactions, both local and international.

C. Christian affairs were, of course, of special interest to the French Catholic ministers in the Levant. Anyone studying this particular aspect of Palestinian history will find much useful material relating to pilgrimages,

Christian institutions and holy places in the area, special taxes imposed on Christians and the attitude of both the government and the population towards Christians and Christianity in general. The Jewish community played a relatively minor role in the area at this time, its activities being restricted to certain sectors of the local economy; due to their overwhelming interest in commerce, however, the archives of Marseille might very well cast some light on this community as well. (It seems that the archives of Aleppo are even more promising to the historian of Jewish communities in the Levant, and these are still untouched.)

D. Another subject on which much remains to be done is the maritime history of the Mediterranean. Christian piracy in the Mediterranean was very prominent during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The significance of this may be seen, on the one hand, as an expression of Christian-Muslim rivalry on the high seas and, on the other hand, as one of the basic factors reflecting the attitude of the local Muslim population towards their Christian neighbours. It seems that the archives of Marseille could also be of use in establishing at least the general trends of Mediterranean economic history — the directions and volume of trade, the flow and exchange of materials and money, etc. In view of the extensive and detailed material contained in the ACCM and ADBR, a comprehensive work — unlike the ordinary regional study carried out up to now — could and (may I add) should be attempted.

III

There are two fields in which the Marseille archives prove to be of little help to us: cultural history (or the history of ideas) and social history. While it is possible to gain some idea of the attitudes held by the French merchants towards the local population, as well as to other aspects of life in the area, there is very little substantial information on the way *local* inhabitants thought or felt. Having expected this as far as the history of ideas goes, one cannot possibly be too disappointed.

This even seems quite natural, in fact, for two reasons: the inability to communicate directly and a general lack of interest in the "Turc". What is rather unexpected, however, is that due to the above reasons, as well as to a superficial approach towards and a certain amount of contempt for the local population, these archives are of a very limited interest to the *social* historian. Society emerges as monolithic, with almost no differentiation of classes being made and inter-relations between the different groups within the society being almost totally neglected.

But this, as discouraging as it may be to some of us, does not detract from the value of the French commercial archives as an important source of

economic, political and military information on the Ottoman Empire and on Palestine as one of its provinces. In an article published in 1951, Professor B. Lewis stated the following: "One of the classical difficulties of the student of history of the Islamic Middle East, as contrasted with his colleagues in the European field, is the lack of archive material."⁴ While little has happened over the past 20 years to warrant a radical revision of this view, it seems to us that there is still a considerable amount of work to be done on the existing, even though very imperfect, European archives, particularly in those of France.

⁴ B. Lewis, "The Ottoman Archives as a Source for the History of the Arab Lands," *JRAS*, 1951.