American Enterprise Institute
Studies in Foreign Policy

A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza

Edited by Emile A. Nakhleh

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
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A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza

Edited by Emile A. Nakhleh

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:

A Palestinian agenda for the West Bank and Gaza.

(AEI studies ; 277)
Bibliography: p.
CONTENTS: Pranger, R.J., Foreword.—Nakhleh, E.A., Reflections on the agenda.—Abboushi, W., Changing political attitudes in the West Bank after Camp David. [etc.]
1. Israel-Arab War, 1967—Occupied territories—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Jordan (Territory under Israeli occupation, 1967-)—Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Gaza Strip—Addresses, essays, lectures. 4. Palestinian Arabs—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Nakhleh, Emile A., 1938- II. Series: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
AEI studies ; 277.
DS127.6.03P35 956'.046 80-15596
ISBN 0-8447-3380-6

AEI Studies 277

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FOREWORD

The background of this volume of essays by Palestinian Arab specialists, edited by Emile A. Nakhleh, is a complex one. In the fall of 1977, the American Enterprise Institute initiated an examination of the practical problems associated with peace settlement scenarios for the West Bank and Gaza. This examination began before the Camp David accords, but it came to have considerable relevance to them, as well as to other efforts to bring a just and lasting resolution to the Arab-Israeli struggle. Part of this resolution will involve the Palestinian Arabs, whose distinguished representatives include authors of this volume.

Appearing first in AEI's West Bank and Gaza series was Emile Nakhleh's *The West Bank and Gaza: Toward the Making of a Palestinian State* and Daniel J. Elazar's *The Camp David Framework for Peace: A Shift Toward Shared Rule,* two very different perspectives published by AEI in 1979. As we proceed with our examination of a peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians, we continue to adhere to AEI's motto, "Competition of ideas is fundamental to a free society." In 1980, for example, AEI will publish parallel studies of Palestinian Arab and Israeli perceptions of practical problems associated with the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

By focusing on the practical aspects of a peace settlement for the West Bank and Gaza we hope to increase public understanding of real issues. Such comprehension may not make the settlement process any easier, as this volume indicates, but it will make the agenda for this process more specific and potentially more manageable. There are over a million persons, mostly Arabs but also some Israelis, in the West Bank and Gaza regions who pursue their daily lives under somewhat adverse conditions of military rule. Public discussion in

the United States of the problems associated with such a way of life suffers from both deficient knowledge of specifics and from sweeping generalizations. It is our belief that the present volume will help clarify the discussion.

Robert J. Pranger
Director of
International Programs

PREFACE

This collection of articles about the West Bank and Gaza written by Palestinians residing in the area offers singular insights into the major issues to be addressed before any new political arrangement on the West Bank and Gaza can be formulated. Several factors have contributed to the uniqueness and usefulness of this book.

First, these are Palestinian voices—committed but not irrationally so—speaking about issues that are crucial to the development of the society of West Bank and Gaza residents. Second, although the political literature regarding the Palestinian conflict is plentiful, this is one of the few studies by Palestinians dealing with issues that are essentially non-political. Third, the authors of these articles have generally adopted a pragmatic approach to the problems they address. This approach is based on field research and dictated by the capabilities and needs of the West Bank and Gaza as a territory and as a people. Fourth, a common element is the authors' general agreement that the West Bank and Gaza should be an independent Palestinian political entity based on the right of self-determination.

The authors were not asked to adhere to any political ideology or to any specific position on the structure of the political solution that might succeed the occupation. Neither the editor nor the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research adheres to any preconception about the future political formation in the West Bank and Gaza.

In reviewing the articles in this book, two observations should be made:

First, the primary focus has been on having the issues presented by scholars with information based on first-hand experience and field research. Qualified people from the West Bank and Gaza were there-

fore asked to do the studies, and Palestinians residing outside these areas were excluded. At the same time, one must not infer that West Bank and Gaza residents differ somehow from other Palestinians. Since it was impossible to include all issues of concern to the people of the West Bank and Gaza, we selected areas in which scholars were already doing research. Our early contacts on medical services and other issues proved unsuccessful. The few experts in this area could not complete the research in time.

Second, in most edited works the quality of separate articles varies greatly, as do the approaches and methodologies used. This book is no exception. As indicated above, the purpose was not to present a methodologically flawless treatise with impeccable scholarship. Rather, the intent was to provide an academically acceptable forum for West Bank and Gaza specialists to offer their own perceptions of the issues. In general, the approach in most of the articles is both descriptive and prescriptive. The authors have attempted to identify the problems in their respective areas, to present facts, mostly derived from official Israeli statistical sources, and to offer practical approaches to these problems.

Many people contributed to this project, and while it is impossible to acknowledge them all, I would be remiss were I not to mention at least a few.

As part of AEI's ongoing project on the West Bank and Gaza, this book could not have been completed without the active support, continued encouragement, and thoughtful suggestions of Dr. Robert J. Pranger, director of international programs at the American Enterprise Institute. I would like also to acknowledge the strong encouragement which I received from the president and the dean of Mount Saint Mary's College, Dr. Robert J. Wickenheiser and Dr. John W. Campbell.

On the West Bank and in Gaza, my deepest gratitude goes to the administration and faculty of Birzeit University, whose support, hospitality, and intellectual contributions were essential to this project. Dr. Gabi Baramki, Birzeit University's vice president, spared no effort in continually encouraging the authors to meet their deadlines and in arranging the many meetings which I had with the authors themselves. I will always remember the working lunches organized by Dr. Baramki at Birzeit during my numerous visits to the area. My sincere thanks go also to Birzeit University's other administrators: Dean Izzat Ghurani, Dean Muhammad Hallaj, and Dean Ramzi Rihan—all of whom have contributed to this volume. Of course,

without the authors themselves this whole endeavor would have come to naught. To all of them, many thanks.

Two of the articles were originally written in Arabic and were translated in Washington. My sincere thanks go to the translators of these two articles: Mr. Kamal Ahwal and Professor Ronald G. Wolfe, both of Washington, D.C.

I would also like to thank the copy editors of this volume, Elizabeth Ashooh and Cynthia Barry, of the AEI publications staff, who spent many hours readying this collection of papers for print.

Finally, as in my other endeavors, this one could not have come to fruition without the special kind of support and understanding which I constantly received from my wife and two children. To the three of them, I dedicate this book.

Emile A. Nakhleh

A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza

1

Reflections on the Agenda

Emile A. Nakhleh

As a pragmatic frame of reference for their work, the authors of this volume have made certain political assumptions regarding the future of the occupied West Bank and Gaza. For example, once the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza is terminated, they assume that it will be replaced by an independent Palestinian political entity, which will be ensured of certain attributes of statehood: self-determination, independence, and freedom to chart its political future, both domestically and across state boundaries.

This book, unlike many other studies on the West Bank and Gaza,[1] presents a program of action with recommendations on the issues discussed—ranging from olive farming to the future of higher education.

In the first paper, Professor Wasif Abboushi gives us a fascinating insight into the nationalist psychology of West Bankers and their attitude toward Israel, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Camp David accords. His analysis of Palestinianism, of the inhabitants' views on Yasser Arafat, and of the business community's identification with King Hussein of Jordan should be read by anyone seriously interested in resolving the Palestinian conflict.

Professor Hisham Awartani, on the other hand, presents a comprehensive plan for the major components of the agricultural sector: land, water, labor, irrigation techniques, fertilizers, new crops, new harvesting techniques, agricultural cooperatives, marketing, financing, and capital investment. While fully cognizant of the present constraints on agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza, Professor Awartani's proposal aims at major, yet practical, objectives: expanding food production to meet anticipated population growth, alleviating malnu-

[1] See the bibliography at the end of the book.

trition, improving the unfavorable balance of trade with Israel, maintaining agricultural exports to Middle Eastern countries, and absorbing large numbers of laborers in agriculture (mainly those who have left agriculture in the last decade to work in Israel) while maintaining an acceptable level of labor productivity.

Unlike agriculture, education in the West Bank is administered by different types of institutions: the government (a combination of Jordanian authority and the Israeli military government), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), and the private sector, consisting of institutions of higher learning and a few privately owned kindergartens. The papers on elementary and secondary education and on the future of higher education assess education as it now exists in the West Bank and offer projections and recommendations concerning the nature, development, and function of education in the two regions.

The major constraints on education in the West Bank, according to Professor Ramzi Rihan and Professor Khalil Mahshi, include the inadequacy of educational data, of school facilities, and of personnel; the multiplicity of administering agencies; the high attrition rates; and the political control of the occupation authorities, particularly in selecting national goals and priorities. The problems of higher education include the lack of a clear definition of the role of higher education, of coordination among the few institutions of higher education in the area, and of a comprehensive program for vocational and technical training.

Professor Muhammad Hallaj focuses on the function of higher education for the Palestinian people after independence. According to Professor Hallaj, the education of Palestinians for a generation has primarily been a "diaspora education," because of the "dispersion of the Palestinian people" and "the absence of a Palestinian national authority . . . at home." To a large extent, Palestinian higher education "has been geared to the fulfillment of individual needs and non-Palestinian requirements and job needs." It has also lacked "a unified cultural base." The primary task of Palestinian institutions of higher learning is to help the society transform itself "from a colonial to an independent community with as little disorder and dislocation as possible."

After a political settlement is achieved, it is generally believed that at least 500,000 Palestinians are expected to seek to return to the West Bank within the first year. Housing will have a critical influence on the volume and rate of returning Palestinians. The housing study by Professors Bakir Abu Kishk and Izzat Ghurani is

based on an earlier report prepared by the Engineers Association of the West Bank, which singles out substandard conditions, exacerbated by high occupancy (exceeding three persons per room), high rent, and a housing shortage. According to Professors Abu Kishk and Ghurani, the housing crisis is expected to deepen, "and in the absence of a national government that is capable of mobilizing resources for alleviating it, housing conditions in the occupied areas will continue to deteriorate."

In his paper on labor, Professor Ghassan Harb maintains that available manpower, both in the occupied territories and outside, can satisfy the needs of an independent Palestinian state. Both the quality and productivity of labor, however, must be maintained at a high level. The question of Palestinian employment in Israel must be examined in the context of a postoccupation regime. To provide employment for the thousands of Palestinians now employed in Israel would be the most serious challenge facing the new regime.

Although the problems of municipal government in the West Bank were analyzed in an earlier study,[2] Muhammad al-Khaas, the city clerk (town manager) of Gaza, deals specifically with the municipal code under which the government in Gaza is supposed to function. Since 1967, Gaza has operated under a nebulous combination of 1934 British municipal law and military decrees issued by the Israeli occupation authorities. During this period, West Bank municipal governments have operated under a combination of Jordanian municipal law and Israeli occupation military decrees.

Unlike the West Bank, no municipal election has ever been held in Gaza under the Israeli occupation. Both the mayor and the members of the city council are appointed by the Israeli military authorities. Following a brief discussion of some of the problems facing local government, the author recommends that a new municipal code be enacted, calling for elections in which adults of both sexes would participate.

One is struck by the multiplicity of charitable societies providing social services in the West Bank and Gaza, and by the diversity of their functions and the success of their efforts. Dr. Amin al-Khatib, president of the Federation of Charitable Societies in the West Bank, discusses a vast array of social welfare projects, ranging from employment to education of the handicapped. Dr. al-Khatib—as well as other leading West Bank figures, such as Mrs. Samihah Salameh

[2] Emile A. Nakhleh, *The West Bank and Gaza: Toward the Making of a Palestinian State* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), pp. 9-24.

Khalil, head of In'ash al-'Usra (Family Rejuvenation) Society of al-Bireh—gives the impression that many trained volunteers, employees, and administrators in the social welfare area are available. This cadre could provide services in health, education, and welfare in the postoccupation era and become the nucleus of national ministries in health, education, and social services.

The last paper in this volume is written in a different vein. Professor Nafez Nazzal discusses Israel's land policy in the West Bank as a means of establishing security and political control over the Arab inhabitants of the region. He surveys the methods used by Israelis to obtain Arab lands and describes the types of settlements in the West Bank and the methods used to establish them, quoting extensively from Israeli official statements. Professor Nazzal concludes that if Israel's policy on the settlements continues, "there simply would be no hope of ever achieving a peace settlement on the West Bank."

In the papers presented in this volume and in interviews, the authors have revealed several political perceptions that they share and that they believe other West Bank and Gaza intellectuals also share. Although the issues discussed here are not political, they believe that a certain political milieu must prevail if the problems they identified are to be addressed adequately. The immediate postoccupation regime must be a transitional political structure, which would ultimately lead to a fully independent Palestinian state. For this transition to lead from Israeli authority and control to an independent Palestinian existence, they argue, the Israeli military occupation of the territories must terminate.

After Palestinian independence, they foresee a representative republic, perhaps presidential rather than parliamentary, based on popular participation in government with the right to vote guaranteed for both men and women. The political system of the Palestinian state would be more like Israel's than those existing in Arab societies. It would be a pluralistic political system, but power would most likely fall into the hands of a bourgeois middle class and upper middle class of professionals, technocrats, and entrepreneurs. Even though the Palestine Liberation Organization would play a central role in negotiations leading to the emergence of this state, it is by no means certain that the PLO leadership would win the first election.

West Bank and Gaza intellectuals expect close political, economic, and scientific ties to develop between their state and its two closest neighbors—Israel and Jordan. Economic interdependence with its neighbors will be a primary prerequisite for their state to remain

economically viable and politically responsible. This interdependence is perceived as a prelude to wider regional cooperation, which in turn would pave the way for an enduring peace.

2

Changing Political Attitudes in the West Bank After Camp David

W. F. Abboushi

The visit to Jerusalem by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt in 1977 and the ensuing Camp David talks have introduced new elements into the politics and attitudes of the people of the West Bank. Generally speaking, these attitudes change with the circumstances that surround the Arab-Israeli conflict. When there is hope that a peaceful settlement is in the offing, attitudes tend to be positive. Inhabitants of the West Bank, however, become militant and united when there is little hope of a solution.

The Initial Reaction to Sadat's Jerusalem Visit

Both Israelis and Arabs were stunned by Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. They watched television in disbelief as he landed at Lod Airport, entered the King David Hotel, prayed at the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, and delivered his famous speech to the Knesset, Israel's parliament. It took some time before it became clear that most people would support his effort to reach an agreement with the Israelis. A minority, however, composed mainly of the pro-PLO mayors and politicians, the young, and the educated, was opposed from the beginning.

The majority's position was influenced by the following arguments:

- The Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be solved by military means because the Arab states are either unwilling or unable to challenge Israel on the battlefield. Some argued that Israel was unbeatable, others that the United States would not allow the Arabs to defeat Israel.
- Life in the West Bank has become so intolerable that an immediate solution is necessary. Many argued that Jewish settlements

in the area would soon succeed in changing the demographic composition of the occupied Arab territories, others, that neither fellow Arabs nor Israelis were treating Palestinians humanely and that, in consequence, the West Bank and Gaza had become the largest prison in history.

- Historically, Arab negativism was an important reason for Arab loss of those parts of Palestine that in 1948 became the state of Israel; more negativism would result in the permanent loss of the rest of Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza).

Some of the arguments of the minority opposed to the Sadat visit were:

- Israel will never give up the occupied territories, particularly the West Bank and Gaza, because it has always wanted all of Palestine, including the east bank of Jordan and southern Lebanon. Since Israel's objective is ideological, there is no point in negotiating with a fanatic like Begin. Only force can ultimately restore Arab rights in Palestine.
- A solution confined to the West Bank and Gaza would not be fair to Palestinians in the older territories who lost their homes to Israel, and who constitute about two-thirds of all Palestinians.
- Imperialism conspires with Israel to put down the Arabs. The United States has interests in an expansionist Israel. Consequently, America's objective is to keep the Arabs militarily weak, and it is using Sadat to accomplish its aims. This argument is strongest among leftists, especially Marxists and communists, but various nationalists also use it.
- Some believe the United States is sincere in its desire to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict but cannot force Israel to accept a reasonable and just solution. They believe the Jewish lobby in the United States is too strong for President Carter to challenge; as he is not a popular president, he will need the Jewish vote.
- Sadat and the United States have ignored the PLO because Israel refuses to negotiate with it but no solution is possible without it. Israel's attitude toward the PLO is not motivated by the PLO's "terrorism" or militancy but by its desire for the weakest, that is, the least costly solution. Immediately after Sadat's visit, the pro-PLO mayors felt the foreign press was ignoring them and giving the world the impression that the West Bank supported Sadat. In terms of population, the mayors represent the majority of the people of the West Bank. The leaders in this group were the mayor of Nablus, the West Bank's largest city, and the dynamic mayor of Ramallah. On the issue

of Sadat's visit, however, the mayors did not represent the majority. The general sentiments of their own cities and towns, as well as of the rural population, were for Sadat's peace initiative.

Reaction to the Camp David Accords

Before Camp David, it was clear that Sadat had already influenced the issues involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Most West Bankers no longer objected to Israel's right to exist. They had also forgone their requirement that Israel make concessions to Palestinians in territories that had become part of the Jewish state. They still insisted, however, that refugees from inside Israel would receive compensation for their losses in the 1948 war, and perhaps some would be allowed to return.

Before Camp David there was a more dramatic change in the attitudes of the people of the West Bank. The most immediate issue became Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The majority of people living in the West Bank were willing to forgo their hoped-for Palestinian state provided the Israelis withdraw from the occupied territories. The issue of who should rule the West Bank—Hussein or the PLO—was no longer an issue as long as Arab sovereignty was established.

In other words, the people of the West Bank, with the exception of a determined minority, would have accepted any solution that (1) required Israel to withdraw its troops and political authority from *all* occupied territories, and (2) restored any Arab sovereignty over them. It was assumed that Jewish settlements would be dismantled and that Israel would not be allowed any military presence in the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, a majority of the people of the West Bank were willing to forget the Palestinian losses of 1948 if Israel were willing to forget its gains of 1967.

The Camp David accords changed all that. After a lively discussion of the two agreements, it became clear that West Bankers would not accept the one affecting the West Bank and Gaza. They saw in this agreement a great deal of ambiguity, and they suspected the ambiguity was intentional.

Two factors did not help the new situation. First, Begin's public statements made clear that he did not intend to withdraw from the occupied territories nor to discontinue, let alone dismantle, the Jewish settlements. Secondly, Hussein's opposition persuaded many people that the agreement was so bad that America's best friend in the region could not accept it. Even a visit to the area by Harold H. Saunders, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South

Asian Affairs, Department of State, could not change Hussein's mind. Ironically, the controversy surrounding the agreement eliminated the rivalry between the PLO and Hussein and opened the door for a rapprochement between the two, who until then had been staunch political enemies.

The pro-Hussein people in the West Bank were less vehement in their opposition to the Camp David accords while they waited for Hussein's position to crystallize. They knew that the king was usually slow in reacting to important events. When Hussein did not come around to support Sadat, his allies in the West Bank became part of the opposition to the Camp David accords.

The majority which had supported Sadat after his visit to Jerusalem became, after Camp David, a minority. Only a few politicians were willing to continue their support for Sadat, and they were keeping a low profile in their public utterances and political activities.

In spite of the overwhelming opposition to the Camp David accords, however, there was interest in the idea of a transitional "autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza. This idea was embodied in the agreement regarding the West Bank and Gaza, though the details were not sufficient for West Bankers to take a definite position. West Bankers wanted to know what would happen after the transitional period. Specifically, would the Israelis withdraw? Would the settlements be dismantled? Would the territory revert to Arab sovereignty? They tried in desperation to get answers to these questions, to no avail.

Americans, both officially and privately, were visiting the area in large numbers to drum up support for the self-rule concept, but none could give definite answers to the questions asked by West Bankers. They were noncommittal but hopeful that Arab cooperation and U.S. support could produce results that would satisfy the Palestinian people. West Bankers did not share in the American optimism. Consequently, the PLO became the rallying force behind the opposition to Sadat and his peace initiative, a fact which soon became apparent to American officials.

The area was visited by British officials who seemed to carry the same message as their American counterparts, but they also failed to persuade the people that Camp David was good for the Palestinians. In fact, if the British persuaded anyone of anything, it was that they were the instrument of American policy in the Middle East.

The most interesting role was played by the Israeli and foreign mass media. Many people in the West Bank felt the media were attempting to set up a new leadership for them. Indeed, scores of

foreign journalists and television people converged upon the West Bank. They came not only from the United States and England but also from nearly every European country and Japan. Some represented leftist journals, but most represented the larger, well-known newspapers and magazines. All the American national TV networks were present. The BBC was active, and so were the French and the Italian networks, to a lesser degree.

It appeared that a few individuals were receiving more coverage than others. Few journalists showed any interest in the average person in the West Bank. Indeed, most of them came to the West Bank only during demonstrations, strikes, and other troubled periods.

With the exception of the mayor of Ramallah, and occasionally some others, the individuals most frequently interviewed by the Israeli and foreign press were the "moderates." These moderates had the following elements in common: none of them was pro-PLO; with the exception of the mayor of Bethlehem, none of them had been elected in recent years; few had ever been elected to any office; and they appeared to be flexible and had a reputation of never taking a position on anything.

This leadership, by grace of the mass media, had no power base and was doomed to fail. Its main problem, however, was not its lack of support. That, in an occupied area ruled by force, is not a decisive factor. Its biggest difficulty was that the plan was no plan at all. Begin continued to make statements indicating that "self-rule" was no more than an administrative device, void of any commitment about the political future of the area. In other words, the Israelis gave the leadership no opportunity to build a power base. As a result, many of its members were seen as collaborators, self-seeking politicians or even traitors, at least among a segment of the population.

Some of the negative attitudes of the opposition hardened during the post-Camp David period. For instance, distrust of Sadat increased. There were strong feelings in the West Bank that Sadat had sold out the Palestinians. People believed there was an American conspiracy to extract Egypt from the Arab world and isolate the opposition, mainly the PLO and Syria. In this way, an Egyptian-Israeli alliance could protect American interests in the region. This alliance would later win over Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab regimes.

The revolution in Iran and Khomeini's Islamic leadership gave West Bankers the hope that no matter how impossible the situation, miracles do happen. For these West Bankers, the Iranian revolution was a miracle. Unarmed people brought down a despotic emperor, supported by a well-equipped army of 450,000 soldiers and by an imperialist superpower, who had at its disposal a network of secret

police. It was not Khomeini's religious fervor but his kind of people's revolution that gave hope to the Palestinians about their own situation.

It will be very difficult for President Carter to change Palestinian attitudes toward Sadat and the Camp David accords. A change in the attitude of Palestinians would require a fundamental change in the attitude of the Israelis toward peace. Such a change seems extremely difficult and filled with psychological elements that Sadat could not isolate or neutralize.

Some Aspects of Palestinian Psychology

The first thing to understand about Palestinian nationalism is that it might be a transient phenomenon. Whether or not it is depends largely on how much other Arabs support the Palestinian cause.

Historically, the Palestinians have felt Arab, not Palestinian. In the 1930s, the report of the Peel Commission stated that neither Jews nor Arabs identified with Palestine as a country, a truism that could not be challenged. Palestine was a British creation, which the Arabs could not accept as the basis of a new national identity, especially with the Balfour Declaration as a part of it. Later the Jews changed the name of the country to Israel, indicating that they too did not want to be Palestinian.

The Arabs of Palestine continued to consider themselves Arabs first and Palestinians second, even after they had lost Palestine, indeed until about 1967. That year was the beginning of Palestinian nationalism because of two important factors. First, the Arab people of Palestine discovered that the Arab countries were weak and unprepared to restore Arab rights in Palestine by force. This was not a sufficient reason, however, to give rise to a Palestinian nationalism separate from an Arab nationalism. What made the Palestinians opt for a nationalism of their own was the second factor: the feeling that Arab nationalism was not strong enough to deter Arab regimes from mistreating Palestinians. Hussein's battles with the PLO in 1970 and Hafez Assad's encounters with them during the Lebanese civil war, without protest from the Syrian and Jordanian rank-and-file, convinced Palestinians that other Arabs were apathetic to their cause. In fact, many Palestinians felt that the provincialism of Jordan and Syria was stronger than their Arab nationalism. Their greatest disappointment was with the Syrians, who had long supported the Palestinian cause.

Thus, to a large degree, Palestinian nationalism was influenced more by Arab attitudes than by Israel. It was only when the Pales-

tinians had been rejected by fellow Arabs that they became Palestinian nationalists. This is why today Palestinian nationalism has much in common with Zionism. They were both largely the outcome of rejection and persecution by host countries.

The Palestinian dilemma is complicated by emotional and psychological factors. Immediately following Camp David, the people of the West Bank felt trapped, isolated, and deserted. They had lost confidence in the Arab countries. Today they have no love either for Sadat or for the rejectionist leaders. To a large extent, they have given up on the Arab masses; they no longer believe these masses can throw out their "corrupt" and unpatriotic leaders. This is why West Bankers are divided between the ideology of the extreme left, which advocates the complete overthrow of Arab regimes through revolution, and the extreme religious right, which either prays for salvation or advocates a return to the true religion of the prophet.

The people of the West Bank no longer want to hear or read statements made by Hafez Assad (president of Syria), Saddam Hussein (president of Iraq), or Muammar Qadhaffi (leader of Libya), whom they consider farcical. King Hussein of Jordan is considered highly intelligent but less patriotic than any other Arab leader. He is even more despised than Sadat. He has a following in the West Bank and Gaza, however, because of the self-interest of particular groups and politicians. His strongest support is in the commercial community and the landed gentry, who fear the influence of socialist ideologies and unsettling revolutionary fervors in the PLO. Also, these groups believe it is politically easier to return the West Bank to Jordan than to give it to the PLO. Geography and international politics are important elements in this pragmatic argument.

If the West Bank were to vote today between Hussein and the PLO, Arafat's PLO would win easily. Hussein, however, would be acceptable if the choice were between him and the Israelis. In other words, Arafat would be dumped if Israeli withdrawal depended on West Bankers backing Hussein.

