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REBELLION IN PALESTINE

REBELLION IN PALESTINE

by

JOHN MARLOWE

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TO
MY MOTHER

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CONTENTS


		<i>Page</i>
<i>Chapter</i>	I The Historical Background . . .	9
„	II The Balfour Declaration . . .	33
„	III The Post-War Settlement . . .	43
„	IV The Palestine of the Mandate . . .	57
„	V The Arabs of Palestine . . .	65
„	VI The Jews of Palestine . . .	82
„	VII The Mandatory Power . . .	96
„	VIII The Palestine Administration . . .	102
„	IX 1920-1935	114
„	X The Rebellion—First Phase . . .	138
„	XI The Peel Commission . . .	173
„	XII The Rebellion—Second Phase . . .	190
„	XIII The London Conference . . .	208
„	XIV Some Aspects of the Rebellion . . .	223
„	XV Epilogue. The War Years . . .	235
<i>Appendix</i>	The Palestine Mandate . . .	261
	Index	270

PALESTINE

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SCALE IN KILOMETRES

MAIN ROADS IN 1939
RAILWAYS
(a) BROAD GAUGE
(b) NARROW "



CHAPTER I

The Historical Background

ROUND about 1500 B.C. raiding parties from a tribe of Semitic nomads known as the Beni Israel began to harass the semi-settled peoples in the hill districts west of the Jordan. Tradition had it that this tribe originally came over the desert from the lands at the head of the Persian Gulf, and had passed that way before, while still a small and unimportant tribe, in the course of a slow westward migration. Eventually, after crossing the desert of Sinai, they had arrived in Egypt, where they found favour with the rulers of the land who gave them a fertile area in the Eastern Delta for settlement. Here they stayed for many generations, forsaking their nomadic ways of life and prospering and multiplying exceedingly. As is the usual way with settled peoples, they gradually lost their tribal organisation, and began to intermarry with the surrounding people. But apparently before the process of assimilation had advanced very far, the Beni Israel fell out of favour with the rulers of the country. It is impossible to discover exactly what happened as such accounts as we have of Egyptian history of the period are completely silent on the subject of the Beni Israel. But it appears that life was made so unbearable for them that certain of the younger members of the Beni Israel, who must still have retained some remnant of tribal consciousness, reverted to the old nomadic life, and mindful of half forgotten legends of the previous sojourn of the tribe in the land of Canaan, set out eastwards in search of a more hospitable land. For many years they wandered in the deserts of Sinai. During this period they reverted completely to nomadic ways of life, and became remarkable among the desert tribes for military prowess, religious fanaticism and strict discipline. They had, moreover, an acquisitiveness and a purposefulness which was in sharp contrast to the shiftlessness of the average nomad. They were not content with mere raids on the sheep and cattle of the tribes of Canaan but set out to dominate them completely. Apart from a section of the tribe which remained East of the Jordan, the Beni Israel eventually established themselves as masters of a large part of the hill district west of the Jordan, and, perhaps with nostalgic memories

of the fleshpots of Egypt, began to cast longing eyes on the fertile coastal plain westward of the hills inhabited by a prosperous mercantile and cultivator people, known to posterity as the Philistines. Although they never took kindly to agriculture the Beni Israel prospered exceedingly, living and increasing mainly by pillaging the property and wealth of neighbouring peoples. They appear to have been an exceedingly ruthless, fanatical and intolerant people, more versed in the arts of war than in those of peace, an ever increasing menace to the prosperous dwellers in the plains. By about 1000 B.C. they had established a kingdom stretching at its height from Akaba in the south to Damascus in the north, dealing on equal terms with the powerful merchant princes of Tyre and Sidon, and sending their trading ships from Akaba down the Red Sea in quest of the wealth of Arabia and Ethiopia.

But this glory was short lived and in a very few years we find the dominions of the Beni Israel very contracted and split into two parts as a result of internal dissensions. The southern kingdom known as Judah consisted of little more than the hills round Jerusalem, the old fortress of the Jebusite tribe whom the Israelites had subdued soon after entering Caanan; the northern kingdom known as Israel consisted of what is now known as Samaria and the plains of Esdraelon and Megiddo. The historical importance of these two tiny kingdoms lies in the fact that between them they dominated the coastal route between the two great Empires of Assyria and Egypt. Israel held the plain of Esdraelon and the north-easterly road to Damascus, and Judah, although it apparently never occupied the narrow strip of coastal plain inhabited by the Philistines, commanded it from a military point of view from their mountain fastnesses which overlooked it. The existence of these two turbulent little States athwart the great highway between Asia and Africa was bound to be precarious.

After some three hundred years of troubled existence the kingdom of Israel was conquered by Shalmaneser, King of Assyria. Following the usual Assyrian practice, the majority of the inhabitants were forcibly transplanted to another part of the Assyrian dominions, and another people from Persia known as the Cuth-eans, afterwards known as the Samaritans, settled in their place in Samaria. The inhabitants of the kingdom of Israel then disappear from history. It is to be presumed that they became com-

pletely assimilated by the surrounding peoples in the regions to which they were banished. There have been various theories, mostly fantastic, about the fate of the "ten lost tribes" but there is no reason to believe that they survived long as a separate people. The Cutheans or Samaritans, after a chequered and unhappy history, still just survive, and are now represented by a few score incredibly inbred and backward people, living in inoffensive isolation in a corner of the Arab town of Nablus.

The kingdom of Judah survived for about a hundred and thirty years after the conquest of Israel until about 550 B.C. when it was conquered by Nebuchadnezzar, King of Babylon, and the people carried off into captivity. A departure was made from the usual custom in that, for some reason, perhaps because of the infertility of the soil around Jerusalem, no settlement of foreigners was made there to replace the previous inhabitants. The inhabitants of Judah were settled in and around the city of Babylon, and, unlike the Israelites, retained their national characteristics in captivity and resisted the natural process of assimilation with the surrounding peoples. It was during the fifty-odd years following the captivity of Judah that Zionism may be said to have been born. At the same time many of the Jews, as the captives from Judah began to be called, rose to positions of considerable importance in the declining empire of Babylon, for Babylonians followed the then usual practice of delegating much of the civil administration to the more gifted of their captives, leaving themselves free for the more serious occupation of war. At the time the Babylonians were particularly occupied with an invasion of those Medes and Persians who finally overcame the Babylonians about seventy years after the captivity of Judah. By this time the Jews were quite an important community in Mesopotamia, far more important than their numbers indicated. Certain Jews who had high administrative positions with the Babylonians managed to ingratiate themselves with their new masters, and to Cyrus, the first Persian king to rule over Mesopotamia, belongs the distinction of having inaugurated the first Jewish national home in Palestine.

As a result of his contact with certain influential Jews in the administration, Cyrus appears to have become interested in the Jews, and eventually agreed that as many as wished to do so could return to their old country which was now under the rule

of Persia. The Jews who developed this idea had as their first purpose the rebuilding of the Temple as a concrete symbol of Jewish nationalism. Nationalism and religion at that time were quite indistinguishable as far as the Jews were concerned. But the policy of a return to Jerusalem developed beyond the original idea of rebuilding the Temple and became a colonisation scheme by which those Jews who had failed to gain a footing in the land of their exile were given the opportunity to return to their old home. According to Josephus about 42,000 Jews availed themselves of this opportunity. It is uncertain how many Jews were in captivity at that time, but it is probable that this 42,000 represented only a small minority of the total number.

As long as Cyrus lived he gave his protection to this venture in spite of the opposition of the local officials who feared its effect on the surrounding peoples, although the apprehension of both officials and neighbours seems to have been a trifle premature considering the numerical feebleness of the new colonists. The local officials seem to have been obsessed with the idea that the colonists were rebuilding Jerusalem as a fortress in order to defy them and terrorise the surrounding peoples. They were also probably irritated by the special privileges which they had to grant to these people by the command of Cyrus, which they resentfully and correctly attributed to Jewish influence at Cyrus' court. The protection of the Persian court was, however, withdrawn under Cyrus' successor Cambyses, who lent a ready ear to the complaints of his Syrian officials about the Jews. For about ten years colonisation remained at a standstill, but under Darius, Cambyses' successor, the Jews came back into favour and colonisation went forward. The people who most jealously tried to interrupt the work of colonisation and to poison the minds of the local officials against the Jews were the Cutheans or Samaritans who had been planted in Samaria by Shalmaneser after the conquest of Israel. This probably accounts for the intense dislike and contempt which the Jews afterwards felt for these people, a feeling which persisted for several hundred years after the Samaritans had become incapable of doing any damage to them.

Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes, and under his benignant protection the colony continued to prosper. The colonists still had to rely to a great extent on help from the Jews of Babylon, and on at least two occasions during the reign of Xerxes the colony

was only saved from disintegration by the arrival of missions from the Jews of Babylon. Ezra, the leader of the first mission, was made High Priest and addressed himself to the task of recreating a cultural and religious consciousness among the colonists. He reorganised the priesthood with its headquarters in the rebuilt Temple, he passed strict laws against intermarriage with surrounding tribes, and insisted on the rigid observance of the traditional fasts and festivals. Nehemiah, the leader of the second mission, devoted himself mainly to the military organisation of the colonists, in view of the threat from the Cutheans and the other surrounding people whom the local Persian officials were unable or unwilling to keep in order.

Ezra and Nehemiah between them appear to have succeeded in converting the colony from a sort of charitable-cum-religious institution run by the rich Jews of Babylon into a self-supporting and self-governing state which from this time began to develop on lines of its own, independent of help from Babylon.

During the reign of Xerxes' son and successor the Jews of Babylon again fell out of favour, and the progress of colonisation was again checked, although as a result of the work of Ezra and Nehemiah the colonists were more independent of Babylon than before. The wrath of Artaxerxes against the Jews of Babylon was, however, visited on the colonists, and Jerusalem was occupied by the Persian general Bagoses and the Temple desecrated.

After the death of Artaxerxes, the persecution of the Jews was relaxed under Darius II. It was during the reign of this king that the Persian Empire was overrun by Alexander the Great and in about 350 B.C. Syria was conquered by Alexander and became part of the short-lived empire of Macedonia.

By this time the colony founded by Cyrus had been in existence for about two hundred years. On the whole the Jews had prospered under the Persian Empire, and, apart from the progress of the Jewish colony of Jerusalem, the Babylonian Jews had spread themselves all over the Persian Empire. This progress was continued under Alexander, who was favourably disposed towards the Jews generally and also towards the Jewish colony in Jerusalem, which he allowed to continue under his protection.

Immediately after Alexander's death, his rapidly won Empire fell to pieces and was partitioned between his generals. Egypt went to Ptolemy, who founded the Ptolemaic dynasty with its capital at

Alexandria. Syria went to Seleucus who founded the Seleucid dynasty with its capital at Antioch. The Jewish colony in Palestine became part of the Ptolemaic empire. Subsequently, when the Ptolemaic dynasty came under the influence of Rome, Palestine ~~passed~~ to the control of Antioch. The next hundred and fifty years were marked by intermittent Jewish insurrections against Seleucid rule. It was during this period that Judas Maccabaeus and his brothers lived and fought and died, and provided a permanent inspiration to the Jewish race in the long struggle for existence that lay before it.

This turbulent period ended in 50 B.C. with the conquest of the Seleucid Empire by Pompey, and the incorporation of the Jewish colony, henceforth to be known as Judaea, into the Roman Empire.

The long series of wars against Antioch had resulted in the emergence of a ruling class among the Jews, descended from their leaders in these wars. The son of Hyrcanus, the greatest of the national leaders after Judas Maccabaeus, had made himself king, and subsequently each succession to the kingship had been disputed between members of the leading families.

These leading families soon realised the futility of active resistance against the mighty power of the Romans and, after the capture of Jerusalem by Pompey, vied with each other in currying favour with their new masters. Such armed resistance as there was, was carried on by isolated bands of guerrillas, known as the Zealots, who derived their inspiration from the deeds of the Maccabees and their followers against Antioch.

After a long series of intrigues and quarrels between the Jewish magnates one of them, named Herod, succeeded, with Roman help, in making himself master of Judaea, and was acknowledged by the Romans as king of the Jews under their protection. Herod himself was only half a Jew, his mother having been an Idumean, from a tribe living south of the Dead Sea, and as such most unpopular with the orthodox Jews. By a few judicious concessions to public opinion, however, such as the appointment of a member of the Hyrcanus family as High Priest, and a show of devotion to Jewish religion and tradition, Herod managed, to some extent, to establish his position with the Jews without alienating the Romans.

The closing years of Herod's life were embittered by dissensions among his sons about the succession to the kingdom. After Herod's death the country relapsed into chaos. One of Herod's

sons, Archelaus, seized the kingdom. The other sons, whom he had dispossessed, appealed to Rome, with the result that Herod's kingdom (which at his death extended to approximately the area of modern Palestine) was partitioned between Archelaus, who was given the southern part, and two other of Herod's sons, Antipas and Philip, who divided the north between them. After a few months Archelaus was banished by the Romans for misgovernment, and his kingdom reduced to the status of a province directly administered by a Roman governor.

About this time was born, lived and died in Palestine Jesus Christ. He was born a few years before Herod's death, and was executed by the Romans, by the then usual method of crucifixion, at about the age of 33, some twenty years after Judaea had become a Roman province. His life and death created little stir in Palestine at the time, and forty years later, on the eve of the destruction of Jerusalem, his followers were a numerically insignificant minority among the Jews of Jerusalem, although the new religion was already beginning to make some stir in the Hellenic world outside Palestine.

The Roman settlement after the death of Herod naturally did not satisfy all the numerous progeny of Herod, and there was a continual course of rivalry and intrigue among Herod's descendants. Eventually Agrippa, a grandson of Herod, who had lived all his life in Rome and had become completely Romanised, succeeded, with the favour of the Emperor Tiberius, in supplanting his uncles in their northern kingdoms, and established a new capital on the shores of the Sea of Galilee named after his Imperial benefactor. Soon afterward the Romans by handing over to him the province of Judaea, from which Archelaus had been deposed, restored him to the whole of the dominions of his grandfather. He only survived his elevation by five years. After his death the northern part of the kingdom went to his son (also named Agrippa), and Judaea again reverted to the status of a Roman province. Continual disorder harassed a series of Governors, until one of them, Florus, making a belated attempt to restore order with inadequate forces, found himself faced with a formidable insurrection. Soon the greater part of Judaea was in the hands of the Jewish rebels, in alliance with the Jews in the territory of Agrippa, who strove continually to keep the peace between his Roman patrons and his Jewish fellow countrymen. The Emperor Nero, alarmed at the situation, sent

Vespasian to put down the rebellion. Vespasian reconquered Galilee, after stubborn resistance by the hardy Galilean peasants, and occupied most of the coastal region. He was about to march on Jerusalem when he was proclaimed Emperor by his soldiers in place of the cruel and gluttonous Vitellius, who had meanwhile succeeded Nero. He then returned to Rome and left the campaign against Jerusalem to be pursued by his son Titus, then in Egypt. Titus marched into Palestine across the Sinai desert and advanced on Jerusalem. After a long siege, during the course of which neither famine nor internal dissensions induced the Jews to surrender, Titus took the city by storm. The Temple was burnt to the ground in the course of the fighting, and the slaughter of the inhabitants which took place after the capture of the city was unusually thorough even for those times, which were comparable to our own in the savagery usually displayed towards beaten enemies.

Jerusalem was captured by the Romans in A.D. 70. It was not until seventy years later, with the defeat of Bar Cochba's rebellion in A.D. 140, that the Romans finally succeeded in breaking the power of Jewish nationalism in Palestine. It was not until about 400 years later that the Jews, as a result of emigration and assimilation, ceased to form an important section of the inhabitants of the country.

Palestine remained a part of the Roman and, after the separation of the Eastern and Western Empires, of the Byzantine Empire, until the Mohammedan conquest in A.D. 636. The declining fortunes of the Byzantine Empire together with the precarious position of Syria on the border between the Empire and the deserts of Arabia resulted, in spite of the revival of Jerusalem following on the official recognition of Christianity, in a gradual regression from the splendid days of the first century A.D., when Syria ranked as one of the most civilised regions on the face of the globe, and when cities such as Baalbek, Petra, Tiberias and Gerash flourished in the midst of what is now arid waste. With the incursions of the Persians from the north and the tribes of Arabia from the south and east resulting in an endemic state of warfare, the desert gradually reclaimed what Roman soldiers and Hellenic culture had so splendidly won from it.

What the weakness and apathy of the Byzantine Empire started the Arabs completed. In the seventh century the tribes of Arabia,

fiercely and strangely united after centuries of internecine war by the common faith of Islam, invaded and occupied Syria during that irresistible uprush of power which, before it had spent itself, had carried them to the confines of India in the east, to the Atlantic Ocean in the west, to the Black Sea in the north and to the Equator in the south. Palestine became a part of the great Moslem Empire ruled from Damascus by the Omayyad Caliphate stretching from Morocco to Persia.

In course of time the insidious accidie of the desert which the Arabs brought with them wherever they went had a curiously blighting influence on the cultures which they overlaid, and this does much to account for the physical and cultural ruin of Syria and Iraq where Arab influence remained strongest.

The Arabs in Syria imposed their religion and their language on a weary and acquiescent people, who accepted the new conquerors and their ways as they had accepted all their numerous conquerors in the past. And as these strangely passive people had assimilated all their previous conquerors so they assimilated the Arabs together with something of the fire and something of the futility which the Arabs had brought with them from the desert.

The Omayyad Caliphate had ruled in Damascus for about a hundred years when Marwan, the fourteenth Caliph, was deposed by the Abbassids, who had a rival claim to the Caliphate and who had gradually been recruiting followers in Mesopotamia. The seat of the Caliphs was removed from Damascus to Baghdad by the Abbassids, the early part of whose Caliphate marked the period of the greatest splendour of Arab rule.

It was during the reign of the Abbassids in Baghdad that the Turks from Central Asia began to infiltrate into the Arab Empire. The Arabs were quite useless at the routine of settled administration and had no notion of organising a system of empire, with the result that the routine of administration and the control of the standing army gradually passed into the hands of foreigners. The Caliph's army was almost entirely recruited from the Turks of Central Asia, who in course of time became so powerful in the Caliph's dominions that the Caliph was frequently a prisoner in his own palace and the real power in the hands of the Turkish mercenaries. The Arab Empire began to disintegrate. For two periods of about forty years Egypt was an independent State ruled by Turkish generals who had deposed the Arab governors of the

Caliph. A rival Caliphate established itself on the north coast of Africa. The Fatimite Caliphs, who claimed descent from Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, were the most powerful protagonists of the great Shia heresy which had originally arisen as a result of dissension between the elected Companions and the descendants of the Prophet. The supporters of election, the Sunnis, had become the orthodox party probably for no better reason than that they were successful in establishing themselves in the Caliphate. The systematic attempt of the Omayyads to wipe out the descendants of the Prophet by murder widened the breach between orthodox and heretic. The Shia heresy established itself particularly strongly in Persia, where it is the State religion at the present day, but to the Abbassids its most alarming manifestation was in the West. The Fatimite Caliphs conquered the whole of North Africa, and el-Moizz, the fourth of the line, added Egypt and most of Syria to the Fatimite possessions. The Caliphate was now split in two and the Abbassid empire was becoming more and more dominated by the warlike Turks. In the eleventh century the Abbassid empire, undermined from within by the Turkish mercenaries, fell an easy prey to a series of invasions by the Seljuk Turks from Central Asia. The Seljuk Turks stripped away the last remnants of Abbassid power and established their capital at Damascus. After the subjugation of the Abbassids they turned their attention to the Fatimites, who were already suffering from the same internal weaknesses which had proved the downfall of the Abbassid Caliphate. The Seljuks soon conquered southern Syria from them, but the Fatimites were to remain in power in Cairo until the city was captured by Saladin in 1171.

The harsh domination of the Seljuks in Palestine contrasted strongly with the tolerant attitude to Christian pilgrims shown by the Fatimites, and one of the results of the Seljuk conquest was the first of the Crusades undertaken by the feudal nobles of Europe with the ostensible object of rescuing the Holy Places from infidel rule. The Crusaders, with the assistance of the Fatimite Caliphs, who viewed with favour the idea of a buffer State between themselves and the Seljuks, managed to establish a sort of international regime in Palestine and a Norman knight was created king of Jerusalem. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, notable chiefly for the murderous barbarity of its rule, was short lived. The Seljuk empire was soon partitioned between various Seljuk

military leaders; one of these, who became Sultan of Damascus, was determined to extend his rule over the whole of Syria, preparatory to subjugating the declining Fatimite Caliphate in Cairo. The Franks, as the Crusaders were called, in alliance with the Fatimites, were decisively defeated by the Damascene general Saladin, who entered Cairo in 1171 and established himself as governor under the suzerainty of Damascus. He then re-entered Syria and broke the Frankish power once and for all at the battle of Hittin, in the hills above the Sea of Galilee, in 1173.

Saladin, following the example of most Seljuk generals, soon shook himself free of his nominal suzerain in Damascus and established himself as independent ruler of Egypt and southern Syria. The rule of Saladin and his successors the Mamelukes may be described as a more or less enlightened military dictatorship. The three hundred years of Mameluke rule in Egypt, from the death of Saladin to the Ottoman conquest, was the golden age of Moslem architecture. Palestine did not share the general cultural revival that accompanied Mameluke rule in Egypt. As so often in the past its geographical position made it a permanent battlefield to the detriment of all material and cultural progress. Several more Crusades were launched in an attempt to recapture the Holy Land, but none came near success. The Franks remained precariously established in Jaffa, Acre and a few other coastal cities until they were finally driven out by the Mameluke rulers Beybars and Qalaun during the second half of the thirteenth century.

During the fourteenth century a new and formidable series of invasions of Turks from Central Asia took place. The Ottoman Turks, so named from one of their leaders, Othman, subjugated the various Seljuk principalities in Asia Minor and, advancing westward, consummated the ruin of the Byzantine empire in 1453 by the capture of Constantinople. Pressing through the Balkans and up the Danube valley into the heart of Europe, these formidable invaders encountered a gradually stiffening resistance. As the momentum of their European progress slackened the Ottoman Turks began to turn their attention towards Syria and North Africa. In 1517 the Ottoman Sultan Selim I, after expelling the Mamelukes from Syria, invaded Egypt and captured Cairo. So ended the rule of the Mamelukes.

The Ottomans continued their triumphant way, and by the time of the death of Soliman the Magnificent in 1566 had con-

quered the whole of North Africa, had brought most of the tribes of Arabia under Ottoman rule, had captured the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and re-established the Caliphate by identifying it with the line of Ottoman sultans in Constantinople, the new capital of the Ottoman Empire. (The Mamelukes had removed the fainéant Caliph from Baghdad in 1258, and maintained a puppet Caliphate in Cairo up to the time of the Ottoman invasion.) Practically the whole of the Moslem world, for the first time since the days of the Abbassid Caliphate, was once more under one ruler. But in the course of the nine hundred years that had elapsed between the Hegira and the death of Soliman the Magnificent, the Arabs had almost disappeared from history. The Arabs in the cities and the cultivated plains had long become assimilated; Arab rule had disappeared everywhere except in the Arabian desert and now even the holy cities were in the hands of the Turks, and the tribes of the desert subject to the terrible invaders from Central Asia. Arab influence seemed to have receded to its pre-Islamic state. Only the religion and the language which they had given to the world still survived.

The barbarous rule and oppressive taxation of the Ottomans completed the cultural and material ruin of Syria. It was not until two hundred and fifty years later, when the designs of a powerful Russia on the declining empire of the Ottomans awoke the alarmed interest of the Western European powers, that Syria swung back into the orbit of international politics.

The Moslem religion and Arabic language are the two permanent survivals of the Arab invasion into the settled lands bordering the Arabian desert. The fact that the three monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Mohammedanism have survived in Europe and the Near East whereas innumerable polytheistic and pantheistic religions have arisen, flourished for a time, and then passed away can reasonably be attributed to their common monotheism. It is reasonable to assume that monotheism responds to human needs more adequately than polytheism or pantheism, or alternatively that it enshrines the truth more completely. At all events, while Christianity took root in Europe, Mohammedanism established itself in the north of Africa and in south-western and central Asia and spread beyond the limits of its first Arab apostles as effectively as Christianity spread beyond the limits of its first Jewish apostles.

The feebleness of the Orthodox Church and the political and cultural decay of the Byzantine Empire enabled the Arab religion and language to gain a hold on the Near East which subsequent invaders have never been able to relax. The Arabic language displaced Greek as the language of educated people and Aramaic the language of the peasantry; the Moslem religion almost succeeded in driving Christianity out of the land of its origin.

From the time of the fall of the Omayyads to the Ottoman conquest, Syria was almost always a sort of no-man's-land, a bone of contention between two competing powers. This precarious existence ceased with its incorporation in the Ottoman Empire, but Ottoman rule brought no prosperity to Syria any more than it did to any other country that had the misfortune to fall under the blight of its rule. Oppressive taxation, a ruthless conscription for military service and a complete neglect of public works reduced Syria, in common with the rest of the Ottoman Empire, to grinding poverty. But the fact that the Ottoman Empire carried out its oppressive measures, not through a centralised system of officials appointed by Constantinople but through the medium of local magnates, prevented the formation of nationalist parties or institutions in the countries under Ottoman rule.

After three hundred years of this lingering death, Mohamed Ali, the Albanian Viceroy of Egypt, having made himself virtually independent of the Sultan, sent his son Ibrahim Pasha to invade Syria. Assisted by feuds between the various Pashas and Amirs of Syria, Ibrahim Pasha had little difficulty in occupying the country in 1832 as a preliminary to an attack on Asia Minor. The British Government, which was unwilling to see a premature breaking up of the Ottoman Empire, since this would probably mean the apparition of Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean, became alarmed at this threat to the Sultan. In 1840 strong British intervention, which was supported by Russia and Austria-Hungary, resulted in the withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria, and its return to Ottoman control. This incident marks the genesis of Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant, for the French, who had maintained many ties with Egypt since the time of Napoleon, had given diplomatic support to Mohamed Ali's adventure, and had made unsuccessful attempts to oppose Great Britain's intervention.

During the short period of Ibrahim Pasha's rule the breath of

life once more began to stir Syria. Ibrahim Pasha encouraged the opening of European schools and the introduction of European culture. Several schools and colleges were opened, mostly by religious denominations both Catholic and Protestant, in the town of Beirut and in the Lebanon mountains around Beirut where the population was mainly Christian. It was this Christian community of the Lebanon which was responsible, as a result of the renewed contacts with European culture through the missionary schools and colleges opened under Ibrahim Pasha, for beginning to revive Arabic as a literary language and, through the medium of this revival, for sowing the seed of Syrian nationalism. This Syrian nationalism must be considered in relation to the resurgent nationalisms of the Balkan races under Ottoman rule. There was nothing specifically Arab about it except the Arabic language.

Meanwhile the Ottoman Empire had received a new lease of life as a result of the Crimean war. Russia had gone to war with Turkey in 1854, ostensibly because of the alleged ill treatment of some Russian pilgrims to the Holy Sepulchre, which led to a general dispute about the rights of the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem. England, fearful as ever about the prospect of Russia as a Mediterranean Power, joined the ambitious Napoleon III of France in an alliance which defeated Russia and saved Constantinople for the Turks. This dubious service to humanity was followed up in 1878 by Disraeli, whose intervention at the Berlin Conference once more prevented the partition of Turkey in Europe and the liberation of the Christian peoples under Turkish rule. For this service a grateful Turkish Government presented Great Britain with Cyprus, and so Disraeli was able to come back from Berlin bearing "peace with honour", a phrase which Mr. Neville Chamberlain repeated with even less justification on his return from an even more sinister mission.

In 1876 Sultan Murad V was deposed after a reign of a few months and was succeeded by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The increasing difficulties of the Ottoman Empire had impressed many Ottoman statesmen with the necessity for making some concession to modern ideas of liberty as a condition of its survival. Accordingly the Grand Vizier Midhat Pasha took the opportunity of the accession of the new Sultan to have a Constitution proclaimed which aimed at introducing a certain measure of autonomy

into the various regions of the Ottoman dominions. But Abdul Hamid had other and possibly more practical ideas. Since the expulsion of Mohammed Ali from Syria a gradual process of centralisation had been going on in the Sultan's Asiatic dominions, the old system of indirect rule through the medium of local chiefs and notables was abolished and new administrative boundaries created. The Vilayet of Aleppo, subdivided into the Sanjaks of Alexandretta and Aleppo, comprised what is now the Hatay and the northern part of Syria. The Vilayet of Syria, subdivided into the Sanjaks of Hama, Damascus, Hauran and Maan, comprised what is now Transjordan and the rest of Syria. The Vilayet of Beirut, subdivided into the Sanjaks of Lattakia Tripoli, the special Sanjak of the Lebanon, and the Sanjaks of Beirut, Acre and Belca, comprised the present Alaouite territory, the Lebanese Republic and northern Palestine. The independent Sanjak of Jerusalem, which enjoyed more or less the status of a Vilayet, comprised what is now southern Palestine. These divisions are particularly interesting as showing how completely the conception of Palestine as a distinct region had become obliterated and how the subsequent post-war settlement cut across existing boundaries.

Abdul Hamid saw, more clearly perhaps than his ministers, the fundamental weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and was convinced that the only way to save it from final disintegration was by a speeding up of the process of centralisation in those districts still fully under Ottoman control. Egypt, under the Khedive Ismail, had fallen into the clutches of Western European bondholders and the Governments who represented them; the Christian provinces of the Balkans, in spite of Disraeli, had most of them gained their independence; Bosnia and Herzegovina were coveted by the Dual Monarchy and shortly to fall into its hands; the tribes of Arabia were as yet too remote for stricter control. As a result the full weight of Abdul Hamid's centralisation policy fell on Asia Minor, Syria, Iraq, and what was left of his European provinces. In the course of time Abdul Hamid established a ruthless and efficient despotism over this portion of his dominions, putting an end to all opposition and very nearly every other kind of activity as well. But the essence of a lasting despotism is a rapid and comprehensive system of communications and this the Ottoman Empire had not got. Abdul Hamid was unable to get the money to develop it without mortgaging himself to the European powers.

This he was determined not to do. In order to establish a closer control over the tribes of Arabia he evolved the idea of a Hedjaz Railway, and, by a masterstroke of perverse genius, held out to his faithful people the prospect of cheap and easy access to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina by means of the railway if they would raise the money to build it. As a result of this, large "voluntary" subscriptions were raised and work on the railway was started in 1901.

Owing to his desire to avoid becoming embroiled with the Western European powers Abdul Hamid made little attempt to interfere with the special status of the Sanjak of Lebanon, and endeavoured to maintain the outward signs of a reasonable administration in the Sanjak of Jerusalem for the benefit of European visitors to the Holy City. But elsewhere the hand of his oppression lay very heavy, particularly on the non-Turkish upper and middle classes who had previously managed to pass most of the exactions of Ottoman rule on to the local peasantry. Abdul Hamid's centralisation policy deprived these people of their influence in local affairs, their means of education, and very often of their jobs, as well as transferring the privilege of despoiling the peasants from them to imported Turkish officials. In Syria, and particularly in Damascus, this led to a gradual conversion of the cultural nationalist movement, which had started in the Lebanon, into a number of more or less separate and necessarily underground movements aiming at various degrees of national independence. The most important of these were two secret societies known as al Fatat and al Ahd, the first composed of Syrian students, the second of Syrian and Iraqi Army Officers. It is important to note that all these so-called Arab national movements were entirely urban in character and that no attempt was made to establish contact, and no apparent solidarity of interest was felt with the Arab chieftains of Arabia, living, so to speak, just outside their back door. The resurgent nationalism of Arabia developed quite independently of this Syrian urban nationalism. The one owed its inception to the puritanical Moslem movement of Abdul Wahab in the deserts of the Nejd in the middle of the eighteenth century and the other to a cultural revival under European influence during the occupation of Syria by Ibrahim Pasha. There is no evidence of any communication or correspondence between the Syrian nationalist movement and the Arab revival in Arabia until 1914.

The Syrian nationalist movement of al Fatat was paralleled by other seditious movements, nationalist and otherwise, among the officers of the Turkish Army. Abdul Hamid was overthrown in 1908 as a result of a military revolt. But in this revolt, which had its origin at Salonica, Syrian nationalism had no part. The revolt was an expression of the revival of those liberal principles which had first been given expression in Midhat's abortive constitution in 1876. The Committee of Union and Progress, a group of young intellectual Europeanised army officers who took over the government after the fall of Abdul Hamid, proved a good deal less liberal in practice than they had been in theory, and such hopes as had been raised in the breasts of the Syrian nationalists by the deposition of Abdul Hamid were soon doomed to disappointment. The regime of the C.U.P. was just liberal enough to satisfy the victims of that despotism. The C.U.P. soon found itself in trouble. A few months after Abdul Hamid's deposition Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1912 Italy, after a short war, took possession of Libya. In 1913 Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria, united together in a precarious alliance, all but drove their old oppressors out of Europe and would have done so but for a quarrel which broke out between the victors over the spoils. As it was, Turkey was left with Constantinople and an area of territory round it about the size of Ireland. These reverses naturally gave the greatest encouragement to the Syrian nationalists, and also to the Arabian princes, in their hopes of independence. At length, towards the end of 1914, it seemed that their chance was near. Turkey, partly from hatred and fear of Russia, partly as a result of the Germanophile tradition of the Young Turk leaders, and partly as a result of bungling British diplomacy, joined Germany and Austria-Hungary in the war which had broken out with England, France and Russia.

The mobilisation of the Turkish armies reacted to the detriment of the Syrian nationalists. It was the practice of the Turks never to let conscripts serve in their native districts. With Turkey's entry into the war the Syrian conscripts were for the most part sent to the Caucasus and Gallipoli fronts and only a small number of the members of the various secret societies were left in Damascus to carry on their activities. It is evidence of the limited scope of these activities that right up to 1915 these secret societies continued to work independently of each other and sometimes

without any knowledge of each other's existence. After the outbreak of war, and encouraged presumably by the difficulties of the Turkish Government, the societies appear to have pursued their aims with greater determination than before in spite of their weakened organisation. Al Fatat, the most important of them, created a certain amount of disaffection among the Syrian and Iraqi officers in the Turkish army. In Syria and the Lebanon, whose special status had disappeared as a result of the war, the nationalist movement became sufficient of a thorn in the side of the Turkish authorities to be visited by the wrath of the cruel Turkish military governor of Damascus, Jemal Pasha. Several Syrian nationalists were hanged for their treasonable activities and this still further inflamed Syrian national feeling against the Turks.

Before ever war broke out Lord Kitchener as High Commissioner in Egypt had become interested in the possibilities of a revolt in Arabia in the event of a war with Turkey.

During the reign of Abdul Hamid, the future King Hussein, at that time an Arabian prince whose territories included the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, had been deposed from his possessions and interned in Constantinople as a possible future cause of trouble to the Empire. He took his exile philosophically and was allowed to live in some state and dignity in the capital. The C.U.P., in the first flush of its liberal enthusiasm, which was so soon to wear off, released him and returned him to his native land and possessions with the title of Sherif of Mecca. Although from an administrative point of view this was intended to be purely honorary, the title of Sherif of Mecca, the guardian of the Holy Places, gave him a very special position in the eyes of the Moslem world, and at the outbreak of war he became something of a key man in the eyes of the British authorities in Cairo. The Sultan of Turkey, in his capacity of Caliph of Islam, was naturally anxious to get the support of the Moslem world by giving Turkey's struggle the character of a jihad or holy war against the infidel. The British were equally anxious to prevent this development and to encourage the Arabs to take the opportunity to declare a jihad against the Sultan as the usurper of the Caliphate. (All this was quite regardless of the fact that at that time of day nobody cared twopence about the Caliphate, least of all the Moslems themselves.) Abdulla, one of Hussein's sons, had for some time been in spasmodic touch with the British authorities in Cairo through the medium of Mr. (now Sir Ronald)

Storrs, Oriental Secretary at the Residency. On the outbreak of war Kitchener, then in England, instructed Storrs to resume contact with Abdulla. Abdulla seems to have been fairly anxious to throw in his lot with the Allies from the beginning, but his father was in favour of caution. Feisal, Abdulla's brother, was at first for assisting Turkey as the most practical means of obtaining concessions from her, but visits to Damascus and Constantinople caused him to modify his views. Meanwhile negotiations dragged on half-heartedly. The slow progress of the Gallipoli expedition increased England's desire for creating a diversion in Arabia, and at the same time made Hussein more cautious about breaking with Turkey. This was the position of affairs when Sir Henry McMahon who had succeeded Kitchener as High Commissioner in Egypt, started his now famous correspondence with King Hussein in July 1915.

The original British offer to Hussein merely took account of Arab ambitions in the Arabian peninsula. But meanwhile Hussein, through Feisal, had been in touch with the Syrian nationalists, and in his reply to McMahon made it clear that he was not only interested in the independence of the Arabian peninsula, but the independence of all the Arabic-speaking countries under Turkish rule. This somewhat embarrassed McMahon. Not only had France made it clear that she considered she had a claim on the whole of Syria, but Great Britain also had designs on the port of Haifa and the east flank of the Suez Canal. So McMahon replied that he thought it premature to begin discussing boundaries. (It would have been more correct to say that it was too late.) Hussein persisted, and eventually in October 1915 McMahon wrote as follows to Hussein:—

“I have received your letter (of 9th September) with much pleasure; and your expressions of sincerity and friendliness have given me the greatest satisfaction.

“I regret that you should have received from my last letter the impression that I regarded the question of the boundaries with coldness and hesitation; such was not the case, but it appeared to me the moment had not arrived when they could be profitably discussed.

“I have realised, however, from your last letter, that you regard this question as one of vital and urgent importance. I have therefore lost no time in informing the Government of

Great Britain of the contents of your letter; and it is with great pleasure that I communicate to you on their behalf the following statement which, I am confident, you will receive with satisfaction :—

“The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modification, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries, and in regard to those portions of the territories therein in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to the interests of her ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances and make the following reply to your letter:—

“Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca. Great Britain will guarantee the Holy Places against all external aggression and will recognise their inviolability.

“When the situation admits, Great Britain will give to the Arabs her advice and will assist them to establish what may appear to be the most suitable forms of government in those various territories.

“On the other hand, it is understood that the Arabs have decided to seek the advice and guidance of Great Britain only, and that such European Advisers and officials as may be required for the formation of a sound form of administration will be British.

“With regard to the vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, the Arabs will recognise that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure those territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests.

“I am convinced that this declaration will assure you beyond all possible doubts of the sympathy of Great Britain towards the aspirations of her traditional friends, the Arabs,

and will result in a firm and lasting alliance, the immediate results of which will be the expulsion of the Turks from the Arab countries and the freeing of the Arab peoples from the Turkish yoke which, for so many years, has pressed heavily upon them. . . ."

It is clear that this "pledge", which Arab interests have since made so much of, really committed the British to very little. It is also clear that the vagueness of the pledge was not accidental but deliberate. It was intended to satisfy Hussein and at the same time to leave the British free to dispose of all the territory mentioned in the correspondence (apart from the Arabian peninsula) in any way they chose in conjunction with their allies. It is absurd to suppose that Hussein was in any way deceived by the ambiguity of the "pledge". He must have known of Anglo-French designs in the Levant and must have realised that the circumlocutions of the "pledge" had reference to these designs. But he was mainly interested in the independence of the Arabian peninsula and in the prospect of becoming established, with British help, as independent leader of the princes of Arabia. It is probable that the wider claims presented to McMahon were partly in the time-honoured tradition of Oriental bargaining and partly as a means of getting the help of Syrian nationalism in the projected revolt.

It soon became obvious that very little help could be expected from the Syrian nationalists, and meanwhile the Turkish authorities were becoming restive and beginning to demand from Hussein something more than verbal assurances of support. He could not go on bargaining with the British indefinitely. It was in any case in the last degree unlikely that he would get anything more specific out of them. So, after a little more quibbling, he professed himself as satisfied with McMahon's pledge, and prepared to raise the standard of revolt as soon as adequate financial and military help would be forthcoming. He then sent Feisal to Damascus to try to satisfy Jemal Pasha, the Turkish governor, with assurances of forthcoming support, and at the same time sent his other sons, Ali and Abdulla, to the neighbouring tribes to prepare the ground for the revolt. Feisal returned from Damascus pessimistic about help from the Syrian nationalists, and fearful of an extension of Turkish influence in Arabia. He insisted on the necessity for starting the Revolt as soon as possible. So in June 1916, four months after the conclusion

of the McMahon correspondence, Hussein, reinforced by British arms, British brains and British gold, called on the tribes of Arabia to join him in a war of liberation against the Turks.

It is uncertain how much the British expected from the Arab revolt. It is fairly certain that they did not visualise a campaign on the scale that actually developed as a result of Lawrence's genius. It is probable that they expected rather more than would have eventuated without Lawrence. Hussein and his sons did not visualise a movement which would extend beyond the confines of the Arabian peninsula. The scope of what might have reasonably been considered possible at the time of the McMahon correspondence makes one wonder at the temerity of Hussein in asking so much, and at the optimism of McMahon in conceding as much as he did. It is probable that McMahon never imagined that the Revolt would assume sufficient importance to enable Hussein to demand fulfilment of even those vague promises that he had been given. It is reasonably clear that, without the unexpected genius of Lawrence, the Revolt would have at best been confined to the Arabian peninsula and would simply have established sufficient diversion in the peninsula to keep a certain number of Turkish troops locked up there. It was Lawrence who united sufficient of the Arab tribes under the banner of Feisal to give the Revolt some claim to the title of an Arab nationalist movement. (Even so three of the most important Arab princes, the rulers of Nejd and Asir, never joined the Revolt, and the rulers of Shammar and Yemen remained faithful to the Turks.) It was Lawrence who led the half reluctant tribes out of the peninsula to the capture of Akaba. It was Lawrence who conceived the idea of an Arab army acting on Allenby's flank in Transjordan, and who, in pursuance of this idea, set the capture of Damascus before the Arabs as the goal of the Revolt. It was Lawrence who, in the interests of British Imperialism, united the tribes of Arabia into a transient unity and stirred the dry bones of Arab nationalism into some sort of spasmodic life. It was Lawrence who established a community of aim and interest between the Arab tribes of the desert and the Syrian nationalists of Damascus. The theory that Feisal was the guiding star of the Revolt and that Lawrence was simply his adviser is fantastic. Feisal, then or afterwards, never showed any sign of that dynamic power which alone could have transformed a local rising, fomented by British money, into a

great national movement. Not for a thousand and two hundred years had such an army marched out of Arabia. The house of Hussein by itself could not have resolved inter-tribal feuds and jealousies sufficiently to bring about such a movement. It was the arrival of Lawrence in Arabia that transformed the Revolt. The strategy of the Revolt was Lawrence's. Feisal was Lawrence's chosen instrument. Arab apologists have made Hussein more simple and Feisal more brilliant than they really were.

It is instructive to observe that there was no potential head of an Arab State or confederation of States, no nucleus of an Arab party or government, no man or body of men who had the faintest claim to be considered as representative of the Arab people. Hussein was chosen by the British partly because of the accessibility of the Hedjaz ports for supplies of arms etc., and partly because of his position as Sherif of Mecca and his resultant importance, which was in fact much exaggerated, from the point of view of a jihad. The McMahon correspondence does not make it clear whether the proposed Arab State was to be a single unified State, a federation of States or a collection of separate States. Such promises as were made, were made to the Arab people through Hussein, who was considered by a polite fiction to be the representative of the Arab people. Hussein's right to represent the Arab people was never admitted for a moment by the other Arab princes and chiefs, and even those of them who joined the Revolt joined it on the basis of a temporary alliance on terms of equality for the pursuit of certain ends. The Syrian nationalists and later the Iraqi nationalists, seeing that they had not the faintest hope of establishing any successful movement of their own, identified themselves with the successful revolt of the Arab chiefs, and in the subsequent post-war wrangle joined with the Arab chiefs in a more or less united Arab front. Feisal, by virtue of the nominal leadership of the Revolt to which Lawrence had elevated him, assumed the position of the Arab spokesman *vis-a-vis* the Allied Powers, but he was given no specific mandate to represent the somewhat heterogeneous collection of interests that made up the Arab front. In fact the various agreements that were more or less extorted from him by the Allied statesmen have always been repudiated by most of the elements comprising the Arab front.

The Arab people in the sense of the general population of the

approximate regions covered by the McMahon correspondence never came into the matter at all. They were part of the booty claimed from the Allied Powers as the price of the Arab revolt by the princes of Arabia together with the bourgeoisie of Beirut, Damascus, Aleppo and Baghdad.

In the Revolt the only people who played an active part were a few thousand tribesmen from Arabia and Transjordan. The Syrian and Iraqi nationalists were too much under the thumb of the Turkish military terror to be able to create any diversion behind the Turkish lines, while the peasantry behaved with their usual apathetic fatalism, knowing that whatever happened they would not benefit. For them war and revolt was not liberation, but simply an intensification of the hopeless misery that was the inescapable pattern of their existence.

CHAPTER II

The Balfour Declaration

DURING the years following the fall of Jerusalem the Jews of Judaea gradually lost their turbulent and fanatical characteristics. The Temple, the focal point of Jewish religion and nationalism, had been destroyed, and the Romans, disagreeably impressed by a hundred years of administering the Jews of Palestine, were determined to oppose the revival of Jewish nationalism in any shape or form. Generally speaking, however, the Jewish colonies in the various parts of the Roman Empire were tolerated and freely allowed to practise their religion.

The Jews of Western Europe, profiting by the security afforded by the *Pax Romana* and by the Christian prohibition of usury, built up for themselves a practical monopoly of finance and moneylending and credit trading. The poorer among them, unable to earn a living in the larger towns as a result of the competition of their more successful brethren, pushed northwards and eastwards beyond the settled frontiers of the Empire as itinerant peddlars. In the strife and chaos that ensued in Europe after the death of Charlemagne the Jews flourished exceedingly. The feudal nobles, who were struggling with each other over the dismembered remains of Charlemagne's empire, needed money and credit to carry on their struggles. The Jews provided both. At that time the actual position of the Jews in Western Europe approximated to what modern antisemites appear to imagine that it is now. (Although those afflicted by the disease seem to be uncertain whether international Jewry is the hand behind monopoly capitalism or bolshevism.) By the twelfth century the feudal economy of Western Europe was heavily mortgaged to the Jews. As a result of this, an appeal was made to the worst instincts of religious fanaticism in order to launch a persecution against the Jews in some ways comparable to that which we have seen in our own day in Central Europe and Poland. The Middle Ages have only this in their favour: at that time the financial domination of the Jews was a matter of fact and not of fiction; the motive of the persecution was not to provide an outlet for the cruelty lust of a half-crazed set of barbarians, but to rid the

nobility of a crippling burden of indebtedness.

Meanwhile the Jewish colonies in Asia, North Africa and Spain had fallen under the domination of the Arabs. Arab economy never gave them the chance to achieve the special position which the Jews had achieved in Europe, and in consequence they never suffered the same terrible reaction. In Egypt and Syria their importance declined with the cultural and mercantile decline of these regions which followed on the Arab invasion. In Spain they had a considerable share in the brief blaze of Moorish civilisation, and the Jewish community in Spain acquired a consciousness and a culture which has had a deep influence on the Jewish people, and survived the persecution and expulsion of the Spanish Jews which followed hard on the restoration of Spain to the arms of Christ in the fifteenth century. The Jews so expelled mostly found asylum in the various Jewish colonies scattered over the Moslem world, and they brought with them a dignity and a culture which did much to hearten and recreate these isolated and poverty-stricken communities.

The persecutions of the Jews in Western Europe had driven thousands of them eastward to Hungary, Poland and Russia, into a worse captivity than they had ever known by the waters of Babylon. Herded together in the vilest slums of the towns and villages of these countries, hopelessly poverty-stricken, isolated from all outside sources of refreshment and culture, they turned to their religion and the memories of their past as the only things that were left to them. It was from these dreams of an idyllic past projected into an improbable future that Zionism was born. The intolerable present and the hopeless future of four hundred years of life in Eastern European ghettos must be felt and appreciated before any understanding of Zionism is possible.

The Jews in Eastern Europe never attained the precarious prosperity that had come to the Jews in the West. Feudalism in Western Europe followed after a highly cosmopolitan society which had lapsed into chaos. The Jews, who had been a part of that civilisation, and who, with the Church, had survived its destruction, were able, with the Church, to take advantage of the chaos. The Church attained dominion over men's souls, the Jews attained dominion over their pockets. The Jews in Eastern Europe never had a chance. As soon as they showed any signs of possessing any wealth they were plundered. In Western Europe they had

never competed with the local workers for a livelihood. They had their own more or less exclusive *métiers*, and so did not incur the hostility of the common people. Even when persecution came there is no evidence that the interested anti-semitism of the nobles was echoed by the common people, except when incitement of the "Who killed Christ?" type drove them to spasmodic fury. In Eastern Europe it was different. The Jews, in order to gain a livelihood, were forced to compete with the gentile small traders, who were themselves poor enough. They thus stirred up bitter enmities against themselves, and their lives were endangered and embittered by periodical outbursts by their neighbours on whose preserves they had been compelled to encroach.

The fury of the Western European persecution was spent as soon as the object of the persecution, namely the repudiation of debts, had been achieved. But the Jews never recovered their old position. Their presence in Western Europe was no more than tolerated until the beginning of the nineteenth century when, under the impetus of the ideas spread by the French Revolution, rights of equal citizenship were given to Jews in most Western European countries. This resulted in a small westward trickle of Jews from Eastern Europe, but it was no more than a trickle, as those Jews who managed to establish themselves in Western Europe severely discouraged a large influx of their compatriots for fear that this would cause a revival of anti-Jewish persecution. The attitude of the Western European Jews in the first flush of their emancipation was that of Charles II after the Restoration: a determination never to go on their travels again. Even a considerable volume of immigration to the United States did not really bring much hope to the ghetto. Some of the clever ones, some of the lucky ones, escaped to freedom, and in some cases even to prosperity; but the main body stayed on.

The Jews who settled in the United States and in Western Europe shared both the prosperity and the degradation which the industrial progress of the nineteenth century brought in its train. On the one side we have Disraeli and the Rothschilds, on the other side the sweat shops of Leeds, Houndsditch, and the Bronx. The circumspect behaviour of the richer Jews effectively prevented any considerable body of anti-Jewish prejudice from marring their good fortune, and in course of time some of them felt secure enough to acknowledge their cousins and co-religionists in Eastern

Europe. It was then that the vague ghetto dreaming of a return to Zion became linked with a philanthropic desire and perhaps a pricking of conscience on the part of the richer Jews of Western Europe and America. The ghetto dream of a return to Zion marched with the desire of the Western Jews to avoid compromising their own position. The practical difficulties of settlement in Palestine were considerable and nothing much more than a "token" or symbolic colonisation was envisaged. Negotiations were started by the Rothschilds with the Sultan of Turkey, considerable sums of money were expended, and by the 1880's a certain number of agricultural colonies had been founded in Palestine and peopled by immigrants from Poland and Russia. These colonies were not successful economically and were only kept going by regular subsidies from the Rothschilds. But it was a beginning. The first efforts at colonisation led to several independent "back to Palestine" movements in Russia and elsewhere as a result of which more colonies were founded. Because of the apparent financial and physical limitations the movement remained largely a cultural one: the creation of a kind of secular Temple in Palestine as a focal point of Jewish thought and culture, and an asylum in which a limited number of aged Jews would be able to end their days in peace and freedom.

It was Theodor Herzl who first conceived the idea of a Jewish State. Herzl was a Viennese Jewish journalist who had never taken any particular interest in his race until the Dreyfus trial, which he had to report for his paper. Herzl shrewdly realised that the Dreyfus case showed on what an insecure foundation rested the citizenship even of Western European Jews. He saw how little was needed to revive the flames of anti-Jewish hatred. After the Dreyfus trial he devoted his life to promoting the idea of a Jewish National Home either in Palestine or elsewhere. He founded the Zionist Organisation to co-ordinate the efforts of the various separate bodies of Zionists and became its first President. He secured the interest of Joseph Chamberlain, then (1903) British Colonial Secretary, and as a result the Zionist Organisation was offered facilities for Jewish settlement in Uganda. Herzl, with the implications of the Dreyfus case still fresh in his mind, was for accepting the offer, but he was overcome by the majority of his colleagues in whom the culture and idealistic sides of Zionism were still uppermost. Henceforth it was Palestine or nothing.

The Jews living under Moslem rule, Sephardi Jews, had practically no points of contact with the European (Azkenazi) Jews and took no part in the Zionist movement in its early days. At the end of the nineteenth century the Sephardi Jews enjoyed a status which at best was a little worse than that of the Western European Jews and at worst a little better than that of the Eastern European Jews. The Sephardi Jews were simply one of a number of non-Moslem minorities and were neither better nor worse off than the rest of them. There was no anti-semitism in the European sense of the term, and very little assimilation.

The extent of racial assimilation that has taken place among the Jews is a matter for argument. There has always been more assimilation in prosperous times than in times of persecution. In times of persecution the Jews were thrown back upon themselves and social contacts with Gentiles were rare. In times of prosperity or even of toleration a certain proportion of each generation of Jews committed apostacy. In cases of mixed marriages it was usually the Jews who were absorbed by the Gentiles. The number of Gentiles absorbed by Jews was never sufficient to destroy or even noticeably to dilute the dominant Jewish strain. The Eastern European Jews, by virtue of the circumstances in which they lived, hardly ever intermarried with Gentiles. During the period of Jewish emancipation in Western Europe and America assimilationist tendencies were very strong, particularly among the richer Jews, and at the present day Western European Jews are racially and culturally far less Jewish than the Eastern European Jews. Culturally, the Eastern European Jews were the only ones who retained or rather regained a specifically Jewish culture, and that was a very narrow culture based entirely on Hebrew religious books. It was, however, the means of preserving the Hebrew language, which is the basis of the Jewish national revival in Palestine. The Sephardi Jews had no secular culture; the Western European Jews adopted the secular culture of their adopted countries. Socially the Jews, whether persecuted or not, for the last two thousand years have always been regarded as a people apart, as minorities in the countries where they have settled. They were always Jews first and foremost and they probably would not have had it otherwise. But in the nineteenth century the upper and middle class Jews of Western Europe, breathing the air of freedom for the first time, and associating Jewry with the filth and stunk

of the slums of Lemberg and Cracow, conceived the idea of subordinating their Jewishness to their adopted nationality as the only means of laying the boggy of recurrent anti-Jewish persecution. They carried this idea to such an extent that at the beginning of the twentieth century there was a large and influential body of Jews in America and Western Europe who were bitterly opposed to Zionism on the ground that Zionism was a direct reversal of the doctrine of social and cultural assimilation which, they contended, was the correct policy for the Jews. The question of racial assimilation was not regarded as important. It was only when it came to be realised that present day anti-semitism has no basis in reason that the futility of assimilation and the necessity for large scale emigration from Europe became generally apparent to the Jews. But this realisation had not been attained, in spite of the Dreyfus case, when the Zionist Organisation turned down the Uganda offer in 1903, nor had it been attained when the 1914-1919 war had made a Jewish National Home in Palestine a practical possibility.

In the very early days of the war the British Government realised the importance of having control over southern Syria in order to protect the eastern flank of the Suez canal, which the Turkish army very nearly succeeded in crossing in 1915. The British official mind was somewhat exercised as to how Great Britain could establish a claim to this region which would satisfy her allies. We have already seen how the McMahon-Hussein correspondence skated over the matter. The exchange of letters ended in February 1916 on the understanding that Hussein would instigate a revolt against the Turks in Arabia in return for an undertaking by Great Britain to secure Arab independence over an area from which it can be fairly said that Palestine was not specifically excluded. Concurrently with, and apparently independently of the McMahon correspondence, negotiations were proceeding between Great Britain, France and Czarist Russia as to the disposal of the Ottoman Empire after the victory of the Allies. These negotiations were completed in May 1916, three months after the conclusion of the McMahon correspondence, in a secret treaty known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, after the names of the chief British and French negotiators. This agreement completely ignored McMahon's negotiations with Hussein. Its terms and provisions were as follows:—

(1) A coastal belt from a little north of Haifa to a little west of Mersina was to be controlled by France.

(2) Southern Iraq, from the Persian Gulf to a little north of Baghdad, together with a small enclave round Haifa, was to be controlled by Britain.

(3) "With a view to securing the religious interests of the Entente Powers," Palestine, with the Holy Places, was to be separated from Turkish territory and subjected to a special regime to be determined by agreement between Russia, France, and Great Britain.

(4) The rest of the territory under discussion was left to "the Arab State or Confederation of States". In the Syrian interior such advice and administrative assistance as were wanted by the Arabs would be supplied by France, in northern Iraq and the country east of the Jordan by Britain.

In July, the Arabs, in complete ignorance of the existence of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, started their Revolt. Soon after, the British Government, still worried about the future of southern Syria, conceived an idea which would give that area, as far as the British were concerned, a more satisfactory status than the international regime foreshadowed in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. It so happened that a chemist called Chaim Weizmann, a Jew of Russian parentage, but a naturalised Englishman and living in Manchester, had made a valuable discovery connected with explosives which had brought him into contact with Lloyd George when he was Minister of Munitions. Weizmann was an ardent Zionist and for some years before the war had been one of the foremost members of a small group of Manchester Jews who were interested in popularising the idea of Zionism in England. Weizmann made use of his contact with Lloyd George to try to interest him in Zionism. By this means the Cabinet became dimly conscious of the Zionist movement; Balfour remembered having met Weizmann and having been impressed by him; Herbert Samuel, as a Jew, was sympathetically interested; Edwin Montague, also a Jew, of extreme assimilationist tendencies, viewed it with horror. Lloyd George who, as Asquith remarked, "didn't care a damn about the Jews", nevertheless appreciated that the Zionist movement might be utilised as a wooden horse of Troy to introduce British control into Palestine. The British Government came to view it in that light. If the Jews were to be

established in Palestine the British would be their natural "protectors". France, our most dangerous potential rival in the Levant, was not suitable after the Dreyfus case; America would be unlikely to accept the role; Italy was not regarded as a serious claimant. And so the British Government adopted Zionism. British Jewry on the whole favoured the idea, although many influential British Jews opposed it. The United States welcomed it whole-heartedly. France was grudgingly prepared to accept it, provided that she was assured of her position in the rest of the Levant. Italy also agreed, subject to the satisfaction of certain territorial claims in Asia Minor. The Zionist leaders on their side were prepared, in return for a declaration undertaking to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine, to do all in their power to "rally Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the Allied cause". The British Government hoped that the Declaration would be effective among Jewish populations in enemy countries. As it turned out the effect that it did have was negligible and German Jews showed a loyalty to their country not always emulated by their Aryan co-nationals, particularly those who were subsequently to make such an aggressive and revealing parade of their Germanism.

