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This volume deals with major themes in the history and political structure of the Palestinian Arabs. The first theme involves the history and politics of the Palestinian national movement from its beginnings and throughout the British mandate. The reemergence of national feeling during the 1950's and 1960's is described and illustrated in the second study. An analysis of the yet unknown aspects of the political organization of the Palestinians living in Jordan's west bank during the years 1948–67 follows. Because the Arab citizens of Israel, for the most part, regard themselves as Palestinian Arabs by national identity, the fourth chapter is concerned with their political organization. Finally, one aspect of guerrilla politics is included here — relations with the Soviet Union.

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TRUMAN INSTITUTE STUDIES

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Mount Scopus, Jerusalem

MOSHE MA'OZ * Editor

PALESTINIAN ARAB POLITICS

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

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FOREWORD

The relatively new phenomenon of a Palestinian-Arab sense of identity came about, in large measure, as a result of the arbitrary Palestine Mandate framework set up by the British authorities after World War I. This feeling grew and expanded during the Mandate era, due to its conflict with, and the challenge of, the National Jewish movement in the Land of Israel, and because of its opposition to British rule. But it receded following the establishment of the State of Israel and the annexation of the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan after the 1948 war. The founding of the "The Palestinian Liberation Organization" (PLO) and the "Palestinian Liberation Movement" (al-Fatah) in the mid 1960's, contributed to the resurgence of Palestinian nationalist feeling. This recently gained further momentum following the October war of 1973 and the pro-PLO vote at the U.N. General Assembly in November, 1974. The Nationalist feeling encompasses at present large segments of the Palestinian Arabs, about 70 percent of whom reside within the territory which constitutes approximately 80 percent of original British Mandate Palestine. Some 30% of the Palestinian Arabs are living east of the Jordan river, 25% in the West Bank, 15% in the Gaza Strip, and the remainder in Israel, Lebanon, Syria, the Persian Gulf emirates, and outside the Middle East.

The study of Palestinian Arab nationalism is not only of crucial importance for the understanding of its aspirations and its course in the conflict with the Jewish nationalist movement. It also constitutes one of the fundamental elements of the Arab-Israel confrontation both because of the emotional involvement and because of the ideological obligation on the part of the Arab

States towards the Palestinians. Unfortunately, in the history of the Arab Israeli conflict there have been repeated attempts, to use Palestinian nationalism in the war against Israel, not only by Arab States, but also by extreme elements among the Palestinian Arabs, in order to aggravate the conflict.

It seems that at the present time the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, who are recognized as the representatives of the entire Palestinian community, do not contribute to the easing of the Arab-Israel conflict because of their extreme and uncompromising position with regard to the Jewish state in Israel. Their aim remains unchanged: i.e. the liquidation of Israel--and the establishment of the Palestinian Arab state throughout the entire area of Palestine. Here indeed lies one of the tragic aspects of Arab-Jewish conflict over Palestine (Eretz Israel). Whereas the majority of the Jewish population have recognized the principle of partition and the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination within the major part of the territory (both west and east of Jordan river), no political Palestinian organization, so far, has been prepared to recognize the right of the Jewish people in Israel to their self-determination, and the *right* of Israel to exist as sovereign state within the pre-1967 boundaries. The Palestinians, or for that matter, most of the Arabs, do not admit the vitality of the Jewish national movement and the fact that Israel's Jewish inhabitants have been realizing their ancient cultural and national heritage for the past twenty seven years.

The present volume, which is largely an outgrowth of a conference held in the Harry S Truman Research Institute in 1973, deals with the major themes in the history and political structure of the Palestinian Arabs. The first theme evolves the history and politics of the Palestinian national movement from its beginnings and throughout the British mandate. The re-emergence of national feeling during the 1950's and 1960's is described and illustrated in the second study. The third chapter is dedicated to an analysis of the yet-unknown aspects of the political organization of the Palestinians living in the Kingdom of Jordan's West Bank during the years 1948-67. The political

organization of the Israeli Arabs during this same period is also included in this book since these Arab citizens of Israel, for the most part, regard themselves as Palestinian Arabs by national identity. Finally, since the issue of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations has received much publicity elsewhere, only one aspect of guerrilla politics is included here--i.e. the relations with the Soviet Union.

It is hoped that this study will promote further discussion in the West, as well as the Arab countries.

Moshe Ma'oz
July 1975

THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS UNDER THE BRITISH MANDATE

YEHOSHUA PORATH

A

In order to understand the political organization of the Palestinian Arabs, one must first know the social milieu in which it developed. It is therefore necessary to briefly present the essential lines of Palestinian-Arab society at the end of the Ottoman period. This material is partially known, and need be reiterated only for the sake of completeness. In addition to a clear division between the various religious communities, there existed a substantial gap between the urban and village populations. Their economic and social ties were still developing, and their mutual relations were characterized by unfamiliarity and, at times, enmity. In previous periods the urban and rural groups had differed, mainly, in occupation and the extent and availability of education. In the late 19th Century, educational form and content changed, but their framework did not. The urban elite, which until mid 19th Century had received a purely traditional Muslim education, began to adapt to the modernization of the Ottoman Empire, and to turn gradually to the new government schools, thus becoming educationally integrated into the process of the *"tanzimat"*. The dominant characteristic of the urban elite in the second half of the Century was its progressive transformation from a combination of notables and religious functionaries to one of notables, land owners, and senior bureaucrats educated in the new schools.

While there were other changes it appears that they were of much less importance. It should be noted that other social transformations were almost non-existent; no new class emerged as a result of extensive changes in the mode of education. It therefore seems that the basic change in the second

half of the 19th Century was the adaptation of the traditional elite to the modernized education of the Ottoman Empire.

A second important aspect of the new social and political situation was a change in the balance of power between the urban and rural elites — a phenomenon common to a great extent, to the entire Fertile Crescent. Until some time after the mid 19th Century, village notables maintained a senior, even decisive, status within their communities. This resulted from their economic power as tax farmers, and the traditional social prestige of their families. They served as intermediaries in the the relations between the State and the villagers.

One of the significant characteristics of the Ottoman regime's modernization in the second half of the 19th Century was the strengthening of the urban elite at the expense of its village counterpart. This found expression in an increasing concentration of land in the hands of the urbanites and, as a result, the limitation of the influence of local rural dignataries on their individual villages. The regional and district apparatus slipped from the hands of the rural elite with varying degrees of resistance and opposition, its functions were assumed by urban notables. In the process, a sharp antagonism developed between the two — an antagonism which became apparent when the time came for joint effort against what appeared to be a common national enemy.

Another factor which influenced the modes of political action of the Palestinians at the end of the Ottoman period, and at least in the first years of the British Mandate, was the beginning of the politicization of public life. This took several forms. The first was the institution of parliamentary elections — the first in 1876, and three preceding World War I, in 1908, 1912 and 1914. The establishment of a parliament gave the urban notables a new instrument with which to influence the Ottoman regime, further their individual and collective interests, and reach the Empire's centers of power. Many of the urban notables had previously held office above the local level, but their membership in the parliament provided them with a permanent opportunity to speak and work for their regional and group interests. No less

important was the fact that the parliamentary elections created and/or institutionalized a particular type of political leadership and activity. Elections were held in two stages, and only owners of considerable property were entitled to vote. Thus, in a clear and legal manner, the right to express an opinion, elect representatives, and participate in public life were reserved for a particular social and economic class. This, in turn, gave clear authority to the concept that only those paying high property taxes had the right, theoretically exercised via their representatives in the parliament, to decide how public revenue should be spent.

The two-stage parliamentary elections provided a clear organizational structure to what had been accepted practice in the past consultation and agreement by urban notables. Under the system, members of the middle and upper classes elected secondary electors who, in turn, chose the members of the parliament. The secondary electors, generally members of the upper class, used their money and influence to gain support and votes from the middle-class. The electors then convened to chose the parliamentary representatives of each district. They did so in much the same way as, when acting as the governor's consultive body, and, later, as formal administrative Councils established in the second half of the 19th Century, they had taken other political and social decisions by informal agreement. Thus, several tens of Jerusalem's notables convened once to elect Jerusalem's representatives to the Ottoman parliament, and once again to discuss regional matters and current problems. In this respect no change occurred; rather, an old social institution was formally recognized and strengthened.

Another, more modern aspect of political activity — the voluntary organization of people with common interests or political conceptions — was underdeveloped in Ottoman Palestine. The most prominent and well known institutions were the organizations for the advancement of Arab cultural and political interests — national associations whose programs evolved from demands for administrative reform to the idea of national separatism. These national associations were neither particu-

larly outstanding nor unique. Throughout the Fertile Crescent there were local associations for the advancement of local education, or charity organizations concerned with maintaining social institutions; they were, in fact, much more developed than in Palestine, where two or three associations for furthering educational interests were established and catered more to the Christian communities than the Muslim majority, which relied on the activities of the Muslim State. In Damascus and other Muslim cities of Syria, local initiative was greater, despite the fact that the central government was more vigorous than in Palestine.

The weakness of voluntary organization in Palestine was even more pronounced in the political sphere. There were very few groups in Palestine dedicated to the advancement of Arab culture or the political rights of the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire. In the Nablus area there were one or two small branches of the Decentralization Party, whose headquarters was in Cairo, but no reform associations, such as the famous ones of Beirut or Basra were established. The Beirut press discerned this and expressed amazement that Palestinians were not part of this phenomenon. Their lack of involvement may be understood against the background of the large degree of autonomy which the Jerusalem elite enjoyed; its members were apparently completely satisfied by their relations with the central government. Thus, on the eve of World War I, the concept of voluntary activity within an organizational framework had not become an accepted tradition.

B

Toward the end of World War I a drastic shift in the direction of political activity became apparent brought about by the challenge posed to the Palestinian-Arab public by Zionism. It was perceived as a severe danger, and led to the acceleration of a process which, under normal circumstances, would have developed more gradually.

Even before World War I the urban political public had expressed unequivocable opposition to Zionism, and post-war events served to intensify its hostility. First, the Balfour

Declaration was interpreted, by both Jews and Arabs, in an exaggerated way unjustified by an objective reading of its text, and certainly by its subsequent implementation. This was primarily due to the Turks who, slowly retreating from Palestine at the end of 1917, warned the Palestinian and general Arab public that the British conquest meant Jewish rule. The Jewish community of Palestine also read into the Declaration more than was apparently intended.

Thus, misinterpretation of the Declaration by both sides changed relationships, behavior and expectations. The arrival of the Zionist Commission, which during the War, had been granted the right of diplomatic activity denied to others, as well as technical and administrative functions, and which was viewed by the Arabs as the potential Jewish Government, exacerbated Arab fears. They saw Zionism transformed from a threatening, but relatively weak, experiment into a political movement enjoying the protection and support of a great power. The activities of the Zionist Commission did nothing to alleviate Arab anxiety.

All political organization at this stage became motivated by the desire to meet the Zionist danger. The Arab organizational development coincides with political development which can be understood only against its historical-political background. In 1918, as the occupation of Palestine was proceeding, the Zionist Commission arrived; the Turks succeeded in creating public fear of it and the movement it represented. Associations for the struggle against Zionism began to form in urban centers, especially in Jerusalem and Jaffa which had been conquered by the British early that year. These groups called the Muslim-Christian Associations, succeeded in forming a loose national organization in the fall of 1918. Along with its fear of Zionism, the organization reflected the social standards of its members. The urban notables, Muslims and Christians, gathered in the traditional manner — senior religious functionaries of every locality, high officials in the Ottoman Administration of Palestine and other parts of the Empire, rich land-owners and merchants. Among the activities of the Muslim-Christian Association were

the presentation of petitions to the government, organization of meetings of notables and, in extreme cases, even demonstrations. All these were aimed at combatting Zionism. At first, no positive demands were made nor, at this stage, did the Association voice its opinions on the political future of Palestine. But as the time approached for the discussion of the question, the general picture changed: factions began to emerge and organizational splits followed in short order. The critical period came in late 1918, as the war ended and preparations for convening the Versailles Peace Conference began. When, by the end of 1918, it became clear that the Conference was imminent, the leaders of the Palestinian-Arab community were obliged to adopt a position regarding not only the evils of Zionism, but the country's political future as well. Regional political events had a considerable influence. In order to ease the process of occupation the British and French published, with utter cynicism, their famous declaration of November 1918 with respect to the rights of Syrians and Iraqis to establish governments deriving their authority from the popular will. This aroused great hopes. At the same time, after the military conquest of the area, Faysal and his army entered Damascus in early October 1918 and established the Hashimite regime which, to many Arabs appeared to be at least the embryo of an independent Arab state. This was the spirit of Faysal's speeches and declarations although, from the British army's point of view, the arrangement was only a temporary part of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. The situation in Damascus strengthened the famous promise of November 1918. At the same time, the explicit and exclusive creation of Syrians and Iraquis left the future of the Palestinians unresolved. In retrospect we can see that this was a deliberate omission. The spokesmen of the Palestinian-Arab public, the leaders of the Muslim-Christian Association, asked the powers about their own future and they were told that the exclusion of Palestine was not accidental They were thus confronted with the greatly disappointing truth that, while the Fertile Crescent would progress towards independence, or seemingly so, the Palestinians were to witness the realization of their worst fears.

C

At this time the first divergent political discussions and organizations began to emerge. The answer of the Muslim-Christian Association leadership, especially in Jerusalem and Jaffa, composed as it was by the old group of Ottoman functionaries and prestigious families, was to fight for autonomous status under British protection, demand British annulment of the Balfour Declaration and press no further. Their stubborn demand for autonomy within the borders of Palestine was, no doubt, based on the shrewed calculation that in an autonomous Palestine, under British protection, the old leadership would be able to retain control. The younger generation, however, was much more excitied by the news of the Arab Revolt. During 1918, with the advance of the British army on both banks of the Jordan, several tens of young Palestinians volunteered for Faysal's army. The British allowed Faysal's emissaries to operate in the area and mobilize volunteers in the name of Arab nationalism, liberation of the Arabs from the Turkish yoke, and the establishment of an Arab state under the Hashemite crown. Naturally, the volunteers were young men who, having no vested interest in perpetuating the political and social status quo, were able to affect the ideological turnabout from loyalty to the Muslim Ottoman Empire to an Arab nationalist ideology. Several score of these young Palestinian nationalists subsequently served the Arab government in Damascus as soldiers, officers or bureaucrats in the small administration developing around Faysal; and this group became the cornerstone of future militant nationalist organizations. It was clear to them that Damascus would be the center, and Faysal the Hero, in the struggle against Zionism and the Balfour Declaration. Unity with Syria, with Damascus, would automatically bring Arab independence and, with it, the annulment of the Declaration. Their answer to the dilemma was not Palestinian autonomy, as the older generation suggested, but rather unity with Syria and the establishment of Palestine as Southern Syria *(Sūriyya al-Janūbiyya)* — an entirely new name, just as the name Syria, as opposed to *Bilād al-Shām*, was also an innovation of the second

half of the 19th Century, adopted from the European usage of an old Hellenistic name.

This change in political perspective led to the creation of several new associations, of which the two most important were the Arab Club *(al-Nādi al-Arabi)*, and the Literary Club *(al-Muntada al-Adabi)*. The associations did not differ politically; both favored unity with Syria. Their major difference centered around family rivalry. *Al-Nādi al-Arabi*, especially its Jerusalem branch, was controlled by the younger generation of the Husayni family, while *al-Muntada al-Adabi* was dominated by the younger generation of the Nashashibi family, with foreign agents having influence as well. British intelligence officers had close ties to both the leadership and the younger members of the Husayni family, while French agents, the extent of whose attempts to undermine the British position in Palestine was not apparent in London or Paris, relied on *al-Muntada al-Adabi.* In doing so they temporarily ignored the potentially explosive confrontation they were creating, one which would later pose a dilemma. These two associations quite successfully influenced developments for a year and a half. Their doctrine of unity with Syria was both clear and convincing to many Palestinians anxious to defeat Zionism. At the first Palestinian National Congress, held at the end of January 1919, they had enough influence to pass a resolution terming Palestine *Sūriyya al-Janūbiyya* and adopting the path of unity with Syria. This was accomplished after two or three weeks of hesitation on the part of the Jerusalem elite, which was forced to agree unwillingly when faced with the threat of losing its leadership in the town of Nablus. The Jerusalem notables did achieve a compromise; the union to be established would be a confederation with every area maintaining its own parliament and legal system, and with the Hashemite King as sovereign.

The unionists next succeeded in putting their stamp on the traditional leadership of the Muslim-Christian Association. They were aided with money, and, to a certain extent, weapons, by their ideological comrades in Damascus, many of whom were Palestinians. The political development reflected, to a great

degree, what was happening in Syria. When Faysal was crowned in Damascus, the unionists associations in Palestine reached the peak of their influence. In the winter of 1920, concurrent with the Nabi Musa festivities, they aroused the country with a series of demonstrations which ended in the first disturbances in a Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem, in April 1920. But political fates in Damascus turned, and the Hashimite regime was threatened by the San Remo decision at the end of 1920. In July, Faysal was ousted by French military action. The collapse of this regime destroyed the prestige of the young unionists, and Palestinian political hegemony returned to the older leadership and its organization — the Muslim-Christian Association. This framework united the urban dignitaries, who established alliances with a few of their village counterparts by promising them a share in the leadership. Thus a framework was established which spoke in the name of the population, and began to organize for a struggle with Zionism on a Palestinian basis. On the one hand, Palestine was the area of controversy, and there the fight against Zionism would take place; on the other, the British regime was to help the Palestinians in their struggle. To this end, country-wide organizations were formed. At their first Congress, in December 1920 in Haifa, decisions were taken in the above-mentioned spirit — a struggle for the annulment of the Balfour Declaration within the borders of Palestine, with no mention of southern Syria. The aim was to achieve autonomy under supreme British rule, such as was developing in Trans-Jordan and Iraq.

The Mandatory Government, unable to estimate the strength of this movement, reacted hesitantly. The British were briefly perplexed but finally decided, informally, to view the Executive Committee elected at the Haifa Congress as the spokesman for the Palestinian-Arab population; through it the Mandatory regime communicated with the local Arab population. To British queries regarding the authority of the Executive Committee, and its right to represent the population, Committee leaders replied, innocently, that they were the country's traditional notables and spokesmen. They had represented its district administrative

councils and had been the majors and property owners — their leadership was merely a continuation, and sprang from accepted social concepts. That the Haifa Congress was not elected precisely according to the British or other European election system was not considered significant. Within their social and political system, they argued, they were the representatives of the public. The Mandatory government could claim that it did not accept this approach, but it quickly became convinced of its correctness. Thus a leadership crystallized which was accepted, at least initially, by the entire political public as legitimate. This took place at the end of 1920. There then followed a period, of two or three years, in which almost the entire public was united around the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Arab Congress, headed by Māsa Kāzim al-Husayni, a senior official in the Ottoman administration (he had reached the rank of district governor), and ex-mayor of Jerusalem. This unity was promoted and sustained by the hope that the Balfour Declaration could be nullified by political means, a prospect which appeared not unlikely in late 1920 and early 1921. Confident of a political solution, the leadership rejected violence and used its influence to restrain Arab activists. The disturbances in Jaffa in May 1921, to the extent that they were organized, and there is some evidence to that effect, were led by the militant remnants of the "Southern Syria" groups of 1919. When their chief, Amin al-Husayni, accepted the title of Mufti of Jerusalem, and later the powerful position of President of the Supreme Muslim Council in Jerusalem, they were left leaderless and were, for a long time, silent. Thus, in early 1921, the public united around the leadership of the Executive Committee and its parliamentary, legal and non-violent tactics, which included political pressure and occasional demonstrations, negotiations, petitions and delegations to London. Their hope that matters could be changed in this way was quite reasonable.

D

It soon became clear to the Arabs that the British civilian government, established in July 1920, had come to recognize the great difficulty of implementing the Balfour Declaration. While it

was true that this government, and especially its two prominent heads, Herbert Samuel and Wyndham Deedes, were more sympathetic to Zionism than the officers of the previous military government, in problems of practical administration they often reached conclusions similar to those of their predecessors. They governed a population hostile to the policy of the Balfour Declaration, which saw it as a threat to its national and even physical existence in the country. Rule based on the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, therefore, required a constant struggle to impose an unwanted policy, and the ever present threat of violence or riots. It was possible to sense that Samuel and Deedes freed themselves of illusions, especially after Samuel's famous speech on the King's birthday, June 3. The speech, at least from the Zionist viewpoint, marked the beginning of a British retreat on the Balfour Declaration. Nor was this the only sign that caused the Palestinians to believe that pressure might still save them. Much more important were events in London. Several things occurred there:

1) In 1921 a new political group of opponents of the Balfour Declaration formed. It included former army officers who had served in the Middle East and administrators of the Expeditionary Force who had completed service;

2) Englishmen who had contact with the region saw the Balfour Declaration as a danger to British interests in the entire Muslim area. They were in contact with the Arab and non-Arab-Muslim world, and spoke in the name of British interests in the Arab Muslim region;

3) Most important, a large group in the Conservative Party rejected the pro-Zionist policy of Lloyd George and Balfour. Despite Balfour's senior status in the party (he had served as Prime Minister in 1902 – 1905), he had little influence. There were those who saw his policy as part of Lloyd George's crookedness. The anti-Zionist faction included 120 – 130 members of Parliament who opposed the policy of the Balfour Declaration. In the House of Lords the situation initially appeared even more promising for the Palestinian Arabs: There was a vehement opposition to the Zionist policy. But the Arabs

slowly learned that the House of Lords did not determine, and hardly influenced, British policy. Several of these Lords were magnates of British journalism, especially prominent being the two Rothermere brothers, and Northcliffe, who represented an ability to influence British public opinion against the Balfour Declaration. For two or three years they concentrated all the efforts on convincing the British public that the Declaration was unwise.

This seemed realistic until after the establishment of the first minority Labour government headed by Ramsey McDonald, in January 1924. by then, all the possible political combinations had been tried and, finally, nothing had happened to nullify the Balfour Declaration. First had come the fall of the coalition of Lloyd George's Liberal faction with the Conservative Party. In November 1932 the Conservatives had gained a large majority in Parliament and several pro-Arabs entered the cabinet, but this brought no change in policy. In the summer of 1923, Conservative Prime Minister A. Bonnar Law was replaced by Baldwin, but again there was no change. Finally, after the establishment of the Labour government, in January 1924, the former policy was retained. Each government had perpetuated it out of consideration for tradition and international prestige. This led to Arab disenchantment with the policy of combatting the Declaration by political means and appeals to the British public. They now realized that the policy would not be easily or quickly abandoned, and the internal Arab splits regarding future action deepened. Still, the moderate Arab position seemed to have had a reasonable chance of success, and the policy of the Palestinian leaders of that period must be seen in that light.

Between 1920-1924, Arab policy was to fully support the pressure being applied in London, making it seem that no sector of the population was prepared to cooperate with the British regime on the basis of the Balfour Declaration. This line caused the rejection of all of the British compromise proposals. The Arab leadership united the overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public against the idea of the Legislative Council and other British suggestions; they were successful in doing so

despite the emergence of disagreement and independent partisan interests within the Palestinian population. These partisan interests took several forms. One was the opposition of the Nashashibi and most other notable Jerusalem families to the growing Husayni monopoly on both the political and religious leadership, exercised through the Executive Committee and the newly established Supreme Muslim Council. With the help of other factions, the Nashashibi opposition succeeded in establishing a strong organization in the 1920's which, for a time, appeared capable of overcoming the Husayni leadership and its ambition to represent all Palestine.

The opposition to the Husayni's had several sources. An anti-Jerusalem feeling was evident. The Husayni leadership was concentrated in Jerusalem, the capital and center of political activity. Public institutions were naturally concentrated there and a disproportionate number of Jerusalemites were nominated for office. This aroused dissatisfaction, particularly in the north where the political tie to Jerusalem was a new one*. Its initial focus was in Acre, whose residents were the first to aid the anti-Husayni forces and sometimes exceeded even the Nashashibis in their opposition to the Husayni leadership.

A second faction, composed of Arabs who doubted the wisdom of the society of non-cooperation with the mandatory government began to emerge and articulate its views. They were bitter about the urban monopoly on government position. These elements favored cooperation with British regime without regard to the Balfour Declaration, in the hope that they might eventually become the country's autonomous rulers. In November 1923, they organized the Palestinian Arab National Party. Although many supporters feared to join, and the party never reached its full potential, a precedent was set for openly

* In the Ottoman period, Nablus and Jerusalem were connected by a number of interlocking institutions, particularly in the legal and military spheres. The Galilee, on the other hand, was never tied to Jerusalem. Palestine north of the Valley of Jezreel, was variously part of the Acre, Sidon or Damascus districts, never Jerusalem. There was certainly no tradition of relations, assuming that social and administrative links aid in the formation of political identity.

opposing what had heretofore been regarded as the general national leadership. This development was, of course, connected with internal social factors and with the failure of political pressure on the British. Had it succeeded, unity would certainly have been maintained for a longer period. Its futility (in September 1923, the mandate became official after it had been ratified by the League of Nations a year before) created conditions for a major breakthrough in the internal struggle. The situation became quite clear. A struggle of the Nashashibis and their supporters for a larger portion of the seats in the Supreme Muslim Council was coupled with periodic attempts to express their opposition in political terms. The basic social factors in the opposition to the Husayni leadership were not erased. Family rivalry was joined to the opposition to the hegemony of Jerusalem, and the opposition of certain rural elements, like the famous Abu Ghush family, to urban leadership.

This phenomenon lasted through the 1920's and between 1925-29 appeared likely to overcome the Husaynis. Its strength was revealed in the elections of the Supreme Muslim Council early in 1926. The elections were subsequently invalidated by the High Court of Justice, but their results indicated an end to the Husayni hegemony over public opinion. The peak of this trend was reached in the municipal elections in 1927, in which the Husaynis were clearly defeated. In Jerusalem Raghib Nashashbi won with the help of the Jewish votes, but even without them he still mustered a plurality, and half the members of the city council elected in Arab areas were Nashashibi's supporters. Similar results were repeated throughout the country, except in Gaza and Majdal.

After 1927 the trend continued. Organizational structures changed according to the political situation, and it is therefore important to understand the factors affecting political changes. Primary among them was the recognition that the old policy of a constitutional struggle for the recognition of the right of self-determination for the Christian and Muslim Palestinian Arabs had failed, despite its initial promise. It was clear that British rule would remain and that the Balfour Declaration

policy was a part of it. Just as this feeling cracked the plaster of the united Muslim community, so it uncovered the split between Christian and Muslims.

Thus began the process which turned the Palestinian movement into an anti-Zionist opposition using Islamic symbols. The clearest expression of this was the disturbance near the Western Wall in August 1929, followed by pogroms in the centers of traditional Muslim conservatism — Safed and Hebron, Palestine's two most traditional and religiously orthodox cities.

The process was, of course, strongly connected to the transformation of the Supreme Muslim Council into a confident body which, by the late 1920's, felt secure and strong enough to carry out a policy which might lead to conflict with the British regime. Before 1928, the Supreme Muslim Council and its president had been very careful to avoid such an eventuality. This phenomenon was first expressed by the change in organizational patterns. The Muslim-Christian Association faded away because of the divisions between the two communities.

As it became clear that the British regime would not pass quickly, efforts aimed at expelling the British decreased, and a new emphasis was put on placing functionaires in the mandatory government. Here the Christians' higher level of education was an advantage. Large numbers graduated from the foreign and local religious schools which had operated energetically and successfully during this period, and many were employed in government service. This created strong Muslim dissatisfaction, and, together with the rise of the Supreme Muslim Council, fostered religious organizations without any pretense of Muslim-Christian unity. Such organizations were dedicated to defending Islam in Palestine from the Jews, or to protecting its holy places in Palestine, and disregarded the theoretical concept of a secular Palestinian–Arab national identity common to Christians and Muslims and based on common origins, culture and history. This found expression in an important development which was to bear fruit later, in 1936-39. Groups of young Muslims began organizing on an exlusively religious basis, both in the Young Men's Muslim Association and the youth scouting associations.

Even those scout troops which had national names were religious organizations and they became a significant force among the youth in the early 1930's.

E

A second important factor was the growth of a stratum whose power and social status were based more and more on education than on origin. From the old social elite came an increasing number of university graduates, whose command of the English language and relative familiarity with the Western culture made them natural spokesmen for the community, thus lending a practical justification to the claim of leadership. This group scorned the old leadership as ignorant in foreign languages (except, of course, Turkish) and unsophisticated, and ascribed a part of the Arab failure to change British policy by political means to their personal limitations. More important, the rise of this new stratum in the country coincided with a move toward independence in the Fertile Crescent and a consequent development of the ideological basis of Arab unity. As the Arab countries approached self-rule they began to question its implications, and a process of ideologization of the Arab national movement took place. The doctrine of Arab unity and post-independence alignment, preached by Sati al-Husri, Constantine Zurayq, Sami Shawkat and many others, gained currency in the schools and cultural clubs of the Fertile Crescent.

This trend influenced the young educated class in Palestine, which was naturally responsive to the lessons of history, and many older people who remembered their days of glory with Faysal in Damascus. It provided the basis for the first ideological organization — the Istiqlal Party, which while theoretically and ideologically a branch of a pan-Arab organization, was in practice a local Palestinian party. It was intended to be a pan-Arab movement, much like the Ba'th Party in the 1950's. The Istiqlal Party failed very quickly, the victim of a split between pro-Saudi and pro-Hashemite factions. Its real importance was as the first local political organization established, not on the basis of family affiliation but of common ideology. It viewed the struggle against Zionism as an element in the wider

issue of Arab independence and unity. From the talks of Ben Gurion and Awni Abd al-Hadi, it is clear that in Party circles there were those capable of considering a limited Jewish immigration to Palestine, provided it took place within the framework of Arab unity. No agreement was reached on the scale of the immigration, but it is significant that the principle was not rejected out of hand.