This point merits reiteration. If West Bankers had a free choice, they would opt for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza under the PLO. If this option were not available, they would not oppose a connection with Jordan. They would probably insist, however, on greater local autonomy.

West Bankers' attitudes toward the PLO and Arafat seem very complex. Because they are Palestinians, West Bankers do not see them merely as political choices in the spectrum of negotiations and peace, but as the natural elements in the makeup of Palestinian solidarity. The PLO's connection with West Bankers transcends

political considerations. It is integral to the patriotism of all Palestinians, including those who criticize it and find faults in its politics.

The PLO is the symbol of Palestinian resistance even though it is weak and beset by problems. It reminds the people of the West Bank of their brothers in the diaspora and of their sufferings. To betray the PLO is to betray the two-thirds of the Palestinian people who live outside the West Bank, a betrayal that would instill perpetual guilt. This is why the United States was unable to persuade the Palestinians to forget the PLO. For many West Bankers, it seemed the Americans were asking them to commit treason. It is not an exaggeration to say that West Bankers would be for the PLO in spite of the PLO—that is, in spite of its weaknesses and its mistakes.

There is little enthusiasm for Arafat. To understand this, one should separate the symbols from the politics of West Bankers. While the young people chant PLO songs and shout Arafat's name during anti-Israeli demonstrations, they remain ambivalent about the man himself. They like him and respect him as a person. He does not have a bad personal reputation, as other Arab leaders do. His image is that of a decent man, but many people wonder about his leadership and his politics. He heads a revolutionary movement, and yet he does not seem revolutionary enough. He appears to be more of a politician than the head of a *fidayeen* movement. There is a widespread belief in the West Bank that Arafat is a very good politician, but the question very much on the minds of many West Bankers, especially the young, is, "Who wants a politician?"

Some West Bankers criticize Arafat for neglecting the military side of PLO activity. They believe Arafat's political victories, such as his appearance at the UN and the recognition his PLO has received from many countries, have not been backed up on the battlefield. Arafat's political pyramid seems to have been built on such shifting military sands that it could easily fall.

Some see contradictions in Arafat's policies. He is supposed to be a revolutionary leader, and yet he depends on ultra-conservative regimes for money. This leads to the belief that Arafat may have lost his independence to Assad, who is disliked in the West Bank as much as Hussein, Sadat, and the Persian Gulf rulers. Nevertheless, many people feel sorry for Arafat and his PLO. They are unable to trust anyone, yet they must deal with almost everyone.

The anguish goes beyond the PLO's dilemma. West Bankers seem to feel that not only the PLO but also all Palestinians are suspect in the eyes of others. This feeling has become an important element in their solidarity. Again, like the Zionists, they are developing the-world-hates-us complex.

Palestinians, in general, cannot understand how the world can hate those it has made miserable. They feel that they have suffered enough and that the world should help them instead of hating them. There is enough frustration among Palestinians with the "other world" to transform them into a time bomb that could explode not only against the Israelis and Western interests but also against other Arabs.

The strongest factor working against such an explosion is the family. Interviews with individuals who have served time in Israeli prisons for working with the PLO show dramatically how family feelings inhibit the performance of "patriotic duties." When a young man goes to prison, his father may become angry and his mother may weep, but when he returns home he is treated as a dependent, sometimes as a child. Joining the PLO or throwing a bomb at the Israelis may result from a young man's need to prove his manhood or a young woman's need to feel liberated.

Ironically, some ex-prisoners want to return to prison where they can feel independent and important. This is even more true of women than of men because of the female's inferior status in the family. It is interesting to note that Arabs detained in the Ramallah prison, allegedly for activities harmful to Israeli security, have for months refused to see their families. The prisoners called this refusal a strike to dramatize their desperate situation, but its psychological implications made it more than a strike. The prisoners wanted to avoid the emotional effects of seeing their families and remembering how totally dependent they were on them.

Any leader who can separate the son and the daughter from the father and the mother can unleash a tremendous fighting force against the Israelis and other perceived enemies of the Palestinian people. Such an effort, however, would require efficient organization, dynamic leadership, and especially money, to be made available to the youth of the West Bank. The PLO has not been able to accomplish this objective, but for the West Bankers it remains their greatest hope for the future.

3
Agriculture

Hisham M. Awartani

The rapid sequence of events affecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip dictates a new priority for research on the agricultural transformation of the territories since Israeli occupation. The future should be considered within the framework of a political settlement that will ultimately result in an acceptable degree of national sovereignty in the two territories.

This paper is intended to outline the basic components of an agricultural policy for the anticipated Palestinian state. The ideas and proposals presented here are based on detailed discussions with a large number of technicians and farmers. Detailed plans would require more comprehensive study.

Primary Goals for a New Agricultural Policy

Agriculture has consistently been second only to services in importance within the economy of the West Bank and Gaza. Agriculture contributes between 28 and 32 percent of the gross national product and employs between 25 and 30 percent of the labor force. This study assumes that the role of agriculture in the overall economic development of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will have the following major objectives:

- *Expanding food production to cope with rapid increases in population, which are expected to result from the repatriation of Palestinians to the new state.* It is prudent to assume that around 500,000 refugees, if they are permitted, will return to the emerging state during the first year following its inception. Such a population growth, together with an estimated demand elasticity for food of 0.9 and a

practically stable income, would increase the demand for food by 50 percent.

- *Alleviating certain forms of malnutrition that are widespread in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.* An Israeli study has estimated caloric intake of West Bankers at 89 percent of Israelis'; total protein at 83.1 percent; animal protein at 41.4 percent; and fat at 59.4 percent.[1]
- *Increasing agricultural production to help correct the West Bank and Gaza's imbalance of trade with Israel, much of which is due to substantial imports of food items from Israel.* Figures for 1977 reveal a combined trade deficit with Israel of I£3047.2 million (around $152.4 million), of which approximately 15 percent is in agricultural trade.[2]
- *Maintaining the position of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as important suppliers of several food items for other countries in the Middle East.* This trading relationship will continue after independence only if producers manage to be more efficient, so that they are able to compete favorably with producers from Israel and elsewhere.
- *Absorbing a much larger number of agricultural laborers, yet maintaining a high level of labor productivity.* This will be possible only in the framework of an ambitious scheme of horizontal expansion in most agricultural sectors.

Existing Constraints. Attainment of quick and sustained growth in agricultural production requires proper evaluation of certain important constraints. Among the more important ones are the following:

Land. One of the important limits on agricultural development is the area of available arable land. The land area of the new state will be about 5,939,000 dunums (1 dunum = 0.25 acres), distributed as follows: West Bank, 5,505,000 dunums; East Jerusalem, 67,000 dunums; and Gaza Strip, 367,000 dunums. Mainly because of mountainous topography, only 47 percent of the land in the West Bank is under cultivation (2 million dunums), whereas, in the Gaza Strip 52 percent of the land is under cultivation (200,000 dunums).

The relative scarcity of arable land makes the following development goals vital:

- developing extensive tracts of new land for cultivation
- instituting new laws forbidding excessive fragmentation of land

[1] Samuel Pohoryles, *Development of Agriculture in Administered Areas* (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Agriculture), p. 27.

[2] *Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly* (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics), vol. 7 (3-4), 1977, pp. 6-7.

- establishing a firm ban on the continuing Israeli acquisition of land purchase
- assuming full authority over all land in the public domain.

Water. A vigorous and competitive agricultural sector cannot be established without intensive exploitation of available water resources. As of 1978, only 81,000 dunums were under irrigation in the West Bank (4 percent of the area under cultivation) and 90,000 dunums in Gaza (45 percent of the land under cultivation). Dry lands are supported by a rainfall of 400–600 mm, much of it lost in run-off water, drained mostly to Israel. In a country where water is so scarce, it is amazing how little has been done to conserve rainfall through terraces, earth dams, and ponds.

Underground water resources in the West Bank have not been adequately ascertained, but rough topography presents greater problems than does the shortage of irrigation water. Most local experts agree that there is enough water to support intensive farming in areas where the topography permits. There are now 314 artesian wells in the West Bank and 1,860 in the Strip, as opposed to 339 and 1,966 prior to the June 1967 War. The Israeli authorities have prohibited the drilling of new wells or the development of weak ones. They have also imposed a ceiling on the volume of water produced by existing wells, though few farmers are prepared to adopt modern irrigation techniques.

The problem of artesian water is complicated by the competition of Israeli settlements for underground water. Israeli settlers in the Jordan Valley have drilled seventeen wells so powerful that they have drastically reduced the discharge capacity of nearby local wells. In 1977–1978, the seventeen "Israeli" wells produced 14.1 million cubic meters of water, compared with 33.0 millions discharged by 314 "Arab" wells.[3]

The underground water situation in Gaza is equally disturbing. Excessive water discharge has resulted in a declining water table and an increase in its salinity. Competition of neighboring Israeli wells for water is keen. It is therefore reasonable to assume that water policies in the Gaza Strip will have to be negotiated on a more equitable basis.

Labor. Until 1967 agriculture in the West Bank and Gaza was, as in most underdeveloped countries, the residual claimant of labor. Rural areas, particularly in the West Bank, were congested with laborers, many of whom were underemployed. Following Israeli occu-

[3] *Monthly Discharge of Artesian Wells in Yehuda and Shomron 1977-78* (Military Government at Beit El: Department of Water), pp. 1-31.

pation, however, large numbers of laborers left their farms for Israel, in search of higher wages.[4] The work force in agriculture declined by 30 percent between 1968 and 1975.

Following a peaceful settlement, labor mobility and possibly trade across international borders in the area (including Israel) might be governed by minimal restrictions. Agriculture in the new state, therefore, will have to employ labor that can seek higher wages in Jordan and Israel, as well as the oil countries. This should further justify the development of agriculture on a solid technological base in the new state.

Agriculture must develop the capacity to employ, at an acceptable productivity level, part of the repatriated Palestinian labor force. With its present land, water, and capital resources, however, the absorptive capacity of agriculture is limited, and a vigorous technological effort would aggravate the problem. Farming will have to be expanded wherever feasible. Should 500,000 Palestinians return, the new regime will have to create jobs for 90,000 new workers, in addition to the present labor force of 206,200. If a third of these new workers are farmers, agriculture will have to create around 30,000 new jobs. The modernization of farming techniques, on the other hand, will eventually lower agriculture's share of the labor force.

Marketing. The present market structure in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is under policies and restrictions imposed by Israel and occasionally by Jordan. Local markets are open to Israeli produce, much of which is subsidized by the government, and local producers have suffered tremendous losses. Arab producers are denied free access to Israeli markets. These measures have resulted in a substantial deficit in the agricultural balance of trade between the two areas and Israel (in 1977, around $152 million).[5] Jordan still permits entry of major farm products, particularly citrus fruits. But on several occasions, Jordan has enacted policies that protect producers in the East Bank.

More equitable terms of trade between Palestine and its neighbors are needed. This matter will be highly contingent on the degree of sovereignty accorded to the new state.

[4] The labor force from both territories employed in Israel is estimated at 62,900 workers (1977), which represents about 30.7 percent of the total employed force (Source: *Administered Territories Statistics Quarterly*, pp. 34-36).

[5] Figures published in the *Statistical Abstract of Israel* show that as early as 1975, the West Bank and Gaza Strip had already become the next largest importers of Israeli exports (19 percent), second only to the United States. When Arab Jerusalem is included (12 percent of West Bank population), the occupied territories become the primary recipients of Israel's exports, accounting for about 24 percent of its total exports.

A Preliminary Development Plan

In view of the previous constraints, the following proposals for development are recommended. A more comprehensive evaluation of individual proposals should be delegated to teams of specialists, with the assistance of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) where possible.

Hilly Terrain Farming. With hilly and rough land composing over 90 percent of the surface area of the West Bank, proper utilization of this area is the most obvious need. During the past eleven years, farming on hilly land has dwindled disturbingly. The main reason is the high cost of labor, which has forced farmers in mountain villages to abandon their farms and seek outside employment, mostly in Israel, and to devote only their spare time to their lands and orchards.

Proposed measures in this sector include the following:

Development of new land. Despite the high cost of developing new land for cultivation, this option must be exercised if agriculture in the West Bank is to contribute materially to a socioeconomic base capable of supporting a much larger population. The proposal, for reasons of economy, deals only with gently sloping lands. Their development includes digging out rocks, building terraces, planting suitable tree seedlings (see "Expansion of Dry-Land Tree Culture" below), and laying farm roads that can handle tractors and trucks.

Quite reasonably, landowners will not at first view such operations as either feasible or remunerative. But this project is a national investment, and in order to promote it and to encourage the participation of farmers, the government must subsidize the cost. The Jordanian experience in this regard has been a great success. The estimated cost of development is variable, but it runs about $75 per dunum. For the foreseeable future, it should be possible to develop around 10,000 dunums of new farmland per year.

Expansion of dry-land tree culture. This project aims specifically at areas growing olives, plums, almonds, grapes, and figs. The trees involved are particularly suited to the Palestinian mountains, but all have suffered from the high cost of labor under Israeli occupation and the shortage of certified seedlings at a reasonable cost.

Local experience has shown the advantages of nurturing seedling trees in specialized nurseries. Under arrangements with the government and philanthropic organizations, seedlings could be distributed at subsidized prices.

Improvement of services to dry-land trees. Trees on the hilly slopes of the West Bank are receiving husbandry inferior to that of trees (and vegetables) under irrigation. As a result of accumulated negligence, the situation for figs, almonds, grapes, and even olives is appalling.

To ensure effectiveness, the recommended measures should combine the following services:

1. Better fertilization: Olive trees receive little fertilization, while other dry-land trees are hardly fertilized at all. Recent extensive efforts to fertilize olive trees have been warmly received, but massive amounts of fertilizers cannot be disseminated without subsidization during the first few years.

2. More effective pest control: Pest damage to fruit trees is rarely publicized or taken seriously, even though the damage to figs, almonds, apricots, and several other crops has been disastrous. Even olives are now suffering serious damage from such pests as the fruit fly, peacock eye, and stem algae.

Weeds are among the more significant pests. Traditionally, they have been controlled by horse-plowing, which has become very expensive. The application of weed killers, therefore, is strongly advocated for use on hilly treelands, particularly in olive orchards. If the use of weed killers saves farmers one plowing (out of two or three) the financial gains will be great.

For reasons of practicality, low cost, and effectiveness, pest control should be handled by regional service units equipped with modern machinery and operated by qualified technicians. Such units should be run as private enterprises with the support of government agencies. In certain localities the units might be handled by local cooperatives.

Although the pest control units can initially be few in number, the West Bank needs twenty-five to thirty full-fledged mechanical service units as soon as the necessary funds are made available to qualified entrepreneurs. The quantity and type of machinery needed in each unit will be ascertained on the basis of specific regional needs.

3. Better pruning techniques: Olive trees have been underpruned for years, mainly because of the high cost of rejuvenating aging trees. To make this process more economical and practical, modern power pruning equipment, run by regional service units, should be used.

4. More advanced technology in olive harvesting by hormones: Most olives are harvested by pickers who receive one-third of the olives they pick in exchange for their labor, which makes it a costly operation. Harvesting by applying hormones is cheaper, but it cannot

be done on a wide scale by farmers. It should be entrusted to regional service units after suitable arrangements are made with farmers.

5. More up-to-date olive oil presses: There are now 172 active olive oil presses in the West Bank and none in the Gaza Strip. The majority of these pressing plants are quite old both in age and design. They are labor-intensive, and they leave around 15 to 18 percent of the oil content unextracted.

Modern oil presses should be purchased after their feasibility is positively ascertained. It should be possible to introduce two to four modern plants a year at an estimated cost of $600,000 each.

In addition, quality control and packaging of olive oil should be improved and standardized in accordance with well-defined criteria. This will help to improve the market image of Palestinian olive oil, which has declined because of frequent cases of adulteration. Packaging olive oil in smaller tin cans after reducing its acidity is also being advocated, but in view of its novelty and the deep-rooted traditions of local consumers, further evaluation is needed.

Irrigated Vegetable Crops. This sector has scored considerable gains in productivity in recent years, often amounting to over 100 percent. This has been achieved through substantial improvements in all production practices. Most experts believe that there is still ample room for further development, mainly in maximizing returns on water resources and other expensive production inputs. Israeli experience in this regard is very instructive. Recommended improvements include the following:

Disseminating drip irrigation techniques. Experience gained over the past three years has demonstrated the superiority of drip irrigation over former practices. Drip irrigation saves over 50 percent on water and 90 percent on labor compared with traditional methods of irrigation. There are now 7,300 dunums under drip irrigation in the West Bank and 9,000 dunums in Gaza (two-thirds of them in citrus groves). Every effort should be made to expand the land under drip irrigation by 5,000 dunums annually for the next few years, at an estimated cost of $300 per dunum.

Constructing irrigation ponds. In order to facilitate the use of modern irrigation techniques, and to save on labor—and perhaps to help raise fish as well—earth or concrete water reservoirs should be constructed to hold water pumped from artesian wells. Many such reservoirs have been constructed in recent years (twenty-two in the Jordan Valley), and the results are quite gratifying. Ten to fifteen such reservoirs should be constructed each year over the next decade,

at a current cost of approximately one thousand five hundred dollars each.

Drilling artesian wells. There are several areas in the West Bank where no prospecting for underground water has been carried out. Every effort should be made to drill artesian wells wherever the topography permits intensive farming. With adequate funds and technology, the area of land under irrigation could be doubled in three to four years.

Processing agricultural fruit. Processing plants will be needed to handle the surplus resulting from the expected increase in output of fruit and vegetable crops. These plants will help stabilize the flow of fresh fruits, and reduce the import of canned foods from Israel and abroad. More important, perhaps, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip might become exporters of canned products.

Three agricultural processing plants should be built. A plant in Arroub (Hebron District) would process grapes, apples, peaches, and summer tomatoes. A plant in Nablus District would specialize in vegetables and olive oil, and the third plant, in the Gaza Strip, would handle citrus products. The total cost is estimated at $4.0 million.

Introducing new crops. Returns from agriculture could be materially improved by introducing new crops, such as roses, strawberries, and onion seeds, for export markets. Palestinians could then use their skills in specialty crops to gain an edge over farmers in neighboring countries. But such export produce must be backed by efficient marketing, transportation, agricultural extension, and credit services.

Field Crops. Despite a lower output caused by smaller acreage, the productivity of grain, sesame, and legume crops has increased by over 80 percent in recent years. Much higher productivity is possible if extension recommendations are adopted on a wider scale. Increased national output of grain crops is not anticipated, however, before the emancipation of the vast areas which are currently out of production as a result of Israeli measures. If productivity is improved and if acreage is restored to normal, a 100 percent increase in the grain output is possible in two to three years. A rapid rise in productivity of grains requires a massive effort involving extension services, cooperatives, and the proposed regional service units. The major proposals are the following:

Improving seed bed preparation. This requires better plowing, discing, and mechanical seeding equipment. These operations are now mainly carried out by inefficient and labor-intensive methods.

Sowing superior quality seeds. Farmers can make considerable gains by replacing their old seed stock with far more productive strains available at nearby markets.

Improving fertilization. Grain farmers are extremely deficient in this respect, using little or no fertilizer.

Controlling weeds by chemicals. Manual weeding of grains is much more expensive and inefficient than the controlling of weeds by chemical sprays. The grain project requires integrated action on various fronts. The most important bottleneck occurs in providing mechanical services at a reasonable cost when they are needed. Regional service units could perform a critical service in this connection.

Citrus Crops. Citrus is by far the most important crop in the Gaza Strip, providing 57 percent of the agricultural income, and it is of primary significance to the West Bank. The citrus crop in the Gaza Strip is estimated at 233,000 tons, and in the West Bank at 76,000 tons.

Although dramatic achievements cannot be scored quickly in this sector, a national citrus policy should aim at the following objectives:

- expansion of acreage based on well-defined technical criteria enforced by the Department of Agriculture
- continuous improvement of cultural practices
- more effective control and certification of the budding stock.

If sufficient effort is put into this sector, it should be possible to increase output by 10 percent annually for the next ten years. The following measures are suggested:

Providing medium-term loans. Substantial capital must be invested in new citrus groves for several years before any income is earned. The majority of landowners are therefore obliged to seek credit at reasonable rates. This kind of credit should be entrusted to a government-sponsored national credit institution, the Palestine Agricultural Credit Corporation (PACC).

Establishing the National Citrus Board (NCB). The proposed board would represent growers, middlemen, and the government. It should be given extensive regulatory rights over citrus production and trade.

Controlling pests. The NCB will work toward the prevention and control of citrus pests. Should the need arise, it must be empowered with the right to organize mandatory regional spraying campaigns.

Establishing modern packing plants. There are eight citrus packing plants in the Gaza Strip, and the need for more is questionable. In the West Bank, there is only one, and two more plants appear to be needed, though their feasibility would have to be established. The NCB will have a decisive role in this regard.

Pastures. Vast areas on the West Bank hills are suitable for natural pastures. Effective programs for pasture development depend upon the restoration of sovereignty over natural grazing land now used for military or settlement purposes. The Palestinian state will have to implement an ambitious program of pasture development to relieve the chronic shortage of mutton. Possibly 50,000 dunums could be converted into grazing land, but only if sufficient funding is available and if the Range Department enforces its rules regulating natural grazing.

Livestock. The creation of a viable livestock sector will probably be the most difficult part of agricultural development in the future state. The main problems lie in the lack of good natural pastures and the scarcity of irrigated land. Locally produced fodder is far too expensive to support a dairy industry competitive with those of Israel and Jordan. A dairy plant depending heavily on reconstituted milk may be needed.

Beef production is probably more promising, since it is based on concentrated feed mixed locally from ingredients easily obtained in world markets. Recent experiments in dry-lot fattening of lambs have demonstrated a potential for expanding mutton output, but a shift in consumer demand from mutton to beef should perhaps be promoted.

Poultry. Based on the experience of Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon, the production of poultry and eggs is probably the most practical solution to the severe shortage of animal protein foods. The poultry industry in the West Bank had achieved considerable progress prior to Israeli occupation, but it was adversely affected afterwards by competition with subsidized Israeli produce. The pre-Occupation rate of growth, estimated at 25 percent annually, can be restored if there is coordinated action on various levels. When Israeli competition ends, the following measures should prove helpful in achieving a rapid and stable growth.

Expanding egg and poultry farms. Priority should be given to poultry farms that are technologically modern and of commercial size.

Credit needs might amount to $1.5 million a year. Lending operations should be undertaken by the PACC.

Establishing modern hatcheries. Until December 1979, poultry raisers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip depended exclusively on chicks hatched in Israel. Every effort should be made to establish two hatcheries in the West Bank and one in the Strip (estimated total cost is $2.3 million).

Establishing poultry slaughter houses. Producers of broiler poultry face serious problems in having to dispose of their live flocks only within a few days after they reach marketable weight. This reduces sellers' bargaining power and causes serious sanitary problems as chickens are slaughtered in the middle of urban centers.

To modernize marketing techniques the construction of two slaughter houses in the West Bank and one in the Strip (at an estimated total cost of $2.5 million) is needed. Legislative and marketing measures should also be taken to discourage the selling of live broilers and to promote ready-to-cook chickens.

Establishing the National Poultry Board. The poultry industry is constantly confronted with difficult production and marketing decisions. To help draw a well-integrated policy a National Poultry Board (NPB) representing various interest groups should be established, with the necessary authority to effect its decisions.

Infrastructural Development

Rapid growth in agriculture can be achieved only if it is supported by a wide range of auxiliary infrastructures. The need is intensified by the deterioration of credit institutions, cooperatives, and other agricultural infrastructures during Israeli occupation. The following list deals with the more important needs in this regard.

In-Service Training of Extension Personnel. The number and academic qualifications of the current technical extension staff pose no important problems. Their vocational skills are deficient, however, mainly because of the lack of training of college graduates recruited into government service. Training workers in agricultural and rural development projects can be expedited in two ways: (1) Ten to fifteen scholarships a year should be provided in foreign countries where the advanced technological training fits local needs. The assistance of FAO and friendly countries will be instrumental in fulfilling this need. (2) A rural development center should be established with

the following aims: (a) organizing specialized pre- and in-service training courses for personnel engaged in agricultural extension, cooperative organization, and agricultural credit; and (b) conducting studies in coordination with these organizations on a wide range of socioeconomic problems, with emphasis on evaluation and appraisal of rural development projects.

Provision of Adequate Transportation for Extension Staff. The effectiveness of extension agents is severely hampered by inept transportation. The only practical solution in the long run is to give each agent a vehicle and an equitable mileage allowance.

Initiating a Solid Program of Adaptive Research. The full-scale modernization of agriculture must be accompanied by modern innovations. A few well-distributed research stations could conduct many adaptive research programs.

Four stations are needed in the West Bank, at Wadi Fara'a Station (Jordan Valley), Arroub (Hebron Mountains), Askar (Nablus), and Khadourie Agricultural Station (Tulkarm). A fifth station, specializing in citrus research, should be established in the Gaza Strip.

Reevaluation of Agricultural Education. Education has failed to meet the needs of agricultural development in the West Bank and the Strip. Courses in agriculture taught in village schools and in the Arroub Agricultural School should be harmonized to fit local needs, and better use should be made of the sizable resources lying idle at Khadourie Agricultural Institute in Tulkarm. Agricultural schools in Israel can serve as models to the new state's school system. For these purposes a specialized team should be appointed to evaluate various programs of agricultural education and to formulate new policies.

Rejuvenation of Cooperatives. The West Bank has had long experience with agricultural cooperatives; though often less than pleasant, it has been instructive. Cooperatives have a role to play in modern agriculture, chiefly by providing a strong bargaining position, in purchasing bulk farm supplies, and in marketing produce.

To achieve these objectives at a reasonable cost, and to minimize the chance of failure, policy regarding agricultural cooperatives should rest on the following guidelines.

- Cooperatives should be established only when sufficient viability is demonstrated and when farmers need them.