Negotiations lasted during most of the year 1917 until finally, in the beginning of November 1917, when the success of Allenby's campaign in Palestine had brought the project within the bounds of practical realisation, the Balfour Declaration was published. It was so called because Lord Balfour, in his capacity as Foreign Secretary, had been responsible for "selling" the idea to the Allied Powers, and for agreeing with them on the precise form of the Declaration. Balfour was a typical Conservative politician, a man to whom equivocation was a mere matter of routine. He knew very little about Zionism and absolutely nothing about the Near East and had neither the time nor the inclination to learn about either. What was wanted was a formula which would enable Great Britain, with the assent of the Allied Powers, to establish herself in Palestine after the war. It was also important to win the support of World Jewry, but this was secondary to the main end. It was essential that no precise commitments should be entered into, with the Zionists or anybody else, which might tend to tie the hands of future British Governments in utilising Zionism in the interests of British Imperialism. It was essential that the wording

should be such as to enable the whole business to be plausibly explained away to the Arabs. For this Declaration, unlike the Sykes-Picot Agreement, was to be openly published. (It was not until just after the publication of the Balfour Declaration that the Bolshevik Government in an outburst of puckish humour published the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, discovered in the Foreign Office archives in Petrograd.) The Balfour Declaration was issued in the form of a letter from Balfour to Lord Rothschild:—

“I have much pleasure in conveying to you on behalf of His Majesty’s Government the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations, which has been submitted to and approved by the Cabinet:—

“His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

“I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.”

No mention is made of the intended British role of “protector” of the proposed National Home. His Majesty’s Government simply undertook to “use their best endeavour to facilitate the achievement” of something that remained undefined. “Civil rights of non-Jewish communities” can mean everything or nothing. It may be held to include political rights, or it may simply mean that Jews and non-Jews will be equal before the Law like dukes and dustmen. It is just as futile to quibble over the wording of the Balfour Declaration as it is to quibble over the wording of the McMahon correspondence. The wording of both is vague and ambiguous because it was intended to be vague and ambiguous. In both cases it was intended to leave the British Government free later to put whatever construction it liked on the undertakings given. If all Great Britain had done in Palestine after the war had been to facilitate the foundation of a Hebrew university and a few orphanages and homes for aged Jews it could have been quite plausibly argued that she had carried out what was undertaken in

the Balfour Declaration. The Jews are the most intelligent people in the world, and they must have realised this, just as Hussein realised that the McMahon correspondence committed Great Britain to nothing except immediate financial and military assistance on a small scale. It is just as nonsensical of the Jews to talk about betrayal on the basis of Balfour's "pledge" as it is for the Arabs to talk about betrayal on the basis of McMahon's "pledge". It is quite obvious that neither the Arab nor the Jewish leaders were deceived by the terms of these declarations, and it would be an insult to their intelligence to imagine for a moment that they were so deceived. The Zionist leaders knew, the Allied Powers knew, that the British Government, like Lloyd George, did not "care a damn about the Jews", but simply wanted Palestine for strategic reasons, and was using Zionism as a means to get it. There is of course no reason why the Zionists, having been made use of by the British Government, should not have made what propagandist use they could of the Balfour Declaration. In the same way there was no reason why the Arabs should not have made similar use of the McMahon correspondence and subsequent "pledges" made to them. But it is incumbent on a student of these affairs, however humble and however superficial, to avoid such disingenuousness. One can condemn British duplicity without pretending that either Arabs or Jews were deceived by it.

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CHAPTER III

The Post-War Settlement

THE ANNOUNCEMENT of the Balfour Declaration, followed a few weeks later by the unauthorised publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, naturally caused a good deal of disaffection among the leaders of the Arab Revolt. This double revelation that the Allies intended to confine Arab independence to the Arabian Peninsula came just at the time when the Arabs were being persuaded to extend the scope of the Revolt beyond the confines of the Peninsula. In spite of this, the British authorities experienced extraordinarily little difficulty in explaining these agreements away to the Arabs. The Arabs no doubt felt that if they extended the Revolt to Syria and Transjordan and possessed themselves of these regions they would be in a very much stronger position for bargaining than if they halted the Revolt in Akaba. This and the driving power of Lawrence caused the Revolt to be carried on.

In order to allay Hussein's suspicions about the Balfour Declaration, Hogarth, an official of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, was sent on a mission to King Hussein, with the object of reassuring him about the restricted scope of the proposed Jewish National Home. This visit is of some importance in that it admits by implication that the British did regard Palestine as part of the area of Arab independence referred to in the McMahon correspondence. Otherwise why was it necessary to reassure Hussein about the Balfour Declaration? From the British point of view this visit of Hogarth's was a blunder. It would have been far better to have taken the attitude that what was done was no concern of the Arabs. This visit of Hogarth's makes nonsense of the subsequent official British attitude that the McMahon correspondence had intended to omit Palestine from the area of Arab independence as being west of the Hama-Homs-Damascus line. Hogarth, assisted by the ambiguous wording of the Balfour Declaration, which had been designed for just such a contingency, appears to have had little difficulty in convincing Hussein that the scope of the National Home was intended to be quite unimportant. That, as Hussein probably realised, was not the point; the point was that Palestine was to be barred from independence, not

because of the Jews, but because the British were determined to keep it for themselves. However, there was nothing for Hussein to do but accept the British explanation and to rely on the success of the Arab Revolt to satisfy his rapidly mounting ambitions.

Those Iraqi and Syrian nationalists who had escaped from Turkish rule were able openly to pursue their activities in Cairo without fear of the executioner. They became acquainted with the McMahon "pledge" to Hussein, they heard of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration. On the basis of the McMahon "pledge" they identified themselves completely with the Arab Revolt, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, affecting as they did the regions in which they were directly interested, disturbed them profoundly. They realised to a certain extent that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was dictated by French ambitions in the Levant and, except in the case of Palestine where the Sykes-Picot Agreement appeared to have been suspended by the Balfour Declaration, there did appear to be provision for eventual independence for those regions not definitely covered by the McMahon "pledge". The Balfour Declaration was another matter. On the face of it, it appeared to mean that Palestine was definitely barred from the area of prospective Arab independence. Now, although Palestine in area and population represented a very small part of the Arabic-speaking area in process of being liberated from Turkish rule, it represented a very considerable part of the area in which the Syrian nationalists were interested. It was not a question of cutting off a small piece of land about the size of Wales from a large homogeneous area stretching from the Euphrates to the Indian Ocean, it was a question of cutting off about one quarter of the total area and population of the prospective State of Syria; and barring that quarter for ever from what the Syrian nationalists considered to be its promised destiny.

The British could have ignored the protests of the Syrian nationalists but for two reasons. In the first place, the setting of Damascus before the Arabs as the goal of their Revolt had completely identified the cause of the Syrian nationalists with that of the Arabs. In order to satisfy the Arabs the Syrian nationalists had to be satisfied too. In the second place, the Arab Revolt had become a necessary adjunct to the advance of Allenby's army, and the satisfaction of the Arabs had become necessary in the interests

of that advance. In addition to this, Great Britain realised that a pro-British Syrian national movement would be a powerful counter to French ambitions when it came to dividing up spheres of influence in the Levant. It was therefore considered important to satisfy Syrian nationalists about the Balfour Declaration. So in March 1918, just after Hogarth's mission to Hussein, a statement was made by the British Government to the Syrian nationalists, which became known as the Declaration to the Seven. This Declaration gave the same kind of reassurance about the projected National Home as had already been given to Hussein. The widest publicity was given to it both in the liberated areas and in the areas under Turkish rule, copies of the declaration being dropped over the latter areas from aeroplanes.

The Syrian nationalists appeared to be slightly reassured either by the Declaration to the Seven, or by one of the Fourteen Points laid down in January by President Wilson, which had been unreservedly accepted by the Allied Powers. The relevant passage in the Fourteen Points reads as follows:—

“The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.

“The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of National Governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

“In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and in recognising these as soon as they are established. Far from wishing to impose on the population of these regions any particular institutions, they are only concerned to secure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen

by the populations themselves."

The U.S.A. as well as France had for a long time been interested in Syria as a result of numerous American missions there and an American University in Beirut, and the Syrian nationalists probably derived more comfort from American interest in their aspirations than they did from the Declaration to the Seven.

At the same time a meeting was arranged between Weizmann and Feisal. Each appears to have been favourably impressed by the other, and expressed himself hopeful that their respective claims to Palestine would be satisfied to the mutual advantage of both. It is in fact possible that the Arabs were satisfied about the limited scope of the National Home, but this was of secondary importance compared with the obvious fact that Great Britain was using the Jews as a means of establishing herself in Palestine. By the same token the real basis of incompatibility between Arabs and Jews was not the prospect of Jewish immigration into Palestine but the fact that the Jews intended to support British Imperialist interests in Palestine as a means of establishing themselves there under the aegis of British Imperialism. That was and is and always has been the root of the Arab objection to the Balfour Declaration and the policy resulting from it. There would have been no objection on the part of the Arabs to the introduction of Jewish capital and Jewish enterprise into Palestine or into the rest of Syria for that matter; something of the sort was needed to help revive the country after centuries of Turkish neglect. It was the fact that the Jews were the stool pigeons of British Imperialism that damned the whole business in Arab eyes from the beginning.

On October 30th, 1918, the Turks, in full retreat before Allenby in Syria and before Marshall in Iraq, surrendered. On November 7th the British and French Governments issued a joint declaration, of which the essential passage was as follows:—

"The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of National Governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations.

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ment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in territories the liberation of which they are engaged in securing, and in recognising these as soon as they are established. Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions any particular institutions, they are only concerned to secure by their support and by adequate assistance the regular working of Governments and administrations freely chosen by the populations themselves."

On the face of it this seemed to give the Arabs what they wanted. On the face of it the declaration provided a confirmation and indeed an extension of the McMahon pledge, and the Balfour Declaration was not even mentioned. It was obviously influenced by President Wilson's Fourteen Points; it makes no mention of Arab independence as such, but refers to "the establishment of indigenous governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia"; it makes no specific reference to the Arabian peninsula in which neither Britain nor France were interested territorially and in which "indigenous Governments and administrations" had already been established. This declaration is the most inexcusable, because the most purposeless, piece of duplicity in the whole sorry tale of Allied promises to the inhabitants of the Middle East. Such of its promises as have since been fulfilled, or half fulfilled, have only been so fulfilled after a considerable delay and in every case as a result of successful rebellion. At the same time it cannot be seriously argued that the declaration was taken at its face value by any of the people concerned. Anglo-French designs in the Near East were a matter of common knowledge and it is nonsense to pretend that the subsequent formulation of these designs at the Peace Treaties came as any shock to the Arab delegates. It is not to be supposed that anybody took the declaration as meaning that Great Britain and France in the first generous flush of victory had suddenly abandoned these designs, and had cast aside those reservations made in the McMahon "pledge".

After the surrender of Turkey and simultaneously with the publication of the Anglo-French declaration, the areas covered in this declaration were divided up into territories known as O.E.T.A. (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration) West, East and South. O.E.T.A. East and South comprising Palestine and

Transjordan were under British control; O.E.T.A. West consisting of Syria was under Anglo-French control. In every case the administration was a military one, and was considered as being a temporary arrangement pending the setting up of a permanent government.

When Lawrence induced the tribes of Arabia to march out of the Arabian Peninsula on to Damascus, he linked the Arab Revolt irrevocably with Syrian nationalism. From that moment something of the fanaticism and something of the force of the Arabian desert communicated itself to the Syrian nationalists. With Arab independence in the Peninsula achieved, the core and centre of Arab nationalist agitation shifted to Damascus. A glance at the map will show the effect of the Arab Revolt on Syria. The Arab advance from Akaba to Damascus was the first time that an Arab army had marched out of the Peninsula since the days of the first Caliphs. Their march brought Arab nationalism northwards out of the Peninsula into Transjordan and Eastern Syria, where it linked up with and transformed Syrian nationalism. When Feisal entered Damascus, it spread along the line of the railway as far north as Aleppo, until there was a steady pressure of the resurgent Arab nationalism of the desert on the whole of the settled regions of Syria. This resurgent Arab nationalism not only blocked the Anglo-French intention of extending their influence eastward from the Levant coast, but also exercised a strong influence on all the peoples of the Levant, sharpening and strengthening their nationalist feeling, and reviving in them a sense of kinship with the Arabs of the desert whose blood flowed in their veins, whose God they worshipped and whose language they spoke.

Meanwhile Hussein had proclaimed himself King of the Hedjaz, which was recognised by the Allies as a sovereign State. Feisal represented the Hedjaz at the Peace Conference with a view to stressing the identity between the Arabs and the Syrian nationalists, with whose interests he was by then chiefly concerned.

In January 1919 Feisal went to London and afterwards to the Peace Conference to learn what he could about Anglo-French intentions in Syria. In return for somewhat vague assurances with regard to the independence of the rest of Syria he agreed to accept the implications of the Balfour Declaration with regard to Palestine.

Meanwhile the areas concerned remained under O.E.T.A.

In April Feisal returned to Damascus where an Arab Congress was being formed with delegates from all over Syria. In October he returned to Europe armed with the mandate of the Congress to negotiate on its behalf. In the same month, simultaneously with the arrival of Feisal in Paris, Great Britain agreed to hand over O.E.T.A. West to exclusive French control. The French thereupon took over the direct administration of the whole coastal area from just north of Haifa to Alexandretta. Feisal returned to Damascus at the end of the year convinced of French designs on the whole of Northern Syria. He had already revoked his previous agreement to the Balfour Declaration on the quite reasonable ground that his agreement had been conditional on the fulfilment of promises regarding the rest of Syria, which had not in fact been fulfilled. In any case Feisal's original right to agree to the Declaration was a dubious one, being based only on his position as representative of his father, the titular head of the Arab Revolt. But in his repudiation of his assent he had the authority of the Syrian Congress behind him.

In March 1920 the Congress proclaimed Feisal King of Syria and Palestine, omitting the vilayets of Basra and Baghdad and that part of Syria west of the Aleppo-Hama-Homs-Damascus line which had been specifically excluded from the promised area of independence in the McMahon correspondence, and which in any case was now firmly in the possession of the French. The inclusion of Palestine was a gesture of defiance. With regard to the rest Feisal probably hoped that he would be able to retain a certain degree of independence in the area east of the Jordan and the Lebanon mountains.

Meanwhile the future disposition of the Turkish Empire was being settled at the Peace Conference. In January the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had decided that the conquered provinces were not to be restored to Turkish rule. In February the Zionist Organisation submitted to the Peace Conference its ideas as to the practical application of the Balfour Declaration. As nobody else besides the Zionists had any very clear ideas on the subject, apart from the fact that Great Britain was determined to stay in Palestine, these ideas formed the basis of the settlement that was eventually arrived at. Great Britain, whose interest in Palestine was primarily strategic, does not seem to have attached a great deal of importance to the details of the organisation of the

National Home, and in consequence the Zionist Organisation was able to a certain extent to get the Peace Conference to accept its own interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. Neither the British nor the French seem to have seriously anticipated that the indigenous population of Syria would be able to do anything to obstruct their designs. They appear to have ignored the fact that the success of the Arab Revolt had entirely transformed Syrian nationalism east of the Jordan and the Lebanon and consequently to have ignored the probable effect of this militant nationalism on the populations west of the Jordan and the Lebanon.

At Versailles President Wilson's idea of a League of Nations was converted by Clemenceau and Lloyd George into a defensive alliance of the victorious nations against the possibility of a future attempt at aggression by Germany. But the League of Nations had another aspect which owed nothing to memories of the Holy Alliance. This was the Mandate system which is said to have been conceived in the brain of General Smuts. According to the mandatory idea the colonies of the enemy countries were not taken by the Allies, but liberated from their previous oppressors. As the inhabitants were as yet unfit to govern themselves, they were allocated to one or other of the victorious powers who were to administer these territories as trustees in the interest of the inhabitants, and to train the inhabitants in administration until such time as they would be capable of dispensing with outside assistance. The Covenant of the League of Nations laid all this down and further stipulated that, as far as the liberated communities of the Turkish Empire were concerned, the wish of the inhabitants was to be the main consideration in the allocation of the Mandates. President Wilson took the whole business of the Covenant very seriously, and as he had brought U.S.A. into the war on the understanding that the principles of the Covenant embodied in his Fourteen Points were to be the basis of the peace settlement, the rest of the Allies had to pay lip service to it.

In the spring of 1919 it occurred to President Wilson that the contemplated settlement in the Middle East was not altogether according to the wishes of the inhabitants, and he pressed for a commission to be sent out to ascertain what these wishes were. The British and French, united in this if in nothing else connected with the Middle East, blocked the proposal. President Wilson

then sent an unofficial commission known as the King-Crane Commission to Syria to report to him on the situation. The Commission returned with the report that the inhabitants (presumably meaning that proportion of the inhabitants who had an opportunity of expressing their views on the matter, which is about as comprehensive as the gossip writers' "all London") wanted complete independence for a united Syria (President Wilson might have guessed this without sending a commission), but failing this the Mandatory of the United States or Great Britain. The Commission also testified to the extreme hostility with which the idea of the National Home was regarded.

Up to the time of the allocation of the Mandates the areas in question remained under O.E.T.A. There was effective British military occupation of Palestine as far as the Jordan, and effective French military occupation of the maritime region of Syria. Transjordan and the inland regions of Syria had been largely under Arab control since the end of the war. The northern part of this area had been allocated to France and the southern part to Great Britain. Great Britain, who did not propose to exacerbate Arab opinion more than it had already been exacerbated (as Great Britain apparently now realised), did not attempt any aggressive penetration into Transjordan, but France immediately made clear her intention of establishing the same measure of control over the inland parts of Syria as she had already established over the maritime region.

In July 1920 the French authorities sent an ultimatum to Feisal demanding the handing over of all essential services in that part of his kingdom which had been allocated to France. Feisal showed himself willing to negotiate a reasonable settlement, but France was not looking for a settlement. She cut short all discussions and occupied Damascus by force in face of a certain amount of resistance. Feisal fled and France soon established control over that part of Syria which had been entrusted to her. Meanwhile Great Britain was in serious trouble. Iraq was in revolt. The tribes of Transjordan had risen in defence of the Syrian Arabs. France, who had conceded Palestine to Great Britain on condition that her claims to Syria were admitted, was clamouring for the suppression of the Transjordan rebels. Nationalist agitation in Egypt was becoming increasingly formidable. A measure of appeasement was indicated. Mr. Churchill, who

was Colonial Secretary at the time and responsible for the administration of Mandated areas allotted to Great Britain, having settled the Iraq revolt and having induced Lawrence to assist him, called a Colonial Office conference in Cairo to consider the position in the Middle East. As a result of this conference Feisal was given the kingdom of Iraq, with the prospect of Iraq becoming independent by easy stages extending over twenty-five years, subject to the safeguarding of British imperial interests there. Abdulla, another son of Hussein, was made Amir of Transjordan, which was separated from Palestine and subsequently declared outside the scope of the Balfour Declaration, while still remaining under British Mandatory rule. These statesmanlike dispositions settled the immediate troubles in Iraq and Transjordan, satisfied the house of Hussein, and left France free to consolidate her position in Syria without sacrificing any essential part of Britain's imperial interests. It was British imperial statesmanship at its best. The British realised that some concession had to be made to nationalist feelings in the Middle East. They realised at the same time that they had only obtained a free hand in Palestine as a result of conceding France a free hand in Syria. They also realised that by establishing Hussein's sons as rulers of Iraq and Transjordan, they would gain the alliance of Arab feudal nationalism as a counterbalance to the almost inevitable disaffection of Arab urban nationalism in Palestine and Iraq. It was the old principle of divide and rule. Great Britain wished by this settlement to avoid the pressure of a hostile Arab nationalism against her interests in Palestine and Iraq. She wished to separate the nationalist aspirations of the Syrian and Iraqi middle classes from the larger and more virile nationalism of the desert. The decisions of the Cairo Conference represented an attempt to scotch that pan-Arabism which Great Britain had half-unwittingly helped to create. As far as British imperial interests in the Middle East were concerned, the representatives of the house of Hussein would be much easier to deal with than the local middle class nationalists, just as in India the princes are easier to deal with than Congress leaders. Feudal rulers have a common interest with British imperialism in repressing the more inconvenient kinds of progress. As it turned out, the eclipse of Hussein's power in the peninsula by the rise of Ibn Saud, the Emir of Nejd, soon deprived the house of Hussein of much of its importance from an Arab national-

ist point of view. But Great Britain foresaw this development in time and deserted Hussein soon enough to avoid incurring the enmity of Ibn Saud. In 1924 Ibn Saud captured Mecca and deposed Hussein from his kingdom. The British Government put a cruiser at Hussein's disposal to take him from Jeddah to the island of Cyprus, where he passed the remainder of his days.

Meanwhile, although the Mandate had been awarded to Great Britain, the terms of the Mandate, in which was to be incorporated the Balfour Declaration, had not yet been defined. This delay was partly due to the necessity for consultation with the United States and partly to the long delay in making peace with Turkey. It was not until July 1922 that the terms of the Palestine Mandate with the Balfour Declaration incorporated in it were officially declared, and it was not until September 1923 that the French Mandate for Syria and the British Mandate for Palestine were formally put into force. In September 1922, soon after the publication of the Mandate, the British Government formally advised the League of its intention to separate Transjordan from Palestine in so far as the National Home clauses of the Mandate were concerned, but confirmed that the other provisions of the Mandate would continue to be applicable to Transjordan. Whether the British Government had ever intended to include Transjordan within the scope of the National Home is uncertain; but the events of the latter half of 1920 had made it clear that it would have been inexpedient to have done so.

The circumstances of the publication of the Mandate differed widely from those of the Balfour Declaration. The Balfour Declaration was a voluntary announcement by the British Government. The Mandate was a curriculum of administration made out, not by Great Britain, but by an international body of which Great Britain was a member, for the use of Great Britain, who was to be accountable to that international body for its proper use. The terms of the Mandate provided for an annual report by the Mandatory Power to the League, whose duty it was to satisfy itself that the terms of the Mandate were being observed.

The Mandate* is naturally a very much more precise document than the Balfour Declaration. Even so there still existed a good deal of ambiguity about the precise status of the National Home. On the one hand the Mandate does not define with any clarity

* See Appendix.

the precise obligations of the Mandatory Power towards the Jews, and on the other hand it does not make any definition of the "rights" which the "indigenous inhabitants" are to enjoy apart from free use of their religion and language. The basis of the Mandate was the Balfour Declaration, but it is clear that the terms of the Mandate were also considerably influenced by the suggestions made by Zionist leaders as to the detailed constitution of the National Home. One of the most important provisions in the Mandate is Article IV, which provides for the establishment of a Jewish Agency, to be recognised as a public body whose function would be to advise and co-operate with the Mandatory Government in matters affecting the National Home. This Jewish Agency, which was a Zionist suggestion originally, and in whose constitution the Mandatory Government has no voice, was to act both as a liaison between international Jewry and the Jews of Palestine and as the representative in Palestine *vis-à-vis* the Administration of both Palestine and world Jewry. This organisation was not paralleled by any similar Arab body. It is fairly clear that the drafters of the Mandate took the view that the main duty of the Mandatory Power was the development of the Jewish National Home and that the only limiting factor in that development was to be a consideration for the welfare (not political or nationalist aspirations) of the indigenous inhabitants. Whether this was a reasonable view, whether this was a practical view, is another matter, but there can be no doubt that this was the view that they held. From the pronouncements of British statesmen at the time it is clear that they did not think that it would ever be desirable or necessary to modify this view of the Mandate in order to meet the demands of Arab nationalism. The terms of the Mandate assume by implication that the Jews will sooner or later be a majority in Palestine; the whole of the provisions affecting the non-Jewish population are provisions affecting a minority; they are provisions similar to those under which, for instance, the Sudeten minorities in Czechoslovakia were protected. It was not considered within the bounds of possibility that the Arabs should come to oppress the Jews in Palestine or the Sudeten-Germans to oppress the Czechs in Czechoslovakia. Now it is no longer a question of safeguards for the Arab, but of safeguards for the Jew. The whole conception of the Mandate has been changed. It is the Jews who are the minority, politically as well as numerically.

This may be right or it may be wrong, it may be expedient, it may be necessary; but it is not the Mandate. The Mandate left a good many things undefined, but there is not the slightest shadow of doubt that it envisaged a minority status for the Arabs with the same general safeguards as were provided for other minorities under the various Peace Treaties. It is not a question of what was intended by the Balfour Declaration; it is not a question of whether or not the Mandate was just to the Arabs; it is a question of interpreting the Mandate in the light of what on the face of it it appears to mean and in the light of what statesmen at the time evidently considered it to mean.

There is no question of the Mandate having been drafted in ignorance of the real state of affairs in Palestine. That might perhaps be said of the Balfour Declaration, but the drafters of the Mandate had every opportunity of learning the true state of affairs, and they could still have implemented the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, while limiting the scope of the National Home, if they had considered such a course justified. Instead they confirmed and even amplified the Balfour Declaration. It is interesting, too, to note that the terms of the Mandate were confirmed by the U.S.A. in spite of the report of the King-Crane Commission. It is also clear that the terms of the Mandate were considered reasonable by Lawrence himself after the settlement arrived at by the Cairo Conference.

The Palestine Arabs have never accepted the Mandate; the Jews have always taken the view that all they require of the Mandatory Power is the execution of the Mandate; the Permanent Mandates Commission at Geneva, which may be considered to be the arbiter of what the Mandate does and does not mean, has always been extremely critical of any undue restriction of Jewish immigration, and has in general taken the view that the Mandate requires that Jewish interests shall be actively developed and non-Jewish interests merely protected and safeguarded. It is not a question of justice; it is a question of interpretation of the Mandate. Great Britain did not come to Palestine in order to preside behind the scales of justice; she came to Palestine and stayed there for strategical and imperialist reasons; she obtained the agreement of the other Powers to this course of action on condition that she governed Palestine in accordance with the terms of a certain instrument, the Mandate. The Mandate

imposed on the Mandatory Power the obligation of sponsoring the establishment and development of a Jewish National Home (not a national home for Jews as in the Balfour Declaration), and also imposed on the Mandatory Power the obligation of safeguarding the rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine (not Arabs specifically, but non-Jewish inhabitants, thus by implication disregarding the existence of Arab nationalist aspirations as far as Palestine was concerned), in accordance with the general spirit of toleration for national minorities which was one of the praiseworthy features of the Peace Treaties.

The above is not seriously disputed even by the Arabs themselves who have always rejected the Mandate as being in contradiction to pledges previously given to them, and as being incompatible with their nationalist aspirations.

Great Britain accepted the Mandate, and in theory the continuation of her administration in Palestine is dependent on her being able to satisfy the League of Nations or its legitimate successor, the United Nations, that she is administering Palestine in accordance with the provisions of the Mandate.

CHAPTER IV

The Palestine of the Mandate

THE TERRITORY comprising the Mandated area of Palestine excluding Transjordan is 25,500 square kilometres in extent, about the size of Wales. On the south side it is separated from Egypt by the desert of Sinai, through which the mapmakers drew a boundary line stretching from the Mediterranean, just where the coast line turns northward, to the head of the Gulf of Akaba. On the west it is bounded by the Mediterranean. On the east the rift valley of the Jordan forms a natural boundary. The northern boundary runs due east from the sea at Ras El Naqura over the Northern Galilee hills, and then makes a cast north as far as Mount Hermon to take in the Huleh Basin. It is a tiny country, about 350 kilometres at its greatest extent from north to south and about 100 kilometres from east to west.

The Jordan rises in the south-western slopes of Mount Hermon, just beyond the northern frontier of Palestine. From there it flows south, through what was once marshland and is now cultivated soil, to Lake Huleh, at about sea level, then down to the Sea of Galilee, and from there into the deep narrow rift connecting the Sea of Galilee with the Dead Sea 400 metres below sea-level. From the south end of the Dead Sea the rift continues in the Wadi Arraba, gently rising to a few hundred feet above sea-level, just north of the Gulf of Akaba. On the Palestine side the Jordan Valley is walled by uplands rising more or less steeply up to anything between 400 and 1,400 metres above sea-level, except just to the south of the Sea of Galilee, where there is a gap in the wall. At this point the Valley climbs gently out of the rift up to just above sea level when the valley broadens out into the plain of Esdraelon, which slopes away gently in a north-easterly direction towards Haifa. Esdraelon is bounded on the north by the uplands of Galilee, and on the south by the hills of Samaria and the low Carmel range which breaks off from the hills of Samaria, like a finger from a hand, separating the plain of Esdraelon from the coastal plain of Sharon. The valley of Jezreel and the plain of Esdraelon separate the two hill areas of Palestine. At the point where the narrow defile of the valley of Jezreel

broadens out into the plain of Esdraelon, Mount Tabor, the southernmost bastion of the Galilee hills, and Mount Gilboa, the northernmost bastion of the hills of Samaria, stand like sentinels guarding the entrance to the plain. The hills of Galilee in the north, separated from the Lebanon range by the deep valley of the Litani, are bounded on the east by the rift valley, and slope gently towards the sea on the west. The hills of Samaria and Judaea, which form the rugged upland core of Palestine, fall away into the desert south of Beersheba and so on to the sea at the head of the Gulf of Akaba. On the east there is a steep fall to the rift valley, on the west a gentler fall to the coastal plain. The coastal plain extends from the southern boundary of Palestine, where it measures about 60 kilometres from west to east, to as far north as Haifa, narrowing all the way till, at Carmel Point, the Carmel spur thrown out by the hills of Samaria runs down to the sea, shutting off the coastal plain from the plain of Esdraelon to the north-east.

Palestine is therefore roughly divided into the following parts:—

The Galilee hill district, the central core formed by the hills of Samaria and Judaea, the desert region of the Negev between Beersheba and Akaba, the plain of Esdraelon, the coastal plain, and the rift valley.

The soil of Palestine in 1918 was for the most part poor. The plain of Esdraelon was a malarial swamp. The coastal plain was marshy in the north, and in the south consisted mainly of semi-desert flats covered with cactus and thorn bushes. In the centre, round about Jaffa, there was a considerable cultivation of oranges, for which the light sandy soil of the coastal plain was especially suitable. Most of the villages were in the hill districts where the impossibility of irrigation and the lack of summer rainfall reduced the possibilities of agriculture to winter, rain-grown crops. The staple crops were cereals, mainly barley. A certain amount of leguminous crops were also grown and there was some olive cultivation, particularly on the western slopes of the hills. Palestine has a dry summer; in the winter between October and March there is a rainfall varying from about 22 inches per annum in the coastal plain and the rift valley, to about 12 inches in the hill districts, and down to about 5 inches where the hills slope down to the desert round about Beersheba. Between Beersheba and Akaba there is the desert region known as the Negev, where

the rainfall is practically nil and where the only possibility of cultivation lies in the discovery of underground water, the existence of which has not yet been established. The hill region has to rely entirely on the winter rainfall for water. In the coastal plain there were ample quantities of underground water very near the surface, but this had only been made use of in the orange groves in the area immediately round Jaffa. The whole country becomes brown and parched during the hot dry summer, but takes on a more hospitable aspect during the winter rainfall. The oranges ripen during the summer heat, and are picked during the winter; the corn is sown at the beginning of winter as soon as the first rains have softened the earth sufficiently for the plough. The cereal harvest is in April and May.

When the military occupation of Palestine was replaced by a civil administration in the summer of 1920, the population of Palestine consisted of about 600,000 Moslems, 70,000 Christians and 55,000 Jews. The vast majority of the Moslems consisted of peasant cultivators, living at a very low standard of life, some of them owning their own plots of land, but most of them tenants of a handful of absentee landlords by whom most of the land of Palestine was owned. There were few towns that could by European standards be described as more than villages. There was Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus in the central hill district, Nazareth on the southern slopes of the Galilee hills, Tiberias in the rift valley on the shores of the Sea of Galilee. In the coastal plain there was Gaza, the gateway through which the British Army had entered Palestine; Jaffa, an ancient sea port surrounded by the orange groves for which it was famous; and Haifa, at the foot of Mount Carmel, and at the junction of the coastal plain and the plain of Esdraelon. Across the bay from Haifa to the north was Acre, famous from Crusader days, and famous in later times as the first city to defy Napoleon. The largest of these towns was Jerusalem with a population of about 80,000. Generally speaking the inhabitants of the towns consisted of a small number of comparatively wealthy landowners, a small but growing class of professional men, doctors, lawyers and so on, a number of small merchants and artisans, a body of urban labourers, and the usual Oriental proletariat of hawkers, beggars and unemployed. With the exception of a soap factory at Nablus there were no important urban industries. Apart from the peasants and the urban popula-

tion there was a small number of nomads inhabiting the deserts south of Beersheba or wandering about the country, camping on the outskirts of towns and villages wherever there was any grazing to be had for their flocks and herds.

The Christian population consisted partly of Arab-speaking Christians belonging to the Greek Orthodox church and partly of religious and semi-religious communities of various European nationalities. Both sections were almost entirely town dwellers, the Arab-speaking Christians forming small communities in nearly all the larger towns, and the European Christians living mainly in those towns with a special significance for Christians, such as Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem. In addition there were one or two small agricultural colonies of German Christians, members of a German religious society called the Templars, who had emigrated from Wuerttemberg at the beginning of the century.

The Jewish population consisted partly of urban communities of devout Jews living in Jerusalem, Safed and Hebron and partly of dwellers in agricultural colonies started with the help of the Rothschilds some forty years before. The most important of these colonies were Petach Tikvah and Rishon le Zion in the coastal plain just inland from Jaffa. There was also the beginnings of a small urban residential colony to the north of Jaffa started by a few Jewish merchants working in Jaffa, known as Tel Aviv. Both in the towns and villages the Jews to a certain extent adopted their neighbours' standards of life; they learnt Arabic, and in general regarded themselves as foreigners settled permanently in Palestine, who accommodated themselves as far as possible to local ways and customs. The Arabic-speaking peasants and townsmen regarded them with the same apathetic tolerance as they regarded the European Christians who had settled in Palestine for religious reasons.

The three communities—Moslem, Christian, and Jewish, had this in common: they were all equally under alien rule. Turkish rule, although oppressive in the matter of taxation and compulsory military service, although thoroughly corrupt, and although completely lacking in beneficence in the way of social services and so on, did not possess the overpowering comprehensiveness of modern dictatorships. People were more or less left alone, provided they behaved themselves and kept quiet. An oppressive government had come to be regarded as inherent in the nature of

things; beneficence was no more associated with governments than gentleness with lions. When one suffered from a particularly severe piece of oppression, one was sorrowful, one was angry, one suffered; but there was no question of being resentful against the government. It was the nature of the beast. As far as the peasant was concerned, he suffered more from the rapacity of his landlord than he did from the rapacity of the government. But there again it was the nature of the beast. The peasants had neither national consciousness nor class consciousness; they had not got beyond regarding themselves and their families as individuals merely; they had not got to the stage of appreciating their dual role as individuals and as units in a system.

The landlords were quite content, except that the increasing centralisation of Abdul Hamid's and afterwards of the C.U.P.'s rule had tended to decrease their influence in local affairs. The Ottoman Government had, however, always appreciated the fact that, with the somewhat slender resources at its command, it was necessary to try and get the co-operation of the owning classes in any foreign country over which it had established dominion. In all history, the owning classes in all lands have always shown themselves to be the first to acquiesce in foreign invasion and domination; probably because they have too much to lose to be inclined to do anything else.

The class most affected by Turkish rule was the small but growing urban middle class. The rich can always compound with their oppressors; the poor are oppressed anyway; it is the middle class that has most to gain by throwing off alien rule. A middle class under alien rule is completely barred from advancement. Even a benevolent rule is a perpetual humiliation. If one is a government official one cannot rise above a certain grade; the highest grades are reserved for foreigners. If one is a merchant, the foreigner always gets preferential treatment from the Government, if not officially at all events unofficially. If one is a lawyer, the foreigner gets all the best briefs, because everyone knows that he will impress the foreign judge more than the native advocate. In any case one probably has to learn a foreign language, and be at a perpetual disadvantage when using it with officials. The frustrated Arabic-speaking urban middle class was the core and centre of Syrian nationalism before, during and after the war. The hopes of independence that had been raised, then lowered,

and then finally shattered, when it was realised that they had merely exchanged a Turkish for a British or a French master, gave them a sense of desperation. The Jewish National Home was merely an aggravation of the bitter grievance against the permanent presence of Great Britain in Palestine.

The war had seriously impoverished Palestine. Before the war it had been a region of very slender resources, and the demands of war had strained these resources to the uttermost. The Promised Land was indeed most unpromising to the superficial observer when the retreating Turkish armies had left Great Britain in possession.

Communications were poor. There was a narrow-gauge railway connecting Haifa with the Hedjaz railway, with a branch running south to Nablus. There was the military railway from Egypt, built by the British Army as it advanced. This railway came up from the south along the coastal plain to Lydda, a village about 12 miles inland from Jaffa, which had been Allenby's G.H.Q. From Lydda connections were made to Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa. That was, and for that matter still is, the extent of railway communications in Palestine.

There were no good all-weather roads, and after heavy rain communications became almost impossible.

Centuries of neglect had put the plain land, potentially the most fertile area in Palestine, almost completely out of cultivation, and most of the population of Palestine was huddled in the inhospitable hills, which were being made more and more inhospitable by the unchecked process of erosion. The landowners were only interested in squeezing enough money out of their tenants to enable them to live their comfortable urban existences. The Turkish Government was only interested in collecting taxes and conscripting soldiers for the army. The peasants themselves were forced by the twin exactions of government and landlord to live a precarious hand-to-mouth existence, falling deeper and deeper into the clutches of the local moneylender to whom periodical bad harvests forced them to have recourse in order to pay their rents and their taxes. Agriculture was carried on in the most primitive way, for the landlords would not and the peasants could not spend money in introducing modern methods. There was no agricultural research, no agricultural policy, no institutions for advancing long term loans at low rates of interest. The money that

was borrowed from the village moneylender at exorbitant rates of interest went to meet current expenses and added one more burden on to the back of the over-driven peasant.

Such was the Palestine whose administration was entrusted to Great Britain. Such was the Palestine in which a Jewish National Home was to be developed. A land wasted with neglect, a land impoverished by oppression, a land overdriven and underfed by rapacious taskmasters, but withal a land with a splendid past and the possibility of a no less splendid future. The climate was pleasant, mild in winter, and not unbearably hot in summer. Over most of the country there was a regular winter rainfall. The plains only needed draining and clearing to bring them back to fertility. There were no trackless wastes or vast mountain ranges to hinder communications. Haifa was an excellent natural harbour which could be made readily accessible to the whole country by means of a comparatively modest expenditure on roads and railways. There was already in the Jaffa orange groves the nucleus of a profitable export business. There were possibilities of using the water resources of the Jordan valley for electrical power. There were known to be valuable deposits of potassium and bromium salts in the Dead Sea. The anticipated stream of Jewish immigrants into the country gave promise of a potential new market for local agricultural produce, and the consequent prospect of better times for the harassed peasantry. Jewish capital might be expected to be attracted to the country in considerable amounts, making possible that development of which the country stood so sorely in need.

Having regard to the immense opportunities for investment provided by the necessity for reconstruction and renewal after the war, it is probable that in normal circumstances Palestine would not have presented a sufficiently attractive field for capital investment. But in the circumstances of the National Home, a vast amount of Jewish capital, public and private, became available for development work in Palestine. There was, therefore, on the one hand an urgent need for reconstruction and development and on the other hand the prospect of an abundant supply of capital for such reconstruction and development.

The war had brought Palestine into the foreground of events for the first time since the Crusades. The future destiny of this land sacred to three faiths became a matter of lively interest to

people all over the world, from the United States of America to the East Indies. Palestine found itself occupying a position of world importance quite out of proportion to its size or to its strategical or economic importance. To British statesmen it was merely the left bank of the Suez Canal, or the future terminus of the Mosul pipeline; to the man in the street all over the world it was something a good deal more. The men chosen to administer Palestine were called to a great responsibility and a great opportunity. Civilised men the world over saw in the combination of British administration and Jewish enterprise the possibilities of resuscitating the Eastern Mediterranean from the blight that had fallen on it, of bringing it back to something of its former glory, and of enabling it to resume its ancient contribution to the sum of human knowledge and wisdom. It is not given to everyone to occupy the seat of Pontius Pilate; it is incumbent on those to whom it is given to improve on the record of that administrator. Whether the British Mandatory Administration of Palestine has done so is a matter of opinion.

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CHAPTER V

The Arabs of Palestine

THE TERM Arab as applied to the indigenous inhabitants of Palestine is a generic term covering a people of mixed ancestry who use the Arabic language as their mother tongue. Neither in appearance, descent nor temperament are they much akin to the nomad Arab east of the Jordan. The Arabs of Palestine are a settled people hardy in body, but peaceful in temperament, long suffering, hard working and patient like most peasant peoples. The plain dwellers have much of the ancient Phoenician blood in their veins; they take more readily to town life than the hillmen; they are a talkative, pliable, rootless people. The hillmen are more silent, more passionate and more self-sufficient—the eternal difference between the hills and the plains. But in all of them there is something of the fatalism and the fanaticism that is of the desert, the result of the constant process of migration and settlement of which the story of Abraham is the prototype. Throughout the centuries there has been a thin but steady stream of vigorous nomad blood trickling into the veins of the settled people in the lands bordering the Mediterranean, infecting them with something of the futility and something of the force that is of the desert.

To the Jews the term Palestine was as real as England is to the English. To the 650,000 Arab-speaking Moslems and Christians who found themselves under British Mandatory rule, Palestine was not even a geographical expression. For them it had no cultural, administrative, geographical or historical significance whatever. It was simply a part of that Arab-speaking area known as Syria which was just beginning to be regarded as a national entity by its inhabitants. These people became completely denationalised at a time when their nationality was beginning to mean something to them. The Allies, in order to encompass the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires, had encouraged the nationalist feelings of the various subject races that made up those Empires. In most cases the victory of the Allies brought national independence to these subject races. But the Arabs of Palestine not only failed to gain national independ-

ence; they were threatened with the loss of even such national existence as they had enjoyed under Turkish rule.

The rise of nationalism in the Levant was not an epidemic disease caught from Europe; it was not the plaything of intellectuals, of a piece with other European affectations picked up in their student days. Neither had it sprung up suddenly from the battlefields of the war, like Cadmus' warriors. Like most social movements it had its roots in economic necessity. It was not an upper-class movement confined to big landlords and notables. The upper class in any part of the world has never been much affected by nationalist feeling. It has merely used such feeling for its own purposes from time to time. Nationalism is essentially a middle-class concept. Syrian nationalism was no exception to this.

In social structure when Great Britain took over Palestine was at about the stage which England had reached at the time of Henry VII. A middle class was beginning to grow up; but as long as it was under alien rule its growth was stunted; the higher executive positions were barred to them; they had no adequate scope for their talents and energies.

This was the driving force behind the local nationalists: to achieve *Lebensraum* for themselves. National independence would not only give them the opportunity for earning good salaries and commanding high fees; it would give them the opportunity for devoting their imaginations and their energies to the performance of responsible jobs. In a land where the magnates were besotted by easy living and the peasants brutalised by overwork, the rising middle class was a force to be reckoned with.

The Arab middle class of Palestine was trebly outraged by the post-war settlement. First, Turkish rule was replaced, not by independence, but by British rule; secondly, the whole mystic of its nationalism had been shattered by the amputation of Palestine from its parent body, Syria; thirdly, whatever became of the National Home, it was not to have a monopoly of the crumbs that fell from the British table.

It is not easy to see how the aspirations of the Arab middle class could have been satisfied or even appeased under the Mandate. It was these people who stood to suffer most from both British rule and Jewish immigration. The landlords stood to gain something by selling land to the Jews at a high price; the peasants

stood to gain by an increased market for their produce; the labourers stood to gain as a result of a great demand for their services. The landlords had something to gain; the peasants and labourers at all events had little to lose. But it was the middle class which was barred from high administrative positions by the British; which would have to share the junior administrative posts with the Jews; which would have to face Jewish competition in trade and in the professions.

In French Syria there was the ultimate possibility of independence. In Palestine there was the almost certain prospect of indefinite British occupation in their role of "protectors" of the National Home. Even without the National Home the Arab middle class would have been bitterly hostile to the Mandate. The National Home exacerbated that hostility and at the same time provided a means for making that hostility effective.

By itself this middle-class nationalism was not very formidable. The post-war settlement had isolated it from both its origins in Syria and from its allies in the Arabian Desert. The decisions of the Cairo Conference in 1921 effectively laid for the moment, as far as Great Britain was concerned, the boggy of pan-Arabism which had been raised as a result of the Arab Revolt, and the Syrian nationalists in French Syria had too many troubles of their own to bother about their co-nationals in Palestine. The Arab population of Palestine was for the moment politically isolated from its neighbours.

If the economic discontent of the Arab middle class was to grow up into a national movement it was necessary to get the support of either the magnates or the peasants, or both. This might have been difficult if it had only been a question of agitating against British rule, for from the point of view of both magnates and peasants British rule would probably have been considered as one of the least of a great many possible evils. It was the social changes connected with the advent of the Jews which enabled the middle class gradually to rouse the whole Arabic-speaking population of the country against the Mandate. Jewish settlement in Palestine brought certain advantages to landlords on the one hand, and to peasants and labourers on the other hand; but it also brought certain disadvantages to both, and it was by concentrating on these disadvantages that the Arab middle class was able to build up a movement that has defied the British Empire.

The peasants and labourers of Palestine existed at a very low standard of life, and were too apathetic to attempt to improve that standard. It was only this that enabled the magnates to make a good living out of the poverty-stricken country. Their tenants and workers were right down at subsistence level; there were no social services, no workers' organisations, no minimum wages, no restriction of working hours, none of the checks on exploitation which the workers of the west have won after years of struggle. The magnates were afraid of the influx of Jewish labourers from the countries of Eastern Europe where the infection of Bolshevism had spread from Soviet Russia; they were afraid of the great programmes of development which would increase the demand for labour and so increase its bargaining power; they saw in their minds' eyes the approach of the dread spectre of red Bolshevism as clearly as any English stockbroker during a coal strike. It was true that they could and did sell their lands to the Jews at prices ten and twenty times more than they had ever dreamed that they were worth, but the whispered association of Jews with Bolshevism caused such initial advantages to be forgotten. Their supremacy, their system, their sources of wealth, their ivory castles of security were threatened. Just as the Nazi careerists stampeded the German industrialists into contributing to their funds by playing on their fears of communism, so the Arab landlords were induced to make common cause with the middle classes, who played on their instinctive fear and hatred of Bolshevism by associating it with Jewish immigration into Palestine.

The magnates and the middle class were natural allies; socially, culturally and racially the middle class was of the landlord caste. Its members consisted largely of junior branches and poor relations of the owning families. They also had a common interest in exploiting as much as possible the peasants and labourers, the real creators of wealth. An alliance between the middle class and the peasants and workers was by no means so natural, for it was difficult to see what conceivable interest they had in common.

Most of the land of Palestine was cultivated by tenants on large estates owned by absentee landlords. Many of these landlords, tempted by the high prices offered by the Jews for land which they had hitherto considered almost worthless, sold their estates to the Jews over the heads of their tenants. Arab middle-class

lawyers, in the intervals of nationalist agitation, did very well out of negotiating these sales and arranging for the eviction of the tenants. Most of the estates in question were either in the coastal plain or in the plain of Esdraelon, both of which were very thinly populated, so that the number of peasants affected was not large. The most famous case of this type was when the Sursocks, a wealthy family of Arab Christians living outside Palestine, who owned most of the plain of Esdraelon, sold the whole of their land to the Jewish National Fund, leaving their tenants to be evicted without compensation of any kind.

Most of the peasants evicted in this way drifted into the larger towns where they were absorbed as day labourers by the building and other enterprises which had started as a consequence of Jewish immigration. The drift to the towns was not confined to evicted peasants. The hard conditions of agricultural life and the crushing burden of indebtedness combined with the prospect of regular work at comparatively high wages caused a great many peasants to leave the fields and come to the towns. Some families forsook the land altogether, but more often some members of the family remained on the holding while the others went off to try to augment the family income in the towns. Building activity in the towns never kept pace with the demand and as a result there grew up on the outskirts of the larger towns, Haifa especially, ramshackle "suburbs" constructed mostly of old petrol tins, unsightly, insanitary and overcrowded. The cost of living in the towns went up with the increase in wages, but even allowing for this the day labourer was a good deal better off than he had ever been before, just so long as boom conditions continued. But when boom conditions relaxed there was widespread unemployment. Peasants, uprooted from the villages, found themselves homeless, penniless and in many cases friendless in the large towns, bewildered and angry at the working of forces of which they had no comprehension.

The first considerable slump was in 1927, resulting mainly from a catastrophic fall in the exchange value of the Polish zloty. This almost put a stop to the immigration of Jews and Jewish capital from Poland and generally exercised an extremely depressing effect on the economy of the National Home. This depression naturally affected the Arabs as well. But at that time the drift to the towns had not assumed very large proportions, and Arab

labour in the towns was not being replaced by Jewish labour to the same extent as was later to be the case. Consequently the social effect of this slump on the Arab population as a whole was limited.

The second slump in 1935 was much more serious. The previous two years had seen the greatest volume of immigration in the history of the National Home. There was a tremendous boom in building, road-making, transportation and agriculture and at the same time a great programme of land purchase. The combination of high prices for land and good wages in the towns and settlements resulted in a considerable increase in the rate of exodus from the Arab villages. Then came the Abyssinian war and the subsequent financial crisis which will be described in greater detail in a later chapter. The organised Jewish workers, who were at least as badly affected as the Arabs, succeeded to a great extent in forcing Jewish enterprises to employ only Jewish labour. The unorganised Arab workers were left stranded. They had no trade unions and no social services to help them; they could no longer have recourse to the hospitable communism of village life; food was expensive to buy and there seemed to be no prospect of being able to earn any money to buy it.

It was not difficult to convince these people that the Jews were to blame for all their misfortunes. If it had not been for the Jews they would never have left their land. Some of them returned to their villages bearing tales of the wicked Jews. And so a feeling of hatred for and distrust of the Jews was spread and intensified all over the country.

It was as a result of the slump of the autumn of 1935 that anti-Jewish feeling became endemic and widespread among the Arab masses and it is no accident that the Arab Rebellion started six months later, in April 1936. It was not until the economic life of the Arab masses had been undermined in this way that there was sufficient mass feeling against the Jews to make nation-wide revolt possible. The rebellion in 1936 was something completely different to the various more or less serious outbreaks that had preceded it, notably in 1929 and 1933. These outbreaks had nothing of the unanimity and determination that characterised the 1936 rebellion because they had not the driving force of desperation behind them.

In addition to these economic causes, the resentment of the Arab peasants and workers had been deliberately and steadily

inflamed against the Jews from 1920 onwards through the medium of the Moslem religion, and many of the anti-Jewish outbursts between 1920 and 1936 were attributable to religious incitement.

The two most influential nationalist families in Palestine were the Husseinis and the Nashashibis.

“It is important to bear in mind that Arab internal affairs were largely dominated and influenced by the rivalry between the members of the Husseinis and the Nashashibi factions, though both factions are united in uncompromising hostility to the policy of the National Home. The two most important posts in Palestine in the Arab world under the Turks were the posts of the Mayor of Jerusalem and the Mufti, and both those posts had been held by the Husseinis. The Mayor was Musa Kazem Pasha el Husseinis and a cousin of his, Kamel Eff. El Husseinis, C.M.G., who had earned the universal respect of the British Administration, was the Mufti. The Mayor had been dismissed by the Military authorities and Ragheb Bey Nashashibi had been installed as Mayor. There was therefore a Nashashibi as Mayor and a Husseinis as Mufti. The Mufti died in March 1921, and the problem of choosing his successor was very difficult.

“The Administration had recourse to the Turkish system, which was to the effect that a certain number of Ulema and other Moslem leaders in different parts of the country chose a panel of three names, from which the Government selected one of the candidates. When the above-mentioned vacancy took place, there was a Husseinis who had been trained for the post of Mufti, i.e. the present Mufti, Haj Amin, a half-brother of the late Mufti. Haj Amin had been on a pilgrimage and had also studied at the Azhar University in Cairo, where he had received a Moslem theological training with a view to representing the Husseinis family in the post. We were informed by a competent witness that Haj Amin was the only man in Palestine at that time having the necessary qualifications for the post.

“The election for the post of Mufti duly took place, but the opposition party secured the omission of Haj Amin's name from the panel of three candidates. He was, however, fourth. The three candidates were, in fact, nominees of Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, and we were told that the election

of one of these three persons would have caused great dissatisfaction amongst the people of the country at large. Subsequently one of the three selected persons resigned in order to enable Haj Amin Eff. El Husseini to become the third candidate and to be included in the panel. Haj Amin was then appointed, but no letter informing him of his nomination as Mufti of Jerusalem was despatched to him, nor was his appointment ever gazetted.

“Haj Amin Eff. El Husseini is an ex-officer of the Turkish Army. He served with the Emir Feisal in Damascus and with Hadad Pasha, a Political Officer on the staff of the Military Governor of Jerusalem. In 1918 he helped the British Authorities to get recruits for the Sherifian Army amongst the population of Palestine. His attitude subsequently changed—doubtless as a result of the Balfour Declaration—for he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment *in absentia* for an inflammatory speech made by him at the time of the Jerusalem riots in 1920. He had fled in the meanwhile to Transjordan, but benefited by a complete amnesty granted by the High Commissioner. He returned to Palestine under the amnesty and shortly afterwards was appointed Mufti. An election of the President and Members of the Supreme Moslem Council was held in 1922 in accordance with the Order of December 1921, and it was at that election that the present holder of the office of President was elected.”*

The Supreme Moslem Council requires some explanation.

“In March, 1921, an Order was issued providing for the constitution of a Supreme Moslem Council for the control and management of Moslem Awqaf and Shari’a affairs in Palestine. There was opposition from the public to the terms of this Order, and in December, 1921, it was replaced by the Order which now regulates the activities of the Supreme Moslem Council.

“The most important sections of the Order of December, 1921, are as follows:—

“1. A Moslem body shall be constituted for the control and management of the Moslem Awqaf and Shari’a affairs in Palestine, to be known as the Supreme Moslem Shari’a Council, having its Headquarters in Jerusalem.

* PEEL REPORT CH. VI paras. 87-90.

"2. The Council shall consist of a President to be known as Rais el Ulema and four members. Of the four members, two shall represent the Liwa of Jerusalem, and the remaining two shall represent the Liwas of Nablus and Acre respectively.

"3. The Rais el Ulema shall be the permanent President of the Council. The members shall be elected for a period of four years.

"4. The Rais el Ulema shall be elected by general election, the method of which shall be prescribed by the Council in a special law that shall also lay down his functions, status and precedence.

"5. (I) Each member of the Council shall be elected by the secondary electors elected by the inhabitants of the Liwa which the member is to represent in accordance with the Ottoman Law of Elections to the Chamber of Deputies.

"The main duties of the Supreme Moslem Council as described in Section 8 of the Order are as follows:—

"(a) To administer and control Moslem Awqaf and to consider and approve the annual Awqaf Budget, and after approval to transmit the budget to the Government for information.

"(b) To nominate for the approval of the Government, and, after such approval, to appoint Cadis of the Shari'a Courts, the President and members of the Shari'a Court of Appeal, and the Inspectors of Shari'a Courts. If the Government withholds its approval, it shall signify to the Council within fifteen days the reasons therefor.

"(c) To appoint Muftis from among the three candidates to be elected by the special Electoral College in accordance with a special regulation to be passed by the Council; provided always that the election of Muftis in Beersheba District shall be made by the Sheikhs of the Tribes.

"The Supreme Moslem Council also has the power to dismiss all Awqaf and Shari'a officials employed in any Moslem institutions maintained from Waqf funds. When any such official is dismissed notice thereof must be sent to the Government, with the reasons for dismissal."*

Haj Amin, in his dual capacity of Mufti of Jerusalem and

* PEEL REPORT CH. VI paras. 80-82.

President of the Supreme Moslem Council, was in a very powerful position. As Mufti he had all the prestige and influence conferred by the guardianship of the Haram-esh-Sherif, a sort of Vatican City in a corner of the old city of Jerusalem and one of the holiest places of Islam. As President of the Supreme Moslem Council, provided that he could carry his colleagues with him, he had control over the Awqaf funds and the whole Moslem religious organisation of Palestine. His nomination by the High Commissioner as Mufti may conceivably have been dictated by the fact that he was the best available man for the post. It was more likely to have been dictated by a desire to preserve a balance between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis in Jerusalem where there was already a Nashashibi mayor. It was quite understandable that the British should wish to do this. Obvious favouritism for one side would have automatically incurred the enmity of the other. But with Haj Amin it was a dangerous policy. He was a man who if given rope was quite capable of putting it to other uses than hanging himself. He is one of the ablest politicians that the Near East has produced in recent years. There is very little of the Arab in him either in mind or appearance. He is of middle height, of a reddish countenance and with somewhat foxy features. There is in him none of the stridency of the demagogue. He can provoke fanaticism without himself being a fanatic. By Oriental standards he is sincere in that he is not motivated by financial self-interest. He is one of those uncomfortable people who love power for its own sake; for whom power is not a means to an end but an end in itself. He is an ascetic in that lust for power leaves no room for other and pleasanter lusts. He is very able and a very dangerous man, whom the British made the mistake of underestimating until it was too late.

Haj Amin's appointment to the presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council took place in March 1922, about eighteen months after his appointment as Mufti. There was no *a priori* reason why the two offices should have been combined and, from the British point of view, there was every reason why they should not have been combined. There is no doubt but that from the outset Haj Amin used his dual position with the deliberate aim of organising an Arab national movement under his own personal control. He was not primarily interested in national independence; he was interested in his own personal ascendancy. He was prepared

to work in collaboration with other Arab parties just as much as and just as long as it suited him. The hold he gained on the masses as a result of his manipulation of religious prejudices, combined with judicious use of Awqaf funds under his control, enabled him to take advantage of the grievances resulting from the Mandate and to direct these grievances into the channel of rebellion which, under his leadership, assumed the formidable and fanatical quality of a holy war.

Thus a variety of forces had to be reckoned with by the Mandatory administration in Arab Palestine, each of which was a potential source of discord. There were the landlords and magnates disturbed by the democratic and what they regarded as the subversive ideas brought by the Jews from European cities. There was the rising middle class which could only find sufficient scope for its talents and ambitions in an independent state. There were the peasants, many of whom had become uprooted from the soil as a direct or indirect consequence of the National Home and turned into a proletariat dependent for a precarious livelihood on the unpredictable forces of the trade cycle. There was the latent fanaticism of all Moslem peoples. And finally there was a man capable of taking advantage of all these forces, of uniting them into some semblance of unity, and of guiding them into a common direction.

The history of the Arab national movement under the Mandate is the history of its development from an amorphous feeling of frustration in the middle class to a disciplined movement which conducted a long-drawn-out and not unsuccessful rebellion against the forces of the Mandatory Power.

The weakness of the middle class as a militant force is its lack of homogeneity. Neither wholly exploiter nor wholly exploited its members live mainly by competing one against the other and so completely lack any semblance of class solidarity. So it was in Palestine. Until 1934 the Arab national movement was not organised into any definite parties at all. Every year or so a Congress consisting of Arab notables and delegates from all parts of Palestine met in order to air their grievances; each Congress appointed a committee called the Arab Executive Committee, which was the official representative of Arab nationalism in Palestine until the next Congress. Neither the Congress nor the members of the Committees ever produced any constructive

programmes. They sent delegates to neighbouring Arab-speaking countries and to London and they carried on a large amount of verbal propaganda among the peasants and town workers against the Jews. This propaganda was roughly divided into two sections: (a) crude appeals to religious prejudice, and (b) the time-honoured method of attributing current misfortunes to the machinations of the Jews. They did not indulge in specifically British or anti-Government propaganda. They did not at first conceive the idea of a rebellion against the Administration; their object was by fermenting anti-Jewish disturbances to convince the Administration of the strength and validity of their grievances against the Jews, and to induce the Administration to limit and put a term to Jewish immigration. The ultimate object of independence was for a time lost sight of in the attempt to gain the intermediate object of a limitation of the National Home.