The party did not last long. Incapable of reaching beyond the small reservoir of educated youth, it was crushed in the clash of family interests. Nevertheless, it remained a source for the flow of educated youth into the Husayni camp, although they did not identify with all its leaders' actions. Party members and affiliated youth, the overwhelming majority of the educated Palestinian generation of the 1930's, joined the Husayni camp and accepted the leadership of Hajj Amin. A turning point was thus marked, if, in the 1920's, there had been no social difference between the Husaynis and the Nashashibis, by the end of the 1930's the Husaynis had become more than a family organization. Their ranks included educated youth, prone to an objective national perspective. The Nashashibi organization was more clearly influenced by a personal-family outlook, and they and their allies from other areas won few supporters among educated youth. Wealthy property-holders dominated the Nashashibi organizations to a far greater extent than was the case with the Husaynis, whose power base included, but transcended, the Husayni family. The personal removal, in 1937, of Hajj Amin and his men from control of the Supreme Muslim Council did not diminish the strength and influence of the Husayni camp. The force they had built remained and even increases, despite their loss, in the 1940's, of the organizational tool which had aided in its construction.

An important result of the 1936-39 disturbances was the creation of a terrible blood feud between the two Palestinian camps. It resulted in a mutual hatred and dissidence so intense that a return to the show of unity, attempted in 1936, became impossible. The Arab Higher Committee which was established in April 1936, was, form the outset, a federation of parties. It had

neither the unity nor efficacy of the Executive Committee of the early 1920's, and represented in that respect, a clear retreat. Moreover, in practical terms, the Arab Higher Committee existed only from April 1936 until its dispersion by the British in October 1937 after the murder of Mr. Andrews. Even during its brief existence, it was actually a forum of clarification and consultation, incapable of making effective decisions. As the indecision of the body became apparent, attempts were made to decide matters by force. The Husayni leadership, allied with armed extremists, adopted a policy of intimidation and murder. Hajj Amin al-Husayni's rejection of the White Paper of May 1939 was enough to cause all other factions to reject it as well despite evidence that not only the Nashashibis but even some Arabs from the Husayni camp were willing to accept it. With whatever degree of self-interested hindsight, Husayni has claimed, in various interviews, that he favored the acceptance of the White Paper in May 1939. In his memoirs Aḥmad Shuqayri notes that in a meeting of exiled Palestinian leaders at Hajj , Amin al-Husayni's house in Lebanon, he advocated accepting the White Paper, and several others are beginning to hint the same thing. Musa al-Alami certainly makes this claim, and his sincerity on this point cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, Hajj Amin al-Husayni's opposition, backed by his armed followers, was decisive. The memory of the many victims of the "Guardians of the Purity of the Camp" was still fresh and frightening.

Here, then, lies the basic explanation of why, after 1944, when it was clear that the fate of Palestine would soon be determined, two years passed before the Arab Higher Committee was re-established. Even then it came into being not as a federation of parties, as in 1937, but by the appointment of the Arab League. The Committee, established in this way, faced the critical period in a state of near impotence. Organizationally there was a total decline. The Higher Committee led no national organization. Mutually hostile parties established separate military organizations and some apparently had non-Arab patrons.

A second factor which contributed to organizational weakness was the appearance of the Arab League — a phenomenon tied to

the renewed pan-Arabization of the Palestine issue. Just as it was vainly believed, in the 1920's, that the salvation would come from Hashimite Syria, so in the mid-1930's, faith was placed in the independent Arab states. Iraq was already a sovereign state, and Syria and Lebanon were approaching this status on the eve of World War II (they became independent after the war). Egypt had been independent since 1936, and in 1945 formally joined the Arab League. There was an expectation that the Arab League would save the day; its imposed re-establishment of the Arab Higher Council substantially explains that body's weakness and lack of support. It was supposed that a bloc of independent Arab states, each one with an army, and some military allies of Great Britain, would obviate the need for independent effort. True, Britain had not yet taken an unequivocal position in favor of Arab interests, but after May 1939 her policies changed. Churchill, a life-long supporter of Zionism, was defeated in the elections of July 1945, and the Labour government adopted a policy entirely contrary to that decided upon in its 1944 Annual Conference. The establishment of the Arab League with British patronage and the alliance of Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan with Britain gave rise to hopes for decisive external aid and weakened the will to self-reliance Arab League intervention in the re-establishment of the Higher Committee and in the military sphere, was welcomed by the Palestinians, who were split internally and lacked any arrangement for the election of leadership. It was convenient for the Palestinian leaders to be represented in London by Nahas Pasha of Egypt, and at the U.N. by Nuri Said, and not by Hajj Amin who was stained by his collaboration with the Nazis. In a U.N. that was established by the victors of World War II, it was no advantage to the Palestinians that several of their leaders had spent the war in Berlin.

Another important organizational development of the 1940's was the growth of the Arab Communist Party, the League of National Liberation. It was formed after the dissolution of a previous party composed of both Jews and Arabs, a source of pride to the members of the short-lived organization. In 1943,

when an exclusively Arab Communist Party was established, it developed quickly, a rarity in the Arab world. The Palestinian Arab Communists of the 1940's succeeded in establishing a firm base of workers and *intelligentzia* within one political framework. This development was the result of two factors which to a large extent, acted independently until the unification. Young intellectuals such as Hamdi al-Husayni, members of the Dajni family and other sons of the upper classes were pushed toward the left in the wake of the Istiqlal's failure. Christians were predominant among them. Their organizations — the Arab Intellectuals Association, students groups, and cultural clubs were radicalized by the impact of World War II. Secondly, the industrial development of the country hastened the formation of Arab trade unions, which within a few years, were used by the Communists or leftist *intelligentzia* as the basis for the founding of a party with a strong trade union and intellectual backing. A base was created that might have lasted were it not for the break of 1948. It cannot be ascertained whether it would have retained its distinctly Communist character; at first it was not clear whether the League of National Liberation would become a regular Communist Party. From the beginning it was actually the left wing of the national movement, and emphasis was on social reform, and not necessarily Marxist-Leninist ideology and the organizational patterns which that implies. It is a fact that until 1948-9 elements of the Zionist left developed ties with League members and thought it possible to channel them into a framework less extreme than the Communist Party.

In summary, an examination on the modes of Palestinian political organization during the entire Mandate period reveals that a complete failure; organizational frameworks succeeded neither in establishing themselves nor in fulfilling their political goals. The gap between far-reaching goals and the organizational strength supporting them was tremendous. This being the case, and with neither a social process to quickly close the gap, nor a tailoring of political goals to their modest organizational capacity, matters ended time and time again in failure, until the most decisive failure of 1948.

POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE WEST BANK UNDER THE HASHEMITE REGIME*

AMNON COHEN

A

When Israel began its administration of the West Bank after the June 1967 war, she found no political parties in the area. They had all been disbanded and outlawed by order of King Hussein on 25 April 1957. This order was issued in response to the great political unrest in Jordan, in the West Bank as well as the East, in the months following the resignation of Sulayman al-Nabulsi's Government. The opposition parties demanded, *inter alia*, the dissolution of Fakhri al-Khalidi's Government and its replacement by one comprising the major parties — i.e. National Socialists, *Ba'th*, *al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab*, and the National Front (the Communists). This political ferment was expressed in stormy, sometimes violent demonstrations during the first months of 1957.

The regime refrained from acting until, at the end of April, because of the demonstrations it was forced to take the extreme

*This paper is based mainly on the Jordanian Security Services archives, now in the Israeli State Archives, Jerusalem. We would like to thank Dr. Alsberg and his staff for their kind help, as well as the Israeli Ministry of Defence for its permission and substantial help, without which this undertaking would not have been possible. A detailed and extensively annotated report of the whole project – of which this paper presents some main findings – has recently been published (A. Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank*, Jerusalem, 1972, in Hebrew, mimeographed). We would like to express our thanks to all of those involved in the above rather prolonged enterprise, the full findings of which will hopefully one day appear in English.

measure of banning the parties. During this considerable interim it had, however, begun to prepare for such a measure. At least from the beginning of January 1957, internal bulletins were circulated by the Jordanian Security Service instructing the various commanders and governors to prepare exact and detailed lists of the names and addresses of all party members, presumably with a view towards their possible arrest.[1] Although the King had decided by the beginning of 1957 to destroy the parties, he waited until the end of April by which time political ferment had become so intense and violent that he was able to act effectively. This tactic somewhat recalls the events, *mutatis mutandis,* of thirteen years later.

His order of 25 April resulted in the closure of all party offices; the confiscation of all their property, including everything found in and around their premises; and the imprisonment of hundreds of members, some for very extended periods.

Formally there have been no political parties in Jordan since 1957. In fact, despite its illegality, there has been underground party activity, albeit on a reduced scale. Several trends can be distinguished according to their post-1957 activity. Some, such as the Party of the Mufti and his supporters, and the Arab Constitutional Party *(al-Ḥizb al-Dusturi al-'Arabi),* disappeared altogether. Then there were others for whom the period after 1967 was, in certain respects, the culmination of a process which had started much earlier, albeit for very different reasons; the banning of political parties in 1957 led to constantly decreasing political activity during the following decade, and finally to the total cessation of party activities in an organized framework after 1967. This group of parties included the Syrian National Party *(al-Ḥizb al-Qawmi al-Suri),* the National Socialist Party *(al-Ḥizb al-Waṭani al-Iṣḥtiraki),* the Muslim Brothers, The Liberation Party *(Ḥizb-al-Taḥrir),* and the Ba'th. Finally, there are those parties which continued to operate in one way or another after 1967, for whom the Six-Day War did not institute a turning point. They continued to engage in actual party activities or in activities organized within a slightly different framework. The two parties which kept on functioning normally, both after

1957 and after 1967, were the Arab Nationalists (*al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab),* which later became the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Communist Party.

Thus, despite the fact that they were outlawed by Jordan in 1957 and constantly hounded during the next decade, and despite the change of regime after 1967, political parties have continued to operate in the West Bank. This activity, which we will try to define and analyze in the following pages, bears witness to the vitality of these parties prior to 1967 and, even more so, following the Six-Day War.

B

A book published by two Arab authors on the history of Jordan in the twentieth century[2] contains the following remarks about the period of the Nabulsi government which preceded the dissolution of the parties:

> In the Nabulsi period general activity in the country took on a party color. If only people would engage in party activity in sportsmanlike and noble manner, guided by that sense of responsibility binding upon each and every citizen! Party activity among us has become a source of haughtiness and arrogance and the business of sloths and parasites. . . .
>
> Urban society began to function as though it were stricken with a sickness, a fever, and the clashes between the various parties began to multiply. ... The fault lies in the mistaken notion that party activity is heroic, and that a man ought to be identified with a party *(ḥizbi)* rather than possess positive moral qualities.

This passage contains three characteristic features of the attitude to party politics in Jordan: 1) The view of the Nabulsi period (1956-57) as one in which political activity in Jordan acquired an organized party character for the first time; 2) The contention that this political activity was beset by a lack of sporting spirit and was motivated instead by negative moral qualities, irresponsible feelings, and dishonorable conduct; and

3) The impression that the parties' operations, even at their peak, were restricted to urban society.

Organized and established party activity was prevalent in Palestine and in Trans-Jordan long before Abdallah annexed the West Bank to his kingdom. There had been branches of Ottoman and post-Ottoman parties among the Palestinian Arabs and new parties were established in the first years of the Mandate. The Hussaini-Hashashibi rivalry acquired a party character in the mid-1930's when the Arab Palestinian Party *(al-Ḥizb al-Waṭani)* the National Defence Party *(Ḥizb al-Difa' al-Waṭani)* were established. Other parties were also founded during this period,[3] six were established in Trans-Jordan in the late 1920's and early 1930's. Despite their different names, all supported the King and the regime. All of these parties tended to be based on certain families or groups, the members of which belonged to the same conservative social circles. The 1930's also saw the first beginnings of political organization on a non-family basis with the formation of the *Istiqlāl* and Communist parties, which gained their greatest impetus in the 1940's. In addition to the "classical" type of political party mentioned above, other groups began to appear on the political map of Palestine and Trans-Jordan.[4] They attempted to base themselves on religious principles (e.g. The Muslim Brothers, from the mid-1940's) or, like the Communist Party, on social ideas.

The Muslim Brothers set up branches in Nablus, 1945, Jerusalem, 1946, and Hebron, 1949. While their activities in these early years were limited, they were not fundamentally different from those they engaged in, on a broader scale, during the 1950's and after. The same is true of the Communist Party. The Palestinian Communist Party of the 1930's emerged in the following decade as the League for National Liberation, only to be renamed the Jordanian Communist Party in the early 1950's. The name, and sometimes even certain political positions, changed but the essential framework of activity remained the same and the same basic political line was maintained.[5]

The main period of party formation in the West Bank followed the promulgation of the new Jordanian Constitution on 3

January 1952.[6] It provided for party activity with certain stipulations, among which were: political activity must be peaceful and non-violent; that it must be directed toward lawful ends; and that the internal regulations of the parties had to conform to Jordanian law. In other words, while the constitution permitted political organization in principle, it required every prospective party to submit to investigation in order to determine the extent of its conformity to these conditions. Only after such an investigation would the decision to grant or deny an official permit be taken.

C

In this regard the major parties that emerged in Jordan after 1950 fell into three categories. In the first categroy were those parties which emerged and became active in 1950–52, but did not request a permit for organization according to the new constitution. The Muslim Brothers was one of these. Following its practice in other parts of the Arab world, it carefully avoided the name "party". Instead it called itself an "association" and registered as such under the Ottoman Law of Associations (still valid in Trans-Jordan). This was confirmed in an official order published in January 1953. Although it was well known that its aims were political as well as social, the regime preferred to accept the contention that the Brotherhood was an association. This tolerant relationship was the result of the government's conviction that it could look to the Brotherhood for support in internal and inter-Arab political matters, and that it was expedient to permit it to function. The same basic reasoning led the Royalist regime in Egypt to recognize the Brotherhood as an association, but while in the former case the ties with the regime were firm and growing, in Egypt they were degenerating. That the Muslim Brothers did, in fact, support the Hashemite king became apparent in the 1957 riots. Nevertheless, the authorities found it prudent to keep a wary eye on the association, and later, during periods of tension between it and the regime, (1959, 1963, 1965) its members were left under strict surveillance, and several were even arrested.

Other groups which did not request a permit were the Arab Nationalist Party *(al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab),* and the Communist Party.[7] The latter had been outlawed by the so-called War on Communism Law of 2 May 1948 and its 1953 revision. Both the original and the revised version made membership in the Communist Party or activity within any sort of Communust framework, in the service of Communist ideas, illegal. The 1953 law, for example, imposed severe punishments of long-term imprisonment with hard labor on those who belonged to the Communist Party or propagated Communist ideas, and three years imprisonment on anyone even found in possession of Communist leaflets.[8] These severe punishments were intended to intimidate and defer potential party recruits. It is therefore not surprising that the Communist Party did not even attempt to obtain a permit for political activity as required by law.

The second category comprised those parties which requested and received a permit to organize and function. One of these was the National Socialist Party, founded in 1954 in Amman. Its main aims were: Liberation of the Arab homeland from foreign rule; Arab unity based on a close link with Iraq; preservation of the royalist regime by offering a clear alternative to the left-wing parties; and very moderate social reforms. The leading members of the party were, for the most part, members of the large traditional families — Anwar and Rashad al-Khatib, Hikmat al-Masri, and Haza' al-Majali, the party's General Secretary. Despite its apparent swing to the left in 1956–57, it should be remembered that this was basically a conservative group, both in its social composition and political positions. For example, its call for closer links with Iraq as a first step to Arab unity meant uniting with the Hashemite state of Nuri al-Sa'id, the protege of the West. It is not surprising that such a party gained official approval, as did another, the National Party (*Hizb al-Umma),* also founded in 1954. Its leaders, too, were members of large conservative families and supporters of the regime. They included Kamil 'Arikat, who later became Chairman of the Jordanian Parliament, Samir al-Rifa'i, and 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Faris from Talluza. A third organization, the Arab Constitutional Party, founded in April

1956 was also explicitly intended to present an alternative to the left-wing groups. Some of its leaders were considered, by leftist and others, socially and economically conservative and even reactionary. They included East Bankers such as Ri'ad al-Muflih and Ahmad al-Tarawna, and West Bank dignitaries like Anwar Nusaiba of Jerusalem and Tawfiq Qattan of Bethlehem, who were eventually to emerge as staunch supporters of the Hashemite regime.[9]

The third category is made up of parties which received a permit for their activities, but only with great difficulty. The most prominent of these was the Ba'th whose existence in the West Bank can be traced back to 1949, and the establishment of two separate groups in Jerusalem and Ramallah.[10] In February 1952, shortly after the promulgation of the constitution, leading members of these circles, such as Abdallah Rimawi, Abdallah Na'was, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyyah, and Munif al-Razaz requested permission to establish the Arab Renaissance Party (*Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabi).* The application was rejected on the grounds that the proposed party would be a branch of the Syrian *Ba'th* and that its aims contravened paragraph 16 of the constitution, which stated that political parties must have "a peaceful purpose and internal regulations which do not run counter to the constitution". The Ba'thists persisted and in 1953 they slightly revised the party regulations (which they were required, by law, to submit) and renewed their request for a permit. Once again their request was turned down by the authorities. They made a third attempt in 1954. They changed not only their regulations, but in view of development in the mother party in Syria, requested permission to establish a Socialist Arab Renaissance Party (*Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabi al-Ishtiraki.)* Their application, was refused for the third time, this time on the grounds that their intention was actually to overthrow the regime in Jordan. Several of the applicants were men who, in view of their legal training, were unwilling to operate without official permission. They therefore took their case to the Jordanian High Court of Appeal. On 28 August, 1955 the court ruled that the government's refusal to grant the party a permit is illegal. With the government's decision overturned, the party was

allowed to operate on the basis of the regulations and internal procedures which they previously had adopted and announced, but the Jordanian government continued to consider it illegal, and the Minister of Defence instructed the Minister of Interior, and through him the district governors and others, that the party was still illegal despite the ruling of the High Court. Its active members were arrested and brought to trial. Early 1956 saw the last phase in the Ba'th's struggle to establish itself as a legitimate party. Two members from the Bethlehem area were arrested for distributing leaflets, tried and acquitted. This marked a turning point, and from then on the Ba'th Party was considered legal by the government. Thus the Party whose requests for a permit from 1952 onward had been consistently blocked, enjoyed one year of legality, from 1956 to 1957. In 1957 the Ba'th Party was banned together with all the others.

The Liberation Party (*Ḥizb al-Taḥrir)* is another group which received a permit with great difficulty. Like the Ba'th, it too requested an official permit in 1952, shortly after the publication of the constitution, and like the Ba'th, its request was refused. The authorities charged that the party's ideology ran counter to the constitution, in two respects. First, it stressed religion as the decisive element in national life. This struck at one of the foundations of the State by dividing its residents along religious lines. Second, one of the party's basic precepts, that the type of regime should be a matter of choice, was contrary to the constitution, which declared quite specifically that Jordan was a kingdom, precluding any possibility of choice in the matter. The party was thus seen as harboring intentions to overthrow the regime, and consequently its activities were not authorized. After its request was turned down, the Liberation Party discovered that it did not in fact need to request authorization, as a party; instead it could register as an Ottoman association, as the Muslim Brothers had done. In March 1953, party leaders sent a letter to the Minister of the Interior and asked to be so registered. The request was also published in the party newspaper. From that time, although it was not authorized as a party, the Liberation Party was recognized as an association. In the elections of 1954

and of 1956 it campaigned openly, and on both occasions its representative, Ahmad al-Da'ur was elected to Parliament.

It therefore seems that a renewed and different type of party activity began in Jordan around 1950 and gained its main momentum after 1952. Many of the parties which emerged were supporters of the government. All of those included in the second category mentioned above were either established directly at the initiative of the authorities or, by virtue of their structure and the social status of their leaders, could be expected to support the regime.

The main parties were, in fact the opposition parties. Some, such as the Muslim Brothers and the Liberation Party had a right-wing, religious orientation; others, such as the Communists, *Ba'th* and Arab Nationalists displayed varying degrees of left-wing ideology. These opposition parties were not only Jordan's largest, but also possessed a comprehensive and relatively well crystalized ideology. They are the main object of this study, and it is on them that attention will be focused in the following pages.

D

The second point raised by al-Madi and Musa, that party activity was unsportsmanlike and lacking in responsibility and honor, is more substantial. The opposition parties made extreme demands on the regime and, in fact, worked against it. Their objective was to overthrow the existing authority. The right-wing parties wanted a regime with a more religious tone; the Communists and, to a certain extent, the Ba'th favored a leftist orientation; while the Arab Nationalists and the Ba'th, to a great extent, demanded a pan-Arab regime.

Yet on closer examination, it appears that neither in practice nor in theory did these parties explicitly demand or work for the overthrow of the regime or the ouster of the existing government in Jordan.

We will look at three parties with respect to their attitude toward the regime — the Ba'th, the Liberation Party, and the Communists. The Ba'th, from its beginnings in the early 1950's,

made the increased democratization of political life one of its chief demands. This meant giving greater representation to the people, granting additional rights and more weight to Parliament and decentralizing authority through the delegation of power by the central government to its representatives in the various districts. All these reforms were to be made within the general framework of the constitution and the existing polititcal structure; there was no demand for fundamental political or constitutional changes. There was room for improvement — the emergency laws should be annulled, for example — but the regime need not necessarily undergo any fundamental change, and it certainly need not be abolished. The party's major criticism of the Hashemite regime's political line stemmed from the basic goal of the Ba'th — the Arab unity. They demanded that the King sever his personal and political ties with imperialism and draw closer to the Arab world. But these demands lay well within the framework of the current political set-up, and implied no fundamental change in regime.

In the Liberation Party on the other hand, there was a definite rejection both conceptual and ideological of a separate Jordanian entity. This rejection which, by the way, extended also to the concept of a separate Palestinian entity, derived from a basic and fundamental belief that Islam as a concept as well as a system should be decisive in determining political direction in the Arab and Islamic worlds. It is held that the common ground for a political community is religion — Islam — and not one or another narrowly-based political state. But the Liberation Party was also explicitly opposed to the use of violence in achieving its goals. It preached action through cooperation with the regime, and presented many examples from Islamic history and tradition showing that the Prophet acted in this way when he spread Islam at the outset of his mission. Just as Muhammed had acted by means of persuasion, first winning over those closest to him and then ever widening circles without resorting to violence, so too should the Liberation Party achieve its goals through nonviolent action.

The Communists took the most negative attitude towards the

King. Abdallah was frequently called the "dog of the imperialists" in Communist leaflets distributed in Jordan. In the middle of 1950 the party even explicitly called for his assassination (it may be assumed that after he was, in fact, assassinated, the Communists had cause to regret this appeal, since they were not in any way involved). Talal and Hussein also came in for some sharp jabs from tine to time, but even the Communists never actually called for the overthrow of the Jordanian regime. In 1956, when Hussein adopted a policy favored by the Communists, they praised and supported him.

The Ba'th, Liberation Party and Communists all followed a policy of attacking the political line of the various Jordanian Governments and demanding its modification; but the sources at our disposal record no call for a fundamental change in the political structure of the country or the overthrow of the State. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the strict adherence of the Communists to the 1947 Partition Plan, even in the 1950's and 60's, and their continued demand for a separate Arab state in part of Palestine, as provided for in the Plan, contained an element of implied subversion. Had the Partition Plan been fully implemented — the logical if not explicit conclusion of their stand on this issue — it would perforce have impinged on the territorial integrity of the Jordanian entity. For this reason rather than any incompatability of the social outlook, the Hashemite regime opposed the Communist Party and singled it out for special persecution.

On the practical level, it is clear that these parties did not engage in any violent activities which endangered, actually or apparently, the regime in Jordan. They all followed the rules of the accepted political game — they nominated candidates for election, conducted election propaganda, and sometimes changed the name of the party (it was expedient for the Communist Party, for example, to call itself the National Front in the election campaigns of 1954 and 1956; it was perfectly clear to all that this was essentially the Communist Party). Some parties even managed to achieve considerable political success within the system, electing Members of Parliament, some of whom later

became Ministers in the Government. The nearest the parties in Jordan came to actual violence was in the staging of demonstrations, and even these were irregular and sporadic outbursts of limited duration in response to specific events. Jalal Bayar's visit in the 1950's was such an event as was the nationalization of the Suez Canal, when demonstrations were organized by the Ba'th, Communists and Arab Nationalists, and the Pope's visit in 1964, when the Liberation Party organized demonstrations. Anti-government agitation was was generally restricted to the distribution of leaflets or other publications critical of specific actions of positions, and violence was never espoused. The degree of danger to either side resulting from the sporadic outbursts of violence was thus negligible.

Nevertheless, there is reliable information to the effect that in 1957–58 the government was aware that at least three parties were planning to resort to force against the regime. There is information indicating that members and supporters of the *Qawmiyun al-'Arab* in Syria were undergoing military training with a view to returning to Jordan to sieze power. In the archives of the Jordanian Security Service there is detailed evidence given by Communist activists who admitted smuggling weapons from the Gaza Strip through Israeli territory and storing them in the Mt. Hebron area, with smaller caches in Ramallah. These weapons, smuggled during 1957–8, were to have been used to seize power by force. Finally, there were clear indications in Ba'thist circles from 1957 that the party intended to infiltrate and base its future activity on the army *("Askartariyya"* instead of *"proletariyya")*, and to prepare a military coup scheduled for a year or two later. The Ba'th Party actively sought out West Bank men and sent them to Syria for military training, with the explicit intention of using their cadres to seize power. This activity was intensified by the formation of the United Arab Republic, following which the party showed ever-increasing signs of becoming a tool of the new union which was basically interested in subverting Jordan's regime and annexing it. The actual preparations had gone quite far and constituted a very real threat to the Jordanian regime.

The authorities took quite a tolerant view of the parties, and in

the 1950's and 1960's, the Jordanian regime seemed quite prepared to play a sort of "cat-and-mouse" game with them. They followed the activities of the parties very closely, while allowing them to continue to operate. The Jordanian Security Service maintained an extensive apparatus, trailing and reporting all the activities of party members, however insignificant. Security Service informers were planted in the cells of the various parties. Intelligence penetration of the Liberation Party was especially extensive (for which the researcher can be most thankful), but quite precise reports concerning the activities of the left-wing parties are also not lacking. The Security Service had comprehensive lists of the members of all the parties and their main branches. These were periodically updated and were detailed enough to grade each member according to his importance in the party (ranking A,B, and C, from the most active to the least). From time to time the regime would inflict a small blow of one sort or another, on the parties, but generally they were allowed to operate and organize, even when enough was known about their activities to justify punishment. The Communist Party was the most striking in this respect; and even though the authorities knew that it was operating illegally, they allowed it to continue.[12] This "cat-and-mouse" struggle was most intense when it came to the secret publication of the party leaflets, papers and so forth. The regime tried to prevent their publication, or at least, as a second line of defense, their distribution to the public. The effort met with generally limited success, and foreign publications and pamphlets (mainly from Syria and Lebanon) were distributed throughout the Kingdom.

The same may be said of the sporadic party demonstrations which broke out from time to time. It is clear that the regime knew of the various activities and deliberately allowed them to continue so long as they were not threatening. When the situation was re-evaluated in mid-1957, and a new approach was adopted, the parties came under attack. But even then, after the parties had suffered a decisive blow and gone underground, the authorities saw fit to turn a blind eye to their outlawed subterranean activities. The same game of "cat-and-mouse" continued until

1967, it being clearly understood that the regime was to play the role of the former and the parties the latter, and not the reverse.

E

The third conclusion drawn from the passage cited above is broader than the previous two and pertains to the structure and composition of the parties. The first characteristic of all the parties under discussion is that all were engaged in a highly centralized form of political activity.

The Communist Party had a single national Central Committee of seven or eight members whose central core, the Politburo, was composed of three or four members. The latter was the party's *de facto* executive body, but it derived its authority from the Central Committee. Under the Central Committee, in each of the main towns were regional committees composed of five members, including the heads of the various branches and centers around that town. Under them there were sometimes local committees which united the party branches in the smaller towns and villages. The basic unit was the cell (*khaliyya)* of five members. Every such cell had a secretary, an ideologue and a treasurer — every member was delegated some responsibility. The cell was the active unit, generally holding one meeting weekly or fortnightly. At these meetings instructions were received from the Central Committee by way of the regional committees. These included plans of action and, more important, the political line concerning current events and developments. The cell held discussions and deliberations on the basis of these instructions and engaged in criticism of political and social events, mainly self-criticism (in keeping with the best Communist tradition). Reports, questions, requests for instructions, and various suggestions regarding future activity recruitment and so forth filtered upward from the cells by way of the same intermediary bodies. The money collected from each member, either as dues or as contributions also flowed upward. The General Secretary of the party during the entire period was Fu'ad Nassar who, judging by all available evidence, towered head and shoulders above the other members of the Politburo and the Central Committee. He laid down the

political line to be followed and the instructions for its implementation. He and over half the Central Committee were from the West Bank. Some, but not all, members served on the Central Committee during the entire period. At the highest level of the party there were no democratic election procedures. Membership in the Central Committee and the Politburo was determined by internal power struggles, and not as a result of elections in the lower ranks of the party.

A similar structure (using slightly different terminology) is characteristic both of the *Ba'th* and the *Qawmiyun al-'Arab*. At its apex the *Ba'th* Party also had a Central Committee, called *al-Qiyadah al-Qutriyyah* (National Leadership). Its seat was in Amman and was composed of eight members, half of them from the West Bank. Under this committee there were a number of intermediate bodies: the central branches *(far')*, which were set up only in Jerusalem and Nablus; under these the *shu'bah*, in each of the big towns: each *shu'bah* was, in turn, composed of three *firqah*; and at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy was the cell *(ḥalqah)*. Party activity was also similar to that of the Communists – the lines of communication were arranged vertically, never horizontally between branches and cells; and all instructions came from above. Here too, there were no internal elections for central institutions, and leadership passed from person to person according to the internal balance of forces. The structure of the *Qawmiyun al-'Arab* was similar in terminology, methods of communication and reporting and the imposed appointment of leadership.