- Cooperatives should be managed in businesslike fashion. The importance of hiring qualified management cannot be overemphasized. A paternal or charitable government policy toward cooperatives is doomed to fail.
- Credit must be provided on reasonable terms. New cooperatives cannot rely on equity capital or commercial banks.
- Educational programs for members and management staff must be maintained.

The implementation of a sound cooperative policy based on these principles would be expedited by the following:

- The Palestine Cooperative Bank (PCB) should be established to provide seasonal and short-term loans to cooperatives. In places where no cooperatives exist, eligible farmers could apply for seasonal loans to the local PCB branch.
- Training and research services should be provided by the rural development center.

Establishing an Efficient Credit System. Capital is essential to the modernization of agriculture. Since most farmers have modest savings, agricultural development is largely financed by specialized agricultural institutions. As capital requirements in the agricultural sector are large, two national credit agencies should be established.

The Palestine Agricultural Credit Corporation. PACC would be a government-sponsored, autonomous organization, run by a board representing the government, farmers, middlemen, and consumers. It would extend variable-term loans to applicants who satisfy set criteria regarding real estate mortgage, collateral, and purpose of loan.

Palestine Cooperative Bank. Every effort should be made to avoid duplication or competition in the activities of PACC and PCB. Credit requirements of PACC and PCB should be subject to extensive study by experts. If the experience of Jordan is a reasonable guide, PACC should start out with JD 4.0 million and PCB with JD 2.0 million.

Reassessment of the Marketing System. One of the chief obstacles to sustained agricultural development is the complexity of problems encountered in marketing. The following are among the more important ones:

- the unduly small share of the retail price that goes to producers for their goods
- the low level of grading, packing, transportation, storage, and other marketing services

- violent fluctuation of prices
- inequitable trade relations with Israel
- unpredictable import regulations imposed by Jordanian authorities.

An effective marketing policy may prove much more difficult to formulate and implement than are programs relating to production. A team of specialists should conduct a thorough evaluation of all marketing problems and recommend detailed programs. Among the more urgent needs is the construction of new municipal wholesale vegetable and fruit markets, where transactions of wholesalers would be routinely scrutinized by qualified municipal auditors. The vegetable wholesale market in Nablus is a good model.

Another priority concerns the construction of cold storage facilities to handle seasonal surpluses of grapes and other products.

Control of Excessive Land Fragmentation. Landholdings have been excessively fragmented through inheritance in many parts of the West Bank. To check further fragmentation, laws should be promulgated to place a minimum size on holdings within the context of a comprehensive zoning scheme. Consolidation of nonviable small holdings should also be promoted on a voluntary basis.

Construction of Farm Roads. It is virtually impossible to modernize agriculture without simultaneously improving the roads connecting farms with neighboring highways. In the West Bank, the topography is so rough that it impedes both production and transportation of produce. To build a functional road network takes years. It is necessary to solicit the cooperation of the community. An estimated 50 kilometers of agricultural roads should be constructed annually for a period of eight to ten years.

Regulation of Tenancy. Landowners constitute about 70 percent of all farmers in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But the importance of tenant farmers far outweighs their numbers, since they are mostly concentrated on irrigated land, where cash rent is the most common type of sharecropping. The main problem in regard to tenants is the loose legal arrangement which denies them more than one or two years on rented land. As a result, tenants take little interest in the maintenance or improvement of the productive capacity of their rented farms. This has led to the deterioration and the exhaustion of farms. A law is needed to ensure the maintenance and improvement of rented farms.

4

Education: Elementary and Secondary

Khalil Mahshi and Ramzi Rihan

Introduction

Education is the cornerstone of social progress and economic development. Hence, any attempt to evaluate the educational situation in a country and to plan for its improvement must be made within the context of a clear plan for economic development. A comprehensive description of the educational situation is also needed to uncover problems that might impede its improvement.

Objectives. Interest in the development of education in the West Bank has been growing recently. Several attempts have been made to evaluate certain aspects of education in the West Bank since its occupation by Israel.[1] These attempts provide a basis for understanding the issues, but none by itself forms a comprehensive study of education in the West Bank; some of them are not sufficiently well documented (because of scarcity of data rather than negligence on the part of the authors), and others need updating.

[1] Khalil Mahshi, *The Situation of Higher Education in the West Bank* (Birzeit, West Bank: Birzeit University Publications, 1978 in Arabic); Sami Mar'i, "Higher Education Among Palestinians with Special Reference to the West Bank," in Gabriel Ben-Dor, ed., *The Palestinians and the Middle East Conflict: Studies in Their History, Sociology, and Politics* (Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove, 1978); Salim Nashef, *The Present Situation of Education in the West Bank, Its Problems and Future Trends, 1970-1971 School Year* (Tulkarm, West Bank: Tulkarm Agricultural Institute, 1972); Hanna Nasir, *Cultural Policies of the Israeli Occupation Toward Palestinians* (Birzeit, West Bank: Birzeit University Publications, 1976); Hanna Nasir and Ramzi Rihan, "Palestine: The Educational Challenge" (Presented at the United Holy Land Convention, Washington, D.C., September 1978, unpublished); and Michael M. Sherman, *The Educational Situation in the West Bank and Gaza-North Sinai* (Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, 1975).

This paper cannot overcome all these deficiencies. It does strive, however, to present a summary of the most important features of the educational situation in the West Bank since 1967. Some of the salient problems are discussed in the hope that future studies will formulate an integrated understanding of the needs and prospects of education in the West Bank.

Sources of Data. Soon after the occupation of the West Bank by Israel in June 1967, East Jerusalem and its environs were detached from the West Bank and annexed to Israel. The rest of the West Bank is divided into six administrative districts: Jenin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem-Jericho, and Hebron. The administrative supervision of education in each district is the responsibility of its directorate of education. The directorates are staffed exclusively by Palestinians from the West Bank. Each directorate, headed by a district director of education, falls under the immediate authority of the officer of education, an Israeli administrator in the West Bank Military Command Headquarters in Beiteen (Beth-El), near Ramallah.

Permission to use detailed statistical data available in the six directorates of education must be secured from the Officer of Education. This constitutes a major problem for the researcher.[2] Permission was not secured for the present study, which instead gathers information from the following sources: (1) statistical publications; (2) personal contacts with Palestinian educational administrators in the six districts and in East Jerusalem; and (3) other related studies. Hence, some information essential to a thorough evaluation of education was not available. Moreover, certain deductions can only be made tentatively because of discrepancies between sets of data and the unreliability of published statistics.

The School System 1967/1968–1978/1979

This section surveys the school system in the West Bank from kindergarten through twelfth grade. East Jerusalem will be dealt with separately.

Demographic Data. Any study of school enrollment in a given region must begin with a look at the demographic data pertaining to the population of the region. Table 1 shows the published data on the overall population of the West Bank during the period 1967–1976.

[2] Fathiya S. Nasru, *Education in the West Bank Government Schools, 1968/69-1976/77* (Birzeit, West Bank: Birzeit University Publications, 1977), p. 1.

TABLE 1

Population in the West Bank by Age and Male–Female Ratio, 1967–1976

	1967	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*Average Annual Growth, 1968–75* [a] *(percentage)*
Total	595.9	581.7	595.2	603.9	617.3	629.0	646.2	661.6	665.1	670.9	2.03
0–14 years	286.6	283.4	287.9	290.0	296.7	301.4	308.6	314.3	313.4	315.6	1.6
15–29 years	119.7	121.8	131.0	137.3	145.4	147.7	159.0	168.1	172.9	178.9	5.1
30–44 years	82.7	79.4	80.8	82.3	83.0	80.0	81.7	83.7	84.2	84.0	0.63
45–64 years	64.6	61.5	62.0	62.5	62.4	65.4	64.9	65.7	66.7	66.9	1.2
65+ years	39.1	35.6	33.5	31.8	29.8	34.5	32.0	29.8	27.9	25.5	−2.5
Males per 1,000 females	985	988	995	995	1,000	995	1,001	1,006	1,005	1,006	—

N.A. = not available.

Note: Figures reflect population, in thousands, at the end of each year.

[a] Unless otherwise indicated, average annual growth rates calculated in this paper were deduced from an exponential best fit to the statistical figures (that is, a linear regression on the logarithms of the figures) for the period indicated. The computations were performed by Mrs. Dixie Hallaj.

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1977*, No. 28, p. 703.

The figures are presumably based on the census of September 1967, reports of births and deaths, entry and exit figures to and from the West Bank, and an occasional sampling. The population figures for the age group 0–14 years have been revised downward in the *Statistical Abstract of Israel* of 1977, but the figures for the other groups remain unaltered. No explanation of this revision is made in the *Abstract*.

Table 2 exhibits more detailed information on the population below age twenty-five. The 0–4 year-old age group declined during the period 1968–1970 and did not recover fully until 1972; and the 5–9 year-old age group declined during the period 1972–1976. These related phenomena could be due to any combination of the following factors of the immediate postwar (1967) period: fewer births, delayed marriages, and preferential emigration of families with young children. The reduction in the number of 10–14 year-olds in 1977 bears out the hypothesis. (The reduction in this age group in 1976 could be due to the downward revision of the population figures mentioned in the previous paragraph.) Nonetheless, during the period 1968–1977, live births increased at a rate of 2.2 percent and the natural increase in the population at a rate of 6.4 percent.[3]

The following population characteristics may be deduced from tables 1 and 2:

- By the end of 1977, 41.4 percent of the population was in the 5–20 year-old age group, from which schools draw their enrollment.
- By the end of 1977, males made up 50.1 percent of the total population and 52.6 percent of the 0–14 year-old age group. This may be due to faulty recording of the female population during the 1967 census.[4]
- The average annual growth rates were 2.0 percent for the total population and 2.1 percent for the 0–14 year-old age group could be close to the actual figures.

The Educational System. Education in the West Bank is divided into the following levels: kindergarten; elementary (or primary) cycle (grades one to six, nominal age group 6–12 year-olds); preparatory cycle (grades seven to nine, age group 12–15 year-olds; secondary (grades ten to twelve, age group 15–18 year-olds)—in the last two years students are screened and placed in a scientific, a literary, or a

[3] Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1978, no. 29, pp. 765-767.

[4] Sherman, *The Educational Situation in the West Bank and Gaza-North Sinai*, p. 10.

TABLE 2

Population in the West Bank by Sex and Age, 1967–1977, up to 24 Years
(in thousands)

Age	*1967*	*1968*	*1969*	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975*	*1976*	*1977*	*Annual Growth, 1968–77 (percentage)*
Total												
Population	595.9	584.1	599.6	610.3	625.6	639.3	657.4	674.5	681.4	670.9	681.2	1.82
Males	295.6	290.5	299.4	305.2	313.6	319.9	330.0	339.3	342.7	336.5	341.6	1.91
0–4 years	106.6	103.1	101.2	101.4	107.9	115.6	118.6	123.6	126.0	119.5	121.3	2.5
Males	55.7	54.2	53.5	53.9	57.3	61.2	63.0	65.0	65.9	62.6	63.6	2.4
5–9 years	98.4	101.5	106.4	107.7	106.0	102.4	100.3	97.6	96.9	93.6	98.6	−1.2
Males	46.7	53.1	55.9	56.3	55.8	54.0	53.1	52.1	52.0	49.4	52.0	−1.0
10–14 years	81.6	81.1	84.8	87.4	91.0	93.7	100.9	105.9	106.9	102.5	96.1	2.7
Males	44.2	43.4	45.4	46.4	48.2	49.5	52.9	55.8	56.0	54.0	50.6	2.5
15–19 years	52.2	55.4	59.4	63.5	67.3	71.3	76.5	80.8	83.0	85.6	87.4	5.4
Males	26.8	28.6	31.0	33.5	35.4	37.6	40.3	42.7	43.8	45.3	46.3	5.6
20–24 years	38.3	37.1	40.7	42.3	45.1	44.7	48.4	51.3	54.1	56.1	60.6	5.2
Males	16.3	16.4	18.5	19.9	21.5	22.1	24.2	25.9	27.8	28.9	31.7	7.1

Note: Figures reflect population in thousands, at the end of each year. The figures for 1976 and 1977 have a different basis from the rest.

Source: For 1967-1969, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1970*, No. 21, p. 625; for 1970, *1971* edition, No. 22, p. 623; for 1971 and 1972, *1973* edition, No. 24, p. 694; for 1973, *1974* edition, No. 25, p. 683; for 1974, *1975* edition, No. 26, p. 685; for 1975, *1976* edition, No. 27, p. 668; for 1976 and 1977, *1978* edition, No. 29, p. 706.

subdivision of the vocational specialization; and higher education (postsecondary vocational training, teacher training, and university education).

Education is compulsory throughout the elementary and preparatory cycles. At the end of the secondary cycle, students sit for the General Secondary School Certificate Examination—the Tawjihi examination—which is administered uniformly throughout the West Bank. Admission into institutions of higher education is determined largely by Tawjihi scores.

In terms of administration, educational institutions fall into three categories: (1) *Government institutions:* These form the largest section of the school system. Government institutions are the "state" schools of the West Bank that were operated by the Jordanian government until 1967 when they were taken over by the military occupation government. The government does not operate any kindergartens or universities. (2) *UNRWA institutions:* The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees has been operating its own school system for some time. Its schools are restricted to the elementary and preparatory cycles as well as to three vocational and teacher-training institutes. (3) *Private institutions:* These compose the smallest sector of the school system. Some private schools provide only preschool (kindergarten) education, while others continue to the end of the secondary cycle. All university education in the West Bank is provided by the private sector.

Free tuition is provided by the government and UNRWA institutions except for occasional nominal fees. Most private institutions charge tuition. Despite the diversity of administration, all schools before 1967 had to adhere to a uniform minimal curriculum between grades one and twelve. Greater latitude exists in kindergartens and in institutions of higher education.

From table 3 it can be seen that, in 1976–1977, 76 percent of the pupils were in government institutions, 15 percent in UNRWA institutions, and 9 percent in private institutions. Distribution of pupils among the three categories has been reasonably stable during the past decade.

Enrollment. Failing to secure the permission of the Israeli Military Education Officer for access to documents, the researcher has no official statistical data on schools except those published by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics. Since 1971–1972, educational statistics on the West Bank have been only issued by the *Statistical Abstract of Israel,* published annually. These statistics are collected in table 4.

TABLE 3

Educational Institutions by Controlling Authority in the West Bank, 1967–1977

	1967–68	*1968–69*	*1969–70*	*1970–71*	*1971–72*	*1972–73*	*1973–74*	*1974–75*	*1975–76*	*1976–77*
Total										
Institutions	821	848	880	894	928	956	970	971	995	1,000
Classes	4,402	4,734	5,231	5,554	5,962	6,330	6,543	6,600	6,921	6,916
Pupils	142,216	162,750	178,479	188,121	196,161	202,556	207,729	213,684	229,062	230,736
Government										
Institutions	N.A.	670	686	699	714	730	737	741	765	760
Classes	N.A.	3,509	3,887	4,156	4,496	4,812	4,959	5,013	5,277	5,235
Pupils	N.A.	120,968	133,411	141,211	147,183	152,898	157,993	162,588	174,187	175,627
UNRWA										
Institutions	N.A.	83	83	82	83	84	86	87	90	92
Classes	N.A.	742	760	781	799	832	853	872	935	971
Pupils	N.A.	25,690	27,724	28,538	29,277	29,718	30,188	31,054	33,596	34,078
Other										
Institutions	N.A.	95	111	113	131	142	147	143	140	148
Classes	N.A.	483	584	617	667	686	731	715	709	710
Pupils	N.A.	16,092	17,344	18,372	19,701	19,940	19,548	20,042	21,279	21,031

N.A. = not available.

Note: These figures include teacher-training institutes which amount to ½ to 1 percent of the total.

Source: For 1967-68 and for 1968-69, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1969*, No. 20, p. 643; for 1969-70, *1970*, No. 21, p. 641; for 1970-71, *1971*, No. 22, p. 646; for 1971-72, *1972*, No. 23, p. 676; for 1972-73, *1973*, No. 24, p. 732; for 1973-74, *1974*, No. 25, p. 720; for 1974-75, *1975*, No. 26, p. 723; for 1975-76, *1976*, No. 27, p. 729; and for 1976-77, *1977*, No. 28, p. 744.

TABLE 4

PUPILS IN THE WEST BANK BY CYCLE AND GRADE, 1967–1977

	1967–68	*1968–69*	*1969–70*	*1970–71*	*1971–72*	*1972–73*	*1973–74*	*1974–75*	*1975–76*	*1976–77*
Total	142,216[a]	161,011	175,894	186,299	194,317	200,864	206,073	211,215	226,678	228,184
Kindergartens	N.A.	5,871	6,582	6,720	7,513	7,967	7,578	7,433	8,166	7,962
Primary Schools										
Total	N.A.	113,699	122,405	128,245	134,122	139,686	143,138	143,563	149,395	146,728
grade 1	N.A.	25,203	27,264	24,473	25,430	25,239	24,469	24,795	N.A.	N.A.
2	N.A.	21,533	22,826	24,863	22,831	23,592	23,914	22,585	N.A.	N.A.
3	N.A.	18,476	20,983	22,653	26,792	25,975	26,394	26,030	N.A.	N.A.
4	N.A.	18,400	19,097	22,857	23,037	25,617	26,116	24,907	N.A.	N.A.
5	N.A.	16,448	17,181	17,496	20,723	21,558	23,659	24,188	N.A.	N.A.
6	N.A.	13,639	15,054	15,903	15,309	17,705	18,586	21,058	N.A.	N.A.

Preparatory Schools										
Total	N.A.	27,665	30,972	33,652	35,135	35,026	36,929	40,335	46,420	48,247
grade 7	N.A.	11,672	12,934	14,514	14,382	13,969	15,804	17,230	N.A.	N.A.
8	N.A.	8,859	9,898	10,823	11,693	11,861	11,576	13,215	N.A.	N.A.
9	N.A.	7,134	8,140	8,315	9,060	9,196	9,549	9,890	N.A.	N.A.
Secondary Schools										
Total	N.A.	13,776	16,025	17,682	17,547	18,185	18,428	19,884	22,697	25,247
grade 10	N.A.	5,322	6,014	7,412	6,025	6,573	7,288	7,788	N.A.	N.A.
11	N.A.	4,799	4,851	5,240	6,223	5,452	5,832	6,417	N.A.	N.A.
12	N.A.	3,655	5,160	5,030	5,299	6,160	5,308	5,679	N.A.	N.A.

N.A. = not available.

[a] This figure includes students in teacher-training institutes.

SOURCE: For 1967-68 and for 1968-69, Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1969*, No. 20, pp. 643 and 644; for 1969-70, *1970*, No. 21, p. 642; for 1970-71, *1971*, No. 22, p. 647; for 1971-72, *1972*, No. 23, p. 677; for 1972-73, *1973*, No. 24, p. 733; for 1973-74, *1974*, No. 25, p. 721; for 1974-75, *1975*, No. 26, p. 724; for 1975-76, *1976*, No. 27, p. 729; and for 1976-77, *1977*, No. 28, p. 744.

TABLE 5

PUPILS IN THE WEST BANK BY CYCLE AND SEX, 1967–1977

	1967–68	*1968–69*	*1969–70*	*1970–71*	*1971–72*	*1972–73*	*1973–74*	*1974–75*	*1975–76*	*1976–77*
Total	142,893	162,930	175,799	187,177	195,208	203,709	206,084	212,131	222,059	227,149
Kindergarten	4,709	6,185	6,494	6,645	7,786	7,840	7,561	7,379	7,931	7,789
Primary										
Male	60,881	66,102	69,674	72,527	74,967	77,736	79,204	79,270	79,536	79,958
Female	43,183	49,887	53,771	57,630	60,172	63,347	63,837	64,961	66,323	66,634
Total	104,064	115,979	123,445	130,157	135,139	141,083	143,041	144,231	145,859	146,592
Preparatory										
Male	16,298	18,335	20,023	22,182	22,795	22,936	24,244	26,137	29,284	30,012
Female	7,353	9,260	10,811	12,018	12,795	12,976	13,308	14,919	17,653	18,671
Total	23,625	27,595	30,834	34,200	35,590	35,912	37,552	41,056	46,937	48,683
Secondary										
Male	7,236	9,258	10,578	10,902	11,582	13,178	12,189	13,163	14,281	16,154
Female	3,259	3,920	4,448	5,273	5,111	5,696	5,741	6,302	7,051	7,931
Total	10,495	13,178	15,026	16,175	16,693	18,874	17,930	19,465	21,332	24,085

NOTE: This table was compiled from information secured through personal contacts with some education directorates and from the office of UNRWA in East Jerusalem.

In an attempt to corroborate the information shown in table 4, data were collected through personal contacts. The information thus obtained is shown in table 5. A comparison of the two tables shows that the figures for total enrollment given in tables 4 and 5 differ at most by 2 percent, for the year 1975–1976. For the nine-year period between 1968–1969 and 1976–1977, the total enrollment figures of table 5 are greater than those of table 4 for six years and lower for three years. In terms of the three cycles of education, table 5 gives generally larger figures for the primary cycle, slightly larger figures for the preparatory cycle, and almost consistently lower figures for the secondary cycle.

A further comparison of the two sets of figures can be made on the basis of the rates of growth implied by each of them. The calculated rates of growth are shown in table 6. With the exception of kindergarten, the two sets of figures yield similar average annual rates of growth of student enrollment in all cycles ranging from about 3 percent for primary schools to about 7 percent for preparatory and secondary schools.

It is unfortunate that the *Statistical Abstract of Israel* does not contain more detailed information on education in the West Bank, such as the distribution of male and female students in the various grades and the numbers and qualifications of teachers. It is even more unfortunate that the information published in the *Abstract* has been reduced significantly since 1974–1975 (see table 4) and that the latest issue of the *Abstract* (no. 29, 1978) does not contain any information whatsoever about education in the West Bank for the year 1977–1978.

Attrition and Rates of Enrollment. The comprehensiveness of schooling is an important issue in any developing society. Two questions arise: of the 1,000 pupils who enroll in first grade, how many remain in school and of the entire population at a given age, how many are enrolled in the grade appropriate to that age?

In regard to the first question, the greatest attrition takes place between the end of the seventh and the end of the tenth grades. This period corresponds to the 13–16 year-old age group. The high attrition could be due to the number of adolescents from the West Bank who work in Israel.

The second question is more difficult to answer. It is noteworthy, however, that only half the students complete the "compulsory" ninth grade and that fewer than one-third pass the Tawjihi exam at the end of the twelfth grade. At the other end of the school spectrum, fewer than two-fifths of five-year-olds are enrolled in kindergartens.

A significant sex differential in rates of enrollment exists, as can be seen from table 5. This increases with the level of schooling, indicating a greater attrition rate for females because of the greater emphasis placed on the education of males. Other data, however, show a slight growth of female enrollment, indicating that social concern for the education of females is increasing. The sex differential in rates of growth is nevertheless quite small in light of the present disparity in enrollment. If present trends continue, it will be a long time before sex equality in schooling is achieved.

School Facilities and Personnel. A description of school facilities in the West Bank has already been given.[5] Among other things, it was found that the number of school rooms and teachers was inadequate, and that only half of the secondary schools had libraries or laboratories. In the present study we concentrate on the adequacy of the school system in two respects: class size and pupil-teacher ratio.

Table 6 shows the number of students per classroom in government schools in the West Bank in 1977–1978. The data in the table indicate that the average class size in these schools is thirty-five; the average class size in rural schools is thirty-four, and in urban schools forty. The typical classroom is thus too large by any criterion. This conclusion holds for all levels of the government school system, in which three-quarters of all pupils are enrolled.

In July 1973, a study group of Palestinian educators and administrators submitted a memorandum to the West Bank Education Officer on the construction needs for the government school system during the seven-year period 1974–1975 to 1980–1981. According to the memorandum, 3,872 classrooms should be constructed during this period; of these, 1,902 were to replace old classrooms and 1,970 were needed for expansion. This implies that two-thirds of existing classrooms are in need of replacement and that existing classrooms meet only 60 percent of the need. Construction both for replacement and for expansion was needed most in the districts of Hebron and Nablus and least in the districts of Bethlehem and Ramallah. There is no available information on whether actual construction has kept pace with the more than 550 classrooms per year recommended by the report, but as table 6 indicates, government classrooms were still congested five years after the submission of the report.

An unpublished and undated survey of West Bank high schools conducted by Bethlehem University reported that 53 percent of the schools had libraries and 47 percent laboratory facilities—60 and

[5] Nasru, *Education in the West Bank Government Schools, 1968/69-1976/77.*

TABLE 6

NUMBER OF STUDENTS PER CLASSROOM IN GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS IN THE WEST BANK, 1977–1978

	To 15	*16–20*	*21–25*	*26–30*	*31–35*	*36–40*	*41–45*	*46–50*	*51–53*	*54+*	*Total*	*Percentage of Classrooms of More than Thirty Students*
Primary												
Total	20	102	303	530	659	571	524	332	111	129	3,281	71.0
Rural	19	98	287	497	550	384	312	198	82	92	2,519	64.2
Urban	1	4	16	33	109	187	212	134	29	37	762	92.9
Preparatory												
Total	55	101	102	203	271	200	183	80	18	12	1,225	62.4
Rural	55	99	101	166	194	122	79	53	13	11	893	52.9
Urban	0	2	1	37	77	78	104	27	5	1	332	88.0
Secondary												
Total	11	38	53	73	137	148	140	62	10	6	678	74.2
Rural	11	35	48	64	63	68	47	19	5	2	362	56.4
Urban	0	3	5	9	74	80	93	43	5	4	316	94.6
All												
Total	86	241	458	806	1,067	919	847	474	139	147	5,184	69.3
Rural	85	232	436	727	807	574	438	270	100	105	3,774	60.8
Urban	1	9	22	79	260	345	409	204	39	42	1,410	92.1

NOTE: Information secured through personal contact.

51 percent respectively for boys schools, and only 35 and 39 percent respectively for girls schools.