It is uncertain how far the various disturbances, notably those of 1921, 1929 and 1933, can be attributed to the incitement of the Arab leaders. The Arab leaders were responsible in so far as they had made the Jew a sort of bogymen in the eyes of the Arab peasants and labourers and thus made them receptive to the most absurd rumours and suspicions. Among a simple peasant people it is only necessary to keep on repeating that such and such a people are their enemies. It is unnecessary to give reasons. Sooner or later they will find or invent reasons for themselves. The most innocent and absurd happenings will be twisted into the most horrific forms. Some fantastic story passes from mouth to mouth, from street to street, from village to village, losing nothing in the telling. Sooner or later there is trouble and bloodshed and the Arab leaders tell British commissions of enquiry of spontaneous outbursts against Jewish immigration.

The aim of Arab policy was to try to convince the Mandatory Power and world opinion that the policy dictated by the Mandate was impracticable in that it was impossible to develop a Jewish National Home without serious hardship to the Arabs; that the fulfilment of obligations to Jews under the Mandate was incompatible with promises and pledges made to the Arabs prior to and apart from the Mandate. The original aim of national independence was pushed completely into the background. This was partly intentional. An attack on the National Home avoided the embarrassment of a frontal attack on the Administration for

which the national movement was not yet prepared. It also attacked the line of least resistance in that a great many Englishmen both in the Palestine Administration and in England, who would have been antagonised by any anti-British agitation, were not unsympathetic towards anti-Jewish agitation. In addition it was far easier to get mass support for an anti-Jewish movement than for a national independence movement. National independence meant nothing to a peasant, but he knew a Jew when he saw one. Fear and hatred of the Jew became in many cases a stronger feeling than the desire for national independence.

To the Arab inhabitants of Jaffa, the most turbulent centre of anti-Jewish feeling, the modern hustling city of Tel Aviv, growing rapidly alongside the sleepy old port town of Jaffa, must have been a constant source of irritation. The Arab middle class, just as it was beginning to walk, was being outdistanced by people who had long since learnt to run. It was inevitable that the busy hum of life should be diverted from ancient Jaffa to modern Tel Aviv. The Arab, who was beginning to pride himself on his modernity, suddenly realised that his modernity was something pathetic and childish beside the real thing. The purposeful energy of Tel Aviv mocked the noisy inefficiency of Jaffa. The Jews set too hot a pace, upsetting the old comfortable rhythm of life. The Jew was always in a hurry and that angered and irritated the Arabs to an extent that is almost incomprehensible to Western minds. If they imitated the Jews they made themselves ridiculous; if they didn't they got left behind. It was this impotent rage against the Jew for being what he was that gave the Arab national movement that aura of inferiority complex which it never lost until the period immediately before the rebellion of 1936. It was this psychological feeling that drove whatever trace there had ever been of progressive or constructive thought out of the movement, and made it purely and simply an "anti" movement doomed in advance to futility. The whole implication of their line of policy was that the Arabs were an inferior people to the Jews, a people to be protected from Jewish exploitation. In England the same people who protested against the stealing of land from Kenya natives were beginning to espouse the Arab cause against the Jews for the same reason. This was the natural result of the forcible-feeble attitude of the Arab nationalists. By 1933 Arab nationalism was at its nadir, and Jewish nationalism at its most aggressive. At that time

the Arabs probably got more sympathy and less help than at any other period.

That was the situation on the eve of the great wave of Jewish immigration which followed the accession of Hitler to power in Germany. The Arab nationalist movement was essentially defeatist in character, with an uninspired leadership composed mainly of middle-class professional men. It had no political organisation and no mass backing. Its only achievement had been to stir up a mass of unreasoning and mostly unreasonable prejudice against the Jews among all sections of the Arab population. This feeling only made itself felt in sporadic outbursts, quickly flaring up and almost as quickly petering out. Arab nationalism seemed to have resolved itself into a series of agitations designed merely to bring about a more liberal interpretation of the Mandate from the Arab point of view.

In point of fact, although there had been individual cases of hardship, the Arabs had not as a whole suffered economically from Jewish immigration. On the contrary, the town workers had gained by higher wages; the landlords had gained by higher land values, and the merchants had gained on the whole by increased business. The number of peasants affected by evictions was not large; those that had been evicted had mostly either been settled on other land or had found employment in the towns; the peasants who remained on the land, particularly those in the coastal plain and the plain of Esdraelon where most of the Jewish agricultural settlement had taken place, had gained by larger and more profitable markets for their produce, and by the improved methods of agriculture which some of them had learnt from the Jews. The real Arab grievance was still the grievance of the frustrated middle class. But, although the rest of the population had on the whole gained economically and were not much affected politically, these gains were not sufficiently large to offset the growing fear of Jewish domination which was beginning to affect all classes of Arabs. This feeling was partly spontaneous and partly the result of deliberate incitement. That part which was spontaneous was manifested not so much in discontent with the present as in fear for the future. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*. The benefits which the Jews brought did not mitigate the peasants' fear of eviction, the landlords' fear of social upheaval, the merchants' fear of ruin.

The tremendous flow of immigration and capital into Palestine

in 1933 and 1934 made these years boom years for Palestine. Arab landowners made fortunes in selling land to the Jews; the money coming to the Arabs from the Jews as a result of these sales caused a subsidiary boom in Arab economy. New houses were built, desert land bought and put into cultivation from the proceeds of cultivated land which had been sold. The Arabs showed a tendency to turn from close cultivation to citrus cultivation, which requires very little labour, except in the picking season. This meant that evicted peasants were not generally reabsorbed on the land, but were absorbed into the towns, where plentiful work and good wages attracted many who came in voluntarily from the villages as well as those who had been evicted or who had sold their own land. The volume of Jewish immigration was not sufficient to keep pace with the demands of Jewish enterprise for labour and this resulted in a great demand for Arab labour and a consequent increase in Arab wage rates. But increased prosperity was matched by a steadily increasing fear of Jewish domination, stimulated by the unprecedented stream of Jewish immigration and the continual process of alienation of land to the Jews.

The remedy for this last was of course in the hands of the Arabs themselves. No land was expropriated to the Jews; the Arabs were under no governmental pressure to sell their land to the Jews. It is symptomatic of the lack of homogeneity in the Arab national movement that the nationalists were quite unable to prevent their fellow-countrymen from yielding to the lure of high prices offered by the Jews. Many of the most ardent nationalists themselves sold land to the Jews, and many more in one way or the other acted as intermediaries in such sales.

The Jewish immigration of these years is an apt commentary on the futility of the tactics which had up till then been pursued by the Arab nationalists. These tactics had won them the sympathy of all and the support of none. The continual agitation for a restriction of immigration and land sales had resulted in a positive orgy of both. This incontrovertible evidence of the complete failure of their previous efforts marks a turning point in the history of Arab nationalism.

The old committee appointed by the Arab Congress was superseded by a number of political parties. The formation of these parties, which at first sight might be taken as a sign of weakness, actually marked the end of the purely "anti" phase of

Arab nationalism and the beginning of the development of a positive policy aiming at ultimate national independence. The two most important parties were the National Defence or Nashashibi party and the Palestine Arab party, which was the Husseini or Mufti's party, the one representing a cross section of the Arab upper and middle class and the other being the personal instrument of Haj Amin el Husseini.

The leaders of the various parties were separated by no difference of principle or aim. They were all alike in wanting national independence or as much national independence as they could get, and they were all alike in regarding national independence as an opportunity for personal self-aggrandisement. Their utter failure to formulate any kind of social policy is perhaps not surprising. What is more surprising is the brazenness that made no attempt to conceal their complete lack of interest in anything that was unlikely to contribute directly to the fulfilment of their own personal ambitions.

Meanwhile Haj Amin was consolidating his hold on the country. The Administration had thought perhaps to remove him out of politics into religion; Haj Amin replied by bringing religion into politics. He was on very advantageous ground. First, the Administration was very reluctant to take any action that might be construed as interfering with the Moslem religion; the large Moslem population of the British Empire has always made British administrators very sensitive on this point. Secondly, an appeal to religious prejudice and fanaticism is the appeal most likely to be effective in a country where a large part of the inhabitants are illiterate. By a persistent course of lies, exaggerations and incitement, Haj Amin gradually contrived to whip up the country into a state of fanaticism which was quite foreign to the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. This fanaticism was not caused merely by the presence of the Jews. The presence of the Jews was used deliberately to stir up fanaticism with the object of employing that fanaticism for political ends. The Mufti is not himself a fanatic. He is an exceedingly cool and calculating politician. He no more believed in Jewish designs on the Holy Places than the Nazi leaders believed in the Czech atrocities in Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938. The Arab peasant, like most peasants, is a very pious man. The misery, toil and poverty of his earthly life naturally make him turn to the consolations and hopes offered

by religion. The Moslem religion forbids him to satisfy his emotions in the saint and image worship of the Catholic and Orthodox peasant; neither is his religion, like theirs, attuned to the ebb and flow of the seasons, nor does it partake of the slow rhythm of his uneventful life. The Moslem religion is a religion of the desert, a barren religion and a fierce one at odds with the peaceful and ordered life of the cultivator and settled man. Among most European peoples national feeling and sometimes class feeling has replaced religious feeling as the chief vehicle of emotional excess. Neither nationality nor class has much meaning for the Arab peasant. As far as he regards himself as a member of a group at all he regards himself as a Moslem.

Thus we have the three forces of hatred, fear and fanaticism, formidable enough in themselves but trebly formidable when coolly and ably directed by a mind affected by none of them. The struggle for self-fulfilment of a frustrated middle class was elevated by these forces so directed into a struggle for freedom as genuine probably in the minds of its participants as any that has ever been fought.

REBELLION IN PALESTINE

CHAPTER VI

The Jews of Palestine

PALESTINE was to post-war Jewry what the frontier was to nineteenth-century America. To some it represented the hope of freedom from oppression; to some the hope of a fresh start; to some a land of opportunity for their children. Others, comfortably circumstanced, were indifferent; others, fearful of the consequences of its disturbing effects, were hostile. Others again regarded it as an outlet for the creative energy and vitality of Jewish youth; others regarded it as a convenient dumping ground for poor relations. To many it was the crown of a lifetime of work and prayer; to some it was simply a return home after long and weary journeyings. In contrast to the pre-war settlers the feeling among post-war Zionists was predominantly secular. They regarded it less as a fulfilment than as an opportunity; an opportunity for self-development, for self-expression, an opportunity to escape from the plagiarism, the parasitism, the sychophancy, the living on sufferance, which at best, and the cringing from oppression which at worst, had been the predominant lot of the Jews during their long dispersion.

At first sight the material need for a Jewish National Home seemed to have diminished as a result of the war; in Russia the revolution had removed from the Jews most of the disabilities of Czarist days; the bourgeois had displaced the Jew as the main object of popular execration and official persecution. In the West the war seemed to have hastened the process of assimilation which many Western European Jews regarded as the logical solution of the Jewish problem. But in Eastern and Central Europe the lot of the Jews was worse than before the War. In these regions the immediate post-war years had seen a bitter but short struggle between the opposing conceptions of class and nation. Many Jews had seen the prospect of liberation in the triumph of the former. The actual triumph of the latter brought home to them that their only hope was a nation of their own. As a result of this the core and centre of Zionism shifted from Russia westward to Poland and Hungary, where resurgent nationalism forced the Jews into even greater isolation than had formerly been their lot.

To them above all Palestine was a land where there existed the opportunity, not necessarily of riches or even of security and comfort, but the opportunity of living as free men. To them nationalism was no new conception; the prospect of a return to Zion was something that had been ingrained in them from the womb; Jewish nationalism was the oldest, the deepest, the most passionate of all.

It is only by equating Jewish nationalism with other nationalisms and by realising that in common with them it owes its force to the economic compulsions behind it that one can understand the Zionism that has built up the National Home in Palestine. European nationalism encouraged Jewish nationalism by heightening the economic and cultural isolation of the Jews. It cast out and destroyed these conceptions of society which alone would have enabled the Jew to live and develop in Europe. The Jew could only continue to live in Europe by setting himself in opposition to the *Zeitgeist* and by so doing inviting his own destruction.

It is folly to idealise Zionism just as it is folly to idealise any other nationalism. Like any other form of nationalism it is simply the will to self-expression of a number of individuals bound together by lingual, racial, cultural and other ties. The opportunities for self-expression liberated by the success or partial success of the struggle for national independence are used in a variety of different ways, good and bad according to the varied natures of the liberated individuals. It is a mistake to imagine that there is a greater common aim among Zionists than there is among any other national groups. It is a mistake to regard the Zionists as coming to Palestine with a common purpose; the National Home provided a common opportunity for pursuing various individual purposes which were no more co-ordinated than individual purposes are co-ordinated in any other nation. The only difference was that there remained the common necessity to struggle for a national independence of which only the first instalment had been achieved. Zionism has never risen above the nationalism in which it was rooted. It was perhaps too much to expect that it should have done so; nevertheless its failure to do so has made inevitable much of the strife that has taken place in Palestine. The whole background of Zionism precluded any serious attempt at co-operation with the Arabs; from the beginning

the national home was to the Zionists something that would have to be developed in spite of and at the expense of the Arabs. There was no question of admitting the Arabs into equal partnership in the building up of a new Palestine.

Zionism has no claim to be judged on any higher plane than that of a national movement struggling for national freedom. By failing to transcend nationalism it condemned itself to the limitations and ultimately to the frustrations of nationalism.

The vast majority of the Jewish immigrants to Palestine after the 1914-1918 war were from the war-scarred and famine-stricken areas of Eastern Europe. They were of every age and of every social class but they were mostly young and mostly workers. Within the limitations of nationalism the Zionists did everything they could to ensure that the National Home should be worthy of the traditions of Jewry. From the beginning the principle of immigration was economic absorptive capacity, that is to say as many Jews were to be allowed to come into Palestine as were deemed capable of providing for themselves in Palestine, always subject to the preservation of the "civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants". This in practice meant that "capitalists" or people disposing of liquid capital of over £1,000 were allowed to come in freely; that qualified professional men were allowed to come in more or less freely provided that they possessed the means to set themselves up in their professions; that labourers—people without capital—were allowed to come in according to annual quotas fixed between the Palestine Government and the Jewish Agency. These quotas were supposed to represent the number of people who could reasonably be expected to find remunerative work in Palestine. The Jewish Agency had little control over the first two categories, but the third category was very carefully selected by the Agency's branches all over Europe. The Jewish Agency was responsible for the immigration of labourers up to the quota decided on. There were always a great many more candidates than vacancies, and consequently a very careful process of selection was possible. From the beginning the idea of the Jewish Agency was to build up a specifically Jewish economy in Palestine; such desire as they had for co-operation with the Arabs never extended beyond a desire for mutual good neighbourship. They never properly considered the problem of relations with the Arabs. They co-operated with and assisted various Jewish organisations

such as the Jewish National Fund in purchasing land, mostly for agricultural settlement, from Arab landowners and appeared completely to ignore the problems that were bound to arise from such alienation, which was obviously going to reach considerable proportions as the National Home developed. They went forward with their plans for development without considering the Arabs at all. It was their business to look after the Jews; the Arabs were no concern of theirs. If they couldn't look after themselves so much the worse for them. The advantages of co-operation with the Arabs did not become apparent to them until it was clear that the Arabs could look after themselves.

The Jewish Agency's idea was to build up a nation of Jews, who would be not Polish Jews or Russian Jews or Roumanian Jews, but Palestinian Jews. They wanted immigrants young enough to start life in Palestine before having become imbued with the peculiar neurosis of the Jews of the Diaspora; they wanted Jews without either a persecution complex or an assimilationist complex; they wanted sane, natural, normal people, the type of people that it was almost impossible for the Jews in exile to be. They wanted young Jews from the ghettos of Eastern Europe, before they became urbanised, in order to train them for the agricultural life which must be the basis of any economy in Palestine. They wanted a generation who in their own homeland would build up a new conception of Jewish life. For centuries Jewish brains, Jewish enterprise and Jewish energy had either been stifled or else employed in the service of and for the benefit of Gentiles; they now intended these qualities to be used for the benefit of Jews to build up a nation which would show the world the qualities of the Jewish race. It was a fine conception and it has been finely carried out. But the Zionists did not realise that they had to develop their National Home in a land already occupied by a people awakening to the consciousness of nationalism. They assumed too readily that the Mandatory Power would accept their own valuation of the scope and purpose of the National Home. They did not realise that the only alternative to compromising with the Arabs was to fight them, or, if they did realise it, it never occurred to them that the Mandatory Power might not see the issue in precisely the same light as they did. They acted as it might have been reasonable to act if they had disposed of an autonomous state behind fortified frontiers. They did not

realise their vulnerability, the extent to which they depended on the goodwill of the Mandatory Power. They did not realise the strength of Arab nationalism, they did not appreciate the lack of unity that was to develop among themselves as the single will of the Zionist organisation was gradually replaced by the divergent and sometimes competing wills of individual Jewish immigrants.

Many of the Jewish workers coming to Palestine were imbued with a virile class-consciousness derived from their sympathies with the "left" movements of the countries of their birth and upbringing. Many of them had become Zionists after the collapse of the workers' movements in those countries had convinced them that there was no future for them except within the framework of their own National Home. They brought to Zionism the political ideas with which they had been associated, tempered with the nationalism which they had subsequently adopted. They had given up the idea of an international brotherhood of workers transcending all frontiers, but they could look forward to making a workers' state of the nation which they had gone to Palestine to found. That was the spirit in which Histadruth, the Jewish Federation of Labour, was built up. Its members were Jews first and workers second.

The Histadruth is partly a trade union and partly a co-operative society and something more than both. Its membership embraces both urban and agricultural workers; in addition to protecting the interest of its members, it runs its own agricultural settlements, its own transport services, its own factories, on a co-operative basis; it has established its own scheme of health insurance on a contributory basis with a chain of hospitals and clinics all over the country; it runs its own newspaper, and puts up its own candidates at municipal and community elections. In organisation it is one of the finest workers' movements anywhere in the world; it is easily the largest and most important of the Jewish organisations in Palestine; its influence in building up the National Home has been immense, and it has been mainly an influence for good. It has been largely responsible for the Jewish social services in Palestine, which are maintained almost entirely by the Jewish community without assistance from the Government, and which have done a great deal to mitigate the hardships that inevitably come to people starting life again in strange circumstances in a strange land. It has protected the Jewish worker to a considerable

extent from the exploitation of Jewish capitalists who saw in Palestine a profitable field for investment. By undertaking production and distribution itself with its farms and factories and transport services it has prevented the development of Palestine from becoming a capitalist monopoly. By its organisation and political power it has ensured that Zionist policy shall not run counter to the interests of the Jewish workers. What there is of good in Jewish Palestine to-day is largely due to the Histadruth.

To the Histadruth the Arabs were primarily a source of cheap labour from whom the Jewish worker must be protected. The Jewish capitalist, intent on keeping his costs down, must be made to employ expensive Jewish labour rather than cheap Arab labour and in order to make him do this the spirit of nationalism must be invoked. It was this conception of the Arabs that confirmed the Histadruth in its nationalist attitude. The Histadruth was the one Jewish organisation that could have changed the nationalist, the almost imperialist, orientation of official Jewish policy; instead it has in course of time become the backbone of Zionist nationalism, ever more insistent on the rigid exclusion of Arabs from Jewish economic life. Any attempt by the Zionists as such to have made contact with the Arab leaders with a view to mutual co-operation in the development of Palestine was probably foredoomed to failure; an attempt by the Jewish workers to approach the Arab workers, not as Jews but as fellow-workers, offered the one fruitful hope for peace between the peoples of Palestine. For the Histadruth to regard the Arab workers as competitors in the labour market instead of as exploited fellow-workers faced with the same problems and having the same interests as themselves, was the negation of the whole principle of the labour movement and a measure of the extent to which the virus of nationalism had affected it. The failure of the Histadruth to take a broader view of its activities in Palestine ranks not only as one of Labour's lost opportunities but as one of the lost opportunities of the Jewish race. If the Histadruth had concerned itself primarily with the welfare of the workers of Palestine without distinction of race instead of regarding itself primarily as a unit in the building up of the National Home the whole history of the Palestine Mandate might have been different. It was the workers of both races who had everything to gain by co-operation; it was the same workers who were doomed to be the heaviest

losers as the result of strife. In a country dominated by the powerful competing interests of Arab feudalism, Jewish nationalism and British imperialism, it was folly for the Histadruth to turn potential allies into bitter enemies.

The other large workers' party in Palestine apart from the Histadruth was known as the Revisionist party, owing to the fact that a demand for a revision of the Mandate to include Transjordan in the scope of the National Home has always been the main plank in its platform. The Revisionists are a violently nationalist body whose championship of Jewish rights and aspirations leaves no time or energy for the consideration of the rights or aspirations of anybody else. They are quite frankly out to establish complete Jewish domination both in Palestine and Transjordan. They argue that the Jewish problem in Europe can only be solved by throwing open a much larger area than Palestine to Jewish immigration and that the throwing open of such an area is, apart from extermination, the only ultimate solution to a problem that is becoming every day more acute. The Revisionists start off with the assumption that the presence of a large number of Jews in a Gentile community creates a problem that can only be solved by the removal of the Jews. They have got to go somewhere. A start has been made in Palestine, but if the problem is to be solved the scope of the National Home must be considerably increased. The effect of this on the Arab is looked upon as an unfortunate necessity, the lesser of two evils. In the Revisionist state the Arab would have the choice of remaining as an alien or of emigrating to neighbouring Arab countries. The Revisionists are not in theory in opposition to the official Zionist policy; they merely carry it to its logical conclusion.*

Some opposition to Zionist nationalism is manifested by certain groups of Jews in Palestine. First, a certain number of orthodox Jews of all classes, most of whom have been settled in Palestine for some time, and who have always maintained friendly relations with the Arabs. These people resent not only the strife and disorder and bloodshed that the Zionists brought to Palestine, but they also resent the neglect of tradition and the materialistic

* Of recent years the intensification of the official Zionist demand for a Jewish State and the growing extremism of the Zionist rank and file means in effect that Zionism as a whole has been converted to the essentials of the Revisionist programme, including struggle against rather than co-operation with the Mandatory Power.

character of the modern Zionist. Secondly, there are the modern Jewish scholars, chemists, research men and so on, who realise that Jewish nationalism, in the same way as any other nationalism, is a stumbling block on the way to a reasonable world society in which the resources of the world could be used to the best advantage for the good of the inhabitants of the world as a whole without distinction of race and creed. This group is particularly strong in the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, whose influence has always been on the side of compromise with the Arabs. Thirdly, there are the Jewish industrialists and manufacturers and, to a certain extent, Jewish bankers, merchants, etc. Jewish nationalism in Palestine tended to cut these people off from cheap Arab labour on the one hand and from the potentially profitable Arab market on the other hand. They realised that an independent or semi-independent Jewish State would be a state in which organised labour would occupy a powerful and privileged position; they do not regard the prospect of such a state with any enthusiasm and feel that their interests are far more akin to those of the Arab landowners than to those of the Histadruth leaders.

The salaried middle class is, as a whole, strongly nationalist. A common experience of hardship and oppression has brought this class closer to the workers than is usual in European countries. There is very little in the way of a bourgeoisie in Jewish Palestine; the middle class has not the solid and comfortable background of the European bourgeois; it has not developed the individuality which comes of ease and self-confidence; its members have not, most of them, the imagination and learning to realise the limitations of nationalism; they can only see the opportunities that nationalism presents.

The salaried middle class can be considered as representing Jewish nationalism at its sharpest and narrowest. It stands to gain most by the realisation and development of Jewish nationalism; its only chance of prosperity is behind the protective fence of nationalism. Behind this protective fence it has managed to create for itself a certain measure of security, a certain measure of self-respect, a certain prospect of advancement, a little leisure and a little dignity.

Jewish Palestine is therefore overwhelmingly nationalist in outlook and aim. There are differences of opinion as to the extent to which compromise with the Arabs is desirable or necessary,

but at best it has always been a question of compromise and not of co-operation. This nationalism has been confronted with a nationalism of a similar temper; each side has felt that its legitimate ends could only be achieved by dominating the other side. On the Arab side the chief compulsion towards nationalism was the economic necessity of the growing middle class; on the Jewish side the chief compulsion was the determination of the workers and the salaried class to maintain European standards of living in an Asiatic country.

The main object of the National Home was to provide a home in Palestine for as many Jews as could earn a living there. In the eyes of Jewry all the world over the success of the National Home was largely judged in terms of the number of Jews which it was able to absorb. Even before the Hitler persecution the pressure from the Jews of Eastern Europe to enter Palestine was tremendous. The number that have actually entered in the last twenty-five years is insignificant beside the number that has wanted to enter. For the young Jew of Eastern Europe an immigration certificate for Palestine was like a university scholarship to an English secondary schoolboy. It opened up the possibility of a fuller and better life than he could otherwise have enjoyed. The main work of the Jews in Palestine was to make room for more Jews to come to Palestine. As long as the economic absorptive capacity criterion was applied by the Mandatory Power it was only necessary for the Jewish Agency to convince the Mandatory Government that there was remunerative work to be done by the people for whom immigration certificates were requested. As fresh immigrants created fresh work—houses to be built, clothes made, services provided etc.—the economic absorptive capacity criterion seemed to promise a steady stream of immigration over a long period of years provided that there was a corresponding flow of capital to enable production to expand with immigration, and also provided that there was a system of tariff protection to enable local industry to compete successfully with imported products. This question will be dealt with more fully in a subsequent chapter, but generally it may be said that while the first condition was fulfilled the second condition was not, with the result that neither capital nor human resources could be used to the optimum extent. However, with this qualification the National Home was able from year to year to absorb a steady stream of immigrants

until, in 1937, the Mandatory Administration, under the pressure of Arab revolt, decided to replace the criterion of economic absorptive capacity by political absorptive capacity. In other words, immigration was no longer to be limited by the power of Zionist enterprise to provide work, but was to be regulated in accordance with the wishes of the Mandatory Power, having regard to the rival ambitions of Arabs and Jews. This decision was a vital one and changed the whole aspect of the National Home. It did more. It ended for the time being the development of the National Home as originally conceived. Henceforward it would be a static rather than a dynamic conception, for it was clear that future immigration would be extremely limited. Its future scope was to be limited, not by the energies of the Zionists, but by what the Mandatory Power considered to be the legitimate political aspirations of the Arabs. It was a reversal of the whole original conception of the Mandate. The Arabs were to be allowed to fulfil their aspirations provided that these aspirations did not conflict with the civil and religious rights of the Jews in Palestine. That is a reasonable description of the policy adopted by the Mandatory Power as a result of the Arab revolt. Under the circumstances prevailing in Palestine it was probably inevitable that sooner or later some artificial check would have to be applied to Jewish immigration over and above that provided by economic absorptive capacity, which meant in effect that the rate of immigration was regulated by the Jews themselves. It would not have been possible indefinitely to pursue an immigration policy which did not take the existence of Arab nationalism into account. If the Mandatory Power was not prepared to outlaw Arab nationalism as being incompatible with the existence of a Jewish National Home, then it was inevitable that the development of the National Home would have to be limited by the Mandatory Power. Once Arab and Jewish nationalisms were regarded as being on a level, once the conception of a positive obligation to encourage the National Home had been replaced by the conception of a duty to arrive at a *modus vivendi* between two communities of equal status, then it became obvious that the Mandatory Power had to arrive at a compromise between the competing claimants and to enforce that compromise on both of them. The Zionists themselves had done much to make the action of the Mandatory Power inevitable. With the intellectual myopia which often characterises practical

men they did not appear to recognise that the Mandatory Power did not and could not take Zionism at its own valuation. They did not appear to realise that the work they were doing, while praiseworthy and beneficial, was thwarting those aspirations in other people which they regarded as legitimate aspirations in themselves. They pointed with pride to their achievements in Palestine and never seemed to realise that the Arabs could not appreciate them, too. They assumed from the beginning that the Arab was an inferior person who would be quite content, provided that his animal wants were satisfied. They did not credit the Arabs with any of the ambitions which they possessed so abundantly themselves. With incredible blindness they did not see that those qualities which they were displaying in Palestine would transmit themselves in some degree to the Arabs; they did not seem to see that the Arabs would not be unaffected by the quickening of tempo, the renewal of life and hope which they had brought to Palestine. They did not see that there was no alternative between war with the Arabs and being prepared to treat them on terms of equality.

The achievements of the Jewish National Home are due to a remarkable extent to communal as opposed to individual effort. The Jews of Palestine are in a very real sense a community, in spite of inevitable religious, class and political differences. One thinks of Jewish Palestine not in terms of prominent individuals, but in terms of societies and organisations. The most important of these organisations is the Jewish Community Council—the Vaad Leumi. The work of the Council is social rather than political and consists of the direction of Jewish education and medicine, the administration of charitable funds and so on. The Jewish Agency is concerned with the political and executive side of the National Home. It is the organisation created by the Mandate to represent the Jewish National Home *vis-à-vis* the Mandatory Power and the League of Nations. It is an executive body which has as its chief duty the development of the National Home. The Vaad Leumi is a representative body consisting of the elected representatives of the Jewish community in Palestine. The Vaad Leumi is concerned with Jews in their relation to each other, the Jewish Agency is concerned with the Jews in their relation to the Mandatory Power and to the Arabs.

On the financial side there is the Jewish National Fund, the

Keren Kayemeth, which administers the financial contributions of Jews all over the world for the development of the National Home. The Administrators of the Fund are empowered to use the moneys of the Fund at their discretion for the benefit of the National Home. With this fund is connected the Palestine Colonists Association (PICA) originally founded by Baron Rothschild in the 1880's to finance land purchase and settlement. Another fund, the Foundation Fund, the Keren Hayesod, also maintained by voluntary contributions, has for its specific purpose the financing of agricultural settlements.

Then there is the Jewish Federation of Labour which has already been referred to. There are a number of political parties representing a variety of aspects of opinion. There is the Rabbinical Council in charge of the religious organisation of Palestine Jews. There are the local councils in each village and settlement. There is the Municipal Council of Tel Aviv, an all-Jewish Council administering an all-Jewish city of about 150,000 inhabitants. Mention must also be made of the two Jewish sports organisations and youth movements, Maccabi and Hapoel, with branches in all the larger Jewish settlements in Palestine. They are organised on much the same lines as were other European youth movements such as the Sokols in what was Czechoslovakia and the Depolavoras in Italy. There is the WIZO, the Women's Zionist Organisation, which is mainly concerned with social work in general and child welfare in particular. There are numerous co-operative enterprises, both urban and agricultural, mostly affiliated to the Histadruth. Almost the whole of the Jewish life in Palestine is regulated and superintended by one or other of these bodies. Individual initiative, enterprise and charity is canalised and directed through the medium of the appropriate organisation. The average Jew lives in an entirely Jewish world. His contacts with the Mandatory Power are usually made through one or other of the Jewish organisations; his contacts with the Arabs are almost nil.

As a result of the National Home the Jewish population of Palestine has risen during the course of twenty-five years from 55,000 to over 500,000 people. Viewed as a contribution to the national settlement of world Jewry this achievement was numerically insignificant. There remained in the state of Poland before the second German war nearly ten times as many Jews as

there are in the whole of Palestine, and in the city of New York alone there are nearly twice as many. But the achievements of the National Home have been out of all proportion to the number of its inhabitants.


About 1,600,000 dunams of land have been acquired by purchase and about 300 agricultural settlements have been established. The marshy plain of Esdraelon has been reclaimed and put under cultivation and what was once a malarial swamp is now a fertile plain in which several thousand settlers earn their living. Similarly the Plain of Sharon has been put back into cultivation after centuries of neglect, and the districts where twenty years ago one could ride for hours without seeing a human countenance are now busy centres of intensive cultivation. What was during Turkish times a small settlement among the sand dunes to the north of Jaffa has now become the great all-Jewish city of Tel Aviv, possessing the amenities and appearance of a modern European city. The total area under citrus, the chief, indeed almost the only, export from Palestine, has increased more than fivefold, until Palestine is now one of the foremost citrus exporting countries in the world. In a land where industrialism was practically unknown Jewish enterprise and capital have established a variety of industries, including a cement factory and several brick factories, sufficient to supply the whole of the requirements of Palestine, an edible oil factory whose products have become known all over the world, and an infinite variety of smaller factories manufacturing products for Palestine's domestic consumption. A Jewish electrical concession has brought cheap electric light and power within the reach of almost every village in Palestine. The valuable mineral salts of the Dead Sea are being exploited for the first time.

More important perhaps than its material achievements are its cultural and social achievements. A Hebrew University has been founded in Jerusalem which has already established itself as one of the foremost centres of learning in the Near East. A Palestine Symphony Orchestra has been founded with which a famous English conductor has expressed himself as proud to be associated. Tel Aviv is the headquarters of a Hebrew repertory company which has a European reputation. At Rehovoth there is a research institute which has already made important contributions to the world's stock of scientific knowledge. The Hebrew language, the use of which for centuries had been restricted to the synagogues,

has in less than twenty years become once more a vivid and vital language and the natural medium of everyday speech among the vast majority of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. Of architecture, with a few notable exceptions such as the Jewish Agency building in Jerusalem and the Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus, the less said the better, but this is due more to lack of good builders than to the lack of good architects.

On the social side the Jewish workers have in the Histadruth, with its housing schemes, its hospitals, its public services and its co-operative farms and factories, built up an institution which, together with the work of the socialist municipality of Vienna destroyed by Dolfuss and the achievements of the co-operative movement in Sweden, deserves to rank among the most impressive examples of working class democracy in action. Jewish elementary and secondary education in Palestine, which is directed and almost entirely financed by the Jews themselves, is of a high standard, and illiteracy is almost unknown. The existence of a large number of communal and charitable organisations of all kinds testifies to the advanced social conscience and democratic practice of Palestine Jewry. Standards of medical and dental attention are extraordinarily high. The zeal and efficiency shown in municipal self-government is additional evidence of their advanced democratic instincts, although their powers in municipal self-government have remained unnecessarily restricted.

These are considerable achievements and it would be both churlish and childish to belittle them. But one may express regret that the faith, the energy, the pride, and the unselfishness which have accomplished so much were not accompanied by the vision and the imagination to realise that the fruits of these qualities should not have been perverted to the service of a narrow and fanatical nationalism.



CHAPTER VII

The Mandatory Power

GREAT BRITAIN'S objects in sponsoring the Jewish National Home have already been referred to. The original object was to secure possession of the east bank of the Suez Canal. After the 1914-18 war other circumstances combined to make the possession of Palestine even more important to Great Britain. First, there was the discovery of the Mosul oilfields and the projected pipeline, eventually completed in 1935, to bear the crude oil from the Mosul wells to the Mediterranean at Haifa. Secondly, there was the air route to the East in which Palestine was a vital link. Thirdly, the tension with Italy resulting from the Abyssinian war emphasised the importance and suitability of Haifa as a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean. Fourthly, the development of an overland route to Iraq and the Persian Gulf was emphasised by the start of the construction of the Haifa-Baghdad road in 1938.

It was hardly to be expected that Great Britain would allow her obligations under the Mandate to interfere with the imperial considerations which had induced her to undertake the Mandate. In order to safeguard her imperial interests in Palestine it was essential for Great Britain to check and discourage any forces or combination of forces in Palestine which might result in a weakening of her hold on Palestine. Conversely it was essential for her to encourage such forces as might exist in Palestine which could be relied on to support the continued British occupation of Palestine. In the early days of the Mandate Great Britain's policy was on the whole to encourage the development of the National Home in full accordance with the letter and spirit of the Mandate. As the development of the National Home was dependent on the continued presence of the British in Palestine it was felt that Zionist support for British imperial interests could be relied on. The far-sighted appreciation of imperial interests which prompted this policy was not wholeheartedly seconded by the local Administration which allowed itself to be influenced far too much by short-term considerations and local prejudices.

The extraordinary appointment of a Jew, Sir Herbert Samuel, to be the first High Commissioner of Palestine may have been

intended by the Home Government as an indication of the extent to which it proposed to support the development of the National Home. If so, the result was the opposite of what was intended. Sir Herbert Samuel, in an honest and sincere endeavour to avoid even the appearance of partiality for his own people, displayed a respect for Arab susceptibilities and aspirations of which the Arabs were not slow to take advantage. In this attitude the High Commissioner was supported by the vast majority of the Palestine Civil Service, who partly out of annoyance at the undoubted tactlessness and arrogance of the Zionist Commission which was the forerunner of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, partly out of the latent anti-semitism which seems to be one of the characteristics of second-rate people of every nation, and partly no doubt from a genuine feeling that the Arabs were being treated badly, showed from the beginning a degree of personal sympathy for the Arabs and personal antipathy to the Jews which is very difficult to reconcile with the duties that had been imposed on them by the Mandate. The result of this attitude on the part of the local Administration was the growth of a Palestine Arab nationalist movement which was aimed, not at first against Great Britain, but against the Jews. The aim of Arab nationalism at first was to put pressure on the Mandatory Power to curtail the development of the National Home and it was naturally encouraged and strengthened in this by the barely concealed desire of many senior members of the Palestine Administration to do exactly what the Arab nationalists were asking them to do. At the same time the attitude of the Administration encouraged the development of a Jewish nationalism which aimed at becoming less and less dependent on the uncertain favour of an authority which rarely troubled to conceal its apathy to the whole conception of the National Home as laid down in the Mandate.

It was only a question of time before the anti-Zionist attitude of the Arab nationalists developed into an anti-British attitude. This was a logical development, for opposition to the National Home was only a part of the larger struggle for national independence. It was impossible to attack the National Home without also attacking the British imperialism which had brought the National Home into being. The Arab landowners, who in 1918 were the undisputed leaders of the Arab people, were gradually squeezed out of the leadership of Arab nationalism by the growing

Arab middle class which could only fulfil itself under conditions of national independence. As it became apparent to the land-owners that the result of national independence would inevitably be a decline in their own importance, so their enthusiasm for Arab nationalism decreased. Similarly, the Jewish industrialists and financiers, who had at first supported the development of the National Home as affording an opportunity for profitable investment, soon found themselves uneasy at the vigorous democratic nationalism growing up among Palestinian Jewry and alarmed at the formation of labour unions, co-operatives and other organisations which greatly diminished the potentialities of Palestine as a profitable field for capitalist investment.

Thus in course of time both the Arab and Jewish national movements became progressively more popular and progressively more anti-imperialist in outlook. Zionism, as a result of the attitude of the Administration, came to regard itself as pursuing the development of the National Home in spite of rather than with the assistance of the Mandatory Power. The Arab national movement, though it never became a popular movement in the same way as Zionism was a popular movement, became increasingly dangerous to the Mandatory Power as it gradually fell under the control of middle class nationalists who stood to lose far less and to gain far more than the landlords in pressing their demands for national independence.

The same tendencies in Arab and Jewish nationalism which brought them increasingly into conflict with the interests of the Mandatory Power also estranged them from the upper-class elements of both peoples, who thus became the natural allies of the Mandatory Power. The real protagonists in Palestine therefore became on the one hand the Mandatory Power, the Arab landlords and the Jewish industrialists, and on the other hand Jewish and Arab nationalists. This was not immediately apparent owing to the fact that Arab and Jewish nationalists were even more opposed to each other than they were to the Mandatory Power and the magnates, and also because the magnates, fearful of the vacillation and weakness of the Administration, and fearful lest it should compound with one or other of the nationalist groups at their expense, dared not give open support to the Mandatory Power until the Mandatory Power had given unmistakable evidence of its intention to remain firmly established in Palestine.

It is open to doubt how far the trend of events was affected by the lack of firmness shown by the local Administration in administering the Mandate. There is no doubt that this lack of firmness heightened national feeling among both Arabs and Jews. The Arabs were encouraged by the hope that increased truculence would bring further concessions ; the Jews came to realise that a co-operative attitude was regarded as weakness and taken advantage of by a weak Administration. It is possible, however, that the situation would have developed much as it did regardless of the quality of the Administration. The vigorous and go-ahead Jewish society which grew up in Palestine would not indefinitely have been content to remain the humble protégé of British imperialism, even if the Administration had given more support than it did to the development of the National Home. The economic urge behind Arab nationalism would have impelled it into the path which it actually took, even if the Administration had been less accommodating to it than it was. Whatever the character of the Administration, British imperialism would have ultimately been driven to the support of the reactionary elements on both sides as the only means of maintaining its position in Palestine unimpaired. The course of development had an inevitability which it was beyond the power of any local Administration to check or deflect.

By the end of 1936, when the first phase of the rebellion had ended with the calling off of the Arab strike, as a result of the intervention of the independent Arab princes, two things had become apparent. First, the nationalist passions of both Arabs and Jews had become a nuisance to Great Britain's imperialist objectives in Palestine. It was not sufficient merely to disarm and defeat the Arab rebellion, for this would not only have encouraged Jewish nationalism with all its inherent and, from an imperialist point of view, undesirable characteristics, but it would have forfeited the support of those elements of both peoples who could be relied on to co-operate with Great Britain within the framework of her imperial objectives. The Arab landlords were prepared to forego their support of Arab nationalism if a check were put on the democratic influence of the National Home which was so inimical to the feudal structure of Arab society. The Jewish industrialists were prepared to forego Jewish nationalism if they could rely on the support of the Mandatory Power against those

elements in Jewish nationalism which spoilt Palestine for them as an opportunity for profit-making. The second thing that had become apparent was the complete inability of the Administration adequately to discharge its functions.

The main object of the appointment of the Peel Commission was presumably to enable the British Government to obtain what it had been quite unable to obtain from the Administration—a balanced appraisal of the situation viewed in the light of Great Britain's imperial necessities and her obligations under the Mandate. The Peel Report, published in July 1937, provided such an appraisal. By a process of elimination the authors came to the conclusion that a partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish territories was the only practicable method by which the objects laid down in the Mandate could be achieved. The British Government at first accepted, in principle, the main recommendation of the Report. On second thoughts, daunted by the undoubted difficulty of implementing the various practical details of partition, and discouraged by the hostile reception given to the Peel proposals by Arabs and Jews and by the Palestine Administration, the Government began to retreat from the Peel recommendations, and sent out a second Commission, the Woodhead Commission, to formulate reasons for finding partition impracticable.

Meanwhile, the Arab rebellion had entered its second and more formidable phase of a popular movement aiming at national independence. The task of crushing it was gradually taken out of the hands of the Administration and given to the military. When the Arab rebellion had been crushed it was the turn of the Jews. A Palestine Conference was convened in London to which Jewish and Arab leaders were invited with the ostensible purpose of trying to arrive at an agreement between Arabs and Jews. The Mufti, as the acknowledged leader of the rebellion, was excluded from the conference (he would not have agreed to attend anyway), but many of his followers were allowed to attend and acted openly on orders received from the Mufti, then living in exile in the Lebanon. As expected, and indeed intended, no agreement was reached. This left the way clear for the British Government to impose its own solution. The solution embodied in the 1939 White Paper put a final end to further Jewish labour (but not capitalist) immigration and envisaged the severe restriction of future land sales by Arabs to Jews. This solution, while it put an

end to any future possibility of the development of the National Home on democratic lines, left unrestricted and indeed enhanced the possibilities of the exploitation and development of Palestine by Jewish capital. It did not satisfy, and was not intended to satisfy, the more extreme Arab nationalists, but it did allay the worst fears and satisfy the more moderate hopes of the Arab upper class, who were already somewhat relieved at the defeat of the insurgent Arab masses.

Thus the British Government, having crushed the Rebellion sufficiently to damp the ardour of the more extreme Arab nationalists, hoped, by the White Paper, similarly to strike a blow at extreme Jewish nationalism, leaving the reactionary elements among both Arabs and Jews reasonably well disposed to, and dependent for their well-being on, a continuation of the British Mandate.

Had not the second German war intervened, it is not impossible that events would have justified the British Government's calculations. But, in the event, the resurgence of pan-Arabism and the violent development of Jewish nationalism, both by-products of the war, irretrievably upset these calculations, and finally disposed of the possibility that the problems of the Mandatory Power might be solved by a process of political manœuvring.

CHAPTER VIII

The Palestine Administration

WE NOW turn to the record of the Palestine Government in the everyday business of administration.

The acid test of any administration is the extent to which it succeeds in diminishing and alleviating poverty and destitution. A successful economic policy goes a long way towards mitigating political defects. It would be ungenerous to carp at the pursuit of imperialist self-interest if, in pursuit of it, bellies were filled, bodies clothed, minds educated, and the general level of happiness raised. If imperialism achieved these things its theoretical defects would be comparatively unimportant.

The Arabs of Palestine had been impoverished and devitalised by several hundred years of sterile, inefficient and corrupt rule. They were miserably poor, even by Oriental standards, and were for the most part sunk in that apathy of mind and lethargy of body which is the curse of the settled Arab.

The initiation of the National Home implied the necessity for turning Palestine from the sterile heritage of the desert to the social and cultural associations of the Mediterranean basin. The Jews, in the course of their wanderings, had ceased to be Orientals and had become a European people. They had taken with them to Europe something of the Orient and had brought back with them to the Orient something of the methods and outlook of Europe. Whether or not the Europeanisation of Palestine is regarded as a matter for rejoicing, the fact remains that if the Arabs were to live in Palestine side by side with the Jews they would have to adapt themselves to the new tempo of life introduced into Palestine by the Jews. It could not be the other way round, for without the introduction of European methods Palestine would not have been able to absorb more than a handful of Jewish immigrants and the National Home would have become a technical impossibility long before the Mandatory Power had decided that it was a political impossibility.

What the Jews brought with them to Palestine was essentially increased productivity. As voluntary co-operation was out of the question on account of the incompatible aspirations of the two

racess, the only way in which a *modus vivendi* could be arrived at was by abolishing the essential, that is to say the economic, difference between the two peoples. As soon as the Arabs were able to compete economically with the Jews on equal terms the road would be open to the attainment of that precarious balance between rival interests which is the nearest we can get to peace in a competitive world. In other words, the main technical problem before the Palestine Administration was the problem of increasing the productivity of the Arabs.

The efforts of the Palestine Administration in this direction have not been particularly impressive. In order to achieve this increase in productivity the beginning of a revolutionary change in the structure of Arab society was necessary. Agricultural banks, agricultural training colleges, technical education, desirable and necessary as all these things were on an ever increasing scale, were not in themselves sufficient so long as the proceeds of the soil were annually plundered by absentee landlords and spent mainly outside Palestine instead of being put back into the land. Until the Arab urban population was able and willing to pump money back into the soil instead of continuing to suck money from it, any measures designed to increase the productivity of the soil were doomed to failure. If anything was to be effected it was necessary to initiate a social change by which the hereditary leaders of the Arab people would be replaced by leaders sprung from the people, who would regard the land as a child to be nursed rather than as a cow to be milked.

Another thing that it was necessary to check was the constant drift of population from the villages to the towns. This drift debased the standards of labour in the towns and resulted in the existence of that large floating population of beggars and semi-beggars living non-productive lives on the very verge of destitution which is a feature of every Oriental town. The problem could only be solved by increasing the productivity of the soil, making it possible for it to support the natural increase of the population of the villages. It all came back to a question of redistributing wealth as a necessary preliminary to increasing the source of wealth, and this implied a change of social structure which the Palestine Administration was prepared neither to initiate nor even to encourage. The Arab landowners, living by the labour of underfed and overworked peasants on estates in which the owners' only

interest was their potentiality as a source of revenue, belonged to a tradition that appealed to all the latent snobbery in the English middle class. This snobbery goes a long way to explain the predilection of the Palestine official for the cause of the Arab landlord. This predilection for the Arab landlord was extended to the Arab peasant, because without the peasant there would be no landlord; the peasant is an integral part of a social system which is so much more attractive to a certain type of British mind than the sweat-sodden hurly-burly of a Jewish co-operative enterprise.

More important than this personal prejudice was the rational necessity for supporting the reactionary elements in Arab society as being those elements most likely to acquiesce in the objectives of British imperialism. The break-up of the Arab social structure would have released new and powerful forces which almost certainly would have been antipathetic to the British intention of establishing themselves in Palestine. For this reason the task of adjusting Arab Palestine to the conditions created by the Mandate was never even attempted. Social and economic conditions in Arab Palestine have not radically changed since the Turkish occupation. The percentage of illiteracy is said to be even higher. So far from encouraging the development of Arab Palestine on modern and European lines the influence of the Administration has always been on the side of the *status quo*, always in favour of maintaining the mortmain of the Arab landlord over his impoverished and over-driven land and peasants. In so far as any attempt has been made to create an economic balance between Arabs and Jews it has been in the direction of damping down Jewish enterprise instead of encouraging Arab enterprise.

Side by side with the problem of increasing Arab productivity was the problem of rationalising and co-ordinating Jewish productivity. This again is a task which the Administration has never seriously attempted. The fact that Jewish economy in Palestine has developed on largely autonomous lines is due not so much to Zionist exclusivity as to the unwillingness of the Administration to interest itself in the tremendous possibilities and the no less tremendous problems created by the influx of Jewish capital and Jewish labour.

Palestine has virtually only one export—citrus. Apart from bromium and potassium salts in the Dead Sea it has no mineral

wealth. In view of the greatly increased population postulated by the National Home it was unlikely that the land of Palestine would ever produce an exportable crop besides citrus, if indeed it would be able to provide sufficient food to supply the essential requirements of the people of Palestine. It followed, therefore, that any import of manufactured consumer goods over and above the value of the citrus crop could only be paid for by diverting capital assets to the purchase of consumption goods. This leaves out of account income from the tourist industry and income drawn from foreign sources possessed by inhabitants of Palestine, particularly by religious bodies, but these sums are comparatively unimportant. If, therefore, Jewish economy was to be established on a sound basis it was absolutely essential that the capital flowing into Palestine was made full use of and invested in such a way as to make Palestine as self-supporting as possible. This meant a planned investment policy combined with a tariff policy designed to regulate imports in accordance with the productive capacity created by this planned investment. An equitable balance would have to be struck between agricultural and industrial investment with the object of providing as far as possible for the essential needs of the inhabitants of Palestine with agricultural and industrial goods produced or partly produced in Palestine. (As far as industrial production was concerned the lack of mineral and of most raw materials meant that Palestinian industry would for the most part have to be confined to finishing processes.)

Absolutely nothing in this direction was done by the Administration with the result that, of the precious capital assets which flowed into Palestine and which might have been used to lay the foundations of a stable and prosperous economy, about 60 per cent. was wasted either by being diverted into satisfying the necessities of day-to-day consumption or by investment and subsequent dissipation in individual enterprises utterly unsuited to and unco-ordinated with the needs and conditions of the country. This resulted not only in the waste of much of the capital invested but also in a diminution of the amount of capital coming into Palestine. The impossibility of providing either imported or locally made consumer goods to keep pace with the increasing population, combined with a gradual falling off in the flow of capital coming into the country, led to a gradual decline in living standards which there seems no possibility of checking short of a

planned economy designed to make the optimum use of such capital as is still available for investment.

That the situation is not worse than it is is due to the Jews themselves, who to some extent have made up for the deficiencies of the Administration by planning on their own account. Their chief contribution to Palestinian economy has been the greatly increased agricultural productivity which their research, enterprise, and their co-operative farming and marketing have made possible. On the industrial side co-operative investment and production has to some extent mitigated the disastrous effects of the lack of any centrally planned policy of industrial investment and development. They have, however, been hampered by a tariff system the operation of which, incredible though it may seem, is solely in the hands of the Department of Customs, which is not only responsible for the collection of tariffs but also decides what tariffs are to be paid on each class of goods. There is absolutely no liaison between the tariff policy and the policy of industrial development, for the very good reason that there is no policy of industrial development. Tariffs are imposed mainly for revenue reasons and very little regard is paid to the industrial needs of the country. Various industrial interests clamour to the Department of Customs for protection for their particular industry, and from time to time the Department claps on a tariff in response to importunity. In its tariff policy the Palestine Government is admittedly severely hampered by Article 18 of the Mandate, stipulating equal tariff treatment for all members of the League of Nations, which makes it impossible for Palestine to take advantage of the most favoured nation clause which is usual in commercial treaties, but there is nothing in Article 18 to prevent the Administration from giving adequate tariff protection to suitable industries established in Palestine.

Although the Administration was undoubtedly hampered in its efforts to improve the economic condition of Palestine by the difficulty in getting Arabs and Jews to co-operate, and also by the policy of discouraging social change among the Arabs imposed by imperialist necessity, there is no doubt that, even with things as they were, something could have been done to increase Arab productivity on the one hand and make the best possible use of Jewish capital resources on the other hand. Even taking into account the difficulties presented by the Arab social structure,

which it was in Great Britain's interest to preserve, it would not have been impossible to do at least as much as had been done in other countries where the same limitations existed. Development Companies on the lines of the Sudan Plantations Syndicate and The Behera Land Company in Egypt could have been promoted for the drainage and irrigation of waste land and the close settlement of Arab cultivators under conditions which would have protected them from the rapacity of the private landlord and educated them in the technique of sound and economical cultivation and husbandry. By putting new land into cultivation it would also have enabled the average size of each individual holding to have been increased, thus doing something to remedy the land starvation from which the Arab peasant had always suffered.

In fact, the Administration could have done for the Arabs what the Jews were doing for themselves. In the towns opportunities for investment in small local industries could have been created so as to provide urban employment and consequently extra money with which to purchase increased agricultural production. The sale of land to the Jews meant that a very large proportion of the Jewish capital flowing into the country was passing into the hands of Arabs. Opportunity could and should have been created to enable that capital to be devoted to the creation of capital resources which would result in increased income and increased purchasing power. Legislation could have been passed to ensure that the proceeds of these land sales did not leave Palestine. The chance of selling undeveloped land to the Jews for anything up to twenty times what it had previously been considered to be worth gave Arab Palestine a unique opportunity of securing capital for development and modernisation. This would, if properly managed, have removed much of the economic inequality which is the main source of friction between Arab and Jew. The proceeds of the sales of one half of the undeveloped land of Palestine to the Jews would have been sufficient for the development of the other half. What happened was that the vast sums of money accruing to Arab Palestine from the proceeds of land sales went mainly to the handful of big landlords who possess most of the land in Palestine, and was partly frittered away by them on visits to Europe, foreign motor cars and articles of consumption generally, and partly invested in additional citrus acreage of which there was already too much. The Administration did nothing whatever to check this

by legislation or by encouraging and fostering alternative sources of investment. It thus missed the only chance that was ever likely to occur of finding the capital to relieve the poverty of the soil and people of Arab Palestine and of enabling it to take its part in the renaissance of energy and productivity which was animating the countries of the Middle East. Its failure to take this opportunity was due partly to an exaggerated respect for the convenience and prejudices of the Arab upper class, carried beyond anything that was necessitated by imperialist considerations, and partly to sheer administrative incapacity. Inaction on the part of the Administration was not remedied or even mitigated by any action on the part of the Arabs themselves, with the result that, as far as Arab Palestine is concerned, the twenty-five years of Mandatory rule has been a period of economic stagnation. Such improvement as has taken place, as higher wages and an increased market for agricultural produce, is due to the National Home, the beneficial economic effect of which on the Arabs, never very considerable at best, got gradually less as time went on owing to the progressive increase in the Jewish labour force and in Jewish agricultural production. It was of the essence of the National Home that the increased productivity which it brought to Palestine should benefit the Jews and not the Arabs. The Arabs only got the overplus.

On the Jewish side the main economic problem was that of the small capitalist—the man who came to Palestine with anything from £1,000 to £5,000. A large proportion of the total Jewish capital flowing into Palestine was brought in by people of this category. If the productive potentialities of this capital were to be fully realised, it was essential for the investment to be planned and co-ordinated with the general economic life of the country.

A good deal in this direction was done by the Jews themselves. Nothing whatever was done by the Palestine Government, either to initiate planned investment themselves for the small capitalist, or to encourage or assist the Jews in initiating such planned investment. What was needed was something in the nature of an Investment Board which would have undertaken to pay a small but fixed rate of interest on money borrowed, and which would have promoted suitable enterprises with the capital obtained. By co-ordinating these enterprises with the economic needs of the country and by designing a tariff system for the protection and

the encouragement of these enterprises, the Palestine Government, through such an Investment Board, would have secured that all the capital coming into Palestine was made into a future source of increased employment and production. It would have insulated the Jewish community from the worst effects of periodical slumps, and would have provided against the inevitable day when the flow of capital into Palestine would cease. From the point of view of the imperialist obligations of the Administration there was no reason why something of the sort should not have been done. A scheme of this type would in fact have tended to encourage the creation of that solid middle class of small investors which is the backbone of reaction all the world over.

The complete neglect by the Mandatory Government of the economic side of administration was a major factor in exacerbating nationalist and anti-imperialist bitterness among both Arabs and Jews. The failure to secure any measure of economic stability by the various means so abundantly at the disposal of the Palestine Government during the 1920's and early 1930's exposed Palestine to the full blast of the slump that resulted from the sudden drying up of credit which took place as a result of the Eastern Mediterranean war scare of the autumn of 1935. On the Arab side it resulted in the undernourishment, underemployment and insecurity which made possible the mass support accorded in the next few years to the Arab Rebellion. On the Jewish side it strengthened the determination of Jewish labour, in its own interests, rigidly to insist on the exclusion of Arab labour from Jewish enterprise and uncompromisingly to oppose any Arab participation in the fruits of Jewish economic life.

Before leaving the subject of economics some reference must be made to the question of Government revenue and expenditure. Government revenue rose from just over £1,000,000 per annum in 1920-21 to just over £4,500,000 in 1936-37. Expenditure during the same period rose from £1,200,000 to over £6,000,000. The Palestine debt consisted merely of a 5 per cent. loan of £4,500,000 raised in 1927 and guaranteed by the U.K. Treasury. From 1921 to 1936, revenue had invariably exceeded expenditure, with the result that the Government was able to meet the vastly increased expenditure caused by the Rebellion from the accumulated surplus from previous years, which, at the beginning of 1936, amounted to over £6,000,000 and which by 1939 had been almost

entirely dissipated as a result of the decreased revenue and increased expenditure during the years of the Rebellion.

Of the total revenue, a proportion amounting to about one quarter in 1920, increasing to nearly one half in 1936, was obtained by means of Customs Duties, which had in many cases the effect of raising the prices of imported manufactured goods without enabling local industry to replace them. What may have been intended to be protective tariffs became in effect revenue tariffs. (An important exception to this is cement, a 70 per cent. import duty on which has enabled the local cement industry to acquire a practical monopoly of the Palestine market.) The balance of revenue, apart from Customs duty, is obtained by indirect taxes of various kinds, urban property tax, rural property tax, stamp duties and so on. In addition to Government taxation there is municipal taxation. This is small in Arab towns and villages, and relatively heavy in Jewish towns and settlements where many social services are maintained out of the proceeds of local taxation. Government taxation does not bear oppressively on any class of the community, and cannot be regarded as a serious burden on enterprise or purchasing power. A total revenue of about £14,000,000 derived from a population of about 1,500,000 cannot be regarded as oppressive taxation, even taking into account the comparative poverty of a large proportion of those 1,500,000. Government expenditure has been correspondingly modest. A large proportion of the total expenditure has always and necessarily been devoted to security; this proportion naturally increased during the years 1936-39. This disproportionately large expenditure on security, coming on top of the routine expenses of administration, meant that very little was left over for public works or social services. The Treasury consistently underspent what little was left over, creating a surplus which was eventually swallowed up by the security expenditure arising from the disturbances. The actual sums spent on social services and public works were ludicrously small in comparison with the needs of the country. As far as the Jews were concerned, education and social services were almost entirely financed by municipal or community taxation; the Arabs relied entirely on such assistance as the Government were able or willing to provide.