In the Liberation Party an attempt was made to maintain a similar pyramid structure with the main power concentrated at the apex and the various subordinate bodies ranged below; but in this case, the structure was less clearly defined. An attempt was made to create such a structure in theory, but there were, in fact, only two units — the cell and the leadership. The intermediate levels existed only on paper, except for regional committees in Nablus and Jerusalem. The leadership body, called the Secretaries Committee *(Lajnat al-Umma)*, was apparently situated in Amman. The main link was from the center directly to

the cells *(ḥalqah)*, which were essentially small units for the study of Taki al-Din al-Nabhani's thoughts and the party ideology. Since the party felt that this structure was not rigid enough to guarantee an acceptable degree of central control, a "roving inspector" was appointed whose task it was to supervise the activities of the various branches. This practice, while it may well have resulted in greater central control, was highly detrimental to party secrecy.

Another distinctive characteristic of these parties is that they draw their main support and membership from the educated middle class, with farmers and urban workers playing a decidedly secondary role. The parties did not center around the traditional leading families although members of such families, selected on their merits, were sometimes found in party ranks in Nablus and other places. Similarly, property played little part in determining success or influence in the party hierarchy, although there were cases of large property owners reaching the highest ranks of leadership, even in the Communist Party. Generally, however, the party leadership and the decisive majority of members came from the educated urban elite and owned little or no property.

Teachers and students comprised the most active element of the urban elite within all three parties and much party action was based on this circumstance, with its obvious advantages. The high school students constituted a very high percentage of the total population and were the main reservoir from which the parties could draw in their efforts to create a mass base. These students had a greater political awareness and youthful susceptibility to political agitation and incitement which made them an important object of interest. Moreover, since many educated Jordanians emigrated to other Arab countries, they became the means for spreading party doctrine and ideas throughout the neighboring states. Inside Jordan itself the practice of transferring teachers from place to place every few years, coupled with their natural influence on their pupils, made them the ideal vehicle for the propagation of party ideology. Furthermore, as urban intellectual, teachers tended to have a strong desire to change the regime. In the Ba'th, for example, statistics show that they

constituted more than a quarter of the total membership, a very high percentage indeed. This party, which also attempted to establish student organizations, based much of its activity on schools such as the Teacher's Seminary in Bayt Hanina, from 1956 to 1960, and the al-Ibrahimiyyah High School in Jerusalem.

A similar situation existed in the Communist Party, which set up special student organizations in Jerusalem and Ramallah.[13] The Party tried to activate the leftist sympathies of teachers and students by drawing them into party activities through the allocation of specific tasks — teachers served as coordinators of the student networks, while the students themselves regularly distributed leaflets. *Al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* also put a strong emphasis on organizing students, and attempted to set up various student bodies throughout the West Bank. Teachers were used as coordinators of student cells. One of their centers of power was *Kuliyyat al-Najaḥ* in Nablus, a hot house of political activism in which *al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* was especially successful. One of the spiritual leaders of the party in the West Bank, Muḥammed al-'Amad (the present director of the school), served as a teacher there and exerted a great influence on his students. The Liberation Party also laid great stress on the role of teachers and students in its various activities. A significant proportion of its activists were teachers of religion. Not only had Taki al-Din al-Nabhani been an instructor at the al-Ibrahimiyyah school in Jerusalem in 1952, but the party also had many supporters at the *al-Salaḥiyyah* and *al-Khalidiyyah* schools in Nablus and Tulkarm High School (1953–54). Because of the great attention given to imparting the party's "basic concepts" *(mafahim)* to its members, teachers were employed in a coordinating and guidance capacity in their study circles; and from 1957 onward there were even explicit instructions from the leadership to establish study circles of students outside the schools and, as far as possible, to place teachers in charge of them.

The great interest shown by all the parties in the student and teacher sector was derived from the place of education in their scale of priorities. This also accounted for the minimal attention they paid the villagers and workers, a phenomenon which was not

the accidental result of their general perspective. In the 1940's the Communist Party, in its previous form as the League of National Liberation, had been largely based on workers. In the early 1950's the Party decided not to base itself on the urban proletariat, but rather, to turn mainly to the education circles. This decision was taken following a power struggle between Fu'ad Naṣṣar and Riḍwan al-Ḥilu. Naṣṣar's view was accepted, namely that the party's chances of success and expansion in Jordan, and especially in the West Bank, would be far greater if efforts were directed towards the educated elite rather than the urban proletariat.[14] Still, the workers were not entirely neglected and throughout there were some cells, like those of the Ramallah metal workers in the 1950's, in which the majority of members were workers. There was even less interest in the *fellahin.* It is therefore not surprising that the leadership and membership of the party was for the most part made up of village magnates such as Rushdi Shahin or 'Abd al-Qadir al-Saliḥ and a large number of mainly white collar workers and professionals, many of whom were doctors (Dr. Abu Khajlah, Dr. Ya'qub Zayyadin). Much the same is true of the Ba'th Party, although there was not the type of reasoned argument encountered in the case of the Communist Party. In addition to the high percentage of teachers among the party members, the large number of lawyers and, to a lesser extent, doctors among the founders of the party and first rank activists is striking. On the other hand, worker representation in the Ba'th was very limited, a prominent example such as Ḥusni al-Khuffash (Secretary of the Trade Union Federation in Nablus) or Sadiq Sunukruṭ (Secretary of the Cobbler's Union in Hebron) are exceptions. The statistics at our disposal show that the percentage of refugees among the members was low (less than 15%) and that the status of urbanites in the party was much the same as that of rural dwellers. But from personal interviews as well as from the first hand impressions of different local leaders, it seems that the urban dwellers were, in fact, more prominent and that there was greater party interest in this sector of the population. While *al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* gave the outward impression of having an educated leadership including several

prominent doctors such as Dr. Subḥi Ghusha of Jerusalem, Dr. Salaḥ al-'Anabtawi and Dr. Walid Kamhawi of Nablus, behind this facade, the party was far more variegated than the others, and among its members were many drivers, craftsmen, and laborers. The Liberation Party also had relatively fewer educated members, and particularly prominent among them were the religiously educated and religious functionaries. Large and small scale merchants also had a larger representation than in other parties. Although it, too, was most active in the cities, the Liberation Party, unlike the Communists, decided to make a systematic and concentrated appeal to the village and uneducated sectors. By 1953 it was decided to establish a broad popular base by appealing to villagers, and many village representatives were in fact invited to Tulkarm or Jerusalem for guidance and direction. In the cities themselves , several attempts were made to establish special cells and study groups for the uneducated which would be led by students. However, these plans were never fully realized, and despite its penetration of the villages, the party continued to receive its main support in the urban centers. The Muslim Brothers too, had a noteworthy number of uneducated urban members, especially in Hebron, Nablus and Jerusalem.

The increased politicization of public life in Jordan in general, and of the Arab Legion in particular, especially the integration of the mostly Palestinian National Guard into the army in 1956, facilitated the penetration of oppositionist ideas into this sensitive sector. The political parties had long displayed an interest in the offices of the Legion as possible sympathizers (there is clear evidence of this in the case of the Ba'th and Liberation Parties, and some indication in the case of certain other parties), and exploited the opportunity to step up their efforts among them. But they met with only limited success, and although the legion was to some degree affected by party factionalism, its degree was minimized by the vigilance of Security Service and the preventive measures taken by the regime.[15]

From the material at our disposal it appears that all parties were predominantly Muslim. This is true not only of those parties

which were Muslim by definition (the Muslim Brothers and the Liberation Party), but of all the others as well. While Christians such as Fu'ad Naṣṣar were prominent among the leadership of certain parties, particularly the Communists and Ba'th, this was of very little significance and neither party members nor their opponents called attention to it. We can now draw the following conclusions with respect to the extent and scope of the parties: firstly, they enjoyed quite considerable popularity in the large towns of the West Bank as well as in many of the smaller towns and villages, each party having its own traditional centers of activity and success. Secondly, their membership was quite small; there was usually a hard core of card-carrying members and a long line of supporters and sympathizers among the general public. Finally, although the parties operated on both banks of the Jordan, and most of them even had their headquarters in Amman, the West Bank formed the territorial center of their political activity and its residents their mainstay (both quantitatively and qualitatively) on either side of the river.

The Liberation Party was most successful in the northern and north-western towns of the West Bank – in the Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jenin area, where they had their greatest successes in the parliamentary elections. In the south, the main centers of activity were Jerusalem and Hebron. As we have already mentioned, while it was most active in the towns, the party also made many substantial gains in surrounding villages and refugee camps. As a religious party with a conservative outlook, it drew its main strength from the traditional centers (Hebron, Tulkarm and Qalqilya) where the social structure was less affected by modern developments. The Muslim Brothers also concentrated their main activities in the larger towns of Hebron, Nablus, Jerusalem and its vicinity, Tulkarm and Jericho and its neighboring villages. The Ba'th Party was most successful in the Ramallah-Jerusalem area throughout most of the period, although in the mid-1950's it also made substantial gains in Nablus, where its membership came to equal or perhaps even to exceed that in the Ramallah-Jerusalem area. Still, even then, its outstanding personalities and leaders, and later its parliamentary representatives, were from the latter

area. Although branches were set up in all the major West Bank towns, there were far fewer in the area south of Jerusalem and the Ba'th was weakest in Hebron. West Bankers were predominant in the party leadership, constituting fully two-thirds of those elected at its first official convention in 1955. The Communist Party developed in the opposite direction. It gained its first major success in the Nablus area, and only later did it manage to gain a foothold in and around Ramallah. In the more traditional areas, where the old social structure was better preserved (such as Jenin, and even more so, Hebron), the party began its activities much later (in Hebron, for example, these only started in 1953), and its gains were far smaller. In the final analysis, the Communist Party too operated in all the major and many of the minor towns and villages of the West Bank. *Al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* centered its activities and had its greatest success in the two main urban centers of the West Bank, Nablus and Jerusalem. During the 1950's, however, its activities extended to the Tulkarm and Ramallah areas as well.

Jordanian press reports in 1955–57 and the reminiscenses of local residents tend to give the impression that there were several large and powerful parties active during that period. A careful reading of the Jordanian Security Service files, supplemented by interviews with leading party figures of the time, would seem to contradict this. The lists drawn up by the Jordanian Security Service make meticulous mention of everything pertaining to party members, and even in doubtful cases where the person concerned might have ceased his party activities years before, the tendency is to continue to view him as an active member. Nevertheless, even during the peak period of party activity in 1956-57, it appears that the membership of the Communist Party in the West Bank never exceeded 1,000[16], and never even reached that number in the East Bank. The most generous estimate of membership in the Ba'th Party does not exceed 700, about the same as in the case of the Muslim Brothers. Membership in the Liberation Party was placed at somewhat less than this, while the *Qawmiyun al-'Arab* was believed to have had no more than a few hundred members. The distinction between party activists and

mere party members is arbitrary and is made almost impossible by the tendency of the written sources to rank every member as an activist to some degree or another. Nevertheless, it is possible that these estimates may have been inflated by the existence of relatively new cells, inactive members, and certain, probably very few, cases where the security service may not have known all the facts. Since the Communist Party had a clearly defined and rigid structure, and members were accepted only after a certain period of candidacy, one may assume that the figure of 800–1000 in the West Bank accurately reflects the size of the party at its peak. On the other hand, the Ba'th Party, which was more lenient in accepting members and defining its supporters, may have been larger, though less stable. As for the Muslim parties, the above figures should be taken as the upper limit, as their less rigid structure enabled them to include in their ranks people who would be better described as supporters than as *bona fide* members. One of the reasons that the parties often seemed larger than they actually were was the high percentage of high school students among their supporters. They were not usually considered to be members, but wherever the parties took to the streets in demonstrations, the students played a major role. An interesting feature of the political history of the West Bank is that when these students matured and reached the age of party membership they tended, in most cases, to grow away from the parties; and as a result the parties did not grow in size as one might have expected, but remained relatively small. The parties in Jordan were based on cadres, and none of them was ever a mass organization. This was a major source of their weakness *vis-a-vis* the regime, and the main reason why they were tolerated to such an unusual degree. The parties' influence on the general public stemmed from two main factors. The first was their indentification with various political developments in the region. As one or another trend became popular, the influence of the party identified with it rose accordingly. This was the case, for example, with *al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* party, which rose considerably in importance during the Nasserist hayday of the 1950's. The second factor was the efficiency of party organization — the degree to which it was able

to bring its message to a broad audience; to assert influence and public pressure greater than its numerical strength; and to withstand the periodic crises caused by the regime's attacks on the parties. In both these areas the left-wing groups had a clear advantage over the Muslim Brothers and the Liberation Party. The rise of Nasserist pan-Arabism, the growing appeal of Socialism, and the Soviet Union's friendship with some of the Arab countries all served to enhance the left wing's strength far beyond that normally registered in the files of the Jordanian Security Service. Moreover, in times of stress, particularly when they were being run to ground by the authorities, it was rigid and ordered organization which enabled the various parties to survive the crises intact. The Communist Party, which had perhaps fewer supporters than the Ba'th or *al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* during certain period, was the best equipped in this respect, and therefore proved to be the most resilient throughout the political vicissitudes of the decade 1957-67.

F

The most spectacular party activities in Jordan, particularly in the West Bank, were those which brought about a collision with the Government — mass demonstrations, arrests and political trials. But in retrospect, during the fifteen years during which Jordan ruled the West Bank after its annexation, the most prominent and sustained party activity was in the field of propaganda. Actual indoctrination was restricted to party members, the natural object for such activity; but propaganda efforts were aimed a much broader audience, and calculated to win new supporters and bring the party message to the masses. Internal ideological guidance and indoctrination were common in the left-wing parties, which distributed leaflets to their members and held meetings to discuss and sometimes even to criticize the party line (the principle of criticism and self-criticism was especially honored in the Communist Party, but the Ba'th and *al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* employed it as well). The principle of ideological guidance was a basic tenet of the Muslim Brothewrs and was applied in the West Bank where cell meetings were called

"religious lessons, (*dars dini*)". Ideological guidance was even more emphatically practiced in the Liberation Party.

A steady stream of publications demonstrated all the parties' constant awareness of the major political developments of the period, and a wide range of non-political topics as well. During the 1950's, although Pan-Arab problems facing Jordan still took first place. This was coupled with a rather limited interest in socio-economic problems. The religious parties were primarily concerned with political matters and so too, were the left-wing groups, despite their protestations of concern. The constitution of the *Ba'th* Party contains many references to socio-economic problems, but they were given very little attention in the party's regular publications or in the many speeches of Ba'th leaders which have been preserved. Even the Communist Party which, as the First of May approached would annually raise the banner of "Bread and Work" in the West Bank, did not devote more than 10% to 15% of the space in its various leaflets, papers, and publications to socio-economic matters.

"Imperialism", and Israel in particular, occupy a much more important place in the propaganda of these parties and in their general outlook. The *Ba'th* saw the establishment of the State of Israel as the first stage in an imperialist plot to strike at the Arab nation. Therefore, the fight against Zionism, the destruction of the State of Israel, and the return of the usurped lands are all seen as different aspects of a single goal no less important than those of the party slogan – "Unity, Freedom and Socialism". This was not always the basic outlook of the *Ba'th* Party. In 1950 Abdallah Na'was still foresaw a moderate solution to the problem. He believed that the mistaken notion of a Jewish State would become universally clear within ten years and that the State of Israel would then disintegrate, and its Jews abandon their intention and blend into the social fabric of the Middle East. However, when it became obvious that this prediction would not be realized, the State of Israel began to appear as "the historic challenge to the entire Arab nation" which, having once failed, would continue to struggle, more successfully, for the final destruction of the Jewish State. Israel's Jewish population would continue to reside in the

successor state which would form part of the greater Arab nation. *Al-Qawmiyun al-'Arab* saw the 1948 war as a turning point in history, and held that the entire Arab nation must work to avenge the humiliation which it had brought down on itself. Responsibility for the defeat belonged not only to imperialism and the UN, and the military superiority of the enemy, but the internal weakness of the Arabs themselves, which was revealed in all its acuteness. The Arab nation had to reform itself and take revenge; it was not to be satisfied with compromise solutions but had to uproot the Jewish entity entirely. "No peace, No negotiations, No partition, No compromise" was the basic stand taken by the party in the 1950's. It was only in the late 1950's and early 1960's that the idea of Arab unity became central to its ideology. In this context, too, the party did not modify its attitude to the Jewish State or the Jewish Nation who foresaw its assimilation into the socio-political processes overtaking the Arab world. Thus, the main pillar and *raison d'être* of the State of Israel would cease to exist. The Muslim Brothers, like the Ba'th, held imperialism responsible for the estagblishment, the continued existence, and the success of the State of Israel. They conceded that the Jewish people also played an important part, but held the most decisive reason for Israel's success was the weakness of the Arab world, and this, in turn, was derived from the neglect of Islam. The final and complete solution to the problem would be achieved only when the states of the region returned to tradition. Meanwhile the Brothers claimed that holy war (*Jihad)* was a proven way to advance to the final solution even before the Arab world had fully accomplished its religious revival. The Liberation Party saw the establishment of the State of Israel as the result of collusion between imperialism and certain traitorous Arab rulers. It rejected out of hand attempts to solve the problem by internationalizing Jerusalem or by creating a separate Palestinian entity; the former would result in the total removal of the Muslim-Arab presence in Jerusalem, while the latter would perpetuate the State of Israel. The ultimate solution was seen as the establishment of an Islamic State which would, at the appropriate time, take its revenge on imperialism. But the

State of Israel was to be dealt with more immediately, by much swifter and more radical means — the *Jihad*. The Party advocated war to the death against the Jews in Israel, and various religious authorizations were cited.[17] ["There will be war between you and the Jew until the stone says: Oh Muslim, there is a Jew behind me. Arise and kill him."] The position of the Communist Party was the most moderate of all, even though it too underwent a certain process of radicalization. The Communists also saw the 1948 war as a plot of imperialism, international oil interest and the Arab League. But the victim of aggression was Israel and the partition plan, which they viewed favorably. The Arab armies that invaded Palestine were seen as "armies of conquest", challenging Israel's right to political existence inside the partition borders. Israel, of course, also came in for criticism, but it was directed against its reactionary ruling circles and not against the entire nation; nor was the fact of its existence disputed. In the mid-1950's the Communist position began to shift. Greater attention was paid to general Arab problems, references to Israeli aggression increased and the Arab aggression was forgotten. Nevertheless, there was no direct call for the destruction of the State of Israel and the Party continued to view both nations — Jewish and Arab — in a positive light.

The high percentage of Palestinians in the various parties, and their naturally acute awareness of the Palestine problem gave it an essential and decisive place in the ideologies and statements of the parties. The more right-wing the party, the more extreme its stand on the roots of the conflict and the means of its solution. With the passing years, despite the receding historical distance of the 1948 trauma, the positions of all the parties became more and more extreme. The different shades of opinion which had at first been distinguishable now began to disappear, giving way to a more or less uniform negativism.

G

Within the Jordanian regime and its supporters, the opposition parties were not merely small groups of men sharing common political views and interests, but organized bodies which, despite

a relatively small active membership, had ties to certain sectors of the general public. These parties, whose views extended right across the political spectrum, were not based on traditional leaders, but on the educated elite and on members of the free professions. They were most active in the towns, but they made many attempts to extend their influence to the village areas as well, where even those parties free of any ties to the traditional elite, such as the communists and the Ba'th, relied almost totally on the old rural leadership — the *mukhtars*. This, together with the very limited attention these parties gave to economic and social problems in their publications, and their minimal dependence on the working class, leads to the conclusion that they were far less left-wing in the accepted sense than might generally have been supposed. Like their right-wing counterparts they were primarily political parties in the narrow sense of the term — their main concern was with political events and developments in the region and in Jordan itself.

The parties under examination were all relatively young Jordanian branches of their mother parties in other Arab countries, with which they had strong financial ties, often dictated by insufficient independent resources. Organizationally and ideologically, the Liberation Party and the Ba'th, and to a lesser extent the Communist Party were closely linked with the mother parties in other states. But fundamentally these were all local parties with a local leadership and a primary interest in local problems; and because of difficulties in communicating with other branches, based mostly in Lebanon and Syria, they became more and more independent.

The parties enjoyed considerable popularity among the more educated sectors of the general public, particularly students. Consequently, they served as a useful indicator of political inclinations and trends, and as an accurate barometer of public opinion. The authorities appear to have appreciated this, and in view of the limited danger which they posed to the regime they were, considering their illegality, allowed to operate with considerable freedom. Nevertheless there were crackdowns during the periods of crisis, during which many party members

were jailed, and their activities greatly curtailed. Despite these sporadic outbursts, the parties did not cease to function. They reorganized themselves whenever the regime struck at their leaders, a fact which bears witness to their considerable vigor and vitality.

All the above parties operated on both banks of the Jordan and most of them had their headquarters in Amman. Nevertheless the majority of their leaders and members throughout Jordan, and generally the most prominent, were from the West Bank. It is hardly surprising, then, that most of their parliamentary representatives were West Bankers. Their numerical strength (and perhaps even the resultant emphasis on the Palestinian Problem) make it possible to view the parties as primarily belonging to the West Bank. As free voluntary organizations they served as a legitimate, or at any rate safely tolerable, outlet for the Palestinians' feelings of frustration, desire for social change, and search for a solution to their predicament. As such, they may be seen as an accurate indicator of the high degree of political awareness in the West Bank and the political traditions of the area. Paradoxically, they can also be seen as an expression of the West Bankers' growing acquiesence to the political framework and concept of the Jordanian State which had been forced upon them. These parties did not have their roots in traditional Trans-jordanian politics, but rather in the growing political awareness of the Palestinians under the British Mandate. Their subsequent growth, largely dictated by the political realities of the Hashemite era, indicated an increasing degree of identification with major trends in the Arab world.

NOTES

1. Bulletin dated January 13, 1957 signed by the general director of the investigations department of general security in: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Division, *The West Bank: Ferment, resistance, suppression*, (Jerusalem n.d.) p. 25.

2. Munib al-Madi and Sulayman Musa, *Tarikh al-Urdun fi al-Qarn al-'Ishrin*, (Amman, 1959), p. 664.

3. Y. Shimoni, *The Arabs of Eretz Yisrael* (in Hebrew) (Tel Aviv, 1947), pp. 289–295; Y. Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian National Movement, 1918–1929* (Jerusalem, 1971) (in Hebrew) pp. 174, 180–184, 201–209.

4. On parties active in Jordan prior to 1948 see: A. Abidi, *Jordan a Political Study 1948-1957* (London, 1965) pp. 191-199.

5. On the early stages in the development of this party see: Y. Porath, "Revolution and Terrorism and the Palestinian Communist Party (P.K.P.) 1929-1939" *The New East* (in Hebrew) Volume 18 (1968) pp. 255-267, and Y. Porath, "The League for National Liberation – its establishment, essence and collapse (1943-1948)" Volume 14 (1964), pp. 354-366.

6. Vatikiotis' contention (P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan* (London, 1967, p. 110) that the appearance of the parties was the result of young King Hussein's liberal policies from mid-1953 should be corrected. In fact, the publication of the constitution should be noted as their starting point, later to be taken up by King Hussein as one aspect of his policy.

7. For a detailed description see: A. Cohen, "The Jordanian Communist Party in the West Bank" in M. Confino and S. Shamir, Eds. *The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East* (Jerusalem, 1973), pp. 419–437.

8. Abidi, *op. cit.* pp. 203–204.

9. Al-Maḍi and Musa, *op. cit.* pp. 597–603.

10. Abidi, *op. cit.*

11. A. Cohen, Jordanian Communist Party, p. 422.

12. Abidi, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–207; al-Maḍi and Musa *op. cit.*, p. 664.

13. In 1952 in Amman communist cells were uncovered even in a girls' school. (W.Z.L., "Communism in Jordan" in *The World Today*, vol. 12, no. 3 (1956), p. 114.)

14. Abidi's contention *op. cit.*, p. 202, that the Communist Party relied mainly on the proletariat should therefore be corrected. This like several other generalizations (for example, the contention on page 205 that the party adopted a method of struggle for power as opposed to persuasion in distinction to all other parties) should be revised in view of the newly acquired evidence.

15. Vatikiotis, pp. 110, 119.

16. See a lower estimate in M. S. Agwani, *Communism in the Arab East* (Bombay, 1969), p. 155.

17. "God's verdict with regard to the acceptance of compensation and the return [to Palestine] under Jewish Rule", an undated pamphlet, *ca.* 1959.

THE PALESTINIANS IN THE FIFTIES AND THEIR AWAKENING AS REFLECTED IN THEIR LITERATURE

YEHOSHAFAT HARKABI

It is generally accepted that until 1948 the Arab-Israeli dispute was principally a *civil strife* between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, though both sides were supported by related ethnic groups: the Jewish communities over the world and the Arab states.

The intervention of the Arab armies in the War in May 1948, and the establishment of the State of Israel, transformed this dispute into an *ingernagional conflict* between states — Israel and the Arab states. As a result the Palestinians were relegated to a secondary position. Indeed, this process had begun before the war, and had been paralleled by the rise of the importance of the role of the Arab states in the conflict. Thus from the establishment of the ephemeral "Government of All Palestine" in Gaza in October 1948 until the founding of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, the voice of Palestinians as an organized political group was muted.

Since the late 1950s, however, a call rose to organize and emphasize the "Palestinian entity" and the Palestinians should become an active element in the dispute. This effort found expression in the establishment of the fedayeen groups and the "Palestine Liberation Organization", epitomizing the "Palestinian awakening." Some questions arise: What happened after 1949 to the groups into which Palestinian society disintegrated and how did they develop socially and politically? How did their

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mood change with the passing years of unfulfilled hopes and expectations? Finally, how did the Palestinians become again a political factor in the conflict?

Research seeking to answer the above questions faces a basic methodological problem. One may attempt to interview those who participated in these events and base his findings on their testimonies. Yet the passing of years, however, makes it increasingly difficult to draw an authentic picture based on recollections from earlier days. Projecting today's findings back twenty years is apt to warp the picture. Recollections, even when spontaneous, are selective; all the more so when they are conjured up from the past, as answers to a foreign researcher. The traumatic effect of the Six-Day War may further tinge earlier memories, making them an undependable source of evidence.

Another way to explore these questions is to survey the Palestinians' own literature, especially their political writings and, to the extent possible, those which preceded the Six-Day War. While such material does not constitute definitive evidence and requires critical examination, at least it is valuable and has the merit of being suggestive. Thus such material even if showing tendentiousness may provide some insights.

Dependence upon written material of necessity limits the picture that emerges; it cannot provide an exhaustive description of the changes in Palestinian society. At most this method of investigation can direct attention to a number of trends in the Palestinian's condition and awakening. But this will suffice for our present purpose.

THE TRAUMA OF DISPERSION

The transition of a society living on its own land to refugee status is bound to be a profound shock. This shock was compounded, according to the description of Anīs Al-Qāsim, by the unfavorable reception accorded the Palestinians by other Arab societies. The attitude of neighboring Arab states ranged from cold to hostile and there was little effort to assist the

refugees. Although it is difficult to estimate the importance of this factor, its mention by Qāsim is significant.

In his book *Min al-Tīh 'lla al-Quds* (From the wilderness to Jersualem) Qāsim declared, "The Palestinians suffered their first blow as immigrants from their Arab brethren." Comparing the hospitable treatment Palestinians accorded to Arab immigrants to their land in earlier times with their own reception as refugees in other Arab countries, he says: "In Palestine there were whole villages inhabited solely by brethren who had migrated to Palestine. In the cities there were whole neighborhoods where our immigrant brethren lived. For example, those from the Maghreb, and there were markets whose merchants were all non-Palestinian Arabs. These Arab brethren obtained government jobs, in spite of the fact that there were Palestinians of equal or superior skill. Despite this, the Palestinians did not grumble, nor did they displace their bretheren, nor harm nor hate them, nor did they chide their lack of patriotism [i.e. for leaving their own land]."[1]

There was no public movement to provide welfare services to the refugees. The Arab League's assistance, Qāsim notes, was insignificant. Though in August of 1948 the League established a Welfare Council; by 30 October 1948, it had allocated 300,000 Egyptian pounds for relief purposes — one half pound to each refugee over a period of three months.

One may perhaps theorize that in societies where poverty and suffering were commonplace, people were hardly affected by witnessing the refugees' sufferings. This apathy was augmented by the lack of state welfare services such as exist in modern states and, perhaps, by a socio-cultural factor i.e., mutual assistance was generally confined to the family unit.[2]

Al Qāsim continues: "What the Palestinians found in the Arab states was not at all what they expected from their brethren, and this was a cruel disappointment. Not one home afforded shelter to one refugee family. Only a few small and weak women's organizations made their appearance but their resources and ability to help were limited."

Instead of receiving assistance from their kinsmen, the refugees were greeted with hostility. Al-Qāsim wrote: "The refugees encountered great difficulties and met with callousness from their own brothers in the Arab States. They were accused of taking the Arab's bread and in a number of instances antagonism, intrigues and attacks grew to the extent that one Arab journalist wrote in wonder: 'How can a Palestinian own a car when in his city he has not eaten an egg'?"

In an earlier passage he states: "The refugees encountered an endless stream of accusations. They became scapegoats. They were accused of betraying and selling out their homeland, spying against the Arab armies, selling out the Arab officers, setting ambushes to them, surrendering their cities and towns, while the betraying Arab governments and the plotting Arab leaders were described as fulfilling their obligations. For the most part, the Arab press did not appreciate its national responsibility during this difficult period, and did not miss an opportunity to slander the Palestinians. If one Palestinian stole, all Palestinians became thieves and robbers."