Pupil-teacher ratio in West Bank schools (as calculated from information secured through personal contact) is as follows: in 1968–1969, 28.0; 1969–1970, 27.6; 1970–1971, 26.9; 1971–1972, 26.2; 1975–1976, 28.6; and 1977–1978, 27.6. The average pupil-teacher ratio for the years 1968 to 1978 is apparently stable at 27.5. The hiring of new teachers is barely keeping up with the increase in enrollment.

The same sources from which the above data were gathered revealed that the percentage of government school teachers who hold university degrees was 13.5 percent in 1975–1976 and 18.5 percent in 1977–1978. The data available are too meager to permit any long-term conclusions.

The Tawjihi Examination. At the conclusion of twelve years of schooling for West Bank pupils, and for Jerusalem pupils as well, there is the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination. It is commonly known in Arabic as the Tawjihi ("guidance") examination because its initial purpose was to guide students into various areas of university study. Before 1967, West Bank students prepared for a Jordanian examination. After 1967, a West Bank Examinations Board was established in Nablus. Working in close cooperation with the Jordanian Ministry of Education, the Board registers candidates, selects examiners and graders, and issues certificates to candidates with their results. In addition, the Board maintains detailed records. The Board has to report to the Israeli Education Officer for the West Bank, but the certificates are exchangeable in Amman for Jordanian certificates which are acceptable as credentials of admission to Arab universities outside the West Bank. Although students are channeled into the various educational streams at the end of the tenth grade, the Tawjihi examination is based on the curriculum of the twelfth grade only. A critique of the Tawjihi examination has been given elsewhere,[6] so only some quantitative conclusions will be given here, based on the data shown in table 7. The number of students taking the examination has been increasing at an average annual rate of 6.6 percent. The number taking the literary examination has been increasing at 7.8 percent, and the number taking the scientific examination, at 5.2 percent. At this rate, the number of literary students will double every nine years while the number of science students will double every fourteen years, a pattern that could have important

[6] Nasir and Rihan, "Palestine: The Educational Challenge."

consequences on manpower resources. The number of students electing non-academic subjects (industrial, commercial, and agricultural) is less than 4 percent of the total.

It is thus obvious that the school system is not qualifying a sufficient number of young people for the scientific, technical, and skilled labor sectors. This shortcoming, which is not peculiar to the West Bank among developing societies, is in large measure a product of the existing educational policy.

The Political Factor. It is by now common knowledge that the educational process in the West Bank under Israeli military occupation has suffered from frequent disruptions. Some of these stem from the general situation that prevails under military occupation, such as curfews, travel restrictions, and general strikes, and have affected education only indirectly. Others, however, have affected the educational process more directly. These include student strikes and demonstrations, military intrusions into schools, arrests of students and teachers, and the closing of educational establishments by military order.

Examples of political disruption of education up to March 1977 have been given.[7] The number of students in the West Bank arrested by the military authorities from May 1977 to December 1978 is as follows: May/June 1977, 120; July/August, 4; September/October, 2; November/December, 136; January/February 1978, 113; March/April, 260; May/June, 30; July/August, 28; September/October, 18; and November/December, 9. The information was gathered from the Jerusalem daily newspapers *al-Quds* and *al-Fajr*. Since some arrests might remain unreported, the list gives the lower limits on student arrests.

Between 500 and 600 students were arrested every year. Periods of detention ranged from two days to twelve years and fines from 1,000 to 10,000 Israeli pounds. Charges included participation in a demonstration, belonging to Palestinian organizations, security offenses, throwing stones at the army, throwing bombs, illegal assembly, writing or distributing leaflets, refusing to pay fines, and agitating in schools, and investigation for security offenses.

The Council for Higher Education in Jerusalem issued a statement on May 9, 1979, listing instances of major military interference with educational establishments in the West Bank during the three-month period from February to May 1979. The list contained the following:

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[7] Nasru, *Education in the West Bank Government Schools, 1968/69-1976/77.*

TABLE 7

THE TAWJIHI EXAMINATION IN THE WEST BANK, 1969–1978

	1969		1970		1971		1972		1973		1974	
Stream	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed
All												
Number	4,999	3,364	6,391	4,584	6,259	4,417	6,373	4,137	7,543	5,326	6,926	4,846
Percentage	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Literary												
Number	3,021	2,017	3,936	2,812	3,604	2,527	3,633	2,315	4,550	3,149	4,104	2,806
Percentage	60.4	60.0	61.6	61.3	57.6	57.2	57.0	56.0	60.3	59.1	59.3	57.9
Scientific												
Number	1,780	1,263	2,166	1,633	2,323	1,723	2,438	1,690	2,698	2,009	2,583	1,897
Percentage	35.6	37.5	33.9	35.6	37.1	39.0	38.3	40.9	35.8	37.7	37.3	39.1
Industrial												
Number	137	50	208	86	169	77	155	61	143	88	138	86
Percentage	2.7	1.5	3.3	1.9	2.7	1.7	2.4	1.5	1.9	1.7	2.0	1.8
Commercial												
Number	37	17	38	20	120	57	115	49	118	52	77	38
Percentage	0.7	0.5	0.6	0.4	1.9	1.3	1.8	1.2	1.6	1.0	1.1	0.8
Agricultural												
Number	24	17	43	33	43	33	32	22	34	28	24	19
Percentage	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.4

SOURCE: Author's compilation.

- February 12—UNRWA Preparatory Boys School, Kalandia (around 800 students): closed by military order[8] and not reopened until April 8, eight weeks later
- March 5—Bethlehem Secondary Boys School (630 students): closed by military order and not reopened until April 6, five weeks later
- March 5—Hisham Ben Abdel-Malek Secondary Boys School, Jericho (328 students): closed by military order and not reopened until April 6, five weeks later
- March 11—Ramallah Secondary Boys School (500 students): closed by military order
- March 12—Birzeit University (1,064 students): army unit shot and wounded one university student and three townspeople; curfew imposed on the town while substantial reinforcements, headed by the military governor of the West Bank, conducted searches and interrogations until late in the evening

[8] Orders to close schools or reopen them are issued either by the military governor of the West Bank or by any of the military governors of the six districts.

1975		1976		1977		1978		Total		
Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	Taken	Passed	*Taken*	*Passed*	*Percent Passing*
7,611	5,215	9,014	6,660	8,300	5,265	9,640	7,010	73,056	50,824	69.6
100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	
4,592	3,003	5,710	4,007	5,398	3,164	6,125	4,291	44,673	30,091	67.4
60.3	57.6	63.3	60.2	65.0	60.1	63.5	61.2	61.1	59.2	
2,730	2,020	3,059	2,484	2,655	1,946	3,188	2,540	25,570	19,205	75.1
35.9	38.7	33.9	37.3	32.0	37.0	33.1	36.2	35.0	37.8	
210	146	164	114	171	103	264	137	1,758	948	53.9
2.8	2.8	1.8	1.7	2.1	2.0	2.7	2.0	2.4	1.9	
63	32	59	37	57	33	40	23	724	358	49.4
0.8	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.3	1.0	0.7	
16	14	22	18	19	19	23	19	280	222	79.3
0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	

- March 12—UNRWA Women's Vocational and Teacher Training Center, Ramallah (650 students): closed by military order until further notice
- March 12—Women's Teacher Training Institute, Ramallah (216 students): closed by military order until further notice
- March 13—Halhoul Secondary Boys School, Hebron District (600 students): closed by military order and not reopened until April 7, four weeks later
- March 16—Dura Secondary Boys School, Hebron District (800 students): closed by military order for fifteen days
- March 17 and 18—al-Najah University, Nablus (1,399 students): entry by army units into the campus
- March 25—all educational institutions in the West Bank closed for a period of one week by order of the military governor of the West Bank
- May 2—Birzeit University: student shot and wounded by an armed Israeli settler; army besieged campus, and some units attempted to enter; university closed by military order, which was not rescinded until July 2, two months later

- May 3—Bethlehem University (730 students): large army unit entered the campus forcibly; university closed by military order for four days
- May 3—Birzeit University: high-ranking officers conducted unprecedented search of the campus
- May 6—al-Najah University: army units entered campus
- May 7—Bethlehem Secondary Boys School: closed by military order

Higher Education

This section deals with the historic developments and the present state of higher education in the West Bank. It is followed by a brief presentation of the problems facing higher education and the attempts being undertaken to solve them.

The Development of Higher Education in the West Bank. Higher education as used here refers to all types of postsecondary education—university education, teacher training, vocational training, and continuing education. Many institutions, in addition to serving students from the West Bank and Jerusalem, also serve to a lesser extent students from the Gaza Strip and the Arab regions of Israel, as well as a few children of expatriate Palestinian families and foreign students.

Although a proposal for the establishment of an Arab university in Jerusalem was made in the mid-1940s, the first steps for providing higher education on the West Bank were not taken until the early 1950s. In 1951, Birzeit University (then Birzeit College—"college" in Arabic is frequently applied to secondary schools, as in the case of Birzeit College from 1942 to 1951 and al-Najah College from 1918 to 1965) began offering courses at the freshman level. A full freshman program was offered in 1953, and the sophomore class was opened in 1961. In 1952, the Jordanian government established the Women's Teacher Training Institute in Ramallah. In 1953, the UNRWA Men's Teacher Training Institute in Kalandia (Jerusalem) was established. The Friends Boys School in Ramallah began a freshman class in 1954 but abandoned the attempt soon afterward. The government Men's Teacher Training Institute in 'Arroub (Hebron District) was established in 1958 and was followed in 1960 by the UNRWA Men's Teacher Training Institute in Ramallah. The government agricultural school in Tulkarm was upgraded to a postsecondary institute in 1961. The UNRWA Women's Vocational and Teacher Training Center was

established in 1962. In 1965, al-Najah University (then al-Najah College) established a Teacher Training Institute in Nablus.

In 1962, a Royal Commission recommended that a Jordanian university be established in Amman, although a minority opinion favored Jerusalem. The University of Jordan in Amman was founded in 1964 and attracted a number of West Bank students.

Thus by 1967 there were eight institutions in the West Bank (including Jerusalem) that offered postsecondary education or training. All three sectors—government, private, and UNRWA—were involved in the effort. All institutions had an enrollment of only a few hundred students, and the period of study beyond high school did not exceed two years. The teaching staff was not highly qualified: a few had no university degrees, most held only bachelor degrees, and some had master's or doctorate degrees. The emphasis was overwhelmingly in favor of teacher training, vocational training came second, and academic education third. A West Bank high school graduate who desired a university education had to go abroad, and many did.

The period between the wars of 1948 and 1967—seen in retrospect—witnessed significant activity in the field of higher education. The activity, however, was not coordinated and did not spring from a comprehensive plan; in the field of university education, only initial steps were taken.

The period following the war of 1967 and Israeli occupation of the West Bank has been characterized by the difficulties of secondary school graduates wishing to matriculate in universities abroad. The subsequent pressure for higher education on the West Bank resulted in placing university education in top priority in the field. The teacher training program, which has remained relatively stagnant, is still in second place, and vocational training has been relegated to third place.

A summary of the present programs of West Bank universities is presented in tables 8 and 9. Some of the most salient plans of the three universities are the following:

- Bethlehem University: founded in 1973 on the grounds of a former Catholic high school. Bethlehem University was established as a totally new institution. The administration is headed by non-Palestinian Catholic brothers and, though there is a local advisory board, is ultimately responsible to the Vatican. The university aspires to remain small with attention focused on nontraditional programs unavailable elsewhere, such as in-service teacher training, nursing, and hotel management. The development plans of the university are relatively well defined for the next two or three years. Buildings on campus are being supplanted by new ones.

TABLE 8

University Enrollment in the West Bank

	Total[a]		*Arts*		*Science*		*Commerce*[b]		*Nursing*		*Education*[c]		*Hotel Management*[d]	
University	Total	First year[e]	Total	First year	Total	First year	Total	First year	Total	First year	Total	First year	Total	First year
Bethlehem	475	186	193	61	97	45	126	52	59	28	211	N.A.	44	24
Birzeit	1030	485	485	236	311	162	234	87			34			
al-Najah	948	590	382	209	201	142	365	239			451	201		
Total	2453[e]	1261[g]	1060	506	609	349	725	378	59	28	696	N.A.	44	24[f]

N.A. = not available.

[a] Total is for regular, full-time programs leading to a bachelor's degree at least; these are: arts, science, commerce and nursing. Full-time students in these programs are estimated as 95 percent at least of enrollment.

[b] Known at Bethlehem as Business Administration and at Birzeit and al-Najah as Commerce and Economics.

[c] Includes teachers college at Bethlehem (all part-time students), M.A. in Education program at Birzeit (all part-time students), and Teacher Training Institute and Teaching Diploma students at al-Najah.

[d] A three-year program leading to a diploma.

[e] Includes continuing students classified as first-year students. Partial data indicate that new students account for 98 percent of the first year, that is, about 1,236 students.

[f] Includes 1,505 males (61 percent) and 948 females (39 percent).

[g] Includes 809 males (64 percent) and 452 females (36 percent).

[h] Total enrollment in all programs is 3,193 students including 1,861males (58 percent) and 1,332 females (42 percent); the number of part-time students of this total is estimated at 300-600 students.

Source: Report of Academic Committee, Council for Higher Education, March 1, 1979.

TABLE 9

UNIVERSITY PERSONNEL IN THE WEST BANK

University	*Full-time Faculty Members (by Degree)*				*Part-time Faculty Members (by Degree)*[a]				*Administrative and Technical Staff*	*Other Employees*	*Total*[b]
	B.A. or B.Sc.	M.A. or M.Sc.	Ph.D.	Total	B.A. or B.Sc.	M.A. or M.Sc.	Ph.D.	Total			
Bethlehem	7[c]	15	16	38	4[d]	15	6	25	13	6	82
Birzeit	18	46	31	95	2	4	4	10	61	34	200
al-Najah[e]	40	26	8	74			1	1	28	10	113
Total	65	87	55	207	6	19	11	36	102	50	395

[a] Some work as administrators in their institutions or are on the faculty of other institutions.

[b] An overcount attributable to part-timers.

[c] Includes three pre-university.

[d] Includes one pre-university.

[e] Includes Teacher Training Institute faculty and staff.

SOURCE: Report of Academic Committee, Council for Higher Education, March 1, 1979.

• Birzeit University: resulted from the growth of Birzeit College, a junior college, to an institution granting degrees in 1972. The staff, though largely Palestinian, includes a number of foreigners. The administration is responsible to a local board of trustees consisting of members from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In 1977, the university formulated a ten-year development plan (1977–1978 to 1986–1987), based on the projected needs of the West Bank, that is the most detailed of any West Bank university. The plan focuses on controlled growth and development toward a medium-sized institution (4,000–5,000 students) with a broad scope in the liberal arts and a selective emphasis in the professional fields. The next step in the plan is to establish a faculty of engineering in 1979–1980. A new campus is under construction.

• al-Najah University: established alongside the Teacher Training Institute in 1977. The administration is responsible to a local board of trustees with members from the city of Nablus. The university has tentative development plans that focus on rapid growth. Plans for a school of engineering have been announced, and the existing building is being expanded.

Problems of Higher Education. The development of university education by the private sector in the West Bank presents an encouraging response to a difficult situation, but a number of problems remain, some of which could have adverse effects on the ultimate picture. The following are deemed to be among the major problems.

• *Lack of clear definition of role of higher education.* As a developing society, the West Bank community has diverse needs, and as long as it remains under foreign occupation, it lacks the apparatus and authority to evaluate these needs and to satisfy them in an efficient manner. One consequence of this anomalous condition has been the undue pressure on higher education to fulfill needs beyond its proper domain. In particular, the West Bank universities, being private institutions not under the direct control of the Israeli military authorities, have become overburdened with social expectations that can distract them from their proper goals.

• *Lack of coordination among institutions of higher education.* The individual universities have plans for the future that are uncoordinated. No comprehensive plan for higher education in the West Bank has yet been formulated. This is due, in part, to a lack of definition of their role. A relatively poor country cannot afford the conflicting results when the separate plans are put together. For example, the combined intake of first-year students at the three universities last

year was one-sixth the number of Tawjihi graduates, whereas their projected intake in five years would amount to nearly half of the expected number of Tawjihi graduates. Nevertheless, plans for more universities on the West Bank and in Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip are being aired. Excessive capacity and the subsequent reduction of standards pose a real danger. To formulate a coherent plan for higher education in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council for Higher Education was established in Jerusalem two years ago. It is composed of representatives of the universities and other educational institutions, the professional associations (such as medical doctors and engineers), mayors, and others. While the impact of the Council so far has been minimal, it is generally considered to be the best channel for planning, coordination, and cooperation at the present time.

- *Neglect of technical and vocational training.* This has gone hand-in-hand with the attention paid to the developing universities. A notable exception to the trend was the establishment of the Hebron Polytechnic in 1978; but this, by itself, is not sufficient to redress the imbalance. The customary social indifference to vocational training has been compounded by the uncertain economic future of the West Bank. Vocational training, by its nature, is more closely geared to a precise job market than is university education.
- *Unstable conditions that prevail in the West Bank.* The disruptions of normal educational operations arising from the occupation have been mentioned previously. Added to this is the uncertainty underlying plans for the future. A related uncertainty concerns funds: no West Bank university has major funds committed for more than one to three years in advance, and none of them has a sufficient endowment.
- *Inadequacy of facilities.* All three universities are engaged in construction, but it lags behind their needs. Local resources for construction are limited; the Birzeit University new campus project, the largest construction project in the history of the West Bank, has strained them to the limit. Most books and equipment have to be imported from abroad, requiring longer range planning than would otherwise be necessary. Moreover, heavy import duties levied by Israeli customs on equipment reduce the effectiveness of available funds and limit research and graduate studies.
- *Insufficiency of available qualified personnel.* As table 9 indicates, the developing universities in the West Bank have attracted a sizable number of academics, both Palestinian and foreign. Because of the continuing growth of these universities and the turnover of

TABLE 10

ILLITERACY IN THE WEST BANK, 1961
(percentage)

Governorate	*Males*	*Females*	*Total*
Nablus	44.5	86.7	66.4
Jerusalem	45.1	79.6	63.0
Hebron	60.5	90.9	76.5
Total	47.0	84.2	66.9

SOURCE: Author's compilation.

personnel, however, the staffing is barely adequate. All three universities have embarked on faculty development programs and are sponsoring graduate studies for underqualified faculty members. The sponsorship allows the person to return to the faculty upon completion of his studies. Possibly the most crippling personnel shortage is that of specialized and capable administrative and technical staff who can cope with the increased complexity and diversity of the operations of the universities as they grow, as well as plan for and handle the process of growth itself.

Illiteracy

Interest in education on the West Bank has been reflected recently by an emphasis on combating illiteracy. The effort had been fragmented with a number of small groups working independently. In 1976, however, the Adult Education and Literacy Program at Birzeit University was established; it engaged in field studies and in training teachers for literacy classes as well as joining in the more traditional activity of offering classes. West Bank efforts in this area were coordinated in 1978 through the establishment of the Literacy and Adult Education Steering Committee, which brought together all groups concerned. A quarterly periodical (in Arabic) on literacy, published by the Steering Committee and edited by the Birzeit University Program, was initiated in 1978. More than 2,000 students, mostly female, are enrolled in literacy classes run by the constituent groups of the steering committee, all of which belong to the private sector.

The latest complete survey of literacy on the West Bank was conducted during the census undertaken by the Jordanian government in 1961. The results of the survey are seen in table 10 which shows the percentage of the population aged fifteen and over that were classified as illiterate.

A study of illiteracy in five villages in the Tulkarm District conducted in 1971 found that illiteracy among males in these villages ranged from 25 to 40 percent, among females from 64 to 89 percent, and among both sexes from 45 to 61 percent.[9] Another study conducted in 1976 and 1977 covered one village in the Hebron District, the city of Ramallah, four villages, and a refugee camp in the Ramallah District.[10] It found that illiteracy among males ranged from 15 to 37 percent, among females from 26 to 58 percent, and among both sexes from 21 to 44 percent. While these two studies indicate an improvement over the situation prevailing in 1961, they are insufficient for the purposes of generalizations. The Birzeit study, however, included a questionnaire which made it possible to deduce the major factors underlying illiteracy. These were:

- *Unavailability of schools.* This is particularly significant for the older age group, the population which grew up during the British Mandate and early Jordanian periods (1920–1955) when schools were still scarce, particularly in villages. A closer look at the study shows a much higher literacy rate in villages where mission schools were established in the nineteenth century. The present congestion in schools would seem to indicate the continuing importance of this factor.
- *Social indifference to schooling.* This includes both parental neglect and a lack of interest among pupils themselves.
- *Financial need.* This factor is more prevalent among males, particularly in large families whose older sons are sent to work at an early age for financial reasons.
- *Neglect of the education of females.* The lack of attention given the schooling of girls results in a large sex differential in literacy. That this is still an important but diminishing factor is shown in table 11, which gives the ratio of female to male students, as computed from table 5. Illiteracy among rural females is probably increased by the tendency of educated village girls to marry outside the village.
- *Insensitivity of traditional jobholders to schooling.* This is seen mostly among older males whose employment in agriculture and trades does not depend on schooling. Young males from the West Bank, however, tend to seek employment as unskilled or semiskilled laborers in Israel, undoubtedly contributing to the renewed significance of this factor.

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[9] Quoted from Salim Nashif, "A Study of Illiteracy in Tulkarm District, 1971" (in Arabic).

[10] Hiyam Abu-Ghazeleh, "The Problem of Illiteracy in the West Bank," Literacy and Adult Education Program, Birzeit University, 1979 (in Arabic).

TABLE 11

RATIO OF FEMALE TO MALE STUDENTS IN THE WEST BANK, 1968–1977
(percentage)

Cycle	*1968–69*	*1972–73*	*1976–77*
Primary	75.5	81.5	83.3
Preparatory	50.5	56.6	62.2
Secondary	42.3	43.2	49.1
Total	64.1	72.0	73.9

SOURCE: Author's compilation.

Jerusalem

Soon after the occupation of 1967, Arab East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel. Information on Jerusalem is not contained in Israeli publications dealing with the West Bank which presents difficulties in obtaining reliable information. Arab schools in Jerusalem have had to follow a different educational policy from that followed in West Bank schools. The scarcity of qualified teachers in Jerusalem seems to have been even more severe than in the West Bank.

In 1967, Jerusalem schools were directed to follow the Israeli curriculum for Arab schools, which is different in many respects from the Jordanian curriculum that had been followed. In 1968, after the difficulties of imposing the Israeli curriculum had become apparent, students at the secondary level were given the option of following either the Israeli or the Jordanian curriculum (with the addition of the Hebrew language), and in 1976 the Israeli curriculum was finally abandoned at the preparatory and secondary levels. It is still followed, however, at the elementary level.

From the sparse information on education published in East Jerusalem by the Central Office of Information of the Israel Ministry of Education and Culture in 1971–1972 we find that:

In 1967–1968, there were twenty-eight state primary and preparatory schools with 350 teachers and 11,000 pupils. There were also eight kindergartens.

In 1968–1969, there were thirty state primary and preparatory schools and two secondary schools, altogether containing 12,000 pupils. There were also six kindergartens.

For 1970, the statistics for state schools are as follows:

- twenty kindergartens with thirty-four teaching posts and 1,131 pupils

TABLE 12

PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN EAST JERUSALEM, 1967–1974

	1967–68	*1968–69*	*1969–70*	*1970–71*	*1971–72*	*1972–73*	*1973–74*
Pupils	4921	7193	8319	8852	8849	8939	9405
Teachers	281	327	368	404	425	436	420
Classes	170	210	247	263	271	271	299

SOURCE: Author's compilation.

- twenty-nine primary schools with 359 teaching posts and 9,190 pupils
- fourteen preparatory schools with 137 teaching posts and 1,379 pupils

Table 12 gives some information on private schools and table 13 on the two UNRWA schools in Jerusalem.

The low enrollment shown in table 12 for 1967–1968 reflects the reluctance of many students to continue in Jerusalem schools immediately following the occupation.

Conclusion

It is difficult to avoid the temptation to give broad evaluation of education in the West Bank as a conclusion to the brief presentation that forms the bulk of this paper. Such an evaluation might be of a tentative nature; it might also suffer from the lack of impartiality that could characterize a study conducted by an outside observer. On the other hand, we hope that it would be of some value precisely because it comes from practitioners in the field.

The West Bank community (and the whole Palestinian community under occupation) has to be understood in the light of three conditions:

- *It is a fragment of a national entity.* Hence its orientation and aspirations transcend it and embrace realities beyond its present predicament. It is moreover entangled in a vast web of international politics.
- *It is a developing society.* In common with all developing societies, it faces social, economic, and political problems that strain the meager available resources.
- *It is under foreign military occupation.* It is therefore not free to chart its own course. In addition, it suffers from individual and

TABLE 13

UNRWA Schools in East Jerusalem, 1967–1979

	1967–68	*1968–69*	*1969–70*	*1970–71*	*1971–72*	*1972–73*	*1973–74*	*1974–75*	*1975–76*	*1976–77*	*1977–78*	*1978–79*
Pupils	753	800	879	907	910	806	796	802	777	789	779	820
Teachers	28	25	29	34	31	31	29	30	31	31	31	29
Classes	22	23	27	27	29	29	27	28	27	28	28	28

Note: Information secured from the UNRWA office in East Jerusalem.

collective hardships. The West Bank community is thus severely limited in three major factors concerning national policy: selection of goals and priorities, decision making, and implementation. While this study has stayed away from political issues, it is clear that any evaluation or judgment of the West Bank must ultimately take the three conditions into account.

The educational sector in the West Bank is large, growing, and active, but it risks losing sight of its goals in the broad national context. Indeed, there are strong indications that this has already happened: the quality and scope of schooling seem to be diminishing, the need for vocational and technical training remains largely unfulfilled, and the universities have so far evaded the issue of comprehensive planning. Palestinians everywhere place a high value on education, but this could lead to individual aggrandizement rather than to national development. Should this become the case, the educational sector could become a passive instrument reacting to demand rather than an active agent fulfilling a need. Though this situation may pertain in many parts of the world, its consequences in the West Bank—with its special circumstances—could be more serious than elsewhere.