The achievements of the Palestine Government in social service and public works must be viewed in the light of the limited sums

available and with due regard to the fact that increased sums could only be raised by increased taxation, which in a poor country like Palestine would have been extremely burdensome. Apart from imported capital there was not sufficient wealth in the country to make possible a redistribution of income through the medium of taxation such as has been done to a limited extent in England. Such a redistribution could indeed have taken place as far as the Arabs were concerned, but only at the expense of shattering the whole Arab social structure. At the same time it must be remembered that this limited taxable capacity was due to the failure of the Administration to increase the productive resources of the country.

In the realm of education the results have been as meagre as the sums spent. The Jews have organised and largely maintained their own educational system, primary, secondary, higher and technical. Arab education has barely advanced from the low level maintained in Turkish times. Only about 50 per cent. of Arab children receive any schooling at all, nearly half of the Arab population is illiterate. Of those who have received some sort of primary education only a very small proportion can be assimilated in the Government secondary schools available. There are no facilities at all in Palestine for higher education for Arabs. There are two technical colleges for Arabs, one agricultural, one industrial. With such an inadequate educational foundation it was obviously impossible to envisage any considerable improvement in Arab standards of productivity, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that some of the surpluses hoarded by the Administration against a rainy day between 1920 and 1936 might well have been spent in improving the standards of Arab education in an effort to avert or at all events to mitigate the violence of the expected rainstorm.

A similar situation obtained in the Public Health services. The Jews organised and largely maintained their own health services, and the Arabs relied entirely on the Government. Here again lack of money prevented the establishment of any comprehensive Public Health organisation. While the curative side was more or less adequately attended to, the preventive and educational side was practically non-existent. It is impossible to consider the question of Public Health without also considering the general question of poverty and living standards. The failure to raise

Arab standards of life by means of a comprehensive and imaginative long term economic policy naturally resulted in a permanently unsatisfactory position as regards Public Health. A rise in the standards of living would not only have raised the standard of public health but would, by increasing the taxable capacity of the country, have enabled larger sums to be made available for public health and other social services. The failure of the Administration to solve the economic problems of the country militated against any prospects of success it might have had in dealing with other problems.

The planning and execution of public works was seriously handicapped by lack of funds, accentuated by the pessimistically cautious persistence of the Treasury in accumulating a war chest made up of annual surpluses in order to fight the rebellion which the policy of the Administration was making inevitable. The railway system remained in the same rudimentary stage in which it had been left by the Military Administration. There is a line from Egypt to Lydda, the Clapham Junction of the Palestine railway system; from Lydda branch lines radiate out to Haifa, Jaffa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. In addition to this there is a narrow-gauge line from Haifa connecting up with the Hedjaz Railway over the Syrian frontier at Deraa. That is all. It was a long time before the road system was sufficiently advanced to make up for the inadequacy of the railways. An all-weather road from Jaffa to Jerusalem was constructed in the early days of the Mandate, but it was not until 1935 that there was an all-weather road all the way from Haifa to Jerusalem and not until 1937 that there was a direct all-weather road from Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Haifa. It was not until 1936 that Jerusalem was given an adequate water supply by the laying of a pipeline from the coastal plain. A good deal was done to develop the facilities at Haifa Port, but Jaffa, the main port of export for citrus, was woefully inadequate in comparison with the demands made on it. Developments, started in 1934, were completed in 1936, just before the majority of the traffic through the port was diverted to the new port at Tel Aviv or to Haifa during the Arab strike in the summer of 1936.

In general it must be said that the provision of port, road and rail facilities has not kept pace with the economic development of Palestine; this has had the effect to some extent of retarding that development.

We now come to the personnel side of the Administration. Palestine cannot be said to have been uniformly fortunate in its administrative officers. At the outset they consisted very largely of men of little or no administrative experience, war-time officers who had received temporary positions under the Military Administration and had been taken on by the Civil Administration in order to achieve some sort of continuity. Few of them acquired that command of either Arabic or Hebrew which is necessary in order to establish adequate personal contact with the inhabitants of the country. Consequently a tradition of "indirect rule" has grown up by which Arab and Jewish District Officers maintain liaison between the British District Commissioners and Assistant District Commissioners and their districts. This has not been a satisfactory substitute for direct contact. The whole of the District Administration is run far too much on the lines of an office in Whitehall, with the written replacing the spoken word, and delegations and memoranda replacing informal questions and discussions. The result has been that half the time the Administration has simply not known or realised the significance of what was going on.

Within the limits set by the necessities of imperialism the standards of British Colonial administration are reasonably high. The shortcomings of British colonial rule can be attributed rather to these necessities than to any incapacity on the part of the administrators. It is a matter for regret that Great Britain did not pay the Holy Land the compliment of ensuring that its administrative personnel should at least be up to that standard which the Colonial Office has achieved in the other territories entrusted to it after the first German war.

CHAPTER IX

1920-1935

IN JUNE 1920 the O.E.T.A. in Palestine and Transjordan was replaced by a Civil Administration with Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner.

"It was deemed advisable that the British Mandate for Palestine and the French Mandate for Syria should be put into force at the same time. Since, therefore, the promulgation of the latter was delayed by Franco-Italian discussions, it was not till September 29, 1923, that the two Mandates came into operation. In Palestine, however, the main provisions of the Mandate had already been applied; and the history of its execution may be said to have begun when in the summer of 1920 a Civil Administration was established in place of the military regime. The first holder of the High Commissioner-ship—a title intended, no doubt, to mark the mandatory character of the territory, though Governorships were instituted for the African Mandates—was Sir Herbert Samuel. The government he headed was a government of a simple 'Crown Colony' type. There was a small Executive Council of officials, and an Advisory Council consisting (besides the High Commissioner) of ten officials and ten nominated non-officials, of whom four were Moslem Arabs, three Christian Arabs, and three Jews—a distribution which gave the minority communities more than their due representation, since of the population as estimated in 1922, 589,000 were Moslems, 83,000 Jews, and 71,000 Christians. The senior officials both in the central departments and in the districts were British, mostly ex-officers of the Army who had served under the military regime. From the first the junior posts were filled by Palestinians, Arab and Jew. The police were Palestinian with British officers, but a special British gendarmerie, numbering originally 762, was enlisted in 1922, mostly from Ireland. As to the judiciary, British judges were presidents of the two sections of the Court of Appeal, of each of the four District Courts, and of two Land Courts. The rest of the judges and magistrates were Palestinians. Cases

of religious law and personal status were determined by Moslem and Jewish tribunals.”*

Immediately prior to the establishment of a Civil Administration there had been in April 1920 a serious outbreak of Arab rioting due to the prevailing fear and uncertainty regarding the future intentions of the British Government in the development of the National Home. This fear and uncertainty was not simply a result of the frustrated desire of the Arabs for national independence; it was much more a result of exaggerated rumours about the scope of the National Home. Nothing was done to dissipate this fear and uncertainty by a reasoned and detailed statement of the future policy to be pursued. There is no doubt that many Arabs believed that the scope of the National Home would be very much more far-reaching in its effect on the common people of Palestine than was in fact likely to be the case; this belief was naturally encouraged by Arab nationalists in order to gain mass support for a policy of resistance, and it is unfortunate that these unfounded fears were not put at rest by the Administration. The Palestine Arabs were further inflamed by news of events in the Arab world outside Palestine where Feisal had proclaimed himself king of a reunited Syria, including Palestine, in defiance of the settlement arrived at by the Allied Powers. The outbreak was quelled by the military before very much damage had been done or much loss of life sustained. Five Jews were killed and over two hundred wounded in attacks made on them by Arabs, and four Arabs were killed and about twenty wounded by the military in restoring order.

The Civil Administration, on taking over, did not take the opportunity of clarifying the position of Arabs and Jews in Palestine under the Mandate. Room was thus left for reckless misinterpretation, both deliberate and otherwise, of the objects of the Mandate. Not only did the Administration make no attempt to define the relative position of Arabs and Jews under the Mandate in a way that would have dispelled the more exaggerated fears of the Arabs, but it allowed the Zionists publicly to discuss and expound their own conception of the scope of the National Home without contradiction or correction. There was of course no reason why the Zionists should not have expounded what views they liked about the National Home, but the Administration

* (Peel report CH. III para. I.)

should not have let it be possible for such views to be regarded by the Arabs as indicative of the official policy.

In May 1921 there was another serious outbreak of Arab rioting consisting of murderous raids by Arabs on Jewish settlements, in the course of which forty-seven Jews were killed and a hundred and forty-six wounded. Of the Arabs forty-eight were killed and seventy-three wounded as a result of police and military action in restoring order. This outbreak was followed by a Commission of Enquiry presided over by Sir Thomas Haycraft, the Chief Justice of Palestine, assisted by two other Government officials. This Commission found, as was inevitable, that the cause of the outbreak was the fear and uncertainty created by the future prospect of mass Jewish immigration. It found that this feeling was largely spontaneous, and not the result of nationalist propaganda. The Commission blamed the attitude and utterances of many of the Zionist leaders, and also the arrogance of many of the younger immigrants, for exacerbating the resentment of the Arabs at the development of the National Home. It is not unfair to say of this Commission that it showed itself more susceptible to Arab than to Jewish feelings. After the publication of the report of this Commission, no attempt was made to quiet Arab fears by reassuring them as to the safeguards provided by the Mandate (which had not yet been published) and in the report of the Commission no attempt was made to dissociate the Administration from the feelings expressed by the Arabs about the National Home; in fact the impression left as a result of reading the Commission's report is that the members of the Commission shared both the fear and the resentment of the Arabs about the National Home. As all the members of the Commission were members of the Administration, the effect of its Report on both Arabs and Jews can readily be imagined.

The sympathy felt by the Administration for the Arabs was reflected in its policy during the High Commissionership of Sir Herbert Samuel. The most important concession made to the Arabs was the granting of autonomy to them in all matters affecting the Moslem religion, which included the administration of Awqaf funds (trust funds bequeathed for religious purposes) and the control of the Sharia or religious courts. This was brought about in December 1921 by an Order creating a Supreme Moslem Council, which was completely independent of Government

control and in whose constitution the Government had no voice. The first President of the Supreme Moslem Council was Haj Amin Eff. el Husseini, who was already Mufti of Jerusalem. The double office invested him with tremendous influence both financial and moral; this influence he used with the single end of establishing himself as master of an independent Arab nation in Palestine.

A further attempt was made to conciliate the Arabs in 1922 by a suggestion for the formation of a Legislative Council in which the Arabs were to have a majority. This proposal was turned down by the Arabs on the ground that the proposed dominance of nominated members and the restricted powers in general to be given to the proposed Council would render it powerless to influence in any way the policy of the Administration.

In June 1922 the British Government did what it ought to have done two years previously. The Colonial Office published a paper entitled "Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation" which was designed to clarify the respective positions of Arabs and Jews under the Mandate and to allay those exaggerated fears which had been so largely responsible for the outbreaks of 1920 and 1921. This paper, while restating Great Britain's adherence to the principles laid down in the Balfour Declaration, was intended to conciliate Arab opinion as far as was compatible with the pursuit of those principles:—

"So far as the Jewish population of Palestine are concerned, it appears that some among them are apprehensive that His Majesty's Government may depart from the policy embodied in the Declaration of 1917. It is necessary, therefore, once more to affirm that these fears are unfounded, and that that Declaration, reaffirmed by the Conference of the Principal Allied Powers at San Remo and again in the Treaty of Sèvres, is not susceptible of change.

"During the last two or three generations the Jews have recreated in Palestine a community, now numbering 80,000, of whom about one fourth are farmers or workers upon the land. This community has its own political organs; an elected assembly for the direction of its domestic concerns; elected councils in the towns; and an organisation for the control of its schools. It has its elected Chief Rabbinate and Rabbinical Council for the direction of its religious affairs. Its business

is conducted in Hebrew as a vernacular language, and a Hebrew Press serves its needs. It has its distinctive intellectual life and displays considerable economic activity. This community, then, with its town and country population, its political, religious and social organisations, its own language, its own customs, its own life, has in fact 'national' characteristics. When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

"This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews."

This, while it did nothing to assuage the hostility and determination of those nationalists whose eyes were set on national independence, did bring about a slightly more moderate temper among the Arab population as a whole. This was reflected in the formation of a moderate group headed by Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, Mayor of Jerusalem.

From this time on, the history of Arab nationalism in Palestine is largely the history of the Husseini and Nashashibi factions. Their differences were partly personal and partly differences in policy. The Nashashibis, generally speaking, were content to regard independence as an ultimate aim, and to work for the maximum possible amount of Arab as opposed to Jewish participa-

tion in the administration of Palestine, combined with a limitation and eventual cessation of Jewish immigration. For the Husseinis, under the dynamic leadership of the Mufti, the struggle against the National Home was only one aspect of the general struggle for Palestine Arab independence on the one hand, and Husseini dominance in Palestine on the other. The Nashashibis, although they showed little disposition to co-operate in any way with the Zionists, adopted a reasonably co-operative attitude towards the Administration, with which they were not unnaturally on far better terms than were the Husseinis. It seemed indeed as if the Nashashibis were disposed to compound with the Administration in order to establish an ascendancy over their rivals.

The Supreme Moslem Council, however, with the intransigent Mufti at its head, was the most powerful Arab influence in Palestine, and this influence was decisive in preventing any real measure of Arab co-operation with the Government. Various offers made to the Arabs by the British Government, with a view to trying to mitigate Arab hostility to the National Home, were turned down. The proposed Legislative Council has already been mentioned. Following this the British proposed the enlargement of the High Commissioner's Advisory Council to include a greater proportion of Arab members. This was also rejected by the Arab Executive, a body elected by the annual Arab Congress which was the semi-official representative of Arab opinion *vis-à-vis* the Government. As the members of the Advisory Council were chosen by the High Commissioner who would naturally have only chosen "moderate" Arabs, it is hardly surprising that the Arab Executive vetoed the proposal. The same fate awaited the Government's proposal for an Arab Agency to which the Government was prepared to accord a status analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency. The rejection of this proposal was probably due to the fact that the Government's offer contained a hint that the continued existence of the Arab Agency would be conditional on its "loyalty" to the Government.

The influence of the Nashashibis was insufficient to induce the Arab Executive to co-operate with the Administration in the government of Palestine so long as the offers made by the Administration were conditional on the acceptance by the Arabs of the implications of the Mandate, as of course they were bound to be.

The Palestine Administration has sometimes been blamed for

its failure to promote self-government in Palestine. It was obviously difficult for the Administration to do so as long as the Arabs refused to accept the implications of the Mandate. Both Arabs and Jews enjoy under the Mandate a considerable degree of autonomy in matters affecting their own communities only, and the Administration cannot be blamed because this autonomy has not gradually been extended to the government of the country.

Although the years 1921-25 were not marred by any serious disorders, it could not be said that the conciliatory policy pursued by the Mandatory Power had sensibly increased the possibility of Arab-Jewish co-operation. As against the formation of a moderate group among the Arabs who were prepared to a certain extent to co-operate with the Administration must be reckoned the hardening opposition of the extreme nationalist groups which regarded the various efforts at conciliation on the part of the Administration as so many signs of weakness. The Mufti was patiently and thoroughly consolidating his position and extending his influence among the masses of the people. The Arab middle class saw how to the south-west in Egypt and the east in Iraq a very large measure of national independence had been wrested from Britain by violence successfully applied. Nearer home still, Transjordan, which had been specifically excluded from the National Home, was progressing towards self-government and its advancing political maturity tended to obscure its static economic poverty. The outward signs of calm, the absence of violent outbreaks, encouraged the Administration to reduce the Palestine garrison down to practically nothing, and also to substitute Arabs and Jews for Englishmen in many junior administrative posts. But the calm was a surface calm, and underneath the surface there was an ever-increasing tension, which belied the apparent optimism of the Administration.

In 1925 a visit by Lord Balfour to Palestine gave the Arabs a chance of expressing their views on the National Home of which they were not slow to take advantage. In the same year a revolt broke out against French rule in Syria. This revolt, which was started by the Druzes, spread to the whole of Syria and was only put down after considerable fighting. The Arabs of Palestine openly showed their sympathy with the Syrian rebels, and declared sympathetic strikes both during the revolt and afterwards when the French High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenal, paid an

official visit to Jerusalem.

Between 1922 and 1926 the number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine each year had been steadily increasing, and this, combined with the uncompromising attitude of the Arab nationalists, seemed to indicate the approach of a further violent outbreak, which, in view of the reduced state of the defence forces, might well have had serious consequences. The political situation was, however, eased by an almost complete check on the development of the National Home, which lasted from 1926-28. In 1925 the Jewish population of Palestine was 121,000, or about 50,000 more than in 1919. This comparatively small stream of immigration was due not so much to restrictions on immigration by the Administration as to the preliminary necessity for industrial and agricultural expansion in Palestine in order to provide work and sustenance for the prospective immigrants. The check to this slow but steady progress of development was brought about mainly by a fall in the exchange value of the Polish zloty. This made it impossible for Jews to leave Poland without experiencing heavy losses in realising their possessions, and thus put a virtual stop for the time to immigration from Poland, a country with the largest Jewish population in Europe. At the same time currency restrictions in Central and Eastern Europe played a part in restricting immigration, for the time had not yet come when Jews regarded themselves as lucky if they got away from Europe with their lives, leaving their possessions in the hands of their oppressors.

For a time it seemed as if the National Home had fizzled out. It looked as if eventually those few thousand Zionists who had come to Palestine would perforce have to become absorbed into a predominantly Arab economy. The political atmosphere became noticeably easier. The economic effects were not so happy. The sudden cessation of capital immigration led to widespread unemployment among both Arabs and Jews. The prevailing distress was accentuated by a severe earthquake in 1927. The economic difficulties of the Jews in Palestine, combined with the almost complete cessation of both capitalist and labour immigration, convinced the Zionists of the Diaspora that the National Home was doomed unless drastic steps were taken to get it moving once more. Not only had Jews ceased to come to Palestine, but Jews who had settled in Palestine had started to leave in considerable numbers. Something had to be done quickly. The Jewish Agency

was reorganised so as to become more representative of World Jewry than previously, and a huge drive was initiated to stimulate interest in and provide funds for the development of the National Home. One is tempted to ask oneself whether in fact it would not have been better to have allowed the National Home to have sunk into oblivion while the 120,000 Jews of Palestine gradually accustomed themselves to Arab ways of life. The answer is provided by the wave of anti-Semitism which swept over Eastern and Central Europe in the early 1930's. Unless the National Home had been revived in 1928, it would in 1933 have been quite incapable of absorbing even that comparatively limited number of refugees which it did absorb, and the plight of German Jewry would have been by that much more terrible than it actually was.

However that may be, in 1928 the development of the National Home, arrested for the previous two years, again began to get under way, and Arab discontent, which had been somewhat assuaged by the apparent failure of the National Home, again began insistently to make itself heard. In neighbouring countries further advances had been made along the road to national independence. The most significant of these advances had been in Syria, where the 1925 rebellion, although eventually crushed, had apparently convinced the French of the necessity of concessions to Syrian nationalism. Although no tangible advance towards independence could be recorded, there was an important change in the attitude of the Mandatory Power, which now expressed its desire to arrive at much the same relationship with Syria as Great Britain had arrived at with Egypt and Iraq. It was only too clear to the Arabs of Palestine that this change of heart had been brought about not by sweet reasonableness, but by the revolt of 1925. The lesson was gradually borne in on them that there was only one effective way of bringing their claims before the notice of the Mandatory Power—the way of violence.

Lord Plumer, who had succeeded Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner in 1925, left Palestine in 1928 after three years of administration marked by political peace but by economic difficulties resulting mainly from the same cause as had brought about political peace. The large fall in revenue, which had resulted from the setback to the National Home, served to remind the Administration of the extent to which the development of the National Home was responsible for the provision of revenue for

the essential services of government, and this may well have led the Administration to speculate on the fiscal consequences of a winding-up of the National Home.

Just before the installation of Sir John Chancellor, Lord Plumer's successor, as High Commissioner, the mounting tension between Arabs and Jews showed itself in a series of seemingly trivial incidents in connection with the Wailing Wall at Jerusalem, which, as part of the wall of the Haram ash sherif, and at the same time the only surviving part of the Jewish Temple, was a fruitful source of potential discord between Arabs and Jews.

The introduction of the religious motif into the quarrel was indicative of the growing influence of the Mufti and of the growing fanaticism which was imbuing the Arabs of Palestine. Throughout the winter of 1928-29 the Mufti and his followers assiduously used the Wailing Wall incidents as a means of inflaming the Arab masses by telling tales of Jewish determination to destroy the Holy Places. A savage outburst in August 1929 can be directly attributed to this course of incitement. Further incidents at the Wailing Wall, trivial in themselves but used by the Arabs leaders to whip Arab indignation up to fever pitch, ended in a series of murderous attacks by the Arabs on Jews all over the country. As a result of the drastic diminution which had taken place in the strength of the armed forces in Palestine, British troops had to be sent from Egypt to help to restore order. In the course of the outbreak a hundred and thirty-three Jews were killed and three hundred and thirty-nine wounded. A hundred and sixteen Arabs were killed and two hundred and thirty two wounded in the process of restoring order.

This outbreak was followed by a Commission of Enquiry under Sir Walter Shaw, which, unlike the Haycraft Commission eight years before, was not composed of members of the Administration. This Commission came to the inevitable conclusion that the outbreak was a result of Arab reaction to the development of the National Home. Although the Jewish population of Palestine was still well under 200,000, and although Jewish land purchases since 1920 amounted to only just over 1,000,000 dunams, or about one sixth of what was, at the most pessimistic estimate, the cultivable area of Palestine, and although most of this land had been uncultivated before the Jews bought it, the Commission recommended restrictions both on immigration and on land sales.

It also recommended a further clarification of the aims and objects of the Mandate, designed once more to try to conciliate Arab opinion by minimising the scope of the National Home.

The Commission further recommended the appointment of an expert to enquire into the potential economic absorptive capacity of Palestine, both agricultural and industrial, with a view to providing some factual basis for the regulation and restriction of land sales and immigration which had been recommended. Sir John Hope Simpson, a prominent Civil Servant, arrived in Palestine to conduct this enquiry.

On the agricultural side, he arrived at an estimate of 6,500,000 dunams as the actual and potential cultivable area of Palestine. This was very much less than even the most pessimistic of official estimates. Of this 6,500,000 dunams rather more than 1,000,000 dunams was in Jewish hands. Sir John calculated that the 5,500,000 dunams left in Arab hands was the minimum amount of cultivable land necessary to maintain Arab standards of living for the existing Arab population, assuming existing Arab standards of productivity. He concluded from this that Jewish land settlement should be suspended until an improvement had been brought about in the standards of Arab agricultural productivity. He recommended that the efforts of the Administration should be devoted towards this end, and expressed the opinion that, if this were done, it would be possible to accommodate eventually "not less than 20,000 families" of settlers from outside without impairing the standards of life of the existing cultivators. He then went on to make the astonishing suggestion that any State land which became available for cultivation should be reserved for landless Arabs, and should not be made available for Jewish settlers. This was certainly a very curious interpretation of our obligation under the Mandate to assist in the development of the National Home. It implied that the Arabs had a prior right in Palestine to the Jews, and that the Jews were only entitled to what was left over after the Arabs had been satisfied. That this astonishing suggestion was made at all is indicative of the spirit in which the whole of the Report was written. The author seemed to take no account of the fact that the Jews had been accorded by the Mandate a special position in Palestine. He regarded them as aliens whose immigration could not be allowed to interfere in any way with the interests of the indigenous inhabitants. He

approached the problem in the same way as he might have approached the problem of Indians in East Africa, or refugees in England.

On the industrial side Sir John Hope Simpson was almost equally pessimistic. He pointed out that he believed that there was widespread Arab unemployment in Palestine, and suggested that it was unfair to admit more Jewish immigrants while there was a considerable body of unemployed inside Palestine. (Here again he treated the problem as one of alien immigration.) He did realise, however, that employment is created by capital expenditure, and that much of the potential Jewish capital available would not be imported into Palestine to employ Arab labour. He therefore admitted that there was a case for a continuance of restricted Jewish labour immigration for industrial employment, and he also appeared to appreciate that Jewish capital expenditure, although directly employing only Jewish labour, would in fact indirectly benefit the Arabs and decrease Arab unemployment. But this point of view only appeared as a rider to the main report. Sir John Hope Simpson did not mention whether in his opinion Arab unemployment had risen or fallen since the inauguration of the National Home, but his report gave the impression that Arab unemployment was largely due to the presence of Jews in Palestine. This of course was quite ludicrous. By 1930 about 80 per cent. of the productive and distributive work being done in Palestine was being done as a result of the National Home. The P.W.D. was engaged on various works that had only been made possible as a result of Jewish contributions to the revenue; this Department employed more Arab than Jewish labour. Large Jewish undertakings such as the P.E.C. and Palestine Potash employed large numbers of Arab workers. In addition Arabs were employed in a variety of different ways as a result of the National Home; Jaffa Port, for example, in which only Arab labour was employed, was handling the whole import and export trade for southern Palestine, about 75 per cent. of which was Jewish. So far from a restriction of Jewish immigration resulting in an increase in Arab unemployment it was very probable that the only way in which Arab unemployment could be reduced would be as a result of the continuance of Jewish immigration and the consequent development of Jewish enterprise. A restriction of Jewish immigration would have meant a restriction of demand, a general

slowing up of the wheels of trade which the immigrants had put in motion, and increased unemployment all round, both Arab and Jewish. Quite apart from the fact that much of the potential Jewish capital would not be brought into Palestine to employ Arab labour, there would not be a market for such additional capital unless additional consumption power was brought into existence as a result of increased immigration. Sir John Hope Simpson's report showed no realisation of the fact that immigrants are potential consumers, and create opportunities for capital investment which otherwise would not exist. Thus they not only create employment for themselves but for other people as well. This is of course only true up to a point, but there was nothing to suggest that in Palestine that point had been reached. The economics of scarcity with which Sir John Hope Simpson's report was imbued regard additional human beings as liabilities to be maintained rather than as the assets which healthy human beings should be in any sane economy.

On the agricultural side it would perhaps have been difficult to quarrel with some of Sir John Hope Simpson's recommendations provided that one accepted his premises. Subsequent events have, however, shown that Sir John Hope Simpson very considerably underestimated the extent of cultivable land in Palestine. He also failed to appreciate the fact that, unless the Jews were allowed to develop the potentially cultivable area of Palestine, it would in all probability not be developed at all. The restriction, or rather the prohibition, of sales of cultivated and cultivable land to the Jews would have automatically restricted the maximum productivity of the land by withholding from the Jews the opportunity of applying modern methods of cultivation to it. It was not that the Arabs were unable or unwilling to improve their methods of cultivation; it was simply that Arab economy was incapable of providing the means for such improvement.

The Shaw Report had been published in March 1930. The Hope Simpson Report was published in October. Following the publication of the Shaw Report, and pending the publication of the Hope Simpson Report, the Administration had suspended all Jewish immigration. Following on the publication of the Hope Simpson Report, the British Government issued a Statement of Policy in the Form of a White Paper embodying the conclusions of the Shaw and Hope Simpson Reports.

It adopted, almost word for word, most of Sir John Hope Simpson's estimate, opinions and recommendations. But there were two notable omissions. The White Paper did not commit the Government to the view that, if a comprehensive policy of development were carried out, there would ultimately be room for a substantial number of Jewish settlers on land not yet acquired by them. Secondly, while it repeated Sir John Hope Simpson's argument as to the connexion between Arab unemployment and the rate of immigration, it made no reference to his saving paragraph on the employment of Jewish capital which would not otherwise have been available. The language of the White Paper, moreover, betrayed a marked insensitiveness to Jewish feelings; thus, while the Government had not in fact gone beyond the decisions and proposals of the Shaw and Hope Simpson Reports, the tone of the document suggested a rather more definite inclination towards the Arab side of the controversy than had either of the two Reports.

After the publication of this Statement of Policy, Zionist fortunes seemed to be at a low ebb. There were fewer than 200,000 settlers in the National Home owning less than one twentieth of the total area of Palestine and only one sixth of the total cultivable area even according to the Hope Simpson estimate. It appeared from the British Government's Statement of Policy that the National Home was to stop at little more than this. The position was even worse than that which was later to face the Zionists after the publication of the 1939 White Paper, for in 1930 the Jewish community was much less homogeneous, much less developed economically, much less self-sufficient than it was nine years later and consequently all the more vulnerable to reverses and setbacks. For the second time in as many years, the National Home seemed on the verge of petering out. But once again Jewish energy and Jewish drive, assisted on this occasion by good fortune, came to the rescue.

In 1930 there was in power in England a weak Labour Government assailed by a strong Conservative Opposition anxious to take every opportunity to discredit the Government. This Conservative Opposition contained two ex-Colonial Secretaries, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery, who had played a large part in the inauguration and development of the National Home, and these two Statesmen formed part of a powerful and sustained

opposition to the Government's Palestine Policy. A series of letters appeared in *The Times*, mostly over the signature of leading personalities in the Conservative Party, protesting against the White Paper and demanding a revision of the policy set out therein. This demand was supported in the editorial columns of *The Times*. (It is interesting to note how the views of *The Times* itself and most of the signatories of the letters changed in the next nine years, at the end of which a Government largely composed of these signatories sponsored a White Paper putting restrictions on the development of the National Home far more drastic than those envisaged in the 1930 White Paper.)

Encouraged by such powerful backing, leading Zionists redoubled their agitation against the White Paper. The Government had a weak case. It had too uncritically accepted the conclusions of the Shaw and Hope Simpson Reports, which in their turn had been influenced by the pro-Arab sentiments which had become a tradition with the senior members of the Palestine Administration. It had been led into treating the whole problem as one of alien immigration, and had exposed itself to a broadside of legalistic and moral recrimination from an Opposition which had been waiting for just such an opportunity to attack the Government on grounds more exalted than protests against slum clearance or free milk for schoolchildren. It is not often that the Conservative Party has an opportunity to go forth to war on even apparently altruistic grounds; when it does have such an opportunity it makes the most of it.

Faced with such a volume of opposition, the Prime Minister, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, decided to bow to the storm. One month after the publication of the White Paper it was announced that the Jewish Agency had been invited to confer with the Government. The White Paper had been succeeded by the White Flag. In February 1931 a letter from Ramsay MacDonald to Dr. Weizmann, the President of the Zionist Organisation and Jewish Agency, was published. The letter purported to be an explanation and clarification of the White Paper. It was in fact a repudiation of the policy laid down in the White Paper. It would have been unworthy of its author if it had shown any precision as to detail, but the general impression given was that the policy outlined in the White Paper would not be carried into effect. In point of fact the broad recommendations of the Shaw and Hope Simpson

Reports were actually carried out in that after 1930 it was established as a principle that Jewish immigration should not be allowed to encroach on the essential economic needs of the Arabs. Henceforward the Jews in Palestine were treated not indeed as aliens as the Hope Simpson Report seemed to suggest, but on less liberal footing than that implied in the Mandate. The original conception of a positive obligation towards the Jews as against the negative duty of protecting the "civil and religious rights" of the Arabs disappeared. It became clear after 1930 that the physical scope of the National Home was limited by the extent to which the Zionists themselves could provide for additional immigrants without dispossessing any Arabs. The emphasis of the Mandatory Administration shifted from the development of the National Home to the protection of the Arabs against the encroachment of the National Home. Protection of the Arab interests became a more important duty than the furtherance of Jewish interests.

In fact very considerable concessions had been made to the Arabs at the expense of the Jews. But this fact was obscured by the deplorable way in which the whole business was handled by the British Government. The precipitate publication of the White Paper followed by its partial repudiation as a result of what appeared to be pressure applied by the Jews naturally gave the Arabs a most unfortunate impression of the apparent subservience of the British Government to the behests of World Jewry. In point of fact the influence of World Jewry would have been ineffective to change the policy of the Government, had not this influence been supported and supplemented, for Party reasons, by powerful Conservative personalities in England, who did not care a fig for World Jewry, but who were anxious to discredit the Labour Government. Just as they had used Ulster in 1914, so they used Palestine in 1930 as a means of trying to discredit the Government whose seats they were anxious to fill. In both cases they were equally oblivious of the interests of the protégés which expediency had thrust on them, and in both cases they were quite prepared later to turn and rend those same protégés when Party interests seemed to demand it.

From 1929 to about 1934 Europe and the United States of America experienced an economic slump of unprecedented severity. This slump affected Palestine in two important ways.

First it caused a diversion to it of Jewish and to a smaller extent of non-Jewish capital which could not profitably be employed in its usual channels; secondly the serious unemployment and business depression in Europe increased the incentive for immigration to Palestine by Jews, both small capitalists and workers. The result was a steady increase in capital and labour immigration from 1929 onwards. The economic absorptive capacity of the country increased with the increase of immigration—*pace* Sir John Hope Simpson—with the result that the restrictive policy that followed on the 1929 White Paper did not seriously affect the volume of immigration. This will be seen from the following figures of annual immigration from 1929 to 1932.

1929	5,269
1930	4,994
1931	4,075
1932	9,553

The steep rise in 1932 can be attributed to the increased economic absorptive capacity brought about by the capital immigration of previous years, which was not immediately translated into terms of production and employment or, of course, consumption. In addition to the authorised immigration, there was a certain amount of illegal immigration. There are no precise figures for this, but its volume was fairly considerable. By 1931 it was estimated that about 6,000 illegal immigrants had entered the country since 1920, and the position of these immigrants was regularised in that year by the Government accepting the *fait accompli* of their unauthorised entry. After 1931 the volume of illegal immigration increased with the volume of legal immigration and may have amounted to as much as 20 per cent. of the total legal immigration.

From 1933 the persecution of Jews in Germany provided another powerful incentive for Jewish immigration, but the importance of this factor in bringing about the tremendous increase in Jewish immigration that took place in the years 1933-36 has been greatly overrated. It is probable that the increased economic absorptive capacity brought about by Jewish capital immigration from non-German sources would have resulted in almost as great an increase in the volume of immigration as actually took place in these years, even without the German persecutions. The European slump had not only caused Jews all

over Europe to turn to Palestine as a way out of the economic frustration which they were experiencing in common with the rest of the inhabitants of Europe, but the slump had resulted in a recrudescence of anti-Semitic feeling in many countries in Eastern Europe—notably Poland and Rumania—which greatly accentuated the desire of Jews in these countries to establish if not themselves at least their sons and daughters in a new life in Palestine. The anti-Semitism in these countries, although not comparable in malignancy, vindictiveness or thoroughness to that which raged in Germany, was relatively more serious in that a much greater number of Jews were affected.

The immigration figures for the years 1933-35 were as follows:

1933	30,327
1934	42,359
1935	61,854

There is no need to stress the enormous increase that these figures represent compared with previous years. This increase was naturally accompanied by a corresponding increase in agricultural and industrial development, and also by a very considerable increase in Government revenue, which increased from just under £4,000,000 in 1933 to nearly £5,000,000 in 1935. In spite of Sir John Hope Simpson's prognostications there was very little unemployment during these years either among Arabs or Jews. In fact during the citrus picking and shipping season there was a shortage of labour which could only be satisfied by casual labourers from the Hauran district of Syria.

The increased prosperity brought about by the increased immigration masked to some extent the growing anger, fear and resentment of the Arabs. At the same time steps had been taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Shaw and Hope Simpson Reports to safeguard the Arabs against the direct effects of Jewish immigration. In 1931 Arabs who had been evicted from their holdings, as a result of these holdings having been sold to Jews over their heads, were invited to submit their claims and offered the opportunity of resettlement on State land at Government expense. It is significant that only a small proportion of those Arabs who had been so evicted submitted claims, the presumption being that the rest had found profitable employment in the towns. In 1933 an Ordinance was enacted securing tenants from arbitrary removal from land in the event of its sale. Jewish

development was not seriously hindered as a result of this Ordinance as it was usually found possible, as a result of superior Jewish productivity, to settle Jews on land purchased from Arabs and at the same time to reserve enough land for the original tenants to enable them to live on at least as high a standard of life as they had enjoyed before.

In spite of all this there was an increasing undercurrent of anger and despair among the Arabs, not so much as a result of discontent with the present as of fear for the future.

There were some significant changes in the character of the 1933 disturbances as compared with those of earlier years. In the first place the 1933 disturbances were directed not primarily against the Jews but against the Administration. The British Government's retreat from the White Paper of 1930, followed as it was by three years of greatly increased Jewish immigration, had the most deplorable effect on the Arab attitude towards the Administration, and the concessions that had in point of fact been made to them since 1930 were completely ignored. Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Dr. Weizmann, the Black Letter as the Arabs called it, had renewed in the Arabs all that distrust of the British Government which they had felt in 1920, and which ten years of conciliation had done a great deal to remove. What was done was not in fact important. It was the manner of doing it. If Mr. MacDonald's letter had never been written, if the Conservative Party had never taken a hand in the game, if the Zionists had accepted the White Paper, even then there almost certainly would have been much the same volume of immigration as in fact took place. Mr. MacDonald's recantation and the increased volume of immigration were not cause and effect. But to the Arabs it appeared to be a case of *post hoc propter hoc*. It appeared to the Arabs that the recommendations of impartial British Civil Servants had been set aside at the bidding of the sinister subterranean influences of the "leaders of World Jewry". It may be said quite frankly that in this belief they were encouraged to some extent by the openly expressed views of many senior members of the Palestine Administration.

In the second place the outbreak was less spontaneous, more organised, and more widespread than any previous disturbance. The fact that the damage done was comparatively small is only attributable to the prompt initiative of local administrative and

police officers in the towns where rioting broke out. There were signs that Haj Amin's long course of organisation, propaganda and incitement was beginning to bear fruit in something more than periodical frenzies of religious fanaticism. There were references in the Arab Press to the sinister designs of British Imperialism; the connection between the Jews and British Imperialism was for the first time openly stressed. Sometimes it was British Imperialism that was the tool of the Jews, sometimes the reverse. But the implication was the same: the British Government was no longer impartial as between Arabs and Jews.

Once more after the suppression of the 1933 riots there followed a period of surface calm. Jewish immigration continued to increase. There was a boom in land sales. Agricultural and industrial development continued apace. There was little unemployment. Economically the Arabs shared to some extent in the prosperity of the National Home. But the old fear of eventual domination by the Jews grew ever more intense as a result of the ever-increasing volume of Jewish immigration. There was also a growing and strengthening purposefulness among the Arabs. The ease with which the 1933 rising had been quelled (there was little doubt that the Arab leaders had intended the various synchronised outbreaks in the main towns of Palestine to be the prelude to a countrywide strike and a general campaign of civil disobedience) demonstrated to the Arab leaders the necessity for a much greater degree of organisation and a much greater volume of mass support before they could expect successfully to bring pressure to bear on the Mandatory Power. For times had changed. The conciliatory policy of earlier days had been abandoned. It was significant that the 1933 riots had not been followed by a Commission of Enquiry to probe grievances and recommend concessions. It now required more than a demonstration of violence to deflect the Mandatory Power from its policy. For the Mandatory Power was now alive to the real motives underlying the Arab national movement. It realised that it was more than a challenge to the National Home; it was a challenge to Great Britain's position in Palestine.

Imperial interests in Palestine had greatly increased since the early days of the Mandate. The Mosul-Haifa pipeline, then under construction, and the Imperial Airways air route, India *via* Gaza, had made Palestine an essential link in the Imperial system of communications. It was no longer merely a question of the east

bank of the Suez Canal, a factor which had lost much of its importance. Palestine was becoming one of the major strategic points in the British Empire.

For the first time Arab violence had failed to wring concessions from the Mandatory Power. It was this fact that dictated the necessity for a radical revision of Arab nationalist tactics and a radical change in Arab nationalist organisation.

In 1934 the Supreme Moslem Council started an active propaganda campaign with the object of preventing further land sales to Jews by Arabs. Small landowners were persuaded to register their lands as family *Awqaf* with the object of preventing their subsequent alienation. Arabs who sold land to the Jews were pilloried in the mosques and in the Press. An Arab bank was formed to assist indigent landowners with loans in order to discourage them from resolving their financial difficulties by selling their land at a handsome price to the Jews. All these were of course perfectly legal and in some cases constructive measures of self-protection to which no exception could reasonably be taken.

The various groups and cliques of Arab leaders were organised into political parties which co-operated closely with each other in pursuance of their common ends, without actually becoming amalgamated into one single party. It remained clear that the various family rivalries in the Arab national movement were too deep rooted ever to be completely resolved even in the face of a common danger and in pursuit of a common aim.

Another significant development was the organisation of Youth movements and Sports Clubs, on the lines adopted in Fascist countries, as forcing grounds of nationalist extremism. The Scout movement in particular was notoriously used as a cover for nationalist propaganda and incitement among the Arab youth of Palestine.

Arab newspapers pursued a persistent course of incitement for the benefit of the literate section of the Arab population. The illiterate section was reached through the mosques, and the Friday sermons degenerated into propaganda messages of the most dangerous and inflammatory kind, addressed as they were to ignorant, gullible and easily swayed masses of people. Under the influence of Haj Amin the whole Moslem religious organisation of Palestine had become primarily a vehicle for the dissemination of propaganda and the organisation of resistance to the Mandatory Power.

Such was the situation in the summer of 1935. It seems improbable that the growing seriousness of the situation was fully realised by the Administration. The military forces in Palestine, which had been fixed at two battalions of infantry and an R.A.F. armoured-car squadron, had not been increased since 1930. The increase of British personnel in the police force had not even kept pace with the increase in population. There were no official auxiliary or voluntary defence organisations. Jewish settlements had been provided with shotguns for defence purposes after the 1929 disturbances, and these remained the only form of protection officially possessed by the Jews. No attempt had been made to try to secure the loyalty of the Arab police in the event of disturbances by providing them with special barracks or living quarters to secure their families from victimisation, or even by giving them a reasonably generous rate of remuneration and pension. Road and rail communications had been left in a rudimentary state, making rapid military movement impossible and leaving many villages and settlements in a precarious state of isolation. The port town of Jaffa, which past experience had shown to be the most turbulently nationalist centre in Palestine, was still the only channel of import and export for the whole of southern Palestine. No attempt had been made to provide adequate communication between Haifa and southern Palestine so as to enable any large part of this traffic to be diverted to Haifa in the event of conditions at Jaffa making the continued use of that port impossible for Jews. A scheme for a joint Jaffa-Tel Aviv harbour, allowing of separate access from Jaffa and Tel Aviv, was discussed and allowed to hang fire. Similarly a scheme for the improvement of railway communications between Jaffa-Tel Aviv, Haifa and Jerusalem on the one hand and between Palestine and Egypt on the other hand, drawn up by Sir Felix Pole at the end of 1934, was duly pigeon-holed. The only provision which the Administration seemed to be making against the possibility of serious disturbances was the accumulation of a large revenue surplus, the expenditure of part of which might have done something, if not to avert the now almost inevitable disturbances, at least to put the Administration in a better position to deal with them.

Jewish absorption in the development of the National Home combined with their partly voluntary and partly enforced isolation from the Arabs caused them for the most part to be equally

oblivious of the signs of approaching trouble. This obliviousness was not quite unanimous. Mention has already been made of the Revisionists or extreme Jewish nationalists, so called because of their demand for a revision of the Mandate so as to provide for the inclusion of Transjordan in the National Home. The afflictions which overtook European Jewry in the 'thirties, together with the greatly increased volume of immigration, had not unnaturally resulted in an increase in the relative and absolute size of this party in Palestine. The Jewish Agency, for political reasons, refused to recognise it, with the result that the organisation of the Revisionists developed independently of the organisation of the rest of the National Home, and hostility increased between them and the official Zionist organisation. The murder of Dr. Arlosoroff, a leading official of the Jewish Agency, on Tel Aviv beach one summer evening in 1933 was widely believed to be the work of the Revisionists. Revisionist demonstrations in Tel Aviv periodically claimed the attention of the police, but no serious outbreaks of violence occurred. The Revisionist youth was organised into a semi-sports organisation on the fascist model, known as the Brith Trumpeldor. This organisation had branches in most of the larger Jewish settlements and more or less openly carried out military drills etc. They were also suspected with some reason of being in possession of arms more numerous and more lethal than the shotguns officially approved by the authorities.

Apart from the Revisionists there was very little awareness in Jewish circles of the increasing state of tension among the Arabs. The outlook of Palestine Jewry at this time, absorbed as it was in the rapid success and development of the National Home, was almost incredibly parochial. They seemed to think that not only economic laws but political realities had been suspended for the especial benefit of the National Home. They showed a complete lack of sensitiveness towards and a complete lack of appreciation for the genuine fears felt by the rank and file of the Arab people at the increasing volume of Jewish immigration. Neither by their words nor by their actions did they do anything to mitigate these fears. They made no attempt to arrive at an understanding on equal terms with the more moderate elements among the Arabs while there was yet time to do so. It is improbable that any such attempt would have been successful, but it might at least have been made. They exhibited no sympathy with or understanding

for the genuine problems and difficulties of the Arab worker. They showed a callousness and lack of regard for everything non-Jewish symptomatic of the worst forms of nationalism. They showed no appreciation of the fact that a last-minute attempt at a rapprochement with the Arab workers was the only possible chance of averting a long course of strife and bloodshed in which the National Home, whatever else happened, was bound to suffer severely. It is true that some isolated attempts were made to establish contact with and to help in the organisation of Arab workers in Haifa and Jaffa, but this was due to individual initiative rather than to official policy. It was impossible for the observer not to have been unfavourably impressed by the arrogant self-absorption and parochial egotism of Palestine Jewry in those fateful months preceding the autumn of 1935, when more than ever before the situation was crying out for a larger understanding, a far-sighted wisdom, and a long-term view of the future development of the National Home.

CHAPTER X

The Rebellion — First Phase

A NUMBER of events which occurred in the autumn and winter of 1935-36 brought the simmering cauldron of Arab discontent to the boil.

During the previous two years, the volume of capital immigration had not kept pace with the tremendous number of immigrants flowing into the country; this was mainly due to the difficulties that were being experienced in transferring capital assets from Germany and other European countries. As a result of this there was a tremendous demand for land, for houses, and for articles of consumption of all kinds, and insufficient ready money with which to pay for them. There were immigrants clamouring for locally grown food, for houses to live in, for goods and services of all kinds. These same immigrants were also clamouring to be employed in the production of all these goods and services. All that was needed were funds to start off the processes of production; the goods and services produced would be bought from the wages paid to those engaged in their production.

But before this could happen, land, plant and raw materials had to be bought, factories erected, crops planted, and houses built. This gap could only be bridged by capital, or failing capital by credit. The ever-expanding consuming power represented by the growing population of the National Home seemed to be an adequate guarantee for the repayment of loans advanced in order to inaugurate production designed for the satisfaction of the needs of this growing population. There were no stringent banking laws, there was no central banking authority to prevent or to control the unrestricted creation of credit. Literally scores of independent banks, commanding only the slenderest assets, sprung up with the object of financing land purchases, house building and industrial development. Factories built on credit found that they could only sell their goods by granting credit to their customers. Wages were paid out of bank credits, and spent in paying instalments on goods bought on credit from suppliers who themselves had purchased or manufactured those goods on credit. A tremendous superstructure of bogus prosperity was built up on these slender

foundations. Industries which relied on paying back the money they had borrowed by money received from customers for the goods which they sold found that their customers were relying on them in the same way as they were relying on the banks. The banks, in order to keep the industries going, had to keep on renewing and even extending the credit originally given. Securities which at one time had seemed easily realisable became frozen as the result of the inability of anyone to pay cash for anything. To demand cash became almost an act of treason, a lack of faith in the future of the National Home. And still the immigrants came flowing in, needing more houses, more food, more clothes. Speculation became rife. Land was bought, not for use, but in the expectation that it would be possible to sell it at a profit. Prices soared in consequence. The infection spread outside Palestine: foreign suppliers in the trough of a slump at home were glad enough to grant credit to their agents in Palestine in order to gain a footing in the expanding Palestine market. Businesses had outstanding accounts out of all proportion to their turnover. Long-term credit became the order of the day even for articles of everyday consumption. Kerosene was sold in the streets from carts against bills; benzine was sold on long-credit terms, not only to lorry and bus owners, but to owners of private cars which had, of course, been purchased on long-term credit. Traders competed with each other on credit instead of on price and service. Rather an expensive article on credit than a cheap one for cash. Better times were coming. There would be no difficulty in paying tomorrow. Why stint oneself today when there were suppliers not only willing but obsequiously eager to wait until tomorrow?

In some directions supply was unable to keep pace with demand. This was particularly the case with housing accommodation. Rents rose to a tremendous extent. Many people were paying up to 40 per cent. of their total incomes in rent, and eking out the rest by running up bills for articles of everyday consumption. Land sales boomed in spite of all the efforts and imprecations of the Supreme Moslem Council. Even the most ardent Nationalists were unable to resist the rapidly mounting prices that were being offered. Arab landowners used the money obtained from land sales to purchase and develop previously uncultivated land, thus contributing to the rapid and uncontrolled rise in land values. The port of Jaffa, which had the handling of most of the great volume

of capital goods flowing from abroad into the National Home, experienced an unprecedented prosperity.

Then came the crash. In October 1935 Italy, after open preparations extending over several months, started its invasion of Abyssinia. The Government of Great Britain, with one eye on the forthcoming General Election, and acutely conscious, as a result of the ballot just held by the League of Nations Union, of the strong feelings held by the British electorate on the subject of collective security, found it expedient to adopt a strong line at Geneva against Italy's aggression. In spite of opposition from an Italophile French Government, British influence succeeded in obtaining a formal condemnation of Italy at a League meeting convened on account of the invasion of Abyssinia. The application of Sanctions followed. There was talk of closing the Suez Canal to the passage of Italian troops and war material. There was talk of sanctions being extended to oil, a measure that would have utterly crippled the Italian war effort. Italy's attitude left no doubt that the adoption by Great Britain of any decisive measure aimed at putting a stop to the invasion would result in war. A large proportion of the British fleet was concentrated in the Eastern Mediterranean at Haifa and Alexandria. Large bodies of British and Italian troops were facing each other across the Egypt-Libya border. War in the Eastern Mediterranean would have meant that Palestine would have found itself well within the area of hostilities. Not only that, but such a war would have meant the automatic cessation of immigration into Palestine for its duration. Hysterical optimism was suddenly succeeded by equally hysterical pessimism. The mental confusion and general lack of balance resulting from the boom made business interests in Palestine particularly unfitted for a calm appraisal of the situation which had arisen. The tendency to mistake molehills for mountains led to a gross exaggeration of the dangers that threatened Palestine as a result of the strained relations between England and Italy.

Even a slight shock is sufficient to bring down a house built upon sand. The war scare that developed as a result of the application of Sanctions was sufficient to bring crashing to the ground the whole flimsy superstructure of credit which had been so feverishly built up in the previous eighteen months. Depositors rushed to the banks to withdraw their deposits. The banks attempted to call in the credits they had extended in order to meet the demands of

their depositors. Businesses demanded cash from their customers in order to meet the demands of the banks. Customers went to withdraw their deposits from the banks in order to meet the demands of their creditors. And so the vicious circle went on.

Slump psychology succeeded boom psychology. Excessive timidity succeeded excessive recklessness. Firms which could have mitigated the effects of the crisis by continuing to pursue a normal credit policy became infected with the general panic and joined in the hunt.

The fact that no bank suspended payment was due to the prompt action taken by the Palestine Treasury in conjunction with Barclay's Bank. Funds were put at the disposal of the weaker banks. The currency in circulation was considerably increased.

Gradually the panic subsided. The danger of war receded. The Conservative Government in England was duly returned to power at the General Election on the strength of its pro-League policy over the Abyssinian war. With its new lease of life it was in a position to thumb its nose at the electorate. It lost no time in demonstrating quite clearly that its pro-League policy before the election was merely a spring to catch woodcocks. Immediately after the election the Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, lost no time in initiating diplomatic moves to bring the war to an end in a manner satisfactory to Italy. Sanctions continued to be applied half-heartedly simply because the British Government could not, without making itself ridiculous, see its way to take the lead in reversing the policy which it had initiated. Many Continental nations have an imperfect idea of the working of British democracy and any undue precipitancy in calling off Sanctions might have been construed as insincerity. As far as Palestine was concerned the British Government's *volte face* removed all anxiety that had been felt at the possibility of war with Italy.

But the damage had been done. The bubble had been pricked. The essential unsoundness of the whole economic structure had been exposed. Palestinian economy was like a large cultivated area from which the water supply had suddenly and unexpectedly been withdrawn. Purchasing power contracted, factories closed down or went on to part time, workers were thrown out of employment. Suppliers refused new credit and began to press for the repayment of old debts. A large proportion of the country's depleted income went in paying for the excesses of the past.

From the political point of view the most important result of the crash was the great increase of unemployment among both Arabs and Jews. Jewish unemployment resulted in the Histadruth making a great drive to try to secure that only Jewish labour should be employed in Jewish undertakings. Consequently a large number of Arabs, through no fault of their own, were squeezed out of employment to make room for Jews. This was a natural and perhaps inevitable reaction to the slump on the part of the Jewish workers, but the resentment of the Arabs was equally natural. They felt that even such economic advantages as the Jews had brought were proving illusory.

There was another important result of the Abyssinian war in so far as it affected Palestine. The Sanctions policy naturally led to Italian retaliation in such directions as retaliation was feasible. Italian propaganda assumed a virulently anti-British tone. Broadcasts in Arabic from the Bari station blared forth an unceasing stream of attacks on British Imperialism in general and British rule in Palestine in particular. Facts were distorted, magnified and even invented in a deliberate effort to stir up anti-British feeling in the listeners, whose attention was held by the ingenious device of ending up each broadcast with a pornographic story. Nor did propaganda stop at broadcasting. Certain Arab newspapers in Palestine were subsidised with Italian money, and propaganda was actively carried on among the Arabs inside Palestine by Italian banks and business houses and more particularly by Italian monasteries and religious houses situated in various parts of the country, the inmates of which were in very close touch with the surrounding Arab population. This propaganda developed into more active help when discontent had been fanned into armed violence.

It is worth digressing here for a moment in order to draw attention to the very considerable influence exercised by the various organised Christian religious bodies in Palestine. There are the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, the Latin Catholics, the Syrian Catholics, the Armenians, the Abyssinians, the Copts, the Anglicans, and a number of other Protestant bodies. In addition to the lay communities of the adherents of these Churches, each Church has its monasteries, convents, hospitals, hospices, schools, etc. Another extremely important Christian organisation in Palestine is the Y.M.C.A., with its palatial building in Jerusalem

crowned with a tower more reminiscent of pagan fertility worship than of Christianity.

All these Christian organisations are to a greater or less extent anti-Jew and pro-Arab, and their influence has always been heavily on the side of concessions to the Arabs at the expense of the Jews. This attitude is most comprehensible on the part of the Greek Orthodox Church in view of the large number of Arabs who are of their communion. It is least comprehensible in the case of the Anglican Church as being the official Church of the Mandatory Power. As such it might have been expected to have adopted a less partisan line than it has in fact taken.

The Italian propaganda was a contributory but by no means decisive factor in stimulating Arab discontent into action. It became a more important, though again by no means decisive, factor later, during the actual course of the revolt. The Mufti established close relations with Italy during the course of the Abyssinian war and continued these relations at all events until his flight from Palestine in the summer of 1937.

Arab feeling in Palestine was sensibly stimulated during this period by events in neighbouring countries. Egyptian nationalism had been stirred to indignation by the complete lack of consideration for Egyptian *amour propre* displayed by Great Britain during the inevitable military and naval dispositions in Egypt during the period of Anglo-Italian tension. That such dispositions were necessary was not disputed; it was the failure to invite the co-operation of Egypt in making them that was resented. This resentment was further inflamed by a remarkably tactless speech by Sir Samuel Hoare in London some weeks before the abortive Hoare-Laval Plan resulted in his temporary eclipse. Egyptian statesmen feared that Great Britain was about to use the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean as an excuse for establishing a protectorate over Egypt. A united front of Egyptian parties was formed, which demanded the conclusion of an Anglo-Egyptian treaty in order fully to establish the complete independence of Egypt. Feeling rose sufficiently high to induce Great Britain to concede the demand. It was agreed to open negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty and these negotiations were actually started in March 1936. In Syria, nationalist leaders were becoming restive at the failure of the French to implement the promises of constitutional advance which had been made several years

previously. There was an outburst of rioting in January 1936, following which a general strike was declared. This strike lasted for fifty days, until 1st March, when the French Government gave way and expressed its willingness to negotiate a treaty which would give Syria the status of an Independent Power in alliance with France.

These examples of the success of violence or the threat of violence were not lost on the Arab nationalists of Palestine.

In October 1935 there occurred an incident which considerably increased the already high state of tension. While some barrels of cement were being unloaded from a lighter in Jaffa port, a barrel fell from the crane on to the quay and broke, disclosing the presence of arms and ammunition embedded in the cement. The whole consignment was seized and examined, and it was discovered that it contained a very considerable quantity of arms and ammunition consigned to a Jew of Tel Aviv. In spite of assiduous enquiries the identity of this gentleman was never discovered (or at all events it was never officially disclosed). The Arabs naturally assumed that this consignment represented merely one of several consignments of arms which the Jews had been smuggling into the country. Arab newspapers published furiously indignant articles, some even going so far as to suggest that this arms smuggling was being done with the connivance of the Administration. A one-day protest strike was declared and observed by Arabs all over the country.

The real truth behind this arms consignment has never been revealed, but it is probable that fairly considerable importations of small arms were made by the Revisionist organisation and possibly by others during this period. The Revisionists were under no illusions about the probability of an Arab rising in the near future and they required the arms partly for purposes of legitimate self-defence which, rightly or wrongly, they considered that the Administration would be incapable in all cases of providing. They also probably had the object of organising a small but efficient armed force, which in the stress of an Arab rising would be able to command considerable influence and authority in the National Home. The ideas of the Revisionists were not always clearly conceived, and they were a good deal tinged with that adolescent romanticism which has been such a powerful recruiting agent for fascist organisations in all countries. Although they almost

certainly did get hold of a fairly considerable store of small arms, mainly by illegal methods, they could not reasonably be held at that time to constitute a serious menace to anybody except themselves.

But there is little doubt that a large section of the Arab people, sedulously schooled by years of anti-Jewish propaganda, did believe something of the wild rumours being spread about Jewish plots to massacre the Arabs and so on. The general effect of the whole arms incident was to intensify Arab fear of and hatred for the Jews, and Arab suspicion and distrust of the Mandatory Power.