The Palestinians were expected to be at the bottom of society. The calamity that befell them collectively, was transformed to contempt and scorn towards them as individuals. Al-Qāsim commented on this situation: "These brethren, God forgive them, see the alien steal and profit to what is worse, they see the Jew purchase land and buildings, and take control of companies and commerce, and say nothing of this but rather cooperate with him, while it annoys them to see a Palestinian who comes to earn a living by his own effort and knowledge."[3]

THE GUILT OF FLIGHT

The questions of the Palestinians' guilt in leaving the country and the degree to which they were responsible for their own fate created a controversy which agitated and affected their collective mood. There was a tendency to place the blame for their fleeing Palestine on Jewish terrorism and expulsion. Some Arabs, however, attributed it to the disintegration of Palestinian

society caused by the abandonment of its leaders in the first days of the war. Walid Al-Qamhāwi, in his opus, *The Catastrophe and the Construction*, wrote: "Four months passed [since the Partition Resolution]... and, in the meanwhile, most of the families of the wealthy and the leadership left Palestine to seek safety in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, while placing the brunt of the stuggle and sacrifice on the workers, the peasants and the middle-class...and so, the third month in 1948 has not yet passed and the Palestinian Arab society was like a feather in the wind, expecting salvation from everyone but from themselves... . These factors, group fear, moral disintegration and chaos in every realm, were what banished the Arabs from Tiberias, Haifa, Jaffa and tens of other cities and towns."[4]

From a psychological point of view, one might expect self-indictment for running away to result in the Palestinians' greater resignation to their fate and situation as refugees. But it is likely that there was little tendency among the Palestinians to accept the onus of self-guilt, and that rather psychological drives motivated a tendency to "self-victimization", considering themselves victims of circumstances and to blame others for their fate: Jews, Arab countries and the Palestinian leadership.

Anīs Al-Qāsim charges the Arab countries with the largest share of the blame for the creation of the Palestinian problem. "How did it it not occur to the Palestinian and Arab leadership that it was necessary to oppose the Palestinians' leaving their land, since leaving in itself would realize the Zionist goals of emptying Palestine in order to settle Jews? Why did no one seek to halt the imminent flood? Why were there attractive promises of the [Palestinians'] imminent return when the circumstances in the Arab world did not support this?"[5]

The rumor apparently spread among the Palestinians that in their flight they make room for the Arab armies, and fulfill a patriotic act that would soon be rewarded by victory and return. The argument put forth by Arab spokesmen such as Prof. Walīd Al-Khālidī that no Arab broadcasts calling for flight were monitored, is not convincing. It may be that there were no such broadcasts, however the evidence shows that the Palestinians

acted according to such a belief. A publication by Al-Fatah, an organization whose Palestinian patriotism is not suspect, bear this out. In the Al-Fatah pamphlet *The Relationship Between the Palestinian Revolution and the Arab and World Revolutions,* published in their *Revolutionary Studies and Experiments Series* one finds: "Our people was expelled from Palestine on May 15, 1948, as it was promised that the seven Arab armies would liberate the homeland for it."[6]

Lutf Ghantūs, whose articles will be discussed more fully below, describes the development of the Palestinian flight and divides it into the following stages: "The first stage was simultaneous with the military operations in Palestine and initially was of an internal, *individualistic* character *(fardīyya,* emphasis added). It accompanied the development of skirmishes between the Arabs and the Jews. The first group of emigrants began to leave in February and [their migration] lasted until April, 1948. There was an internal migration of sixty thousand emigrants from the Galilean villages. With the entry of the Arab armies on May 15, 1948 emigration increased at a frightening rate, and by October, 1948 it reached eighty thousand."[7]

SOCIAL CHANGES WITHIN THE REFUGEE SOCIETY

Analyses of the social changes that took place among the Palestinians as a result of the 1948 War have been rare. One such attempt, though tendentious and showing its Marxist approach, was made by Lutf Ghantūs in his articles: "The Influence of Class Composition on the Palestinian Problem," which were published in the November and December 1965 issues of *Dirāsāt Arabīyya.* Ghantūs deals with the Palestinian society on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Because of post-war social disintegration and population dispersion it had become, he explains, very heterogeneous. Families and villages had been broken up and the regrouped families in the camps were often not complete. Splinters of families and villages which found themselves within the same camp, could not constitute cohesive societies as their only social links were their common grie-

vances. Al-Qāsim corrobates this analysis: "The Palestinian society ceased to exist as such. It lost the social links and cohesion that had been created by many generations of belonging to the land, the village, the city and the family."[8]

Ghantūs describes the effect of the catastrophe on the socialization of the younger generation. The father's role changed and his status and authority were impaired, as he was replaced as the bread-winner by an impersonal welfare agency. The children's dependence on their father decreased, and this limited his ability to impose his authority and educate them. According to Ghantūs's analysis, this weakened the adult generation's ability to pass on its values to the children, and led to a disintegration of the family. The role of the nuclear family underwent a reverse process of change. Because the social frameworks of the village and the extended family were shattered, the smaller, nuclear family became the basic focus of identity.

The main thrust of Ghantūs's article is directed to the class problem and its influence on the national struggle. He notes that "The Catastrophe" did not blur class distinctions. Middle-class Palestinians had been able to save some possessions, and they found openings on the job market and adjusted more easily. The Palestinian merchant class had become wealthy because of the technical experience they had acquired, while competing with the Zionists during the Mandate period. In contrast, the majority of the common people had trouble in finding employment because the Arab societies into which they moved did not require unskilled labor. Thus, despite the common fate of the Palestinian refugees, class distinctions become even more prominent in their society.[9]

Ghantūs points out that the primary means of vertical mobility in the refugee society was education. Schooling was the only key to get out of the camps, and many of the younger generation were determined to take advantage of the educational amenities placed at their disposal, in the creation of a relatively large class of educated and vocationally trained refugee youth.

Al-Qāsim also notes the enthusiasm for study: "The Palestinians swarmed to studies in a way that the Arab nation had never seen. Their children were often outstanding in schools and universities, and the number of their graduates was disproportionate to their numbers and without precedent in the Arab world. After the castastrophe the Palestinians understood that there is no possession like knowledge, something that no one could ever take away. They sacrificed much to attain it, even in their situation as refugees. Parents who often accepted hardships and resigned themselves to living in tents, spent their earnings on their children in schools and colleges.[10] A corollary result was the strengthening of family ties, for young people needed family support if they were to study and progress.

Ghantūs also dwells on the psychological characteristics created by life in the refugee camps. Extended unemployment resulted in the atrophy of ability, the growth of passivity and fatalism and the tendency to "lose self-assurance and develop a sense of dependence (Sifāt ittikalīyya)".[11] Widespread unemployment also awakened feelings of vengeance and hate. Thus a combination of opposing characteristics emerged of passivity and strong hatred.

THE SENSE OF ALIENATION

An important factor in sustaining the Palestinians' identity, their attachment to the land and their hope to return to it, was their protest against the degradation of their situation as refugees. The refugees felt themselves aliens in the Arab societies in which they resided.

Tibāwī reports that the motif of being alien recurs frequently in the refugees' literature.[12] It is worth noting that the emphasis on alienation appears in spite of Arab nationalism, and the common bonds it creates.

Ghasān Kanafānī, described in his novels the callous treatment that the refugees suffered at the hands of their fellow Arabs.

The very status of being a refugee was in itself humiliating. In Arab society the ownership of land is a source of social status.

Thus the refugees, without land of their own, lacked a foundation, a social position and roots. Consumed by a sense of emptiness and rootlessness of the middle-class refugee, the problem of social acceptance became the basic concern of the refugee overshadowing even his economic difficulties.

Anīs Al-Qāsim comments on this point: "The Palestinian was lost not because he migrated, since not all immigrants are lost, but because he had lost his homeland, and because he could not, even had he wished, completely belong to the place where he was. The Palestinian was lost because no matter where he was, he could not escape his subconscious alienation, although the intensity of this alienation varied."[13]

The Palestinian refugees' mood is characterized by Amīrah Habībī in her study, *Al-Nuzūh Al-Thāni*: "The Palestinian did not at all forget the symbol of degradation that accompanied him from the period of 1948, nor did he forget the confiscation of his possessions by the Israelis who expelled him from his land and his home. He therefore dreamed of the day when he would regain his land and so retrieve his honor, as a man with the right to be the master of what he possesses, to defend himself and to enjoy justice. For twenty years he has been promised that his honor will be safeguarded, but this promise was not realized, and meanwhile he has had to live miserably and in poverty and, more important, with his degradation."[14]

The degradation inherent in being a refugee was further intensified within the Arab societies which have been characterized as "Shame Societies."[15] This situation was described by Nigūla Al-dur: "For a long time the Palestinian has become chided for his weakness, his cowardice and the loss of his self respect. For a long time he has been troubled by his moral disintegration and his being a dead living. He has been accused of being low and contemptible, lacking honor and manliness. He has been accused of selling out his homeland and then bewailing it like women and children. He has been contrasted to his brethren in Algeria, in order to humiliate the Palestinian while glorifying the Algerian."[16]

The sense of identity was reinforced by the Palestinians' ill-treatment at the hands of fellow Arabs and the Arab States. A Fatah pamphlet explicitly declared: "The persecution of the Palestinians in the Arab countries was a factor contributing to preserving the character of the Palestinian personality and resisting assimilation."[17] Many refugees, it seems, had a feeling of being in exile.

Professor Haim Hillel Ben-Sasson differentiates between "dispersion" and "diaspora" and characterizes the latter as "a situation in which one feels himself uprooted as a nation from his homeland and subject to foreign rule.... Only the disappearance of a central ethnic-state and the feeling of complete uprootedness and impotence change dispersion into exile...(the feeling of diaspora) is expressed in the sense of being foreign in the strange land, longing for the political and national past, and haunted by penetrating questions as to the causes, reasons and purpose of the present situation".[18] The Palestinians had something of this feeling, although their diaspora was in no way comparable to the Jewish diaspora.

A genre of Arab writing, known as "catastrophe literature" *(Adab al-Nakba),* deals with the causes of the Palestinians exile. Tibāwī noted in his article on refugee poetry that "indeed many young Palestine refugees consider the catastrophe as a purifying ordeal from which a new life will blossom."[19]

It is natural that the Palestinians seeking solace in a time of distress, would tend to see their calamitous situation as a purgatory experience which would bring a rebirth. Some Palestinians also viewed themselves as a chosen group contributing to the progress and development of the Arab countries. Bound up with this concept was their gratification that the oil-rich states needed their skilled manpower. They began to take pride in the large number of educated and successful Palestinians in the academic and commercial realms.

This attitude was reflected in the writings of several Palestinian writers. Anīs Al-Qāsim: "The day will come when history will narrate the influence of the Palestinians' dispersion on the modern Arab revival. History will acknowledge that the Palesti-

nians carried the Arab countries from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century. They skillfully played a great role in the development of the Arab world. With this they must be credited."[20]

Abu Shilbāyā: "This people [the Palestinians] is the salt of these countries and has provided them with what is good, grasped their hands in order to lift them from the frozen shadows of backwardness to the light, the light of culture and progress in science, in knowledge and in toil, in schools, universities, the press, factories, and the green fields that have been created from yellow, arid wilderness."[21]

Recognition of the large number of educated and qualified Palestinians undoubtedly contributed to bragging descriptions, in the mid–1960s, of the Palestinians as a community of great, untapped ability, lacking only a political realization. This may have served too in some sense, as a psychological compensation for the Palestinians' inferior position in the Arab countries.

ATTACHMENT TO PAN-ARAB NATIONALISM

The Palestinians' adherence to his own identity did not prevent him from adopting, perhaps more than any other Arabs, the Pan-Arab nationalism. Through their dispersion, many Palestinians had become familiar with, and often attached to, a number of Arab countries. In contrast, the Egyptian, Syrian or Lebanese had acquaintance with only one country, and felt a patriotism for his homeland which was generally stronger and more tangible than his abstract attachment to pan-Arab nationalism.

Dr. Anīs Sāyegh stated with pride that the Palestinian tie to Arab nationalism was stronger and more developed than that of any other Arab group. (This was noted by the National Convenant of the Arab Higher Committee as well.) Sāyegh shows that the Palestinians did not manifest tendencies toward local nationalism, such as existed in other Arab groups (Phoenicism in Lebanon or Pharonism in Egypt).[22]

It is true that acquaintance with a country does not necessarily endear it. Social psychology teaches that contact with foreign peoples may also create antagonism, sharpen the awareness of difference and strengthen self-identity. These factors no doubt worked simultaneously among the Palestinians. However, it is likely that the bitterness they harbored against certain Arab states or groups with whom they came in contact did not detract from their overall attachment to Arab nationalism. It is possible too, that devotion to the concept of pan-Arabism also served as a compensation for the grievances that they had against individual Arab states. This pan-Arab identity was certainly strengthened by a feeling of helplessness in their confrontation with Israel; and their expectation of assistance from the Arab states, which made pan-Arabism a concrete interest. Abu Shilbāyā makes this point: "The Palestinian people are by their nature inclined to unity, because of their special circumstances and needs for the continued support of their Arab brethren."[23]

The attitude of the Arab states to Arab unity was more ambivalent. While they were pledged to the concept of unity, they saw that it could be attained only by relinquishing some part of their individual political independence and national sovereignty — attributes which the Palestinians lacked in any event.

THE CONCEPT OF RETURN TO PALESTINE

The question arises: How did the refugee community view its own situation and what solution did it envision? Was adherence to the concept of return to Palestine interrupted by periods of skepticism or despair?

There is interesting evidence on this matter from a later period. In February 1964 two researchers from the Norwegian Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ingrid and Johann Galtung, visited the Gaza Strip and investigated the attitudes of the refugees. The Galtungs were impressed by the internal consistency and cognitive balance of the refugees' description of their past, the 1948 war, and the reasons for fleeing their homes. The

report notes, "It is difficult to imagine a social group with a more homogeneous perception and definition of the past and present than the refugees in the Gaza Strip. Regardless of age, income, educational level or social status of the persons we spoke with, their definition seemed to be the same at least in so far as they wanted to present it to foreigners."[24]

A disinclination by the refugee's to improve their dwellings or to make arrangements which implied permanence was noted by the Galtungs as tangible evidence of their adherence to the concept of return to Palestine. The Norwegian researchers explained that there was a general feeling that such activities would indicate a lack of faith and an admission that return was far off. Hence all initiatives in improving the camps had to come from the UNRWA authorities.

The Galtungs also noted that, for the same reason, the refugees tended not to sign long-term work contracts in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. One may assume that social, no less than ideological, factors played a role in this. Palestinians working in Arab countries were often separated from their families and this, too, must have played in part in the workers' view of foreign employment as temporary.

The Galtungs report that the refugees tried to convince themselves that there had been little change in Israel and that they would return to find their property just as they had left it. The refugees tended to be reluctant to accept facts to the contrary. In effect, the mechanism that psychologists call "selective inattention" was exercised in an intellectual and emotional effort to repress information about change in what had been Palestine. Such change would have violated the very idea of "return" in its primitive form, the return to abandoned property.

Similarly, Palestinian literature adhered to the concept that Palestine had not changed. Mustafa Dabāgh's *Palestine, Our Land*, written over a period of years and published in 1965–66, describes the country in detail — every village as it had been in 1948. The book portrays a Palestine frozen in the mold of pre-state conditions. The writer asks, "When shall we return and

see our villages, our stoves with the smoke rising from them; when shall we return and see our cities and the gardens of our homes?"[25]

Refugee literature contains many expressions of deep nostalgia and affection for Palestine. Dabāgh, whose work combines Palestinian nationalism with Islamic orthodoxy, sums up the tie to the land: "Palestine is ours and we are hers; Palestine is ours alone, we have no desire to share her. We are bound to her by strong cords that time's hardships cannot loosen, nor can the passage of time succeed to sever. This is the land of purity whose beauty and holiness emanated from God; this is the blessed land upon which God bestowed holiness for all the world. This is the beloved Palestine that was praised in every way, that recalls our forefathers, blessed be their memories, who liberated it, built it and made it bloom, defended it nobly and at the heavy cost of their blood, and whose sons were betrayed of late by the British breach of their pledge, by the contemptible crime of the Americans, and by the violence of the contemptible enemy....Palestine, to which flocked groups from all over the world, was turned into a Jewish and Zionist country after being Arab and Muslim. This alien element ambitious and hostile is planted in the heart of the Arab world and threatens the existence of the Arabs in all the rest of their countries.

"Today the land waits nostalgically for the black, strong hands that cared for its beauty and gave it magic and loveliness, that broke the rocks in order to bring forth seed and nourishment. The fertile land is longing for Arab hands to toil, plow, plant, harvest and give warmth to its womb. The orange trees, the vineyards, the olives and the figs are longing, the green gardens, blooming with luscious fruit, are yearning for those who planted and took care of them.... We are waiting for the moment when we shall regain our good land, so that we may bow down on the pure soil satiated with the blood of the messengers, the prophets, the companions and those who fell for the holiness of God and our forefathers. God protect you, dear homeland! By God, we did not go into exile without remembering you. You fill our hearts; whether near or far, you are our existence and all that

pervades us and the generations which will succeed us."[26] The chapter ends with a passage from the Koran: "Fight them, God will deliver them into your hands and they will be disgraced, and victory will be given to you over them and the hearts of the believers shall be comforted."

A similar sentiment is found in the words of Nasir al-Dīn al-Nashāshībī, in his book *A Return Ticket.* "Every year I shall say to my little son: 'We shall return, my son, and you will be with me; we shall return; we shall return to our land and walk there barefoot. We'll remove our shoes so that we may feel the holiness of the ground beneath us. We'll blend our souls with its air and earth. We'll walk till we come to the orange trees; we'll feel the sand and water; we'll kiss seed and fruit; we'll sleep in the shade of the first tree we meet; we'll pay homage to the first martyr's grave we come across. We'll turn here and there to trace our lives. Where are they? Here with this village square, with this mosque's minaret, with the beloved field, the desolate wall, with the remains of a tottering fence and a building whose traces have been erased. Here are our lives. Each grain of sand teaches us about our life. Do you not remember Jaffa and its delightful shore, Haifa and its lofty mountain, Beth-Shean and the fields of crops and fruit, Nazareth and the Christian's bells, Acre and the memories of al-Jazzār, Ibrāhīm Pasha, Napoleon and the fortress, the streets of Jerusalem, my dear Jerusalem, Tiberias and its peaceful shore with the golden waves, Majdal and the remnant of my kin and its land'?"[27]

Tibāwīs' study of the development of refugee poetry notes the publication of collections of poems that display nostalgia and affection for Palestine. He calls this a demonstration of "neo-Zionism," and recalls the passage from *Psalms*, "By the waters of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept...." as a source of inspiration for the motifs that appear in the poetry of the refugees.

The attachment to Palestine was probably also a reaction by the refugees to their suffering and lowly state. Without the hope for a change and a return to the land they would have perceived themselves as doomed to national and personal degradation. For

those Palestinians who were not in the refugee camps and whose lots were better, the attachment to Palestine served as a compensation for their feeling as foreigners in their new environment.

HOW DID THEY IMAGINE THE RETURN?

An outstanding feature of the Palestinian discussions of their return to the land is their avoidance of detail and concrete descriptions. One may suggest several factors which contributed to this phenonenon.

The Galtungs indicated that the oppressed condition of the refugees led to a narrowing of their time perspective and limited activity to daily talks. A good portion of the day was devoted to bargaining for, and the commercial exchange of, essential commodities. This factor, plus the apathy and dependence of which Ghantūs spoke, contributed, no doubt, to the absence of specific thought about future plans.

Dr. Sādek Jalāl Al-'Azm explained the vagueness and lack of detail that enveloped the ideal of "the return" or "the liberation" in his article, "The Arabs and the Marxist View of the Jewish Question." Though the article deals with a later period, the description is undoubtedly valid for earlier years as well.

"This motto [the liberation] remains, after the past twenty years, an idea that is cloudy, sacred, and enveloped in a halo of honor and esteem that is not to be seriously discussed or held up to objective criticism, or even detailed analysis of its execution in the present or the future. I declare to the reader in all honesty that from my limited experience and personal observation I have been impressed with the feeling that the meaning of the "liberation", especially to a great part of the Palestinian Arab people, is a sort of verbal and technical return to the conditions that existed in 1948. By this I mean that [the concept] of "liberation" awoke in the people's minds the image of the Arab armies' entrance into Israel, as conquerors, after which all Palestinians would dust off their old certificates, present them to the Arab conquerors as establishing their ownership of this

house or that plot of land, and so the victors would return to the owners their rights, as if nothing [in the meanwhile] had happened..."

"To put it another way, until the defeat of 1967 the idea of liberation remained immersed in obscurity, naivete and sanctity; it meant simply, a pseudo-verbal return to Arab Palestine as we left it almost a quarter of a century ago, and so a return to the continuation of our historical development once again, as if history suddenly halted for some time and afterwards renewed its movement from the point at which we thought it had stopped."[28]

Al-'Azm blames the Arab leadership, the Arab states and the political organizations for failure to encourage clear thinking and an analysis of the concept of liberation, thereby leaving it abstract, intangible and a subject for demogoguery. This lack of clarity, "accompanied by an official silence, arouses fear regarding the future in the Jewish population." Thus from this rose, according to his explanation, the expression by some circles, of throwing the Jews into the sea. To Al-'Azm's explanation for the lack of clarification of the idea of liberation, which is political, one may be added that is possibly psychological. A detailed discussion of the practical difficulties in the return would have cast doubt on its feasibility, which was not in the Palestinian self-interest. Thus tenacity to the idea of return was dependent on the avoidance of clarifications of its implications.

RETURN BY ALL-ARAB EFFORT

The Arab literature of the early 1950's often contained descriptions of how one day the refugees would gather men, women and children — all along the Israeli border and, as one, march and spread throughout Israel. It would be a type of non-violent act, since the refugees would be unarmed, and the Israelis would not dare fire on them. This mass-march would be merely a symbolic gesture, but would constitute a natural, tangible and personal embodiment of "the return." It would bring about chaos and result in Israel's disintegration and in a

return to the *status quo ante.* The idea's impracticality was too obvious to be considered a concrete plan and caused it to peter out.

The Palestinians' feeling of impotence intensified in the years following 1949. If they had not been able to prevail over the Jewish community in Palestine, they could not expect to defeat a state with its well-trained, mechanized army. Thus, during the 1950s it became generally accepted that the return would not be accomplished by the Palestinians, but by a common Arab effort. This is the main characteristic of the climate of opinion among the refugees and the Palestinians. The "awakening" of the Palestinians expressed itself in its reversal and the giving of an active role to the Palestinians.

"*Nasharat Al-Tha'r*" (The publication of revenge), published by "The Committee Opposing Peace with Israel *(Haiat Muqawamat Al Sulh Ma' Isrā'īl)* — primarily composed of Palestinian founders of the Quamiyun Movement—preached the Al Sulh idea of unity as a path to liberation and adopted the motto: "There is no honor but vengeance and there is no solution but unity."[29] Their aim was summed up in the phrase "Unity, Liberation and Revenge."

According to the description of the Galtungs, Palestinian skepticism regarding the return of the individual to his property did not shake their confidence that eventually, in a coordinated effort, the Arab armies would overcome Israel. Their report, which dealt only with the Gaza Strip and cannot be regarded as a wholly representative study, concluded that the refugees based their belief in eventual return on the basic numerical and financial superiority of the Arab peoples and armies.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION

During the 1950s, differences in the attachment to Palestine began to form between the generation of refugees who had left Palestine, and the younger generation that had grown up outside the country.

The older generation's attachment to Palestine was based on personal concrete memories and desire to recover the posses-

sions that they had left behind. With the passing of time, they began to idealize their lives as they had been before the catastrophe; this tendency was reinforced as contrasted with their suffering in the refugee camps. Past disgraces were forgotten, and life in Palestine came to be remembered as a period of great personal and collective happiness. Fathers tended to describe their past to their children in glowing terms, and it was not by chance that the expression "al-Firdāus al-mafqūd" (the lost paradise) was used.

Members of the younger generation who were born outside of Palestine or who had left it at an early age, had no memories of the war, the defeat and the flight. For them, knowledge of the country was vicarious. Nevertheless many younger Palestinians would identify themselves as being from "Haifa" or "Jaffa," even if they were born in Beirut or Kuwait.

Their attachment, unlike that of their parents, was not founded on direct experience, nor did it stem from the memory of abandoned property. It was based on two main factors: The rejection of life as a refugee in a foreign country; and an ideological position that emphasized Israeli aggression, the injustice done to the Palestinians and the need to rectify the situation. This approach was fostered by their education, which provided them with an ideological orientation and emphasized the "return" and the struggle against Israel as national imperatives.

Many of the refugees had been peasants. But their children who received a better education found no attraction in the idea of returning to familiar villages or living as their parents had. For these youngsters, the return was not seen as restoration of property lost, but as a change in their present condition.

Clearly, the younger generation of Palestinians, born and brought up in trying conditions of the camps, expected a change in their situation. Their education and culture made them more sensitive than their simple parents to the suffering and distress of their lives and made them aware of their "relative deprivation." Inevitably they had a closer attachment to the Arab countries in which they lived and were more nationalistic than

their parents. They saw their salvation within the framework of Arab nationalism and its goals. Their idea of Arab unity for them included a liberated Palestine. It may be assumed that many of the younger generation had fewer reservations about the attitude of the Arab countries and felt less acrimony about their role in the defeat in 1948.

Although the younger generation's ties to Palestine were not based on personal experience, this does not mean that their attachment was weaker than that of their parents. On the contrary. Despite the fact that their anti-Israel feelings were, until the Six-Day War, purely the product of learning, their hostility tended to be stronger than that of their parents. The Galtungs report noted that among the elders of the Gaza Strip there was some degree of resignation, while the young were rebellious and belligerent. This no doubt reflects the generational differences in approach existing elsewhere in refugee centers.

There is probably an additional psychological explanation for this generational difference. The attachment of the older Palestinians was based on individual memories and experiences, while that of their children was anchored in the collective ethos. For the young refugee it was not simply a question of selfish desire to return to lost private property, but a matter of collective national policy and a universal ethical mission to right an historical injustice. The small personal ego became submerged in current of the collectivity; this gave the desire to return greater respectability and, perhaps, a longer longevity as well. The sentimental longing of the older generation for its possessions was too fragile; once confronted with the fact that the property no longer existed (as was realized after 1967), the rationale for return could be shaken. The altruistic attachment of the younger generation was more immune to such influences.

PALESTINIANS WHO PROSPERED AND ADJUSTED AND THOSE WHO REBELLED

Despite the foregoing analysis a substantial number of talented, and professionally qualified Palestinians were econom-

ically absorbed by the Arab countries which experienced a period of prosperity and expansion in the 1950s. Some Palestinians rose to prominence in public service, business and finance. These included millionaires such as Boustāni in Lebanon, government officials and advisors such as Nasir Al-Din Nashāshībī who became the editor of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Jumhūrīyya*, and Ahmad Shuqayri, who served as Assistant Secretary to the Arab League's Secretary General, a Syrian representative to the UN, was later offered the position of Syrian Foreign Minister, and served for years as the Minister for UN Affairs on behalf of Saudi Arabia, professors in Beirut, such as Nabīl Fāris, the Sāyeghs, Walīd al-Khālidī and many others.

Some Palestinians, especially upper middle-class, struck roots in various countries and began to view them as permanent new homes, even to the point that their attachment to Palestine was weakened.

In his article "The Palestinian Revolution, to What End?" Dr. Al-Khatib Al-Khatib wrote: "During the years following the catastrope a new generation of Palestinians was born. Educated in the Arab or non-Arab schools of their host states, they assimilated the local color and were stamped with the political and social dispositions (of the countries in which they lived). In addition, the Palestinian refugees who resided and earned their living in the different countries developed local ties and interests not to be underrated. Most probably their interest in the "return" became, comparatively, a secondary issue. This applies mostly to the petty and big bourgeoisie."[30]

Dr. Al-Khatib cites "...the disregard of the Palestinians for their Palestinianism and its rush to obtain citizenship from Arab and other states, its hiding the features of the Palestinian character: for example, changing deliberately in their dialect and social habits...".[31] The aim of this statement is to censure the Palestinian bourgeoisie but despite the author's generalization, the extent of this phenomenon cannot be determined. On the other hand, it should be noted that Palestinian militancy originated precisely among the wealthy and economically independent Palestinian circles.

The al-Fatah publication, "A Strong But Not Legendary Enemy," that describes Israel and the struggle against her, makes this point clearly. It states that the readiness to fight Israel came first from the Palestinians living in the Persian Gulf Oil Emirates. "Apparently the communities whose standard of living is higher seek to struggle against the challenge of assimilation imposed upon them by their exile; for in their sojourn in the wilderness, and their life of relative abundance — in comparison to the living conditions in the camps — and in the slogans, the identity of these people could have been blotted out were it not for its deep rots."[32]

Many of the economically independent refugees became staunch guardians of Palestinian identity. They were experts in the problems of Palestinians in the Arab countries, and served as a pressure group within the Arab communities agitating for the aim of the "liberation". Books and articles written about the Palestinian problem were partly responsible for the importance that it came to assume in Arab national life. Arnold Hottinger noted that many of this group in the Arab countries who set the tone regarding Palestine were influential in the publicity media.

This led to a contradiction. Those Palestinians whose financial problems were solved urged the refugees to resist absorption, and to continue living in camps. This double standard attitude doubtless did not escape the camp dwellers.

The leadership which conducted normal lives wished to prevent the Palestinian masses from doing the same.

Hottinger speaks harshly of these leaders: "If any fault lies with the Arabs in the Palestine question it is this. It is the fault of the intellectuals who are not willing to recognize the fact that Israel exists and who have, for the past ten years, been keeping their unlettered brothers artificially in a situation which makes it impossible for them to adapt themselves to the facts and to develop their own creative work. Whenever foreign relief organizations, whether sponsored by private bodies or by UNRWA, attempt to do something to overcome this situation, they are blocked by the instigation of the Palestinian bourgeoisie, whose consistent strategy it is to keep alive the Arabs' hatred for Israel

and to prevent at all cost, any sort of accommodation with her."[33]

For the sake of accuracy it should be said that not all the blame for the failure of the Palestinian masses to become absorbed in their new countries should be focused only on the upper-middle-class. Tibāwī emphasizes that the Arab leaders, far from determining the refugees' behavior, acted in response to the latter's desires and predispositions. The decision to maintain a miserable, temporary existence was the refugees' own. There may be some truth in Tibāwī's argument, though this does not excuse the leadership from the cynicism or hypocrisy which governed its actions.

WEAKNESS IN PALESTINIAN SELF-ORGANIZATION

In the fifties there was little inclination on the part of the Palestinians to organize themselves. The Galtungs were impressed by the absence of such a desire in the Gaza camps.[34] A number of factors would seem to have contributed to this phenomenon:

1) Even before 1948 the political mobilization of the Palestinians was low. The disintegration of Palestinian society and its dispersion made its organization even more difficult.