A certain amount of diversification has occurred in West Bank education. Apart from the establishment of the universities, one can cite the growing interest in nurseries and kindergartens and the considerable efforts devoted to literacy and adult education. Within the context of military occupation, these achievements can be credited to the private rather than to the government sector. It must be remembered, however, that the institutions and organizations involved have to carry an increasingly heavy burden and grapple with more complex issues. It remains to be seen how well they succeed in their mission as the load continues to grow. In all probability, these institutions are reaching the end of the initial stage of development, which was fueled by vitality and enthusiasm, and are now entering a more mature stage that requires, in addition, careful planning, competent organization, and highly qualified professionals.

5

Mission of Palestinian Higher Education

Muhammad Hallaj

Several times in this century, Palestinian history has changed course suddenly and drastically. In 1918 Britain replaced the Ottoman Empire as the sovereign authority in Palestine. In 1948 a Jewish state was established in the greater part of the country, and most of the people became homeless refugees. In 1967 Israeli occupation replaced Jordanian and Egyptian rule in the rest of the country. On none of these occasions were the Palestinians prepared for the changes that overtook them or for the new conditions that confronted them.

Regional and international events of the past few years unmistakably point to yet another impending change in Palestinian history. Today, however, the Palestinians are better equipped to anticipate and plan for the future. This is so because it is becoming clearer with every passing day that a consensus—Palestinian, regional, and international—is emerging. Also, the Palestinians have a viable national movement and the trained personnel to plan for the dawning future. This paper is intended to explore the responsibilities of Palestinian higher education in preparation for the coming phase of Palestinian history.

Diaspora Education

The ability of underdeveloped countries to provide a higher education for their citizens has proved so inadequate that a substantial number have had to seek opportunities abroad. In the case of the Palestinian people this tendency has been intensified by the following factors:

- the political and military events which led to the eviction and dispersion of the Palestinian people, most of whom currently reside outside their country[1]

[1] It is estimated that 1,275,000 Palestinians lived in the West Bank and the Gaza

TABLE 1

RATIO OF UNIVERSITY STUDENTS TO POPULATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	*Students/1000 Population*	*Country*	*Students/1000 Population*
United States	30	Egypt	5.4
Palestine/Jordan	11.2	Iraq	3.2
U.S.S.R.	18	Kuwait	3.0
France	9	Tunisia	2.0
England	8	Libya	1.8
Algeria	7	Bahrain	1.6
Lebanon	6	Sudan	0.8
Syria	6	Saudi Arabia	0.5

SOURCE: A. B. Zahlan, *Arab World: Year 2000* (Beirut: Arab Projects and Developments, 1975).

- the absence of a Palestinian national authority to establish and encourage a system of higher education
- the high rate of interest in higher education among the Palestinian people

In 1970 the ratio of Palestinian university students to the total population was considerably higher than among other Arab populations and even surpassed some of the most advanced European communities (table 1):

For the Palestinians alone, the ratio was in fact higher than the table indicates, since most students with Jordanian passports were in fact Palestinians. When we take into account that the Palestinians made up two-thirds of the population of Jordan and 90 percent of the Jordanian students were Palestinian, the Palestinian student population ratio increases to about 15 per 1,000.[2]

A more recent study indicates that higher education in Palestine reached the level of 20 per 1,000 population in the academic year

Strip and 500,000 lived in Israel in January 1978, out of a total worldwide Palestinian population of slightly more than 4 million. Emile A. Nakhleh, *The West Bank and Gaza: Toward the Making of a Palestinian State* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), p. 45.

[2] Nabeel Sha'ath, "High Level Palestinian Manpower," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972), pp. 92 and 94. A study of a sample of university students and professional people of Jordanian citizenship in the United States in 1970 showed that only 9 percent of the group were Jordanians by birth. Lafi Ibrahim Ja'afari, "The Brain Drain to the U.S.A.," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1973), p. 120.

1976–1977,[3] while the ratio for the Arab world as a whole was still 4 per 1,000.[4] Out of a total 80,000 Palestinians who received higher education that year, only 6,615 students were able to find places in postsecondary programs and institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,[5] though 2,000 Palestinian students were enrolled in Israeli universities.[6] Thus in comparison with the impressive ratio of 20 per 1,000 students to population for Palestinians as a whole, the ratio is only 4.8 per 1,000 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[7]

It is clear from the preceding data that Palestinians have been dependent on non-Palestinian institutions for opportunities in higher education. Thus one of the primary tasks of Palestinian higher education should be to rectify the imbalance and to make higher education for Palestinians a primarily Palestinian endeavor.

Before we discuss the responsibilities of higher education in the coming phase of Palestinian history, it should be noted that the events of 1948 both intensified Palestinian motivation for higher education and improved its availability. The motivation was heightened when the loss of land by a predominantly agrarian society drove Palestinians to compensate by searching for more secure and reliable ways to earn a living. Education and training, being suitable to the needs of an uprooted community and not given to destruction or confiscation, were the obvious answer in the circumstances. Furthermore, the Palestinians' perception of one of the causes of their loss—Israeli educational and technological superiority[8]—impelled them to try to improve their level of education and skills. In other words, the Palestinians perceived higher education to be the means of personal survival and national salvation.

The dispersion of the Palestinian people not only intensified their desire for higher education, but also inadvertently improved their access to it. More Palestinians were able to study simply because they lived in areas where such opportunities existed. Most

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[3] Muhsin D. Yusuf, "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Education on a Palestinian State," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer 1979), pp. 78-79.

[4] A. A. El-Koussy, "The Education Structure as It Should Be in the Arab World," *Journal of the Middle East*, vol. 4 (Ain Shams University, 1977), p. 17.

[5] David W. Mize, et al., *An Assessment of Education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, July 1979), table 4-6.

[6] Muhsin D. Yusuf, "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Education on a Palestinian State," p. 78.

[7] This figure includes only students in West Bank/Gaza institutions.

[8] For one of the earliest Palestinian interpretations of the 1948 defeat, see Qadri Tuqan, *Ba'd Al-Nakba* (Beirut: Darul'ilm Lilmalayin, 1959). (In Arabic.)

Palestinian refugees settled in or near the larger cities in the host countries, within reach of centers of higher learning. Social taboos and economic constraints were weakened, allowing greater educational opportunities for females and the economically disadvantaged.[9] Many countries, furthermore, eased a disproportionately large number of Palestinian students into their institutions as a matter of policy and aided them financially.[10] Alongside these developments a number of postsecondary institutions were established, specifically teacher training colleges, for the Palestinians by UNRWA.[11]

As a result, the Palestinians' darkest hour was illuminated by a bright ray of hope. During their dispersion they became both highly educated and skilled, which helped them to survive in exile as well as under occupation.

It is an observable fact that the advanced levels of education and skill thus acquired by the Palestinian people afforded them access to residence, employment, and protection in many Arab and non-Arab countries. It also generated a source of support, material and otherwise, for the Palestinian community at home.

The fact that higher education for the Palestinian people was basically the product of the diaspora may well limit its contribution in the future when it is called upon to help prepare for the reemergence of Palestinian society at home. This is due to the following factors in the present Palestinian educational picture.

Relevance to Palestinian Needs. Higher education for Palestinians has been geared to the needs of individuals, of job markets, and of non-Palestinian requirements and job markets. It not only has created an imbalance between available manpower and national needs, but has often led to educational and work experiences which are not relevant to Palestinian conditions. Professor Antoine Zahlan estimated in 1976 that only 10 percent of the 70,000 Palestinian university graduates worked in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (although 30 percent of the Palestinian people lived there). He observed that "the evolution of the Palestinian labor force in the service of the Arab countries

[9] It would be interesting to consider the sociopolitical implications here, especially the degree to which they reinforce the egalitarian potential of Palestinian society.

[10] For example, the attitude of Egypt and its institutions toward students from the Gaza Strip.

[11] For a critical survey of the educational system established by UNRWA, see Nabeel Badran, "The Evolution of the Socio-economic Concept of UNRWA Education and a Preliminary Perception of the Aims of Educational Planning for the Palestinian Arab People," *Shu'un Falastiniya*, no. 3 (July 1971), pp. 219-228. (In Arabic.)

over the past twenty-eight years has resulted in its being adapted to the Middle East labor market rather than to the needs of the Palestinian people."[12] In fact, the work experience of Palestinian university graduates was obtained not only away from home but even away from the principal areas of Palestinian concentration abroad. Zahlan noted that "the Arabian Gulf manpower demands of the 1970s have led to a rapid drain of Palestinian manpower from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan," as well as the West Bank and Gaza.[13]

Cultural Base. Higher education for Palestinians lacks a unified cultural base, which is desirable in the educated elite of any society and an imperative for those who may be responsible for building a nation. This lack is aggravated by the diversity of educational systems in the preuniversity cycles. Professor Abu Lughod analyzed a study by the Planning Office of the PLO in 1977, which included a content analysis of the social science curriculum in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. He pointed out that the education received by a Palestinian student in those countries leaves him

> in no position to identify the major outlines of Palestinian history prior to or during the Mandate period; he would not be able to identify the specific importance of Palestine to Palestinians or to the Arab people in general; he would remain ignorant of social and economic life of the Palestinians prior to 1948; and he would remain unaware of the type and nature of the struggle which the Palestinian people waged to prevent the usurpation of Palestine. The subsequent tribulations of the Palestinians, their attempts to preserve themselves as a community and the outbreak of the Palestine revolution with specific objectives would remain a mystery if the Palestinians were to rely on the orientation and values of the educational system which prepared their offspring for the future.[14]

A more recent study shows the continuing validity of this observation. Table 2 shows how little students, including Palestinian students, learn about the history and geography of Palestine in the three Arab countries with the largest Palestinian diaspora communities closest to home:

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[12] Antoine Zahlan, "The Economic Viability of a West Bank State," *Middle East International*, no. 66 (December 1976), p. 20.

[13] Antoine and Rosemarie Zahlan, "The Palestinian Future: Education and Manpower," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 6, no. 4 (Summer 1977), p. 106.

[14] Ibrahim Abu Lughod, "Educating a Community in Exile: The Palestinian Experience," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 2, no. 3 (Spring 1973), p. 96.

TABLE 2

History and Geography in Preuniversity Curricula

Country and Subject	*Total Pages*	*Percentage of Arab History and Geography*	*Percentage of Palestinian History and Geography*
Jordan			
History	2,118	65.0	10.5[a]
Geography	1,463	68.0	0.9
Lebanon			
History	1,155	13.8	0.02
Geography	1,244	N.A.	0.13
Syria			
History	2,165	85.0	2.1
Geography	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.

[a] This relatively high percentage is due to the fact that a course is taught on the Palestine question, but it is taught only to high school seniors in the literary stream.

Source: Adapted from Najla N. Bashour, *The Palestine Question and Arab Unity in the Curricula of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon* (Beirut: Al-Mu'assasah Al-'Arabiyah Liddirasat Wannashr, 1978), pp. 14-15. (In Arabic.)

The lack of a unified cultural foundation in the education of Palestinians and their consequent exposure to various educational systems was one of the problems which led to the concept of a Palestinian open university. The university would attempt to ameliorate the two defects of diaspora education: its irrelevance to Palestinian conditions and its lack of a unified cultural foundation.

Interest in a Palestinian open university has reached the stage of serious consideration. A feasibility study for such a university is now being undertaken under the auspices of UNESCO.[15]

The Challenge of the Future

At this point it is necessary to make explicit a basic assumption which has so far been implied. A discussion of the future role of Palestinian higher education must be related to a specific assumption regarding the future of the Palestinian people. The assumption made here is that, in the 1980s, at least half the Palestinian world population of

[15] Antoine and Rosemarie Zahlan, "The Palestinian Future," p. 111. Also see "Free Palestinian University," *Almustaqbal* (Paris), September 29, 1979, pp. 64-65 (in Arabic), and Susannah Tarbush, "PLO and UNESCO Work Towards Palestine Open University," *MEED* (October 12, 1979), pp. 12, 17-18.

more than 4 million people will be resident citizens of an independent Palestinian republic, most likely located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Although this is not necessarily the most equitable or sensible solution to the Palestinian question, this is not the place to debate the matter.[16]

The thrust of the emerging international consensus on the future of Palestinians clearly points in this direction. Since the Fourth Arab-Israeli War, in 1973, bilateral, multilateral, and general international pronouncements and resolutions have moved inexorably in the direction of recognizing the centrality of the Palestinian question in the Middle East conflict, and the right of the Palestinian people to independence in their homeland.[17] The assumption suggested above therefore seems to be reliable and reasonable. Therefore, I postulate the following in regard to the Palestinian situation:

1. An independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which may or may not be preceded by a transitional self-governing political entity.
2. There will be a return of an unpredictable number of Palestinians, who will undoubtedly give the Palestinian state a small majority of the Palestinian world population.

This question of the size and structure of the Palestinian state has been a source of difficulty for all who have sought to plan for it. The emotional "vision of the return"[18] has led to some simplistic and almost naive prophecies:

> A good proportion of the Palestinians have succeeded during the last quarter century in amassing vast amounts of wealth, whether in the oil-producing countries or in the Americas. Naturally, they will bring their wealth to their own Palestinian state when it is established, so they can invest it there, precisely as the Arab professors who work in the Arab universities will come over to teach in their country's universities when they arise. Journalists, businessmen, agriculturists, industrialists, etc., will act similarly.[19]

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[16] For a summary of Palestinian positions see Hussein J. Agha, "What State for the Palestinians?" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 4, no. 1 (Autumn 1976), pp. 3-38.

[17] This shift was becoming sufficiently defined and discernible as early as 1974. See Ghayth Armanazi, "The Rights of the Palestinians: The International Dimension," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 4, no. 3 (Spring 1974), pp. 88-96.

[18] A. L. Tibawi, "Visions of the Return: The Palestine Arab Refugees in Arabic Poetry and Art," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 17, no. 5 (Autumn 1963), pp. 507-526.

[19] Muhammad Abu Shilbaya, "On Palestine's Viability," *New Outlook*, vol. 20, no. 4 (June/July 1977), p. 47.

Those who have a better grasp of the dynamics of the diaspora refrain from being specific about how many Palestinians would return to a Palestinian state. Sabri Jiryis said, "I think a minority,"[20] and others also express modest expectations. The most serious attempt to produce a defensible estimate based on the degree of hardship felt by the dispossessed Palestinians, was made by Tuma and Drabkin in a study of the economic viability of the proposed state. Basing their calculations on 1975 population figures, they concluded that the Palestinian state would have a population of 2,374,000.[21] Even they dared not estimate how many qualified people would return and to which fields of specialization.[22]

The return of the expatriates, especially those who may be classified as educated or skilled, would depend on the political life in the new state as much as on family ties, job opportunities, and the like. Educated Palestinians have a strong attachment to their homeland which tends to increase with the passage of time. A 1970 survey of Palestinian students and professionals living in the United States showed that only 11 percent preferred to be living in Palestine three years hence and 58 percent chose to be in the United States. When asked their preference six years hence, however, 25 percent of the sample said they preferred to be living in Palestine, compared with 26 percent who preferred the United States; and nine years hence, 35 percent gave first choice to Palestine, with all other choices trailing far behind.[23]

The political environment of the new state will undoubtedly have a significant bearing on the return of qualified Palestinians, who show great sensitivity to such considerations. In the survey quoted above, Palestinians in the United States indicated that 32 percent of them might remain in America if political regimes and conditions were unacceptable at home; the second strongest reason for remaining abroad (better career opportunities) accounted for only 17 percent.[24]

Taking all relevant factors into account, it is reasonable to assume a population in the new state of slightly more than half of the world's

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[20] "A PLO Moderate Speaks Out: Interview with Sabri Jiryis," *New Outlook*, vol. 18, no. 6 (September 1975), p. 17.

[21] Elias H. Tuma and Haim Darin-Drabkin, *The Economic Case for Palestine* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 44.

[22] Ibid., p. 116. Muhsin D. Yusuf makes the reasonable assumption that most of the returnees would be unskilled refugees and their families. "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Education on a Palestinian State," p. 92.

[23] Lafi Ibrahim Ja'afari, "The Brain Drain to the U.S.A.," p. 130.

[24] Ibid., p. 122.

Palestinians. This estimate assumes the return of about 750,000 out of a diaspora population of 2¼ million, including most of the residents of refugee camps abroad, a large minority of the stateless Palestinians in the diaspora, and a small minority of other groups.

3. The new state in Palestine will maintain open links with Palestinian communities abroad, especially with the largest of them in Jordan. A two-way exchange of demand and support is likely to characterize the relationship. The diaspora Palestinians may offer the home community expert manpower, financial backing, political support, and a good press and, in return, the home community may offer them citizenship and refuge if needed, passports, diplomatic protection, investment opportunities, and Palestinian education for their youth.

The Mission of Higher Education

Before pursuing the discussion of the role of higher education in the future, certain elements should be pointed out that make the Palestinian situation sufficiently unique to warrant caution in applying general theories about third world colonial societies that became self-governing. These unique factors introduce a degree of uncertainty and novelty and call for flexibility in planning for Palestinian higher education. The most important of these factors are the following:

Territory and Demography. The geographic and demographic scope and structure of the Palestine of the future will be determined by diplomatic, economic, and perhaps military contests yet to come. This was not the case for most third world countries that achieved independence in this century. The timing and the style of their independence were often obscure but not the territorial and demographic elements. This uncertainty has often hindered efforts to evolve plans for the Palestinian state. Writing in 1974 on the economic viability of a Palestinian state, Professor Elias Tuma observed that the effort "is complicated by the lack of specified geographical boundaries, hence of input and supply endowments such as population, raw material, land, water and so on."[25] We call attention to the fact not to inhibit discussion but to advocate flexibility in planning.

[25] Elias H. Tuma, "Is a Palestinian State Viable?" *New Outlook*, vol. 17, no. 7 (August/September 1974), p. 76. In his more extensive and recent treatment (with Darin-Drabkin) he makes explicit territorial and demographic definitions. See *The Economic Case for Palestine*, especially the section entitled "Dimensions of the Palestinian State," pp. 41-46.

Educational Level. Palestinian society is unique in that no nonself-governing territory in the third world has reached the level of Palestinians in the area of higher education. Palestinians had a better opportunity to acquire education and skills through formal training, and by the incorporation of large Palestinian communities in Arab states, especially Jordan, they acquired diplomatic, military, judicial, and administrative experience usually reserved to citizens of sovereign states. A survey of Palestinians of higher learning in the early 1970s showed that among 10,000 respondents (16 percent of the estimated total number of Palestinian university graduates at the time), there were twenty-seven ambassadors, seven cabinet ministers, sixteen top ranking government officials, and thirty judges.[26] A large pool of highly trained and experienced people is theoretically available to the prospective Palestinian state. Since it is impossible to determine at this stage how many of these people would be available to the new state, there should be flexibility in planning for the needs of such a state.

Outside Influences. The supply and demand for higher education will continue to be greatly influenced by regional conditions and therefore subject to the policies and activities of other independent states. This is due to the strong pan-Arab tendencies of the Palestinian people, to the anticipated persistence of substantial Palestinian communities abroad, and to the disparity in wealth and educational levels of the states in the region. These factors will continue to create a demand for educated Palestinians. Professor Tuma expressed the view that one reason for the economic viability of a Palestinian state is that "access to employment in the oil producing countries continues to prevail for some time to come."[27] Antoine and Rosemarie Zahlan projected that by the year 2000 "Palestinians should be contributing about 3 million workers to the Arab labor force, 20 percent of which will be university graduates."[28] They therefore advocated an educational policy which would take into account "the well established tendency to fill the manpower developmental requirements of the Arab states."[29] The emergence of a Palestinian state should neither deprive the Palestinians of access to regional employment opportunities nor deprive the region of needed Palestinian manpower.

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[26] Nabeel Sha'ath, "High Level Palestinian Manpower," p. 90.

[27] Elias H. Tuma, "Is a Palestinian State Viable?" p. 79. Tuma estimated that 400,000 residents of the state would depend for their living on the "export of talent to the oil producing countries for employment."

[28] Antoine and Rosemarie Zahlan, "The Palestinian Future," p. 105.

[29] Ibid., p. 106.

With the future of the Palestinian people and the constellation of factors influencing their manpower requirements in mind, it is time to identify the guiding principles and responsibilities of Palestinian higher education. They should be related to the future Palestinian situation and should be derived from it. From this premise I venture to advance the following proposition:

> A people who undergo major and relatively sudden demographic and political transformations are likely to witness a period of instability and dislocation. This possibility not only endangers the potential viability of the emerging community but also, given the context of the Palestinian situation, may endanger the smooth transition of the Middle East from strife to normality. Therefore, existing Palestinian institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, especially the institutions of higher learning, should play a crucial role in preparing their community for this transformation and in helping it to undergo the metamorphosis from a colonial to an independent community with as little disorder and dislocation as possible. I perceive this to be the national mission of Palestinian higher education during the coming few years.[30]

This mission would give Palestinian higher education a constructive role in the approaching phase of Palestinian history, and at the same time the motivation and guidelines for purposeful development that it currently lacks. In this respect, several tasks should be undertaken without delay.

The Tasks for Higher Education

Nationalizing the System. The first task for Palestinian higher education is to become a national system by increasing the opportunities for higher education in Palestine. This would be accomplished when Palestinian higher education ceases to be primarily an expatriate endeavor and becomes basically Palestinian. The effort entails both a quantitative growth and a diversification of programs at Palestinian institutions.

To calculate the required quantitative growth of West Bank/Gaza institutions of higher education merely on the basis of the needs of the local labor market is both inappropriate and harmful. The

[30] Two studies which deal with the nation-building potential of existing West Bank/Gaza institutions are Emile A. Nakhleh's *The West Bank and Gaza: Toward the Making of a Palestinian State*, cited previously, and John P. Richardson, "Developing Palestinian Institutions," *New Outlook*, vol. 17, no. 7 (August/September, 1974), pp. 88-92.

calculation will be affected by the expected repatriation of Palestinians, the continuing regional need for Palestinian manpower, and the relative stagnation of economic growth under occupation. Professor Norman C. Hunt, of the University of Edinburgh, who conducted a preliminary survey of higher education in the West Bank and Gaza in July 1979 for the Council for Higher Education (Jerusalem), reported that he was advised against using the labor market demand to calculate the need for higher education since many qualified Palestinians seek employment in the Gulf States and America; and that, therefore, "one should ignore the market and provide higher education for all who are qualified for it."[31] Educational demands cannot be calculated on the basis of job market needs because the economy does not reflect Palestinian potential.[32] In the West Bank and the Gaza Strip "the economic poverty of the area is exacerbated by the military occupation with the resultant underdevelopment of both industry and agriculture, the strict control of the already very scarce water supply, and the limitations placed upon export opportunities."[33] A recent report on Israeli policy in the West Bank concluded that "while Israel continues to control the West Bank there can be no significant development of agriculture or industry in the area."[34] Consequently, to restrict the growth of higher education to suit the needs of an artificially depressed economy would amount to social strangulation. The short-range effects may be defensible—to discourage emigration—but the long-range impact on society would be disastrous. For this reason, Professor Hunt made his final calculations on the theory that higher education should accommodate the supply of qualified high school graduates.

In 1978, 2,369 students who completed their secondary education in West Bank schools scored 70 percent or higher on the Tawjihi examination[35] and, therefore, became eligible for university education.

[31] Norman C. Hunt, "Report on a Visit to the West Bank Council for Higher Education," July 1979, p. 3 (unpublished).

[32] For an argument against basing calculations on Arab market needs, see Nabeel Badran, "The Development of UNRWA Socio-Economic Concept of Education and a Preliminary View of Educational Planning for the Palestinian Arab People," *Shu'un Falastiniya*, no. 3 (July 1971), pp. 219-228. (In Arabic.)

[33] Hunt, "Report on a Visit to the West Bank Council for Higher Education," p. 1.

[34] Sarah Graham-Brown, "Water: How Israeli Policies Hurt West Bank Arabs," *Arab Report*, May 23, 1979, p. 4. On the economic impact of the occupation, also see "Israel and the Resources of the West Bank," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 8, no. 4 (Summer 1979), pp. 94-104.

[35] The Tawjihi is the standardized national examination administered at the end of the Secondary Cycle. Arab universities use it as the basic criterion for admission of students. Assuming the availability of space, a score of 70 percent is generally considered acceptable.

They represented 10 percent of the eighteen-year-olds in the population. Twice that number passed the Tawjihi examination but scored below 70 percent and therefore were eligible for nonuniversity types of higher education.[36] Assuming a four-year cycle for university education, and assuming an equal commitment to education among Gaza Strip residents, the demand for higher education in the West Bank and Gaza is 23 per 1,000 population.[37] If West Bank/Gaza institutions operate at the current world-wide Palestinian student-to-teacher ratio of 20 per 1,000, Palestinian educational institutions could accommodate 87 percent of the number of qualified school graduates.

Calculating the expansion of Palestinian institutions of higher learning in this way will enable Palestinians to maintain their present levels of access to higher education. This is psychologically and politically important in dispelling fears that previous standards would not be maintained in the newly independent state.

The gap between higher education now available in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (4.8 per 1,000 for a population of 1,275,000) and the minimum demand expected at the time of independence (20 per 1,000 for a population of at least 2 million) is enormous. To close the gap, the system, which now has slightly more than 6,000 students, would have to handle 40,000 students.[38]

It is important that the quantitative expansion not await establishment of the state and the expected demographic changes. Delay would be particularly serious in view of the high popular expectations that will accompany independence. Pressure for rapid expansion could threaten the quality of higher education as well as the credibility of the infant state.

The required expansion must be planned in advance: this is the primary responsibility of higher education. It is imperative, therefore, that existing institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip be assisted in acquiring needed capacities as fast as is compatible with the maintenance of good standards. Moreover, the defects from

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[36] Hunt, "Report on a Visit to the West Bank Council for Higher Education," Appendix D.