Shortly after this incident Arab imagination was fired by the exploits of a brigand, a political refugee from Syria named Sheikh Izzed Dine el Kassem, who had established himself with his band in the hills of Galilee. Brigandage has always been endemic in Palestine and many of the brigands have achieved a sort of Robin Hood notoriety. Sheikh Kassem was, however, different from the ordinary run of brigand chiefs. In the first place he enjoyed a wide reputation as a religious leader; in the second place he was an Arab nationalist who had taken to brigandage, not primarily for motives of robbery, but as a means of escape from the French authorities. To the nationalist Arabs of Palestine he appeared as a symbol and as an example. After he had been killed in an encounter with the police near Jenin, his funeral at Haifa was marked by scenes of considerable disorder.

One significant development which has already been referred to was the increasing identity of view between the various Arab nationalist groups, most of which had been organised into political parties. There were, for the moment, no moderates, Arab feeling was such that moderation would have been fatal to any chance of support and the Nashashibis were for the time being almost as fervent as the Husseinis in their denunciation of Jews and of the Mandatory Power.

On 25th November, the five Arab parties, immediately motivated by the arms incident at Jaffa port, made a formal demand to the High Commissioner under three main headings: I. The establishment of representative government in Palestine. II. The prohibition of land sales to the Jews. III. The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration.

It was pointed out at the time, with some justice, in a Jewish

newspaper that the second demand, which was in effect that the Arabs should be protected from themselves, was incompatible with the first demand for representative government. If they were fit for representative government they should not require government action to ensure that they were not led to commit acts prejudicial to their own interests.

The Administration once more decided to try conciliation. The second and third demands struck at the very root of the Mandate, and could not be conceded without abolishing the Mandate. With regard to the second demand the Administration expressed the intention of bringing in legislation to prohibit the sale of land unless the owner retained a sufficient amount of it to provide subsistence for himself and his family. This proposal was analogous to the "five feddan law" in Egypt, and while it was a very useful proposal from the point of view of social legislation, it did not really touch the fringe of the problem, which was the fact that the majority of land sold was sold by large absentee landlords over the heads of their tenants. However, it was evidence of a desire to meet the Arab view as far as was reasonably possible in the circumstances. With regard to Jewish immigration also the Administration gave a conciliatory reply to the Arab demands. It declared its readiness to make a new survey of the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine with the help of the newly-formed Office of Statistics, and to limit future immigration in accordance with the economic absorptive capacity so determined.

But it was with regard to the first demand for representative government that the Administration made the most far-reaching proposal. Sir Arthur Wauchope, who had succeeded Sir John Chancellor as High Commissioner in 1931, and whose term of office had been renewed for a further four years in 1935, had always attached great importance to the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine. The Municipal Corporations Ordinance, which had come into force at the beginning of 1934, had provided for the establishment of Municipal Councils in most of the larger towns of Palestine. These Councils were given certain powers of local self-government designed as the first step towards a share in the administration of the central government. The next step was to be a Legislative Council. This was not, of course, a new proposal, but Sir Arthur's proposed Council was somewhat more liberal than the original one in that it provided

for a much greater proportion of elected as opposed to nominated members. In December 1935 the High Commissioner submitted to the Arab and Jewish leaders his scheme. The proposed Council was to consist of 28 members, of whom only 5 were to be officials. There would be 11 unofficial nominated members and 12 elected members. Of the 23 unofficial members 12 would be Moslems, 7 Jews, 3 Christians, and 2 representatives of commercial interests. The president would be "some impartial person unconnected with Palestine". There were to be three "reserved points". I. The Mandate was not to be questioned. II. The High Commissioner was to have the power in emergency to legislate by ordinance. III. The Labour Schedule was to continue to be determined by the High Commissioner.

From the Arab point of view the proposal naturally left a good deal to be desired. True the Arabs were given a clear majority over the Jews in the Council (it was reasonable to suppose that the Christian members would be either Arab or pro-Arab, so that excluding the representatives of commercial interests the Arabs could count on at least fifty per cent. of the votes in any division), but the practical advantage of this was largely nullified by the fact that the question of immigration and the validity of the Mandate generally was outside the scope of the proposed Council's powers. It was also clear that the High Commissioner could when he chose ignore the Council altogether by legislating by ordinance.

In fact it was not really, from the Arab point of view, any improvement on the proposal which the Arabs had rejected ten years before, and it is probable that the Arabs would have similarly rejected it, had it not been for the vehement opposition of the Jews to the High Commissioner's proposal.

The Jews had in principle always been opposed to any form of representative government which did not give them equal representation with the Arabs irrespective of the size of the respective populations. They argued that a representative assembly in which they would be a minority would, as far as they were concerned, be no representation at all, and would submit them to Arab domination on all points on which the Council was allowed authority. They were also not sufficiently confident in the intentions of the Administration to feel sure that their major interests, which remained in the hands of the Administration, would be properly looked after in the face of vociferous

opposition from the Arab majority in the Council.

In view of these considerations the Jews opposed the proposal with such vehemence that the Arabs began to wonder whether there might not be some good in it after all. The very disadvantages stressed by the Jews gave merit to the scheme in the eyes of the Arabs. Although as it stood the Council would be powerless to affect the broad lines of government policy, a majority on it might well be turned to good effect as a means of pressing forward Arab claims. As a result of the Jewish attitude the Arabs, while not definitely accepting the proposal, at least maintained a non-committal attitude on the subject.

Sir Arthur Wauchope's proposal for a Legislative Council was not a very felicitous one. In that it gave the Jews a minority status on the Council it did not appear to be in accord with the spirit of the Mandate, although the calling in question of the Mandate by the Council was specifically prohibited. Relations between Arabs and Jews being what they were it was clear that the Arab majority would see to it that the decisions of the Council were solely dictated by Arab interests. But the limitations of the Council's powers would make it impossible for the Arabs to use the Council effectively for this purpose. A Council such as was proposed would only be able to fulfil a useful function provided that there was a certain common ground between Arabs and Jews, which common ground did not in fact exist. It appeared probable that instead of encouraging co-operation it would merely have been a means of generating further friction.

The Jews made it clear that they would have nothing to do with the proposal. The Arab united front of parties, which, for the time being, was the official representative of Arab opinion in Palestine, realised the strategic advantage of not rejecting out of hand a government proposal on which the High Commissioner was known to be personally very keen and which the Jews had already rejected.

A slightly more optimistic feeling began to prevail in Arab circles. Although the Administration's response to the three main demands put forward by the united front in November had not been wholly satisfactory from the Arab point of view, it did appear to indicate an awareness on the part of the Administration of the necessity of doing something to meet Arab demands. There was not much to be said for the proposed Legislative Council in itself,

but it was felt that conditional acceptance might be instrumental in securing various modifications favourable to the Arabs in the policy of the Administration.

This cautious optimism made the subsequent bitterness of disillusion all the more poignant. The Legislative Council proposal was debated in both Houses of Parliament in February and met with a surprising unanimity of opposition. Members of all parties seemed to feel, not only that the proposal was in dubious accord with the spirit of the Mandate, but that it was unlikely in any way to contribute to the solution of any of the various problems confronting the Palestine Administration. In face of this opposition there was obviously nothing to be done but to shelve the proposal indefinitely.

The effect of these debates on the Arabs was comparable to the effect of Mr. MacDonald's "Black Letter" to Dr. Weizmann four years previously. They appeared to the Arabs to furnish conclusive proof of the subservience of the British Government to vaguely defined "Jewish interests". For the second time in four years it appeared that Jewish influence had succeeded in diverting the British Government from its declared policy. In fact the modification of the 1930 White Paper by the 1931 "Black Letter" had neither appreciably benefited the Jews nor harmed the Arabs. In the same way the dropping of the Legislative Council proposal which the Arabs had only supported for reasons of policy because the Jews opposed it, was unlikely either to harm the Arabs or to benefit the Jews to any considerable extent. In any case a number of instances could be cited in which the Government had given at least as important concessions to the Arabs as a result of Arab agitation. This should have been sufficient to acquit the British Government of any pro-Jewish bias. As in 1931 the fault was not in what was done but in the manner of doing it. In 1931 the Government had too precipitantly accepted the recommendations of a Commission of Enquiry, and in 1936 it too precipitantly accepted the recommendations of the High Commissioner. In both cases the opposition to the proposed policy came not only or even mainly from the Jews, but from members of Parliament as a whole, including in both cases ex-Colonial Secretaries, who had a close acquaintance with the Palestine problem. In neither case would purely Jewish opposition have been sufficient to make the Government change its mind. If the Government, before

instead of after stating its policy, had given itself time for consideration and consultation, the appearance of capitulation to Jewish interests would have been avoided on both occasions. So far from learning a lesson from these two unfortunate blunders, the British Government was to repeat the blunder once more, less than two years later, by a similarly precipitate acceptance of partition as proposed by the Peel Commission followed speedily by the reversal of that acceptance. Such repeated precipitancy in the direction of Palestine policy, followed as it was on each occasion by complete or partial recantation, is evidence of the complete lack of constructive thinking about Palestine on the part of the Colonial Office.

With so many factors combining to push the Arabs to extreme courses, the outbreak of violence was now only a question of time. In view of the importance of the citrus trade, not only to many Arab nationalist leaders but also to a large number of Arab workers engaged in picking and handling citrus, there was a general desire to avoid having the shipping of citrus interrupted by disturbances. Consequently the month of March 1936 passed quietly.

By the end of March virtually the whole of the citrus crop had been shipped. The comparatively slack summer season descended on Jaffa port. Large gangs of Hauranis who had come south for the citrus picking and shipping, and who were always a prolific source of mischief, wandered idly about Jaffa, their employment ended. Banditry in the hill districts, always endemic in Palestine, showed sinister signs of being on the increase. There was evidence that a steady trickle of arms was coming into the country from Syria, Transjordan and Iraq.

On April 15th, two Jews were murdered by Arab bandits on the Tulkarm-Nablus highroad. On the following night two Arabs were murdered near Petah Tikvah. This was considered by the Arabs to have been a reprisal for the murders of the previous day. There were demonstrations in Tel Aviv on the 17th, during the funeral of the two murdered Jews, and several Arabs were attacked.

On the morning of Sunday the 19th the storm broke in Jaffa. Jews in the streets of Jaffa were attacked and violently assaulted. Nine Jews were done to death. The police force in Jaffa appeared to have been taken completely by surprise, but soon succeeded in getting the situation more or less under control. An attempt was made by an Arab mob to march on Tel Aviv, and the police had

to open fire to disperse them. An R.A.F. armoured car squadron arrived from Ramle soon after midday and by the middle of the afternoon order had been restored.

Curfew was imposed on Jaffa and Tel Aviv and the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council and Emergency Regulations were invoked for all Palestine. For it was recognised that the Jaffa outbreak was the signal for countrywide disturbances.

On April 20th, which was marked by further murders in Jaffa, a meeting of Arab leaders was held at Nablus and resolved on the declaration of a general strike throughout the country, to be maintained until such time as the Government had conceded in full the demands put forward by the United Front in November. The next day the leaders of the United Front accepted this decision and called a general strike of all Arabs in Palestine to take effect as from April 22nd. National Committees were set up in all the main towns of Palestine to organise and direct the strike, and in Jerusalem a Supreme National Committee, known as the Arab Higher Committee, was formed consisting of the leaders of all Arab parties. This Committee had Haj Amin Eff. al Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Moslem Council, as its president. Its secretary was Auni Bey Abdel Hadi, a prominent Arab lawyer and head of the Istiqlal party, which had hitherto refused to join the United Front. The treasurer was Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, also a member of the Istiqlal party and manager of the Arab Bank, an agricultural bank which had been formed a few years previously to accord loans to hard-pressed landowners in order to try to discourage them from selling their land to the Jews. The other members were Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, the Mufti's chief rival, whose long term of office as Mayor of Jerusalem had terminated about a year before as a result of a lawsuit which made it clear that his term of office had been marked by gross maladministration in which he had consistently pursued family and personal ends to the detriment of his official duties. Also on the Committee was Dr. Hussein Eff. al Khalidi, Ragheb Bey's successor as Mayor of Jerusalem, Jamal Bey al Husseini, a cousin of the Mufti and a prominent member of the Palestine Arab party, Abdel Latif Bey Salah, a Nablus notable, Yacoub Eff. al Chussein, member of a prominent landowning family in southern Palestine, Yacoub Eff. al Farraj, a representative of the Arab Orthodox Christians, and Alfred Eff. Rock, an

Arab Roman Catholic and a notable figure in Jaffa citrus and shipping circles.

Even from the beginning the Arab Higher Committee represented a somewhat uneasy alliance. A few weeks before the outbreak of the "disturbances" (the euphemistic term generally used in Palestine to describe the Arab revolt against British rule) the Arab leaders had proposed, and the Colonial Secretary had agreed to receive, an Arab delegation in London to put the Arab case before the Government. There had been a great deal of wrangling behind the scenes as to the constitution of this delegation. Ragheb Bey Nashashibi had refused to go if Dr. Khalidi went, and Dr. Khalidi refused to go if Abdel Latif al Salah or Yacoub Bey al Ghussein went. After the outbreak of the disturbances the idea of an official delegation was abandoned, and the differences between the various individuals who composed the Higher Committee appeared for the moment to have been patched up. During the course of the summer Jamal al Husseini went to England and, with Dr. Izzet al Tannous, a prominent Christian Arab Nationalist, formed a kind of unofficial delegation, which had a very busy time putting forward the Arab case to groups of M.P.s, representatives of the Press and so on.

The newly formed Higher Committee adopted a resolution dotting the i's and crossing the t's of the demands put forward by the United Front in the previous November. This resolution expressed a determination to continue the strike until the British Government "alters its present policy in a fundamental manner, the beginning of which is the stoppage of Jewish immigration". The resolution also re-stated the other two demands: (1) The prohibition of land sales by Arabs to Jews, and (2) the establishment of a National Government responsible to a representative Council. This was a clarification of the previous demand for representative government. The immediate demand, however, was for the cessation of Jewish immigration. If this was done the Higher Committee announced that the strike would be called off, and the Arabs would be prepared to discuss their other demands at a conference.

Meanwhile the general strike was being imposed by the various local Committees. In Jaffa there was little enthusiasm for the strike either among the merchants or the port labourers. The port owed much of its prosperity to the Jewish trade which it was

handling and the port workers knew that the result of a strike would be either to divert this trade permanently to Haifa or else to enable the Jews to get what they had been demanding for years, their own port in Tel Aviv. The regular port workers had taken little part in the disturbances on April 19th; the main responsibility for the bloodthirsty ruffianism displayed on that day lay on the Hauranis, who had no interest in those nationalist aspirations of which the "disturbances" were supposed to be the expression. The local Strike Committee, however, assisted by gangs of these Haurani roughs, succeeded by terrorist methods in imposing the strike on both the port and on the rest of Jaffa. Reprisals were threatened on the families of the port labourers unless they joined the strike; merchants who opened their shops were assaulted, their stocks destroyed, and their customers driven away.

The eyes of Arab Palestine were on Jaffa, and in these first few days there existed the possibility that the backbone of the strike might be broken by energetic and effective support by the Administration for those wavering elements in Jaffa who were prepared to defy the local Strike Committee if they could rely on protection from the Administration. But such protection was not forthcoming.

Critical days were allowed to pass without energetic action on the part of the Administration, and the initiative gradually passed into the hands of the strikers. A complete cessation of work was imposed on Jaffa, and, with this lead, other Arab towns followed suit. In all Arab towns the strike was complete. In the Arab part of Jerusalem the strike was also more or less complete. Only in Haifa, where Arabs and Jews worked together in the port and railway workshops, and where a more moderate Arab leadership prevailed than in most of the rest of Palestine, life went on more or less normally. The Arab railway workers did not join in the strike, and the railways continued to function normally, apart from the derailments and sabotage that afterwards took place.

Arab road transport owners and drivers, at the instigation of the Arab Car Owners and Drivers Committee, at the head of which was Hassan Sidky Bey Dejeni, an able and prominent Arab nationalist whose individualist opinions had kept him out of the Higher Committee, joined in the strike, and lorry, bus and taxi owners, most of whom were relying on their monthly earnings to pay the instalments on their vehicles, laid these vehicles up and

joined most of the rest of the Arab population in its enforced idleness.

Although the imposition of the strike had been moderately successful, it appeared at once from the continued working of Haifa port and the railways that the strike alone was not an effective weapon. It merely hindered, without crippling, the activity of the country.

On May 8th a conference of the provincial Strike Committees was held in Jerusalem and decided that, in addition to the strike, a movement for the non-payment of taxes should be instituted. As the direct Arab contribution to the revenue was very small, and as the strike would in most cases have meant inability to pay even this small share, the decision was little more than a gesture of defiance. At the same time efforts were made to induce Arab government officials, all of whom had stayed at their posts, to join the strike.

The strike was accompanied in various parts of the country by demonstrations of violence directed against Jewish lives and property. In the north of Palestine many Jewish trees were burnt and Jewish crops destroyed. The Jewish inhabitants of Jaffa, about 3,000 in number, had to be evacuated to Tel Aviv to protect them from Arab violence. A large number of Jewish and Arab houses were burnt down. Jewish settlements all over the country were sniped at and Jewish traffic stoned. There was, however, no serious violence on a large scale during the first few weeks of the strike, apart from the initial outbreak at Jaffa.

One of the most important effects of the Arab strike was the closing of Jaffa port with the consequence that all Jewish import and export traffic in southern Palestine had to be diverted to Haifa. As port facilities at Haifa and communications to the south were quite inadequate to cope with this, the Jews lost no time in asking the Administration to be allowed to establish their own port at Tel Aviv. This permission, which in the circumstances could hardly be withheld, was immediately granted. The Jews with characteristic energy got to work on the construction of a jetty and lighter basin at Tel Aviv; Customs facilities were installed and within a few weeks of the start of the strike the first vessel called at Tel Aviv to unload cargo, to the accompaniment of a noisy demonstration from the Jaffa boatmen who attempted to prevent the despatch of certain material by lighter from Jaffa to Tel Aviv. Behind the

fury of the boatmen was the bitter realisation that for them at least the strike had meant the loss of the best part of their livelihood, not merely for the duration of the strike, but for ever.

On May 5th the High Commissioner appealed to the Higher Committee to use its influence to call off the strike and to assist the Government in maintaining law and order. The Higher Committee refused to co-operate in any way unless Jewish immigration was suspended. The High Commissioner's reply to this was to approve, on May 18th, a Labour Schedule of 4,500 immigrants for the next six months. This represented a considerable reduction of the 1935 rate of immigration. This reduction was justified by economic circumstances and could not by any means be construed as a concession to the Arabs. Nor was it regarded by the Arabs as such.

On the same day as the publication of the Labour Schedule it was announced in the House of Commons that it had been decided to appoint a Royal Commission to investigate the causes of unrest between, and the alleged grievances of Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It was intimated that the Commission would not come to Palestine until the strike had been called off and order restored.

It is possible that the Government decided on the appointment of a Royal Commission, not because it lacked the necessary information required for a decision as to the policy to pursue, but because it was considered that the appointment of a Royal Commission might induce the Arabs to call off the strike and so end a situation with which the Administration seemed absolutely powerless to cope.

The announcement of the Royal Commission, however, following as it did the High Commissioner's appeal to the Higher Committee, probably convinced the latter body that further pressure would bring further and possibly more concrete concessions. Be that as it may, the announcement of the appointment of the Royal Commission was received almost with derision by the Arab leaders.

Meanwhile the situation was rapidly deteriorating. The strike showed no signs of weakening as the days passed. On the contrary, it became more and more all-embracing, such objectors as there were being terrorised into compliance.

The most serious development was not in the towns but in the hills. As has been mentioned, Palestine has never been entirely

free from banditry. The exploits and subsequent death of Sheikh al Kassem in the previous November had invested banditry with a semi-religious, semi-patriotic glamour, and many adventurous Arabs, particularly from the districts round Nablus and Tulkarm and from Galilee, tired of the enforced idleness and eternal lounging and coffee-drinking imposed on them by the strike, went off to join one or other of the bands which lurked in the near-by hills.

Apart from the inhabitants of Palestine these bands were composed of adventurers and soldiers of fortune from Trans-jordan, Syria and Iraq, who had drifted over to Palestine at the first hint of trouble in quest of fighting, adventure and loot.

At first these bands were simply independent groups of adventurers, unorganised, ill-armed, but filled with a fanatical patriotic zeal and fired with the desperate courage of men who have little to lose except their lives. Soon, however, a greater organisation and a greater purposefulness became apparent in their activities. They appeared to be more numerous, better drilled, better armed, better clothed. In fact a parallel, and what was eventually to prove a more formidable, active rebellion was taking shape in the hills, alongside the passive rebellion in the form of the general strike in the towns.

This rebel army, as it subsequently became, was estimated by the end of the strike to consist of about 5,000 men. It was divided into regulars or Mujehadin (warriors in the Holy War) and Fedaji (martyrs), the former operating against British troops, the latter consisting of irregular, so to speak part-time rebels, whose duties consisted of sabotage, sniping, etc. At first the operations of this rebel "army" were mainly confined to Galilee, in view of the proximity of the Syrian frontier, over which both arms and recruits were smuggled; but its activities soon spread farther south into Samaria, although it was not until the later stages of the rebellion that any considerable armed rebel forces appeared very much south of Nablus. In August a certain Fawzi ed Dine al Kawakji, who had been one of the leaders of the Syrian rebellion and subsequently military adviser at the Court of Ibn Saud, crossed into Palestine, and assumed command of the rebel forces, which had by then reached a fairly advanced stage of organisation.

The connection of the Arab Higher Committee with the armed rebellion in the hills is not quite clear. The Committee's official

attitude was that the rebellion in the hills was a spontaneous rising against British oppression and injustice. Although they refused to discourage it, they always maintained that they were not responsible for it. In point of fact they were in close touch with it, and there is every reason to believe that it was largely organised by the Mufti, assisted by agents both inside and outside Palestine, who had at their disposal a certain amount of money obtained both from Italian sources, and from the religious funds under the control of the Mufti. The arms possessed by the bands were mostly obsolete weapons, some of them relics of the 1914-18 war, some of them smuggled across the borders of neighbouring States. Similarly the ammunition consisted largely of spoil from old ammunition dumps supplemented by smuggling over the Syrian border.

It is fairly clear that at this time the Mufti was playing a double game. On the one hand, as President of the Higher Committee, he was helping to direct and organise the strike and civil disobedience movement; on the other hand, possibly in association with some of the members of the Higher Committee, and certainly with the assistance of various intermediaries both inside and outside Palestine, he was organising the armed rebellion in the hills. The Arab Higher Committee was composed of members of almost every Arab party; the rebellion was directed only by the Mufti and his satellites.

The Arab Higher Committee included two Christian members; the armed rebellion was being built up largely on a basis of religious fanaticism. The Mufti was quite prepared to combine with other parties for the purpose of the strike. But he knew that the effectiveness of the strike would only be limited, and even if it were to be successful beyond all expectations, he was not interested in an independent Arab Palestine in which he would share the reins of power with the Nashashibis and the various other interests represented on the Higher Committee. At the same time, for the Mufti, the strike had its uses. It served as a shield behind which the rebel bands could become organised. It created the conditions of disorder in which the rebel bands could best function. It turned the attention of the Arab people to the necessity of opposing not only the Jews, but the British as well.

Conditions of increasing insecurity resulted in the despatch of military reinforcements to Palestine. These reinforcements started

to arrive in the middle of May. Their duties were confined to purely defensive measures, such as patrolling the highways and railways, escorting convoys, guarding port and oil areas, etc. No attempt was made to assume the offensive against the armed bands in the hills; all that was done was to attempt to limit their depredations.

It is to be noted that at no time during the 1936 disturbances was martial law declared in Palestine, and it was not until September that the control of the armed forces in Palestine was taken out of the hands of the R.A.F. and put into the hands of the Army under Lieut.-General Dill. Up to the time of General Dill's arrival, nearly six months after the outbreak of the disturbances, there had not been an Army officer of general's rank in Palestine during the disturbances.

The Civil Administration showed a curious reluctance or inability to come to grips with the situation. From the beginning of the disturbances the Mufti and all the members of the Higher Committee were permitted to go quite freely about the country, making seditious and inflammatory speeches, encouraging the strike and generally inciting the Arab population to the performance of illegal acts. The Friday sermons at the mosques consisted too often of barely veiled incitements, not only to illegality but to violence. In consequence serious outbreaks were expected every Friday following such incitement, and in many cases were only averted by the vigilance of the police. Bands of hooligan youths roamed round the towns and villages beating up anybody who was not observing the strike, strewing nails in the streets to puncture the tyres of any strike-breaking vehicles, and generally making intolerable nuisances of themselves. Arson was rife as was the throwing and planting of bombs, mostly of a comparatively harmless "home-made" variety.

In the Southern District the difficulty of preserving law and order was greatly increased as the result of the refuge afforded for fugitives by the impenetrable labyrinth of narrow alleys and passages which constituted the old town of Jaffa. Surmounting the small hill overlooking the port and only approachable by steep, narrow, winding lanes, interrupted by flights of steps which made them inaccessible to wheeled traffic, the old town of Jaffa had successfully defied the march of progress. Shunned alike by tourists, police and tax-collectors, the old town had acquired a

sinister reputation for violence and lawlessness. Of Europeans only the Carthusian monks living in the monastery on the summit of the hill walked unmolested and unafraid through its devious paths.

The existence of this fugitives' sanctuary assumed a major importance during the disturbances. Apart from its use as a place of refuge, its position on a rocky eminence enabled it to dominate the rest of the town and the battered stone houses on the cliff face overlooking the modern town became veritable snipers' nests. Difficulties of access rendered it almost impossible to eliminate this menace with the small forces at the disposal of the Administration, and the military advised the driving of a wide road over the crest of the hill through the middle of the old town in order to enable it to be adequately policed and patrolled. So congested and so solidly built were the houses of the old town, that it was necessary to blow up a large number of houses in order to clear a way for the proposed road.

From the beginning of the outbreak of the disturbances the civil authority had displayed an extreme reluctance to take strong measures against the Arabs. This was partly due to the personal sympathy for the Arab case felt by many senior members of the Administration, partly to a fear of the consequences which might be provoked by strong action, and partly to a general disinclination for decisive action of any kind. In fairness to the Administration it must also be surmised that its members were actuated by humanitarian motives and by dislike at the prospect of the bloodshed, the pain, the sorrow and the misery which are concealed behind the euphemism of a strong hand. In addition to this there was not, in the early days of the disturbances, a sufficient number of troops in Palestine to cope with outbreaks of violence on a really large scale and there was a serious risk of widespread massacres if such violent outbreaks were to occur. The Administration was particularly apprehensive about the possibility of an outbreak of religious frenzy occasioned by an accidental, or even invented, example of desecration by troops unused to the habits of Moslem peoples. As a result of the Mufti's activities there was a dangerous undercurrent of religious fanaticism just below the surface, and some trivial incident, misconstrued either deliberately or genuinely as an act of sacrilege, might have provoked dangerous consequences with which the Administration was not equipped to deal.

With these considerations in mind the Administration was most reluctant to accept the advice of the military about the proposed demolitions. The military continued to insist. The question assumed an importance out of all proportion to the point at issue. Eventually the Administration, faced with the possibility of a complete rupture between themselves and their military advisers, gave way. A circular was issued, emanating from the Government Press but without any further clue as to its authorship, and distributed to the inhabitants of the old town, announcing that for sanitary and town-planning reasons it had been decided to demolish a number of houses in the old town of Jaffa. This sudden pretence of concern for the health of the inhabitants of the old town met with the contempt it deserved and the result of the absurd piece of evasion was to advertise the dissensions and weaknesses of the Administration and consequently to strengthen this determination of the Arabs to persevere in the strike.

The demolitions were carried out humanely. Ample time was given to the inhabitants to evacuate themselves and their property from the houses to be demolished and provision was made for the compensation of the property owners affected (but not for the tenants who had been turned out, many of whom had paid their rents in advance and who had no alternative accommodation provided for them). It would be absurd to deny that, as a result of the demolitions, a great deal of hardship was caused to a number of perfectly innocent people. For although the old town of Jaffa was undoubtedly a refuge for all kinds of fugitives from the law, the great majority of its inhabitants were perfectly law-abiding and respectable people. The hardship caused to these people by the demolitions was accentuated by the dilatoriness of the Administration in helping them to find alternative accommodation. Many of the families rendered homeless by the demolitions were forced through lack of other accommodation to live in insanitary hovels on the outskirts of Jaffa, built mainly from old petrol tins. So much for the Administration's concern for sanitation.

The legality of the demolitions was contested in the Palestine Courts by an Arab property owner in the old town of Jaffa. The case was tried in the High Court before the Chief Justice, Sir Michael Macdonnell, and the Senior Puisne Judge, Mr. Justice Manning. The Court dismissed the petitioner's application for an injunction against the Administration on the ground of the

Government Advocate's submission that the demolitions had been carried out under Article V of the Emergency Regulations which put them outside the jurisdiction of the Court. Both members of the Court, however, in separate judgments, commented in the strongest terms on the unfortunate way in which the affair had been handled by the Administration. The Chief Justice stated that the petitioner had performed a public service in drawing attention to it. The issue of the demolition notices without signature and the subsequent denial of responsibility by all the officials concerned was condemned in scathing terms. "The singularly disingenuous lack of moral courage displayed by the Administration" was remarked on by the Chief Justice, and the Senior Puisne Judge referred to the Administration in terms hardly less trenchant.

There is no doubt that these strictures were fully justified. The conduct of the Administration in the affair was deplorable. If it had really thought the demolitions unjustified it should have refused to allow the military to proceed with them. The Civil Administration and not the military was in charge; its members knew conditions in Palestine better than the military, and most important of all, they had to govern Palestine after order had been restored. On the other hand, after having instructed the military to proceed, they should openly have assumed full responsibility. Instead they hid behind the ludicrous pretences of sanitation and town planning, and then, acting like schoolboys caught out in a misdemeanour, refused to own up. It was thoroughly undignified and discreditable and calculated still further to diminish the respect commanded by the Administration.

Whether the strictures of the High Court were timely was another matter. It is no light thing, in the middle of serious civil disturbances, for the Judiciary to hold the Executive up to ridicule and contempt, however much the Executive may have deserved it. On the other hand the independence of the Judiciary from the Executive is rightly regarded as the most important of all safeguards against tyranny and injustice, and a demonstration of that independence might, in certain circumstances, have been valuable in a country where the impartiality of British justice was being freely impugned. In this particular case, however, the Court gave the impression, not so much of indignation at such conduct, as of personal satisfaction at being given the opportunity to castigate it.

It may be said that the conduct of the Administration in this affair gave rise to grave doubts as to its ability to deal with the increasingly serious situation. That the seriousness of the situation was increasing nobody could reasonably doubt. Violence was on the increase. Towards the end of May the Administration was compelled to arrest a number of agitators who were deported from their home towns and put under police supervision. In June a number of Arab leaders, including a member of the Higher Committee, Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, were arrested and placed in an internment camp at Sarafand. In an attempt to deal more drastically with the increasing violence the Emergency Regulations were amended in June to enable the death penalty to be passed in cases of discharging firearms and in certain cases of malicious damage.

At the end of June the senior Arab government officials, who had all remained at their posts, submitted a memorandum to the High Commissioner in which the Arab nationalist case was urged and the cessation of Jewish immigration demanded. A similar memorandum was submitted soon after by the junior Arab officials. In the middle of July yet another memorandum, this time compiled by the judges of the Moslem religious Courts, was presented to the Administration. These judges were not government officials, but were appointed by and responsible to the Supreme Moslem Council. The extremely immoderate tone of this memorandum was, therefore, not surprising.

The Amir Abdulla of Transjordan made an attempt to mediate. But the Arab Higher Committee adhered to its attitude that a cessation of Jewish immigration was a prior condition of calling off the strike. The Amir Abdulla's intervention therefore came to nothing. Nuri Said, the Foreign Minister of Iraq, made a similar attempt at mediation with similar results. Both these attempts were apparently made with the tacit consent of the Administration. While there was nothing to be said against an attempt at mediation by the Amir Abdulla in view of his special position as regards Palestine, it was a little surprising that the Foreign Minister of an independent State should have been allowed and even apparently encouraged to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestine. The impropriety of Nuri Said's intervention was all the more marked in view of the fact that the rebels were known to be receiving considerable assistance from Iraq both in arms and men. While

there was no suggestion that this assistance had come from the Iraq Government, it was clear that the Iraq Government was making no particular effort to prevent the arrival of such assistance.

Meanwhile the strike continued with no signs of weakening and the rebellion in the hills steadily increased in strength and organisation. It soon became apparent that this rebellion was a more serious menace than the strike. There were grounds for believing that by the end of the summer the strike would collapse of its own accord without the necessity for any decisive action on the part of the Administration. But the rebellion in the hills was a different matter.

The growing strength of the rebel army made it clear to the Colonial Office that the situation would have to be treated a good deal more seriously than it had been treated hitherto. At the beginning of September the Administration suggested to the Home Government that, in order to induce the Arabs to terminate the strike, Jewish immigration should be temporarily suspended. This suggestion, coming as it did at the end of a month in which rebel activity was becoming every day more marked, evidently convinced the British Government that drastic action was needed to bolster up the wavering resolution of the Administration. On September 7th a Statement of Policy was issued, in which the Government announced that all attempts at reasonable conciliation had failed, that its patience was now exhausted, that it intended to take all necessary measures to crush the rebellion by force of arms, and that it was making immediate arrangements to despatch a large force of troops to Palestine under the command of Lieut.-General Dill. In fact, arrangements were immediately put in hand to despatch a whole division of troops, and a number of Class A Reservists were called up in order to bring the battalions concerned up to active strength.

Up to this time the British troops in Palestine, assisted by the police, had only been able to adopt defensive tactics against the rebel forces in the hills. But it was now clear that the British meant to take the offensive with a view to rounding up the rebel forces. With the troops now arriving it was obvious that the defeat of the rebels would only be a matter of time.

The Higher Committee was quick to appreciate the change in the situation. Apart from the imminent prospect of decisive action against the rebels in the hills and possibly against the Arab

population as a whole, the approach of the citrus shipping season was beginning to affect the unanimity of the resolve to carry on the strike. The citrus season was due to start in November. When the strike started in April there were very few Arabs who envisaged the possibility of it continuing far into the following autumn. Most of them were thinking in terms of the fifty-day strike in Syria at the beginning of the year. The citrus season meant a great deal to a large number of Arabs in terms of income and employment. If the strike continued into November it was going to be impossible to pick, transport and ship the crop. The financial strain of the strike had been severe. Voluntary contributions to the various strike funds had become less and less numerous and less and less voluntary. There was much destitution. Failure to export the Arab orange crop would mean economic ruin to many hundreds of Arabs and something like starvation to many thousands of others. A decision by the Higher Committee to extend the strike into the citrus season would undoubtedly have strained Arab unanimity to breaking point. In Jaffa particularly, where the port workers were still lamenting the loss of the Jewish traffic, there was a growing feeling of discontent with the strike and an almost unanimous desire to see it terminated in good time before the citrus season. The Higher Committee, some of whose members were themselves vitally interested in citrus, began to cast about for some means by which they could call the strike off without appearing to have given way to the Administration.

The Mufti himself was not slow to realise the position. In the first place he realised that even his prestige was insufficient to enforce the continuance of the strike after the end of October. In the second place he realised that it was essential that the rebel army in its rudimentary state of organisation should not have to take the field against the now formidable British forces. He calculated (correctly) that there would be no disposition on the part of the Administration to insist on the rounding up of the rebel bands in the hills, provided that the strike were called off and conditions on the surface restored to normal. The Administration still seemed to hold the view that the rebellion in the hills was subsidiary to and a result of the strike. It did not appear to appreciate the truth, namely that the strike had been little more than a diversion staged by the Mufti to cover the formation of a rebel army and to create conditions favourable to its formation.

A significant feature of the disturbances had been the increasing interest displayed in the affairs of Palestine by the rulers of the independent and semi-independent states of Arabia. Easily the most important of these rulers was Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud had never shown signs of much enthusiasm for pan-Arabism and his relations with other Arab States had never been particularly cordial. Feisal and Abdulla, on the thrones of Iraq and Transjordan, could not be expected to be on terms of warm friendship with the man who had declared war on, conquered and deposed their father. Ibn Saud was not unwilling to appear in the role of chief protector and patron of the Palestine Arabs, but he was not prepared to involve himself in difficulties with Great Britain by taking their problems too seriously. The same could be said of Amir Abdulla, who had, however, rather a closer connection with Palestine in that he was naturally concerned with the future relations between Transjordan and a possible independent and predominantly Arab State in Palestine. King Ghazi of Iraq, Feisal's son, was not interested in politics, but his ministers were, from the point of view of Iraq's prestige, anxious to be represented in anything connected with Palestine in which the other Arab States were involved.

The first efforts at mediation by neighbouring Arab States had, as we have seen, been ineffective in view of the intransigence of the Higher Committee. But now circumstances had changed. Towards the end of September a delegation from the Higher Committee set off to confer with Ibn Saud, after having publicly announced their determination to continue with the strike.

Meanwhile, by the end of September, almost the whole of the British reinforcements had arrived in Palestine, and on September 29th Martial Law was proclaimed, but not put into force.

On September 29th Auni Bey Abdel Hadi went to Transjordan to interview the Amir Abdulla. It was clear what was happening. The Arab Higher Committee, realising the danger of calling off the strike on its own initiative without obtaining the cessation of Jewish immigration which it had so continually demanded, and, on the other hand, realising the impossibility of continuing the strike very much longer, was trying to throw on to the Arab Princes the responsibility of appealing for a cessation of the strike.

It is not clear how far these manœuvres were connived at and even encouraged by the Administration, but there is no doubt

that the Administration was quite prepared to co-operate in saving the face of the Higher Committee if this was going to help put an end to the strike.

As a result of these manoeuvres, Ibn Saud, King Ghazi and the Amir Abdulla despatched, on October 10th, identically worded appeals to the Arab Higher Committee, reading as follows:

“Through the President of the Arab Higher Committee to our sons the Arabs of Palestine:—

“We have been deeply pained by the present state of affairs in Palestine. For this reason we have agreed with our Brothers the King and the Emir to call upon you to resolve for peace in order to save further shedding of blood. In doing this, we rely on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain, who has declared that she will do justice. You must be confident that we will continue our efforts to assist you.”

Much relieved at being able to make a virtue out of what was rapidly becoming a necessity, the Higher Committee, on October 11th, published the appeals from the Arab rulers and graciously announced that they intended to respond to these appeals and call off the strike.

A certain amount of unofficial bargaining with the Administration had preceded this announcement, as a result of which the Administration undertook to allow the rebels in the hills to disperse without further punitive action being taken against them. The Administration prevailed on the somewhat sceptical military authorities to accept this point of view, and the day after the Higher Committee's announcement, the Military Command issued a statement to the effect that no further action would be taken against the rebel forces, even to the extent of disarming them, provided that these forces were disbanded. As a result of this the larger part of the rebel forces were disbanded, for the time being. The Palestinian members returned to their villages with their arms, which were hidden securely in caves and other caches until such time as they would once more be needed. The rebels from the neighbouring Arab states were allowed to cross the border with impunity, as were the leaders of the rebellion, including the notorious Fawzi al Kawakji, who was by that time a national hero in Arab Palestine.

The failure to disarm the rebels was much criticised at the time and the military authorities warned the Administration of the

danger of concluding what was in fact an armistice with the rebels. The Administration's attitude was motivated by several considerations. First, it was almost desperately anxious not to put anything in the way of a cessation of the strike and a return to conditions of normality. Secondly, it was anxious for the Royal Commission to start its enquiry as soon as possible, and wished the Arabs to adopt an accommodating spirit towards the enquiry. Thirdly, many, perhaps the majority, of the rebels were not of Palestinian nationality, and one of the leaders had occupied an important official post in Ibn Saud's administration. It appeared probable that punitive action against the rebels might prove a source of mutual embarrassment to the Administration and to the Arab rulers, to whom Great Britain was inclined to look as a moderating influence on Arab nationalism in Palestine. Lastly, any serious attempt to disarm the rebels would have been an extremely difficult, lengthy and costly operation under the conditions obtaining in Palestine, and would have left a legacy of bitterness which it was desirable, if possible, to avoid.

The decision not to proceed against the rebels, provided that the strike was brought to an end and provided that the rebel bands voluntarily dispersed, would have been a reasonable one if the rebellion could be regarded as part of and arising from the strike. But as it was the rebel movement was organised largely independently of the strike, and while the strike was just ending the rebellion proper was only just beginning. If the troops had been enabled to continue their operations against the rebels, there is no doubt that within a few months British authority would have been vindicated decisively and unmistakably. The military felt strongly that they should be allowed to complete the task which they had been set. It was always uppermost in General Dill's mind, however, that it was the Civil Administration that would have to govern the country after the troubles were over, and in the last resort he was always prepared to defer to the Civil Administration on that account.

So ended the first phase of the rebellion. It had lasted six months. During the course of it 16 police and 21 military had been killed and 102 police and 104 military wounded; 89 Jews had been killed and over 300 wounded. The Arab casualties were not easy to assess; the official figures give 195 killed and 804 wounded, but these are admittedly incomplete and it is probable that at

least 500 were killed.

It was remarkable and disquieting that not a single conviction was obtained and upheld in the Courts in respect of the numerous murders that had been committed during the disturbances. Not only this, but the number of convictions for other serious offences arising out of the disturbances amounted to only a very small proportion of the total number of offences committed. Most of the crimes committed during the disturbances were committed with impunity. In the case of those criminals who were apprehended and finally convicted and punished, the due processes of the law were so slow that the sentence, when ultimately it was pronounced, was pronounced so long after the crime that the connection of the punishment with the crime appeared to be too remote to have any deterrent or exemplary effect.

The Emergency Regulations that had been applied to Palestine during the disturbances made no provision for any change in the machinery of the law. This machinery, adequate enough in normal times, became hopelessly overburdened as a result of the numerous cases arising out of the disturbances. Not only that, but much of the work of preparing and presenting police prosecutions was in the hands of Arab officials who, not unnaturally, did not pursue with very much zeal the task of prosecuting their compatriots on charges connected with the disturbances. The result was that a very large number of almost certainly guilty people were discharged on account of faulty procedure by the prosecution, this faulty procedure being due partly to the conditions of strain under which the police were working, and partly to sabotage by Arab members of the police and Legal Department.

In troubled times justice, to be an effective deterrent, which is its main function in such times, must be both swift and certain. If the apprehension of the criminal is the exception rather than the rule, crime will flourish. Unless apprehension and punishment follow hard on the commission of crime the apparent immunity of the criminal will encourage crime. Although it is better for a guilty man to escape than for an innocent man to be punished, it is questionable whether it is not better for society for one innocent man in a hundred to suffer rather than for ninety-nine guilty men out of a hundred to escape.

It has generally, in times of stress, been found desirable to grant to summary Courts a greater freedom and a more extensive

power than would be granted to summary Courts in normal times. For in times of stress it is only respect for the law that stands between society and chaos, and in such times respect for the law can only be maintained by continued and repeated demonstrations of its striking power. The inability of the Palestinian Courts to provide such demonstrations was a contributory cause of the failure of the Administration to deal effectively with the disturbances.

Another significant feature of the first phase of the rebellion was the interest displayed in it by neighbouring Arab countries and indeed by the whole Moslem world. The Arabs of Palestine became objects of concern to Moslems all over the world in the same way as the Jews of Palestine were objects of concern to Jews all over the world. As a piece of publicity the strike was a success. The Palestine Arabs had no further cause for complaint that their case went unheard in the outside world.

The interest displayed in Palestine by the Arab states was not unwelcome to Great Britain. Relations between Great Britain and the Arab states were good and as far as Great Britain was concerned pan-Arabism was less menacing than Palestine Arab nationalism. It was hoped that the former would have an emollient effect on the latter. It is noticeable that Great Britain never questioned the rights of the Arab states to intervene in the affairs of Palestine; in fact British policy after the strike tended more and more to stress the integral connection between the Arabs of Palestine and the rest of Arabia. The wheel had turned full circle.

The fact that the strike had been sustained for as long a period as six months was certainly indicative of the depth and extent of nationalist feeling among the Arabs. It was also, and perhaps more significantly, indicative of the organisation and determination of the nationalist leadership. While it cannot be said that the majority of the Arab population was against the strike, there was by no means a universal enthusiasm for it. Its extent and duration was due partly to the use of organised terrorism, partly to incitement, and partly to the fact that it took place in the summer when economic activity among the Arabs of Palestine is at its ebb. The strike went on from the end of one citrus season to the beginning of the next; from the end of one cereal harvest to the time of the autumn sowing.

The economic loss occasioned to the Arabs by the strike was

very considerable. The town to suffer most severely was Jaffa. About two-thirds of the traffic passing through Jaffa port had been diverted either to Tel Aviv or to Haifa as a result of the strike. All Jewish businesses and shops had withdrawn from Jaffa to Tel Aviv. Many Arab agents in Jaffa had lost their connections with their principals and correspondents as a result of the strike. Many Arabs previously working with Jews found themselves without employment. When the shops opened their doors again their former customers were usually too impoverished to buy anything. Even at the height of the citrus season the activity at Jaffa port was a mere shadow of what it had been the previous year. The Jaffa-Tel Aviv road, once crowded with traffic passing to and from the two towns, was as deserted as a country lane. The rest of the country suffered much less severely, although the Arab transport industry was very hard hit by six months of idleness as were other non-agricultural occupations such as quarrying. The Arab population of Haifa suffered least of all. The port and most of the shops and business houses as well as the railway workshops and the large Jewish cement factory, which employed many Arab workers, remained open all through the strike and life in Haifa continued in a comparatively normal way.

The Jewish National Home, although it had developed to a large extent independently of Arab economy, nevertheless suffered considerably from the strike and the disturbances. In addition to the difficulties arising from the closing of Jaffa port and problems of transportation, considerable losses were occasioned to the Jews by the uprooting of trees, the burning of houses and crops, and damage to property generally. A considerable amount of effort had to be diverted from constructive work to the patrolling and defence of Jewish villages and settlements. Development work in outlying districts became almost impossible. All this, coming as it did hard upon the slump of the autumn of 1935, reacted severely on the progress of the National Home. Yet, all things considered, it was remarkable how little the Jewish population suffered from the strike compared with the Arabs. For the most part work went on fairly normally. New settlements were even founded during the course of the disturbances. A tremendous fillip was given to Jewish enthusiasm and energy by the construction of Tel Aviv port. A trust was formed for the construction and management of the port and the necessary

capital was subscribed by Jews all over the country. The work progressed rapidly and by the time the strike was over the jetty had been completed and the lighter basin was under construction. Jewish lightermen from Salonica, who at first found themselves in difficulties from the treacherous surf on that part of the coast, soon accustomed themselves to the conditions and set themselves gradually to acquire a skill comparable to that of the famous Jaffa boatmen in the neighbouring port.

It could not be said that the Administration, apart from the police force, which had acquitted itself competently under difficult conditions, had emerged from the disturbances with credit. The incident of the Jaffa demolitions was in itself sufficient to arouse grave doubts as to the calibre of its senior personnel. The practice of arresting the obscure, while negotiating with the prominent inciters to disorder, was not very commendable. Members of the Higher Committee were allowed an astonishing freedom in their campaign of incitement and intimidation. Arab newspapers were allowed to encourage illegality and to condone and even praise violence unchecked, save for an occasional suspension of publication for a period of days. Incitement from the mosques was admittedly a more difficult matter to handle, but the Supreme Moslem Council was allowed to continue the abuse of its functions without Government control of any kind long after it had become apparent that the organisation and the funds at its disposal were being used for illegal, seditious, and even murderous purposes.

Although the strike had come to an end nobody could call the result a victory for the forces of law and order. Certainly the strike had been brought to an end without the assurance of the stoppage of Jewish immigration which the Arabs had demanded as a condition of ending the strike. But as against this the prestige, position and influence of those responsible for the strike remained unimpaired. They had been allowed to bring the strike to an end without loss of face and were left perfectly free to pursue what activities they pleased. More important still, the rebel bands in the hills were left undefeated, fully armed, and free to continue and develop their connections with the neighbouring Arab countries, which were the chief source of their strength. The independent constitution of the Supreme Moslem Council was left unchanged and the Mufti and his colleagues were still able

to use this organisation as they wished for their own secular purposes. The strike had come to an end on terms which saved the faces of both the Administration and the Arab leaders. Law and order had not been restored. Disorder was merely in partial abeyance. But the restoration of law and order, even if it had been accomplished, would by itself have solved nothing. Nationalism is either an aspiration that has to be satisfied, or a disease that has to be cured. In either case mere suppression, while temporarily hiding, can only end by aggravating the trouble, unless suppression is accompanied by some constructive course of treatment.

The effect of the disturbances on the Administration's finances was striking. The extra expenditure directly arising from the disturbances was about £1,500,000. The loss of revenue due to the same cause was about £1,000,000, making a total of about £2,500,000, out of an accumulated surplus of about £6,000,000. The Administration's nest-egg thus had to be drawn upon to a considerable extent. In addition to this the Palestine Treasury was later debited with just over £1,000,000 as its contribution towards the cost of military reinforcements.

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CHAPTER XI

The Peel Commission

ON NOVEMBER 11th, exactly one month after the termination of the strike, the Royal Commission, to be known as the Peel Commission after its Chairman, arrived in Palestine to conduct its enquiry. The Commission consisted of the following members: Earl Peel, a well-known Conservative politician and formerly Secretary of State for India; Sir Horace Rumbold, a former member of the Diplomatic Service who had been British Ambassador in Berlin; Sir Laurie Hammond, an ex-Provincial Governor in India; Sir Maurice Carter, a former High Court Judge in Kenya; Sir Harold Morris, President of the Industrial Court in England; and Professor Coupland, an authority on Colonial history and administration. It was an unusually strong Commission, composed of eminent men with a wide variety of experience. The terms of reference of the Commission were as follows:—

“To ascertain the underlying causes of the disturbances which broke out in Palestine in the middle of April; to inquire into the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine is being implemented in relation to the obligations of the Mandatory Power towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to ascertain whether, upon a proper construction of the terms of the Mandate, either the Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances upon account of the way in which the Mandate has been, or is being implemented; and if the Commission is satisfied that any such grievances are well founded, to make recommendations for their removal and for the prevention of their recurrence.”

On November 5th, just before the arrival of the Royal Commission in Palestine, the Colonial Secretary announced in the House of Commons that the Government had decided that there was no cause for a suspension of Jewish immigration during the course of the Commission's investigations. The only reason why the question had been raised at all was that such action had been taken during the course of the Hope Simpson investigation six years previously. The Higher Committee took umbrage at what

they regarded as a departure from the precedent that had been set. They announced, on November 6th, that they would boycott the Commission and called upon the Arabs of Palestine to follow suit.

Soon after the publication of this announcement signs of dissension in the Arab Higher Committee began to become apparent. The old rivalry between Husseini and Nashashibi was once more beginning to make itself felt, and there were rumours that Ragheb Bey Nashashibi was insisting on giving evidence before the Commission. On December the 24th a significant article appeared in "Falastin", the organ of the Nashashibi party, criticising the Higher Committee's boycott of the Commission. At the beginning of January Sidky Bey Dajani, President of the Arab Car Owners and Drivers Committee, who, although not a member of the Higher Committee, was an influential member of the nationalist movement, announced his intention of giving evidence. In general there was a growing feeling among influential Arabs that the Higher Committee was making a mistake in refusing to take the opportunity given it for making a reasonable presentation of the Arab case. This feeling spread to members of the Higher Committee itself, and as a result the Higher Committee once more allowed itself to be persuaded by the entreaties of the Arab rulers. Letters were received from the Arab rulers assuring the Higher Committee of the moral support of these rulers and recommending the Palestine Arabs to trust to the sense of justice of the Great British nation, etc. As a result the Higher Committee announced that it had "found it necessary to accept" the request of the Arab rulers to give evidence before the Royal Commission. The announcement added a request that no evidence should be given to the Royal Commission except with the authority of the Higher Committee.

There is no doubt that the Higher Committee had made a mistake in arriving at its original decision to boycott the Royal Commission. The result of this mistake was to advertise the latent dissensions in the Arab camp, and the clumsy device by which the mistake was repaired did not enhance the dignity of the Arab cause.

The months following the termination of the strike saw a gradual change in the constitution of Arab nationalism. The magnates and landowners, who were identified largely with the Nashashibi party, became apprehensive of the growing power of

the Mufti and his clique and of the Mufti's growing indifference to their wishes. They were disturbed by his obvious preparations for a resumption of armed rebellion; they were not prepared to go to the length of a long-drawn-out war against the British in a struggle for the achievement of an independent Arab state in which the Mufti would be the supreme master. They were not enthusiastic about the religious fanaticism which was an important part of the Mufti's armoury, and they were fearful of the possible consequences that might arise from the encouragement and organisation of the armed bands. They felt that the Mufti was pursuing a course which was bound to diminish their own importance and which might endanger their very existence.

Consequently the rift which had first appeared in the Higher Committee over the question of giving evidence before the Royal Commission grew wider and wider. As the Mufti became more and more radical, the Nashashibis and the magnates became more and more conservative. They were not in an enviable position. They had gone too far in their opposition to be able to effect an immediate rapprochement with the Administration, which was not at all inclined to trust them. In any case their dislike and fear of the radical wing of the nationalist movement headed by the Mufti was not yet sufficient to make them want to retrace their steps and retract all that they had said and thought and done in the previous few years. On the other hand they had not the least desire to go forward in the direction in which Palestine Arab nationalism seemed inexorably to be heading. They found themselves in the unfortunate position of moderates all the world over. The Administration regarded them as rebels, and the rebels were beginning to regard them as incipient traitors. Moreover they were not fortified by those abstract considerations of justice and right thinking which are so often the support of moderates. They were actuated, as they always had been, solely by considerations of their own personal welfare. There is some consolation about having got into difficulties in trying to help a noble cause; to get into difficulties as a result of trying to help oneself is ridiculous and humiliating.

The final rift between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis was not to come until some months later. Meanwhile there were other elements among the Arabs who had been consistently opposed to the Higher Committee and the whole extreme nationalist move-

ment. It was to these elements that the Mufti and his subordinates began applying those methods of political terrorism and assassination that were later to be applied to the Nashashibis as well.

These methods had, of course, been freely practised during the strike. They did not cease with the strike. Hardly a week passed unmarred by a political assassination. Sometimes the victim was a rich and important man; more often he was a mukhtar of some obscure village who had tried to carry out his duties, or else some villager suspected of being an informer or of helping the police. Old blood feuds became mixed up with new and half-understood political differences.

Arab life in every village and town in Palestine is honeycombed with personal feuds, often of an extremely bitter kind, and political views are usually decided by local and personal sympathies and antipathies. Because a man had the reputation of being anti-nationalist it was a mistake to assume that he was a convinced supporter of British rule. The more likely explanation was that his greatest personal rival was an enthusiastic rebel. Political differences were used as a means of pursuing personal rivalries; they sharpened, but did not create these rivalries.

Feeling among the Arabs of Palestine as a whole was undergoing a certain modification. In the towns the economic difficulties occasioned by the strike had caused feelings of bitterness and disillusion. The losses had been great, the gains insignificant, or rather, for the moment, non-existent. It remained to be seen whether the Report of the Peel Commission would result in concessions to the Arabs sufficient to provide a justification for the strike. There was a general feeling in the towns that the duration and comparative unanimity of the strike had served its purpose in that it had drawn the attention not only of the Mandatory Power but of the whole world to the grievances of the Arabs, and that the constant application of peaceful pressure combined with propaganda etc. would bring about a gradual amelioration of those grievances. The possibility of a further strike was regarded with distaste as was the prospect of renewed violence and disturbances.

In the hill towns of Nablus, Jenin and Tulkarm a much more extreme nationalism prevailed, and it was from these towns and from the Arab towns and villages of Galilee that the Mufti drew his main support.

The villages, generally speaking, had not been severely affected by the strike and consequently harboured no feelings of disillusion or frustration after it. Feelings of religious fanaticism, which had grown up alongside nationalist agitation during the previous ten years, were strong and easily roused, and if there was unlikely to be much active support among the more responsible elements in the villages for armed rebellion against the British, there was unlikely to be much active opposition to it.

The character of the second phase of the rebellion was thus already taking shape. Organised active resistance was to take the place of more or less spontaneous passive resistance. The rebellion was no longer to be directed by a Committee representative of all shades of Arab nationalist opinion, and consisting largely of landowners and magnates, but by a radical leader, who cared nothing for the welfare of the landowners and magnates, but who was only concerned for his own personal aggrandisement. It was to be no longer primarily a rising against oppression, but a struggle for power. The old spontaneous character of the rebel bands was disappearing, and recruits to the rebel army were being attracted, not by the hope of glory and adventure, but by the promise of good pay. The rebel army was being formed not as a national Palestine Arab army but as the personal instrument of one man, to whom fellow Arabs who differed from him were as much enemies as Jewish immigrants or British soldiers. The Arab rebellion was emerging from the Long Parliament into the Cromwellian phase. During April 1937 rumours appeared in the London Press and elsewhere that the Peel Commission was going to propose a scheme of partition as a solution to the difficulties besetting Palestine. These rumours became more and more persistent and several weeks before the Report of the Commission was finally published in July it was generally accepted that the Report would recommend partition. The reaction of the Arab and Jewish Press to these rumours was as might have been expected; both expressed the greatest hostility to any solution involving partition of the country. There was also a lot of talk about the possibilities of "cantonisation" on the Swiss model. In May it became clear that some radical modification of the Mandate was envisaged, when it was announced that the British Government had asked the League of Nations to arrange for a special meeting of the Permanent Mandates Commission in

August to discuss Palestine.

On May 10th a new Labour Schedule was announced by the High Commissioner covering the four months April-July. It was usual to announce the Labour Schedules covering six-monthly periods, but it was presumably felt by the Administration that it would be unwise to undertake commitments beyond July, when it was expected that the Peel Report would be published. The Labour Schedule was fixed at 770 for the four months compared with 1,800 for the previous six months. Bitter protests were recorded by the Jewish Agency and other Jewish public bodies at the smallness of the Schedule. Making all due allowance for economic circumstances it is clear that the Administration was already moving away from the economic absorptive capacity criterion in the regulation of immigration, although economic absorptive capacity was still officially the guiding principle.

During the months of May and June speculation and excitement about the contents of the Peel Report mounted steadily. Although it was generally accepted that partition would be recommended, the proposed boundaries and the details generally of the scheme still remained uncertain. At the same time violence seemed, if anything, to be on the decrease; in fact the Colonial Secretary was able to tell the House of Commons in the middle of June that the situation in Palestine was "continually improving".

By the end of June the tension between the Husseini and Nashashibi factions on the Higher Committee reached breaking point. On June 30th Fakhri Bey Nashashibi, a nephew of Ragheb Bey, and an active member of the National Defence Party, was shot at and seriously wounded in Jaffa. Fakhri Bey had, during the previous few weeks, been occupied in organising opposition in Jaffa to the Husseini faction, both among the local notables and among the port workers. Four days after this murderous attack, which was generally believed to be the work of the Mufti's agents, Ragheb Nashashibi and Yacoub Farraj, the two members of the National Defence Party on the Higher Committee, resigned from the Higher Committee. A statement explaining the reasons for their resignation complained that of recent weeks the Mufti had been acting more and more independently of the rest of the members of the Higher Committee. The statement went on to mention a recent visit paid by the Mufti to Syria, where important discussions had apparently taken place and decisions been arrived

at without reference to the rest of the Higher Committee. The statement concluded by deploring recent acts of terrorism and hinted that the Mufti was responsible for them. From then on it was open war between the Husseinis and the Nashashibis.