2) The old Palestinian leadership had lost its authority because of its failures, and a new leadership had not yet arisen. Though the Arab Higher Committee existed and continued to publish statements and proclamations, it lacked organized, public backing.

Ghantūs: "The catastrophe...tangibly proved to them [the Palestinian people] the failure of the previous generation to face their problem and its political demise. This resulted in a leadership vacuum, to the extent that Palestine remained without any leadership capable of filling this vacuum created by the previous generation.[35]

The former communal patterns had been tied to traditional, locally-based forms of organization. These fell apart in the refugee communities, and new ones had not yet developed. The

local, traditional leaders maintained their authority in areas like Hebron, Jerusalem, Samaria and Gaza. However, there they existed in the shadow of Jordanian and Egyptian rule.

3) The Galtungs attributed the lack of inclination to organize, even within the camp framework, to the narrow perspective of refugee life and its overriding concern with subsistence. The problems of earning a living drained the refugees' energy from collective activity. To this one may add the psychological characteristics which Ghantūs indicated — passivity and the predisposition to dependency.

4) The concept that salvation will come by an inter-Arab effort also may have diminished the pressure to organize. During the fifties the concept of renewing the struggle by Palestinian self-action had not yet matured.

5) The Arab states purposely hindered the organization of the Palestinians, a fact attested to by the complaints of embittered politicians and writers. The Palestinians were restricted in their activities and their movements. Anīs al-Qāsim explains that the Arab countries' opposition to Palestinian organizations stemmed from their suspicion that such groups, which they expected would naturally press for action, might lead them to confrontation with Israel. Another, and perhaps more important, explanation is that the Arab regimes feared the Palestinians as a subversive and restive factor, especially since Palestinian youth were disposed to join radical organizations. Al-Qāsim: "The internal weakness of the regimes in the Arab countries made them sensitive to, and fearful of, the organization [of Palestinians] because of their internal situations. They were in dread lest they [the Palestinians] be a means of implementing the policy of one or another Arab state in their countries."[36] The Palestinians were suspected, in particular, of supporting and being agents of Nasser, a fact which further reduced the sympathy of anti-Nasser regimes for their political organization.

In this context, a representative of the Arab Higher Committee wrote in 1962 in an open letter to an Iraqi newspaper: "Are there those among you who are convinced that the Arab states will permit the Palestinian refugees living within them to organ-

ize, or that they will act in the opposite way, and put every obstacle in the path of such organization? Ask the Arab Higher Committee if obstacles were placed in its path, or in the path of any Palestinian organization. The Palestinians know very well that the Palestinian problem cannot be lifted from its context unless the Palestinians themselves will organize."[37]

Yaser 'Arafat, in opening the tenth session of the Palestinian National Council on April 6, 1972, said, "The general image of this people was expressed in many secret organizations that manifested themselves in word and thought, while there was an official Arab effort to halt all self-movement of the Palestinian people."[38]

THE PAN-ARAB INCLINATIONS OF THE YOUNGER GENERATION

During the 1950s, the younger generation, as well, displayed little enthusiasm for Palestinian organizations, though they tended to join general Arab political parties. The approach to nationalism was Pan-Arabic and they hoped that the Palestinian problem would find its solution in inter-Arab action. In this they differed from their parents' generation, who were disinclined to any political mobilization.

In an interview with Lutfi Al-Khūlī, the editor of Al-Tali'a, Abu Iyad (Salah Khālaf) one of the Fatah leaders, said: "During the fifties we saw a very strange phenomenon. Seldom was it possible to meet a young Palestinian who was not a member of a political party or movement, from the extreme right to the extreme left."[39]

It is probable that the psychological need to belong played a part in the politicization of the younger Palestinians. The sense of belonging to the family clan had been undermined; they could not fully identify with their countries of residence, and even their affiliation and identity as Palestinians lacked a means of tangible, active expression at the time.

Anīs Al-Qāsim hinted at this when he wrote: "The Palestinians found that belonging to these movements [parties like the Ba'th and the Qawmiyun] eases part of the feeling of loss. The

most difficult thing for a man is to be lost, to belong to nothing, especially, when he has a goal that he wishes to realize. The Palestinians were still lost, and they belonged to nothing that would help them achieve their goals. Every Palestinian was lost. It made no difference whether he left the homeland or remained in it, whether he was impoverised and lived in a tent or became rich and purchased gardens, or whether he carried a refugee certificate or a diplomatic passport."[40]

Isām Sakhnīnī, a member of the Research Center of the PLO in Beirut and editor of the series "Yawmiyat Filastīnīyya", summed up the ideas appearing in "*Nashrat al-Tha'r*" and noted that they emphasized inter-Arab nationalism. "After everything that came previously concerning the understanding of the Palestinian as [an Arab] national problem, it must be understood that in no way were traces of Palestinianism found in the thinking of the publication. Whenever the Palestinians were referred to they were called "Nazihun" [displaced, and not Palestinian, persons].[41]

TWO DIFFERENT POLICIES: JORDAN AND THE GAZA STRIP

The Palestinians' situation varied from country to country. The refugees in Jordan and in the Gaza Strip provide polar examples of the social and political conditions governing their lives.

1. *Jordan*

Most of the Palestinians were concentrated in Jordan. Paradoxically, although the Palestinians were given Jordanian citizenship, they did not identify with the Jordanian entity.

Anīs Al-Qāsim wrote: "Most [of the Palestinians] who remained in the West Bank and in Jordan merged into the entity of the Jordanian state. The Palestinians became Jordanians, having to solve their problem within Jordanian communities, Jordanian policy, Jordanian governmental mechanisms and Jordanian trade unions. All of these hindered activities in which expression

was given to a Palestinian character that was independent of the Jordanian identity....What occurred in Jordan was a merger and not a merger at the same time. It was a merger in the sense that the Palestinians living on the two banks of the Jordan were all considered Jordanians, according to naturalization law and the force of annexation. The Palestinians were subject to the same obligations as their Jordanian brethren. This was not a merger, however, in the sense that the West Bank preserved a character and an entity separate from that of the East Bank. The allocation of seats in the Jordanian House of Assembly and Senate was based upon the principle of differentiation between the West and East Banks. Both banks send an equal number of representatives to the two houses, on the principle of a differentiation between the East Bank or West Bank. One must note, however, that this is not true with regard to the cabinet. Most cabinet members were from the East Bank, and there was no Palestinian appointed to the position of Prime Minister save for one, the late Dr. Hussein Fakhrī al-Khālidi, and that was only for a brief transitional period. All this confirms that the West Bank had a special status and entity within the Jordanian state."[42]

Many Palestinians rose to important positions within the Jordanian Government and in the diplomatic corps. However, it is not surprising that the King was most attentive to the Jordanians closest to him. A Palestinian Prime Minister, notes Abu Shilbāyā, was appointed when the aim was the suppression of the Palestinians, in 1957, when Dr. Khālidi was appointed, and before the September 1970 massacre, when General Muhammed Dāoud al-Husseinī was appointed."[43]

As the tension between the Jordanian Government and the PLO mounted, consciousness of discrimination against the Palestinians grew. This was particularly evident in 1957, when the Jordanians took steps to suppress the Palestinians in the West Bank. Writing about the Jordanian attitude, Abu Shilbāyā said: "Deliberate, planned activity was designed to develop the East Bank at the expense of the West Bank. There was curtailment of development and building programs in one [area] to benefit the other. Thus it was intended that workshops,

factories, newspapers, development programs and a university were to be established in the East Bank, while the West Bank and the city of Jerusalem were grossly neglected. Even the Friday prayers were broadcast from the Great Husseini Mosque in Amman instead of from the world's third most holy mosque in Jerusalem. Finally, the justifiably embittered Palestinians began to say that had the Jordanian regime been capable of transferring the walls of Jerusalem to Amman, it would have done so."[44]

Although Palestinians received Jordanian citizenship, their passports bore a notation that it had been conferred according to Section Three of the regulations; non-Palestinian Jordanians received their citizenship in accordance with Section One. Despite their Jordanian citizenship not many Palestinians, it seems, were fully identified with the Hashemite regime. In the 1950s many of them denounced Jordan for its ties with the Eastern Powers, while others had reservations about the legitimacy of Jordan's very existence. In the cold war between the Arab States, many Palestinians tended to support Jordan's enemies and endorsed their criticisms of the Hashemite regime. From the very beginning it was clear that Palestinianism and Jordanianism had opposing and competing goals. Officially, if not always in practice, the Jordanian policy was to grant the Palestinians full civil rights on a personal, individual level, while refusing to recognize their collective existence and aspirations. In this way the Jordanian policy was the opposite of the Egyptian policy in the Gaza Strip.

2. *The Gaza Strip*

It is an historical irony that in the Gaza Strip, where Egyptian rule restricted the Palestinians, withheld Egyptian citizenship and kept them stateless, and excluded them from important governmental positions, the tension between the regime and the Palestinian community that existed in Jordan did not develop. The Egyptians maintained and enforced in the Gaza Strip Palestinian citizenship and the law of the Mandate. The Palestinians remained Palestinian in character, and were spared the conflict of identity that typified their relations in Jordan.

Anīs Al-Qāsim: "In the Gaza Strip the Palestinians maintained their former citizenship and a sort of Palestinian entity. The Palestinians could govern themselves and act as Palestinians. They were fewer in number than the Jordanian Palestinians and their financial status was comparatively lower. However, they were allowed to establish a Palestinian Legislative Council, a Palestinian National Union and a Palestinian Army and Fedayeen. The missions that were sent from the Gaza Strip were Palestinian. The Palestinian personality and entity remained intact in the Gaza Strip without being influenced by the existence of the UAR military governor. For example, they were given the right to establish a Palestinian Workers' Union and a Palestinian Lawyers' Union and the name "Palestine" was preserved in the Gaza Strip."[45]

In December, 1959, the Palestinian "National Union" was established in the Gaza Strip as an extension of the Egyptian National Union. In April of 1960, Munīr al-Raīs who had been appointed as its chairman was delegated to represent the Palestinian people at the Afro-Asian Summit in Conakry. In November of that year a congress of the Palestinian National Union was held. The Palestinian distinction was given expression in the constitution that was enacted for the Gaza Strip on March 5, 1962.

Although the Egyptian government maintained a military administration and enforced curfews and restrictive regulations, the Palestinians could not protest about deprivation on the national level. Abu Shilbāyā notes the merits of Egypt's handling of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip: "The Egyptians loyally and honestly preserved the Palestinian nature and character, left the Palestinians their citizenship, and granted them advantages that even the Egyptian people lacked. The Palestinians in the Gaza Strip had the right to import duty-free and unlike the Egyptians, they remained unaffected by the decrease in the value of the Egyptian pound. The Gaza Strip became a new Hong Kong, whose inhabitants benefited from political, economic, social and cultural advantages which the Egyptian citizen in Cairo and Alexandria did not share."[46] Abu Shilbāyā's description con-

demns the Jordanians by exaggerating the virtues of Egypt's administration. Indeed, a market in imported goods did flourish in the Gaza Strip with the hard currency from the dispersed Palestinians; but not all the public benefited from it, and the conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps of the Gaza Strip remained oppressive. The description of a social and cultural blossoming in the Gaza Strip is doubtful. It is interesting, however, to note the fashion the differences appeared to Abu Shilbāyā and, perhaps, to others.

THE PALESTINIAN AWAKENING

The idea that the Palestine entity should be preserved, organized, and utilized in the struggle against Israel, emerged on two levels:

a) *The Palestinian level*—— the idea as discussed by the Palestinian public, and its tangible manifestation in Palestinian organizations;

b) *The official inter-Arab level*—— the concept as discussed in the Arab League.

Tracing the discussions in the League meetings is comparatively simple and merely requires a survey of its protocols and decisions. In contrast, it is much more difficult to trace the development of ideas and their organizational framework among the Palestinians, since much of the evolution took place clandestinely, and many of the organizations were short-lived.

A. *The Palestinian Awakening and the Arab League*

The tendency to describe the Palestinian organizations as tools of the Arab states has been quite common. Among Israelis this view has possibly filled a psychological need to minimize the authenticity and spontaneity of these movements by representing them as an artificially created force. Some Arabs, on their part, have tended to view specific organizations, though not the entire movement, as the tools of rival Arab states.

It seems safe to say that without the aid or at least tolerance of the host states the Palestinian movements could not have

existed. It is not true, however, that thereby they were only tools of the host countries.

It is true that the Arab League discussions of the Palestinian entity from March 1959 onwards preceded the official organization of the Palestinians, although underground groups had existed even before 1959. It is also true that the raising of the issue of Palestine in the League was intended to serve as a weapon in inter-Arab rivalries. Yet the previous popularity of the idea is precisely what made possible its manipulation by Arab states in their contest to gain popularity and condemn their rivals.

The existence of the power struggle dressed in ideological garb has long been an outstanding feature of inter-Arab relations. The disloyalty, intrigues, dishonesty, cynicism, nihilism and harshness, including intramural brutality (e.g. Ba'th), in Arab political life were so pervasive that people were apt to downgrade the importance of ideology, and to become excessively suspicious of the sincerity of Arab leaders' ideological pronouncements. Such suspicions, however, are exaggerated. A demagogic use of ideology does not necessarily imply disbelief in the same ideology itself. If Arab leaders brandished demagogic ideas about the organization of the Palestinians in inter-Arab rivalries, it does not follow that they did not believe in what they said. It only proves these ideas were able to rouse the Arab public. In ideology, tactics and strategy, demagogy and genuine faith can co-exist and even hypocrisy can be honest.

Shuqayri describes the introduction of the Palestinian idea in the League as arising from instigations on the popular level: "In the late 1950s, Arab and Palestinian public opinion began complaining about the deterioration of the Palestinian problem in the Arab and world spheres. The all-Palestine Government had become a token apparatus. The Palestinian problem became a routine which the Arab delegations handled by means of the reports of the refugee welfare agency.... When I was the assistant to the Secretary General of the Arab League, I endeavored to the utmost of my ability to inject the Palestine government with life. But my efforts came to naught. Ahmed

Hilmi Pasha was loyal, but the undermining of his health, together with the weakness of Arab political life, contributed to the stagnation of the Palestinian problem. And so, in response to Arab and Palestinian urging the Arab League Council studied the matter in its session of March 1959, upon the initiative of the government of the UAR...."[47]

The order of priorities was, consquently: 1. A real or potential measure of popularity of the idea of organizing the Palestinians for the sake of the struggle against Israel; 2. The exploitation of this mood in inter-Arab struggle. This set in motion a process which continued until the decision of the First Summit Conference opened new vistas for Palestinian organizations that had not previously existed.

The relationship between the awakening on a Palestinian level and action on the inter-Arab level was expressed in a manifesto issued jointly by the Qawmiyun Movement, the Palestinian Students' Association and the Palestine Liberation Front (JTF): "During the past sixteen years, the Palestinian people lived under compelling circumstances which prevented it from fulfilling its obligations in serving its cause in as full a manner as expected. However, the new awakening began to manifest itself in many forms expressing the decision of the Palestinian people to fulfill its obligations for the sake of restoring its stolen homeland. Afterwards came the Summit Conference which opened the field for the Palestinian people, imposing on the organized forces the duty of taking the initiative in benefitting from the singular experience of Arab collaboration, for serious preparation for the liberation of Palestine."[48]

There can be suspicion that there was interest for the Palestinian spokesmen to present the development in this fashion. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the description was not correct.

The Palestine Liberation Organization was also portrayed as having been established in order to hamper irresponsible guerrilla activities undertaken by the Palestinian organizations.[49] It is doubtful that this is historically true, since the Summit Conference and the establishment of the PLO gave a push to the

Palestinian underground organizations dedicated to guerrilla activities with Israel. Al-Fatah began its activities *after* the establishment of the PLO.

The PLO came into being because the idea of the need for a Palestinian organization had matured, and because of the needs of the Arab states to have it, in which tactics and honesty alternated. The argument that Shuqayri was deliberately chosen as representative of Palestine in the Arab League to insure the PLO's ineffectuality, is too not substantiated.[50] Shuqayri was dismissed by Faysal in August 1963 because of his refusal to submit a complaint in the UN against Egypt's intervention in Yemen. He describes how the emissaries of Nasser and of Iraq tried to convince him to accept the position of "Palestinian representative" in the Arab League that became vacant upon the death of Ahmed Hilmi on June 29, 1963. Shuqayri relates that Yaser 'Arafāt also approached him during that period, and offered him the position of political head of Fatah's leadership.[51]

Shuqayri was chosen as the representative of the Palestinians because of his ability as a fiery orater as during this period the principle aim was to emphasize the Palestinian entity in the international scene and his first task was to create a delegation to the UN Assembly of 1963. Shuqayri was enthusiastically recieved by Palestinian gatherings. At the same time he was criticized by his competitors, such as the Arab Higher Committee and the radicals who urged the establishment of a "revolutionary" organization.

It should be noted that the First Summit Conference did not decide upon the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Its decision merely stated: "Mr. Shuqayri, the representative of Palestine in the Arab League, will continue his contacts with the Arab governments which are members of the Arab League, and the Palestinian people, with the aim of forming the foundations for an organization of the Palestinian people, enabling it to fulfill its task in the liberation of its homeland and achieve self-determination." Shuqayri related that King Hussein demanded that the phrase "Palestinian entity" be deleted from the resolution, and that the phrase "self-

determination" would come after the "liberation of its homeland." The official communique of the Summit Conference read: "The conference has taken the necessary practical decisions to repel the Zionist danger through the organization of the Palestinian people and the enabling of it to play its part in the liberation of its country and self-determination."

With the establishment of the PLO by the first Palestinian Congress, in May 1964, Shuqayri presented the Second Summit with a *fait accompli.* In his memoirs, he claims to have done this purposely. It was not by chance that the Arab Higher Committee, in its manifesto of June 10, 1964, maintained that in establishing the PLO Shuqayri had overstepped the authority entrusted to him by the Summit Conference.[52] In his speech at the Second Summit Conference Shuqayri spoke as though the "establishment of the Palestinian entity" was the Summit's decision. By doing so he hoped, it seems, to convey the impression that his actions had been in the spirit of past Summit decisions. The character that Shuqayri gave to the PLO no doubt differed from Arab states' conception of an institution dealing mainly with external propaganda. The rivalries among the Arab states were a key factor enabling Shuqayri to extend the activities of the PLO.

B. *The Developments on the Palestinian Level*

From 1949 onward the Palestinians discussed their role in the struggle against Israel and the need for organization and articles about this and related subjects appeared periodically in the Arab newspapers. Further impetus for such ideas came in 1956 from Gaza, where, according to Al-Fatah's analysis, the discovery of Egypt's inability to defend the Strip stimulated a tendency of Palestinian self help.

Such a trend apparently subsided afterwards and the Sinai Campaign came to be regarded as a victory for Arab nationalism. It also ushered in a period in which the idea of national revolution and Arab unity spread. This reached its peak with the establishment of the UAR in February, 1958. Palestinians, especially the politically active among them, joined in the

general Arab national enthusiasm, and saw the union as the beginning of their redemption. They believed that it would be in Nasser's phrase, a "nutcracker" to crush Israel. This enthusiasm was short-lived however, and was followed by a period of ebbing Arab nationalism and sharp fraternal conflict. Iraq quarrelled with Egypt, both were hostile to Jordan, and the relations between Syria and Egypt deteriorated. There was a brief improvement in relations in the beginning of 1963 during which tri-partite talks were held among Egypt, Iraq and Syria over their union, but once again their differences surfaced.

It seems that the Palestinian awakening must be related not to the revolutionary mood of 1956 but to the later period of regression.

Anīs al-Qāsim: "The Arab states oppose the organization of the Palestinians, while the Palestinians on their part demand it. This situation was among the causes of Palestinian discontent which impelled them to grumble and subsequently to join the ideological political and revolutionary movements and, later, to the establishment of clandestine organization."[53]

A similiar description is found in the Fatah pamphlet "A Strong, but not Legendary Foe." It relates to the Palestinian awakening: "In the mid-1950s, after the tri-partite attack upon the Arab nation represented by Egypt [the Sinai campaign], the Palestinian students began to awaken to the possibility of embarking upon revolutionary activity, although this budding vision was not immediately influential because of the growing Arab struggle against other imperialistic alliances and programs that sought to surround the Arab homeland and its masses. Until then the Palestinians were bound by their political affiliations, and still believed that they were heading the path leading to liberation. The slogans brandished during that period emphasized that the liberation of the Arab lands bordering with Palestine was a condition for the liberation of Palestine. Indeed, events swiftly succeeded one another and the Arab movement was not at that point capable of giving more than it did. Though the Arab movement was able to yield the seed of the unified state [UAR] in 1958. Its enemies swiftly dealt a mortal blow to it

which from the viewpoint of the Palestinian masses, was a step in the direction of liberation."[54]

It continues: "Therefore, the Palestinian national movement was renewed, declaring the inception of revolutionary activity that publicized the slogan "Palestine of battle and liberation as a means to unity" and not the opposite. Some small groups consolidated-waving a banner of war and declaring themselves secretly as representing a new line armed struggle. There is no doubt that the success of the Algerian and Cuban revolutions greatly influenced the crystallization of the beginning of this activity."

BEHIND THE FACTORS OF PALESTINIAN AWAKENING

1) The idea of the need for Palestinian organization appears first and foremost as a reaction against dependence on the Arab states and disappointment of their action. The Palestinians condemned the Arab states for their dishonesty, hypocrisy, inaction and the obstructions they put in the way of the Palestinians who sought to organize themselves.

In his book *The Way to Palestine*, published in 1964, Naji Alush explains that "In the last few years Palestinian movements here and there have been growing as a result of the belief that the Arab states are not faithful in their handling of the Palestinian problem, and that the solution lies in the rising up of Palestinian vanguards who will begin the campaign of liberation".[55] The inter Arab rivalries of 1961-63, and especially the disintegration of the UAR, destroyed the hope that coordinated action by the Arab states would bring salvation. It is probable that the divisiveness among the Arab states appeared to be acute to the Palestinians, for the rivalries were not only between the progressives and the so-called reactionaries, but were sharpest among the progressives themselves.

Sakhnīnī: "[We have shown] the stream that began rising in the early 1960s, calling for the making of the Palestinian personality conspicious. Behind this current exist a number of tributaries, the greatest of which was in my estimation, the deep

disappointment of the Palestinians over the breakup of the two parts of the UAR in 1961. The union of the two territories as a minimum, with a subsequent overall Arab union and essential establishment of a strong, united army, was the foundation upon which the Palestinians based their hopes and dreams for the liberation of their homeland. The break up of UAR aroused doubts in the Palestinian masses in the merit of their awaiting unity. Thus began the search for an autonomous Palestinian action, by which the Palestinian people will address themselves to their cause directly and not vicariously. This goal was strengthened by the rivalries in the Arab world."[56]

The Palestinian cause has been enmeshed in a paradox. Palestinian activism got its impetus from inter-Arab rivalries and in reaction to the Arab states' failure to act efficiently to solve the Palestinian problems, thus indicating that the Palestinians could not rely on them. On the other hand, such activism was dependent on the consent of at least one, and to a great extent all, of the Arab States. While the idea of Palestinian activism was the outcome of Arab rivalries, its realization depended on the resolution of those rivalries at least their abatement, and an Arab detente.

2) The success of the Algerian struggle for achieving independence in July 1962, which utilized methods of guerrilla warfare, coupled with the prestige acquired by "wars of liberation" throughout the world, provided a source of encouragement to the Palestinians. Three basic factors that characterized the Algerian success fascinated at least part of the Palestinians: a) the struggle was carried out by Algerians; b) the aid of the Arab states was only of secondary importance and; c) guerrilla warfare proved its value.

Abu Iyad: "One may say that the success of the Algerian revolution played a great role in this development, because the Palestinian youth sensed that they were not inferior to their Algerian brethren and that they were capable of unfurling the slogan of armed struggle and carrying it out. However, the situation in the Arab world stood in the way of such a slogan and the possibility of its accomplishment."[57]

3) A new Palestinian generation arose, unburdened by past failures and eager for new efforts. The old leadership was discreditied, the simple people were preoccupied with ensuring subsistence, and the old wealthy refugees were busy with their material interests and satisfied, in Ghantūs's words, with a "verbal struggle to return Palestine." In this milieu a young, educated and nationalistic middle class began to emerge and to become first restive and then active.

In his survey of books by Palestinian authors, ushering in the new period Alūsh differentiated between the "defeated generation" (the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee) and the "generation of revenge" (Subhi Yassīn, Nicol Al-Dur, Nasir Al-Dīn-al-Nashāshībī), and praised the new generation's greater understanding of the problem, while decrying its lack of revolutionary zeal. Only then emerged the new revolutionary youth crying for action.[58]

4) The growing difficulties in finding employment may also have contributed to the political activisim of the youth. In the earlier years, qualified Palestinians could find openings in Arab countries, however the development of education facilities in these countries produced an indigenous trained manpower which took precedence in employment over the Palestinians. Nabīl Sha'ath in a survey of "High level Palestinian Manpower" writes: "But young, fresh graduates are finding it harder to find a job than was the case a decade ago, due to tougher competition for jobs by Arab graduates everywhere in the Arab world. In most Arab countries, the Palestinian is considered a dispensable "foreigner" or expatriot who should be replaced by local manpower whenever such manpower becomes available. He is gradually finding it harder to obtain a a work permit and keep it renewed."[59]

The problem of discrimination in employment added another tragic dimension to the Palestinian predicament, intensifying their grievance against the Arab host countries.

Although the first leaders of the PLO were from the older Palestinian generation, they were sensitive to the pressures coming from the younger generation's mood of activism.

The process of an emerging of a new guard of leadership was consumated by the 1967 war. This is evident in the complete change in the personal composition of the Fourth National Council in July 1968. The wandering of the Palestinians in the political wilderness drew to an end. They regained an active role in the conflict. Their real problems had just started.

NOTES

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3. Al-Qāsim, *op.cit.* pp. 20-22.
4. Walīd al-Qamhāwi, *Al-Nakba Wa-al-Bina fī Al-watan al-'Arabī* (The catastrophe and the construction), Second edition, (Beirut, 1962) Part 1, pp. 69-70. This motif of societal disintegration as an element in the Arab flight after the 1967 war is also suggested in studies by Halim Barkat and Peter Dodd in *A River without Bridges*, The Institute for Palestine Studies, (Beirut, 1968) and by Amīrah Habībī in *Al Nuzūh al-Thani* (The second exodus), PLO, Research Center (Beirut, 1967).
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7. Lutf Ghantūs, *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyya*, Beirut, vol. 2, no. 2 (December, 1965) p. 43.
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9. Ghantūs, *op.cit.* p. 45.
10. Al-Qāsim, *op.cit.*, p. 21.
11. Ghantūs, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
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18. *The Hebrew Encyclopedia*, Jerusalem, vol. 10, p. 813.
19. Tibawi, *op. cit.*, p. 524.
20. Al-Qāsim, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
21. Muhamad Abu Shilbāyā, *Al-Tarīq 'ilal-Khalās wal-Hurīyya wal-Salām* (The road to redemption, liberation and peace), Al-Quds, p. 13.
22. Anīs Sāyegh, *Palestine and Arab Nationalism*, PLO, Research Center (Beirut, 1966) pp. 104-5.
23. Muhamad Abu Shilbāyā, *Lā Salām bighayr dawla filastiniyya ḥurra* (No peace without a free Palestinian state), Jerusalem, p. 80.
24. Ingrid and Johann Galtung, *A Pilot Project from Gaza*, Institute for Social Research, Oslo, February, 1964.

25. Mustafa Dabāgh, *Biiāduna Filastīn* (Palestine Our Land) (Beirut, 1965-1966) part II, p. 139.
26. *Ibid*, pp. 138-40.
27. Nasir al-Dīn al-Nashāshībī, *A Return Ticket*, al-Maktab al-Tijāri (Beirut, 1962).
28. Sadek Jalāl Al-'Azm, *Dirāsāt 'Arabīyya*, Beirut, January, 1970, pp. 35-6.
29. *Nashrat al-Tha'r (The publication of revenge)*, Beirut No. 20. vol. 3 (April 7, 1955). 1955).
30. *Husām al-Khatīb, Shu'un Filastīnīyya*, Beirut, No. 4 (September 1971), p. 14.
31. *Ibid*, pp. 10-11.
32. Al-Fatah Adūwun Qawīyun Lakinnahu Laysa Ustūrīyan (A strong but not legendary enemy).
33. A. Hottinger, *The Arabs*, Thames and Hudson (London, 1963) p. 246.
34. This is not to say that there was no Palestinian organization at all in the 1950s: but what existed was rudimentary and underground and without wide public backing. From the end of 1952 until 1958, a Beirut weekly, *The Publication of Revenge*, was issued by the "Committee Opposing Peace with Israel." See "'Iṣām Sakhnīnī," Nashrat al-Tha'r: Qirāa fī Muqaddimāt al-fikr al-Mūqawim." *Shu'un Filastīnīyya*, No. 21 (May, 1973).
35. Ghantūs, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
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40. Al-Qāsim, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
41. 'Iṣām Sakhnīnī, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
42. Al-Qāsim, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.
43. Abu Shilbāyā, *No Peace without a Free Palestinian State*, Jerusalem, p. 24.
44. *Ibid*, pp. 25–26.
45. Al-Qāsim, *op. cit.* p. 32.
46. Abu Shilbāyā, *op. cit.* p. 28.
47. Ahmad Shuqayri, *Min Al-Qimma 'ilal-Hazīma* (From the summit to defeat) Dar al-'Awda, (Beirut, 1971) pp. 56-7.
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52. *The Yearbook of the Palestinian Problem for 1964*, Beirut, p. 102.
53. Al-Qāsim, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
54. Fatah, *A Strong Enemy*, etc.
55. *Alūsh, op. cit.*, p. 189.
56. 'Iṣām Sakhnīnī, *Shu'un Filastīnīyya*, no. 15 (November, 1972), p. 27.
57. *Al-Tali'a*, Cairo, June 1970.
58. *Alūsh, op. cit.*, pp. 77-86.
59. Nabīl Sha'ath, "High Level Palestine Manpower." *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Beirut, vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972), p. 90.