[37] Muhsin D. Yusuf found that the ratio for the West Bank and Jordan is 23.5 per 1,000. Yusuf, "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Education on a Palestinian State," p. 79.

[38] It should be pointed out that this may be a highly conservative estimate. Antoine and Rosemarie Zahlan projected that "well over 400,000 Palestinians (or 50 percent of the 18-24 age group) may be enrolled in colleges and universities around the world" in the year 2000. "The Palestinian Future," p. 105. If this is an accurate projection, Palestinian institutions would still be meeting less than half of the demand even if they continued to grow by 10 percent a year after the initial expansion proposed by this paper.

which expansion now suffers must be eliminated. In this context, reference should be made to two problems.

The first is that quantitative expansion should redress the imbalance now existing to the disadvantage of technical and vocational training. There is a tendency to underrate this sector of higher education. The Polytechnic Institute of Hebron, which was established in 1978, can barely meet the need in this area.[39] Professor Hunt warned that "the West Bank is in danger of making the classic developing country error of overproviding university places and grossly underproviding for technical and vocational training."[40] This point is particularly significant because the site of the future Palestinian state is relatively poor and densely populated. Its economy, therefore, will have to depend to a considerable extent on the development of industry, which calls for technical education.[41]

The second problem is the duplication of programs by existing institutions and the unplanned proliferation of institutions.[42] Professor Hunt suggested that the Council for Higher Education be the effective planning and coordinating agency in West Bank/Gaza higher education.[43]

The problem has resulted from the ambiguous role of institutions of higher learning,[44] especially the "absence of national educational goals."[45] It has also been suggested that one remedy requires "a genuine commitment on the part of institutions to Palestinian rather than institutional or personal objectives."[46]

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[39] See the article on education which Khalil Mahshi and Ramzi Rihan contributed to this volume.

[40] Hunt, "Report on a Visit to the West Bank Council for Higher Education," p. 3. For graphs showing his estimate of demand for university and vocational training, see Appendices B and C.

[41] Joseph D. Ben-Dak and George E. Assousa, "A Blueprint for New Palestine," *New Outlook*, vol. 17, no. 7 (August/September 1974), p. 85; also Antoine Zahlan, "The Economic Viability of a West Bank State," p. 20.

[42] For a description of existing institutions and their programs, see Khalil Mahshi, *The Status of Higher Education in the Occupied Territories* (Birzeit University, 1978), and David W. Mize, et al., *An Assessment of Education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: America-Mideast Educational and Training Services, July 1979).

[43] The Council is a citizen group formed in Jerusalem in 1977 to coordinate and encourage higher education in the West Bank and Gaza. Hunt, "Report on a Visit to the West Bank Council for Higher Education," pp. 4-5.

[44] Mahshi and Rihan, "Education: Elementary and Secondary," in this volume, p. 50.

[45] UNESCO, *Report of the Director-General on the Mission he sent to the Arab Territories Occupied by Israel to collect on-the-spot Information on the Educational and Cultural Situation*, June 1978, Annex II, p. 2. Executive Report 104EX/52 and Addendum.

[46] Hunt, "Report on a Visit to the West Bank Council for Higher Education," p. 5.

Resources spent on duplicate programs could better be used to achieve greater diversification. At the present time there is very little professional university education available in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Faculty of Engineering at Birzeit University, which opened in 1979, is the first professional faculty in West Bank universities. There is no university level training in medicine or agriculture. Many fields of study in the social and physical sciences (such as geology, botany, zoology, public administration, and psychology) are still not available for specialization. There is only one postgraduate program at Birzeit University.

The Importance of Excellence. The second major task for Palestinian higher education should be to attain a degree of excellence which would make Palestine a regional educational center. Excellence has special significance for Palestine. In view of its poor resources and its continued dependence on outside job opportunities for its citizens, the quality of its manpower may well be a determining factor in the well-being, if not the survival, of the new state. This would remain true even if a peaceful environment is secured for the new state.

Agency Building. Educationally related structures should be developed as embryonic public agencies. Examples of this type of activity would be programs emphasizing fieldwork in the areas of public health, social work, archaeology, labor-management relations, adult education, literacy programs, in-service training workshops, and others. They would also include a center for documentation and archives, a multidisciplinary research center, a center for demographic studies, agricultural experiment stations, a department of special education, a department of environmental studies, soil testing and conservation, meteorological stations, a center of folklore and oral traditions, a museum, a printing press, and others.

Such programs and structures augment the teaching and research capacities of educational institutions, and they certainly have a proper place in their developmental plans. They can be valuable avenues furthermore, for community services now, and they can contribute to nation-building in the future. As Professor Zahlan indicated, "In the best of circumstances, the creation of a new state in the Third World is difficult and arduous. In the case of the proposed country on the West Bank and Gaza the process is extremely difficult." He attributed this difficulty to "the institutional vacuum prevailing in the Palestinian community."[47] Consequently, the existing institutions must go beyond

[47] Zahlan, "The Economic Viability of a West Bank State," p. 21.

formal instruction in traditional disciplines and begin to establish programs with broader implications for the community.

Encouraging Pluralism. An effective cultural base should be developed by fostering certain attitudinal tendencies and thought processes in students that support a pluralistic-constitutional polity. Citizens should be committed to keeping all options open to the free choice of a self-governing people.

This role for Palestinian higher education will be particularly important as a corrective influence in the future state. It is likely to be administered by an elite which of necessity has been imbued with conspiratorial methods and clandestine behavior—with attitudes and skills more compatible with an era of violent struggle than with reconstruction and rehabilitation. The post-independence upheavals experienced by some third world societies, such as Indonesia, testify that enthusiasm for the heroes of the struggle should be tempered with the more functional and well-rounded experiences of an educated citizenry. Palestinian higher education, therefore, should plan to help form future civil servants, managers, educators, and opinion makers for a society whose leadership will be taking up the challenges of peaceful reconstruction.

There are encouraging indications of a national commitment to such ideals. Sabri Jiryis observed that despite adverse conditions, Palestinians have managed to operate democratically to a remarkable degree. He attributes this to the egalitarian conditions and the socio-economic mobility caused by the dispersion and by the high level of education, as well as to memories of the abuse of power in the 1936–1939 rebellion. He concludes that "the structure and activities of the PLO now have an unmistakably democratic character."[48] It has also been shown that Palestinian resistance groups seek to inculcate in their youth groups *(Ashbal)* the spirit of true patriotism, without chauvinism. A study of the political socialization of Palestinian children in Kuwait showed the effort to be highly successful.[49]

Increasing Autonomy. As Palestinian higher education retools for the future, building institutions will become a major task. Institutions of higher learning in the West Bank and Gaza should strive to become entrenched in the community, and to nurture a strong tradition of

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[48] Sabri Jiryis, "On Political Settlement in the Middle East: The Palestinian Dimension," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1977), pp. 12-13.
[49] Tawfic E. Farah, "Political Socialization of Palestinian Children in Kuwait," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 5, no. 4 (Summer 1977), pp. 90-102.

intellectual freedom and institutional autonomy. The institutions themselves could thereby achieve a healthy growth, while assisting the community to develop along the pluralistic-constitutional lines advocated earlier.

Fortunately, the taste for autonomy and independence has already become a part of the tradition of Palestinian higher education. All of the universities of the West Bank and many other institutes of postsecondary education are and have always been nongovernmental. The fact that they have always functioned under alien authority, or authority from which they have been alienated, has increased these autonomous tendencies. Since the temptation would be greater to accept control and direction from a national Palestinian authority, the task of institution-building conducive to the self-government of the system of higher education becomes more important.

General Reservations

Several caveats should be indicated regarding the proposals that emerged in the preceding discussion.

- The foregoing discussion was intended to identify landmarks rather than to chart an itinerary. It was designed to establish broad guidelines, or perhaps a philosophy, to help steer Palestinian higher education on a course toward a developmental role in a period of social regeneration. Every proposal, whether it deals with quantitative expansion, diversification, or institution-building, requires follow-up studies to convert it from a guideline to an operative plan. As stated earlier, lack of a developmental policy for Palestinian higher education has been a deterrent to purposeful growth.
- Planning for the future of Palestinian higher education at home needs to be synchronized with planning for Palestinian education in the diaspora.[50] The dispersion of the Palestinian community to diverse foreign lands makes the task more difficult but not any less necessary, especially if the assumption made concerning the two-way exchange of demands and supports is valid. In that case, coordinated planning will facilitate the resettlement of the repatriates and will provide mutual benefits for the home and the diaspora societies.
- Since the guidelines proposed for Palestinian educational planning derive from assumptions which may fail to materialize or which may materialize in a modified form, planning must exhibit the resilience necessary to adapt to unanticipated events. Palestinian

[50] The idea of the "open university" would be relevant here also.

educational planners should remain alert to the possibility that the educational system may be called upon to help the community withstand pressures for assimilation or even of submersion in a non-Palestinian entity.

- Finally, we must remain alert to the adverse effects that may be generated by the development of Palestinian higher education along the lines proposed here. Special attention should be drawn to two of the more serious possibilities and to safeguards against them:

First, Israeli occupation authorities, who now exercise de facto control of the West Bank and Gaza, might perceive these ideas and any activities emanating from them as being undesirable and, therefore, might seek to thwart them. It is unfortunate that the Israeli Military Government and the Israeli press have not been able to grasp the logic, the necessity, or the promise of this type of thinking. They have tended to view it with suspicion, as a provocative call for the politicization of the institutions of higher learning and for their conversion to fronts for clandestine political activities.[51] As a consequence, the occupation authorities nearly paralyzed the educational system in the West Bank during the latter part of the 1978–1979 academic year. They dispersed the student populations by forbidding village students to attend schools in the cities, often denying them access to better schools. They closed down numerous secondary schools, vocational training centers, teacher training colleges, and universities.[52]

This attitude is counterproductive for Israel as well as for Palestinians and the region as a whole. The experience of many Afro-Asian states which have achieved independence since World War II attests to the critical importance of an orderly transition to independence. Planning and preparing for such a transition should be encouraged, and it is in this spirit that we advocate a nation-building mission for Palestinian higher education. An effort should be made to educate the world community, especially the Israelis, to accept as legitimate any effort at development in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

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51 For a collection of articles of this type which appeared in the Israeli press, see Office of Public Relations, Birzeit University, *The University in the Israeli Press, March 3, 1979-May 15, 1979* (Birzeit University, 1979). Also see repeated statements to the Israeli press made by military and government spokesmen during the two months which followed the closing of Birzeit University on May 2, 1979, to justify the order to close.

52 Council for Higher Education, *Statement about the Disruption of Education in the West Bank* (Jerusalem, May 9, 1979).

The second possible adverse effect is that some proposals made for helping higher education prepare the community for its future needs may well contravene the community's present requirements. As long as the present weak employment structure in the West Bank and Gaza persists, there might be an intensification of emigration of precisely the sort of people needed most by the community. Professor Zahlan estimated in 1976 that out of a total of 70,000 Palestinian university graduates, only 7,000 (10 percent) worked in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, although the Arab population for these two areas was 30 percent of the total Palestinian population.[53] This is not solely due, of course, to the lack of job opportunities. The presence of families abroad, income differentials, and Israeli restrictions on residence in the West Bank and Gaza are also responsible.

To minimize emigration as we seek to work for the viability of the Palestinian community at home, planning for the future of higher education should be accompanied and supported by the comprehensive development of the West Bank and Gaza.[54]

Conclusion

When peace comes to the Middle East, it will be difficult to adapt to its requirements after generations of cultural, economic, diplomatic, and military strife. Palestinians have been the primary victims and the principal issue in the conflict, but given the incentive and the opportunity, they can become effective participants in regional reconstruction. The demonstrated potential of the Palestinians should be developed to prepare them to be free and equal partners in this task. Their ability to develop a system of higher education commensurate with this challenge, and their freedom to begin to do so now, may be crucial to the future of the Middle East.

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[53] A. Zahlan, "The Economic Viability of a West Bank State," p. 20. Also see Philip Davies, "The Educated West Bank Palestinians," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Spring 1979), pp. 65-80.

[54] For a view on how this comprehensive development should be undertaken see "A Development Plan for the Palestinians," *Middle East International*, no. 66 (December 1976), pp. 17-19.

6

Housing

*Bakir Abu Kishk and Izzat Ghurani**

Substandard housing conditions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are a cause of deep concern. Low income levels, overcrowding, and poor facilities affect the lives of many people in the occupied areas. The housing problem includes the following factors:

- *The type and quality of facilities in existing housing units.* These are mostly substandard and in many cases inadequate.
- *The number of people per room.* More than one-half of the population lives in units where the occupancy density exceeds three persons per room.
- *The rental as a percentage of income.* More than 50 percent of the average worker's income is earmarked for rent.
- *The supply of new housing units.* There is an actual decline in the total number of housing units because of the low rate of new housing starts and the high rate of deterioration and abandonment of the older housing units.

The typical Arab family is large, and families in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are no exception. Fifty-five percent of the Arab families in the occupied areas consist of more than six members. Over one-half of these families live in housing units with more than three persons per room, and in some cases as many as seven.

The situation is aggravated by the lack of adequate facilities. Forty-one percent of the units in the West Bank are without lavatories, 54 percent without kitchens, 76 percent without electricity, and 83 percent without bathrooms.

* The authors are grateful to the Engineers Association of the West Bank, which sponsored with Birzeit University a study on housing in the occupied areas. This paper is based on that study.

This study is based on official data published by the Israeli authorities. More data on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are available than on East Jerusalem. The gaps of information on East Jerusalem were filled in as follows: We took bench-mark data, mostly for 1967, and assumed that since Arab families in East Jerusalem have the same characteristics as those in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, rates of change in all variables related to this study would be similar. In this manner, the tables appearing in this study were completed.

The study covers the following: (1) the economic indicators of the housing problem, (2) the supply of housing units up to 1976, and (3) the demand for housing units for the period 1976–1990 under different density assumptions.

Economic Indicators of the Housing Problem

A housing problem in an absolute sense exists when a large segment of the population is forced to occupy housing units in which living conditions are below minimum standards. A housing problem in a relative sense exists when members of a community cannot improve their housing conditions to levels that are considered socially acceptable by the community. A housing crisis, either in the absolute or in the relative sense, can be identified in terms of specific indicators.

The Existence of an Income Crisis. An income crisis, like a housing crisis, can be thought of in absolute as well as relative terms. The crisis is absolute when a family's income cannot provide the minimum needs for survival. The crisis is relative when income is below the poverty line. In both concepts, the lower limit of poverty is by-and-large fixed while the upper limit tends to shift upwards over time at rates that differ from one community to the other. Seventy percent of the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip suffer from an income crisis of both varieties.

The evidence can be derived from official statistical data,[1] which indicate that the average labor force participation rate in the occupied areas is 21 percent of the population as compared with 36 percent in Israel. This means that under equal conditions of work opportunity and income, the per capita income of an Arab in the occupied territories is 60 percent of that of an Israeli.

Furthermore, since work opportunities are not equal and since Arab workers are employed in low income jobs, the ratio is much smaller. Fifty-three percent of the total Arab labor force is employed in agriculture, construction, and other low income positions with no

[1] *Census of Population and Housing, 1967*, Parts 1 and 2 (East Jerusalem).

social security benefits. It is estimated that the per capita income in the occupied areas does not exceed 40 percent of that in Israel.

The average family in advanced countries spends no more than 30 percent of its income on food; the balance is spent on other necessities of life. A large percentage of families in the occupied territories receive incomes that hardly cover the necessities. Official data indicate that the standard consumer basket for Israel assigns a weight of 25 percent to food, whereas in the occupied territories it is 46 percent.

One consequence of the low level of income among Arab families is that more than 70 percent of them face a housing crisis. Some are forced to emigrate in order to improve their living conditions.

The High Density of Occupancy. Specialists on housing agree that a housing crisis for a family exists whenever its occupancy reaches three persons per room.

Table 1 shows the density of occupancy per room for East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel for the years 1967, 1970, and 1975. It also shows that a housing crisis exists in the occupied areas. About 50 percent of Arab families live in housing units where the occupancy density is three persons per room or more, as opposed to about 4 percent of all Israeli families.

Stress arises not only from overcrowding but also from the co-existence of different generations living under the same roof, each with its own needs and desires which cannot be satisfied.

Lack of Facilities in Housing Units. The level of services of a housing unit determines the suitability of the unit for comfortable and healthy living. Housing units that lack such amenities as toilets, kitchens, running water, electricity, or bathrooms are to that extent unsuitable. Table 2 classifies housing units in the occupied areas according to the availability of such services and compares them with Israeli housing units. It indicates that about 20 percent of all Arab housing units are without toilets or kitchens, about 70 percent are without bathrooms, and about two-thirds are without either running water or electricity. Housing units in Israel have their full complement of such services.

Supply and Demand for Housing Units

A housing unit is defined as a place in which a number of individuals live and eat. The individuals need not be related and could constitute

TABLE 1

OCCUPANCY PER ROOM IN EAST JERUSALEM, THE WEST BANK, THE GAZA STRIP, AND ISRAEL, 1967, 1970, 1975

(percentage)

Occupancy per Room	*1967*				*1970*				*1975*			
	East Jerusalem	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Israel	East Jerusalem	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Israel	East Jerusalem	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Israel
Less than one	9.5	3.3	2.1	41.4	9.7	3.5	2.6	47.5	9.9	3.7	3.6	52.2
1–1.99	27.5	19.1	19.0	28.3	28.0	19.7	19.6	27.6	28.5	20.3	21.2	28.7
2–2.99	20.9	21.1	26.5	21.1	21.9	22.4	27.3	17.9	23.0	23.5	28.0	14.8
3 or more	42.1	56.4	52.4	10.2	40.4	54.4	50.5	7.0	38.6	52.5	47.2	4.3

SOURCE: Data for 1967 for East Jerusalem are from *Census of Population and Housing* (1967) East Jerusalem, Parts 1 and 2; for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, from *Census of Population (1967)–West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza Strip, and Northern Sinai-Golan Heights*, No. 1; and for Israel, from *Survey of Housing Conditions* (1969) Special Publication No. 323. Data for 1970 for East Jerusalem are from *Survey of Housing Conditions* (1971) Special Publication No. 405. All other data are from *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*, Nos. 21-28 for the years 1970-1977.

TABLE 2

AVAILABILITY OF FACILITIES IN HOUSING UNITS, 1967 AND 1974
(in percentage of total units)

	1967				1974			
	East Jerusalem	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Israel	East Jerusalem	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Israel
Toilets								
No toilets	6.8	41.4	29.0	5.0	5.9	36.0	21.0	3.0
External toilets only	15.5	10.8	36.5	N.A.	24.4	17.0	19.0	N.A.
Kitchen								
Without	20.5	54.0	43.7	N.A.	13.7	36.0	28.0	N.A.
Shared	5.5	2.3	4.7	N.A.	3.8	3.0	12.0	N.A.
Water								
Cistern	17.6	27.8	27.5	N.A.	20.9	33.0	30.0	N.A.
Main outside the house	12.9	9.9	27.3	N.A.	19.0	17.1	38.5	N.A.
Electricity								
Without electricity	28.6	76.1	81.1	N.A.	24.3	54.0	64.0	N.A.
Bathroom								
Without	71.0	82.3	79.7	5.0	65.6	76.0	82.0	N.A.

N.A. = not applicable.

SOURCE: Data for 1967 for East Jerusalem are from *Census of Population and Housing* (1967) East Jerusalem, Parts 1 and 2; for 1967 for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, from *Census of Population (1967)–West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza Strip, and Northern Sinai-Golan Heights*, No. 1; and for 1967 for Israel and for 1974 for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, from *Statistical Abstracts of Israel*, Nos. 20-28 for the years 1967-1977. Rates of change between 1967 and 1974 were assumed to be equal to those of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

more than one family. Thus, the number of housing units in a community could be less than the number of families living in that community. This is typical of less developed regions where family units of three generations often live together.

The Supply. The supply of housing units during a given period of time is equal to (1) the number of units existing at the beginning of the period; plus (2) the number of new units built during the period; and minus (3) the number of units depleted during the period. Table 3 is a summary of the total supply of housing units in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. The total number of housing units in the occupied areas was 5 percent less in 1976 than in 1967. In other words, there was a decline in the total supply of housing despite population increases and new family formations during the same period. This is evidence of an income crisis as well as that of a mounting housing crisis.

The Demand. One way to classify the demand of consumers for goods and services is to place them in two major categories: biological demands which represent the irreducible minimum of goods and services needed to sustain life; and social demands which represent the incomes, tastes, prices, and standards set by the community. Most consumer demands in primitive societies are biological, but as societies develop and socioeconomic conditions improve, social demands begin to proliferate. Actual demand is a function of income and prices. It is used in this study as the basis for estimating the number of housing units needed in the occupied areas, assuming certain characteristics of the population.

Population characteristics for the period 1967–1976, including the number and size of existing families as well as new family formations, were derived from official Israeli data. For the period beyond 1976 a projection was made assuming that population growth up to 1990 would continue at rates equal to those that existed during the period 1967–1976. It is assumed that emigration from the occupied areas will continue at existing rates. Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize the data on population, the availability of housing units, the number of rooms, and the occupancy density per room for the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem respectively, and present further evidence of the housing crisis. The number of families exceeds the number of housing units, and the number of rooms per housing unit ranges from 1.82 to 2.27 for an average household of 6.1 persons. Since the total number of housing units in the occupied areas in 1976

TABLE 3

Housing Units Available, 1967–1976

Year	East Jerusalem				West Bank				Gaza Strip				Total
	Units at beginning of year (1)	Units built (2)	Units destroyed or unused (3)	Units at end of year (4)	Units at beginning of year (1A)	Units built (2A)	Units destroyed or unused (3A)	Units at end of year (4A)	Units at beginning of year (1B)	Units built (2B)	Units destroyed or unused (3B)	Units at end of year (4B)	(4+4A+4B)
1967	12,589	172	N.A.	12,636	120,632	445	11,393	109,684	66,843	7	5,804	61,046	183,366
1968	12,636	149	125	12,660	109,684	673	8,837	101,520	61,046	33	909	60,170	174,350
1969	12,660	275	269	12,666	101,520	791	5,592	96,719	60,170	83	474	59,779	169,164
1970	12,666	290	150	12,806	96,719	842	1,650	95,911	59,779	100	142	59,737	168,454
1971	12,806	458	151	13,113	95,911	1,486	11,988	85,409	59,737	391	324	59,804	158,326
1972	13,113	695	133	13,675	85,409	2,256	2,105	85,560	59,804	816	112	60,508	159,743
1973	13,675	770	136	14,309	85,560	2,466	326	87,700	60,508	1,015	309	61,214	163,223
1974	14,309	830	346	14,793	87,700	3,320	645	90,375	61,214	1,090	696	61,708	166,876
1975	14,793	1,039	652	15,180	90,375	4,156	1,775	92,756	61,708	886	520	62,074	170,010
1976	15,180	1,218	1,033	15,365	92,756	4,773	1,623	95,906	62,074	1,149	101	63,122	174,393

N.A. = not available.

NOTE: Columns 1, 1A, 1B give the total number of housing units at beginning of the year; 2, 2A, 2B give the total number of new housing units built during the year; 3, 3A, 3B give the total number of housing units destroyed, depleted or otherwise unused during the year; and 4, 4A, 4B give the total number of housing units at the end of the year. Columns 1, 1A, 1B and 2, 2A, 2B are official statistics. Columns 4, 4A, and 4B are residuals resulting from subtracting columns 3, 3A, and 3B from columns 1, 1A, 1B and 2, 2A, 2B combined.

SOURCE: Bakir Abu Kishk, *The Housing Problem in the Occupied Areas* (West Bank Engineering Association and Birzeit University) [Arabic]. Based on table 5.

TABLE 4

POPULATION AND HOUSING IN THE WEST BANK, 1967–1976

Year	Housing Units	Number of Rooms	Number of Rooms per Housing Unit	Occupancy per Room	Population	Number of Families	New Families[a]	Total Families
1967	120,632	229,192	1.90	2.6	595,900	132,695	4,171	136,866
1968	109,682	215,444	1.96	2.7	581,700	120,650	4,072	124,722
1969	101,518	212,571	2.09	2.8	595,200	111,672	4,166	115,838
1970	96,717	208,241	2.15	2.9	663,900	106,388	4,647	111,035
1971	95,909	205,766	2.15	3.0	617,300	105,500	4,321	109,821
1972	95,003	209,667	2.21	3.0	629,000	104,503	4,403	108,906
1973	95,159	212,566	2.23	3.04	646,200	104,669	4,523	109,192
1974	96,594	215,505	2.23	3.07	661,600	107,023	4,631	111,654
1975	99,269	215,941	2.18	3.08	665,100	109,196	4,656	113,852
1976	101,650	217,119	2.14	3.09	670,900	111,815	4,696	116,511

NOTE: [a] New families equal 0.7% of the population.

SOURCE: Bakir Abu Kishk, *The Housing Problem in the Occupied Areas*, tables 2 and 3; *Census of Population and Housing* (1967) East Jerusalem, Parts 1 and 2; and *Survey of Housing Conditions*, 1971 (Special Publications No. 405).

TABLE 5

POPULATION AND HOUSING IN THE GAZA STRIP AND NORTH SINAI, 1967–1976

Year	Housing Units	Number of Rooms	Number of Rooms per Housing Unit	Occupancy per Room	Population	Number of Families	New Families[a]	Total Familes
1967	66,843	141,076	2.11	2.7	380,900	73,527	2,666	76,193
1968	61,046	130,366	2.14	2.7	355,900	67,151	2,491	69,642
1969	60,670	130,758	2.16	2.77	362,200	66,737	2,535	69,272
1970	60,279	130,854	2.17	2.8	367,700	66,307	2,574	68,881
1971	60,237	131,895	2.19	2.85	375,900	66,261	2,631	68,892
1972	60,304	132,699	2.20	2.9	383,500	66,224	2,685	68,909
1973	61,008	135,563	2.22	2.93	397,200	67,211	2,780	69,991
1974	61,714	138,007	2.24	2.96	408,500	67,775	2,860	70,635
1975	62,108	139,500	2.25	3.0	418,500	68,099	2,930	71,029
1976	62,474	141,118	2.26	3.04	429,000	68,391	3,003	71,394

NOTE: [a] New families equal 0.7% of the population.