On July 7th the long-awaited Report of the Royal Commission was published, together with an official announcement that the British Government had accepted "in principle" its conclusions and recommendations.

As was generally expected, the Report recommended partition. From a reading of the Report it was apparent that the decision to recommend partition had only been arrived at after the compilation of the main body of the Report had indicated to the Commissioners the inadequacy of any less drastic recommendations. The Report did not attempt to go into details regarding the problems and difficulties involved in partition; it merely indicated the broad lines on which it considered that a scheme for partition should be worked out. It recommended that the Mandate as it stood should be brought to an end, and that the country should be divided into three parts: an Arab state comprising those parts of Palestine predominantly Arab; a Jewish state comprising those parts predominantly Jewish; and certain areas comprising those parts of the country which were of particular religious significance or strategic importance, which were to remain under the Mandate.

The proposed Mandated area was to consist of (a) the towns of Jerusalem and Bethlehem; (b) a narrow corridor between Jerusalem and Jaffa running along the line of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road and including Lydda airport; (c) the port of Haifa; and (d) the mixed towns of Tiberias, Safad, Nazareth and Acre. The proposed Jewish state was to consist of the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon, most of Galilee, and an enclave south of the Jaffa-Jerusalem corridor so as to include the Jewish settlements lying between Ramle and Gaza. The proposed Arab state was to consist of the rest of Palestine, including Jaffa, which was to have access to the rest of the Arab state through the Jaffa-Jerusalem corridor.

The Report envisaged the granting of independent status almost immediately to the Arab and Jewish states, in accordance with the precedent already set in Iraq, and subject, as in the case of Iraq, to British control over foreign policy and defence.

The Commissioners had obviously been impressed by the depth and the apparent irreconcilability of the differences between the Arabs and Jews. It must be borne in mind that the evidence that they had heard was mostly, though not exclusively, either from leaders of both races, imbued with strong feelings of nationalism, or else from Government officials who were obviously at pains to stress the difficulty of the situation in order to exculpate themselves from not having dealt with it more adequately. In these circumstances it is natural that the difficulties inherent in a continuation of the Mandate as it stood appeared to them to be almost overwhelming.

The difficulties inherent in partition were by no means inconsiderable. First and foremost there was the problem of the minorities that would exist in each of the proposed states. The Report proposed solving this by transfers of population and exchanges of land. There were the administrative problems of communications, customs etc., that were bound to arise between the two states. There was the problem of finance. In view of the fact that the proposed Jewish state would include most of the best land in Palestine, and in view of the superior technical ability of its inhabitants, the Report proposed that the finances of the proposed Arab state should be assisted by an annual subvention from the proposed Jewish state. The geographical boundaries suggested in the Report raised a whole series of problems. The two Jewish enterprises of Palestine Potash and the Jordan Valley Power station were in predominantly Arab areas and were allocated to the Arab state. The Jewish-owned Huleh Concession could not be joined to the Jewish state without also including predominantly Arab districts in Galilee. The proposed status and future of the "mixed" towns were not very satisfactory. The proposed boundaries were strategically unsatisfactory from the Jewish point of view. The problems posed by partition were, in miniature, the same problems as had faced the Versailles treaty makers all over Central and Eastern Europe eighteen years previously. They were formidable, but not insoluble problems, which would, sooner or later, have to be squarely faced.

It was presumably envisaged that the Arab state would sooner or later become united with Transjordan under the rule of the Amir Abdulla or his descendants. From the British point of view this would have been eminently satisfactory as it would have

provided a counter-balance to the middle-class urban nationalism of Palestine which had been the cause of all the trouble. It was probably this consideration that gave the scheme of partition such merit at first sight in the eyes of the British Government. It was only later that the difficulties began gradually to be appreciated.

The Report received a hostile reception from both Arabs and Jews. But with a difference. Jewish criticism concentrated mainly on the details, Arab criticism on the principle of the partition scheme. Jewish opinion was not as a whole averse to the idea of a Jewish state comprising a part only of Palestine, provided that reasonable room were allowed for expansion, and provided that the boundaries were suitable both from an economic and a defence point of view. The Jews felt, however, that the proposed boundaries did not provide sufficiently for future expansion, and in particular were insistent on the Negev being included in the Jewish state in any plan of partition. The Negev is that area lying between Beersheba and Akaba, and is nearly as large as the whole of the rest of Palestine. It is at present almost entirely desert. The Jews were confident of their ability to develop it and felt strongly that, in the event of partition, such undeveloped territory should be allocated to the Jewish State. In the light both of the letter and the spirit of the Mandate it is very difficult to contest this view. Jewish opinion also felt that it would be absolutely essential to have a frontier with the Arab State which would not put the Jewish State at a disadvantage from the point of view of defence. It was claimed that if this condition were to be fulfilled it was necessary for the predominantly Arab populated foot-hills of Samaria and Judaea to be included in the Jewish State.

Arab opinion on the other hand was almost uniformly hostile to the whole idea of partition, although it was significant that Mr. Philby, a British Moslem and adviser to Ibn Saud, counselled the Arabs to accept it. (It was later explained that this represented the personal opinion of Mr. Philby and was not an indication of the attitude of Ibn Saud.) The Arab Higher Committee met and despatched telegrams to the Arab rulers asking for their advice and soliciting their assistance in their struggle against the dismemberment of their country. Non-committal replies were received from all the rulers, except the Prime Minister of Iraq who, in a strongly worded telegram, stated that he viewed with disfavour the principle of partition and would do his utmost to

remove such an "aberration". Public opinion in Iraq was more actively interested in Palestine than was the case in the other Arab states, largely owing to the propaganda that had been carried on by Kawakji, who had taken up residence in Iraq after the collapse of the strike in the previous autumn. The somewhat unguarded reply of the Prime Minister to the Higher Committee's telegram may well have been dictated by public opinion, but he had certainly gone farther than the British Government was prepared to tolerate in his criticism of the declared policy of that Government. Appropriate representations were soon made to ensure that support of the Palestine Arab cause should not be given to an extent likely to prove embarrassing to the British Government.

The British Press was on the whole favourable to the partition proposal. *The Times*, which had been consistently critical of the Palestine Administration, stated its opinion that "new Methods and new Leadership" would be required in Jerusalem if the future of Palestine was to be satisfactory under partition or any other solution.

The British Government had already asked for a meeting of the Permanent Mandates Committee to discuss Palestine, and, immediately on the publication of the Peel Report, suggested that the Committee should examine the proposal for partition contained in the Report, and submit its recommendations to the League Council. (The consent of the League Council was necessary before the implementation of partition, involving as it did a radical modification of the Mandate which had been entrusted to Great Britain.)

Meanwhile the Administration had been digesting the voluminous Peel Report. (It consisted of nearly 400 pages.) After due consideration, it reported to the Colonial Office that the main obstacle to the acceptance of partition by the Arabs was the inclusion of Galilee, where the majority of the population was Arab, in the Jewish state. The Jews, on the other hand, attached great importance to Galilee, partly because of the opportunity it afforded for future expansion, partly because of the Huleh Concession in the north of Galilee, and partly because the inclusion of Galilee would give the Jewish state a common frontier with the Lebanon, which the Zionists, at that time, regarded as a possible area for future Jewish immigration. It was

clearly going to be impossible to formulate a scheme of partition that was in the least likely to be acceptable to both parties.

When the Report was debated before the House of Commons a fortnight after its publication, a good deal of the first enthusiasm with which it had been greeted was beginning to subside. There was a feeling that the Government had been somewhat precipitate in accepting the principle of partition, and there was general relief in the House when Mr. Churchill proposed an amendment to the effect that the League of Nations should be given an opportunity of examining the Commission's recommendations before Parliament was finally asked to commit itself to them. This amendment was carried, and the partition proposal thus remained in suspense. The general impression given was that the Government itself was beginning to have some doubts about the wisdom of partition.

The day after the debate an interesting letter appeared in *The Times* over the signature of Sir Henry McMahon, who wrote that, in view of the controversies which had taken place at various times over the interpretation to be placed on his correspondence with King Hussein, he felt it to be his duty to place publicly on record the fact that in his "pledge" to Hussein he had intended Hussein to understand that Palestine was definitely excluded from the scope of the "pledge". In view of the deliberately vague wording of the "pledge" the explanation was perhaps a little disingenuous. This letter was naturally a source of encouragement to the Jews and a corresponding source of discouragement to the Arabs, but the McMahon correspondence had ceased by that time to be very much more than a debating point, in view of the fact that the real motive behind the wording was quite sufficiently obvious. The letter did, however, provoke a rejoinder from the Amir Abdulla, who published correspondence in refutation of Sir Henry's assertion. But nobody was very much interested one way or the other.

At the end of July the Permanent Mandates Committee met to discuss the Peel Report. A month later it presented its report to the League Council. While approving of partition in principle, the report suggested that other alternative solutions such as "cantonisation" might be considered. The report was also critical of the policy that had been pursued by the Administration and commented that "certain fluctuations in the policy of the Manda-

tory Power tended to encourage the Arabs in the belief that violence could stop Jewish immigration”.

During August the Zionist Congress had assembled at Zurich. The main item on the agenda was of course the question of partition. Dr. Weizmann proposed to the Congress that partition should be accepted in principle, and that he should be empowered by the Congress to discuss the question of partition with the British Government. There was a strong minority in favour of rejecting partition out of hand, but Weizmann won his motion by a comfortable margin.

In September the League Council met. The Permanent Mandates Committee's approval in principle of partition had been submitted to the Council and all that was required was a formal ratification by the Council of that approval. But Mr. Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, instead of asking for approval to proceed with partition, requested approval for sending a Commission to Palestine to work out the details of partition. Although the despatch of such a Commission was a natural step, the form of Mr. Eden's request strengthened the rumours already current to the effect that the British Government was not so enthusiastic about Partition as it had been two months previously and that it wished to play for time before making up its mind finally on the subject.

Meanwhile the Mufti's rebel and terrorist organisations continued to develop. Instead of small scattered rebel bands there were now two well-defined rebel armies, one operating in the hills of Galilee and the other in Samaria. These armies consisted partly of regular full-time troops and partly of "territorials" who assisted the regulars in such time as they could spare from more legitimate occupations. In addition to these two armies there was a smaller band operating near Hebron and various other small bands operating in different parts of the country. No less important than his military organisation was the Mufti's terrorist organisation. This was divided into two parts, one for the south with its headquarters in Jerusalem, and the other for the north with its headquarters in Damascus. Since the Mufti's visit to Syria in May, which had been the immediate reason for the break with the Nashashibis, the Damascus connections of the rebellion had become very much closer; the importance of Damascus increased in this respect as the Jerusalem authorities became more vigilant.

The retreat of the British Government from its originally expressed intention of implementing without delay the recommendations of the Peel Commission had the worst possible effect on the Arab nationalists, who not unnaturally ascribed the Government's hesitation to the fear of violent Arab reaction. The British Government appeared to be in no hurry to appoint the Commission which the Foreign Secretary had referred to at the League Council, and the impression deepened that the Government had the intention of shelving the Peel Report and of letting matters in Palestine go on as they were, in the hope that the situation would clear up without the necessity for the introduction of any radical changes.

In September a National Arab Congress was convened at Bludan in Syria to discuss Palestine. It was attended by delegates both from the Husseini and Nashashibi parties and also by unofficial delegates from all the neighbouring Arab countries. The Mufti himself did not attend, but he was elected honorary president of the Congress in his absence. The Congress spent several days in the delightful surroundings of Bludan, but beyond passing a resolution condemning partition did not accomplish very much. The Mufti was said to have been most dissatisfied with the lack of results obtained in the form of concrete help from the neighbouring Arab states.

On September 27th Mr. L. Y. Andrews, District Commissioner of Galilee, and his police escort, were murdered at Nazareth. This murder of a senior British official seems to have awakened the Administration to a belated realisation of the fate which many humbler servants of the Administration had suffered at the hands of the terrorists.

Five days after the murder of Mr. Andrews the Administration took drastic action. The Higher Committee and the various local Arab National Committees were declared to be illegal organisations. Warrants were issued for the arrest and deportation of those members of the Higher Committee in Palestine at the time, under an addition to the Emergency Regulations which was especially enacted for the purpose. The Mufti was deprived of his position as President of the Supreme Moslem Council and Chairman of the General Wakf Committee. Four members of the Higher Committee were arrested and deported to the Seychelles. Two others, who were outside Palestine at the time, were forbidden to return.

Two others escaped to Syria. One of these was the Mufti. There is no doubt that his escape was deliberately connived at by the Administration. At the same time hundreds of smaller fry consisting mainly of Wakf officials, municipal councillors and employees, minor government officials and so on, had been arrested and placed in internment camps in the days immediately following the murder. (It may be mentioned that at this time the High Commissioner was on leave and the government was being administered by Mr. Battershill, the Chief Secretary. Responsibility, however, for the failure to arrest the Mufti cannot be laid to Mr. Battershill as he had only recently been appointed to Palestine and had only just arrived in the country.

The deliberate failure to arrest the Mufti deprived this round-up of the effect that it might otherwise have had. It had for some time been apparent that the control of the revolt had almost completely passed out of the hands of the Higher Committee as a whole and had passed into those of the Mufti and his agents, who were working to a great extent independently of the Higher Committee. It is doubtful whether the Higher Committee, at the time when action was taken against it, had very much power to influence the course of events, although its members certainly acquiesced in them with varying degrees of willingness.

There is little doubt that the arrests were ill-considered and mistaken. If they had been made at all they should have been made at least a year before. Since that time events had moved far beyond the point at which the arrests were desirable and necessary in the interests of law and order. The policy of the Mufti was beginning to cause a reaction among those elements that had previously been considered extremist, and in course of time most of the members of the Higher Committee, if left alone, would probably, out of resentment to the Mufti, have veered over towards moderation in the same way as the Nashashibis were doing. In little more than a year the British Government was compelled to recall the exiles from the Seychelles in order to negotiate with them on equal terms as the only alternative to negotiating with the Mufti and the rebel leaders.

On the night before the arrests the Mufti had slipped out of the Haram esh Sherif, where he had been in hiding since an attempt to arrest him two months before, made his way to the coast just south of Jaffa and from there took ship to Syria. There

he established himself in a village in the Lebanon, where he lived under the somewhat lax surveillance of the French authorities. It soon became apparent that he was able to direct the rebellion at least as conveniently from his eyrie in the Lebanon mountains as he had been able to from Jerusalem. Although he was not allowed freedom of physical movement, the French authorities put no obstacles in the way of his receiving what visitors he chose, and allowed him to send and receive correspondence freely. This tolerant attitude on the part of the French authorities was later to become so marked as to amount to an extreme lack of co-operation. Relations between the British authorities in Palestine and the French authorities in Syria and the Lebanon had never been particularly cordial. This lack of cordiality was accentuated in 1925 during the Druze rebellion, when the French became firmly convinced that the rebels were receiving help from Transjordan with the connivance of the Mandatory Administration. This suspicion was no doubt due to the fact that the Druzes had undoubtedly been receiving help from the Arabs of Transjordan, combined with the fact that the Druzes had, since the middle of the nineteenth century, always been regarded as protégés of the British Government. The tradition of mutual mistrust and suspicion had persisted, with the result that the French authorities did not feel at all inclined to risk trouble in Syria by taking action against the Mufti in order to oblige the British Administration in Palestine.

After the dismissal of the Mufti from his official posts, the Supreme Moslem Council and the Wakf funds were put under the direct control of the Administration. Investigation proved what had long been apparent, namely that the Mufti had for some time been diverting a substantial part of the funds at his disposal from their legitimate objects to the purposes of the rebellion. The maintenance of mosques and the general interests of the Moslem religion in Palestine had been grossly neglected. It was strange that the Administration did not see fit to give more publicity than it did to this aspect of the Mufti's activities. No organised attempt was made in this or in any other direction to try to discredit the Mufti and his actions among the people of Palestine.

Any expectations that the action taken by the Administration would put an end to organised violence in Palestine were soon

falsified. Less than a fortnight after the deportations the half-finished airport at Lydda was set on fire, two British constables were murdered, and there was an outbreak of violence in Jerusalem which necessitated the imposition of a curfew. The hesitation of the British Government in implementing the partition recommendations of the Peel Commission was attributed by the Arabs to the strength of the Arab reaction against partition; this apparent hesitancy acted as a direct incitement to further violence. The only recommendation of the Commission that was immediately carried into effect was one which was designed further to encourage the Arabs and to depress the Jews. The Commission had recommended, pending the completion of the partition arrangements, that immigration should be restricted over and above the limits set by economic absorptive capacity. Assuming that the Government really intended to implement the partition recommendation such a limitation would have been perfectly reasonable, provided that other and more positive recommendations had been carried out as well. In view, however, of the fact that the Government was obviously wavering over partition, the Ordinance, published on October 10th, giving the High Commissioner "unfettered discretion" to limit immigration as he chose, appeared to be one more attempt to conciliate the Arab nationalists. Under the provisions of this new Ordinance the number of immigrants to be allowed into Palestine between September 1937 and March 1938 was fixed at 8,000. On being questioned in the House about this Ordinance the Colonial Secretary stressed that it was temporary.

During the autumn of 1937 it was announced that the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, would be retiring in the following spring. The last years of his appointment had been bitter ones for Sir Arthur. He had first come to Palestine in 1931. In 1935, at the end of his first term of office, he could look back on four years of comparative freedom from large scale violence, and of greatly increased material prosperity for both Arab and Jew. The rejection of his Legislative Council proposal by Parliament in the early part of 1936 was a source of great disappointment to him. The disturbances followed. Sir Arthur's experiences in the first German war had given him a deep and sincere loathing for bloodshed and violence, which does much to explain the extremes of conciliation to which he was prepared to go in dealing

with the rebellion. The failure of this conciliatory policy made a change in the High Commissionership desirable and, indeed, inevitable. Sir Arthur, who was a bachelor, gave to Palestine much enthusiasm, much devotion and much love. Palestine gave him a very poor return.

CHAPTER XII

The Rebellion—Second Phase

FROM the month of November 1937 onwards the Arab rebellion steadily grew in strength and intensity. Control of it had passed completely out of the hands of the urban middle-class nationalists into the hands of the Mufti and the leaders of the rebel bands. By October 1938 a large part of Palestine was physically under the control of the rebels, and almost the entire Arab population was either giving active support to, or was dominated by fear of, the rebels. From October 1938 onwards, large military reinforcements, combined with the increasing war weariness felt by the Arab population as a whole, began to act as a check on the hitherto unimpeded progress of the rebellion. Villagers began to resist rebel demands for men, food and money. Such of the Mufti's political opponents as still remained alive and in Palestine began to form an organised opposition to the continuance of the rebellion. A series of engagements with the military severely mauled the rebel army. Several rebel leaders were either killed in battle or else captured and executed. Roads were driven through many of the hill districts, thus facilitating the pursuit and rounding up of the rebel bands. The increasing risks attendant on membership of the rebel bands almost put a stop to new recruiting, and resulted in numerous desertions. The rebellion was thrown on to the defensive. At the same time it was obvious that the liquidation of the rebellion by military methods was going to be a long and costly business, involving the prosecution of war against a large section of the Arab population. Complete defeat of the rebellion was undoubtedly possible, but only at the expense of keeping a large garrison in Palestine and by ruling the Arab population by martial law for an indefinite period. It is not to be wondered at that some settlement by negotiation appeared preferable to the British authorities, both military and civil. By the beginning of 1939 control of the country was being steadily regained, and in general the situation appeared to have improved sufficiently to make it possible to open negotiations with the Arabs without creating the impression of a too complete surrender to violence.

Such in brief was the history of the next year, which we are

now about to describe.

On November 10th, 1937, new Emergency Regulations were published providing for the establishment of Military Courts for the trial of offences of violence in connection with the rebellion. These Courts were empowered to pass the death penalty on all those found guilty of discharging or carrying firearms, and lesser penalties for arson, possession of arms, sabotage and so on. The Courts were to be Summary Courts and there was to be no appeal from their decisions, except that convictions and sentences had to be confirmed by the General Officer Commanding, who had the power to reverse convictions or amend sentences. (In the case of the death penalty the final word still remained with the High Commissioner, who, as His Majesty's Representative, was still vested with the power of Pardon.) The inadequacy of the ordinary legal channels for trying offences connected with the rebellion has already been commented on, and the number of deeds of violence that were being committed with impunity was a sufficient justification for the introduction of more summary methods. Although provision for the establishment of Martial Law had been in existence for over a year, this was the first instance in which the Military had assumed any power that enabled it to act independently of the Administration.

It cannot be said that the deterrent effect of the new Regulations became immediately apparent. One reaction to the establishment of the Military Courts was perhaps unexpected. Presumably in imitation of the Military Courts, the rebel leaders set up summary "Courts" of their own, before which informers and "traitors" were tried, and, if convicted, punished or reprimanded. The first case of this kind to become known was at the beginning of December, when two Arab policemen were kidnapped near Haifa, tried by a rebel "Court" and subsequently "executed".

On December 4th the name of Sir Arthur Wauchope's successor was announced. There had been much speculation on the subject in both the British and the Palestine Press, and several well-known names had been canvassed. The actual choice was, on the whole, a surprise. Sir Harold MacMichael, who had been Governor of Tanganyika for the previous two years, had spent the greater part of his life in the Sudan Political Service. He had for many years been Civil Secretary at Khartoum, where he had won a reputation for efficient and successful administration. He was an Arabic

scholar and a well-known authority on things Arab. Varying opinions were expressed as to the suitability of the appointment, but it was generally felt to be a good thing that a professional administrator had been appointed rather than a retired General or a politician tired of the back-benches. It was clear that such a man was, at all events, unlikely to be a cipher in the hands of his senior officials, and that he would bring a fresh and distinguished mind to the grievous problems which beset Palestine.

Meanwhile violence continued with little sign of abatement. On December 22nd the Colonial Secretary announced in the House of Commons, with extraordinarily little justification, that the situation had "somewhat improved". Since Mr. Eden's announcement at Geneva nothing further had been heard about the Commission that was coming out to Palestine to consider the details of partition, and the Government did not seem over-eager in the matter. Early in the New Year the Colonial Secretary sent a Despatch to the High Commissioner which was published in London as a White Paper. In the Despatch the Colonial Secretary announced for the first time that the Government was not committed to partition. The Despatch went on to give the terms of reference of the proposed Commission which was to "advise in due course as to the provisional boundaries of the Arab and Jewish areas and of the new Mandatory area, with full liberty to suggest modifications, and also to undertake the financial and other enquiries. . . ." It was explained that the function of the new body was to act as a "technical" Commission, that is to say, its functions would be confined to ascertaining facts and to considering in detail the practical possibilities of partition. Unofficially it was generally considered that the Commission's real function was to provide the Government with convincing reasons for abandoning its hasty acceptance of the principle of partition. It had by this time become apparent that the Arabs would actively resist any scheme of partition which the Government would be likely to offer, and would certainly resist any scheme of partition based on the boundaries suggested by the Peel Commission. The Technical Commission was to the British Government what the Arab rulers had been to the Higher Committee.

During the last weeks of 1937 the military had been making continual efforts to establish contact with the armed bands in

Galilee and Samaria. On Christmas Day the biggest clash since the beginning of the rebellion took place near Tiberias. 1,500 British troops were engaged in the battle which lasted three days. Eleven rebels and two British were killed. A further big encounter took place at the end of January in the Carmel Hills near Jenin. As a result of these and other encounters it became clear that no decisive results could be expected until, first, the country had been opened up by the construction of roads through the hills, making possible rapid communication and free movement of mechanised and motorised troops, and, secondly, until troop reinforcements had been received. In the engagements which had taken place all that had been accomplished was a temporary dispersal of the rebel forces, which were later able to reassemble more or less intact, since the casualties which the military were able to inflict were insignificant. In view of the lack of communications it was impossible for the troops to follow up the rebels after dispersing them. The other alternative, which was to surround them and close in on them, was not practicable owing to insufficient numbers. The result was that for the moment the military were restricted to defensive measures, which consisted of keeping the rebels confined as far as possible to the hills, and of preventing them from making raids on Jewish settlements and on road and rail communications.

One of the most serious aspects of the rebellion was the growing insecurity of both road and rail communications. Travellers on main roads were continually sniped at, railway track was torn up and trains derailed. This was partly the work of organised rebel bands swooping down from the hills, and partly that of irregular part-time auxiliaries in the villages.

Terrorist activity continued in the towns and villages. Previously the terrorists and the rebel bands had worked to a large extent independently of each other, but signs of liaison between them were now apparent, and individual terrorists seemed to be working in conjunction with, or under the control of, the leaders of one or other of the rebel bands, who were themselves working under the direction of the Mufti.

These rebel leaders each had their headquarters in the hills, their "Staff Officers", the "Military Courts" and their intelligence services. Under their instructions, informers and other "traitors" were sought out and killed, sometimes by members of the band,

sometimes by hired assassins. Sometimes offenders were abducted and tried before a rebel "Court"; sometimes they were simply waylaid and shot without trial. The bands were in close touch with the Mufti and with his agents in Damascus, which was now becoming the headquarters of the rebellion.

The money required to finance the rebellion must have been fairly considerable. By the end of 1938 the rebels were estimated to have about 15,000 men under arms as compared with about 5,000 in 1936. A certain proportion of these were volunteers or auxiliaries, but there were a considerable number of regulars in receipt of wages. Large sums were paid to terrorists for murders, acts of sabotage, etc. There was the cost of arms and ammunition smuggled over the border from Syria. The Mufti's income from the Wakf funds had been cut off. Other sources of income had to be looked for. These were, in the main, as follows:—(a) "Voluntary contributions" from wealthy Arabs in Palestine; (b) money stolen in "hold-ups" and in forced levies on Arab villages; (c) money collected by the Mufti and his agents from neighbouring Arab countries; (d) funds received from German and Italian sources.

The amount of money received from Italian sources was considerable. It was received partly via Syria and partly through the agency of Italian religious and business houses in Palestine. The most important German help received was in the form of active assistance from the Aryan German residents of Palestine, but funds and arms were also received through the German propaganda centre in Damascus, which had been started a few months previously by the German Youth leader, Baldur von Schirach.

In the spring of 1938 it might still have been possible to confine the rebellion to the hills. By that time large parts of the hill districts were under the control of the rebel bands. It might have been possible to isolate these districts from the rest of the country and so prevent the rebellion from spreading beyond these districts. This could have been done in the following way:—The British Administration could have been evacuated from those areas which it had ceased effectively to administer. These areas could then have been treated as enemy territory, and communications between them and the rest of Palestine cut off by the blocking of roads and tracks, and by constant land and air patrolling. Identity cards could have been issued to all the inhabitants outside the

rebel areas, so that anyone found without an identity card could be presumed to be an inhabitant of the rebel areas. The adoption of this or some similar plan would have made it possible to prevent the spread of the rebellion from the central hill districts to the country as a whole, and would have enabled the military in due course to turn their attention to the methodical subjugation of the rebel areas.

While the second part of this programme was for the moment impracticable owing to lack of sufficient troops, there was no reason why some effort should not have been made to isolate the rebel areas from the rest of the country. Nothing, however, was done until the military took over in October 1938, and then it was too late. The issue of identity cards and a general restriction of movement from one place to another in those districts where it was still possible to enforce the authority of the Administration would, if it had been carried out in the spring of 1938, probably have prevented the rebellion from developing the unmanageable proportions it was soon to assume. By attempting to hold on too long to those areas of which it had already virtually lost control, the Administration was to end by losing effective control of most of the country. By not attempting to segregate those areas which were, to all intents and purposes, in rebel hands, the Administration allowed the infection of rebellion to spread to the whole country. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Administration did not really appreciate what it was up against. It was still thinking in terms of the "disturbances". It did not seem to realise to what extent it had lost control of certain areas. There was no evidence of any concerted plan to deal with the rebellion as a whole. Everything was left to unco-ordinated individual judgments, each dealing with some particular local problem, without reference to the one general problem confronting the Administration. The various manifestations of organised terrorism and revolt were treated as if they were a series of independent incidents unconnected with one another except in the most general way.

The failure of the Administration to hand over the rebellion to the military while the rebellion was still of manageable proportions made it impossible decisively to defeat the rebellion without declaring war on the whole Arab population.

During the spring the military were busily occupied in driving

roads through the hill areas west of Jenin, which had always been a great centre of rebel activity. Another important work that was put in hand at the same time was the construction of a barbed-wire fence along the Syrian frontier in an attempt to cut off the rebel communications with Syria. The construction of this fence had been recommended by Sir Charles Tegart, during the course of his advisory visit to Palestine, and was known as "Tegart's Wall". It was an application of the principle of isolation which, as had been suggested, might have been adopted in a different form on a wider scale.

In view of deteriorating conditions of security it was announced that further troop reinforcements were coming to Palestine during the latter half of the summer. As soon as sufficient troops had arrived it was intended to put the rebel areas under military rule. This would have been an excellent thing if the rebel areas had meanwhile been isolated as far as possible from the rest of the country. By the time the reinforcements had arrived the whole country was a rebel area.

At the end of February the British Government had announced the names of three members of the Partition Commission. They were Sir John Woodhead, late of the Indian Civil Service, Sir Alison Russell, of the Colonial Legal Service, and Mr. A. P. Waterfield, of the British Treasury. The fourth member, Mr. Thomas Reid, late of the Ceylon Civil Service, was announced later. It was intimated that the Commission would arrive in Palestine soon after Easter, over nine months after the publication of the Peel Report. The Commission actually arrived in Palestine on April 27th. The interest displayed in it was inconsiderable and the progress of the rebellion continued unchecked throughout its stay.

On March 3rd Sir Harold MacMichael, the new High Commissioner, arrived and took over. Sir Arthur Wauchope had left a few days previously.

On March 15th the Immigration Schedule for the next six months was announced, together with the information that it was intended to continue the limitation of immigration at the "unfettered discretion" of the High Commissioner for another year. The quota fixed for the period March-September inclusive was 2,000 capitalist immigrants and 1,000 labourers. This was a considerable reduction of the figure of 8,000 which had been

fixed for the previous six months. It is interesting to note the tremendous reduction in immigration brought about by the "disturbances". In 1935 there had been a total legal immigration of just under 62,000. In 1938 the volume of legal immigration was about 10,000. This in itself must have appeared to many Arabs to be a justification for the rebellion. It was a tragic fact that during these years the need for increased Jewish immigration, owing to the ever-growing fury of the persecutions in Germany, was becoming daily more pressing. The part played by Palestine in the relief of German Jewry became more and more insignificant in proportion as the need of German Jewry increased.

It must be emphasised that by this time the rebellion was no longer what it had, to some extent, originally been—a spontaneous uprising against Jewish immigration and the Mandate. It had now become a struggle for power on the part of one man, who was using mercenary soldiers and hired assassins to attain his end. Arabs who were not prepared to acquiesce in his designs were as much his enemies and as much exposed to his violence as were the Jews or the British. In fact, during 1938 the Mufti was concentrating mainly on the extermination of his Arab political opponents, and on the terrorisation of the Arab population generally, as a preliminary to the more effective prosecution of the rebellion against the British. The personal ambitions of the Mufti were becoming more and more extravagant; he was even credited with the ambition of reviving the Caliphate in his own person. This *folie de grandeur* was to prove his downfall. He overestimated the extent of the concessions that the British Government would be prepared to make for the sake of peace against an enemy who was almost ridiculously puny when pitted against the might of the British Empire. The Mufti lost his sense of proportion. Years of dealing with the Palestine Administration had got him into the habit of underrating his opponents. He began to think that he was another Hitler who could bring the British Government to another Munich.

The first part of his programme—the establishment of complete ascendancy over the Arab population—was successful for a time. It was successful for as long as British methods were such as to lead the Arab opponents of the Mufti to fear him more than they respected the British. This state of affairs may be said to have lasted until the military took over in October 1938.

In June 1938 occurred an incident that was almost as indicative as the Jaffa demolition of what Sir Michael McDonnell had stigmatised as the Administration's lack of moral courage. On June 5th two young Jews were sentenced to death by a Military Court for firing at an Arab bus on the Acre-Safad high-road. A third young Jew, tried for the same offence, was found insane and ordered to be detained accordingly. The bus had not been hit and nobody had been injured. The three youths were all of good character and absolute novices in the use of firearms. The attempted crime was bungled in a pathetic fashion. The motive for this amateurish attempt was clear. For the last several weeks the Jewish community of Safad had been continually subjected to Arab attacks. Many Jews had been killed, including a young girl who had been stabbed to death in a ditch while fleeing from a car which had been fired upon by Arab bandits. The effect of such incidents on youths of impressionable age and living in the midst of them may be imagined. It may be asserted absolutely definitely that if the youths had been Arabs they would, in similar circumstances (if they had been sentenced to death at all), have been reprieved. There had been a similar case before a Military Court not long previously, when some Gaza fishermen had been sentenced to death and subsequently reprieved in view of their clean record and the fact that no death or injury had resulted from their action. Hardened ruffians convicted of murder during the 1936 disturbances had been reprieved. But the Administration was out for Jewish blood. It wanted to hang a Jew in order to give the Arabs a demonstration of its impartiality. Major-General Haining, the G.O.C. (who had only just taken over from General Wavell), acting on the urgently expressed wishes of the Administration, which made great play of the effect a reprieve would have on Arab opinion, confirmed the sentences. Subsequently, on its being proved that one of the prisoners was under eighteen, his sentence was commuted. The remaining youth of the three, Shlomo Ben Yussef, was to die. Great efforts were made by Jews all over the world to obtain a reprieve. Representations were also made by the Polish Government, whose subject Ben Yussef was. Although the G.O.C. had confirmed the sentence, the final word remained with the High Commissioner, in whom was vested His Majesty's Prerogative of Pardon. But the Palestine Administration, whose past weaknesses

had brought about the conditions which provided the provocation for the crime, decided to make this the occasion for a show of firmness. Ben Yussef was executed on the morning of June 29th. It was one of the worst miscarriages of justice in the history of British Colonial administration. It had not even the excuse of expediency. As a means of demonstrating that the Administration was not pro-Jew, it was superfluous. As an attempt to impress Arab opinion it was undesirable. As a demonstration of firmness it was ludicrous; all it demonstrated was the Administration's extraordinary and discreditable desire to curry favour with the Arabs. The effect of the execution was to increase the Arabs' contempt, the Jews' dislike, and many other people's disgust for the Administration. Members of the Administration were immoderately pleased about it, and seemed to think that they had scored a notable triumph.

While this discreditable episode was taking place in Palestine, the Permanent Mandates Committee was sitting at Geneva and discussing Palestine. The Colonial Office had taken the unusual course of sending Sir John Shuckburgh, an Under-Secretary, to assist the Palestine Government representative in giving evidence. The Committee showed itself very critical of the arbitrary restrictions on immigration, and was assured that these restrictions were only temporary. It also showed considerable interest in the activities of the Mufti in the Lebanon, and Sir John Shuckburgh had to head off some awkward questions to Mr. Kirkbride, the Palestine Government representative, about the attitude of the French authorities. Sir John did not enlighten the Committee about partition beyond stating that the Woodhead Commission was carrying out its investigations.

On June 14th the Colonial Secretary found himself able to tell the House of Commons that the military had succeeded in breaking up the larger rebel bands. A week later, also in the House of Commons, he implied that the Woodhead Commission had got the power to pronounce partition impracticable. As has been stated, a good many people believed that it was precisely for this purpose that it had been sent to Palestine.

In spite of the Colonial Secretary's optimism, rebel activity in Palestine showed little sign of abatement. On June 23rd the first of a series of determined attacks on Jewish settlements in the Emek was made, and three Jewish youths were kidnapped. Their

dead bodies were found some weeks later. At about the same time the first of a series of clashes between Arabs and Jews on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv border, which had been quiet for about 18 months, indicated that rebel influence was beginning to spread from the hill districts into the larger towns.

On July 6th there was a bomb explosion in the vegetable market in Haifa; 23 people were killed and 79 wounded, most of them Arabs. On the same day a bomb was thrown into a Tel Aviv street from a train passing a level crossing, and there was further trouble on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv border. On the following day there was a bomb explosion in Jerusalem in which two Arabs were killed. On July 10th a bomb was thrown at a Jewish bus in Haifa.

It was plain that the situation had taken a turn for the worse. The Administration, as usual, seemed to be shocked and surprised at this, although it was beginning to reap the natural consequences of failure to confine the rebellion to the hill districts where it had originated. It was announced that two battalions of infantry and an armoured car regiment were immediately leaving Egypt for Palestine.

On July 15th there was a bomb explosion in the Old City of Jerusalem, in which 10 Arabs were killed and 29 wounded. Although it had by no means been proved that all these bomb outrages had been the work of Jews, it was clear that a section of the Jewish population was beginning to depart from that restraint which it had almost invariably shown during the previous two years. The effect of these Jewish reprisals, or what were considered to be Jewish reprisals, was, of course, greatly to intensify Arab violence and generally to contribute to a rapid worsening of the situation. Several more Jewish settlements were attacked. There was a bomb explosion on the sea front at Tel Aviv. On July 25th there was another bomb explosion in the vegetable market at Haifa, in which 39 Arabs were killed and over 60 injured.

During the second half of July the military, aided by recent reinforcements, and having completed a number of roads through the Carmel Hills, initiated a drive against the rebel bands in the triangle bounded by the hill towns of Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm. It was the first genuinely offensive action which the military had been able to take against the rebels, and it had the effect of very

greatly improving security conditions in that part of Palestine.

At the beginning of August the Woodhead Commission, which many people had forgotten about in the turmoil of the month of July, left Palestine for England. On the day of its departure *The Times*, which had for some time been extremely critical of the Palestine Administration, published a remarkably frank article from its Jerusalem correspondent. This article referred to the growth of anti-British feeling among the Jews in Palestine as a result of a widespread feeling that no real effort was being made to check the progress of the rebellion. It referred to the impression which existed that the Administration was in sympathy with the rebels, and said that it was "impossible to suppress a rebellion when its (the Administration's) policy was indefinite and believed to be non-existent". The article went on to refer to the help which the rebels were receiving outside Palestine ("not wholly from Oriental countries", as *The Times* delicately put it), and suggested that the Mufti's activities in the Lebanon should be more actively taken up with France.

On August 17th the Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm Macdonald (he had lately taken over this office from Mr. Ormsby Gore on the latter's succession to the Peerage), who had possibly been disturbed by the charges of inadequacy which had been persistently levelled at the Administration in the Press, in the House of Commons, and elsewhere, by people of every shade of political opinion from Mr. McGovern to the leader writer of *The Times*, paid a flying week-end visit to Jerusalem to confer with the High Commissioner.

Immediately after the Colonial Secretary's visit, the High Commissioner broadcast an appeal to the people of Palestine to cease from the violence "which has disgraced this country", and hinted that if persuasion were ineffective, stronger measures would follow. This appeal had no noticeable effect. On August 24th Mr. Moffatt, the Assistant District Commissioner at Jenin, was murdered. On August 26th there was a bomb explosion in the vegetable market at Jaffa in which 24 Arabs were killed and 39 wounded. As in the case of the Haifa bomb explosions, the origin of the bomb was obscure. It was at first assumed that it was the work of Jews. There was some reason for suspecting that the bomb had been made in a local German workshop, which was also suspected of harbouring Arab terrorists among its

workers. It was well known that there were Germans in the neighbouring German colonies who were acting as technical advisers to the rebels, and the improvements that were noticeable in the various infernal machines used by the rebels were due to German advice. Whatever the origin of the bomb, its explosion was followed by a rapid intensification of rebel infiltration into and rebel control of the town of Jaffa, until, by the middle of September, it could not be said that the Administration maintained anything but the mere semblance of authority in the town. Terrorist murders occurred daily, and with impunity, in the main streets; police stations were raided and pillaged; prominent residents who were known to be antipathetic to the Mufti, including most of the members of the Municipal Council, were forced to flee the country as the only alternative to assassination; arson was rife; people were held up at the pistol-point, robbed, and sometimes abducted, in broad daylight; shops and stores were rifled of their contents; the inhabitants were forbidden by the rebels to use electric light (supplied by a Jewish concessional Company) and terrorised into observing the prohibition; street lamps were smashed and telephone wires cut; rebel notices and "communiqués" were posted on the walls; lock-ups were raided and prisoners removed. The whole population became utterly cowed and terrified, to the extent of passively observing the kidnapping and even the murder of friends without making the slightest protest. The situation was infinitely more out of control than it was even in the hill towns, where there were detachments of troops who managed to maintain some semblance of order within the limits of the towns themselves.

A similar situation obtained in the Old City of Jerusalem, where the Haram esh Sherif was used as a rebel fortress which dominated the city within the walls. The new city outside the walls remained relatively under control, although shooting and bomb throwing were of almost daily occurrence. The Administration could also be said to have abdicated its functions in Gaza, Beersheba and Hebron, with the result that by the middle of September a large part of southern Palestine has passed under rebel control.

As the situation in southern Palestine was deteriorating, the situation in Samaria and Galilee was improving as a result of the activity of the now reinforced military. The rebel bands were being forced on to the defensive and were no longer able to avoid

large-scale actions in which they frequently sustained heavy casualties.

The need of the rebels for money became more and more desperate. Arab business houses and individuals were terrorised into contributing to the rebel funds; thefts of money from Arab villages became more and more frequent. But there was as yet no sign of organised Arab opposition to the intolerable demands and exactions of the rebels. It may be said at once that this was due to the deep-rooted distrust of the competence and good faith of the Administration, which was felt by people of every race and every shade of opinion in Palestine. It was not considered impossible that the Administration would make a complete surrender to the rebels, and in view of this there was a general reluctance to show active opposition to people with whom the Administration might at any moment decide to compound, leaving would-be law-abiding citizens to their fate.

It was apparent that something would have to be done to check the steady drift of the country towards chaos. On October 5th the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons referred to the serious deterioration in the Palestine situation. On the same day the High Commissioner left Palestine for London by air to confer with the Colonial Office. A week later it was announced that four more battalions of troops were being sent to Palestine, bringing the total strength of troops in the country to seventeen battalions. *The Times* published another outspoken article on Palestine, in which it mentioned, *inter alia*, that the Arab police could no longer be relied on, and that in southern Palestine the rebels were in command of many of the larger towns and some of the main roads. The article went on to say that "the situation had been largely created by delays which encouraged the extremists and deprived the moderate elements of their confidence in the power of the Government to protect them."

While the High Commissioner was in London, a frequent visitor to the Colonial Office was Taufiq al Suaidi, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who also happened to be in London at the time. It was rumoured that he had been taken into consultation by the Colonial Secretary and that he had made certain suggestions regarding a possible settlement. About the middle of October there were persistent reports that a temporary cessation of Jewish immigration was being considered. These reports produced an

instant reaction from Jewish circles all over the world, and particularly in the U.S.A., where it was said that the U.S. Government was considering making representations to the British Government about Palestine. On October 14th the High Commissioner returned to Palestine. The Jews felt most uneasy about the situation. They realised that definite decisions had probably been arrived at during the High Commissioner's stay in London, and they were very apprehensive about the nature of these decisions. It was clear that, apart from discussing the immediate situation, the Woodhead Report had been discussed, and it was feared that this Report (which had not yet been published) contained recommendations which would drastically limit the future of the National Home. There was a definite feeling in Palestine, both among Arabs and Jews, that very considerable concessions to the Arab viewpoint were imminent.

The policy that had been decided upon in London can be summarised as follows:—(a) The temporary assumption of control by the military with a view to a speedy and decisive cleaning-up of the rebellion. (b) The abandonment of partition in accordance with the (as yet unpublished) recommendations of the Woodhead Commission. (c) An attempt to rally to the side of "law and order" the "moderate" and anti-Mufti section of the Arab population by an indication of willingness to make sweeping concessions to Arab demands concerning Jewish immigration and land sales.

Just before the High Commissioner's return the Administration had belatedly announced that all males over the age of 16 must provide themselves with Identity Cards. The Arab population took very little notice of this order, and the Administration was not in a position to enforce it.

In the early part of October the Palestine Arab Defence Committee, the Mufti's organisation in Damascus, sent a remarkable telegram to Dr. Weizmann, in which it threatened the Jews in Palestine with dire calamities if the policy of Zionism were not abandoned. The Mufti was trying to terrorise the Jews by the same methods as had already been so successful with his fellow-Arabs.

On October 17th there was a fresh outbreak of rioting in Jerusalem. By this time the rebels, with their headquarters in the Haram esh Sherif, were in almost complete control of the

Old City. On October 18th it was announced that the Military Authorities had taken over control of Jerusalem District from the Civil Power. The officers of the Administration were to act as advisers to the military, and the Palestine Police Force was put under military command. Apart from the provision regarding the Police Force, which was applicable to the whole of Palestine, military control was for the moment confined to Jerusalem District, but its extension to the rest of the country was foreshadowed in the immediate future. This extension actually came into effect four days later. The country was divided into four Military Districts—Jerusalem, Southern, Samaria, Haifa and Galilee—corresponding to the administrative divisions, each under the command of a Brigadier.

The first act of the military was to restore control over the Old City of Jerusalem. Troops forced their way into the walled city through the gates, which had been barricaded by the rebels, who were forced to retreat into the Haram esh Sherif, from which many of them escaped by night, climbing over the walls and disappearing into the open country. The rest of the Old City was searched for arms, but in deference to Moslem susceptibilities, no attempt was made to prosecute the search into the Haram esh Sherif itself. Apart from the Haram esh Sherif, order and comparative security were restored to the Old City in a few days with negligible loss of life. But as long as the Haram esh Sherif enjoyed its immunity, and as long as this immunity was abused in the interests of the rebellion, this security could only be classed as comparative.

On October 24th the military took the action which ought to have been taken by the Administration six months previously. They introduced drastic restrictions on movement outside and between the urban areas of Palestine. It was announced that, as from November 1st, permits issued by the military would be necessary for driving a car or for travelling as a passenger by road or rail anywhere outside the municipal limits of the main towns. Furthermore, in order to enforce the Order regarding Identity Cards which had been recently issued by the Civil Administration, and which had been largely ignored, it was announced that no such permits would be given to anyone not in possession of an Identity Card. These Regulations were made applicable to every adult in Palestine.

At the same time the military started a drive in the Galilee Hills, in the triangle bounded by the towns of Acre, Safad and Nazareth. By the end of the month most of the larger villages in this area had been occupied by troops; this greatly facilitated the subsequent mopping up of rebel bands operating in that district.

On October 26th Jewish suspicions of the intentions of the British Government were partly and temporarily allayed by the publication of the Immigration Schedule for the six months September-March, which was fixed at a figure of 4,500 Jews of all categories. It was nothing to be enthusiastic about as far as the Jews were concerned, but in view of the rumours that had been current during the previous few weeks, they were almost relieved that the figure was not lower still.

Meanwhile the Permanent Mandates Commission had been asking some pertinent questions about the position of affairs in Palestine. Serious criticism was expressed of the French authorities in Syria and the Lebanon for their failure to prevent these countries from being used for the organisation of the rebellion in Palestine, and particularly for their failure to restrain the activities of the Mufti. The French representative made the astonishing reply that "the Mufti had shown no signs of an incorrect attitude". The humour of this reply can only be appreciated when it is remembered that at this time the British Government was stoutly maintaining that Italy and Germany were showing no signs of an incorrect attitude in connection with the policy of Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War.

On November 1st the new Travel Regulations came into force. The rebel leaders, on instructions from the Mufti, had ordered all Arabs to boycott the Regulations. This resulted in the equivalent of an Arab transport strike from the day on which the Regulations came into force. This boycott had shortly to be relaxed in order to allow for the transport of citrus. The shipping season was about to begin, and the rebels planned to replenish their almost exhausted finances by a forced levy on every case of Arab citrus shipped. The rebels, used to dealing with the civil Administration, imagined that they would be allowed to transport citrus and at the same time to maintain their boycott of all other classes of traffic. They were rapidly undeceived. The Military Commander of the Southern District announced that he would not allow any permits for citrus-carrying vehicles owned by Arabs

unless there was an adequate number of applications for permits for other classes of traffic. This announcement and its enforcement had the effect of breaking the boycott, for the rebels could not afford to face the consequence of failure to export the citrus crop. The rebels had been made to look ridiculous. The moral effect of this setback was considerable, and may be said to mark the beginning of the end of the thralldom in which the Arab population of the country had been held by the gang leaders.

CHAPTER XIII

The London Conference

ON NOVEMBER 9th the Report of the Woodhead Commission was published, accompanied by a Statement of Policy from the British Government. The Report was unanimous in finding that the partition scheme proposed by the Peel Commission was impracticable. Two alternative schemes, called Schemes B and C, were propounded. Scheme B differed from the Peel Scheme (referred to in the Report as Scheme A) in that northern Galilee was assigned to the Arab state. (In both Schemes B and C, the Mandated area around Jerusalem and the Jaffa-Jerusalem corridor were larger than in Scheme A, and included the Jewish colonies to the south of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road.) Scheme C confined the Jewish state to the Plain of Sharon as far north as Tantura, and proposed that the whole of Galilee should be a Mandated area. Two of the Commissioners preferred Scheme C and one Scheme B, and the fourth Commissioner considered that both Schemes were impracticable. All the Commissioners were unanimous in recommending against the adoption of partition although their terms of reference had compelled them to produce the best scheme of partition they could devise. The British Government, in its covering Statement of Policy, announced that it had decided to abandon partition, and proposed to continue with the Mandate as it was and make an attempt to arrive at a solution by agreement between Arabs and Jews. The Statement intimated that in order to arrive at such a solution it proposed to call a Conference of Arab and Jewish leaders, to which would also be invited representatives from the independent Arab States.

It must have been fairly obvious to the British Government that an agreed solution arrived at between Arabs and Jews as a result of a Conference was a remote prospect. It was clear that the British Government had in mind a solution of its own which it was prepared to impose on both parties in the likely event of no agreement being arrived at between them. It was not difficult to guess at the broad outlines of the solution which the Government had in mind. In order to break the hold which the rebels still had over the Arab population it was necessary to provide an alternative

leadership with sufficient prestige to enable it to gain the support of the Arab population. In order to give it this prestige it was necessary to grant far-reaching concessions to the demands which Arab nationalists of all parties had been putting forward for the past several years. There was now no practicable alternative to this policy. A refusal to grant concessions to the incipient Arab opposition to the Mufti which was beginning to manifest itself would have meant that this opposition would swing back to support of the rebellion. The only alternative to far-reaching concessions was war against the whole Arab population. The attitude of the Administration during the previous two years had made ultimate concessions inevitable.

The Jews realised this perfectly well. The partition schemes produced in the Woodhead Report (although neither of them had been adopted), providing as they did for considerable, and in the case of Scheme C for drastic, reductions in the areas allotted to the Jewish State under the Peel Scheme, showed the trend of official opinion in England. It was significant that Scheme C had been preferred to Scheme B by the Chairman of the Commission and by the Treasury member.

On November 15th Fakhri Bey Nashashibi published a letter which he had sent to the High Commissioner. In this letter he expressed the "unlimited satisfaction" of the Arabs that the British Government had decided to abandon partition. He disputed the Mufti's claim to represent Arab opinion in Palestine, and claimed that the National Defence Party represented 50 per cent. of Arab opinion in Palestine and 75 per cent. of propertied interest. (This last claim was very revealing.) The writer went on to say that he looked forward to the success of the Conference, at which he hoped that those Arab demands which had been found justified by various Commissions in the past would be conceded.

It is not certain whether or not Fakhri Bey had received a hint from the Administration that such an initiative on his part would be acceptable. But it was obvious what was in the wind. Having regard to the social structure of Arab Palestine, there were only two practicable alternatives to the leadership of the Mufti. One was the Higher Committee (minus the Mufti), most of whose members were exiled in the Seychelles. The other alternative was the Nashashibi party. Of these two alternatives the second was obviously preferable as far as the Administration was concerned.

The Nashashibis were likely to be less extreme in their demands, and a Nashashibi leadership of the Arab delegation to the Conference would save the Administration from the otherwise inevitable humiliation of having to recall the people whom it had exiled just over a year previously in order to enable them to go to London.

It soon became apparent that the Nashashibi party had not sufficient weight to carry the role which Fakhri Bey coveted for it, and which the Administration would have been willing to see it play. Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, the head of the party, who was in Cairo, having left Palestine in order to escape the attention of the Mufti's terrorists, repudiated Fakhri Bey's letter, and the Mufti launched an intensified campaign of terror against the Nashashibi party and its sympathisers. Fakhri Bey managed to organise two mass meetings of sheikhs and notables who demonstrated in support of the Nashashibi policy of co-operation with the Administration. The latter of these two meetings was held in a village in the hills near Hebron, and was attended by high officers of the military and of the Administration.

But the idea of Nashashibi leadership, if it had indeed ever been held by the Administration, was soon abandoned. On November 23rd the Colonial Secretary announced in the House of Commons that he had instructed the High Commissioner to arrange for the formation of a Palestine Arab delegation representing all the leading groups in the country, and that he had asked him to arrange this in consultation with the groups and individuals concerned. He also announced that facilities would be given for the Seychelles deportees to attend the Conference if the High Commissioner should recommend this. He stated that the Mufti would not be acceptable as a delegate. In reply to a question he made it clear that the leading groups referred to did not include such organisations as there were in Palestine representative of the Arab workers. (In point of fact the Administration had seen to it that there were no such organisations of any importance. The Administration could be firm on occasion.) In the course of his speech the Colonial Secretary paid generous tribute to the achievements of the Jews in Palestine, but in dealing with the Arabs he let drop a remark which seemed to give a hint as to the trend of the Government's intentions. He said, "If I were an Arab I should be alarmed at the increasing rate of Jewish immigration."

With regard to security in Palestine the Colonial Secretary said, "Steadily and painfully the process of restoration of order is going on throughout the country." It was a speech that revealed a generous understanding of both Arabs and Jews, but it certainly seemed to forecast an indefinite continuation of those restrictions on immigration which the previous Colonial Secretary had assured the House were both arbitrary and temporary.

A few days after this speech it was announced that it had been decided unconditionally to release the Seychelles deportees in order to give them the opportunity of being chosen to represent the Arabs at the Conference.

On December 19th the ex-members of the Higher Committee left the Seychelles en route for Egypt. It was significant that a spokesman of the Nashashibi party, speaking at a rally of Nashashibi supporters, had welcomed the agreement to release the deportees who were not "responsible for any destructive policy". It seemed likely that some sort of united front between the Nashashibis and the ex-members of the Higher Committee, excluding the Mufti and Jamal Husseini, was being considered. Ragheb Nashashibi was still in Cairo when the deportees arrived, but any conversations that he may have had with them were apparently abortive, for shortly after their arrival Ragheb Bey announced that he had become reconciled with Fakhri and that he supported the efforts that Fakhri was making with the Administration for a 50 per cent. Nashashibi representation at the Conference.

It soon became clear that the British Government's decision that the Mufti should not attend the Conference was simply a piece of face-saving, for, soon after the arrival of the Seychelles deportees in Cairo, it was announced that the British Government had no objection to their consulting with the Mufti before deciding on the delegates who were to go to London. After a certain amount of delay and difficulty about visas, the deportees, together with Jamal Husseini, who had met them in Cairo, proceeded to Beirut, to confer with the Mufti. They had decided that it would be quite useless to go to London without having come to some agreement with the Mufti, although they were not, with the exception of Jamal Husseini, going to London as the direct representatives of the Mufti. The attitude of the British Government had put the Mufti in a favourable position. He could

see that his views were represented at the Conference, he could ensure that no settlement would be agreed to at the Conference without his approval, and at the same time he bore no responsibility for the results of the Conference, and was in a position to repudiate the delegates to the Conference if he wished to do so. The British Government had got the worst of both worlds. The truth was that, although the mass of Palestine Arabs were heartily sick of the Mufti and his methods, it was still impossible to organise any effective political opposition to the Mufti. That being so, if the British Government were prepared to negotiate at all under such conditions, it should have insisted on negotiations with the Mufti direct.

The Arab Higher Committee, which reconstituted itself as such in Beirut, arrived at an agreement with the Mufti as to the personnel of the delegation that should proceed to London. Jamal Husseini was to lead the delegation as the Mufti's representative. The rest of the delegation was to consist of Auni Bey Abdul Hadi, Hussein Khalidi, Alfred Rock, Musa al Alami, with George Antonius and Fuad Saba as secretaries. The first four named were all members of the old Higher Committee, Musa al Alami had been a Government official, Fuad Saba had been secretary of the Higher Committee, George Antonius was a scholar who had recently published a book in English on the Arab national awakening.

The announcement of the delegation was made in the name of the Arab Higher Committee, and insisted that its members should be the only Palestine Arab representatives to go to the Conference. It was intimated that they would not go to the Conference unless this condition were fulfilled. How far the views of the Mufti coincided with those of the majority of the delegation is uncertain, but it is probable that an agreement was reached to pitch the Arab demands as high as possible. It was apparent anyway that no agreed solution would be reached between Arabs and Jews, and that the British Government would impose a solution which the Arabs would be free to accept or reject as they thought fit. It is clear that the agreement between the Mufti and the Higher Committee did not extend further than an agreement on the nature of the Arab demands to be put forward and an agreement not to recede from these demands at subsequent discussions.

As the Higher Committee delegation had been appointed

without any reference to the Administration, the Nashashibis also considered it in order to proceed with the appointment of a delegation of their own. It was clear that there was no prospect of a composite delegate composed of all parties. Consequently a Nashashibi delegation was formed, consisting of Ragheb Bey, Fakhri Bey, Yacoub Farraj and two others. As it turned out only Ragheb Bey and Yacoub Farraj proceeded to London.

The Mufti had no intention of "letting up" on the terrorist campaign during the Conference. Right up to and during the Conference the activity of the rebels was only limited by the vigilance of the military and the growing reluctance of the Arab villagers to continue providing food and refuge for the "holy warriors". This reluctance was due partly to the greater protection which the military were now able to afford to peaceful villagers, partly to fear of military retribution, but mainly to the weariness of a peasant people with a state of disorder which was upsetting the ordered village routine by which they made their living. Seedtime and harvest, threshing and ploughing, all in their seasons, were being interrupted. The young men of the villages either volunteered or were pressed into the service of the gangs. Flocks were stolen and cattle was slaughtered. Small, hard-won sums of money, fruit of a year's labour, were either stolen by the bands or else taken to pay collective fines imposed by the military. All the half-forgotten blood feuds of the villages had flared up again; every village was divided against itself; none knew security either in the fields or within the doors of his house. Poverty deteriorated into destitution, destitution into despair, and finally despair into a fierce anger against the "holy warriors" and their brutal exactions. Six months more and the voice of the Arab people would have been heard for the first time since the rebellion had started. Perhaps that was the reason why the British Government had suddenly determined to get matters settled as quickly as possible.

The armed rising was coming to an end. The rebel armies had been broken up, and the smaller bands were no longer marauders but fugitives. Those rebel auxiliaries who had jobs to go back to went back to them. Only the professionals, the Mujehaddin, remained. A quarrel had broken out between the two foremost rebel leaders, Abdel Razzak and Abdel Rahim. The former was the chief lieutenant of the Mufti, a brutal tough, whose trade was

murder and who would stick at nothing. Abdel Rahim was of a different quality. To him the rebellion had always been a war of liberation and a fight against oppression; to him traitors really were traitors and not merely personal enemies or people who disagreed with him. He was considerate to the villagers; he exacted a reasonably humane standard of conduct from his followers and punished, sometimes with death, those who did not conform to it. When he was killed towards the end of March, trying to break through a military cordon surrounding a village, there was widespread and genuine grief throughout Arab Palestine.