THE PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA ORGANIZATIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION*

MOSHE MA'OZ

A. *The USSR rejects the PLO*

In his autobiography, Ahmad Shuqayri, the former head of the PLO, writes that since 1948 he has sought to establish relations with the Soviet Union; as Syria's UN representative, he supported the USSR against the United States in every instance, in order to build friendly relations with the Soviet Union and utilize these relations for the Palestinian cause.

However, when Shuqayri later tried to collect the "debt" he felt was owed him by Russia, he was to be disappointed. From 1963 to 1965 Shuqayri courted the Russian embassies in the Arab countries, met with Kosygin, Khrushchev, Gromyko and Malik, and requested military assistance, aid for the refugees, recognition of the PLO, and permission for this group to open an office in Moscow.

"For two long years [1963-1965] I knocked on the gates of Moscow as though I were Henry IV, standing seven hundred years ago before the gates of Canossa, doing penance before the Pope. I did not seek penance for I did not sin, but I sought a large deposit that I made in the Soviet Union over a period of fifteen years. I came to request the settlement of this debt, even a fraction of a fraction of it".[1]

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*This article is based on a paper entitled "Soviet and Chinese Relations with the Palestinian Guerrilla Organization". The paper was submitted to a conference held at the University of Pennsylvania, in October 1973.

Later in his account, Shuqayri noted: "But the Soviet Union did not agree to the liberation of Palestine and did not want to recognize the Liberation Organization".[2]

The Soviet leadership explained to Shuqayri that they could not respond positively to his approaches because of the Russian attitude toward Israel, and because of his own position on the Palestine question.

They agreed to continue hearing his thoughts on Palestinian matters and suggested that he pass them on via a Soviet embassy. It was then that Shuqayri and the PLO decided to turn to China for assistance.

Despite Russia's negative response, its status as the largest and strongest power in the Middle East and the principal supplier of weapons to the radical Arab states motivated both Shuqayri and the guerrilla organizations to continue wooing the Soviet Union in the years to follow. They occasionally noted Russia's positive function in the UN Security Council in resisting American and British attacks, and termed the Soviet Union as the principal support of the Arab masses.

Nonetheless the Soviet Union continued to turn a deaf ear to the Palestinians' "courting". From 1965 to 1968, its relations with the PLO, al-Fatah and the other guerrilla groups can only be described as ranging from disregard to repudiation. During the first two years of the Palestinian guerrilla movement's activities (1965 to 1967) the Russians, convinced that it lacked significant political weight and could in no way serve Russian interests in the Middle East, disregarded it.[3] Russia had already succeeded in establishing its presence in the area through the legitimate Arab governments, and had no reason to support guerrilla organizations that were still in their formulative stages, in spite of the fact that some of them professed Marxist-Leninist principles.

Ideology was irrelevant to the Russians, who also had reservations about the guerrillas' declared intentions of destroying the State of Israel.

After the Six Day War, Russian disregard of the Palestinian guerrillas was, for a short period, replaced by a negative stance.

This change was due to Soviet suspicion that the guerrillas' activity would alter the status quo in the Middle East. These organizations threatened to undermine the Arab regimes from within and to ignite a new war with Israel. Such possibilities were likely to endanger the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East, which had already been weakened temporarily by the Six Day War, and so put an end to Moscow's efforts to reach a political solution that would preserve its status in the area. Perhaps the Soviet Union also suspected that such political shocks were likely to create conditions condusive to the encroachment of its growing enemy – China – in the Middle East.

The Russian press at the time sharply attacked and condemned the "adventurist" and "ultra-revolutionary" Palestinian guerrilla groups for pressing for another round with Israel, without considering the results. They were also called "backward elements of an Arab national movement that are nourished by the Chinese for their own purposes".[4]

B. *Change in Soviet policy*

With the strengthening of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, particularly al-Fatah, after 1968, and their growing political importance both in the Arab world and on the international scene, the USSR shifted its policy toward these groups and sought to improve its relations with them. It hoped to establish its influence over this new, weighty factor in Middle Eastern politics and so serve its own interests in the region.

Russia now considered the Palestinian guerrilla movement to be an active, significant factor in the region, able to call upon considerable support among the Arabs. By developing relations with the Palestinians, the Soviet Union could strengthen its image which had suffered in the previous few years due to its inability to achieve a "political solution" to the Palestine problem, and to its and Egypt's strategic miscalculation in the war of attrition against Israel.

It must be strongly emphasized that the Soviet Union did not see the improvement of its relations with the Palestinian

guerrilla movement as a substitute for its orientation toward the radical Arab states (Egypt, Iraq and Syria) — even though its relations with these states had cooled off. Rather, this development fit within the framework of that orientation; indeed at that time there was also a substantial improvement in the relations between the Palestinian organizations and the radical Arab states, which was expressed in coordinated and cooperative activities.

Furthermore, from the Soviet Union's viewpoint, the Palestinian guerrilla movement was likely to become a factor to be exploited in the event of an Arab-Israeli settlement that was not to Moscow's liking, especially if it were to take the form of an Israeli-Jordanian accord under American influence. Relations with the Palestinians were also important to the Soviet Union in the event that the regime in Jordan was toppled by guerrilla intervention, or a Palestinian state was established on the West Bank.

In addition to this objective, Russia also sought to neutralize every power source in the Middle East that could potentially weaken and undermine its position through ties with an antagonistic power. In this respect, the Russians were obviously suspicious of Peking's influence upon the Palestinian guerrillas, and feared that China would gain an advantage over the Soviet Union in the struggle for the leadership of the national liberation movements in Asia and Africa.

These considerations motivated then the Soviet Union to change its policy toward the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, particularly al-Fatah and the PLO. (There was almost no improvement in relations with the marginal Palestininan extremist groups because of their plane hijackings and "provocative activity" against Israel and other states.) The strengthening of ties with the Palestinian guerrilla movement was, however, neither initiated nor initially executed on an official Soviet governmental level, but rather was channeled through various public bodies serving the USSR. Clearly the Soviet Union was cautious of officially tying itself to the Palestinian guerrilla organizations whose political future was uncertain —— espe-

cially when such official support was likely to complicate the relations between the Soviet Union and the pro-Western Arab nations (e.g. Lebanon and Jordan), or result in American intervention.[5]

In the summer of 1968 and increasingly during 1969, the Soviet press began giving wide coverage to the activities of the Palestinian movement, through analytical articles and translations from Arab newspapers. In these articles the existence of the Arab people of Palestine was noted and the Palestinian guerrillas were described as "partisans".[6] In the following years, articles by Soviet journalists frequently contained such phrases as "the Palestinian resistance movement", and described operations against "the conquerors and ruling circles" in Israel as "desirable and legitimate revolutionary" actions.[7]

The Soviet Union also sought to improve relations with the Palestinians through international or Soviet public bodies subject to governmental dictates, such as women's, laborers' and students' organizations, the 'World Peace Council' and the 'Afro-Asian Solidarity Commission'. Thus, for example, a delegation of Palestinian women arrived in the Soviet Union in March 1973 upon the invitation of the Soviet Women's Association,[8] and Yassir Arafat and his delegation were warmly received at the World University Games in Moscow in August of that year. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee extended several invitations to Yassir Arafat and other Palestinian representatives to visit the Soviet Union and meet with representatives of public organizations, Communist Party leaders, authors and journalists;[9] one recent visit took place at the end of November 1973, shortly after the October war between the Arab states and Israel.

C. *Soviets oppose extremism*

Along with these gestures of friendship, the Soviet Union instructed the Arab Communist Parties in 1970 to improve relations with the Palestinian guerrilla organizations and to seek to bring them under Russian influence. Accordingly, these parties declared their full support for the "Palestinian liberation

movement"; indeed, some of them went as far as expressing a more extreme line regarding the Palestinian question than that of the Soviet Union, and matching the guerrilla organizations in their call for the destruction of Israel.

The Iraqi Communist Party declared that *fedayeen* activity was the realization of the Arab Palestinian nation's struggle and aspiration to liberate the homeland and reclaim its stolen rights, including self-determination in that homeland. It issued a message calling upon all liberated Arab states and Arab peoples "to support and assist this movement [*fedayeen*] with neither conditions nor reservations and with all material, technical and military means, and to enable Arab youth to join the *fedayeen* organizations."[10]

The Jordanian Communist Party took practical steps in this direction, publicly announcing the establishment of a new, armed organization called "Quwwat al-Ansar". Among the declared objectives of the organization were an anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist campaign and the liberation of Palestine.

Such extreme positions, which diverged from the Soviet Union's line, aroused the criticism of the Soviet Union. In deliberations held in Moscow on the Syrian Communist Party's platform, the Russians denounced the call for Israel's destruction, and recognized that Israel is an existing fact.[12] They emphasized to the Palestinians that there was no contradiction between a political solution, which the USSR backed, and the national aspirations of the Palestinian people. According to the Soviet Union, these aspirations were likely to be realized in two stages: the first, after Israel's return to the borders of 1967, and the second, after its return to the 1947 borders —— a demand which the Soviet Union would be likely to make after the termination of the first stage.[13]

At various opportunities, the Soviet press has tried to create the impression that the objective of the Palestinian guerrilla movement is the execution of Security Council Resolution 242, and has tended to support a Palestinian armed struggle to this end only. Thus, though some Soviet circles have expressed "understanding" for the motivation of various terrorist opera-

tions in Europe, such as Munich;[14] the methods used, especially the hijacking of planes, have generally been condemned.[15] A typical expression of this condemnation may be found in a statement made in July 1969 by Primakov, *Pravda's* correspondent in Cairo, to an Egyptian journalist: "We, as a government and people support the struggle of the Palestinian people to free the occupied territories. There are, however, various aspects which we cannot support, e.g. we are against attacking civilian airplanes or other civilian objects." He emphasized that the Soviet Union opposes extremism because "...it knows well that adventurism might be a threat to Arab revolutionary progressive regimes."[16]

D. *Growing Soviet support*

Soviet support for the Palestinian struggle was not limited to the Russian press only; it came gradually also from Soviet officials and leaders. In February 1969, Tass, the Soviet government news agency, reported an official message from the Soviet Union's UN delegation that described the activity of the Palestinian guerrilla movement as "a struggle of liberation" and added that the "struggle of peoples against invaders and occupiers is motivated and just from the viewpoint of international law".[17] A Soviet representative in the UN also initiated a proposal supporting the right of "peoples who are under colonial domination" to engage in armed struggle.[18]

In October 1969 Alexander Shelepin, of the Soviet Communist Party's Politburo and Chairman of the Trade Unions, proclaimed at a World Assembly of the Communist Trade Unions in Budapest: "We consider the struggle of Palestinian patriots for the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression as a just anti-imperialist struggle, and we support it".[19] The Prime Minister of the USSR, Alexei Kosygin, expressed similar opinions in November 1969,[20] and in October 1970, the Secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev, described Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan as "troops of the Palestinian resistance movement".[21]

The Soviet policy of political support for the Palestinian

guerrilla organizations, which was semi-official since the end of 1969, and became more overt after the expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt in the summer of 1972, achieved explicit and full sanction after the October 1973 war. A joint statement issued in Moscow following the Brezhnev-Tito talks in mid-November 1973, called for the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab nation.[22] Nonetheless, the Soviet Union has continued to deny requests made by the PLO until the spring of 1975 to open an office in Moscow, even though such an office was later opened in East Germany in August 1973 and in Rumania as well.

The increasing Soviet support of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations also found expression in military aid. When relations between Russia and the guerrillas began to improve at the end of 1968, the Soviet Union agreed to supply them with weapons and equipment indirectly, through East European countries. War material and medical equipment continues to stream to the Palestinian guerrillas from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and East Germany. News of a large weapons deal between Arafat and East Germany became known in the summer of 1973.[23]

Since the end of 1971, the Soviet Union has provided the Palestinian guerrilla movement with substantial direct military aid,[24] and has offered to train al-Fatah members and hospitalize the wounded in Russia.[25] Al-Fatah received the first Soviet arms shipment, consisting primarily of light weapons, through Syria in September 1972. Among the weapons apparently supplied to the guerrillas, directly or indirectly, were the Russian made SAM 7 anti-aircraft missiles which were found in the arsenal of Black September members in Rome in the autumn of 1973. Other shipments consisted of medical supplies and a variety of equipment.[26]

There have also been reports of Russian and East European intelligence aid to the Palestinians,[27] such as the assistance extended by the Czechs to the guerrillas who overpowered a train carrying Russian Jews from Czechoslovakia to Austria in September 1973. Russian support of the Palestinians was expres-

sed when it interceded in Jordan for the commutation of the death sentences decreed for Abu Daud and other al-Fatah members.[28]

E. *The PLO criticism of the USSR*

The Soviet Union's cautious policy toward the guerrilla organization until a few years ago met with critical response on the part of the Palestinians. In a statement made in January 1971, Abu Iyad, one of the leaders of al-Fatah, hinted the reserved attitude of his organization toward Russia, which backed peace talks between Egypt, Jordan and Israel. "The only power which adopts the commando point of view is China.... Our only real friend now is Communist China,"[29] he said.

Arafat also spoke ironically of the Soviet Union's stand, saying that his organization was further left than the Soviet Union itself, because the latter sought a "peaceful solution" while the PLO rejected such a solution.[30] On his return from talks in Moscow in October 1971, Arafat announced that "Moscow snow is warmer now than it used to be".[31] Similarly, in a conference dealing with the national liberation movement and the socialist states, held under the auspices of *al-Ahram*, representatives of the Palestinian movement publicity committee complained that the Palestinian issue did not receive the same backing from the Soviet Union as did other issues, like Vietnam, whose fate the Soviet Union was interested in determining.[32]

Shu'un filastiniyya, an important Palestinian periodical published in Beirut, which carefully followed Russian activities related to the Arab-Israeli dispute, complained of the reserved approach of Soviet leaders to the Palestinian problem during such important events as the Twenty-Fourth Conference of the Soviet Communist Party (March 1971) at which Leonid Brezhnev spoke, and at the visit of Nikolai Podgorny, President of the USSR, in Egypt in the summer of 1971. Although in both instances the Soviet leaders condemned Israel and noted the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, they did not mention the Palestinian struggle at all.[33]

In addition, Palestinian publications commented critically upon Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel, and upon contacts between the two countries regarding a renewal of diplomatic relations. In talks with Russian newspaper editors, senior Palestinian representatives implied that such Soviet policies were likely to strengthen reactionary forces in the Arab world and force nationalist organizations into America's sphere of influence.

They emphasized that since imperialistic and reactionary interests were invested in this area, which contains a large part of the world's oil reserves, Russian support of nationalist organizations and resistance movements was of great importance. The Palestinians further pointed out that the liberation organizations were convinced that the radical Arab states must maintain friendly relations and cooperate with the Soviet Union, reasoning that these states supported the Arab liberation movement, which was part of the world liberation movement. The Palestinian representatives noted that they could distinguish between their political friends and enemies, and wanted to increase the ranks of their friends.[34]

It may be nevertheless said that the fundamental approach of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations to the Soviet Union is basically pragmatic and not ideological. The Soviets are seen as suppliers of aid and support in realizing Palestinian goals, not as sources of conceptual inspiration.

The PLO and al-Fatah have endeavored to strike a position of independence in their relations with the Soviet Union. They have been largely unwilling to follow the dictates of this power in matters felt to be of essential importance to Palestinian goals, unless the Soviet directives were either compatible with these objectives or concerned matters of secondary importance. On other levels, however, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations have been interested in pleasing the Soviet Union and cooperating with it as far as possible.

The guerrilla organizations, for example, have been prepared to study the experience of Communist liberation movements and apply it to the administration of their own struggle, but they have

not been interested in Communist ideology and are far from a Communist world-view. To the extent that a process of radicalization exists within the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, it stems largely from internal developments rather than from Soviet influence. Partly as an expression of thanks to the USSR for its aid, and partly out of self conviction, the Palestinian guerrilla movement has occasionally adopted Marxist slogans, and has even followed radical-left operational lines.

Thus, at the Tenth National Convention of the "Palestinian Liberation Organization", held in April 1972, the movement declared its intention of participating in the struggle against (American) imperialism in the Middle East in all of its forms —— military bases, financial investments and cultural institutions.[35] It is reasonable to assume that this leftist-revolutionary mantle was partly to satisfy the USSR and partly to strengthen the Palestinian image among world liberation movements.

By the same token, the demands of the Soviet Union for the unification of the guerrilla groups was only partially satisfied by the Palestinian movement. After a period of obstinacy, the various guerrilla leaders overcame their suspicion that each would forfeit his position of leadership within an inclusive organization, and decided in April 1971 to unite under a general framework called the "United National Front", within which each group would maintain its organizational independence and ideology.[36] In this federative union of organizations, al-Fatah by and large maintained its dominance, and the senior position of Yassir Arafat as leader of al-Fatah and the PLO was hardly affected.

To be sure, the PLO and al-Fatah leaders took this step essentially because they felt that it would enhance their image within the Arab world and on the international scene, and not simply because the Soviet Union urged them to do so. Indeed, examples of Palestinian defiance of Russian dictates on this issue occurred during the previous year, when Arafat stubbornly refused to include in the delegation of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations to Moscow (October 1971) representatives of the

Popular Front, the Democratic Front and the Iraqi-based Liberation Front.[37]

For example, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations did not fully acquiesce to Soviet demands to cease terrorist activities against international, civilian targets and concentrate its activity in the West Bank of the Jordan. Externally the Palestinian guerrilla groups disassociated themselves from operations like Munich and Khartoum, but in conversations with Soviet editors, guerrilla leaders pointed out the immense value of such operations to the Palestinian people and to the Socialist world. They felt that Munich struck a blow to Arab circles which called for the severing of relations with the Socialist camp, spurred Egypt into improving relations with the USSR, forced America and Israel to recognize the Palestinian entity, and raised the morale of Palestinians in the Arab countries.[38]

Another demonstration of the Palestinian movement's independence of the Soviet Union is reflected in its continuing relations with China against the wishes of the USSR. The Palestinian guerrilla organizations attach great importance to maintaining relations with China, "the greatest nation in the world", as Shuqayri put it, that has allied itself with the refugee-nation of "the dispersed and exiled Palestinians",[39] and has supported it without reservation.

F. *Conclusions*

On the whole, it can be concluded that in its practical policies, the Palestinian guerrilla movement has by no means become a Marxist-revolutionary movement, united and led by Moscow. It does not follow Soviet lines in its struggle against Israel, nor has it fulfilled Soviet expectations of carrying on a popular war in the conquered territories. It is also doubtful that the movement has contributed to a more pro-Soviet orientation of the radical Arab states.

Several factors prevent the movement from realizing communist doctrines and advancing Soviet interests in the Middle East. First, the outlook of the PLO is primarily Arab-nationalist and somewhat Islamic, but not Marxist-Leninist; and its goal is

the liberation of Palestine and not the propagation of Communist interests in the region. Secondly, the Palestinian guerrilla organizations have proved themselves incapable of carrying on a popular war in Israeli-held territory, as is prescribed by Communist strategy, because of Israel's power and their own weakness. For a similar reason, the Palestinian liberation movement has not succeeded in toppling the pro-Western regime in Jordan.

Yet another local factor affects the relations between the Communist powers and the guerrilla organizations. These groups function in relative freedom in the radical Arab states, but they are to a great extent dependent upon the good will of the host regimes. The Arab states serve as a filter between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the Palestinian guerrilla organizations on the other. They regulate the influence of the USSR on the guerrilla organizations by preventing direct and extensive contact between the parties, since the means of influence (weapons, equipment and other material aid) must pass through their territories.

The October 1973 war has served to strengthen the relations between the USSR and the Palestinian guerrilla movement, and is likely to raise these relations, for the first time, to a level similar to those enjoyed by the USSR and the radical Arab states. The war enabled the Soviet Union to prove its massive support for the Arab war against Israel, and its ardent backing of the Palestinians' struggle for their national rights.

The present circumstances also provide the Soviet Union with an opportunity to work for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which could become yet another base of Soviet presence and influence in the Middle East. Failing to achieve this aim, the USSR could at least use the Palestinian card to try and undermine any *pax Americana*, i.e. Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli agreements reached under the auspices of the United States.

It would seem that the attitude of the guerrilla organizations toward the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank will be dictated, as ever, by their own aims rather than by

Russian considerations. Yet, in case they decide to demand a creation of a "first stage" state in parts of Palestine, the Palestinian guerrillas are likely to rely heavily on the Soviet Union for both political support and military assistance.

NOTES

1) Ahmad Shuqayri, *Min al-Qimma ila al-Hazima* (from the summit to the defeat) (Beirut, 1971) pp. 214-218.

2) *Ibid* p. 270.

3) Cf. O. Eran, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Guerrilla Organizations*, The Shiloah Center, Tel Aviv University, 1971, p. 3.

4) *Ibid* p. 5.

5) Radio Moscow 11 March 1973, *USSR and the Third World* Vol. III, no. 3, p. 182. See also *New York Times*, 7 June 1969.

6) Eran, *op. cit*, p. 8.

7) *Pravda*, 29 August 1972; *Al-Hadaf* (Beirut), 16 December 1972.

8) *USSR and the Third World*, III 3, 1973, p. 182.

9) See for example, *Soviet News* 24 February 1970; *Herald Tribune* 2 October 1971; *al-Anwar* (Beirut), 4 November 1971; "Radio Peace and Progress" 2 March 1973, in *USSR and the Third World, op. cit*, p. 182-3.

10) *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 1 March 1970.

11) *Al-Nida* (Beirut), 26 March 1972.

12) *Al-Ra'ya* (Beirut), 26 June 1972.

13) Eran *op. cit*, pp. 9-10.

14) See text of conversation between editors of Soviet newspapers and a Palestinian delegation in *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), 10 December 1972.

15) *Pravda* 17, 29 September 1970 quoted in Eran, *op. cit*, p. 9.

16) *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Cairo), 10 July 1969 quoted in A.Y. Yodfat "Moscow Reconsiders Fatah" *The New Middle East* No. 15 (December 1969) p. 17.

17) *Tass Statement Press Release*, 28 February 1969.

18) L. Romaniecki, *The Arab Terrorists in the Middle East and the Soviet Union*, The Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University (Jerusalem, 1973) p. 3.

19) *The Guardian*, 13 November 1969.

20) The *Daily Telegraph* (11 December 1969) reported that Kosygin declared Russian support of the just struggle of the Palestinians against Israel.

21) *Pravda* 3 October 1970.

22) *Al-Nahar* (Beirut) 17 November 1973.

23) *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv) 21 August 1973.

24) *Egyptian Gazette*, 11 November 1971; *International Herald Tribune*, 4 November 1971 quoting *Fath* journal.

25) *New York Times*, 30 December 1971; *Ha'aretz* (Tel Aviv) 21 August 1973; Cf. *Kul Shay* (Beirut), 4 March 1972.

26) *New York Times*, 18 September 1972; *Daily Telegraph*, 28 September 1972; *Ha'aretz*, 4 April 1973.

27) *International Herald Tribune*, 30 August 1972; *Egyptian Gazette*, 21 April 1973; *Ha'aretz*, 15 March 1973; *Kul Shay* (Beirut), 4 March 1972.

28) Tass New Agency, 11 March 1973, quoted in the *USSR and the Third World op. cit; Ha'aretz*, 15 March 1973.

29) *Daily Express* (London), report from Beirut, 5 January 1971; Cf. *Financial Times*, 5 January 1971.

30) Talāl Salmān, ma'a fath wa'l-fidayyun (Beirut, 1969), p. 20.

31) *Shu'un filastiniyya*, No. 5 (November 1971), p. 199.

32) Middle East News Agency, Cairo, 27 March 1972, reporting on a conference concerning the "National Liberation Movement and the Socialist Countries".

33) *Shu'un filastiniyya*, No. 3 (July 1971), pp. 159-160; No. 4 (September 1971), pp. 193-4; No. 5 (November 1971), p. 212. See also, *al-Hadaf* (Beirut), 23 December 1972.

34) *Ibid*, 16 December 1972 and 13 January 1973.

35) Munazzamat al-tahrir al-filastiniyya, al-mu'tāmar al-Sh'abi wa'l-majlis al-watani al-filastiniyya, al-dawra al-'āshira, 6-12 nisān 1972 (PLO, The Palestinian National Convention and Council, the 10th session, 6-12 April 1972), pp. 102, 130; cf. Muhimmāt al-marhala al-jadida, al-taqrir al-siyāsi lil-mu'tamar al-thalith lil-jabha al-sha'biyya li-tahrir filastin, March 1972, n.p. 1972 (Missions of the New Stage, the political report of the third convention of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), pp. 20-21.

36) *Arab Report and Record*, 1972, issue 7, 1-15 April, p. 197.

37) See *Shu'un filastiniyya* No. 5 (November 1971), p. 191.

38) *Al-Hadaf* (Beirut), 16 December 1972.

39) Shuqayri, *op. cit*, p. 250, 279.

THE RISE OF NEW POLITICAL CURRENTS IN THE ARAB SECTOR IN ISRAEL 1948-1974

ORI STENDEL

During the British Mandate, the political organization of the Arabs in Palestine was not cast into any one mold, nor was it marked with the stamp of a traditional structure, with all its characterizing features. The development of the town and the formation of an urban proletariat led to the emergence of the Communist Party as a political force, completely different in character from the existing structure, though still without any real influence. Its hold on the village was very weak, and even in the cities it had few members.[1]

In the State of Israel new currents gradually began to arise, separate from the traditional framework, and occupying the vacuum created by its reduced power.

There is no doubt that with the weakening of the *ḥamula* or the religious community, as the basic socio-political unity, the specific weight of the individual in Arab society has increased. He has less need for the *wasta* of traditional leaders to resolve his problems. He has less need for the *ḥamula* support and he is less willing to accept the authority of its leaders.

The young Arab in Israel has an increased sense of his independence, an awareness of his personality, and a more critical attitude. He recognizes the extent of the socio-political change that he must bring about in the society from which he

sprang. Not completely free of his obligations to the traditional leadership, he now sees its weak points and sometimes even exaggerates them.

It is hard for the Arab youngster to find his way in the confusion of the transition period. There is a weakening of loyalty based on blood ties within the family framework. He now has difficulty in defining where he belongs; he finds himself different from his father, different from his Jewish contemporaries; his own position has not yet crystallized.

Against this background the young Israeli-born Arab faces the question of his identity. He is increasingly in need of some framework in which he can become entirely integrated, which satisfies his desires, and clarifies his identity.

We already know that the veteran notables in his family or religious community have failed to provide such a framework. Most of them lack the qualities valued by young Arab generation searching for leadership.

It is difficult to find such leaders. They are coming forward slowly. Meanwhile "substitute figures" arise from time to time. Political organizations based on the individual try to fill the vacuum by preaching loyalty to the Arab nation and/or a world-embracing ideology. They direct the enthusiasm of the young Israel Arab against his country, and even against his *ḥamula's* elders.

At first glance it would appear that such organizations do in fact provide an adequate solution to the acute problems of Arab youth. But it soon becomes apparent that their solutions are based on a view of the world in black and white. Despite their severely critical attitude, the Arab youngsters are not willing to turn their backs completely on the *ḥamula* to which they belong, on the old leadership, or on traditions which have existed for generations.

The ideological doctrine of these parties seems borrowed from another world, whose summons to identify with the Arab nationalist movement does not help them find their way in daily life as citizens of the State in which they have grown up, and against which they are being called on to organize themselves.

The new organizations are swarming with members of every age, who are striving to become leaders of the Arabs of Israel. It is true that they are "liberated" from the traditional frameworks, but so far they all lack the qualities of leadership demanded by the young Arab generation. As a result there is a continual vacillation; members of the younger generation are wandering between two poles, between the *ḥamula* and the "party" of "movement", between the traditional frameworks and the new currents. The attraction of the party is seen most clearly during the elections to the Knesset, and much less during local municipal election campaigns. Most have not joined these parties, which remain little more than small nuclei of activists.

This can best be illustrated by describing the development of the principal political organizations which have been established by the Arabs of Israel, in opposition to the traditional leadership, and its aims and values.

A. ACTIVITY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE ISRAEL ARAB SECTOR

1. Outline of development 1948-1972

At the end of 1948, a "Unity Congress" was held in which without formal ceremonies, the nucleus of The Israel Communist Party, known as Maki, by its Hebrew initials, was established. In fact this party was not born in Israel. Its seeds had been sown in the British Mandatory period, during which it came into existence, with all the basic elements that characterize it. As time went by, it became clear that those Communists, Jews and Arabs, had a very alert "historical memory". The residues of the past are etched deeply into their consciousness.

Until 1943, the Palestinian Communist Party, P.C.P., was active in Palestine under joint Jewish-Arab leadership. However, most Arab workers also belonged to the Arab nationalist movement, which took part in attacks on the Jewish community, especially in 1936-37, at the height of the riots.

During the Second Wold War, conflicts within the party increased and the standing of its leader, Ridwan al-Ḥilu,

gradually deteriorated, while the strength of the educated Arab circles grew. Friction between Arabs and Jewish members led to a final split in 1949.

During the same period, a new group ("Usbat A-Taḥarur al-Watani") appeared in the Arab community: the League for National Liberation. It gradually assumed control over Arab communist circles, overshadowing the veteran workers' guard of the P.C.P., headed by "Musa". In contrast to the P.C.P., the League was composed entirely of educated Arabs not necessarily of proletarian origin. From the outset the League severed all its ties with Jewish Communist organizations. It prided itself on its pure Arab character and scornfully rejected Jewish applicants for membership. The League emphasized nationalist Arab ambitions. In its political platform it adopted the main political views of the Mufti, Haj Amin Al-Huseini, although in contrast to him it was willing to "recognize" the Jewish residents as citizens of a Palestinian Arab State (but it was willing to grant this "special privilege" only to those Jews who had come to the country before the Balfour Declaration of 1917).