SOURCE: Bakir Abu Kishk, *The Housing Problem in the Occupied Areas*, tables 2 and 4; for population data, *Statistical Abstracts of Israel* No. 21-28; and for housing units data, *Census of Population (1967–West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza Strip, and Northern Sinai-Golan Heights*, No. 1.

TABLE 6

POPULATION AND HOUSING IN EAST JERUSALEM, 1967–1976

Year	Housing Units	Number of Rooms	Number of Rooms per Housing Unit	Occupancy per Room	Population	Number of Families	New Families[a]	Total Number of Families
1967	12,589	25,800	2.05	2.55	65,900[a]	13,848	461	14,309
1968	12,636	25,255	1.99	2.55	64,600	14,176	452	14,628
1969	12,516	25,866	2.06	3.0	77,600	14,465	543	15,008
1970	12,641	26,566	2.10	3.0	79,700	14,696	558	15,254
1971	12,780	24,576	1.92	3.3[b]	81,100[b]	14,868	568	15,436
1972	13,105	25,182	1.92	3.3	83,100	15,235	582	15,817
1973	13,664	26,531	1.94	3.2	84,900	15,310	594	15,904
1974	14,088	26,812	1.90	3.2	85,800	15,473	601	16,074
1975	14,266	27,437	1.92	3.2	87,800	15,577	615	16,192
1976	14,442	27,594	1.91	3.2	88,300	15,666	618	16,284

NOTE: [a] New families equal 0.7% of the population.

SOURCE: Bakir Abu Kishk, *The Housing Problem in the Occupied Areas, table 2/2;* [a] *Census of Population and Housing* (1967) East Jerusalem, Parts 1 and 2; and [b] *Survey of Housing Conditions* (1971) Special Publication No. 405.

TABLE 7

DEMAND FOR ROOMS, 1976–1990

Year	Population	Rooms Needed		
		Occupancy 3.03 per room	Occupancy 2.0 per room	Occupancy 1.4 per room
1976	1,189,000	392,409	594,500	849,286
1980	1,277,834	421,727	638,917	912,739
1985	1,398,522	461,558	699,261	998,944
1990	1,530,923	505,255	765,462	1,093,516

SOURCE: Author's calculations.
NOTE: rooms = $\frac{\text{total population}}{\text{occupancy density}}$

was 174,393, and since the population was accommodated by these units, it follows that this number represents the actual quantity of housing units supplied at the then existing average occupancy density of 3.08 persons per room.

Obviously, a density of 3.08 persons per room is high by any standard and calls for additional rooms. Thus, if we are to reduce occupancy density to 2 persons per room (the average density in Israel in 1957) or to 1.4 persons per room the average density in Israel in 1971), the housing problem in the occupied areas will be ameliorated. Construction of new buildings depends not only on financing but also on labor and materials.

Table 7 represents the projected demand for rooms for the years 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1990, given the present density of 3.08 persons per room and an improvement of this density to 2.0 and to 1.4 persons per room respectively. Assuming that the average family size in the occupied areas is 6.1 persons, we can determine the number of housing units needed under each of the three densities. This conversion gives rise to table 8 and to the number of housing units needed.

The total demand for housing consists of the number of housing units needed at the beginning of each period, given a specific density, plus the number of housing units needed to accommodate new families minus the number of housing units which need to be replaced. This demand is summarized in table 8.

TABLE 8

TOTAL HOUSING UNITS NEEDED FOR 1976–1990

Year	Units[a]	Units for new families[b]	Replacement[c]	Deterioration[d]	Total
		Occupancy, 3.03 per Room			
1976	195,230	8,320	—	2,340	203,550
1980	209,800	8,900	3,900	2,518	225,118
1985	229,600	9,790	3,900	2,755	229,262
1990	251,400	10,710	3,900	3,017	268,027
		Occupancy, 2.0 per Room			
1976	194,914	8,320	—	—	203,237
1980	209,475	8,900	2,571	2,513	223,440
1985	229,262	9,790	2,571	2,571	244,340
1990	250,967	10,710	2,511	3,011	267,240
		Occupancy, 1.4 per Room			
1976	194,885	8,320	—	—	203,205
1980	209,344	8,900	1,810	2,343	224,318
1985	229,116	9,790	1,810	2,755	246,667
1990	250,807	10,710	1,810	3,016	269,842

SOURCE: [a] Table 8 above. [b] 0.7% of the total population in each year. [c] Bakir Abu Kishk, *The Housing Problem in the Occupied Areas*, table 218. The average family of 6.1 was divided by the occupancy per room to derive the number of rooms in each unit. The number of housing units to be replaced was estimated at 2 percent per annum of the 1967 housing units available at that date. [d] Deterioration was taken to be 1.2% of the total housing units available at the beginning of each year.

Table 9 compares the number of housing units demanded and supplied for the years 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1990. This table was derived from table 3 where the supply for housing units was considered suitable for the existing density rate of 3 persons per room. With the density reduced to 2 persons per room, these units would be equivalent to two-thirds of the original number. When density was reduced to 1.4 persons per room the equivalency became one-half of the original number. These are represented in columns 1, 2, and 3. The next three columns represent the total demand for housing units for each of the three densities. The last three columns represent the gap.

TABLE 9

HOUSING UNITS SUPPLIED AND DEMANDED AND HOUSING SHORTAGES, 1976–1990

	Quantity Supplied			*Quantity Demanded*			*Housing Shortage*[c]		
	Occupancy per room			Occupancy per room			Occupancy per room		
Year	*3.03*[a]	*2.0*[a]	*1.4*[b]	*3.03*	*2.0*	*1.4*	*3.03*	*2.0*	*1.4*
1976	178,566	117,675	82,140	203,550	203,237	203,205	24,984	85,562	121,065
1980	190,679	125,657	87,712	225,118	223,440	224,318	34,349	97,783	136,606
1985	207,590	136,802	95,491	246,045	244,340	246,667	38,455	107,538	151,176
1990	226,235	149,089	104,068	268,027	267,240	269,842	41,792	118,151	165,774

SOURCE: [a] Bakir Abu Kishk, *The Housing Problem in the Occupied Areas*, tables 6 and 11; [b] The quantities supplied at densities of 2.0/room and 1.4/room were computed as follows: the quantity supplied at a density of 3.03/room was multiplied by a coefficient of 4.661, derived by dividing the size of the housing unit at a density of 2.0/room. A coefficient of 0.460, derived in the same manner, was used to calculate the quantity supplied at a density of 1.4/room; [c] Calculated as the difference between quantity supplied and demanded for each density level.

It is clear that new housing units are not being built fast enough and that the demand is excessive even at the high occupancy density of 3.08 existing at present. As the density rates are lowered, the gap becomes larger.

Conclusion

A housing crisis of large magnitude exists in the occupied areas along with an income crisis. On their own, it does not appear that the family units concerned are capable now, nor in the foreseeable future, of solving the housing problem. With an increasing shortage of housing units, the crisis will be aggravated, and in the absence of a national government that is capable of mobilizing resources for alleviating it, housing conditions in the occupied areas will continue to deteriorate.

7
Labor and Manpower

Ghassan Harb

Any discussion of the problems of labor and manpower in the post-settlement era in the West Bank and Gaza must be based on the nature of the settlement that may be achieved for the Middle East conflict in general and for the Palestinian problem in particular. This paper is based on the author's belief in the inevitability of an independent Palestinian state in the territories occupied during the June 1967 war: the West Bank, including Arab Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. Such a state is considered by many researchers to be economically viable; it will provide a secure path for future economic development for the Palestinians; and it will fulfill the legitimate political aspirations of the Palestinian people.

In a country moderately endowed with natural resources but lacking in the capital needed for development, the labor force acquires importance. As the economists Haim Darin-Drabkin (an Israeli) and Elias Tuma (a Palestinian) stress in their study of the economic viability of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, "the human resources that make the Palestinian people must play the most important role in achieving viability."[1]

This conviction is supported in the highest ranks of Palestinian leadership, both in the occupied territories and outside them. Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), a prominent figure in the PLO, in an interview with Eric Rouleau, Middle East editor of *Le Monde*, stressed the necessity of "creating a state in the freed territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip," emphasizing that "the Palestinians have an abundance of manpower, plenty of technicians and executives who have done university studies, and they can above all count on considerable finan-

[1] Elias Tuma and Haim Darin-Drabkin, *The Economic Case for Palestine* (Croom Helm, London: 1978), p. 15.

cial help from oil-producing states. In any case we are much more 'viable' than the State of Israel itself."[2]

Admittedly, the question of the Palestinian labor force has not yet been studied thoroughly. Because of the dispersal of Palestinians in 1948, the Palestinian labor force is now scattered throughout many different countries. It consists of two main components: the workers located in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and those living outside the territories that may be assigned to the independent state.

This paper is mainly concerned with that part of the Palestinian labor force which has remained in the homeland. This, of course, should not lead us to ignore or underestimate the importance of those in exile, who may play an important role in strengthening the local labor force when the obstacles to their return are overcome.

Most of the data contained in this paper are taken from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics publications, the only organ which publishes official data on the occupied territories. There are discrepancies between some of these data and the information gathered by local researchers.

The Present State of the Labor Force

It is necessary to examine briefly the population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as sources of labor. At the end of 1977, the population of the occupied territories was 1,122,600, of whom 681,250 resided in the West Bank and 441,350 in the Gaza Strip and North Sinai. (Israeli official data on the population of the occupied territories include North Sinai, whose citizens are Egyptian, but since they are few, they do not significantly affect the situation as a whole.)

The population structure of the occupied territories has the same characteristics that prevail in most developing countries. Table 1 shows that approximately half the population is below fourteen years of age and does not participate officially in economic activity.

There is a peculiarity in the population growth of the West Bank. Contrary to the experience of the majority of developing countries, the population of the West Bank has witnessed a decline during the past twenty-five years. Despite a natural increase of approximately 30 per 1,000 people,[3] the population of the area at the end of 1977, according to official Israeli statistics (681,250), was smaller than in 1952

[2] *Jersualem Post*, Jerusalem, January 12, 1979.

[3] U. O. Schmelz, "Population Changes in Judea and Samaria," *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 4, Summer 1977, p. 99.

TABLE 1

POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BY SEX AND AGE (percent)

Age Group	*Total*	*Males*	*Females*
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
0 - 14	46.8	49.2	44.4
15 - 29	27.3	28.2	26.4
30 - 44	11.4	9.3	13.5
45 - 64	10.3	9.2	11.4
65 +	4.2	4.1	4.3

SOURCE: *Statistical Abstract of Israel (SAI)* No. 29, 1978, p. 766, table 27-3.

(686,000).[4] This was mainly due to successive waves of emigration: local migration to the East Bank of Jordan before 1967, the exodus directly after the war of 1967, and the departure of thousands of job-seekers since.[5]

The resulting imbalance in the population in the West Bank is reflected in its sex/age composition. There are fewer young adults and middle-aged people than might be expected. In particular, there is a marked absence of men: at the end of 1977 there were only about 787 men per 1,000 women of the age group 25–44 in the West Bank. This ratio is even smaller in all the occupied territories: 757 men per 1,000 women.[6] This factor has had an adverse effect on the structure of the labor force; female participation in the labor force is still at a low level.

As in other developing countries, the rate of participation in the labor force of people aged fourteen and over is low, as may be seen in the following table:

The low participation of those who do not seek work although they are of an age to do so is attributed to various factors. Chief among these are: (1) The low participation of women in the labor market, either because they are needed at home or because of traditions that discourage them from joining the labor market. Official statistics show that in 1976, 64.3 percent of women aged fourteen and over in the West Bank, and 80.7 percent in the Gaza Strip were housewives.[7] Recent years have witnessed a slight trend toward more

[4] Ibid., p. 96.

[5] The exact figures are not available, if indeed they are known, but it is no exaggeration to speak in terms of thousands.

[6] Computed from table 27-3, *SAI*, No. 29, 1978, p. 766.

[7] Appendix to *ATSQ*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 83-84.

TABLE 2

POPULATION AGED 14 AND OVER BY LABOR FORCE AND SEX IN 1976
(in thousands)

	West Bank	*Gaza Strip*	*Total*
Total			
Population	371.0	231.5	602.5
Labor force	131.3	76.3	207.6
% labor force to population	35.4	33.0	34.5
Males			
Population	178.9	108.4	287.3
Labor force	106.8	71.1	177.9
% labor force to population	59.7	65.6	61.9
Females			
Population	192.1	123.1	315.2
Labor force	24.5	5.2	29.7
% labor force to population	12.8	4.2	9.4

SOURCE: Appendix to *Administered Territories Statistical Quarterly (ATSQ)*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 77-78.

participation of women in the labor market, especially in the West Bank. (2) The relatively high percentage of young people attending schools and universities; in 1976, 24.78 percent of the population aged fourteen and over in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were involved in various stages of learning.[8]

Table 3 shows the distribution of the labor force by economic sector.

Two further issues concerning the labor force in the occupied territories must be stressed: (1) A high percentage of laborers commute daily to Israel for work. Of the 205,800 persons employed, 64,900 or 31.5 percent worked in Israel in 1976. The real rate is higher than that given in official statistics because many people work in Israel illegally. In February 1979, the Israeli ministry of labor and social welfare estimated the number to be 20,000. (2) There is a high rate of emigration. It became apparent after the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948 and was intensified after the Israeli occupation in 1967. Thousands of young people leave every year for political, economic, or other reasons.

[8] Calculated on the basis of tables 3 and 4, in Appendix to *ATSQ*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 83-84.

TABLE 3

DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP BY ECONOMIC SECTOR AND LOCATION OF WORK (1976)

	Employed in West Bank and Gaza Strip	*Employed in Israel*	*Total*
Total	140,900	64,900	205,800
Percentage	100.00	100.00	100.00
Agriculture	31.4	15.4	26.34
Industry	14.4	19.7	16.07
Construction	8.1	50.3	21.41
Other sectors	46.1	14.6	36.17

SOURCE: Appendix to *ATSQ*, No. 2, 1977, pp. 90-91.

Political interference by the Israeli military authorities causes a great many persons, especially university students, not to return, thus diminishing the local labor force.

Emigration for economic reasons has intensified since 1974, when the Israeli economy faltered. Thousands of Arabs employed in Israel lost their jobs and were obliged to seek work in Arab and foreign countries. The *Israel Economist* estimates the number of emigrants from the West Bank alone in the five years from 1974 to 1978 to be 50,000, at an average yearly rate of 10,000.[9]

These two factors, work in Israel and emigration, will leave their imprint on the labor force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for many years to come, whatever form the final political settlement may take.

The Labor Force in the Postsettlement Era

Since forecasts based on a detailed study of each economic sector are not available, this section will concentrate in general terms on the macroeconomic aspects of the problem.

The main question is: Can the various economic sectors in the future Palestinian state provide suitable job opportunities either in production or services for its labor force? The answer depends upon a comparison between the supply and demand of labor.

The Supply of Labor. With respect to labor supply, there are two alternative assumptions:

[9] *Israel Economist*, Jerusalem, October 1978, p. 25.

- that the aggregate population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will continue its present trend, with a normal rate of natural increase
- that an abnormal increase in the population will take place, because of the influx of the Palestinian refugees returning home.

The supply of labor according to the first alternative: To be efficient, the labor market must be judged in two ways—quantitatively and qualitatively.

1. *The quantitative aspect:* Assuming that the existing natural increase of approximately 30 per 1,000 persons will continue, and that emigration will cease, the anticipated population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during the next ten years will be as follows: in 1980, 1.263 million; in 1985, 1.465 million; and in 1990, 1.689 million.

According to Israeli statistics, the percentage of the labor force to the total population of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during 1968–1977 averaged 18.8 percent. Assuming that this percentage will increase, especially because of greater female participation,[10] the figure will probably reach 20 percent in the coming decade. Hence the number of job-seekers is expected to be 252,700 in 1980, 292,900 in 1985, and 339,600 in 1990, giving an average number of 295,000. This adds almost 100,000 to the average yearly number of job-seekers during the period 1970–1976.

2. *The qualitative aspect:* A well-known fact should be emphasized: The Palestinian labor force is the best qualified in the entire Arab East. This was one of the major findings of a "high-level manpower assessment" project conducted and sponsored by the Institute for Palestinian Studies in Beirut. In his research study "High Level Palestinian Manpower," Nabeel Sha'ath states that "the ratio of higher level manpower and the ratio of present Palestinian university students to the total Palestinian population is higher than the ratio for any Arab country (including Egypt and Lebanon)."[11]

The reason for the high level of education is that most Palestinians, expelled from their country after the 1948 war, found that education was the key to finding work in Arab countries. This also holds true for those Palestinians who remained in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, some of whom have been refugees since 1948.

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[10] Nevertheless, no drastic increase in female participation is expected in the coming decade because families in the region are large and need married women to take care of the children. There are few nurseries and kindergartens in the area because the "extended family" fills this role.

[11] Nabeel Sha'ath, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2 (Winter 1972), p. 94.

TABLE 4

STRUCTURE OF LABOR FORCE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP BY STAGE OF EDUCATION

Years of Education	*1969*	*1976*
Zero	35.62	26.47
1–4 years	15.17	14.09
5–6 years	21.98	20.73
7–8 years	8.37	11.40
9 years and more	18.86	26.50
	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: Calculated on the basis of *Monthly Statistics of the Administered Territories (MSAT)*, No. 6, 1972, p. 88 and *ATSQ*, No. 2, 1977, p. 80.

Classification of the labor force in the occupied territories in 1978 shows that the category that includes scientists, academics, professionals, technicians, administrators, managers, and clerical staff, comprises 11.39 percent of the labor force; skilled workers in industry, mining, building, transport, and other trades compose 23.8 percent; merchants and their staffs, 10.9 percent; service workers, 7.15 percent; agricultural laborers, 26.06 percent; and unskilled workers in industry, transport, and building, 20.7 percent.

The educational structure of the labor force shows that in 1976 approximately 38 percent had received intermediate and higher education. If we add the generally well-qualified workers who have left the area during the past ten years, the high level of Palestinian manpower is even more apparent.

The labor force in the occupied territories is characterized by a trend toward better education, as shown in table 4.

Another fact demonstrates the improved quality of the labor force. The ratio of the per-employee productivity of an Israeli to that of a Palestinian is decreasing: this ratio in agriculture was 3.7:1 in 1970 and 2.1:1 in 1976; in industry it was 7.5:1 and 3.25:1 respectively.[12]

Thus one may conclude that the potential quality of the labor force in the occupied territories is promising. No doubt a policy for further sophistication will show an increased improvement.

Supply of labor according to the second alternative. One of the benefits of a comprehensive, just, and lasting settlement will be the

12 Calculated on the basis of *SAI*, No. 23, 1972, pp. 167 and 314, and No. 29, 1978, pp. 177 and 354; *MSAT*, No. 11, 1972, p. 82; *ATSQ*, No. 1, 1977, p. 74; appendix to *ATSQ*, No. 2, 1977, p. 90.

right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland. This will drastically change the composition of the population and labor force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In his article entitled "The Economic Viability of a Palestine State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,"[13] Haim Darin-Drabkin forecast that 1.2 million refugees would return during the first five years of the settlement, resulting in a population of 2,374,000 with 546,000 laborers (23 percent of the population). Darin-Drabkin suggests the following employment structure by economic sector: agriculture, 99,000; industry, 81,000; construction, 100,000; and services, 267,000.

We can conclude that the combined quantity and quality of the labor force will allow it to bear the burden of development of the future state.

The Demand for Labor. We will deal with demand in the same way we dealt with the two assumptions above.

Demand for labor according to the first alternative. Again, no detailed analysis of the demand in all sectors can be given because of the lack of data. We shall, however, give a detailed example that may serve to illustrate the effect of a single economic sector (construction) on the increased demand for labor.

In his study of the housing problems in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,[14] Bakr Abu-Kishk, chairman of the Department of Economics at Birzeit University, shows that solving the housing crisis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the next decade will provide employment for a large number of workers.

Abu-Kishk discusses the alternatives which will determine the demand for housing units with a density of two persons per room: (1) that the rate of emigration will continue at the existing level; (2) that emigration will decrease by 30 percent; (3) that emigration will end by 1990.

He estimates the demand for labor by private and public construction as shown in table 5.

To give an idea of the implications of these figures, the work created under Alternative 1 will absorb the majority of West Bank construction workers now working in Israel, who numbered 18,290 in 1976.

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[13] *New Outlook*, Jerusalem, April 1978.

[14] For details see "Housing Problems in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," an unpublished research paper by Bakr Abu-Kishk in cooperation with the Association of Engineers in the West Bank.

TABLE 5

DEMAND FOR LABOR IN CONSTRUCTION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA STRIP
(in thousands of laborers)

Year	*Alternative 1*	*Alternative 2*	*Alternative 3*
1980	11.9	13.9	16.7
1985	15.3	17.8	21.3
1990	19.5	22.8	26.9

NOTE: Computed by adding 20 percent (for public building) to the figures in table 2/11 in the source given in footnote 14.

Table 5 does not show how the construction sector will create a demand for labor in other sectors. Abu-Kishk assumes that a ratio of 1:1 will prevail between the demand for labor in construction and that in other economic sectors. Thus the total demand for labor will be doubled. He also assumes that the economic effect of construction on the other sectors will be low because a substantial part of the wages accruing from construction will be spent on foreign consumer goods. One may safely conclude, however, that the development of competitive industries in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will eventually compensate for this.

This demonstrates how only one economic sector can provide work for between 39 and 54 percent (depending on which of the three assumptions is considered) of the estimated 100,000 future job-seekers.

As to the investment required for such a housing project, according to Abu-Kishk, Alternative 1 will cost approximately 94 million Jordanian dinars (1 J.D. = U.S.$3.10) per annum at 1978 prices; the second will cost 106 million J.D.; and the third 152 million J.D.

The effects of construction should not be overestimated. Genuine efforts should also be directed toward developing industry, agriculture, and the other spheres of material production.

Demand for labor according to the second alternative. According to Darin-Drabkin, the repatriation of 1.2 million Palestinian refugees during the first five years of the settlement, along with the young local job-seekers, will necessitate the creation of roughly 408,000 new jobs (see table 6). He suggests that "employment in infrastructure works will form the main source of employment during the first stage of development, even before commencement of housing construction

TABLE 6

INVESTMENT NEEDED TO CREATE ADDITIONAL EMPLOYMENT

	Number Employed	*Investment* (in millions of dollars)
Agriculture	55,000	770
Industry	60,000	720
Construction	90,000	270
Services	202,000	1,212
Total	407,000	2,972

SOURCE: *New Outlook*, April 1978, p. 52.

for the additional population. At the same time, the establishment of vital public services will be an additional source of employment in the initial stage."[15]

Based on an investigation of the different sectors of the economy, Darin-Drabkin estimates the overall investment required to create a sound employment structure for 1975 at approximately $3.5 billion: $500 million for modernizing present employment conditions and $3 billion for creating additional jobs, as follows:

Conclusions

Our main conclusions may be summarized as follows:

- In both its quantitative and qualitative aspects, the labor force in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, together with that of Palestinians in exile, is capable of meeting the requirements of development of the future state. It may compensate for the relative deficiencies present in other factors of production in the occupied territories.
- A new equilibrium between the supply and demand of labor may be reached.
- The future improvement in the quality and efficiency of labor is of vital importance to the country. The development of a series of educational and vocational institutions geared to the needs of the country will contribute effectively to this end.
- A proper utilization of the labor force may be achieved through effective economic planning.

[15] H. Darin-Drabkin, "The Economic Viability of a Palestine State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," *New Outlook*, April 1978, p. 51.

- Since the local resources for the accumulation of capital are not sufficient to provide the investment needed, foreign aid and loans will play a considerable role in the future state, especially in its primary stages. The international community—Arab states and friendly countries throughout the world—will be urged to contribute to such a goal.
- Investment will provide a solid base for the creative activities of Palestinians and for the transformation of this land of suffering and instability into a flourishing oasis of security. This will be the contribution of the Palestinian people to the noble cause of world peace.

8

Municipal Legal Structure in Gaza

Muhammad al-Khaas

The case of Bassam al-Shaka, the elected mayor of the city of Nablus (the West Bank's largest city), together with the events that stemmed from it in the Arab occupied territories, attracted attention throughout the world. The case offers an occasion to examine the local authority structure—its establishment, its organizational authority, and the various laws that govern its functions and activities.

Al-Shaka was arrested in late 1979 by the military authorities for allegedly having made a statement in a private conversation with the military governor in support of Palestinian "terrorist" activities in Israel. The conversation, which was leaked to the press, created an uproar in Israel. At the orders of Israel's defense minister, Ezer Weizman, the military authorities arrested al-Shaka and started deportation proceedings against him. It was shown later, however, that the conversation was misrepresented and that al-Shaka was misquoted. Because of the Israeli press's continued criticism of the handling of this case, the rising violence among the Palestinians in the occupied areas, and the attention of the international community, al-Shaka was released and reinstated as mayor of Nablus.

It is unfortunate that Palestine, from the Turkish occupation to the British mandate, has been prey to foreign occupations which though varied in name and form, were similar in their nature and goals.

Shortly after the decision of the United Nations in 1947 to end the British mandate and to partition Palestine into two independent states (Arab and Jewish) the Arab-Israeli war began. Israel im-

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This paper, originally written in Arabic, was translated into English by Kamal Ahwal of Washington, D.C.

mediately occupied portions of the Arab territory and declared them part of Israel.

The West Bank was annexed to Transjordan and regarded as part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The remainder of Palestine, the Gaza Strip, was placed under Egyptian administration, but neither annexed nor integrated, and it remained so until the war of June 1967. Israel then occupied the entire Arab Palestinian land, as well as parts of the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights.