Terrorism, sabotage and assassination were more difficult to cope with, but the slowly returning confidence of the vast majority of law-abiding Arabs robbed the terror of its chief weapon. People began once more to lend that assistance to the forces of law and order without which neither law nor order is possible. Arrests of terrorists began to be made, murderers could no longer assume immunity, crime no longer invariably went undetected. Fear of the rebels began to be succeeded by respect for the law. But the process had still a long way to go, and very little was needed to bring about a severe retrogression.

1938 had been the worst year of the rebellion. The casualty list was as follows:—

			Killed.	Wounded.
Arab civilians		486	636
Rebels	1,138	196
Jews	292	649
British	69	233
Others	12	6

The rebel casualties were almost certainly a great deal in excess of the listed figures.

Meanwhile the preparations for the Conference were going forward. The Jews, who viewed the Conference with deep misgivings, had for some time clung to the hope that the Arabs would refuse to participate. When they saw that this hope was illusory, they reluctantly agreed to take part themselves. In order to stress the international nature of Great Britain's obligation towards the National Home, and also in order to counterbalance the presence of representatives from the independent Arab States at the Conference, the Jewish delegation included representatives

from U.S.A. and Central Europe as well as from Great Britain and Palestine. Dr. Weizmann headed the delegation, which had been selected by the Jewish Agency in consultation with various representative Jewish bodies inside and outside Palestine.

The Conference opened in London on February 7th, 1939. The Arabs had refused to confer jointly with the Jews and the two delegations were greeted separately by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chamberlain. By the time the Conference opened no agreement had been arrived at between the Higher Committee and the Nashashibi delegates. The Government intimated its willingness to confer with the two Arab delegations separately if necessary, but some days after the opening of the Conference an agreement was arrived at by which the Nashashibis were to join the main delegation and contribute two members to it. This was merely a face-saving manœuvre. As an agreed solution was out of the question, there was no point in weakening the Arab case by carrying dissension any further. That the agreement did not go any deeper than that was apparent from the fact that terrorism against the Nashashibi party and "moderates" generally continued in Palestine throughout the Conference, one of the victims being a young member of the Nashashibi family. The alliance, for the purposes of the Conference, between the Higher Committee and the Nashashibis was simply due to the common agreement between them that the maximum Arab demands should be put forward at the Conference. On the nature of these demands all Arab nationalists were agreed. Where they differed was the extent to which they were prepared to compromise on them.

On February 9th Jamal Husseini, on behalf of the Arab delegation, put forward the Arab demands, which were broadly as follows:—

- (i) Recognition of the Arab right to independence in what they regarded as their own country.
- (ii) Abandonment of the Jewish National Home.
- (iii) The abrogation of the Mandate and its replacement by a Treaty of Alliance with an independent Arab Palestine.
- (iv) Immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and immediate prohibition of land sales to the Jews.

The Jewish case was presented by Dr. Weizmann, and can be summarised as follows:—

- (i) Refusal to accept a minority status.

- (ii) A continuation of the Mandate on the terms originally laid down.
- (iii) Immigration to be continued on the basis of economic absorptive capacity.
- (iv) An active policy of development.

There followed discussions between the two separate delegations and the British Government. The Arabs persisted in their refusal to confer jointly with the Jews, although there were some unofficial discussions between the Jewish delegates and the delegates from the Arab States. The Arab delegation concentrated on the good debating point afforded by the interpretation of the McMahon correspondence, and induced the British Government to agree to the publication of this correspondence (which had not until then been officially published on the British side). In view of the apparent meaning of the text this could be regarded as a definite score for the Arabs. The Jews, on the defensive, relied on the wording and plain meaning of the Mandate.

It soon became apparent that the Government had in mind a surrender to Arab demands even more complete than had been suspected. Proposals were made to the Jews embodying a termination of the Mandate and the convening of a Round Table Conference in the following autumn which would lay down the constitution of an independent Arab State of Palestine under the protection of Great Britain in which the Jews were to be a minority safeguarded by guarantees. Having regard to what had happened to the Assyrian minority in Iraq a few years previously under precisely similar conditions, the proposal was almost staggering in its shamelessness. The Jewish delegation rejected the proposal with a vehemence that apparently made some impression on the British Government. Rumours of the proposal reached Palestine, where they caused despair among the Jews and wild rejoicing among the Arabs, in whose attitude satisfaction at British defeat was more apparent than gratitude at British generosity.

Whether because of the memory of the Assyrian massacres or some other consideration more worthy of the Chamberlain Government is uncertain, but the Government withdrew the proposal, which had been "misunderstood". The intentions of the Government were, however, clear.

The Arab reaction to the British proposal was characteristic. Having been offered more than they could have expected even

in their most optimistic moments, they presented a counter-demand for the immediate implementation of the proposals. They were not prepared to wait until the autumn. They wanted the whole thing settled there and then at the Conference. Behind this impatience there was the suspicion that the proposed delay would enable Jewish and other pressure to be brought on the Government to withdraw the proposal. This suspicion was, it must be admitted, to some extent justified by past events. But the Arabs overplayed their hand. If they had accepted the proposal outright the Government might have experienced some difficulty in receding from it. As it was the Arabs missed their opportunity. They made the same mistake as the Jews had made over partition. If the Jews had immediately and wholeheartedly accepted the Peel proposals, which they should have realised was the best offer they were ever likely to get, they might have been able to secure its implementation. But they haggled and hesitated and were lost. So it was with the Arabs at the Conference.

The Conference went on. It was more than ever clear that no agreed solution would be reached. The British Government had completely lost whatever goodwill had previously existed on the Jewish side, and the course of the Conference had naturally not convinced the Arabs of the necessity or even the desirability of making any concessions whatever, quite apart from the fact that any concessions agreed to by them would have exposed them to the danger of assassination when they returned to Palestine.

In Palestine the rebellion went on. In February, while the Conference was sitting, no fewer than 113 people were killed and 153 wounded.

On March 6th, in a last attempt to save the Conference, the Egyptian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs flew from Cairo to Beirut to see the Mufti in order to try to get his sanction to concessions being made by the Arab delegation. The last shred of pretence that the British Government was not treating with the Mufti was thereby exposed. Willynilly, the Arab delegates were nothing more than the mouthpieces of the Mufti. This effort at mediation failed. The Mufti was not prepared to tie his hands. He did not want to be bound by any agreement which the Arab delegation might come to. He had, perhaps, hoped that the delegates would come to some agreement with the British Government without his consent, which would have given

him the opportunity of repudiating it and denouncing its authors as traitors. But the delegates realised this danger, and however tempting it might have been to defy the Mufti, they were too much afraid of his influence to do so.

On March 16th, when it had become certain that there was no prospect of an agreed solution (many of the Zionist delegates had already departed), the British Government announced its own solution. The grant of statehood was postponed for ten years and was then to be made conditional on the agreement of both Arabs and Jews. To that extent the Government had receded from its original proposal. Meanwhile the Mandate was to continue. The economic absorptive basis of immigration was to be abandoned. 75,000 more Jews were to be admitted to Palestine during the next five years, after which there was to be no further immigration without the consent of the Arabs. With regard to land sales, Palestine was to be divided into three zones, which were not then defined, in which land sales to non-Arabs were to be (a) forbidden, (b) restricted, and (c) unrestricted. In addition steps were to be taken to give both Arabs and Jews an increasing share in the Administration with the object of encouraging co-operation between them and of fitting them for that independence which the British Government reiterated was the ultimate aim of the Mandatory Power. The Statement of Policy went on to say that the only satisfactory solution was a solution freely negotiated between Arabs and Jews, and expressed the hope that such a solution would eventually be arrived at.

This Statement of Policy was greeted by the Jews more with sorrow than with surprise. It had been apparent for some time that it had been the British Government's intention to limit both immigration and land sales. The Arabs professed dissatisfaction at the relegation of independence to an indefinite date in the future, but on the whole they were not ill-pleased. Their fears had been assuaged, even if their ambitions had not been fully realised. The mass of the people, both in the towns and the villages, felt that whatever justification there had been for continuing the rebellion had disappeared. Only the Mufti was dissatisfied. No settlement was of any use to him that did not carry with it immediate independence, which would enable him to become master of the country. The satisfaction of Arab grievances merely had the effect of depriving him of a weapon

which he had been using for the furtherance of his own ends. But for nearly everyone else the rebellion had lost its *raison d'être*. The Mufti, with his diminishing band of hired toughs and bravoës, was henceforward fighting a losing battle, politically as well as physically.

In due course the Government's Statement of Policy was debated before the House of Commons. Some strong criticism was expressed, notably by two ex-Colonial Secretaries, who were also the two ablest men in the Conservative Party (although, or perhaps consequently, not members of the Government), Mr. Churchill and Mr. Amery. The Government got its inevitable majority.

During the course of the summer the Government's Statement of Policy (which became known as the 1939 White Paper) was considered by the Permanent Mandates Committee at Geneva, which, by a majority, found that the British Government's proposals with regard to immigration and land sales amounted to an infringement of the Mandate. Subsequently the British Government's influence at Geneva succeeded in avoiding the humiliation of a formal condemnation of its policy in Palestine.

The only defence of the White Paper was the defence of necessity, and, to do the Government justice, it was the only defence put forward by its spokesmen in support of it. Past weaknesses in policy and performance had brought it to a point at which it had to choose between concessions at the expense of the Jews which were indistinguishable from a surrender to violence, and an indefinite continuance of violence.

The Government made no attempt to justify the restrictions on immigration and land sales (which were complementary) on the ground of the exhaustion or approaching exhaustion of economic absorptive capacity. They were acknowledged to be a political expedient for keeping the Arabs quiet. There was no reason, apart from short-term expediency, why the political aspirations of the Arabs should be satisfied, or rather given the ultimate possibility of satisfaction, at the expense of the Jews simply because the Arabs had chosen to use methods of violence in advancing those aspirations. The Jews had national aspirations as well as the Arabs and these aspirations were entitled to at least equal consideration with those of the Arabs. The point was well put by a correspondent in the *New Statesman and Nation*, who

wrote:—"It is no doubt a good thing that men like Jamal Husseini should have a despatch case and Cabinet rank. But it is not such a paramount good that it justifies the Jews in renouncing their claim to equal status with other national groups or sacrificing the aims which the Arabs regard as so reasonable when professed by themselves." It may be said that Jewish nationalism is a bad thing and makes the solution of the Jewish problem more difficult than it would be otherwise. But precisely the same thing can be said about Arab nationalism. There is no reason why one should be pandered to at the expense of the other. They should either both be recognised or both discouraged. There is nothing to be said for sacrificing one to the other.

From the point of view of the British Government the settlement was, on a short-term view, not disadvantageous. No British interest had been surrendered. The position of the Mufti had been considerably weakened. The goodwill of a considerable section of the Arab population had, for the moment, been regained. Jewish nationalism seemed unlikely to prove dangerous. A severe blow had been dealt at the more inconvenient kinds of Arab and Jewish nationalism.

The restrictions on immigration were given immediate effect. This did not mean any immediate reduction, as the volume of immigration during the rebellion had fallen below the yearly average laid down in the White Paper. But the prospect of eventual total restriction, combined with the appalling and worsening plight of the Jews in Europe, very greatly increased the incentive for Jewish refugees to get into Palestine at all costs. The consequence was a tremendous increase in the rate of illegal immigration. This illegal immigration was connived at by the Jewish authorities and assisted by a large number of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. It would have been highly unnatural if this had not been so. The Palestine Administration was in a difficult position. It was fairly accustomed to seeing its regulations flouted, although more often by Arabs than by Jews, but the volume of illegal immigration was becoming so great that the whole basis of the British Government's policy of appeasement towards the Arabs was being undermined. Although the Jewish authorities did not altogether welcome this illegal immigration, for the reason that it was impossible to handpick the illegal as was done with the legal immigrants, they did not feel inclined, nor would Jewish

public opinion have allowed them, to co-operate with the Administration in trying to put a stop to it. For a time the Jews defied the Administration with the same freedom as the Arabs had done a year previously. One way out of the Administration's difficulty would have been to approach the Jewish Agency with the offer of increased legal immigration on condition that the Jewish Agency and Jewish people co-operated with the Administration in the suppression of illegal immigration. This was the method that had been adopted with the Arabs. The Jews were defying the Administration because they had a grievance; why not win back their obedience by remedying that grievance even if it could only be remedied at the expense of other people? The good people who had been busy advocating this line of action during the Arab rebellion did not seem to see its application to the problem of illegal Jewish immigration. Neither did the Administration. Apprehensive of the effect which this illegal immigration was having on the Arabs, the Administration announced that all illegal immigration would be deducted from the annual schedules of legal immigration. It was the collective fine principle applied to the whole of Jewry. Unlike many of the Palestine Government's regulations, it was effective. The volume of illegal immigration rapidly diminished, and finally almost ceased as a result of the outbreak of the second German war.

The land sale restrictions were not given immediate effect. When the war came the Jews hoped and the Arabs feared that they would be shelved indefinitely. But the Arabs still had to be appeased, while the loyalty of the Jews was assured anyway. Early in March 1940 the proposed land sales restrictions were promulgated. The broad outlines had already been laid down in the White Paper. Palestine was to be divided into three areas in which land sales to non-Arabs were to be (a) banned, (b) restricted, and (c) unrestricted. Sales were to be allowed in the restricted area when it was considered that such a sale would be to the mutual advantage of Arabs and Jews. (It may be noted in parentheses that sales of land or anything else are not usually made unless the vendor and purchaser consider the sale to be to their mutual advantage.) The area in which unrestricted sales were still to be allowed was limited to a narrow strip of the coastal plain between Tel Aviv and Tantura. The restricted areas were those where there was a mixed Arab and Jewish population, such

as Galilee and the Jordan valley. All purely Arab areas were put in the banned category. The putting of this measure into effect without first submitting it to the League, whose Permanent Mandates Committee had already decided that the principle was in contravention to the Mandate, was excused by the Colonial Secretary on the ground that it was necessary to put the restrictions into effect with the greatest possible speed in order to avoid the possibility of further trouble in Palestine. In other words, the Arabs were using Great Britain's absorption in the war for the purpose of political blackmail.

CHAPTER XIV

Some Aspects of the Rebellion

IT IS at first sight a little surprising that a small rebel force, operating in a small country, ill-armed, ill-equipped, and opposed by modern resources, including aircraft, should have been able to enjoy the success that it did.

It must be remembered that the various rebel "armies" were allowed to organise themselves almost unhindered. During the summer of 1936 there was not a sufficient force of troops in Palestine to do anything more than defend settlements, guard communications and so on; no attempt could be made to seek out the rebel forces. Then in the autumn of 1936, when there was a division of troops available in Palestine, the Administration agreed to what was, in effect, an armistice with the rebels, before the troops had really had a chance to go into action. Most of the additional troops that had been rushed out were then sent home again, and only about four battalions were left in Palestine. For the next year the rebels were almost completely free to go on with their recruiting, their general organisation, and their supply arrangements. They were greatly assisted in these preparations by the fact that they enjoyed almost uninterrupted access to and from Syria. (This was partly remedied later, first by the construction of a road along the frontier to facilitate patrolling, and afterwards by a barbed-wire fence.)

Rebel bands became established in certain fairly well-defined districts. There was one in Upper Galilee, one in the Carmel hills, and one farther south in Samaria between Nablus and Ramallah. There was also a smaller band operating in the Judæan hills near Hebron. These gangs operated more or less independently of each other, but they were all controlled (in the later stages of the rebellion) by the Mufti's agents in Damascus. The ease with which communication was maintained with Damascus was of great assistance to the rebels. Later this communication became more difficult, but it was never cut off entirely. The strategy of the rebels was first to establish control of their bases in the hills, and then gradually to extend that control into the plains. It was quite out of the question to accomplish the latter object by invasion. It

was also out of the question to establish anything in the nature of complete occupation of the plains. It was also unnecessary. All that was required was to disrupt communications and generally to harass the Administration while maintaining communications with their bases in the hills, and without ever drawing attention to themselves by moving about in large concentrations.

As has been explained, the rebels, in addition to their regular forces, could rely on the services of a number of part-time "auxiliaries" in nearly every town and village. These auxiliaries assisted the regular rebel forces when they were in the neighbourhood, gave individual rebels refuge when they were hard pressed, arranged for supplies of food, and established the influence of the rebels in their respective quarters and villages. They also frequently accompanied the regulars on raiding expeditions. These auxiliaries secured for the regulars their contacts with the general Arab population. They were invaluable to the rebel forces as they enabled them to remain completely mobile and at the same time to retain control of the various districts from and in which they operated. It was by means of these auxiliaries that the rebels were enabled to extend their control into the Arab towns and villages in the plains as well as into Jerusalem itself. Individual rebels would penetrate into these towns and villages and recruit bands of helpers, who, by methods of persuasion or terror, would render the whole local Arab population amenable to rebel influence, thus paving the way for further incursions of rebels, who would be assured of refuge and assistance.

Bearing in mind the superior knowledge of the country possessed by the rebels, and the fact that they could rely on the co-operation of the local inhabitants, it was not practicable for the military to take offensive action against the rebels until they had a fairly considerable force at their disposal. For, in order to take such offensive action, it was necessary first to occupy a number of villages, then to cut the rebels off from assistance from these villages, and finally to encircle the rebel forces and close in on them. Until they had sufficient forces for offensive action the military had to content themselves, first with guarding communications, settlements and important points from attack, and secondly with periodical and isolated raids on villages known to be giving assistance to the rebels. The method used in such raids was, to surround the village with a cordon of troops and then to

make a thorough search of all the inhabitants and all the houses in the village. When arms or ammunition were found on a person, that person was arrested; when arms or ammunition were found in a house, that house was blown up. These searches were certainly a source of embarrassment to the rebels and were very effective when the element of surprise could be secured. Large hauls of arms and ammunition were sometimes made, although, in a rocky country, it was not difficult, given short notice, to hide weapons and ammunition in places where they were unlikely to be found. Another method employed by the military to discourage assistance being given to the rebels was that of the collective fine. When it was proved to the satisfaction of the military that a particular village had habitually harboured or otherwise assisted rebels, they recommended that the civil authority should impose a collective fine on that village. This greatly strengthened the hands of those elements in the villages who were opposed to the rebels for personal or other reasons, by providing them with a powerful argument for not assisting the rebels.

One of the main difficulties experienced by the military in the conduct of operations against the rebels was the lack of communications. The roads of Palestine for the most part skirted the hill districts from which the rebels operated, and there were large areas only crossed by footpaths or cattle tracks which were inaccessible to motor traffic. Under these circumstances it was not easy for even considerably superior military forces to take the offensive against highly mobile, lightly equipped rebels who knew the country intimately. Consequently the military, in conjunction with the civil authorities, started a programme of road building designed first to provide easy access for motorised troops to the heart of the hill areas, and secondly, by cutting across the centre of the hill areas, to reduce the size of the areas in which the rebels were free to manoeuvre.

The most important piece of road building, which had been contemplated for a long time but which was only completed at the instance of the military in 1937, was the coastal road from Jaffa-Tel Aviv to Haifa. A direct road from Jenin to the outskirts of Haifa, running along the north-east bottom of the Carmel spur, had been completed shortly before this. Subsequently a series of roads were cut through the passes in the Carmel Hills, joining the Haifa-Tel Aviv road with the Jenin-Haifa road. Another important

strategic road was built along the Syrian frontier. In the south a road was built branching north-east from the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road, up the Vale of Ajalon and through the Judaeian hills, joining the Nablus-Jerusalem road at Ramallah, about ten miles north of Jerusalem.

The construction of these roads was most useful in limiting the scope of the rebels' activity when military operations were in their defensive stage, and in assisting the round up of the rebels when the military assumed the offensive. The construction of new roads and the improvement of existing tracks was an essential preliminary to the process of encirclement and closing in, which was the only way in which the main rebel forces could be effectively dealt with. The improvement of communications enabled this process to be carried out in a number of comparatively small areas bounded by roads which enabled the military to be even more mobile than the rebels.

This road-making did not proceed without counter measures from the rebels. A good many military casualties were incurred, road-making slowed up, and movement appreciably hampered by the laying of land mines of varying degrees of lethal efficiency.

The armed rebellion in the hills was bound to be defeated as soon as there were sufficient military forces available to deal with it. The thin but strong web of violence and terror which the rebels had spread all over Arab Palestine was potentially far more formidable. The organisations forming this web were at first dependent on the rebel bands in the hills, but they soon became self-supporting and in a position to carry on almost indefinitely without assistance from or contact with the main rebel forces. These organisations were particularly formidable in the larger villages and in the towns. The smaller villages could be cordoned off and searched at fairly frequent intervals, and could also be effectively occupied by small bodies of troops. Also the imposition of collective fines was both equitable and efficacious in small villages where everybody knows what his neighbour is doing and is in a position to co-operate with the authorities in order to stop him doing it. But for obvious reasons collective fines were not similarly equitable or efficacious in the larger units of population.

In the smaller villages there was another important factor which contributed more perhaps to the ultimate defeat of the rebellion than any action taken by the military. This was the existence of

the bitter family feuds which are endemic in Arab village life. Because of these feuds it was impossible for the rebels, even with the aid of terror, to gain the unanimous support of any village. There was always an irreconcilable opposition which no terror could entirely quench. Arab nationalism was quite unable to transcend these feuds, and terrorism exacerbated instead of suppressing them. To the ordinary peasant the family unit was far more real, more important, more significant than the concept of Arab nationalism. This aspect of village life became particularly apparent after the establishment of Military Courts. In almost every case of arms or ammunition having been discovered in someone's house, the defence alleged that they had been planted there by a personal enemy of the accused. This defence was true sufficiently often to render the task of the Military Courts an exceedingly difficult one. The chance of obtaining for a personal enemy a long term of imprisonment or worse was too much for many Arab villagers to resist. Similarly rebels were frequently betrayed to the military or police by informers who acted more out of a desire for revenge than out of hope of monetary reward. In the villages the rebellion gradually deteriorated into a series of struggles between various local factions.

There was another side to the medal. The existence of these blood feuds, which were most common in, but which were by no means confined to, the smaller villages, made the task of organising terrorism a good deal easier than it otherwise would have been. By giving political differences the exalted status of personal animosities, the rebel organisers were able to arouse for the task of murder a passion and a tenacity far greater than would have been the case if they had had to rely on hired assassins. The Mufti, with his usual skill in making best use of the material that lay to hand, was most adroit in making the most of these blood feuds when it suited him.

But on balance these feuds militated against rather than in favour of the terror, and may be said eventually to have broken it. For no terror on earth will drive the Arab villager to the extent of acquiescing in a long-standing wrong, real or imaginary, which has been done to him or his family by a neighbour. To do this would rob life of much of its meaning.

In considering the military measures taken against the rebels, it must be borne in mind that anything in the nature of total war

was deemed out of the question. If the hill areas dominated by the rebels had been regarded as enemy territory, the task of the military would have been a good deal easier. As it was, military operations had to be conducted on police lines. That is to say, the rebels were regarded as lawless elements within the State. No part of the country was ever formally evacuated. The fiction of governmental control was maintained everywhere. From a military point of view an evacuation of certain areas followed by systematic reconquest would have had considerable advantages. But politically it was considered undesirable. It would have identified the Palestine Arab population as a whole with the rebellion; it would have completed that unification which the Mufti was trying to bring about by terror. The result was that the military could do little more than supplement the efforts of the police. This was particularly so until the military took over from the civil administration in October 1938. While the civil administration was in control it showed an extreme reluctance to interfere with the ordinary routine of life. It tried to deal with the rebellion as if it were nothing more than an outbreak of crime on rather a large scale. A man was assumed to be a good citizen unless there was reason to believe that he was a rebel. Under military administration this viewpoint underwent a change. The military assumed that every Arab was an actual or potential rebel, until he showed himself to be otherwise. The terror had made it impossible for the civil administration's view to prevail any longer.

The restrictions on travel imposed by the military administration came too late. By that time the rebel network had been firmly established all over the country and the various local groups were capable of functioning independently without the continued support of the rebel bands. The rebellion could no longer be geographically isolated; it was working like leaven among the whole Arab population. The rebel forces were still in the hills, but to defeat them was no longer to defeat the rebellion. The problem of dealing with the rebellion had ceased to be primarily a military problem before the military were given an opportunity of dealing with it. Just as in the autumn of 1936 the strike had become of secondary importance compared with the armed rebellion, so in the autumn of 1938 the armed rebellion had become of secondary importance compared with the insidious terrorist organisation which had all Arab Palestine in its grip.

The attitude of the Arabs to the rebellion was simple and understandable. They had no love for the Jews or for the British, and were quite prepared to support the rebellion and enjoy whatever benefits the rebellion might bring them provided that the rebellion and their support of it was not likely to cause them much trouble, expense or inconvenience. A certain number of them gave it their active support from the first, either because it provided them with a source of income, or because it appealed to their patriotic instincts, their love of adventure, or their religious fanaticism. Later many of them supported the rebellion because it became advantageous from the point of view of business, social popularity, or even of personal safety, to do so. In the early days of the rebellion, that is to say during the general strike, it may be said that, although there was not a great deal of active enthusiasm for it, there was at least very little feeling against it. A large part of the Arab population would have been glad to see things return to normal at the end of the strike, but that feeling was not sufficiently strong, nor sufficiently organised, to constitute anything in the nature of opposition to the rebellion.

The active rebels were in a minority from the beginning, but, like many resolute minorities, they succeeded in establishing complete ascendancy over a majority that was uneducated, unorganised and irresolute.

The villagers felt far less strongly than the townsmen about the points ostensibly at issue. For instance land sales. The grievance that the Jews were continually pushing the Arabs off the land, which was the most publicised and the most sympathetically received of all the Arab grievances, was far more bitterly felt by the townspeople, who had no direct interest in the question, than by the villagers, who were the people who were supposed to be suffering. This fact cannot be reasonably attributed to the altruism of the townsmen. Such spontaneous animosity as the villagers felt against the Jews was due more to religious fanaticism and general xenophobia than to any sense of economic grievance. In fact, in normal times, relations between Arab villagers and the Jewish settlers, who were alleged to be squeezing them out of existence, were reasonably good.

In the same way the villagers felt far less animosity towards the British than did the townsmen. They had, of course, been steadily incited against both Jews and British by the Mufti's

propaganda methods, but the effect of this tended to wear off when confronted with the reality of endemic strife and insecurity which the rebellion brought to them.

The townsmen were not seriously affected by the rebellion until much later than was the case with the villagers. Before that day came the urban middle classes, who were more nationalist than any other section of the population, had realised the implications of the rebellion, and were beginning to shrink from it. The designs of the Mufti were far removed from their conception of national independence as a petty bourgeois paradise. They had not opposed the rebellion at a time when such opposition might have been effective, because they still thought that there was a prospect of some benefit to themselves accruing from it. When they realised what a potential danger the rebellion was to them, it was too late for them to do anything about it. The workers and small merchants and other non-political elements in the towns had been unenthusiastic from the first, but their influence counted for nothing. The landlords viewed the rebellion with undisguised concern. They feared the domination of the Mufti far more than they disliked the prospect of continued British rule, and they realised that the latter was an insurance against the former. They were in a doubly vulnerable position. First, they were the Mufti's most important potential rivals, and thus the first to receive the attentions of the terrorists; secondly, they had the money which the rebels so badly needed. The campaign of terror against the landlords was therefore a two-pronged fork. Either the landlord acceded to the rebel demands for money, in which case he was bled white; or else he fled the country to escape the terror and thus ceased to be an effective opponent. Either way the Mufti stood to gain. Most of the big landlords prudently retired to Cairo or to Beirut while the terror was at its height, and came back to their various heritages under the aegis of the Pax Britannica, when the terror had spent its force on Arab policemen and other of the humbler members of the Arab population. (Beirut was an interesting place during the rebellion. The cafés were full both of "opposition" Arabs fleeing from terrorists and of terrorists who were fleeing from the police. Beirut was "home" for both sides.)

Arab Government officials were in an impossible position. Although they had made no secret of their nationalist sympathies during the strike, they viewed the rebellion with the same alarm

as the urban middle classes generally. But the weakness of the Administration, and its frequently demonstrated inability to protect its loyal servants, particularly its non-British ones, did not encourage them to co-operate very seriously with the Administration against the rebellion. As far as was possible they let things take their course, trying on the one hand to avoid official censure for lack of zeal, and on the other hand to avoid something rather more dangerous than censure for any untimely display of it. There were some notable exceptions to this among some of the junior members of the Arab police. Their fate confirmed the majority in their non-committal attitude.

The attitude of the Christian Arabs had always been dictated by their fear of the Moslem majority. Apart from this a very large proportion of the Christian Arabs belonged to that urban middle class in which nationalist feelings were strongest. Thus, partly from fear and partly from self-interest, the Christian Arabs could be regarded as strong nationalists. There were two Christian members of the Higher Committee, and both the secretaries of the Arab delegation to the London Conference were Christians. But the Christians had particular reason to fear the rebellion, the main motive force of which was Moslem fanaticism. They had no illusions as to what their status would be in an independent Arab state; they would be little if at all better off than the Jews, guarantees or no guarantees. At the same time they were even less able to offer effective opposition to the rebellion than were the urban Moslems, as they were so much more vulnerable to the onslaughts of terrorists and to accusations of traitorous behaviour. Christian Arab nationalism was particularly concentrated on anti-Jewishness. They did not want independence, but they did want the suppression of the National Home. A large proportion of Arab business interests were in Christian hands, and these had been particularly affected by Jewish competition. Economically the Christians, in proportion to their numbers, had probably suffered more from the Jews than had the Moslems. But they stood to lose everything by the severance or even the weakening of the British connection, and they knew it.

Thus the rebellion was not a national movement in the sense that it commanded the active support of the majority of the Arabs of Palestine. But the rebellion would not have been possible without the existence of a strong national movement under cover

of which it was able to develop. It developed in the same way as fascist movements in various European countries have developed, under the cover of nationalist or patriotic revivals. These movements are cheered and helped in their early stages by more or less disinterested patriots who think that "the country is going to the dogs", and by less disinterested magnates who think they can make use of these movements for their own purposes. Then these patriots and magnates wake up and find that they have helped a dangerous gang of hooligans into power, and that, instead of being able to use them, they are used by them. So it was with the rebellion.

The most important feature of the rebellion, in so far as it concerned the Jews, was the effect it had on the relations between the Jews and the Administration. At the beginning of 1936 the attitude of the Jewish Agency towards the Administration was somewhat as follows:—"We know that you don't much like us, and for the most part we can do without your help; when we are entitled to your help and need it and can't get it, we will appeal to the Colonial Office or to the Cabinet." This attitude, although it had been largely brought about by the attitude of individual members of the Administration, was naturally resented by the Administration as a whole. The Zionists, ever since 1918, had been far too apt to regard the Administration as a sort of branch office of the British Government in London, and were far too ready to use what influence they possessed (or imagined themselves to possess) to go over the Administration's head even in comparatively minor matters.

The Zionists showed a lack of political sense distressing in so intelligent a people. They did not seem to realise what should have been abundantly obvious, namely that with increasing discontent among the Arabs the sponsorship of the National Home was becoming more and more burdensome to Great Britain, and that there were very definite limits beyond which Great Britain was not prepared to go in order to fulfil her obligations towards the Zionists. The Zionists leaned far too heavily on their influential connections in Great Britain, and these proved to be broken reeds. They did not realise that Zionism had served its main purpose as far as Great Britain was concerned by giving Great Britain the entry into Palestine. They did not see that the logical policy for Great Britain to pursue, and the policy she did

in fact consistently pursue, was gradually to liquidate her obligations to Zionism, once Zionism had served its main purpose. They overrated both the power and willingness of certain sections of British opinion to fight the battle of Zionism in the British political arena. They overestimated the strength of every factor in their favour, and underestimated, or even ignored, the strength of every factor that militated against them.

When the disturbances started in 1936 the Zionists actually thought that events had played into their hands. One of the first results of the Arab strike was the construction of a port at Tel Aviv, which freed the Jews from their dependence on the all-Arab port of Jaffa. They seemed to think that the continuance of the disturbances would bring further disabilities to the Arabs and corresponding advantages to themselves.

The process of Zionist disillusion was slow and painful. The first instalment came when they saw the dilatory way in which the Administration dealt with the "disturbances". It gave the impression that it deliberately avoided crushing the strike in order to provide the Colonial Office with an illustration of the strength of the Arab nationalist movement and the necessity for making concessions to it, at the expense of the Jews. In Great Britain there was a growing feeling that Arab friendship was being sacrificed, not only in Palestine but elsewhere, for the sake of carrying out obligations to the Jews. People began to ask themselves whether it was worth it. It was at that time not fashionable to observe international obligations when it seemed inconvenient to do so. Then came British casualties in the fighting in Palestine, and people began to ask why British lives should be sacrificed for the National Home. It was an aspect of that short-sighted self-regardingness which was to have its shameful and disastrous culmination at Munich, and of which Mr. Chamberlain was so perfect a representative.

But the Zionists continued to rely on the good offices of the British Government. They were encouraged by the obvious dissatisfaction shown by the Colonial Office at the failure of the Administration to deal effectively with the 1936 troubles. They awaited the arrival of the Peel Commission in a mood of considerable confidence, which was only slightly dimmed by the British Government's apparent acquiescence in the armistice which brought the strike to an end in October. The evidence of the

Jewish Agency representatives before the Peel Commission contained some frank criticisms of the Administration; they were on the offensive, intent not on preserving what they had got, but on making fresh gains. They thought that they could get these gains in spite of the Administration. Their reaction to the Peel partition proposal reflects the optimistic spirit which still prevailed. There was a large minority of Zionists who were not prepared to accept partition at all, not on the ground of impracticability, but on the ground that there was no reason to accept half a loaf while there was still a good prospect of getting a whole one. The majority accepted partition as a basis of discussion, but implied that the areas allotted to the Jewish state were quite unacceptable.

Subsequent events were to bring the Zionists more in touch with reality. The rebellion convinced the British Government that substantial concessions would have to be made to Arab nationalist demands in order to secure the support of the mass of the Arab people, both inside and outside Palestine, with a view to ending the rebellion. The British Government became convinced of this after the failure of the "strong" policy adopted after the murder of Mr. Andrews. The decision to put a term to the development of the National Home was arrived at during the High Commissioner's visit to London in the autumn of 1938, as being the only practicable way of putting an end to the existing state of affairs and of re-establishing British control over the country.

The very success of the National Home made the frustration of Zionism all the more bitter. Its success had raised as many political obstacles as it had created economic opportunities. And from the point of view of the Mandatory Power it was the political obstacles that counted.

CHAPTER XV

Epilogue—The War Years

BRITISH POLICY in Palestine between 1919 and 1939 represented an attempt on the part of successive British Governments to impose the policy of the Balfour Declaration on a reluctant Arab majority. The 1939 White Paper was an expression of the British Government's intention to terminate this policy and to substitute for it a policy of imposing the will of the Arab majority on a reluctant Jewish minority. Just as the former policy had necessitated the use of force to coerce the Arab majority, so the White Paper policy necessitated the use of force to coerce the Jewish minority. Within a few weeks of the termination of the London Conference the position of Arabs and Jews *vis-à-vis* the Administration had been reversed. The Arabs had become the "loyalists" and the Jews the "rebels". During the summer of 1939 the Administration was confronted with a wave of illegal immigration which was actively or passively supported by the majority of the Jewish population. The Administration was almost as helpless in face of it as it had been in the days of the Arab rebellion.

The failure of a policy of appeasement in Palestine was becoming apparent when the world was faced with the result of the failure of appeasement on a wider scale. The outbreak of war in Europe caused the majority of Palestinian Jews to declare a truce in their hostility to the Administration. Distrustful as they were of the Administration, and of the British Government as it was then constituted, they were unwilling, both for reasons of long term self-interest and of common decency, to hamper Great Britain in her war effort against Germany. A minority, taking a more parochial view, continued to regard the fight against the White Paper as being more important than the fight against Nazi Germany. The Jewish Agency placed itself unreservedly at the disposal of the British war effort. There is no doubt that in this decision it had the support of the Jewish population of Palestine as a whole. There is equally no doubt that the majority of Jews in Palestine hoped, by active participation in a cause which they realised as their own, to recommend their national aspirations to Great Britain and to the Allied Powers. In this they were neither

more nor less disinterested than the other nations and individuals fighting against Germany. All were fighting, not only for survival, but for a recognition of what they regarded as their legitimate aspirations. To the Jews of Palestine the recognition of Zionism was as important as was a recognition of the Four Freedoms to the common man of England or America.

The identification of the Jews of Palestine with the Allied cause placed the Palestine Arabs at an initial disadvantage. Their only two effective leaders, Haj Amin al Husseini and Jamal al Husseini, were both irrevocably committed to the Axis. The precarious alliance of groups represented by the Higher Committee had crumbled into a welter of petty rivalries. Their martial spirit had been broken by the years of the rebellion. Although they were for the most part imbued with a deep respect for German military might, and expectant of a German victory, they had neither the desire nor the means to assist Germany by actively embarrassing Great Britain. On the other hand they had no intention of prejudicing themselves with a potentially victorious Germany by competing with the Jews in assisting the British war effort. With no decisive leadership to urge them to the folly or glory of active participation on one side or the other, the Palestine Arabs remained politically inactive until the march of events removed the possibility of a German victory and enabled them, under the aegis of Arab Unity, to climb belatedly on to the United Nations' bandwagon.

It was not until the summer of 1940 that Palestine was drawn into the orbit of active operations by the hostility of Italy and the collapse of France. By August there was a potentially hostile army on Palestine's northern frontier, and fighting was taking place in Lybia, 500 miles from her southern frontier. The Axis invasion of the Balkans in the winter of 1940-41 brought Palestine within measurable distance of invasion. There was much building of roads, pillboxes and airfields. The spring of 1941 was a momentous time for Palestine as for the rest of the Middle East. British and Dominion troops had to evacuate Greece. The enemy was once more on the western borders of Egypt. Crete fell. Russia waited passively for whatever might be in store. Turkey remained faithful to the British alliance in a strictly Pickwickian sense. Palestine seemed cast for the role of the nut on which the Axis nut-crackers were about to descend. The Arab world watched

the exploits of "Abu Ali" (Hitler) with respectful admiration, in the same way as it had watched the advance of Allenby's armies in 1918. The Germans in 1941 were experiencing the same difficulties as the British had experienced twenty-five years earlier in their efforts to induce the Arabs to give them active assistance. Decisive leadership might have swung the Arabs into action on the side of the Axis. It was fortunate for the Arabs that they lacked such decisive leadership.

In May 1941 an inefficiently organised and pusillanimously conducted revolt in Iraq was suppressed without much difficulty by the handful of derisively equipped troops which was all that Great Britain could spare to deal with this minor emergency. The rapid collapse of the revolt, followed by the flight of its leader, Rashid Ali, and Haj Amin (then sheltering in Iraq) to German-occupied Europe, destroyed any chance that the Axis might have had of mobilising the Arab world against Great Britain. From that time on Arab politics reverted to domesticity, until two years later, when the battle of Alamein made the Middle East safe for a revival of pan-Arabism under the patronage of the British Foreign Office.

In June 1941 another small Allied force invaded Syria from Palestine in order to put an end to the increasing Axis influence over the Vichy regime in Syria. The Vichy forces surrendered after about six weeks fighting, in the course of which the Arab population, both settled and nomad, had preserved a judicious neutrality. (It is fair to mention that in this campaign and in the Iraq campaign the Transjordan Arab Legion fought creditably on the Allied side.)

These two campaigns, combined with the German attack on Russia in June 1941 and the Anglo-Soviet occupation of Iran in the autumn, removed from Palestine the fear of imminent, though by no means the possibility of ultimate, invasion.

Meanwhile Jewish nationalism in Palestine was developing an organised underground terrorist movement. The overt, non-violent resistance of the majority of the Jewish people to the White Paper was being supplemented by the covert violent resistance of a minority drawn mainly from the old Revisionist Party and deriving its inspiration from men who had learnt the art of secret and desperate defiance amid the horrors of German rule.

The history of Jewish terrorism begins with the secret and illegal stores of arms and ammunition which were collected by most Jewish settlements during the years of the rebellion. These weapons were originally collected for the morally respectable, if legally reprehensible, purpose of supplementing the usually inadequate official protection afforded against Arab attacks. If it had not been for these illegal weapons a great many Jewish settlements would have been obliterated during the rebellion. There is no doubt that, with a few exceptions, the secret arming of the Jews started with the quite genuine purpose of self-defence. During the war the prospect of German invasion and occupation shifted the emphasis from self-defence against the Arabs to preparations for guerilla warfare against the Germans. The Jewish youth of Palestine, frustrated by the almost incredible folly of the British authorities in refusing to give them the opportunity for combatant service in the armed forces, turned more or less spontaneously to the formation of underground "resistance" groups, and started training, with such arms as they could get hold of, against the day when they might have to fight for their lives under a pitiless German occupation.

The largest and most important of these Jewish "armies" was the Hagana. Although officially illegal, it was sponsored more or less openly by the Jewish Agency, had branches in every settlement in Palestine, and was not actively molested by the British authorities. It is difficult justly to appreciate the mixed motives behind the foundation and development of Hagana. Like other Jewish illegal bodies it had its origin in the traditional self-defence organisations in the settlements. It was in part an instinctive reaction against the refusal of the British authorities, first to admit Palestinian Jews into any combatant unit, and subsequently to permit the formation of specifically Jewish combatant units. A dominant motive during 1940-41 was a desire to organise against the possibility of a German invasion. In addition to all this, there was, without doubt, a certain amount of infiltration into Hagana by members of terrorist minority groups, such as the Stern Group, and from the beginning Hagana was, in the eyes of many of its members, primarily the armed force of the future Jewish State. As the likelihood of German invasion receded, and as Jewish resentment against the Administration intensified, the terrorist complexion of Hagana deepened, and police action drove it

underground, where it helped to swell the membership of more irresponsible and more unscrupulous illegal groups.

The alarm manifested by the Administration at the illegal arming of the Jews is understandable. Having obtained what most of its members genuinely regarded as a satisfactory settlement in Palestine under the provisions of the 1939 White Paper, it was anxious on the one hand to suppress any sign of violent Jewish reaction to the White Paper, and on the other hand to avoid giving the Arabs any excuse for retaliatory action against the Jews. There were underground organisations in Palestine which could, without abuse of language, be described as terrorist. In the autumn of 1940 the liner "Patria", about to transport illegal immigrants to Mauritius, had been blown up in Haifa harbour by Jewish terrorists; Jewish terrorism was not a figment of anti-semitic imagination. It was an alarming symptom of genuine and deep resentment among the Jews of Palestine against the policy of the British Government and the attitude of the Palestine Administration.

At the same time there was an equally genuine desire among the Jews of Palestine to throw the whole weight of their resources into the scale against Nazi Germany. The Administration would have shown a generous wisdom if it had accepted the long-term risks of allowing this sentiment freely to express itself in action, and if it had encouraged from the outset the formation of Jewish combatant units recruited from the youth of Jewish Palestine. Instead, the Administration, with almost unbelievable persistence, devoted a large part of its fortunately inconsiderable energy and ability to preventing Palestinian Jews from fighting Hitler. By doing so it was instrumental in creating the exact situation it was presumably seeking to avoid—the formation of armed Jewish bands in violent opposition to the Administration. The members of the Palestine Administration made the mistake of thinking that the majority of Palestinian Jews were as parochially minded as they were themselves. Immersed in their administrative duties, which they did not perform very well, they seemed incapable of realising the passionate, neurotic desire of the average Palestine Jew to do something violent and spectacular in a war which he regarded as peculiarly his own concern. By frustrating legitimate aspirations the Administration encouraged illegal activity. By opposing at every step proposals which the pressure of events forced them

finally and reluctantly to acquiesce in, it helped to turn potential co-operation into active opposition. As has been said, there were long-term risks inherent in a policy of taking full advantage of the Jewish desire to participate in the war effort in ways chosen by them. These same risks were accepted by the Allied Governments when they encouraged the formation of resistance movements in the occupied countries of Europe. The war would not have been won if these risks had not been taken. The Palestine Administration, with singular perversity, started adopting long-term views about Palestine, in the middle of a World War, in an attempt to remedy a situation which had been created largely by its adherence to short-term views in the past. Characteristically its attempt to remedy the situation had the immediate effect of aggravating it.

The increasing bitterness with which the majority of Jews regarded the Administration created obvious difficulties for the Jewish Agency, the officially accredited liaison office between the Jewish population and the Administration. Such co-operation as had ever existed between the Administration and the Agency virtually ceased after the implementation of the 1939 White Paper. Even after the outbreak of war relations remained distant, since the co-operation which the Agency had offered and was giving to the war effort involved contact with the British military authorities rather than with the Administration. As time went on it became increasingly difficult for the Jewish Agency to harness Zionist resources wholeheartedly to the war effort and at the same time adequately to represent the political feelings of the majority of the Palestine Jews. The main difficulties arose not, at first, over terrorism, but over illegal immigration. During the first years of the war the Agency was able, without much trouble, to dissociate itself and the majority of Palestinian Jews from the activities of terrorist Jewish organisations such as the Stern Group. Illegal immigration was more difficult. During the whole course of the war, and particularly during the early years, fairly large numbers of Jews managed to escape from Europe, and naturally looked to Palestine as, at any rate, a temporary refuge. The Administration, fearful of the effect on Arab opinion of any departure from the immigration figures laid down in the White Paper (75,000 spread over a period of five years), but reluctant openly to refuse sanctuary to these wretched refugees, took the most exasperating course of all by retiring behind a zariba of

bureaucratic procrastination. Early in 1942 this procrastination produced a result which did more than anything else to unite Palestine Jewry against the Administration. A few hundred refugees from occupied Europe had managed to embark in an old and unseaworthy vessel called the "Struma", which was cruising aimlessly about the Black Sea pending permission from Jerusalem to proceed to Palestine to land its human cargo. While the Palestine authorities were interminably debating the matter, the "Struma" struck a mine and sank with most of its passengers. Jewish sentiment in Palestine was stirred to its depths. The Administration had been guilty of nothing more than its usual inability or unwillingness to apply the ordinary standards of common decency to any problem concerning Jews. But the tragedy of the "Struma" brought to a focus all the bitter resentment felt by Palestine Jewry at the unimaginative incomprehension with which the Administration implemented the immigration restrictions laid down in the White Paper. Up to the time of the sinking of the "Struma" terrorist activities had been genuinely deplored by the vast majority of Palestinian Jews. After the sinking of the "Struma" Jewish opinion became more and more reconciled to the necessity first of non-co-operation with and subsequently of active violence against an Administration which they regarded as irredeemably hostile to them.

The Jewish reaction to the "Struma" tragedy was of course unreasonable. A reasonable attitude was hardly to be expected in the circumstances. But it was the duty of the Administration, in this as in other matters, to take some account of the harrowing psychological stresses to which the Jews of Palestine were being subjected. In this as in other matters the Administration created its own difficulties by its refusal even to try to arrive at a sympathetic understanding of the human material with which it was dealing.

But, in spite of everything, the increasing stresses that were becoming apparent in Anglo-Zionist relations were cemented over by the common bond of war, so long as the Middle East remained within the zone of active hostilities. In spite of everything Anglo-Zionist co-operation remained more important than Anglo-Zionist dissensions. These dissensions did not interfere with the development of Jewish industry for war purposes, with the engagement of Jewish technicians and experts of all kinds in the service of the

war effort, with the recruitment of 20,000 Jewish men and women in the armed forces, with the innumerable and fruitful activities of half a million citizens of a civilization fighting for its life.

After the battle of Alamein the war receded from Palestine. There was no longer any serious prospect of defeat for the United Nations. There was no longer any fear of the invasion of Palestine. The sense of urgency departed as far as the war was concerned. Domestic politics began to claim their pre-war share of attention. The Jews no longer felt the same necessity for restraint in their fight against the White Paper. The Arabs began to adjust themselves to the certainty of continued British influence in the Middle East.

The Administration was committed to the White Paper, which represented the acceptance by the British Government of the views of "the man on the spot" (in the British, not the American, sense). The Arabs, deprived of the leadership of Haj Amin, and slightly embarrassed by his Axis affiliations, stood for an acceleration of the policy laid down in the White Paper. The Jews demanded a return to the policy originally envisaged in the Balfour Declaration.

The long interval of two and a half years between the battle of Alamein and the collapse of Germany was marked by a rising tempo of political activity, not only in Palestine, but in the whole of the Middle East. The immediate preoccupations of war were receding, but the prospect of political development was still remote. Military occupation, security censorship, political arrests and controls of every kind continued unabated. Beneath this restrictive network Arab politicians laboured to reorientate themselves in conformity with the shape of things to come. In Egypt the Wafd—once the spearhead of Anglophobe nationalism—had been elevated to power by the British in defiance of the wishes of the ambitious young King Faruq. Nuri Pasha Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, and another British protégé, journeyed importantly to and fro about the Middle East. American oil interests negotiated with Ibn Saud in his desert capital of Riyadh. The French in Syria, realising the inadequacy of the puppet President Tajeddin, installed after the Allied occupation in 1941, started negotiating with Shukry Kuwatly, the until-lately-exiled leader of the National Bloc. The British Foreign Office conceived the idea of perpetuating British influence in the Middle East by

an alliance with Arab nationalism, and the British Foreign Secretary gave his public blessing to the as yet scarcely conceived project of Arab unity. This project was welcomed enthusiastically by the Hashemite dynasties in Iraq and Transjordan, and by the Wafd Government in Egypt. Ibn Saud and the Syrian National Bloc were less enthusiastic.

But all the Arab states were united on the question of Palestine. If Great Britain wished to enjoy the benefits of Arab friendship there must be no retreat from the policy of the 1939 White Paper. In this, if in nothing else, the desert and the town were united.

Arab unity became the fashion among British Middle East "experts" in the same way as the Jewish National Home had been the fashion twenty-five years previously. The maintenance of the White Paper policy became almost an article of faith among those who earned a comfortable wartime living by disseminating unsolicited advice about Arab affairs. Appeasement, bombed out of Whitehall, raised its timorous head among the requisitioned flats of Qasr el Doubara.

Meanwhile more and more Jews were beginning to feel that it was necessary to reassert by force the ground that they had lost. The Jewish Agency tried desperately to retain its hold on Palestine Jewish nationalism and at the same time to leave the door open for peaceful negotiations with the British Government. For Zionism still had some diplomatic cards up its sleeve. Most of the more prominent members of the British Government—Churchill, Amery, Attlee, Sinclair, Morrison—had voted against the White Paper in 1939. Smuts, one of the most powerful personalities among the United Nations leaders, was known to be pro-Zionist. Both Republican and Democratic opinion in the United States favoured Zionism.

The Jewish Agency, and Zionism as a whole, had abandoned the negative policy of struggling against the White Paper. In 1942, after a certain amount of internal dissension within the Jewish Agency, the majority of the Zionist groups represented in the Jewish Agency adopted what came to be known as the Biltmore programme. This programme, which derived its name from a resolution passed at the Zionist Congress in 1938, embodied three main points: unlimited immigration, no restriction on land sales and development generally, and a Jewish State as the ultimate objective. The Biltmore programme thus went very much farther

than a return to the *status quo ante* the White Paper. It was a re-statement of the original Zionist interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. Although from the point of view of practical negotiations with the Mandatory Power this programme was very little more than a gesture of defiance, it was probably the minimum programme that would have enabled the Jewish Agency to command the continued support of Palestine Jewry. Wildly impracticable as the Biltmore programme may have seemed *vis-à-vis* the Mandatory Power, it was no more impracticable than a mere repudiation of the White Paper would have been *vis-à-vis* the overheated nationalism of Palestine Jewry.

If there was to be any hope for a peaceful settlement in Palestine, the Jewish Agency had to endeavour to bridge the gap between the maximum that Great Britain was likely to grant and the minimum that Palestine Jewry might be persuaded to accept. The gap was steadily getting wider. For Arab unity on the one hand provided the British Government with reasons for persevering in the White Paper policy, and on the other hand impressed Palestine Jewry still more powerfully with the future necessity for Jewish statehood. By the advocacy of the Biltmore programme Zionist leaders hoped to impress the rank and file of Palestine Jewry with the continued possibility of attaining Jewish nationalist aspirations by legitimate means. In this they were not altogether successful. The younger Jews of Palestine were becoming impatient with peaceful methods of agitation. Their minds had been harrowed by the fate of millions of their compatriots in Europe, a fate which some of them had narrowly escaped themselves. They were mindful of all that the Arabs had gained for their cause by methods of violence. They read with admiration of the deeds of the various resistance movements in occupied Europe. Hampered in taking an overt part in the fight against Nazi oppression, they became more and more attracted to the prospect of a covert fight against what they regarded as oppression at home. The scaffold acquired something of the glamour of the battlefield.

The methods evolved by the Jewish terrorists differed widely from those that had been adopted by the Arabs during the rebellion. The Arabs formed the majority of the people of Palestine. The hill districts were almost entirely Arab. Arabs were numerous even in predominantly Jewish districts in the

plains. Thus Arab bands could operate in force and with comparative immunity in the hill districts, and were also assured of information and assistance when operating in the plains. The Arab rebels were mostly peasants, or of peasant descent, well suited for guerilla warfare, ill-fitted for urban sabotage. The Jewish terrorists, on the other hand, had to operate in a country where the Jews were in a minority, and mostly concentrated either in the towns or in sharply defined rural settlements. They had for the most part an urban outlook. They lacked the fieldcraft and local knowledge of the Arabs, but possessed technical aptitudes denied to the Arabs. Thus circumstances led the Jewish terrorists to urban sabotage just as surely as they had led the Arabs to guerilla warfare. Tradition may also have had something to do with it. While the Arabs thought in terms of Lawrence and Feisal and hereditary memories of the "ghazzu", the Jews tended to take as their models such past masters of illegality as the Nihilists of Czarist Russia and the Anarchists of Spain.

The Jewish Agency and responsible Zionist leaders generally continued to deplore, both publicly and privately, the rising tide of Jewish terrorism. Apart from any humanitarian considerations they realised that this terrorism jeopardised the attainment of the very objects it was intended to promote. For there was no real substance in the terrorist argument, implicit rather than stated, that as Arab terrorism had forced the hand of the Mandatory Power so Jewish terrorism could do the same. This argument was fallacious for several reasons. First the Mandatory Power was a very different proposition in 1944 to what it had been in 1939. It was infinitely stronger both morally and materially and infinitely less likely to submit to humiliation. Secondly, while the Mandatory Power had been actively or passively opposed by neighbouring Arab states in its efforts to deal with Arab terrorism, it could rely, if necessary, on the active support of these states in suppressing Jewish terrorism. But the most important practical argument of all against Zionist terrorism arose from the circumstance that the case for Zionism stood or fell by the support which it received from the sort of people outside Palestine who placed enlightenment, progress, humanity and morality above expediency. Jewish terrorism, if unchecked, risked losing for Zionism much of that support in Great Britain and U.S.A. on which it depended for its continued useful existence.

At the same time the Jewish Agency found a not unnatural difficulty in co-operating wholeheartedly with the Administration in the suppression of Jewish terrorism. The Jews of Palestine as a whole no longer regarded the terrorists as criminals, but, at worst, as misguided enthusiasts. They realised the necessity, from the Administration's point of view, of tracking them down and of punishing them, sometimes with death, when they were tracked down. But they were not prepared to see their neighbours nor their representatives assisting the police in tracking them down. This was an illogical attitude. Terrorism was either desirable or it was undesirable. If it was undesirable the sooner it was suppressed the better, and the more help that was given to the authorities the sooner it would be suppressed. That the Administration resented the attitude of the Jewish public and the Jewish Agency is understandable. But it showed little appreciation either of the difficulties of the Jewish Agency or of the psychology of the Jewish people. As had happened so often in the history of the Palestine Mandate the Administration's inability to appreciate the psychology of the people it was supposed to be administering exacerbated an already dire situation.

It was becoming apparent to the outside world that the Administration's policy of a wooden adherence to the provisions of the 1939 White Paper was simply not adequate to the situation. It was necessary either to advance beyond or to retreat from the White Paper. It was not going to be possible for the British Government or for the Administration to use the White Paper as an intellectual Maginot Line to defend themselves from the necessity for constructive thought.

In March 1944 the five-year period laid down in the White Paper, after which there was to be no more Jewish immigration into Palestine without Arab consent, came to an end. The Administration announced that Jewish immigration up to the total of 75,000 laid down in the White Paper would continue even though the five-year period had expired. It was a gracious concession by the Administration to the fact that there was a war on. The Maginot Line had been breached. The White Paper was no longer sacrosanct.

In August 1944, a few weeks before the Presidential Elections in the United States, both the Democratic and the Republican Party Conventions passed resolutions in favour of unrestricted

Jewish immigration into Palestine.

At about the same time Sir Harold MacMichael left Palestine after a term of six years as High Commissioner. Just before his departure a fortunately unsuccessful attempt was made on his life by Jewish terrorists. He left Palestine without any very kindly feelings towards the Jews. The Jews on their side certainly had very few kindly feelings towards the man whose term as High Commissioner had been marked by the virtual abandonment of the policy of the Balfour Declaration. The Arabs feared that his departure might presage a return to the policy set out in the Mandate, a document which the retiring High Commissioner had not appeared to regard very seriously.

In September 1944 an Arab Unity Conference, attended by delegates from all the Arab states, met in Alexandria. Among the delegates was one from Palestine, Musa al Alami, who had been chosen with some difficulty from the welter of local rivalries to which politics in Arab Palestine had been reduced since the departure of Haj Amin for German occupied Europe. Beneath the somewhat exiguous cloak of Arab Unity there were a great many dissensions. Ibn Saud and the Syrian National Bloc were bitterly opposed to the Hashemite representatives from Iraq and Transjordan. Nahas Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt, was distrustful of Ibn Saud. The Christian Lebanese were distrustful as always of Moslem domination. Imam Yehia of the Yemen distrusted everyone and everything. Most of the delegates considered that the Conference had been convened by Nahas Pasha as an opportunity for enhancing his waning personal prestige in Egypt. (He was in fact dismissed from office less than two months after the Conference.) As usual, Palestine provided the great standby. It was a subject on which all the delegates could agree, and, moreover, was a subject on which no immediate action appeared to be either practicable or necessary. The Conference produced an agreed programme of action which came to be known as the Alexandria Protocol, providing for political, economic and cultural co-operation between the Arab States, and pledging the Arab States to the support of the national aspirations of the Palestine Arabs.

In November 1944 Lord Moyne, the British Minister of State in the Middle East, was assassinated by Jewish terrorists outside his residence in Cairo. It was a particularly senseless crime, since

Lord Moyne was believed to be a good deal more sympathetic towards Zionism than were most high British officials in the Middle East. Moreover that section of world opinion that was sympathetic to Zionism was not likely to feel that the case for Zionism had been strengthened by the assassination of a man whom the Zionists had no reason to regard in any sense as an enemy.