The League leaders kept in close contact with the Mufti. On June 23, 1946, the Communist journal *al-Ittihad* extended warm congratulations to the Mufti on the occasion of his escape from France to Egypt. Delegations were continually sent to meet with him until the very outbreak of the war.[2]

After the Soviet declaration of support for the Palestine partition plan the League split up. One group, headed by Fu'ad Naṣṣar and Emil Ḥabibi, accepted the verdict of Soviet authority. A "rebel" camp, which put itself at the disposal of the Supreme Arab Committee, objected angrily to the proposed solution. Heading this group were Emil Toma and Musa Dajani.

When war broke out the Arab Communist leaders of all factions scattered in every direction. Many escaped, some were imprisoned by the Egyptian army.[3]

As the fighting died down, many of the key men of the Arab Communist organizations began to gather again in Israel. Among those who returned from Lebanon were the upper echelon leaders Emil Ḥabibi, Tawfiq Tubi, Advocate Ḥanna Naqqara

and Emil Toma. They concentrated on re-establishing the League cells in Haifa and Nazareth.

Under the new conditions, they found it realistic to set aside the conflicts of the past, at least temporarily and willingly accepted the initiative of the Jewish Communist leaders to reunite. Thus Maki was founded; its framework brought together the remnant of the P.C.P., both factions of the League for National Liberation and the Jewish Communists.

Ironically enough, the ranks of the revived party were strengthened with the assistance of the Israel Defence Forces which, as they advanced, freed Arab Communist prisoners from Egyptian captivity at the Abu 'Agela camp.[4] Today Arab leaders share senior positions in the Maki Leadership with Jewish comrades, against whom they had set out so furiously just before the establishment of the State.

The conflict between the two sections was not resolved, and there is no doubt that, throughout its history, the Israel Communist Party has been divided in spite of scrupulous efforts to gloss over internal conflicts. In 1965 it redivided as a consequence of the essential contradiction in its composition.

Still, Maki acted with great energy during its earlier years. It was the only political machine working among Israel Arabs after the founding of the State that was able to re-establish itself with relative speed and to escape the results the blood-riots which had only just ended, leaving a trail of deep destruction throughout the Arab population.

From the first, the party was a new political force which sought to challenge the traditional frameworks and even to replace them. From the beginning of its activity, Maki identified with the Arab nationalist movement, seeing in this path an effective means of winning the sympathies of Israel's Arabs.

In October 1949, Maki leader Meir Wilner emphasized the party's support of "independence for both nations within the State of Israel". But the formulation of the party's position on the question of recognition of the State of Israel always tended towards vague generalizations, sometimes making use of double meanings or resorting to innuendoes. This resulted from the

desire to find a "common denominator" between the Jews and Arabs in the party. The final wording was probably the result of long internal argument and negotiation between two basic positions not easy to reconcile. It would appear that generally the Arab nationalist stance was the decisive one.

The first national conference of Maki adopted a resolution: "recognizing the rightful aspiration of the Arab nation in Palestine for independence in its political life, and its natural and legal right to determine its fate".

The resolution also states, with special emphasis: "We are struggling for the establishment of an independent and democratic Arab State in the other part of Palestine."

Again and again the Arab Communists insisted on emphasizing the impossibility of reconciliation with the State of Israel within its present borders. Apparently they encountered opposition from the Jewish leaders of Maki who shrank from such a clear call for stripping Israel of territory as the first step towards its destruction.

In 1952, the Maki convention adopted a platform which included a key sentence on this basic question: "Israel's Arabs have the right to self-determination, including separation. This compromise wording was the result of stubborn negotiation during which most of the concessions were made by the Jewish Communists, without satisfying the demands of their Arab comrades.

The platform also contains demands for the rescinding of territorial annexations, for the recognition of the right of the Arab nation in Palestine to have an independent State, and for the right of the Arab refugees to return to their country.

From convention to convention, the internal conflict within Maki continued. The Arab leaders did not conceal their admiration for Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, emphasizing repeatedly their radical, nationalist attitude towards Israel. The Jewish Communists were harshly critical of the policy of the State of Israel, but they could not reconcile themselves to the narrow nationalist approach of their Arab comrades, which seemed to be a complete contradiction of the Marxist view.

There was a tremendous commotion at the Maki conference in June 1956, during preparations for the party's 13th convention. Arab members of the central committee demanded that the pre-convention platform include specific support of the idea of restricting the area of Israel to within the borders which were determined in the partition plan of 1947. Most of the Jewish members argued that the time was not suitable for raising such a point so bluntly. They supported more moderate wording and upheld the formula that both nations "have the right of self-determination". This time they even managed to drop from the summary the significant words: "including separation". The nationalist Arab circles in the party were enraged by this retreat, and in fact the resolutions of the 13th Congress itself, which was held in June 1957, again include these two key words. The wording of the final resolution was agreed upon only after prolonged bargaining. It reads: "The State of Israel must recognize the Arab Palestinian nation's right to self-determination, including separation, since it is basic to the solution of the territorial problem, and it must recognize the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homeland and to re-establish themselves in it. On the other hand, the Arab states must recognize the State of Israel and sign a treaty with it, to recognize Israel's right to free navigation in the Red Sea Straits and the Suez Canal...."

It appears that, in return for the agreeing to the right of separation, the moderates in the party managed to produce a less radical formula "for the sake of the Jewish public". The demand to "rescind the territorial annexations", which had been included in the 1952 platform, was shelved, and the convention declared that "it favors a solution to the problem under dispute between Israel and the Arab States only through peaceful means and negotiation between the parties".

These resolutions, the fruit of stormy arguments, were not the end of the story as far as the Arab communists were concerned. After the convention their agitation increased; they wanted to give full expression to the radical, nationalist policy to which they subscribed. The partnership with their Jewish comrades

was a burden they were ready to throw off. They were encouraged by the growing tension in the Arab sector caused by the political upsets then taking place in the Arab states.

Towards the end of 1957 their plan began to take shape. Within the Arab leadership of Maki the nucleus of the League for National Liberation was secretly formed; its aim was to undermine the foundations of the State of Israel, with the help of an active, secret agency working under cover of the political struggle. The ideological platform of this rebel movement threw overboard those compromises that typified the doctrine of Maki. It clearly maintained that the State of Israel is an imperialistic phenomenon which must be considered as "occupying Arab territory", while the Arabs living in it are a nation suffering the occupation of their country.

The League for National Liberation was to bring together all the Arab circles concerned with the fate of their nation. It was to become a part of the Nationalist Arab movement with close affinity to the Soviet Union, whose support was vital to the final aim of the movement. It was necessary to proceed by degrees, and in the early stages, the public proclamation of this goal was considered impolitic. During the first stage, the slogan was to be the call for the implementation of the partition resolution, thus reducing the area of Israel; granting the right of self-determination to the Arabs of Israel and returning the Arab refugees to within its borders. In this way the ground would be prepared for the final blow, as Israel would be consumed from within and the masses of returning refugees would drown it in a mighty flood.

Preparations were made during early 1958, until the plan was discovered by the Jewish members of the Maki leadership. They understood immediately what was involved and without delay began applying heavy pressure on the nucleus of the movement, hoping to break it up before harm was done.

The Jewish leaders of the party proved powerful and the radical Arab circles were afraid of a direct confrontation. They felt that the time was not right, especially because, at this time, the first signs of a break between Egypt and the Soviet Union

were beginning to appear. This break destroyed the united front idea which the Arab Communist leaders had sketched for themselves, in which their partners in the destruction of Israel would be both the Soviet bloc and the Nationalist Arab movement, headed by Abdul Nasser. Sharp differences of opinion arose within the Arab Communist leadership concerning the most suitable course of action; while the attempt to found the secret movement had failed, the intentions behind it did not disappear. The current of Arab nationalism continued to flow within the Communist Party, seeking an outlet. Indeed, during the 1958 May First demonstration, there was an outburst of violence which reflected these attitudes. "Workers Day" had always served Maki as an occasion to display its image as patron of the "downcast Arab minority in Israel", with large posters denouncing the "Israel Occupying Power", and demanding "return the Arab Refugees", "Give back the stolen lands", and, "Stop the National Oppression". On this occasion, the Maki processions in Nazareth and Umm al-Fahim were accompanied by outbursts of violence, including fights with the police. However, the security forces re-established order, arresting the chief instigators.

The Arab Communists saw this development as compensation for their failure to set up an underground national liberation movement, and they hastened to establish a "Public Arab Committee for the Protection of those in Prison and Exile". This declared aim was, superficially, very moderate. To widen the committee's scope, nationalistic Arab workers outside Maki were added, among them three outstanding senior notables: Yani Qustandi Yani, Chairman of the Kafr Yasif Council, Advocate Elias Kusa from Haifa and Jabur Jabur, head of the Shafa'amr municipality.[5] This new body rapidly turned into an "Arab Front", founded on July 6, 1958, and headed by Yani Yani, a local leader who was known for his violent hatred of the State of Israel.

It is possible that within the Arab Communist leadership there were some who cherished the hope that this new organization might some day develop into the nucleus of the longed-for rebel

movement. But the Jewish leaders of Maki were on their guard, and saw the advantage which they bring to the party. Maki extended its patronage and superimposed its own aims, until total identification was achieved; the sections dealing with social and economic questions were stricken from the group's platform in order to reduce the "weight" of Marxist doctrine.

After some time, the Arab Front's name was changed to "Popular Front". At its head stood an executive committee of 13, most of them from Maki circles. Branch offices were set up in a number of villages, but their scope was rather limited. It was a well-known fact in the Arab sector that the "Popular Front" was only a branch of Maki. Radical nationalistic workers in the "Popular Front" were not reconciled to this situation and left it about a year after it was founded, to set up the "Al-Ard Group".[6]

The "Popular Front" remained an ineffective organization, whose activities centered upon unsuccessful attempts to organize mass protest rallies, inciting Arab settlements against the Government and sending anti-Israel memoranda to international organizations. From time to time journals were published, in single editions bearing different versions of the title "Al-Ard".[7]

After the storm within Maki in 1958-9, relations between the Jewish and Arab leaders calmed down, though the conflicts were not resolved. The party tried to "have its cake and eat it", presenting itself as a radical fighter for the Arabs of Israel and, at the same time, striving to avoid antagonizing potential Jewish support by moderating its tone of identification with Arab nationalism. It thus often spoke ambiguously, or in intentionally vague generalities.

This argument of "tactical necessity" was used by the moderates in the party before the 14th convention in the spring of 1961, to exclude from the "Summary" the words "including separation", which "accompanied" the right of self-determination. Once again there was a stormy protest by the Arab members against this omission and apparently "electoral considerations" were not sufficient to silence it.

During the next four years, Arab strength in the Maki Central Committee increased. At the same time, the internal arguments

within the party leadership became more impassioned. The "concessions" made by the Arab leaders to their Jewish comrades in the name of party unity led, from 1958, to a withdrawal of impatient young Arabs from the ranks. This worried the Arab leadership and it increased its pressure for greater emphasis on a nationalist Arab tone, which was resisted by the Jewish Communist leaders. Nevertheless, the latter failed to win support from the Jewish public.

The Jewish Communist leaders were sharply denounced for compromising with the nationalist Arab movement. They could not shrug off responsibility for the sharp anti-Israel statements that appeared in *al-Ittihad* or in the manifestos circulated among Arab settlements. Their Arab comrades forced a decision upon them the moment they ceased to hold power in the central committee, in 1958.

Just before the 15th convention in 1965, Maki stood on the brink of a split, despite desperate attempts to pull back. The two sides drew up to confront each other; the political division was almost identical with the national one, showing a striking similarity to the division in the Communist camp in Palestine in 1943.

The elections to the convention would determine the balance of power within the higher organs of the party. The "Jewish" group headed by Mikunis, Sneh and Wilenska, had the better chance under the prevailing party electoral system, since they were supported by the majority of the branches in the Jewish sector. But in the central committee of the party the advantage was held by the rival camp, headed by Tubi, Ḥabibbi and Wilner. They used their position of strength to propose changes in the method of election, which in fact would ensure their victory through technical means.

There was a "District Revolt" against this plan, and the division widened into an unbridgeable chasm. The dispute was aired in the pages of *Kol Ha'am*, in an attempt to preserve the balance. Communist workers continued to claim emphatically that "the harshness of the dispute within the Communist Party is not necessarily a sign of a coming split", but the way to a

compromise was blocked. After lengthy negotiations an agreement was very nearly achieved, but in the end the Tubi-Wilner group backed out of it. Pressure within the Arab section, which was confident of its own strength, grew stronger. The split became a reality and there were two separate conventions, with different platforms, which reflected the ideological conflict behind the split. Thus the New Communist List — Rakah — was established in opposition to Maki. The two "sister" communist parties in the State of Israel were and are rivals to the core.

To a large extent, Maki remained a Jewish Communist Party, though its leaders have vehemently refused to recognise the loss of their hold in the Arab section. Very few Arabs have remained in its ranks. In order to preserve its declared character as a mixed party, some Arabs who had not previously held key positions, such as Muhammad al-Khatib and Muhammad Ḥasan Jabbarin were promoted. *Kol Ha'am*, which appears in Hebrew, is the Maki mouthpiece. Maki's activity in Arab areas is very limited, though its platform still emphasizes its sympathy with the problems of the Arabs in Israel.

In the December 1973 elections Maki was reorganized and certain circles of leftists Zionists joined "Moked" with the purpose of presenting a new image. Thus the drawing power of Arab votes was further diminished.

Rakah, on the other hand, concentrates all its forces on the Arab public. It is estimated that Jews still account for about one-third of its members, but they do not differ from their Arab comrades in their approach to the State of Israel. The Jewish section of the party has its centre in a small private apartment in Tel Aviv, which is also the editorial office of the Rakah Hebrew organ *Zo Haderekh* (This is the Way); its very small circulation reflects the party's lack of influence in the Jewish community.

Rakah is not an independent party. As a Communist Party it follows the Kremlin line without reservation. Until the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with Israel, Rakah leaders kept in close contact with the Soviet Ambassador in Israel. During the period of the split with Maki, Soviet Ambassador

Chubakhin was active, apparently, in trying to maintain party unity. In June 1965, at the height of the tension between the two sections, he even paid a visit to Nazareth.

Since the Six Day War, the differences between Maki and Rakah have become more pronounced. Rakah supports, without hesitation, the Soviet penetration of the Middle East and the Kremlin's aid to the Arab states. On the other hand, Maki criticizes Soviet policy and supports Israel's demand for a true peace as a necessary basis for the solution of the dispute.

Rakah defines Israel as a warmonger and an "imperialistic country" which is oppressing its Arab minority. In its propaganda, every action taken by the Government of Israel is criticized, and every personal or public problem of Arabs in Israel, whatever its source, is presented as additional evidence of anti-Arab discrimination. The style of Rakah's attacks is violent, fanatical and imbued with bitterness.

2. The Arab Leadership in the Communist Party

The front rank of Arab leaders in the Communist Party consists, to a great extent, of key figures of the Communists organizations that were active in Palestine during the final phase of British rule. The veteran quartet of Emil Ḥabibi, Bulus Farah, Ḥanna Naqqara and Emil Toma returned to prominence in Haifa immediately after the 1948 war.[8] They lost no time in rallying their followers and re-establishing party cells.

Emil Ḥabibi is a man with a sense of leadership, an exciting speaker, tireless organizer and prolific journalist. He has a permanent column in his party's newspaper and often signs his articles with the nom de plume Guhayna.[9] Alongside Ḥabibi stands Emil Toma, "ideologist" of the Israel Arab Communists, who has once again assumed the editorship of *al-Ittihad*. Radical in his outlook, he often assumes the mantle of the "angry prophet", in his passionate denunciations of the State of Israel.[10]

Ḥanna Naqqara is the "legal officer" of the leadership. He represents the party in legal matters, submitting claims of "stolen lands", "deprivation" and "discrimination".[11] Bulus

Farah is a less outstanding figure; he did not long remain active within the party, but withdrew to handle his business affairs.[12]

In Nazareth, Tawfiq Tubi became prominent. He had not previously been among the central personalities of the Arab Communist leadership, but he now became one of its chiefs, and was even chosen to represent it in the Knesset. He rose rapidly in influence to the top of the party ladder. Since January 1949, he has held a safe seat in the Knesset as representative of the Communists.[13] The importance of Nazareth in the politics of the Arab sector has helped leaders from that town, particularly Saliba Khamis, the late Fuad Khuri, and Mun'im Jarjura, rise to leadership in the Communist Party.[14]

In the course of time, other personalities rose in the Arab section of the Communist Party on the local level: Uthman Abu Ras from Tayba, Rakah secretary in the Little Triangle, who usually appears among the party's top ten candidates in the Knesset elections; Ramzi Khuri of Acre, known as the "strong man" (He is Rakah secretary in the town and a member of the municipal council. He, too, is a member of the Greek Orthodox community); veteran Acre Communist Jamal Musa, who was among those chosen for the honor of closing the Rakah list for the 1965 Knesset elections; Zaki Karkabi, a Greek Orthodox resident of Haifa who rose to membership of the Rakah central committee; and Yusuf As'ad, chairman of the village council at Yafi'a, near Nazareth, representative of the village leader who is a member of the Communist Party.

The political pyramid of the Communist Party in the Arab sector has shown almost no significant change of personnel since the founding of the State. The "permanent" members of Knesset, Emil Habibi and Tawfiq Tubi, are firmly at the top of the ladder. These two have very different personalities. Tawfiq Tubi, critical, serious, conservative in his habits, is regarded as particularly loyal to Moscow; he is the moderate among the members of the old guard and the most devoted in his Marxist views. It was easy for him to serve as a bridge between the two currents within Maki; he found a common language with the Jewish communist leaders more easily than did his Arab

comrades. Emil Ḥabibi, on the other hand, is known to the Arab public as an ardent nationalist. There is a rumor, perhaps started by one of his rivals, that at one of his meetings with Soviet leaders in Moscow he asked them to declare the 1947 Soviet support of the founding of the State of Israel a Stalinist mistake.[15] He is a facile and fiery speaker as well as a superb political tactician. Some see him as the real leader of Rakah.

Within Rakah leadership the weight of the Christian Arabs is decisive; especially important are those of the Greek-Orthodox community. They have an absolute majority within the Arab Communist leadership, out of all proportion to their number among the general Arab population. They represent the veteran leadership which has held on to its power, but which is now growing old.[16]

Surprisingly, there is a lack of young people in senior positions in this party which appeals to the young and considers itself so revolutionary. There is also a noticeable scarcity of Muslim leaders.

With the development of the branches in the Little Triangle, whose population is entirely Muslim, the position of 'Uthman Abu Ras has become stronger, but it is still not equal to that of the Christian leaders: Ḥabibi, Tubi, Khamis, Toma or Naqqara.

It is hard to reach the front rank of the Arab Communist Party. Key positions are strongly held and every change is something of a shock. There was great agitation in the Nazareth branch of Rakah, in 1971, when such a change took place. Until the death of Fuad Khuri, in 1968, the Greek-Orthodox leadership faction ruled in the town, the "Rakah Capital". There has since been a reshuffling, and in the 1970 Nazareth municipal elections the list was headed by a Muslim, the poet, Tawfiq Ziad who contested this place against the Greek-Orthodox leader Mun'im Jarjura. The contest was accompanied by great tension within the local branch of the party, in spite of the fact that community religious considerations are ostensibly of no significance in the Communist Party, which fights against traditional framework.

Tawfiq Ziad is not representative of the Muslims seeking key positions in the Rakah party. He is not a member of the old

guard, having joined the party when the State was founded. Today he is about 40 years old and his profession as a writer gains him much respect from the younger Rakah members. In the Eighth Knesset Tawfiq Ziad was elected as a MK for Rakah, and important changes in the Party were instituted.

Young Arab poets whose works passionately attack the State of Israel enjoy special standing in Rakah. They have university education, and many of them are lawyers. They are seen as the future replacements of the Party's old guard leaders.[17]

3. The Organizational Structure

It is estimated that Rakah has about 600 registered Arab members, but there is no doubt that it has the sympathies of a much wider public. The large gap between the number of active members and the votes it gets in elections is one of the characteristics of this Communist Party.

The party is organized on five levels:

a. The Party convention, which meets once a year. The resolutions adopted by this supreme body are in fact decided before it convenes.

b. The Central Committee: This body decides all party matters. It is composed of a number of committees, most important of which are the Secretariat and the Political Bureau. Also important are the Trade Union Committee and the Communist Youth Committee.

c. The District Committees: The party is divided into territorial districts, with a district committee in charge of the branches in its area. It is subordinate to the central committee. There are two principal district committees: Nazareth, which organizes Party activity in the largest Arab community in Galilee, and the Little Triangle, which is in charge of the branches in Umm al-Fahim, Tayba, Tira, and other villages in the area.

d. The Branches: In every district there are a number of branches, which are subdivided into cells. These deal with local matters. At their weekly meetings they decide on questions of organization, propaganda, membership dues and contributions, enrollment of new members and local affairs.

e. The Cells: The cell is the basic organizational unit. It has a small number of members. Branches are generally divided into an ideological cell, a women's cell and a youth cell, though these may be united in small cells.

Rakah nerve centres are in Nazareth and Haifa. Only in recent years has it begun to develop in the Little Triangle. Nazareth is considered the "Rakah Capital". The party has a large branch in the town, located near the "Moskobiye". It is opposite a large open space which was donated to Rakah by the Russian church and is used for open air assemblies.

Nazareth is the centre of Rakah's "First of May" demonstrations. The starting point for its processions is the square near Miriam's Well, next to the Church of the Annunciation. It is called "Saḥat Awal Ayar" (First of May Square).

In the Seventh Knesset elections, held in November 1969 5,580 Nazarens, 44.2% of the total, voted for Rakah; it has proved to be the strongest party in town.[18]

In the Nazareth municipal elections of December 8, 1970, Rakah won 39% of the vote and received seven seats out of 17 seats in the town council. This decline is to some extent the result of differences between national and local considerations; it may also reflect the internal conflicts within Rakah when the list of candidates was being drawn up. In addition, the efficient organization of rival lists helped check the rise of the Communist Party.

Rakah's second base is Haifa. The party's press is located on the main street of the Wadi Nisnas neighborhood. Here the twice-weekly *al-Ittihad* is published, as well as the literary monthly *al-Jadid* (The New) and the youth organization's *al-Ghad* (The Tomorrow). Hanna Ibrahim Elias, from the village of Bi'na, is in charge of the modern press.

In the Little Triangle, Rakah activity is concentrated in the three large villages, Tayba, Umm-al-Fahim and Tira. There is also a network of cells spread through the smaller villages. Rakah has even penetrated Druze settlements which have always shown a profound loyalty to the State.[19] Its hold among the Druze is weak, but it continues to cultivate it.

Rakah energetically directs the activities of its cells. Through them it distributes its publications, recruits new members and electioneers. It often organizes congresses, meetings and cultural evenings, with readings of nationalistic poems of an inflammatory nature.

Internal party discipline is strong, especially within the youth organization, which has manifold activities.

It is very active in trade unions. In elections to the Teacher's Union, Rakah works through the Democratic Teachers Faction, which is a front organization for the Communist Party. It has a strong influence within the Arab Student's Committees, though this is not in itself an indication of influence on the general Arab student body.

Rakah effectively employs the organizational technique of establishing various "fronts", to increase its influence in specific fields. Fronts have their own names and are ostensibly independent, but they are in fact directed by active Rakah members, in accordance with party directives.

4. The Position of Rakah in the Arab Sector

In the complex situation in which the Arabs of Israel find themselves, Rakah is a factor of particular importance. However, even after the split, it is still a party with inherent contradictions.

The Marxist-Leninist doctrine serves as a strange cloak for Arab nationalist fervor. The supreme councils of the party contains both Arab leaders who have with difficulty managed to absorb a foreign ideology, and bizarre Jews with grave visages, who regard themselves as priests in a sacred ritual. The pattern of internal relations is accordingly complex and filled with tension.

Rakah stands at the extreme left of the Israel political spectrum.

To the general Jewish public, it represents blind opposition to the State and has thus become the symbol of Arab nationalist hostility to Israel.

On the whole, the Arabs of Israel see Rakah as a factor which, to a large extent, determines their development. They are aware of the symbolic significance of Rakah with regard to the substance of the relationship between the two peoples within the State.

As a result, Rakah loses votes precisely at times when the security situation is most tense. This happened on the eve of the Knesset elections in 1969, when there was an increase in acts of sabotage, the victims of which were ordinary Israeli citizens, including women and children. Arabs withheld votes from Rakah to disassociate themselves from such acts of violence, and/or of fear that an increase in that party's strength would be interpreted as a demonstration of solidarity with the terrorist organizations and thus invite reaction from the Israel authorities or public.

There can be no doubt that Rakah enjoys the support of many who need an outlet for their personal bitterness and find it by opposing the parties in power, as well as those with some grudge against the Government. A demonstrative vote can be given to Rakah out of jealousy that some job has gone to a member of a rival family, or because a Minister visiting a village did not call at the house of the head of the *ḥamula*. In this way, Rakah "drinks from the well into which it spits",[20] since it gains votes through traditional inter-clan rivalry, while it stresses its independence of the traditional social frameworks with their hide-bound customs and feuds.

Such phenomena do, indeed, occur, but their importance should be exaggerated, and the achievements of Rakah at election time should be seen as measure of the feelings of the Arabs of Israel toward the State. These feelings are influenced by additional factors, two of which deserve mention:

a. *The status of the Soviet Union in the region and the pattern of its relations with the Arab States, especially with Egypt and Syria.*

When relations betwen the Soviet Union and the Arab States were at a low ebb, the Communist Party lost popularity. When

such a crisis occurred at election time it was clearly reflected in the outcome of the elections. In 1959, the shadow of the dispute between Egypt and Iraq was cast over Maki. Gamal Abdul Nasser was then attacking Communism, and there were fierce arguments within the party, between those adhering to the "Moscow line" and the fervent nationalist admirers of the Egyptian President. In the elections to the Fourth Knesset that year, the Communist Party earned 3,000 fewer votes than in the elections in 1955, and this in spite of the increase in the electorate.

Relations between Cairo and Moscow once again grew close; the Soviet penetration of the Nile Valley deepened and it was linked with solemn declarations of friendship. The hold of the Communist Party on the Arabs of Israel became stronger accordingly.

Soviet support of Egypt following the Arab States' debacle of June 1967, increased the pride of Rakah in the "source of its faith".

The rift between Egypt and the Soviet Union in the summer of 1972 weakened Rakah considerably within the Arab community and caused internal strife in the party.

b. *The Ability of Israel to hold fast, as seen by the Arabs of Israel.*

In the first few years after the establishment of Israel, it was not considered a State like any other. Arabs everywhere used to call it disparagingly "Al-Maz'uma", or "figment of the imagination", a temporary, transient thing, without any hope of survival. Not infrequently, political discussions among Arabs on the future of the young State used to end with the self-assured and condescending phrase of extremist Arab nationalists that, "its end is about to come, it is very, very close". The Communist Party was just beginning to clarify its policy, and this prevailing attitude no doubt helped greatly to consolidate its hold among the Arabs of Israel. In the first election campaign in 1949, it won 22.2% of all Arab votes. Since then, it has benefited from the weakening of the social patterns. There is no doubt that it would

have grown much more rapidly had there not been a gradual acquiescence amongst the Arabs of Israel to the existence of the State as a basic political reality; the more the State demonstrated its viability in its economic and social development, and its military strength, the more the Arabs have come to accept its existence.

The rise of the Communist Party in the Arab sector is reflected in the election graph. This shows ups and downs according to circumstances, but the general trend is fairly clear. Its two principal opponents:

a. The ruling party and the Arab lists associated with it;
b. Mapam (United Workers' Party).

The following table demonstrates the fluctuations in the rise of the Communist Party:

Arab Votes for the Communist Party and its Principal Rivals (%)

	Election Year	Communist Party[21]	Ruling Party and its list[22]	Mapam[23]
1st Knesset	1949	22.2	61.3	0.2
2nd Knesset	1951	16.3	66.5	5.6
3rd Knesset	1955	15.6	62.4	7.3
4th Knesset	1959	10.0	52.0	12.5
5th Knesset	1961	22.7	50.8	11.0
6th Knesset	1965	22.6	50.1	9.2
7th Knesset	1969	28.9	56.9	—[23]

Following the blow suffered by the Communist Party in 1959, when the prestige of the Soviet Union was damaged by the crisis in its relations with Egypt, the party recovered, and in the election of 1961, it collected close to a quarter of all the valid votes. Another sharp upward surge took place after the Six Day War, as seen in the election results of October 28, 1969.

In this campaign, two principal camps faced each other: the traditional forces rallying round the Labour Party and its lists; and the Rakah sympathizers, reinforced by young people voting for the first time.[24] Mapam having joined the Labour Party in a common bloc lost its identity to a large extent. The Arab Communists attacked it vehemently for having become an inseparable part of the establishment, and it is difficult to believe that, under these circumstances, Mapam could have succeeded in keeping its Arab votes, 10% of the total in 1965.

Rakah increased its strength mainly in the mixed towns and the large villages. It extended its influence in the Muslim villages of the Little Triangle. Even among the Beduin it registered a small increase, from 4.5% to 5.1%.[25]

In 1969 Rakah also recorded an impressive increase in local Arab municipal elections. In its campaign the party appeared in most localities openly, under its own name; whereas in 1965 it hid behind such facades as "Popular Democratic Front", the name differing from one locality to the other, but always including a "Democratic" label.[26]

On the average, Rakah votes went up from 19% in 1965 to 27% in 1969. The phenomenon of "split voting" was reduced, indicating strengthening of the local cells of the party and at the same time a new stage in the weakening of the traditional social patterns. But not all localities registered a uniform degree of success for Rakah. In some villages it lost votes because of its failure to help concretely in the development of services, or because the traditional forces united against it.

In East Jerusalem, the population almost entirely ignored Rakah, which did not have sufficient time to spread its cells within the city. Contrary to all forecasts, the Arab inhabitants decided to take part in the elections. Polling was twice as heavy as under the Jordanian government, perhaps because for the first time women had the right to vote.[27]

The voters, no doubt, sought to demonstrate their support for the Mayor, Teddy Kollek, because of his positive attitude toward them in the critical period following re-unification. Their votes reflected the impact of the effective services provided for

them, and their awareness that Jerusalem had indeed become a united city, not again to be divided, into which they must integrate. In view of its failure in East Jerusalem, Rakah will undoubtedly attempt to find ways to rally support for the 1973 elections.