By the beginning of 1945 the problem of Palestine was susceptible of being viewed with a greater measure of detachment than had been the case for some years. What remained of European Jewry had been or was about to be liberated. The Arabs no longer possessed a potential nuisance value as far as the war effort was concerned. The propaganda of the various pro-Arab and pro-Zionist "pressure groups" could be assessed with a judgment not too much clouded either by pity or by panic. It was generally appreciated that the 1939 White Paper was not the result of a considered policy but simply a concession to force. No serious attempt had ever been made to justify it on any other ground. It was clear that the White Paper "policy" was due to be superseded by a real policy based on constructive, calm and impartial thinking.

By the summer of 1945 the end of the war with Germany and the prospect of an early General Election in Great Britain combined to bring the affairs of Palestine to a focus in time for the World Zionist Congress, the first since 1939, which was to be held in London in August.

The end of the war with Germany had increased the possibilities without greatly decreasing the need of providing a home in Palestine for many thousands of the remnants of European Jewry, who seemed likely to be as much of outcasts in the New Chaos as they had been under the New Order. For Zionists the work of rescue assumed a practical and urgent form. To them, if not to others, it was apparent that no real rehabilitation of European Jewry could take place in Europe. To them, if not to others, it was apparent that anti-Semitism in Europe had not died with Hitler, and that the appalling economic conditions in Europe rendered its continuance certain. The possibilities of life for Jews in Europe had contracted even more drastically than had the Jewish population of Europe. When so many were short of the necessities of life it was tolerably certain that the Jews would get nothing.

With regard to the forthcoming Elections, the British Labour

Party was, on the whole, committed to an abandonment of the White Paper policy. Indeed, at the Labour Party Conference in April 1945 Mr. Dalton, at that time regarded as the Labour Party's spokesman in foreign affairs, had made a declaration in favour of a Jewish State in Palestine. On the other hand it seemed probable that the Conservative Party, if returned to power, would be influenced in its attitude to Palestine by a compact and determined group of Arab Unity enthusiasts led by General Spears.

Meanwhile the Arab League, as it is now styled, had not made any very decisive progress since the Alexandria Conference. A number of meetings of representatives of the Arab states had been held to discuss the implementation of the programme laid down in the Alexandria Protocol, a permanent Arab League Secretariat had been set up in Cairo to provide machinery for initiating common policies. The Arab States, including Syria and the Lebanon, received and accepted invitations to the San Francisco Conference. Contacts were made with independence movements in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

Coincident with all these formalities a situation was developing in the Levant which provided a test for the reality of the League proclaimed in the Alexandria Protocol. Ever since General Catroux, on the eve of the Allied occupation of the Levant States in 1941, had promised independence to Syria and the Lebanon, the French had been trying to make the implementation of that independence conditional on the two States concluding treaties with France analogous to those which Egypt and Iraq had concluded with Great Britain. The return of France to effective statehood in the autumn of 1944, and the consequent partial restoration of French prestige and material resources, caused the French to be more peremptory in their demands for a Treaty. After the Lebanese crisis of November 1943 the French had handed over most of the administrative services to the local Governments, but retained control of the Syrian and Lebanese armed forces with the intention of using their handing over as a bargaining counter in their demands for a Treaty. The two States maintained their attitude of refusal to grant a privileged position to France or to any other foreign Power. Negotiations, which became more and more acrimonious on both sides, continued throughout the winter and into the spring of 1945. The repre-

sentatives of the Arab League continued talking about Palestine, where no immediate action was required, but showed no disposition to take an active interest in French pressure on the Levant States in a matter which clearly affected the independence of the two States.

The outbreak of violence in Syria in May 1945 was the logical outcome of Syrian resistance to increasing French pressure. The Arab States, which had done nothing to try to counter that pressure, were naturally unprepared to assist Syria in combating French violence. It was left to Great Britain to intervene and to substitute a British for a French occupation of Syria. The immediate effect of this intervention, as far as the Middle East was concerned, was to make the Arab League look ridiculous. It was as if the United States had cut across the interminable debating at Geneva in 1935-36 and thrown the Italians out of Abyssinia themselves.

After the Syrian episode, the Arab States, while preserving the façade of the Arab League, concentrated mainly, as far as foreign affairs were concerned, on the furtherance of their various national aspirations. Egypt, under a Government bitterly opposed to Nahas Pasha and the Wafd, began pressing on Great Britain its demands for the evacuation of British troops, for a revision of the 1936 Treaty, for the handing over of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, etc. Iraq became fully occupied with a Kurdish rebellion. Numerous successive Syrian and Lebanese Governments became immersed in their future relations with France and with each other. Ibn Saud concentrated on strengthening his hold on the Arabian Peninsula by means of American gold obtained in exchange for Arabian oil.

It is improbable that the lesson of the Franco-Syrian clash was lost either on the Palestine Arabs, or on the British Government, or on the World Zionist Congress which met in London at the beginning of August, a week after the accession of a Labour Government to power in Great Britain.

Although the trend of Zionist thought was well known, as were the views of the Jewish Agency, there had been no opportunity for an authoritative Zionist pronouncement on Palestine since the previous Zionist Congress in 1939. In April 1945 the Jewish Agency had requested the British Government for an immediate grant of 100,000 immigration certificates to meet some

of the more urgent needs of Jews in liberated Europe. The Agency had followed this up a month later by a formal demand for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. It was to be expected that the Zionist Congress would endorse these demands. In fact the "political declaration" issued at the end of the Congress went a good deal further. The first part of the declaration was devoted to an attack on the White Paper, which it described as "the repudiation of an international pledge". It pointed out that the White Paper had been issued and implemented without the approval of the League of Nations, and without consultation with U.S.A. It recalled that the Permanent Mandates Committee at Geneva had declared the White Paper incompatible with the Mandate, and claimed that, but for the White Paper, a certain number of the 6,000,000 Jews who had been murdered in Europe would have been able to get to Palestine. It stigmatised the White Paper as a concession to Arab terrorism which had failed to accomplish its purpose since, in the event, the Jews had been the only national entity in the Middle East that had given whole-hearted assistance to the Allies. The declaration went on to demand that Palestine "undivided and undiminished" should be constituted as a Jewish State "in accordance with the purpose of the Balfour Declaration". A truculent paragraph was added warning the British Government against any "delays or half-measures" in implementing this demand. The declaration, concluded by endorsing the Jewish Agency's request for the establishment of a Jewish state, which embodied the following demands:—

- (a) An immediate decision to establish Palestine as a Jewish State.
- (b) Investment of the Jewish Agency with the necessary authority to bring to Palestine as many Jews as possible and to develop the resources of the country so as to provide for increased immigration.
- (c) The floating of an international loan to assist the settlement of "the first million" Jews in Palestine.
- (d) Reparations in kind from Germany as a contribution to the development of Palestine.
- (e) International facilities for transit of Jews wishing to settle in Palestine.

The condemnation of the White Paper said little more than what a

great many people outside the ranks of Zionism thought and said about it. In its references to the massacres of Jews in Europe the declaration made a telling point when it stated that such massacres would not have taken place if the Jewish nation had had the advantage of statehood. The demand for the constitution of Palestine "undivided and undiminished" as a Jewish state, and the reference to the "first million" Jewish immigrants cannot be regarded as being on the same plane of realism. The Zionists have erred before in overrating the importance of international influences operating in their favour, but it is difficult to believe that on this occasion they misjudged outside opinion so seriously as to believe that these demands would command any practical support from other than Jewish opinion.

Behind the intransigent façade of the "political declaration" the immediate practical objectives for Zionism at the conclusion of the Zionist Congress would seem to have been (a) a relaxation of the White Paper immigration restrictions so as to enable an immediate and substantial immigration of Jews from Europe to Palestine, and (b) the ultimate creation of a Jewish State which would consist not of Palestine "undivided and undiminished", but of at least as much territory as was allotted to the Jewish State by the Peel Commission.

These objectives would carry with them a considerable body of support both in Great Britain and in the United States. Without such support Zionism can achieve nothing. It is open to doubt whether the Zionist Congress was wise in presenting demands which would not command that support which is essential to Zionism. On the other hand it may be argued that the rank and file of Zionism would have accepted nothing less from its leaders, and that it would in any case have been a tactical error to have started off what was clearly destined to be a process of bargaining by the announcement of demands that would admit of no subsequent compromise. Provided that the Zionist leaders do not really regard their publicised demands as practicable the content of the declaration is unimportant. What is important for the future of Zionism as for the future of Palestine is that the Zionist leaders do not, in expectation of outside support which they are unlikely to receive, lose their sense of what is politically possible.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Zionist Congress it was

announced that President Truman, after receiving information from General Eisenhower about the plight of the displaced Jews in Europe, had asked the British Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, to authorise the immediate entry into Palestine of 100,000 European Jews. This, combined with the "political declaration" of the Zionist Congress, was the signal for an intensification of political activity concerning Palestine, both in Palestine itself, in the Middle East, and in the world at large. It was also the signal for an intensification of Jewish terrorist activity inside Palestine. Palestine was once more in the headlines. Zionist leaders openly advocated mass illegal immigration. Arab statesmen despatched telegrams and held conferences. British military reinforcements arrived in Palestine. President Truman summoned his Middle East diplomatic representatives to Washington, presumably in order to obtain more objective information about the situation than was available from the various "pressure groups" inside the United States. The British Government, including Mr. Dalton, whose indiscreet utterances at Blackpool about Palestine must have been a source of embarrassment to his colleagues, remained silent. Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, interviewed Dr. Weizmann and the Secretary-General of the Arab League. Several bombs were thrown by Jewish terrorists in Palestine. Special correspondents in Palestine cabled mainly mendacious despatches to their respective newspapers. The Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government announced that 65,000 out of the total of 75,000 immigrants laid down in the White Paper had already been admitted to Palestine. He added that this figure included 10,000 illegal immigrants who had been deducted from the quota. President Truman told a Press Conference that Mr. Attlee had rejected his request for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine. On "Balfour Day"—November 2nd, the 28th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration—there was an outbreak of sabotage by Hagana in Palestine, and anti-Jewish riots in several Arab cities outside Palestine, notably Cairo and Tripoli.

A statement of policy from the Mandatory Power was becoming imperative, but continued to be delayed owing to negotiations between the British and U.S. Governments. It was apparent that the U.S. Government, while prepared publicly to criticise and advise the British Government on the subject of Palestine, was

unwilling to share with the British Government the responsibility for deciding on the policy to be pursued in Palestine. It was also apparent that the British Government was endeavouring to persuade the U.S. Government to take some share in the solution of difficulties which had been considerably exacerbated by the publication of President Truman's request to Mr. Attlee, to say nothing of the official attitude of the two major American political parties.

One of the main effects of President Truman's request, motivated as it was by a desire to relieve the plight of the remnants of European Jewry, was to link the problem of Palestine even more closely with the problem of the disposal of European Jewry. The Arab League had made it impossible to regard Palestine as merely a problem in British colonial administration. President Truman had made it impossible to regard Palestine as merely a problem in British imperial policy. This aspect was underlined by the British Government's announcement that the Foreign Secretary, and not the Colonial Secretary, would in due course make the Government's statement of policy in Palestine to the House of Commons.

It remained uncertain whether the U.S. Government would accept the implication of President Truman's intervention. It was for the British Government to try to impress on the U.S. Government the lesson which British statesmen had learnt with difficulty during the course of the nineteenth century—that the assumption of moral leadership is incompatible with political isolationism.

Meanwhile it had been announced that the High Commissioner, Lord Gort, had resigned on grounds of ill-health. His resignation at such a time inevitably led to rumours that he was in disagreement with the policy about to be announced by the British Government. These rumours were subsequently discounted, in part, by the news that Lord Gort had undergone a serious operation immediately after his return to London. His departure from Palestine was regretted by both Arabs and Jews, who had found his friendliness refreshing after the Olympian inaccessibility of Sir Harold MacMichael.

On November 13th, while Mr. Attlee was in the United States conferring with President Truman about the atomic bomb, Mr. Bevin made the British Government's long-awaited statement of

policy about Palestine to the House of Commons. He announced that the United States Government had agreed to participate in a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, which was to be appointed by the British and U.S. Governments and charged with the task of making *ad interim* and, finally, permanent recommendations for the future of Palestine and for the disposal of European Jewry. The Terms of Reference of the Committee were to be as follows:—

“To examine the political, economic and social conditions in Palestine as they bear on the problem of Jewish immigration and settlement therein, and the well-being of the peoples now living therein.

“To examine the position of the Jews in those countries in Europe where they have been the victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution and the practical measures taken or contemplated to be taken in those countries to enable them to live free from discrimination and oppression; and to make estimates of those who wish or will be impelled by their condition to migrate to Palestine or other countries outside Europe.

“To hear the views of competent witnesses and to consult representative Arabs and Jews on the problems of Palestine in so far as such problems are affected by the conditions subject to examination under paras. (i) and (ii) above, and by other relevant facts and circumstances, and to make recommendations to His Majesty's Government and to the Government of the United States for the *ad interim* handling of these problems as well as for their permanent solution.

“To make such other recommendations to His Majesty's Government and the Government of the United States as may be necessary to meet immediate needs arising from the conditions subject to examination under para. (ii) above, by remedial action in the European countries in question or by the provision of facilities for emigration to and settlement in countries outside Europe.”

Having placed the whole future of Palestine *sub judice* pending the recommendations of the Joint Committee, it was obviously impossible for Mr. Bevin to add anything very illuminating to his announcement. He went on to say that the Arabs would be consulted with a view to making arrangements to ensure that Jewish immigration would continue at the existing monthly rate

pending the *ad interim* recommendations of the Committee, and added suitable platitudes about the British Government's determination to deal resolutely with any attempts at influencing policy by a display of violence. (Mr. Bevin's announcement about immigration was not clear. At the time of his speech there were about 10,000 immigrants still to come in under the provisions of the White Paper in respect of whom no consultation with the Arabs was necessary. As the "existing rate" of immigration was about 1,500 per month, this meant about another six months of "White Paper" immigration. Assuming that the Joint Committee would take more than six months over its *ad interim* recommendations, it is difficult to imagine that any satisfactory arrangement about the continuance of Jewish immigration after that period could be achieved as a result of consultations with the Arabs.)

At a Press Conference after his announcement Mr. Bevin claimed that the Labour Party had never pledged itself to the establishment of a Jewish State, and emphasised the Government's view that the obligation of assisting in the establishment of a Jewish National Home did not necessarily involve the creation of a Jewish State.

The statement of policy was received with reserve by both Arab and Jewish leaders. Both, as was to be expected, expressed disappointment, but both seemed inclined to delay final judgment. The Arabs realised that the Foreign Secretary's announcement foreshadowed the abandonment of the White Paper policy and its substitution by a policy which would almost certainly be less favourable to the Arabs than the White Paper had been. The Zionists were perturbed by Mr. Bevin's emphatic denial of Great Britain's obligation to establish a Jewish State. But both sides realised that the occasion called for diplomatic rather than direct action, and to that extent the announcement brought about a relaxation of tension in Palestine.

The Arab League prepared to meet in Cairo, the Zionist Executive in Jerusalem.

The Arab League was quick to realise the urgent necessity of uniting the various political parties of Arab Palestine sufficiently to enable a re-created Higher Committee to be formed which would, in conjunction with the Arab League, represent Arab Palestine *vis-à-vis* the Joint Committee. Consequently Jamil Mardam, Foreign Minister of Syria, and an experienced negotiator

went to Jerusalem to confer with the Palestine Arab leaders. His task was not an easy one. There were about as many political parties in Palestine as there were political leaders. The absence of the Mufti, who had fallen into French hands after the collapse of Germany, and the continued detention of Jamal Husseini in Northern Rhodesia (his release was announced at the end of November, just after Jamil Mardam had succeeded in securing some sort of united Palestine Arab representation in time for the meeting of the Arab League in Cairo) deprived Arab Palestine of the only effective leadership it had enjoyed during the period of the Mandate. At the same time a too insistent demand for the Mufti's return would, in view of his wartime record, risk alienating Anglo-American sympathies.

The difficulties of the Arab League were not diminished by the action of the Amir Abdulla of Transjordan, who chose this singularly inopportune moment for advocating the creation of a Greater Syria, comprising Palestine, Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon, in close concert with Iraq, and under Hashemite rule. This announcement produced angry disagreement from Saudi Arabia, provoked indignant protest from the Lebanon, and revealed the endemic rivalry existing in Syrian political circles between Saudite and Hashemite supporters. In the flurry caused by the Amir's gaff the needs of Palestine seemed temporarily to have been forgotten.

The Zionist leaders, too, were having their troubles. Jewish public opinion in Palestine was becoming more and more restive, and there were indications that Hagana was acting quite independently of the Jewish Agency and in a much more extreme role than heretofore. At the beginning of November a carefully planned attack was made on the Palestine railway system which involved a large-scale para-military operation by Hagana. There was a spontaneous outburst of rioting in Tel Aviv. At a time when it was more than ever desirable to make a favourable impression on Anglo-American opinion, the Zionist leaders were finding that they had lost, to a greater extent than ever before, the power of controlling their followers.

While the Arab and Jewish leaders were wrestling with their internal difficulties, Sir Alan Cunningham, Lord Gort's successor, arrived in Palestine, and negotiations proceeded between the British and U.S. Governments regarding the composition of the

Joint Committee.

American participation in the Committee of Inquiry can be regarded as a diplomatic success for the Labour Government, although the value of such participation will necessarily be dependent on the willingness of the U.S. Government to assist in implementing the recommendations of the Committee. Having established the principle of combining a solution in Palestine with a solution of the problem of European Jewry, the British and U.S. Governments are committed to making a contribution themselves to the latter problem as a preliminary to imposing on Arabs and Jews a solution of the former problem. If the U.S.A. and the British Empire are prepared to accept a substantial volume of Jewish immigration themselves, it will be possible for them to approach the Palestine problem with clean hands and a clear conscience. In that event, and in the event of the U.S. Government lending the weight of its active support to whatever recommendations the Joint Committee may put forward, the diplomatic success of the British Government may well prove to be something substantially more than a mere diplomatic success.

In any event, the British Government, with or without the co-operation of the U.S. Government, is committed, by the pressure of events if by nothing else, to provide a peaceful and constructive solution in Palestine. It is not beyond the powers of our imperial race.

The Joint Committee is faced with the immediate necessity of recommending a temporary policy, and with the ultimate responsibility of recommending a permanent policy, for Palestine. Neither the continued enforcement nor the mere abandonment of the White Paper is compatible with the maintenance of organised government and the prospect of orderly progress in Palestine. A temporary compromise is, no doubt, possible. The Jews can be temporarily appeased by a partial relaxation of the immigration restrictions of the White Paper. The Arabs can perhaps be temporarily reassured by the maintenance of the principle of the White Paper policy. Such a temporary compromise may indeed be justified in view of the numerous and formidable preoccupations of the United Nations. But such a temporary compromise is no substitute for a permanent policy, which will have to be something more than a mere averaging out of two rival claims.

It is sometimes forgotten, in connection with Palestine, that the main object of the Mandatory system is to prepare the inhabitants of the Mandated territories for self-government, and finally for independence. In the case of the Class A Mandates, of which Palestine is one, this process was regarded as being a short-term administrative rather than a long-term educational problem. The other Class A Mandates have already passed through self-government to independence. Transjordan, included in the Palestine Mandate, has long since been self-governing in its internal affairs. In Palestine even such limited municipal self-government as has been granted has, in many cases, had to be revoked. This is not, of course, due to the incapacity of the inhabitants, nor to the deficiencies of the Administration. It is because Arabs and Jews have been unable to agree even over the simplest matters of routine procedure. Constitutional progress in Palestine is conditional on the attainment of a *modus vivendi* between Arabs and Jews which would enable each community, while maintaining its own identity and aspirations, to co-operate on an *ad hoc* basis in the affairs of everyday administration. This condition exists to a lesser extent to-day than ever before. There is now practically no social or economic contact between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. There is a legacy of twenty-five years of bitterness and estrangement. All of those circumstances which reluctantly drove the Peel Commission to the conclusion that partition was the only practicable solution persist to-day in an even more intransigent form than in 1937. There has been no progress towards self-government in the intervening years. There is less self-government in Palestine now than in the most backward colony in the British Empire.

The Joint Committee will have to consider whether there is any justification for continuing to unite under a single administration two communities who profess different religions, speak different languages, have widely different social customs and standards of life, who cherish mutually incompatible political aspirations, and who are actuated by bitterly hostile sentiments towards one another. Those who are acquainted with the Lebanon will be aware how destructive of national unity, administrative efficiency and political and economic progress are the competing claims of the various communities which make up the Lebanese State. But the differences between Maronites and Druzes, between Sunnis

and Shias, fade into insignificance beside the blank wall of distrust and incomprehension which separates Arabs and Jews in Palestine.

The administrative difficulties of partition are as formidable as they were in 1937, but they are by no means as formidable as are the administrative and psychological difficulties of creating a composite Arab-Jewish State out of present-day Palestine. To-day the term "Palestinian" is meaningless as applied to a person, except for the purposes of official classification. There is no living reality behind the status of Palestine citizenship. The Arabs and Jews regard each other as cuckoos in the nest. Partition would merely give administrative and political sanction to a social and psychological reality.

It may be said that it is absurd to partition a country about the size of Wales. It may be urged that the geographical distribution of Arabs and Jews does not lend itself to a plan of partition. It may be objected that partition would ruin both Arabs and Jews economically. It may be argued that the hostility between Arabs and Jews which is advanced as a reason for the necessity of partition would in itself make partition unworkable. But, when all is said, what is the alternative ?

APPENDIX

MANDATE FOR PALESTINE, together with a Note by the Secretary-General relating to its application to the Territory known as Trans-Jordan, under the provisions of Article 25.

MANDATE FOR PALESTINE

The Council of the League of Nations :

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country ; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine ; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval ; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions ; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 [paragraph 8], it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations ;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows :

Article 1.

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

Article 2.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

Article 3.

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

Article 4.

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

Article 5.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.

Article 6.

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

Article 7.

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

Article 8.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine.

Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their

non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately re-established in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

Article 9.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

Article 10.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

Article 11.

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

Article 12.

The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequaturs to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

Article 13.

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected

herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect ; and providing also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

Article 14.

A special Commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

Article 15.

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

Article 16.

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

Article 17.

The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

Article 18.

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations [including companies incorporated under its laws] as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

Article 19.

The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

Article 20.

The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

Article 21.

The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nations of all States Members of the League of Nations.

[1]

"Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year A.D. 1700.

[2]

The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorisation referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

[3]

No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

[4]

Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

[5]

No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

[6]

Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

[7]

Authorisation to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorisations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

[8]

The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

Article 22.

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

Article 23.

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

Article 24.

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

Article 25.

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which

is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

Article 26

The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 27.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 28.

In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

Certified true copy:

FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL.

RAPPARD,

Director of the Mandates Section.

NOTE

GENEVA,

September 23rd, 1922.

ARTICLE 25 OF THE PALESTINE MANDATE

Territory known as Trans-Jordan

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to communicate for the information of the Members of the League, a memorandum relating to Article 25 of the Palestine Mandate presented by the British Government to the Council of the League on September 16th, 1922.

The memorandum was approved by the Council subject to the decision taken at its meeting in London on July 24th, 1922, with regard to the coming into force of the Palestine and Syrian mandates.

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE

- 1 Article 25 of the Mandate for Palestine provides as follows:—

“In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this Mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.”

2. In pursuance of the provisions of this Article, His Majesty's Government invite the Council to pass the following resolution:—

“The following provisions of the Mandate for Palestine are not applicable to the territory known as Trans-Jordan, which comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from a point two miles west of the town of Akaba on the Gulf of that name up the centre of the Wady Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk; thence up the centre of that river to the Syrian Frontier.”

Preamble.—Recitals 2 and 3.

Article 2.—The words “placing the country under such political administration and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and”.

Article 4.

Article 6.

Article 7.—The sentence “There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.”

Article 11.—The second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph.

Article 13.

Article 14.

Article 22.

Article 23.

In the application of the Mandate to Trans-Jordan, the action which, in Palestine, is taken by the Administration of the latter country, will be taken by the Administration of Trans-Jordan under the general supervision of the Mandatory.

3. His Majesty's Government accept full responsibility as Mandatory for Trans-Jordan, and undertake that such provision as may be made for the administration of that territory in accordance with Article 25 of the Mandate shall be in no way inconsistent with those provisions of the Mandate which are not by this resolution declared inapplicable.

INDEX.

A

- Abbassids, 17-18
 Abdel Latif Bey Salah, 151-2
 Abdel Rahim, 213-4
 Abdel Razzak, 213
 Abdul Hamid II, Sultan, 22-3, 25
 Abdul Wahab, 24
 Abdulla, son of King Hussein, 26-7, 29; Amir of Transjordan, 52; attempted mediation in general strike, Palestine, 162; attitude to Palestinian Arabs, 165-6; advocacy of a Greater Syria, 257
 Abyssinia, invaded by Italy, 140
 Administration, *see* Mandate, Palestine
 Advisory Council, 119
 Agrippa, 15
 Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, 151
 Al Ahd, 24
 Al Fatat, 24-6
 Alexander the Great, 13
 Alexandretta, 28
 Alexandria Protocol, 247, 249
 Ali, son of Hussein, 29
 Amery, Mr., 127, 219, 243
 Andrews, Mr. L. Y., 185, 234
 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Palestine, 255-6, 258-9
 Antipas, 15
 Antonius, George, 212
 Arab Agency, proposed, 119
 Arab Congress, 75, 79, 119, 185
 Arab Defence Committee, 204, 209
 Arab Higher Committee, 151-2; appealed to during strike, 155; connection with rebel army, 156-7; efforts to stop the strike, 163-6; mediation of Ibn Saud, 165-6; attitude to Peel Commission, 174; Husseini-Nashashibi faction, 174-8; Committee declared to be illegal, 185; return of deportees allowed, 210-1; London Conference, 212
 Arab League, 249; Palestine and Syria, 250; national aspirations, 250; Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 256-7
 Arab State, of the McMahon correspondence, 31; Sykes-Picot Agreement, 39
 Arab Unity Conference, 1944, 247
 Arabia, under Ottoman rule, 20; nationalism, 24; War of 1914 and revolt against Turkey, 26; McMahon negotiations, 26-9; united by Lawrence, 30; independence confined to, 43; attitude to Palestinian disturbances, 165, 169
 Arabic language, 20, 21; revival of, 22
 Arabs :
 occupation of Syria in 7th century, 16-17; influence of in Syria and Iraq, 17; power of Turks in Arab empire, 17; disintegration of, 17-18; disappearance of Arabs from history, 20; national movements, 24; independence of all Arabs, 27-9; boundaries discussed, 28; British "pledge", 29, 31; Arab revolt against Turkey, 29-32; Arab attitude to Balfour Declaration, 43-6; Arab independence and Palestine, 44-5; revolt linked with Syrian nationalism, 48, 50; pan-Arabism and British policy, 52, 67, 101, 169; Arab revolt and Palestine Mandate, 91;
 Arabs, Palestine :
 Characteristics, social structure, 65, 66, 68; attitude to post-war settlement, 66; aspirations, 66-7; social conditions, 69-70, 78-9, 102-3, 106; slump of 1927 and 1935, 69-70; boom years, 1933-4, 78-9; economic conditions, necessity for increased productivity, 103, 106; economic stagnation, 108; losses caused by the strike, 170
 Parties and factions, 80, 134; Husseini and Nashashibi factions, 71, 80, 118-9, 174-5, 178, 209-10
 Land sales to Jews. *See* Land Sales
 Arab-Jewish relations, fear of Jews and Bolshevism, 68; anti-Jewish propaganda, 76-7; co-operation not advanced, 120; Wailing Wall incidents, 1929, 123; increased fear and resentment, 1930, 131-2; attitude towards arms smuggling, 145; violence during strike, 154
 Nationalism, under the Mandate, 75-8, 80, 97, 120; minority states envisaged, 55-6; immigra-

tion and nationalism, 91-2; Arab nationalism a challenge to British position, 133; revised tactics, 134; identity of views, three demands 145, 152; extent of nationalism evidenced by general strike, 169, 176-7; satisfaction at abandonment of partition policy, 209; White Paper, 1939, 220-1, 235, 242; Arab leaders and a German victory, 236; Anglo-American Committee, 255;

Riots and rebellion, 70-1, 99-100; in 1920, 115; in 1921, 116; anti-British attitude, 97-100; co-operation rejected, 119; strikes 1925, 120; policy of violence, 122; directed against the Administration, 1933, 132-3; propaganda, 134; causes leading to rebellion, 138-56; the rebel army, 156-7, 163; growth, organisation, methods, 223-4; effect of feuds, 227; the general strike, 151-66; attitude of Administration towards disarming rebels, 166-7; Casualties, 167; organised active resistance, 177, 184;

Rebellion, second phase, 1937, 190-207; rebel summary courts, 191-2; military actions, 192-3; terrorist activity, 193; finance of rebellion, 194 203, 206; a struggle for power led by the Mufti, 197; situation worsens, 199-202; boycott of travel regulations, 206; rebellion ending, 213; continues during London Conference, 217; Casualties, 1938 214; attitude of Arabs to the rebellion, 229-31; relation to the national movement, 231-2

Aramaic, 21

Archelaus, 15

Arlosoroff, Dr., murder of, 136

Arms smuggling, 144

Artaxerxes, 13

Asquith, Mr., 39

Assyria, Empire of, 10

Attlee, Mr., 243, 253-4

Auni Bey Abdel Hadi, 151, 162, 165, 212

Austria-Hungary, and Syria, 21; Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25

B

Babylon, inhabitants of Judah settled in, 11; conquest by Medes and Persians, 11; progress of Jewish colony, 13

Baghdad, vilayet, 28

Bagoses, 13

Balfour, Lord A. J., 39-40; visit to Palestine, 1925, 120

Balfour Declaration, 33-42, 43, 117; and Syrian nationalists, 44-5; Arab attitude to, 46; Zionist Organisation and Peace Conference, 49-50; incorporated in Palestine Mandate, 53-5, 117; British policy, 1919-1939, 235; Jewish desire for policy of the Declaration, 1939, 242, 251

Bar Cochba's rebellion, 16

Bari Radio Station, 142

Basra, vilayet, 28

Battershill, Mr., 186

Beni Israel, 9-10

Ben Yussuf, Shlomo, executed, 198-9

Berlin Conference, 1878, 22

Bevin, Mr., 253; statement on Palestine, 254-6

Beybars, 19

Biltmore Programme, 243-4

"Black Letter", 128, 132, 149

Bolshevism, Arab fear of, 68

Bosnia and Herzegovina, 25

Brith Trumpeldor, 136

"British Policy in Palestine," 1922, 117

Byzantine Empire, Palestine under, 16; ruin of the Empire, 19, 21

C

Cairo Conference, 52, 67

Cambyes, 12

Canaan, Beni Israel in, 9

Carter, Sir Maurice, 173

Catroux, General, 249

Chamberlain, Mr. Neville, 215

Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, 36

Chancellor, Sir John, 123, 146

Christian religious bodies, influence of, 142-3

Christianity, 20; and Mohammedanism, 21

Churchill, Mr., Cairo Conference, 51-2; and National Home, 127; Peel Commission recommendations, 183; White Paper, 1939, 219, 243

Citrus crop, 104-5, 150; citrus shipping season and effect on general strike, 164; and on Arab rebellion, 206-7

Clemenceau, 50

Committee of Enquiry. *See* Anglo-American Committee

Commission of Enquiry, Haycraft.
See Haycraft

Commission of Enquiry, Shaw.
See Shaw

Commission, Technical; Partition
Commission. See Woodhead
Commission

Conference, London. See London
Conference

Conservative Party, 128-9, 132, 141,
249

"Correspondence with the Palestine
Arab Delegation and the Zionist
Organisation", 1922, 117

Coupland, Professor, 173

Crimean War, 22

Crusades, 18; Saladin and, 19

Cunningham, Sir Alan, 257

Customs, Department of, 106

Customs Duties, 110

Cutheans, settled in Samaria, 10-12

Cyprus, ceded to Great Britain, 22

Cyrus, 11-12

D

Dalton, Mr., 249, 253

Damascus, 48 51

Darius, 12

Darius II, 13

Dead Sea, 104

Declaration to the Seven, 45

Dill, Lieut.-General, 158, 163, 167

Disraeli, 22, 23, 25

Dreyfus trial, 36, 38

Druze rebellion, 187

E

Economic absorptive capacity, Hope-

Simpson report, 124-6, 130; new
survey promised, 146; Admin-

istration moving away from, 178;
abandoned, 218

Economic slump of 1929-34, 129-30;
economic conditions and slump of
1935, 138-41

Eden, Mr., 184

Egypt, Beni Israel in, 9; coastal
route to Assyria, 10; position
under Arab empire, 17-18; Sala-
din and his successors, 19;
Mamelukes, 19; Ottoman Sultan
Selim I, 19; French ties with
Egypt, 21; Nationalist agitation,
1920, 51; demand for Anglo-
Egyptian treaty, 143; the Wafd
in power, 242; demands on
Great Britain, 250

Emergency Regulations, 1937, 191

Employment and unemployment,
125, 131; after slump of 1935, 142
Esdraelon, plains of, 10; reclaimed,
94

Ezra, mission of, 13

F

Fakhri Bey Nashashibi, 174, 209-10,
213

Faruq, King, 242

Fatimite Caliphs, 18-19

Fawzi ed Dine al Kawakji, 156, 166

Feisal, King, 27, 29; and the Arab
revolt, 30-1; meeting with Weiz-
mann, 46; enters Damascus, 48;
and Anglo-French policy, 48-9;
King of Syria and Palestine, 49,
115; overthrown by France, 51;
King of Iraq, 52

Florus, Roman Governor, 15

Foundation Fund, 93

Fourteen Points, and Syrian nation-
alists, 45; Covenant and the
Fourteen Points, 50

France, Anglo-French rivalry in
Levant, 21, 29; France and Syria,
see Syria. Anglo French rela-
tions over Palestine and Syria,
187, 206

Fuad Saba, 212

G

Galilee, reconquered by Vespasian,
15-16; position of Galilee in
proposed partition, 182

Germany, persecution of Jews, 130,
197; assistance to Arab rebellion,
194, 201-2; and Arab policy,
236-7

Ghazi, King, of Iraq, 165, 166

Gore, Mr. Ormsby, 201

Gort, Lord, 254

Greek language, displaced by Arabic,
21

H

Hagana, 238, 253, 257

Haifa, 27, 39, 96, 153; Haifa-
Baghdad road, 96; effect of
strike on, 170

Haining, Major-General, 198

Haj Amin Eff. El Husseini, Mufti,
71-2; President of Supreme
Moslem Council, 74-5, 100, 117;
his position and policy, 74, 80,
119, 123, 133, 236; relations with
Italy, 143; Arab Higher Commit-
tee, 151, 157; connection with

the rebellion, 157, 184, 230; attitude to the strike, 164; Nash-ashibi party apprehensive of growing power, 174-5; deprived of his offices, 185; escape to Syria, 186; his use of funds for the rebellion, 187; control of the rebellion, 190, 197; efforts to terrorise Jews, 204, 213; French attitude to activities of the Mufti, 206; London Conference, 211-2, 217, 218-9; in French hands, 257

Hammond, Sir Laurie, 173

Hapoel, 93

Hassan Sidky Bey Dejadi, 153

Hauranis, 153

Haycraft, Sir Thomas, Commission of Enquiry, 116, 123

Hebrew language, 37, 94-5

Hebrew University at Jerusalem, 94

Hedjaz, Hussein proclaimed King, 48

Hedjaz Railway, 24

Herod, King, 14

Herzl, Theodor, 36

Histadruth, activities and policy, 86-7, 93, 95; attitude to Arabs, 87

Hoare, Sir Samuel, 141, 143

Hogarth, Mr., mission to King Hussein, 44

Hope Simpson, Sir John, Enquiry, 124-7, 173

Hussein, King, Sherif of Mecca, 26; correspondence with Sir H. McMahon, 27-9, 38; Arab revolt, 29-32; and Balfour Declaration, 43-4; King of Hedjaz, 48; deposed by Ibn Saud, 53

Hussein faction, 71, 80, 118-9; and Peel Commission, 174-5; tension on the Higher Committee, 178

Hyrcanus, 14

I

Ibn Saud, Emir of Nejd, 52-3, 242, 250; deposes Hussein, 53; attitude to Palestinian Arabs, 165; mediation in strike, 165-6; Arab unity, 247

Ibrahim Pasha, 21-2, 24

Identity Cards introduced, 204-5

Imam Yehia, 247

Immigration: terms of the Mandate, 262; Arab fear of Bolshevism, 68; effect of

immigration, 69, 78-9; immigration after 1914-18, 84; political ideas of immigrants, 86; immigration and absorptive capacity, 90-1; regulation by Mandatory Power, 91; White Paper of 1930, 129; White Paper of 1939, 100-1; Haycraft Commission, 116; increase of immigrants, 1922-6, 121; after 1933, 133; Hope Simpson Report, 124-5; effect of slump 1929-34, 130; illegal immigration, 130; failure of capital immigration to keep pace with demands, 138; speculation and credit, 138-9; demand for cessation of immigration, 145-6, 152; not suspended during Peel Commission, 173; Labour Schedules, 155, 178; limitation by Ordinance, Oct. 10th, 1937, 188; Schedule for 1938, 196, 206; limitation at discretion of High Commissioner, 196; reduction in immigration due to the disturbances, 197; concessions to Arab demands, 204; decision of London Conference, 218-9; illegal immigration and deduction from Schedules, 220-1; policy of illegal immigration after 1939, 235, 240-1; attitude of the Administration, 241; immigration continued after 1944, 246; Zionists demand relaxation of White Paper restrictions and a Jewish State, 251; President Truman's request, 253; statistics of immigration, 253; Anglo-American Committee, 255

Imperialism, 52, 96, 99-100, 104, 113, 133

Investment Board, necessity for, 108-9

Iraq, Arab influence in, 17; Iraqi nationalists and Arab revolt, 31-2; Sykes-Picot Agreement, 39; revolt, 1920, 51-2; King Feisal, 52; national independence, 120; revolt of 1941, 237

Israel, kingdom of, 10; conquered by Shalmaneser, 10; disappearance of, 11

Istiqlal party, 151

Italy, and Libya, 25; invades Abyssinia, 140; propaganda against Great Britain, 142-3; financial aid to Arab rebellion, 194

Izzet al Tannous, 152

J

- Jaffa, 94, 125; rivalry of Tel Aviv, 77; strike at, 153; port closed, 154; headquarters of rebels at, 158-9; demolitions at, 160; legality of, 160-1; effect of strike on, 170; bomb explosion at, 201; rebel control of, 202
- Jamal Bey al Husseini, 151-2, 211-2, 215, 257
- Jamil Mardam, 256-7
- Jebusite tribe, 10
- Jemal Pasha, 26, 29
- Jerusalem, Jewish colony in, under Persian Empire, 13-14; captured by Pompey, 14; by Titus, 16; the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 18; Sanjak of, 24; Mayor and Mufti, importance of offices, 71; rebel control of Jerusalem, 202; taken over by Military Authorities, 205
- Jesus Christ, life and death of, 15
- Jewish Agency, established, 54, 97, 262; and immigration, 84; function of, 84-5, 92; reorganisation, 121-2; and White Paper of 1939, 128; attitude to the Administration, 232, 240, 246; to Great Britain, 1939, 235; the Biltmore programme, 243-4; attitude to Jewish terrorism, 245-6; demand for a Jewish State, 251
- Jewish Community Council, 92
- Jewish Federation of Labour, 86-8, 93
- Jewish National Fund, 69, 85, 92-3
- Jewry, World, influence of, 129, 132; alleged British subservience, 149; necessity for providing a home for European Jewry, 248; problem linked with Palestine, 254; Anglo-American Committee, 255; British and American responsibility, 258
- Jews, captives from Judah called, 11; an important community, 11; return from captivity in Babylon, 11-12; colony in Palestine developing into a State, 13; Ptolemaic empire, 14; rights of Orthodox Church, 1854, 22; position under Roman Empire, 33; position in Western Europe, 33-5; colonies in Asia, N. Africa and Spain, 34; in Eastern Europe, 34; persecutions, 34-5; racial assimilation, 37-8; culture, 37-8; British interests in establishing Jews in

Palestine, 46; meaning of Palestine to the Jews, 82-3; condition of the Jews in Europe, 82-3; National Home. *See* National Home

Jews, Palestine:

- The Histadruth, 86-8; Revisionists, 88; opposition to Zionist nationalism, 88-9; Societies and Organisations, 92-3; economic contributions, 106-8; position changed by White Paper, 1930, 129; oblivious attitude towards Arab resentment, 1935, 136-7; casualties during period of general strike, 167; Arab attacks and Jewish reprisals, 1938, 199-200; anti-British attitude, 201; effect of the rebellion upon Jewish attitude to the Administration, 232-4
- White Paper, 1939: Jews as rebels, 235, 237
- War years, 1939-45: attitude towards Great Britain, 235-6; Jewish terrorist movement, 237-8, 244-5, 253; illegal arming, 238-9; desire to assist against Germany, 239-40; attitude of the Administration, 240; policy to return to Balfour Declaration, 247, 251; the Biltmore programme, 243-4; Palestine a Jewish State, 251-2. *See also* Immigration, Jewish Agency, National Home, Zionism
- Jouvenal, M. de., 120
- Judaea, incorporated into Roman Empire, 14; Herod, King of, 14; after death of, 15
- Judah, kingdom of, 10; settled in Babylon, 11
- Judaism, 20
- Judas Maccabaeus, 14
- Judiciary, Palestinian, 114

K

- Kamel Eff. El Husseini, 71
- Kassem, Sheikh Izzed Dine el, 145, 156
- Kawakji, 182
- Keren Hayesod, 93
- Keren Kayemeth, 93
- Khalidi, Dr. Hussein Eff. al, 151-2, 212
- King-Crane Commission, 51, 55
- Kirkbride, Mr., 199
- Kitchener, Lord, 26-7

L

- Labour Party, attitude to Palestine affairs, 249, 255-6, 258
- Land sales in Palestine, 68-9, 79, 107, 123-4; Hope Simpson Report, cultivable land, 124-6; Ordinance of 1933, 131-2; boom after 1933, 133; efforts of Arabs to prevent sales, 134; speculation and rise of prices, 139; demand for prohibition of sales, 145-6, 152; concessions indicated, 204; decision of London Conference, 218-9; promulgation of restrictions, 221-2
- Lawrence, of Arabia, and the Revolt, 30-1, 43, 48; Palestine Mandate, 55
- League of Nations, Mandate System, 50; Covenant, 50; Permanent Mandates Committee and Peel Report, 183-4; discussion on Palestine, 199, 206, 219
- Lebanon, Christian community of, 22; Sanjak of, 24; nationalism, 24; effect of war of 1914, 26, 50; French demand for a treaty, 1944, 249-50
- Legislative Council, 117, 146-7; Jewish opposition, 147-8; opposed in Parliament, 149
- Levant, French ambitions in, 44-5; effect of Arab nationalism, 48; rise of nationalism, 66
- Libya, and Italy, 25
- Lloyd George, Mr., 39, 42, 50
- London Conference, necessity for concessions to Arab nationalists, 209; Nashashibi policy of co-operation, 210; formation of an Arab Delegation, 210-1; negotiations with the Mufti, 211-2; Nashashibi Delegation, 213; Jewish attitude, 214-5; Arab demands 215; Jewish case, 215-6; Government attitude to Arab demands, 216; no agreed solution, 217-8; the influence of the Mufti, 217; the Government solution, statement of Policy, 218-9; attitude of Arabs and Jews, 218-9

M

- Maccabees, 14
- Maccabi, 93
- Macdonald, Mr. Malcolm, 201
- Macdonald, Mr. Ramsay, letter to Dr. Weizmann, 128, 132, 149
- McDonnell, Sir Michael, Chief Justice, 160, 198

McGovern, Mr., 201

McMahon, Sir Henry, correspondence with King Hussein, 27-9; "pledge", 29, 38; Arabs and Palestine, 44; letter in *The Times* on the "pledge", 183; publication of the correspondence, 216

MacMichael, Sir Harold, 191, 196, 247

Mamelukes, the, 19

Mandate, Palestine:

Text of Mandate, 261-7; declared, 1922, 52; terms of the Mandate, 53-5; Jewish Agency established, 54; interpretation and obligations, 56; sources of discord to the administration, 75; Arab national movement, 75; Jewish Revisionist party, 88; regulation of immigration, 91; British motives in accepting Mandate, 95, 99; Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner, 96-7; attitude of Palestine Administration, 97, 99; Arab and Jewish nationalism, anti-British attitude, 97-8; Peel Commission, 101; Woodhead Commission, 100; Palestine Conference, White Paper, 1939, 100-1; misinterpretation of Mandate, 115

Administration of the Palestine Government, 102-13; increasing the productivity of Arabs, 103-4; Jewish productivity, 104-7; citrus crop, 104-5; use of capital, 105-8; tariff policy, 106; economic problems, 106-10; revenue and expenditure, 109-10; social service and public works, 110-12; education, 111; Public Health services, 111-12; personnel of the Administration, 113

Civil Administration, 1920; nature of, 114; failure to clarify position of Jews and Arabs, 115; policy towards Arabs, 116-18; efforts at conciliation, 119-20; situation in 1935, 135; attitude of Civil Administration to disturbances, 1936, 158-9, 166-7; demolitions at Jaffa, conduct of the Administration, 160-2; Statement of Policy, 163; failure of Courts of Justice, 168-9; conduct of the Administration during the strike, 171; Peel Commission and alteration of Mandate, 177, 179; failure of Administration to maintain control, 194-5; attitude

towards Jewish incidents and execution of Ben Yussef, 198-9; criticism of Administration by *The Times*, 201; High Commissioner's appeal, 201; London decisions and policy, 204, 208-9; London Conference continues the Mandate, 218; policy and difficulties of the Mandate System, 259-60
 Mandate System, 50; main object of, 259
 Manning, Mr. Justice, 160-1
 Marwan, Caliph, 17
 Medes, conquest of Babylon, 11
 Megiddo, plains of, 10
 Mersina, district, 28
 Mesopotamia, 11; Fourteen Points, 45; Anglo-French Declaration, 1918, 46-7
 Middle East, Cairo Conference, 52; British policy in, 52
 Midhat Pasha, 22, 25
 Military actions, 1937, 193; "Teg-art's Wall," 196, 200-1; increased military strength, 203; temporary military control decided, 204; restrictions on movements introduced, 205-7; military methods and difficulties, 224-5, 227-8
 Military Courts established, 1937, 191
 Moffat, Mr., murdered, 201
 Mohamed Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, 21, 23
 Mohammedanism, 20; spread of, 20-1; autonomy in matters affecting Moslem religion, 116
 Monotheism, 20
 Montague, Mr. Edwin, 39
 Morris, Sir Harold, 173
 Morrison, Mr., 243
 Moslem Awqaf and Shari'a affairs, 72
 Moslem world, interest in Palestinian affairs, 169
 Mosul oilfield, 96; pipeline, 133
 Moyne, Lord, assassinated, 247
 Mufti of Jerusalem, election of, 71-2. *See* Haj Amin
 Municipal Corporations Ordinance, 146
 Municipal Councils, established, 146
 Murad V, Sultan, 22
 Musa al Alami, 212, 247
 Musa Kazen Pasha el Husseini, 71

N

Nablus, survival of Samaritans in, 11

Nahas Pasha, 247, 250
 Napoleon III, 22
 Nashashibi faction, 71, 80, 118-9; and Peel Commission, 174; attitude to the Mufti, 174-5; tension on the Higher Committee, 178; co-operation with the Administration, 209-10; London Conference, 213
 National Defence party, 80, 209
 National Home in Palestine :
 inaugurated by Cyrus, 11;
 Jewish Colonies back to Palestine movement, 36; idea of a Jewish State, 36; efforts of T. Herzl, 36; war of 1914-19, 38-41; British attitude to, 40, 96; attitude of the Powers, 40; and Zionist leaders, 40; Balfour Declaration, 40-42, text, 41; restricted scope of, 44; Peace Conference and Zionist Organisation, 50; terms of Palestine Mandate, 53-5; Arab opposition, 71, 97, 115-6; need for Jewish National Home, 82-3; Zionism precludes Arab co-operation, 83-4; main object of National Home, 90; effect of regulation of immigration, 91; National Home a communal effort, 92-3; effect on population of Palestine, agricultural and economic results, 93-4; cultural and social achievements, 94-5; Zionist views, 115-6; interpretation of National Home, defined 1922, 117-8; check on development, 1926-28, 121; consequent fall of revenue, 122-3; situation in 1930, 127; White Paper, 1930, 126-9; rise of speculation and credit, 138-9; slump and panic, 140-1; effect of strike on, 170; White Paper, 1939, 220-1; development checked, 1938, 234
 Nationalism, Arab movements, 24; British alliance with Arab nationalism, 243
 Nationalism, Balkans, 22
 Nationalism, Jewish :
 rebuilding the Temple, 12;
 nationalism and religion, 12;
 Roman conquest of, 16; Jewish and other nationalisms, 83; attitude of Jewish classes, 88-9
 Nationalism, Levant, rise of, 66
 Nationalism, Syrian. *See* Syria
 Nebuchadnezzar, 11
 Nehemiah, mission of, 13
 Nero, Emperor, 15
New Statesman and Nation, 219

Nuri Said, Foreign Minister of Iraq, 242; attempted mediation in general strike, Palestine, 162

O

Omayyad Caliphate, 17-18
Othman, 19
Ottoman Caliphate, 20
Ottoman Empire, Crimean War, 22; Berlin Conference, prevents partition of, 22; Constitution proclaimed new administrative boundaries, 22-3; centralisation policy, 23-4; seditious movements in Turkish Army, 25; Committee of Union and Progress, 25; loss of Territory, 25; War of 1914, 25-6; support of Moslem World, 26; Arab revolt, 29-32; disposal of the Empire, Sykes-Picot agreement, 1916, 38-9, 41; Fourteen Points, 45; Peace Conference, 49, 50

P

Palestine :

Historical, Ptolemaic Empire, 14; Moslem, 17-18; the Crusades, 18; division of Ottoman Empire, 23; under Turkish rule, 60-62; special position of, 63-4

Description of, 57-8; soil, climate, crops, 58-9; citrus crop, 104-5; industries, 59-60; economic conditions, 62-3, 104-6; finance, communications, 62; Christians, Jews, 62

Arab independence, 38; Sykes-Picot Agreement, 39; British control, 39-40; McMahon correspondence and Arab independence, 44; Palestine barred from independence, 43-4; British interests in establishing Jews, 46, 96; O.E.T.A., military administration, 47-8, 51, 114; Feisal proclaimed King, 49; British strategic interests, 49-50, 96, 133-4; policy of Cairo Conference, 52; British policy in Palestine, 55; meaning of Palestine to the Jews, 82-3; Europeanisation of, 102; War of 1939-45, 236-7; Mr. Bevin's statement on Palestine, 254-6; Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 255-6, 258-9; necessity for a temporary and permanent policy, 258; backwardness of self-government, 259

Palestine, Administration. *See* Mandate, Palestine

Palestine Arab Party, 80

Palestine Colonists' Association, 93

Partition of Palestine: difficulties of, 260; Partition Commissions, *see* Peel Commission, Woodhead Commissions.

"Patria" liner, 239

Peace Conference, 48-9; Zionist Organisation and, 49-50

Peel, Earl, 173

Peel Commission and Report, quoted, 71-3, 114-15; its recommendations, 100, 179; Members, 173; terms of reference, 173; Arab attempt at boycott, 174; scheme of partition, 150, 177-81; Arabs and Jews both hostile, 181-2; British attitude to, 182-3; the question of Galilee, 182; Report discussed by Permanent Mandates Committee, 183-4; Zionist Congress attitude, 184; British Government hesitate to implement Report, 185, 188; White Paper on Government's attitude, 192; compared with Woodhead Commission, 208-9; attitude of Zionists to, 234

Permanent Mandates Commission.

See League of Nations

Persians, conquest of Babylon, 11; and Palestine, 12-13; Empire overrun by Alexander the Great, 13

Philby, Mr., 181

Philip, son of Herod, 15

Philistines, 10

Picot: Sykes-Picot Agreement, 38-9, 41

Pipeline, 133

Plumer, Lord, 122

Poland, anti-Semitic feeling, 131; emigration from, 121

Police, Palestinian, 114

Pompey, 14

Population of Palestine, 59, 93; drift of, 103; in 1922, 114; Jewish, 1925, 121

Ptolemaic dynasty, 13-14

Q

Qalaun, 19

R

Rabbinical Council, 93

Ragheb Bey Nashashibi, 71, 118, 151-2, 174, 178, 211, 213

Railways, 112
 Rashid Ali, 237
 Rebellion. *See* Arabs, Palestine
 Reid, Mr. Thomas, 196
 Representative government demanded by Arabs, 145-8, 152
 Revisionist party, 88, 136; importation of arms, 144
 Roads and road construction, 255-6
 Rock, Alfred, 151, 212
 Roman Empire, Palestine under, 14; Jews under Roman Empire, 33
 Rothschild, Lord, Balfour Declaration, 41
 Rothschilds, 35; subsidies for Jewish colonies in Palestine, 36
 Rumania, anti-Semitic feeling, 131
 Rumbold, Sir Horace, 173
 Russell, Sir Alison, 196
 Russia, and Ottoman Empire, 20; and Syria, 21; Crimean War, 22; and Mediterranean, 22

S

Saladin, 18, 19
 Samaria, kingdom of Israel, 10; Cutheans in, 10
 Samaritans, established, 10, 11, 12; dislike of, by Jews, 12
 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 39, 96-7, 114; policy of, 116-7
 Schirach, Baldur von, 194
 Seleucid dynasty, 14
 Self-government, 120; and the Mandate System, 259
 Selim I, 19
 Seljuk Turks, 18
 Sephardi Jews, 37
 Shalmaneser, 10, 12
 Sharon, plain of, 94
 Shaw, Sir Walter, Commission of Enquiry, 123, 126
 Shia heresy, 18
 Shuckburgh, Sir John, 199
 Shakry Kuwatly, 242
 Sidky Bey Dajani, 174
 Sinai, Beni Israel in, 9-10
 Sindair, Mr., 243
 Slump of 1929-34, 129-30
 Smuts, General, 50, 243
 Soliman the Magnificent, 19, 20
 Spain, Jews in, 34
 Spears, General, 249
 Statement of Policy, Sept., 1936, 163; 1939, 218-9
 Stern Group, 238, 240
 Storrs, Sir Ronald, 26-7
 Strike, general, 151-7; Royal Commission appointed, 155; Higher

Committee and efforts to stop the strike, 164-6; mediation of Arab Princes, 166; estimate of results of strike, 171-20 financial cost, 172
 "Struma" incident, 241
 Suez Canal, 27, 38, 96, 134
 Supreme Moslem Council, 72-4; created, 116-7, 119; propaganda campaign, 134; and the strike, 171-2; placed under control, 187
 Sursocks, 69
 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 38-9; 41; and Syrian Nationalists, 44-5
 Syria, conquered by Alexander the Great, 13; position during Byzantine Empire, 16; occupied by Arabs, 16-17; influence of, 17; conquered by the Seljuks, 18; Mamelukes expelled, 19; under the Ottomans, 20-21; position in international affairs, 20; occupied by Ibrahim Pasha, 21-2; British and Russian intervention, 21; revival of nationalism, 22, 24-5; effect of 1914 war, 25-6; French claim on Syria, 27; McMahon negotiations, 28; nationalists and Arab revolt, 31-2, 43, 48, 50; British desire for control, 38; Sykes-Picot Agreement, 39, 44; Nationalists and Palestine, Declaration to the Seven, 44-5; Fourteen Points, 45-6; Balfour Declaration, 44-5; interest of U.S.A. in Syria, 46; Anglo-French Declaration, 1918, 46-7; O.E.T.A., military administration, 47-8; Arab Congress, 49; French control, 49, 51; King-Crane Commission, 51; French action, 1920, 51-2; Mandate for Syria, 1923, 53, 114; revolt of 1925, 120, 122; rioting and strike, 1936, 144; Allied force enters, 1941, 237; French demand for a Treaty, 1944, British intervention, 249-50

T

Tajeddin, President, 242
 Tariff System, 106
 Taufiq al Suaidi, 203
 Tegart, Sir Charles, 196
 Tel Aviv, 94, 153; rivalry with Jaffa, 77; Municipal Council, 93; port developed during strike, 154
 Ten lost tribes, 11
 Tiberius, 15

Times, The, 128, 182, 201, 203

Titus, 16

Transjordan, revolt extended to, 43; O.E.T.A., military administration, 47-8, 51; revolt, 1920, 51; Abdulla, Amir of Transjordan, 52; separated from Palestine, 52, 53, 120, 268-9; self-government of, 259

Truman, President, request for admission of Jews to Palestine, 253-4

Turkey. *See* Ottoman Empire

Turks, infiltration into Arab Empire, 17; power of, 17-18; Seljuk Turks, 18; Ottoman Turks, 19

U

Uganda, Zionist Organisation, 36, 38
United States of America, and Jewish immigration into Palestine, 247; attitude to Zionist demands, 252-3; negotiations with Great Britain, 253-4; Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, 255-6, 258-9

V

Vaad Leumi, 92

Vespasian, 16

Vitellius, 16

W

Wailing Wall incidents, 123

Wakf funds, placed under control, 187

Waterfield, Mr. A. P., 196

Wauchope, Sir Arthur, 146, 148; retirement, 188; estimate of his work, 188-9

Wavell, General, 198

Weizmann, Dr. Chaim, 39, 253; meeting with Feisal, 46; Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's letter, 128 132; partition of Palestine, 184; letter from Arab Defence Committee, 204; London Conference, 215

White Paper, embodying Shaw and Simpson Reports, 126-7; opposition to, 128; repudiated, 128-9, 132

White Paper, 1939, 218-9; policy of, 235, 242; Arab support for White Paper, 243; adherence of the Administration, 246; policy likely to be superseded, 248;

British Labour Party policy, 249;

Jewish Agency's attack on, 251

Wilson, President, Fourteen Points, 45-6, 50; League of Nations, 50;

King-Crane Commission, 50-1

Women's Zionist Organisation, 93

Woodhead, Sir John, 196

Woodhead Commission, 192, 196, 199, 204; partition impracticable, 199, 204; returns to England, 201; Report, 208-9; Statement of Policy, 208

X

Xerxes, 12-13

Y

Yacoub Eff. al Chussein, 151-2

Yacoub Eff. al Farraj, 151, 178, 213

Z

Zealots, 14

Zionism, birth of, 11, 34, 36;

Zionist Organisation founded, 36,

262; T. Herzl, 36; C. Weizmann,

39; Great Britain and Zionist

Movement, 39-42, 96; Zionist

Organisation's views accepted by

Peace Conference, 49-50; post-

war Zionism secular, 82; Zionism

and nationalism, 83-4; attitude

of Jewish parties, 84-91; Zionist

attitude to Arabs, 91-2; Zionist

Commission, 97; Zionist Con-

gress and question of partition,

184, 234; Zionist attitude during

the rebellion, 232-4; Anglo-

Zionist relations during the war,

241-2; adoption of Biltmore

programme, 243-4; attitude to

Jewish terrorism, 245-6; World

Zionist Congress, 1945, 248,

250-1; establishment of a Jewish

State, 251-2; loss of control over

Palestinian followers, 257. *See*

also National Home

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