Rakah was very successful in the 1969 elections to the Conference of the General Federation of Labour (Histadrut). Following an intense effort among the Arab workers, Rakah doubled its vote from 5,700 in 1965 to 11,366 in 1969.

Votes in the two Histadrut election campaigns

List	1965		1969	
	Number of Votes	%	Number of Votes	%
Rakah	5,700	19.8	11,366	31.4
Maarakh[28]	17,119	60.0	22,245	61.6
Mapam	3,847	13.4	———[28]	———[29]
Other lists	1,985	6.8	2,537	7.0
Total	28,651	100.0	36,148	100.0

The considerable success registered by Rakah in three electoral spheres — national, local and Histadrut, has encouraged it to intensify its activities in the Arab sector in order to obtain a decisive supremacy there.

On the face of it, therefore, a thorough transformation of political systems can be expected in the fairly near future.

At the same time, it is possible that Rakah's popularity may have reached its peak, for the following reasons:

a. The Arabs of Israel increasingly tend to accept the existence of the State, while Rakah is hostile to it. Rakah

attracted many votes among the young who sought to express their protests against the traditional leadership, within the context of the struggle between the generations which is taking place in Arab society. The decision of other parties to accept Arab members regardless of clan or community is likely to withdraw one of the planks from Rakah on which it relies for support.

b. There is a strong natural objection to Communism in all its manifestations among the Arab population in Israel; even Arab nationalist circles, at present Rakah's pillar of strength, regard it just as a substitute for a purely Arab nationalist party, without the participation of Jews and without "Marxist" limitations. Should such an Arab political force come into existence, Rakah would lose most of its present attraction for them.

c. The readiness of Rakah's Arab sympathizers to put up with its close association with the Kremlin depends upon the continuation of the alliance between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

Other changes in the political situation in the Middle East are also liable to affect Rakah adversely. A peace agreement would upset its program, since it would decrease the importance of the Arab national ideology contained in its platform.

B. THE ATTEMPT OF THE AL-ARD GROUP TO CREATE AN ARAB LIBERATION MOVEMENT

The Al-Ard group came into existence following a protracted effort to set up an Arab nationalist organization which would be independent of external bodies, but nevertheless linked in every respect to the center of the Arab national movement.[30] There is no doubt that its founders saw Gamal Abdul Nasser as the "father" of their movement. They had no use for the "fathers of Marxism-Leninism" who were the focus of admiration in Maki, a party which they challenged fanatically.

In the summer of 1959, the time seemed ripe for laying the foundations of the new movement. The echoes of the dispute between Cairo and Moscow were in the air, and in the "Popular Front" young Arab nationalists were stormily protesting against

Maki's identification with the Kremlin's support of the Iraqi ruler, 'Abdul Karim Qasim. The elections for the Fourth Knesset were drawing close and the influence of the election year was strongly felt among the Arab public.

Arab students at the Hebrew University were in ferment because of those events. Many sought ways of demonstrating their admiration of "Abu Khalid", the Egyptian President, whom they regarded as their supreme leader. They avidly believed his promise that the "day of liberation" was at hand and that before long the "Usurper State" would vanish from the map. Maki, subject to foreign authority, appeared to be heading in the wrong direction, and they outlined a plan for concrete action of their own.

Their horizons had been widened at the University; they had learned the meaning of Israeli democracy and they thought they could exploit it for their own aims.[31]

Prominent among them were law students who thought that their studies would help them to keep within the law while circumventing it.

In July, a split took place in the "Popular Front", and a new political group "Usrat al-Ard", or the "Family of the Land", made its appearance. This "family" was destined to undergo stormy changes.

From its inception, it aimed opposition at three groups stronger than itself:

a. The State of Israel constituted the principal target. Al-Ard group did not conceal its aspiration to "change the political map", and it decided to fight for the attainment of its aim as an Arab movement, without the participation of Jewish members. In their national zeal, its founders did not use the possibility, so well exploited by the Communist Party, of enlisting Jews in order to conceal the national character of the movement and present an image of a balanced party to the outside world. It seems that the members of the group were not prepared to trust Jews, even those who were altogether alienated from the State of Israel. They even failed to perceive the importance of explaining their cause to the Jews of Israel.

b. The members of Al-Ard saw the traditional Arab political set-up as an establishment which was ailing, out of step with the times and serving the Israel regime. They sought to undermine it further and cause its collapse.

c. The Israel Communist Party, the parent of the Al-Ard group, was in this initial stage its most dangerous enemy, precisely because of the similarity of aim. Maki still had members who could very well have been partners of the "Family of the Land", but, as long as they did not join it, they were prone to strangle it in its infancy. These people were older than the founders of Al-Ard, more experienced, and they had available a methodically built-up, ramified organizational machine. Furthermore, they were backed by a world power. They were the first to become alarmed by the appearance of the new group, fearing it might jeopardize their position with the Arab public because it was more extreme, "more Arab" and less dependent on foreign support.

At the time, Maki was an opponent of the "revolutionary regime" in Egypt, because of the support given by the Soviet Union to Qasim in Iraq. The Al-Ard group sought to take advantage of this fact, in the hope that it would be able to attract Arab nationalist circles. Maki fully realized this danger.[32]

The Al-Ard group emphasized the differences between it and Maki by all the means at its disposal. It looked for its *lebensraum* inside the Communist Party and sought to derive strength from it. Many Arab Communists welcomed it secretly, and identified with its objectives.

The two organizations, so close to each other, felt that there was no escaping a confrontation. The first "declaration of war" was made by Al-Ard in a roundabout but profoundly significant way. The Arabs of Israel were exhorted by the "Sons of the Family of the Land" to boycott the Knesset elections, since their very participation was tantamount to a recognition of the Zionist State. This was consistant with the basic principles of the extremist nationalist organization, but this approach was meant to hit Maki, for the supporters of the Communist Party were in fact being called upon not to vote for it.

Al-Ard regarded its extremism, its nationalism and its uncompromising attitude as the means of ensuring its advance over the forces in its path. It brought itself to the notice of the Arab public in sharp and unambiguous style.

Its first medium was a journal, full of incitement against the State, which made its appearance at the beginning of October, 1959. In order to escape the necessity of obtaining a required permit, the editors depicted it as a "one-time" publication, and issued it under a different name every week, until January 1960.

The weekly expressed emphatic support of Egypt. Its attitude to the Israel Government was peremptory and threatening: "The rulers of Israel must understand that the time has come for the solution of the refugee problem by means of justice, before it will be solved by the sword and what a sword it will be!"

Another article exhorts the Israel authorities: "Live and let others live and perhaps you will live!"

David Ben Gurion, the then Prime Minister, was contemptuously called the "Jerusalem dwarf". Cartoons to this effect appeared in all issues.

The editor, Salih Baransi, and his associates were brought to court for publishing a newspaper without a permit. They were found guilty and given suspended prison sentences.

From then onwards Al-Ard sought ways and means of expanding, while remaining within the protection of the law, and the lawyers in the group guided it through the possibilities provided by a democratic regime.

In the course of this effort Al-Ard passed through the following stages:

a. The setting-up of a "commerical company". Seven Al-Ard activists applied in June 1960, for the registration of the "Al-Ard Company Ltd."

The Registrar of Companies refused their request for "reasons of security and in the public interest". A legal struggle began for the right of the group to associate as a company. Mansur Qardush, one of its leaders, asked the High Court to order the Registrar of Companies to rescind his refusal.

The High Court upheld his claim by a majority of two to one and questioned the manner in which the Registrar had used his authority in the matter.[33]

The Attorney-General secured a review of the case by five High Court justices. At the beginning of 1962, the matter was heard again and the decision of the Registrar of Companies again annulled.[34] Accordingly, in the summer of 1962, a special company, with activities not confined to the sphere of business, joined the list of companies operating in Israel.

The decision of the High Court greatly encouraged Al-Ard, and confirmed its assumption that the confines of the law were wide enough to satisfy their needs.

Another attempt was made to obtain a permit to issue a weekly newspaper. This was rejected by the District Representative, and when they went again to the High Court the latter would not interfere with his decision.

The group continued its work of organization and, at the same time, sent memoranda containing accusations against the Government of Israel,[35] to international institutions and the foreign press.

After a period of internal consolidation, the Al-Ard activists took the next decisive step:

b. An attempt was made to register as an "association" under Ottoman law. This is the legal framework for parties in Israel and this step was intended to establish an extremist Arab party that would assist in the realization of the aims of the Arab national movement with regard to Israel.

The Government decided to thwart this attempt. The Haifa District Representative, to whom the members of Al-Ard applied, refused to approve the registration of the association, stating his reasons to their representative, Sabri Jiryis, as follows:

"I have examined the rule attached to your letter and especially section 3 (c) and also the material brought to my notice. After scrutiny, I have to communicate to you that:

The association named Al-Ard Movement that you propose, together with other persons to register, is an association set up

for the purpose of harming the existence of the State of Israel and its integrity .... Should it become clear that, in spite of what is stated above, you are acting as an association, steps may be taken against you under the law".

It was clear that an open confrontation was about to take place. The Al-Ard activists decided to take the initiative and attempted to exploit the letter of the law. They went once more to the High Court with a request to approve the legality of their association.

In the hearing which followed this action every aspect of the character of the Al-Ard movement, its objectives and its rights in a democratic State, were revealed.

The Attorney-General, Moshe Ben-Zeev,[36] appeared before the Court in person. He was assisted by Zvi Terlo, a lawyer of experience and great eloquence.[37] They collected various items of evidence of the subversive aims of the Al-Ard movement, in order to bring out his hostile character clearly.

They also suggested that the justices examine material which, for security reasons, could not be revealed in open court. The Court did not make use of this evidence.

The Attorney-General opened with an analysis of the aims of the group, according to its own rules, and reached the clear conclusion that it ignored the existence of the State and the rights of its Jewish residents.[38]

The three justices agreed unanimously with the decision of the Haifa District Representative, deciding that such an association exceeds the bounds of democracy, inasmuch as its purpose is to undermine it.

In the course of the deliberations, illustrations were provided outside the court of the link between Al-Ard and the tempest of Arab hatred surrounding Israel. Under the headline "We are coming back — this is the first spark" the Jordan paper *Filistin* carried an article saying enthusiastically that Al-Ard deserved, "support and encouragement, as it is the first spark of the revolution in Palestine, in the very heart of the stolen homeland....It is one of the dozens of organizations active in our occupied land and we must get to them and bring them under a

unified Palestinian command. This is not difficult for feddayyun who are willing to give their lives, in order to ignite the five of the revolution of return".

Cairo newspapers wrote in a similar vein, and Arab radio broadcasts were vociferous in their expressions of solidarity with the group.

In the meantime, intelligence agents from Egypt and Syria began seeking contact with Al-Ard activists, on the assumption that its members would not hesitate to cooperate with them at every level.

This was the background to the detention of four Al-Ard leaders: Mansur Qardush, Habib Qawaji, Sabri Jiryis and Salih Baransi.

At the end of November 1964, the Minister of Defence signed an order placing the Al-Ard outside the law. The order stated:

"A group of people known as the Al-Ard group, whatever its name be from time to time, and also a group of persons associated in the 'Al-Ard Company Limited' which was set up by the joint action of shareholders of the said company, or any part of them are an illegal association".

In pursuance of this order, the share company of the group was dissolved and its organized activity came to an end. The Arab public was not prepared to be dragged into illegal activity, and it sensed the danger to it inherent in this group.

The Al-Ard activists made another attempt to come to the surface before the elections of the Sixth Knesset in 1965. Circumventing the order of the Minister of Defence, they presented a list of candidates under the name of "The Arab Socialist List".

Participation in the Knesset elections contradicted a basic principle in their policy, and they had previously regarded participation in elections to the Israeli Parliament, as an act of recognition of the State. But when they saw there was no other way to obtain the protection of the law, they sought it in this manner. They hoped to exploit the immunity of parliamentary candidates and work within the framework of the new list, while

attempting to spell out too clearly their political aims, which had been subjected to such sharp criticism by the High Court.

The appearance of the list brought about a revolutionary change in Egypt's attitude towards Knesset elections. For the first time, the Arabs of Israel were not exhorted to boycott the elections. An Egyptian radio station, "Saut al-Arab", now appealed to the Arabs in Israel to give their votes to the "Arab Socialist List". This appeal was premature. The Central Elections committee disqualified the list, seeing in it a permutation of the Al-Ard movement.

Rejecting the list's appeal, the High Court accepted the argument of the Attorney General that it was, indeed, "the same woman in different garb".[39]

In his appeal, advocate Ya'acov Yeridor claimed that the authority of the Elections Committee to disqualify lists was confined solely to grounds of deficiencies enumerated in the Knesset Elections Law.

The Committee's authority was, indeed, limited, he argued so that it could not prevent the emergence of new political lists, whatever their orientation.

The High Court, by majority decision held that there is a limit to the freedom of political competition, where the body endeavoring to participate in it is bent upon undermining the foundation of the State.

The President of the Court, Justice Shimon Agranat, after analyzing the wider meaning of the Knesset Elections Law, stated:

"I agree that, in the normal course of events, the Central Elections Committee should not go into the personal background of the candidates or their political opinions, when exercising its authority to approve or reject a list of candidates. This rule, however, does not apply in the present case: the moment the attention of the Committee was drawn to the fact that the list making the application is identical with the group of persons in relation to whom the High Court of Justice determined that it constitutes an illegal association, and also to the

fact that, following this decision, that group was declared an illegal organization".[40]

Ever since that decision, the members of the group have continued their activities as individuals, while trying from time to time to revive the cells of their organization under one cover or another.

In 1966, the lawyer, Sabri Jiryis, the applicant in the Al-Ard movement case, published, "The Arabs in Israel" a book made up of bitter calumnies against the Government of Israel, facts related out of context, and blatent falsehoods. At a later stage, he was detained on suspicion of cooperating with terrorist organizations and, at his request, he was permitted to leave the country. He went to Beirut and is now engaged there in anti-Israel propaganda activities.

Salih Baransi, another Al-Ard leader, attempted to initiate nationalist activities within the framework of sports clubs in the Little Triangle. He tried to have one such club registered as an association, without including himself in the list of applicants, but this attempt failed when its real purpose was revealed.

Since the Six Day War there has apparently been a tendency by former active members of Al-Ard to establish contact with terrorist organizations. Three of the leaders were brought to court, convicted in January 1968, and given long prison sentences. The Arab community has disassociated itself from the Al-Ard movement which has remained peripheral. Nevertheless the possibility cannot be excluded that in the future, further attempts may be made, which are more devious, but with the identical objective.

As long as the basic factors in Israel-Arab relations do not change, an organized extremist Arab nationalist effort aimed at subverting the State, may be expected.

C. THE EXPERIENCE OF MAPAM IN THE ARAB SECTOR

Mapam, too, constitutes a special political body in the Arab sector. It was the first of the Zionist parties to open its doors to Arab members and it is, to this very day, the only one among

them to have a common framework, based on individuals and not on affiliated lists. A short time before the 1973 elections the Labor Party decided to open its ranks to Arabs, offering political equality. Arabs were included in the lists of candidates for the Knesset; however, none were elected. In fact the party did not succeed in Arab integration.

At first Mapam, too, tried to gain support among the Arab population by means of a list of candidates linked with it, under the label of the "Popular Arab Bloc". This list failed totally, polling only 2,812 votes.

In the election campaign for the Second Knesset in 1951, Mapam gave an Arab, Rustum Bastuni, a safe place on its list, and he was duly elected. Bastuni did not enjoy clan support, nor was he a member of the Muslim community which make up the majority of the Arab population. An architect by profession, he is a graduate of the Technion and he stayed on in his native Haifa after 1948 because he believed in the possibility of Arab-Jewish co-existence in Israel.

Rustum Bastuni did not find a place for himself within Mapam and left, but the "tradition" was established in the party that one of its Knesset seats is "reserved" for an Arab member. From 1955 onward this was occupied by Yusuf Khamis, a Christian Arab, who ceded it in 1965 to Abdul Aziz a-Zu'bi a Muslim of Nazareth. He died in 1974.

Zubi was known by his personal qualities, and his family background; he is a member of the many-branched Zu'biye clan. There is no doubt that this family association is of secondary importance, but the combination of his assets was of real value to Mapam.

Mapam deliberated extensively over whether to grant full party membership to Arabs. Discussion ceased only in 1954 when, after attempts had been made to arrive at intermediate solutions, all barriers were finally removed.

The leaders of Mapam take pride in the Jewish-Arab partnership achieved within their party, but they know full well that it is accompanied by much soul-searching and at times considerable internal strain, the "Zionism" of Mapam frequently disturbs its

Arab members, and at present reduces its power of attracting support in the Arab sector.

In an effort to overcome this handicap, Arab Mapam activists have, on many occasions, come out against ideas that belong to the fundamental ideology of this Zionist socialist party, and it has been reluctantly obliged to renounce statements by their Arab comrades, while the latter have demanded the freedom to express their national sentiments.

Mapam finds itself in constant competition with a strong force on both its flanks; on the left, it is threatend by the Communist Party now rid of "Zionist considerations" and, on the right, it is being worn away by the Labor-led bloc in power.

Moreover, when Mapam forms part of the Government, as it currently and frequently does, its status as an opposition party is seriously weakened.

Mapam conducts widespread activities in Arab localities, especially in the vicinity of its kibbutzim, which form a powerful political base. In 1954, the party established an "Arab Pioneering Youth" organization on the pattern of the Jewish youth movements, seeking in this way to form a force in opposition to the traditional social fabric. The organization has maintained its ties with Hashomer Hatzair, the party's Jewish youth movement.

Young Arabs have received agricultural and vocational training in Mapam kibbutzim and have been instructed in setting up cooperative societies. This activity has been aimed mainly at the 15 to 20 age group. The Arab Pioneering Youth grew steadily from 300 members in 1954 to 1,500 in 1959, but gradually its attraction dwindled and it ceased to exist.

Mapam still engages in joint Arab-Jewish ventures, such as summer camps, excursions, sports, and lectures. It also maintains an "Institute for Arab Studies" for young Jews and Arabs.

There is no doubt that Mapam has succeeded in fostering a cadre of young Arab intellectuals. As the general process of acquiescence in the existence of the State proceeds, so do tensions in the party diminish, and the edge of internal contradictions becomes blunted.

The political power of Mapam among the Arabs grew steadily, from 0.2% in the elections of 1949 to 12.5% in 1959. Its influence has somewhat decreased and, since then, in the elections to the Sixth Knesset it polled only 9.2% of the Arab vote. In 1969, Mapam joined a bloc with the Labor Party and it cannot be determined with certainty to what extent it was supported among the Arab public, but it seems that this support was greatly reduced.

NOTES

1. Since 1943 the Arab Communist Party has not appeared openly under its own name, and its activity continued within the framework of various front organizations. It has undergone a change with the sprouting of new circles which completely severed their ties with the traditional Arab society. Ridwan Al-Ḥilu, known as "Musa", the first leader of the Communist Party, lost his senior position. From the '40s the prominent leadership consisted of young leaders from the educated class, including Emil Ḥabibi, Bulus Farah, Emil Toma, and Fu'ad Naṣṣar These were to reappear as leaders later, after 1948.

2. See for instance Nida a-Sha'ab on 3.11.47. The last Communist delegation sent to Ḥaj Amin Al-Ḥuseini included the chief leaders of the League for National Liberation, Emil Toma, Fu'ad Naṣṣar, Rushdi Shahin and Muhammad Naṣṣar. The delegation declared publicly that its visit expressed "its devotion to the leader and the readiness of its members to sacrifice their lives". A short time after this solemn declaration the picture changed, in accordance with the policy of the Soviet Union.

3. Fu'ad Naṣṣar, for instance, was once head of an Arab band during the 1936 riots, but in 1948, being loyal to the Soviet line, he disseminated propaganda in Egyptian occupied territory calling for withdrawal of the Arab armies from Palestine. He was arrested by the Egyptians and imprisoned in Abu 'Agela. After some time, he managed to escape from there to Jordan, but in December 1951 was arrested by the Jordanian authorities. He served as secretary of the Jordanian Communist Party after the war. Other leaders left for Lebanon. Details on the development of the Arab Communist organizations in Palestine during the Mandatory period are found in abundance in the book by G.Z. Israeli: "History of the Communist Party in Eretz Israel", Am Oved (Tel Aviv, 1953).

4. Among the liberated prisoners was 'Auda al-Ashab, one of the veteran Arab Communists in the country. In 1948 he distributed proclamations in Hebron which called on the Arab armies which had invaded the country to withdraw. Afterwards, he was arrested by the Egyptians and imprisoned in Abu 'Agela. (His brother, Na'im al-Ashab was left on the other side of the "green line" and took the place of Fu'ad Naṣṣar, after the latter's arrest, as leader of the Communist Party in Jordan). 'Auda al-Ashab is now a senior worker in the Rakah newspaper *al-Ittihad*, in Haifa. Among the liberated were also 'Ali 'Ashur, one of the outstanding active members of the Israel Communist Party, today deputy editor of *al-Ittihad*, and Salim al Qasim, a most energetic worker who after the founding of the State, served as General Secretary of the Communist Workers Congress in Nazareth.

5. None of these three are still alive. Yani Yani died in 1962. Jabur Jabur died later. On June 21, 1971, the last of the three, Elias Ni'matallah Kusa died in Haifa. These three personalities of the older generation were radical Arab nationalists. The world of the Communist Party was alien to them, but they saw it as an ally in their struggle against the State of Israel.

6. See following text.

7. Literally "The Front".

8. All four belong to the circles of the League for National Liberation. Emil Ḥabibi, Bulus Farah and Emil Toma laid the foundations of this organization in 1944. The four cooperated in various areas until they parted company, following the Soviet stand on the question of the partitioning of the country and the establishment of a Jewish State within it. Until then they had been known for their widespread propaganda activity.

9. Emil Ḥabibi, born in Haifa, member of the Protestant community, was assistant to "Musa", the P.C.P. Leader. He published the "historical manifesto" that sharply condemned the path taken by the Jewish members and set the seal to the "national" split in the party. Afterwards he deserted his leader and participated in the founding of the League. At one time he also stood at the head of the "People's Club", an organization of intellectuals with leftist tendencies. Guhayna is the name of one of his two daughters.

10. Emil Toma is the son of a Haifa merchant family, a member of the Greek-Orthodox community and a graduate of Oxford. He has a Jewish wife. He was the chief editor of *al-Ittihad*, which began publication in May 1944, and served as the organ of the "League for National Liberation". With the founding of the "Workers' Congress" in August 1945, the journal was regarded as the organ of that organization too. With the founding of Maki, Emil Toma was called on to submit to public "self-criticism", since he had participated in the armed struggle against partition, which had the support of the USSR. For some time he was removed from positions of influence in the party, but after a short cooling-off period he resumed editorship of *al-Ittihad*.

11. Hanna Naqqara together with Emil Ḥabibi, from 1946 onwards, published the caustic political journal *al-Mihmaz* (The Porcupine). He was its political editor and Emil Ḥabibi served as secretary to the editorial board.

12. Bulus Farh is a Greek Orthodox Haifa business man, with a Jewish wife. During the period of the Mandate he owned a large book store, which later became a cafe. Together with Emil Ḥabibi he organized a club for intellectuals, Shu'a al-Amal. Like Ḥabibi, he opposed Soviet support for partition, identifying himself with the aspiration of Palestine Arabs to one Arab state in established Palestine. During recent years he has spent most of his time in Germany.

13. Tawfiq Tubi is the only Arab to have sat in the Israel legislature from the first elections, through all seven terms. Emil Ḥabibi served with him in five terms. Tawfiq Tubi, a member of the Greek-Orthodox community, was educated in a British mission school in Jerusalem. He completed his academic studies at the American University in Beirut, the Alma Mater of many of the prominent statesmen of Arab countries. During the Mandatory period he worked as a supervisor in the Labour Exchange where he came into close contact with the working class. He began his political career in the congress of Arab Workers in Palestine. Afterwards he was in the League of National Liberation.

14. Saliba Khamis is an energetic worker for the "proletarian cause", and is known as the "Red Boss" of Nazareth. He achieved his position through handling workers' problems. He, like some of the other Communist leaders, has a Jewish wife, the daughter of Prof. Gideon Mar from Rosh Pina. He is regarded as the "Foreign Minister" of Rakah, in whose name he has contributed to the world Communist movement's newspaper "Problems of Peace and Socialism". His views are fanatically nationalistic, and he did not hesitate to praise the anti-Semitic book by Ivanov, *Zionism Uncovered*, published in the Soviet Union.

Fuad Jaber Khuri is an intellectual, son of a highly respected Greek-Orthodox family. Until his death in 1968 he led the Nazareth branch of the Communist Party, navigating it through opposing currents. His strong personality helped him, despite his communal origins, to overcome oppositions from the Muslims, who formed the majority in the

population. He served as head of the Communist faction in the Nazareth municipality and became a member of the Central Committee of Maki in its earliest years, soon after the founding of the State.

Mun'im Jarjura, from a wealthy Nazareth family, is also a member of the Greek-Orthodox community. He is a member of the Rakah Central Committee. In the Nazareth Municipal elections in 1970 he tried, with the support of the Christian old guard, to head the party list, but was defeated by the Muslim Tawfiq Ziad.

15. See Dani Rubenstein's excellent article "The Red Cross of Rakah". *Davar Hashavua*. 10.10.69.

16. Essentially, this is the old Haifa group, with the addition of leaders from Nazareth. The Jaffa members who at one time held senior positions in the Communist organizations, have disappeared from the top leadership.

17. Among the Arab Communist leaders rising from the ranks of the younger generation, is George Tubi, brother of Knesset Member Tawfiq Tubi. He organized the Rakah propaganda for the Seventh Knesset elections. His wife is Jewish and is also active in Rakah. Mixed marriages are widespread among the active members of the Communist Party.

18. Rakah's national average among Arabs was almost 30%. In Histadrut elections which were held shortly before the Knesset elections, Rakah registered a very sharp increase in Nazareth — from 28% in 1965 to 49% in 1969.

19. In 1965 the Rakah leader in the Druze village of Mghar was elected head of the local council. In the elections of 1969 some residents of Druze villages voted for Rakah. A Druze poet, Samih al-Qasim, is considered actively sympathetic to the Communist Party.

20. A popular Arab proverb.

21. The term "Communist Party" is used to denote Maki until the split in 1965, after which it is applied to Rakah. After the split, Maki received only a fraction of 1% of the Arab vote, and in the 1969 elections it received a mere 682 votes.

22. The "Ruling party" indicates Mapai, and later the "Maarakh" (Bloc) and the "Labor Party". Other parties — both government and opposition — are not given. The traditional forces among the Arabs are concentrated mainly within the ruling party and its lists.

23. In the elections for the Seventh Knesset in 1969, Mapam joined the Labor Party in the "Maarakh".

24. Twenty thousand young Arab voters were added to the election register since the 1965 elections. It can be said with certainty that Rakah enjoyed greater support among this group.

25. This is of no special significance, since the two Arab lists linked with the Labor Party also increased their votes, from 49.9% to 51.5%. It seems that on the whole the Beduin have displayed a consistent conservatism in their voting.

26. Needless to say that in this "game of names" there was never any doubt as to what political body stood behind these lists, and perhaps this was the reason why Rakah gave up its camouflage.

27. The inhabitants of East Jerusalem took part in the municipal elections. There were various explanations for their participation. One was the contention that a certain amount of pressure was exerted on them. But in view of the threats of the terrorist organizations, there can be no escaping the conclusion that acquiescence in the reunification of the city was a decisive factor.

28. Bloc of Mapai together with Ahdut Ha'avoda.

29. In all the 1969 election campaign, Mapam joined the Labor Party bloc consisting of Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avoda and Rafi

30. An earlier abortive attempt to establish an Arab extremist political body was made by the lawyer Elias Kusa, and the Muslim notable, Taher Fahum, prior to the elections for the Third Knesset. On their initiative, a "Bloc of Israel Arabs" was established to oppose the "Government policy of persecution". A little while later, the bloc turned into a party which concentrated on distributing leaflets and sending letters of protest to the press. The party failed to extend beyond a limited circle of middle-aged nationalist notables, members of the middle-class. It lacked organizational machinery and drive, and was opposed by Maki, which did not want a rival organization. After the elections, the party broke up and its activists, for want of alternative, became an "external wing" of the Communist Party.

31. Sabri Jiryis, a graduate of the Law Faculty of the Hebrew University, was one of the young leaders of the "Al-Ard" group. His words are revealing. He said openly, "Instead of showing admiration and swimming with the current, I made use of the opportunity to study in Jerusalem. My political ideas clarified and matured, and step by step they became firmer". See *Ha'aretz* of December 12, 1965, article by Attallah Mansour, "A Young Arab extremist presents the problem".

32. On July 10, 1951, long before Al-Ard was established, Emil Ḥabibi showed his claws to some extent, when he wrote in his column in *al-Ittihad*: "A few members who work with us in the Popular Front attack us clandestinely. This situation cannot be permitted to continue..." A few days after the publication of these words, the full extent of the split became apparent. Mansur Qardush, one of the central figure in Al-Ard, emphasized that the split was an outcome of the Nasser-Qasim dispute.

33. High Court of Justice 241/60 Qardush v. Registrar of Companies High Court Reports, 15, p. 1151.

34. 16/61 Registrar of Companies v. Qardush, High Court Reports 16, p. 1223. See *Ha'aretz* of June 27, 1962.

35. In July 1964, Al-Ard sent a detailed memorandum to the Secretary General of the United Nations Organization, U Thant, which included sharp attacks on the Government of Israel. Its text was also sent to foreign embassies and to major newspapers abroad.

36. Moshe Ben-Zeev, formerly District Court in Haifa; at present in private practice.

37. Zvi Terlo, Director General of the Ministry of Justice and lecturer at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

38. See pp. 191-193.

39. 1/65 Ya'acov Yeridor v. Chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the Sixth Knesset, High Court Reports, 19-III, p. 365.

40. 1/65, ibid, p. 387. At the same time, Justice Agranat stressed that he does not deny the right of any of the candidates to stand for election individually, or to be included as a candidate in another list.

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