Although this paper deals primarily with questions of the local authority in Gaza, some historical background should be given regarding the various municipal laws and regulations in occupied territories in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Israeli authorities have been accused of seeking to change the nature of the Palestinian land occupied in 1967 as a prelude to its annexation. A similar pattern was followed in the Arab territory in the Galilee, which Israel occupied after the war of 1948.

The Jordanian and Israeli municipal laws were derived from the British law applied in Palestine and Transjordan before 1948, but they have undergone numerous amendments. The Gaza Strip is the only part of Palestine that has formally kept its Palestinian characteristics. British laws remained largely in force there, though the Egyptian administration imposed some amendments between 1948 and 1967.

Approximately 450,000 persons live in the Gaza Strip. Four cities have municipality status (Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, and Deir el-Balah), and six villages have village councils.

The population of the Gaza Strip also includes Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps. Gaza is the largest city in the Strip, with a population of 150,000. It represents the most important city, not only because of its large population but also because of its political, social, and cultural standing.

The last election was held in the Gaza Strip in 1946, during the British mandate, in accordance with the municipal law of the British authority of 1934. The same law was adopted by the Egyptian administration during its presence in Gaza after 1948, probably because those who ruled the Gaza Strip viewed the local authority as a means to serve their own interests rather than the interests of the people of Gaza.

The municipal law of 1934 gave the British commissioner sole authority to appoint and dismiss the municipal council and the power to decide who could vote or be eligible for nomination. Contrary to

most rules of democracy, this law tended to neglect the interests of the inhabitants.

The central authority, represented at various times by the British commissioner, the Egyptian administrator, and the Israeli military governor, dismissed the municipal councils at will, even though these councils were legally elected or appointed. These dismissals often occurred after the council adopted a social or political stand contrary to the interests of the central authority. This was the case in 1936 when municipal and village councils supported the popular Palestinian revolution. The British mandatory government dismissed the councils and arrested many of the mayors. During the twenty years of Egyptian rule, many councils were summarily appointed and dismissed by the Egyptian administrator, at times without any stated reason for the action. Since 1967 the Israeli occupation authorities have dismissed two mayors of Gaza. The first was dismissed for his refusal to connect the Gaza Strip to the Israeli electric power grid; the second for his refusal to go along with the Israeli decision to annex the al-Shati' refugee camp to the Gaza municipality, which he viewed as an Israeli attempt to submerge the Palestinian refugee question. All of these actions were based on the antiquated law of 1934 (particularly Article 4).

The municipalities have had no choice but to perform the tasks approved by the central authority or to suffer the consequences. Acceptance of the orders of the central authority was the only "guarantee" that a municipal council would continue to function. When elections were held, they only created weak municipal councils from the ranks of those willing to cooperate with the central authorities.

Although Gaza and the Strip were populated primarily by poor peasants and workers, only taxpayers were allowed to vote. The councils therefore represented only one sector of the population, consisting mainly of landlords, rather than the vast majority of the population. In addition, each candidate on the announcement of his candidacy had to deposit the equivalent of four months of a government employee's salary. This precluded many small businessmen and landowners from becoming candidates.

Article 11 of the 1934 law forbade government and municipal employees from running for office in municipal elections, a particularly restrictive prohibition since civil servants constituted the majority of the educated class.

The law also discriminated against women by denying them the right to vote (Article 2). Late in 1975, the Israeli military government amended the law to allow both women and civil servants to participate

in future elections and to have a certain representation in appointed municipal councils if elections were not held.

Mayors in the Gaza Strip have not been selected by the majority of the members of the council, as in the case in the West Bank, but by the military governor. The military governor also has the power to appoint the town clerk, through whom he can maintain surveillance over the political and social functions of the council. The British mandatory authorities used this power to appoint British officers to the post, but the Egyptian administration and the Israeli military government have not done so. Instead they relied on other limitations and controls in the 1934 law, such as denying municipal councils the right to implement any legislation they pass without the explicit approval of the military governor. This limitation applies to finances, taxation, and the hiring of town employees.

Municipal budgets pose a major difficulty for the councils. The British, Egyptian, and Israeli administrations constantly sought to limit the funds contributed to the municipalities and to shift the burden to the local population. This has led to serious deficits and the inability to provide adequate public services. Thus the budget for development, which is supposed to be financed by the central authority, has been increasingly placed on the shoulders of the inhabitants: one-third of the budget is paid directly by the inhabitants; the second third is paid by the municipality from its general budget, which is garnered through taxes levied on the population; and the final third is paid by the central authority in the form of grants and loans with high interest rates. Consequently, municipal councils are able to pay only the interest on the loans but unable to pay on the principal. Moreover, the central authority levies taxes on all the equipment, machinery, and parts purchased by the municipal councils, even though the machinery is used to provide public services. Both the inhabitants and their city governments have suffered heavily from high taxes and galloping inflation.

Municipal councils have had to turn to Arab governments and cities for grants and contributions, which have become the primary source of municipal development projects. The collection and expenditure of these grants must have the approval of the military occupation government.

More than thirty-three years have passed since the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip have had a voice in the selection of their representatives in municipal councils. In spite of the occupation, the demand for municipal elections continues. If this public demand is to be satisfied, a national body must be entrusted with the task of preparing an

election law that reflects progressive and democratic principles both in nominating and in voting. Such a law should allow the various sectors of the population to participate regardless of sex and economic status. The population of the Gaza Strip should no longer be denied the right to vote or be governed by an archaic law enacted by a colonial power over half a century ago.

9
Social Work and Charitable Societies

Amin al-Khatib

The goals of social work may be summed up as follows:

- coordinating the volunteer efforts of citizens for the good of individuals, groups, and society
- caring for the individual in the various stages of his life and improving the conditions of his environment
- using the talents of the citizenry in the social development of the individual and of society as a whole
- developing a feeling of responsibility, leadership, and harmony among people.

Voluntary social work preceded official efforts by many centuries. Various religions have encouraged taking care of orphans and other unfortunates as a type of organized social activity. Religious organizations have undertaken many responsibilities for social welfare, but seldom went beyond providing assistance to the needy, shelter homes for orphans and the indigent, and hospitals for the ill.

With industrial urbanization, problems became more complex and religious organizations lost some of their leadership elements. Private organizations were established by private citizens to meet indigenous problems and to provide social services on a nonprofit basis.

In sovereign countries, the government cooperated with voluntary social organizations in bearing the responsibility of social work. Government authorities set social policy and established laws and regulations to ensure the development of social services appropriate to cultural and social needs. Various government agencies collected

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This paper, originally written in Arabic, was translated into English by Ronald G. Wolfe of Washington, D.C.

statistics, authorized studies, and trained personnel to support the volunteer sector both morally and materially. Voluntary social organizations, under government supervision, carried out social operations in areas outside the government's purview. They also identified new problems and drew public attention to them.

Voluntary organizations worked as agents of the state in caring for the handicapped, providing family assistance, conducting social work among young people, and providing cultural and recreational activities. They participated in establishing social policy through national councils and social service unions. They also cooperated with the state in training social workers and in raising financial support for their social programs. In the absence of a national authority, however, the voluntary sector had to keep abreast of conditions and adapt to its resources, without any cooperation from official quarters.

In 1951, the Jordanian Ministry of Social Affairs was established by law. It set forth the legal structure and the supervision necessary for the voluntary social movement. The activities of the charitable organizations then in existence had a strong influence on the direction of the ministry's concerns. Together, they confronted the major social problems.

The Ministry began by supervising and supporting private organizations, which later developed into district federations and formed the General Union of Charitable Societies. This organization was given the responsibility of planning overall policy, establishing funding policies, coordinating services, and providing aid to district organizations and unions, in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs.

Administratively, the West Bank is now divided into three provinces. The province of Nablus in the north includes the districts of Jenin, Qalqilia, Tulkarm, and Nablus. The province of Jerusalem includes Arab Jerusalem and the districts of Bethlehem, Ramallah, and Jericho. The province of Hebron includes the city of Hebron and the surrounding villages. Each province has a Union of Charitable Societies under which all charitable societies of the province operate. Each union, and each member society, has its own constitution and administrative system. The task of each union is to organize and coordinate the activities of the charitable societies.

The three unions include as members all charitable societies, which are officially registered with the Jordanian Ministry of Social Affairs. They operate in accordance with the Ministry's laws and regulations, and they often receive moral and material assistance from the Ministry. A joint committee of the three unions meets at

frequent intervals to coordinate activities, exchange experiences, and provide assistance to any society needing it.

Each union has a Privy Council elected every two years by the General Organization made up of the charitable societies. Care is exercised in the election to see that the various regions and districts that make up the province are represented in the council. The work and activities of each union include the following:

- supervision over the activities of the charitable organizations, and coordination of them
- guidance of member societies to provide the best possible service to citizens
- cooperation with other societies and unions to solve the problems of the populace
- supervision of literacy programs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
- supervision of nursery school programs, especially in villages
- supervision of instruction in private schools belonging to the societies
- supervision of programs to aid Arab detainees in Israeli prisons and their relatives within the bounds of the relevant laws
- provision of financial and moral aid to university students, especially the poor
- assistance to students who want to study in Arab universities, within the country or abroad, and in universities in socialist and Asian countries
- provision of financial assistance to poor families after a detailed survey of their living conditions
- provision of medical treatment for poor Arab Palestinians in private clinics and hospitals

The services provided by charitable societies include three major areas—health services, educational services, and social services.

Health Services

The health services provided by charitable societies in the West Bank account for more than half the services in the area. The military government and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) provide most of the remainder, which is considered less than what is deemed appropriate and necessary by the international commissions that have visited the region, such as the World Health Organization. The services provided by the charitable societies will

be described here, to show the repression and deprivation current in Arab society.

Hospitals. The largest hospitals in the West Bank are those run by the charitable societies. The Islamic Makasid Charitable Society Hospital has approximately 120 beds and provides specialization in general surgery, neurosurgery, obstetrics and gynecology, internal medicine, and heart disease. Other major hospitals include: the Red Crescent Hospital for Obstetrics and Gynecology; the Eye Hospital, which belongs to a British charitable foundation called St. John's; the Mar Youssef (St. Joseph's) Hospital, which belongs to a French charitable foundation; the Princess Basma Hospital, which treats paralysis through both surgery and physical therapy; the Bayt Dawoud (House of David) Hospital, which handles bone surgery; and the Hospital of the Union of Arab Women, in Nablus.

Out-Patient Clinics. Because hospitals are unable to provide medical services to all citizens, medical clinics were opened by the charitable societies in towns and villages to provide needed health services at prices much lower than actual cost. Many people look to these clinics for guidance and advice as well as for physical care.

Educational Services

The Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 created administrative conditions that differed from those existing previously. Just as health services are cared for by three organizations, so too is education in the West Bank. There are schools and institutes under UNRWA, under the military government, and under various beneficial societies, including institutions sponsored by foreign Christian societies. In general, the programs correspond to the curriculum used in Jordan. Some schools in Jerusalem follow the Israeli curriculum, which is devoid of anything that would strengthen Arab nationalism or an independent Palestinian national character.

In order to preserve the history, national identity, and religion of Palestine, institutes were established at the various levels of education. There are ten schools in Arab Jerusalem and its suburbs, many of which provide all three educational levels—elementary, preparatory, and secondary. Some have, in addition, nursery schools or kindergartens. Others have opened day-care facilities, to care for the children of women who are working.

Charitable societies now supervise most educational institutions directly. They are responsible for funding, competency levels, and

school buildings and employees. Were it not for the many factors limiting freedom of action and movement, such as blocking funding from Arab countries, more schools would have been opened to meet the increasing need.

The schools and institutes supervised by UNRWA and the military government include those run by the Jordanian government prior to 1967. Four universities have been established in the West Bank—the Birzeit University, the University of Bethlehem, the al-Najah University, and the University of Jerusalem, which was recently established with the opening of a college of Islamic law (*Shari'a*) in Jerusalem. The Jerusalem College of Sciences is expected to open soon.

The schools supervised by the charitable societies follow a unified curriculum. It is supervised by an elected national committee, which coordinates school affairs, plans curricula, and organizes symposia for teachers in their areas of specialization. This committee functions as a ministry of education; indeed it is a ministry of education, coordinating the activities of the schools in the occupied territory with each other and with the Ministry of Education in Jordan.

The Council for Higher Education has members and representatives from all of the national institutions, including universities and the higher institutes. This Council supervises the Palestinian universities and the secondary education systems of the West Bank. It is working to obtain official recognition from the Arab countries, and it seeks funds from Arab countries to determine the number of colleges, their quality, and their curricula.

In view of the region's pressing need for people with scientific and practical qualifications, one of the societies has established a polytechnic institute in Hebron, the first of its kind in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is expected to expand and attract large numbers of students.

In addition to academic and vocational schools, the societies have taken on the task of opening business schools, especially for young women. They can take a business diploma or learn typing, shorthand, and secretarial duties. The main purpose of these institutes is to encourage women to find fruitful, constructive work and to help meet family expenses, which had relied entirely on the male's income.

Social Services

The social services provided by the charitable societies is the cornerstone of all the services. The wars of the past thirty years have

resulted in tragedy, terror, poverty, ignorance, and illness. Social chaos, in every respect, has become widespread. The urbanized West has created new environments in this region, transferred social ills into it, and corrupted the society with drug addiction, gambling, and other forms of moral delinquency, especially among the young. The number of young student drop-outs increased. The country, in effect, was afflicted by the worst elements of modern urbanization.

Industrialization, even at a modest level, is new to the region, but is proceeding at the fastest rate permitted by resources. Religion and culture reduce the severity of the problems of industrialization, but these institutions are themselves affected by change. In addition to contributing to problems of housing, sanitation, unemployment, and recreation, urbanization weakens the family, leaving it unable to carry out its normal responsibilities. As women leave home to work, they thereby deprive the children, the elderly, and the handicapped members of the family of needed care and emotional support. Freedom can lead to marital problems and to the breakup of the family. Families migrating from the rural areas to cities find difficulty in adjusting to their new life. Guidance is needed, and since the state is generally not in a position to meet this challenge, voluntary organizations bear the burden. Many services such as care of children, the handicapped, and the homeless are now available, but they cannot meet all needs or even most of them. There are problems with inadequacy of specific services, with overlapping programs, and with an unequal distribution of care. Since precise statistics are not available, there is an acute need for research to show specialists the extent of the need, the extent of service duplication, the needs that have been met, and those that have not.

Various foreign voluntary agencies operate in this region. Humanitarian concerns undoubtedly motivate much of their work, and religious or political organizations sponsor some agencies. Any assistance or support is welcome, provided that it does not interfere in the general affairs of the people. Support of local charitable societies and voluntary organizations is greatly appreciated.

10

Land Tenure, the Settlements, and Peace

Nafez Nazzal

The crux of the Palestinian problem since the inception of the Zionist movement has been the struggle for the possession of land in Palestine. The strategy of the Zionists has been to seize land by war, to expropriate it, and to purchase it through voluntary means.[1]

From the occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 to June 1978, Israel, because of its conquests, regarded itself as the successor of Jordan. On the question of the state ownership of land, 700,000 dunums (about 175,000 acres) registered as state land, 500,000 dunums not properly registered for ownership under Jordanian law,[2] and 320,241 dunums of the so-called abandoned property[3] were expropriated by the Israeli authorities.

At present sixty-five Jewish settlements in the West Bank and ten urban developments in and around Jerusalem have been established, are under construction, or are approved for construction on these lands.[4] On September 8, 1978, the Israeli government decided to increase the number of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and

[1] As expressed by Menachem Ussishkin in 1904 during the meeting of the first Zionist conference.

[2] *Jerusalem Post*, February 11, 1979.

[3] "Abandoned property" refers to the land of Palestinian Arab refugees who fled to Jordan during the 1967 war. See John Ruedy, "Israeli Land Acquisition in Occupied Territories, 1967-1977," as cited in *Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on International Relations*, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st session, September 12, 21, and October 19, 1977, p. 179.

[4] Thirty-one West Bank settlements were established before Begin came to power, twenty-three were authorized or established by Begin's cabinet. These settlements range in size from 500 to 24,000 dunums. At present Israel controls 30 percent of the West Bank and Gaza, and 70 percent of the land in the Jordan Valley, the best agricultural land in the West Bank.

the Gaza Strip to sixty-nine settlements. Two settlements will be established in the Jordan Valley, one or two settlements in the Gaza Strip on the only empty land between Khan Yunis and Rafah, and the rest in the West Bank in the midst of Palestinian urban and agricultural centers. These fifteen new settlements are part of a larger plan to establish another twenty-five to forty settlements in the West Bank and Gaza in the coming five or six years. Accordingly, the Israeli government approved a special budget amounting to I£800 million earmarked for the "thickening" of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank for 1978–1979.[5] Recently, the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) was allocated I£1.1 billion to strengthen existing settlements for 1979–1980.[6]

Although the present government of Menachem Begin has the reputation of taking a hard line on establishing settlements in the occupied territories, the former Labor government that ruled Israel from 1967 to 1977 was not exactly soft. On June 28, 1967, three weeks after the 1967 war, the government committed itself to the total annexation of Jerusalem.

"Fattening up" is an expression that became widely used in the Hebrew language soon after the 1967 war ended to describe the settlements in the West Bank near Jerusalem. These, together with a united Jerusalem, were supposed to create a greater Jerusalem which would divide the West Bank into two districts, north and south, without any geographical delineation.

The most important method of ensuring the city's unification and containing the Arab residents in Jerusalem to a one-third minority limit, was the planning of Jewish residential zones.[7]

In accordance with this plan, two complexes were established: an Inner Ring that includes Malot Defna, Giv'at Shapira (French Hill), Giv'at Hamivtar, Ramat Eshkol, Mount Scopus, and the Old City; and an Outer Ring that includes Neve Ya'acov, the industrial zones of Atarot and Mishor Adumim, Ramot, Gilo, and Talpiot Mizrakh. These projects straddled the road to Ramallah, thus separating East Jerusalem from its northern suburbs and, with Mount Scopus, forming the northern wing of the pincer around the Arab sector.

> We are anticipating a very difficult political struggle concerning Jerusalem . . . I think Jerusalem more than any other

[5] *Yediot Aharonot*, November 1, 1978.

[6] *Jerusalem Post*, February 27, 1979.

[7] David Kroyanter, "Developing Jerusalem 1967-1975," *Jerusalem Foundation and Kroyanter*, 1975, p. 20.

> place else. The result of this struggle depends on the physical and demographical facts that we are creating in the city and its surroundings. This consideration guides the government ministers' committee in their action. . . . In accordance, the government has moved the Bureau of Police to Jerusalem. A specific plan is ready to transfer 600 to 800 workers in the security ministry to Jerusalem.[8]

The situation in the West Bank with regard to the Jewish settlements is best summarized in a plan propounded by the late Foreign Minister Yigal Allon. Although Allon's plan was not formally accepted, it guided the thinking of the government. According to the Allon plan, no settlements were to be established in Jericho because it was to become an Arab corridor to the territory (populated by Arabs) that the Jordanian government would receive in Judea and Samaria in the event of a political settlement.[9]

The Israeli government published a map of the West Bank in the Hebrew press (*Yediot Aharonot*) on May 12, 1976. The map shows the West Bank divided into two territorial islands. The northern area is bounded by three lines of settlements going from north to south. This area, now officially called Samaria, is completely surrounded by Jewish settlements established on Arab land since 1967, and by Israel proper. The strategic purpose of these lines is to guard the heavily populated areas of the West Bank; to divide the population of the West Bank into areas that would have no more than 100,000 inhabitants each; and to separate them from the Arab populated region of the Triangle by a line of settlements (now established), running north to south on the western edge of Samaria, which borders Israel's narrow waist and population centers. The southern block, officially called Judea, is similarly surrounded by Jewish settlements and Israel proper. These two blocks, the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, were to be separated by the "fattening up" of Jerusalem, creating a buffer zone between the two blocks.

West Bank settlements have several features in common. Each one (including the civilian) is surrounded by a double or triple barbed-wire fence, with watchtowers. Near most of the settlements, military camps have been established, served by a common branch road. The settlements are rather small, usually from 20 to 100 houses, with a population of under 100 persons. A few exceptions, like Kiryat Arba adjacent to Hebron, have a total population of about 1,700 residents. Altogether, there are about 13,000 Jews living in the West Bank settle-

[8] Haim Tsadok, Head of Ministers Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, *Yediot Aharonot*, May 13, 1977.

[9] *Ha'aretz*, July 10, 1977.

ments. An additional 35,000 Jews have moved into buildings built in Arab Jerusalem, which is still inhabited by about 60,000 Palestinians.

The money invested in these settlements is out of proportion to their size. For example, all the houses are air-conditioned, and those situated in the Jordan Valley are equipped with a powerful apparatus capable of dealing with the heat of the valley. Each house, or in some cases every pair of houses, has access to a huge air-conditioned shelter, dug in the ground and overtopped by boulders, which is connected by a paved way to the front yard of each house. Rows of electrical lamps crisscross each settlement and surround the fence. (I was told proudly that each settlement is flooded by light during the night.) Inside the settlements there is a central area covered by grass. Because of the desertlike conditions, excessive amounts of water and labor must be used to keep the lawn green.

Community services, such as kitchens, clubs, dining rooms, and so forth, are air-conditioned. The dining hall of the settlement of Gitit, for example, which now has forty families, can easily hold 300 people. Most of the settlements are underpopulated because many of the original settlers have left, but the government has promised additional settlers—100 families to each settlement.

All the settlements are connected to main roads by paved roads. The settlers live like rich people, according to Israeli standards. Various answers are given to inquiries about the source of their livelihood. In one settlement, Netiv Hagdud, inhabited by twenty families, each person who will settle there is provided with thirty dunums of confiscated Arab land. Many other settlements are provided for in the same way.

The agricultural laborers, who clear and work the land, are Palestinians brought in for the purpose from the surrounding Arab villages. The settlers, because of their small numbers, work only as supervisors, as operators of the heavy mechanical equipment, and as guards. A force of Israeli reserve soldiers is assigned to help guard the settlements.

Various settlements have industrial plants, sometimes affiliated with the ministry of security. Mekhorah, for example, which is built high up in the mountains, makes locks for the ministry of security. West of the city of Nablus there are about 200 persons living in the settlement of Kfar Khaddum. Many of them commute daily to their work in Tel Aviv and other cities. The remaining inhabitants work in small factories; one makes Jewish religious objects (Mezuzah), which are sold locally and outside of Israel under a contract with the

Israeli army. By August 1976, roads at the settlement were paved, electricity and water were made available, sewage systems were completed, a central park and gardens were in bloom, and public services (medicine, education, library) were working efficiently. The steel plant on which the Kfar Khaddum economy is based has begun operations and is supplemented by small factories producing glazed containers, clothing, and other goods.

Most of the settlements that have been constructed in the southern part of the West Bank are traditional Moshavim or Kibbutzim. The settlement of Gush Etzion was rebuilt over the area that fell to the Arab Legion during the war of 1948. It is now a center for Jewish studies, where Israeli high school students are sent to live and study. Another school was built for American Jews to study Judaism. In addition, a synagogue was built and dedicated in March 1977 by the president of Israel. The settlement of Elizar in Block Etzion was founded as a scientific center for Jewish scientists who undertake research in physics and chemistry. A road is being built which would start from the settlement of Gilo, go south in the direction of Block Etzion and arrive at Beersheva. A branch of this road would connect the settlements in Block Etzion with the industrial zone of Mishor Adumim. What these and other Jewish settlements in the occupied territories have in common is that they are islands of an Israeli presence in a sea of hostile Arabs.

The settlements are designed for permanency, and will be increased in number. Of the 186 new settlements proposed for the period 1977–1992, the settlement department of the World Zionist Organization has allocated 49 to the territories. Of these, 20 are designed for the Rafiah area, 10 for the Golan Heights, 4 for the eastern Sinai coast, and 15 for the West Bank, including the lower Jordan Valley, Judea, and the slopes of Samaria.[10]

> Not everybody agrees with our settling here, and there is a political struggle ahead of us for our right to raise our children in the Jordan Valley, to cultivate trees and to draw water there. The success of that struggle depends primarily on your persistence. . . . Governments come and go, but the colonization effort must continue in the way it has been agreed on, and we must get on with it faster than before because the existing void increases the political and military danger, especially regarding our plan of action in the Jordan Valley.[11]

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[10] *Jerusalem Post* (International Edition), September 20, 1977.

[11] Cabinet Minister Mr. Israel Galili, to the settlers of Na'aran at the inauguration ceremony of their Kibbutz. *Ma'ariv*, April 13, 1977.

Those who are concerned with a political solution to the Palestinian problem must take the above observations into consideration.

The Essence of the Israeli Settlements

> To build settlements is not an aim in itself, but a means to achieve political ends, and the existing settlement plan will not only be fully implemented but even extended.[12]

Civilian and military settlements in the West Bank and Gaza are considered part of Israel's security system. Even settlements which are by nature religious (Kiryat Arba, Kfar Khaddum), sentimental (Gush Etzion, Kfar Darom), or industrial (Mishor Adumim) are part of this system.

> West Bank settlements are necessary for Israel's defence. . . . If we are today living a relatively quiet life it is because of these settlements.[13]

There are two major security concerns for Israel: defense against an external attack and security within the occupied territories. Justifying settlements for security reasons is misleading. At present, Arabs (and Israelis) are armed with heavy and sophisticated weapons and could easily sweep over a few settlers armed only with rifles and pistols. As the Israeli army discovered during the 1973 war, the settlers were actually a hindrance and had to be moved out before the Israeli troops could turn their full attention to the attack.

The West Bank is bound on three sides by Israel. It has only one open border, which has been fenced off since 1967 to prevent infiltration from Jordan. The Palestinians in the occupied territories are not armed. They do not have weapons capable of threatening Israel's security. Thus, Israel does not need to keep the West Bank, or even the settlements in the Jordan Valley, to fend off an attack from Jordan and Syria. What Israel does need is early warning stations. As the experience in South Lebanon demonstrated, borders did not prevent Israel from taking what actions it believed necessary for its safety. Israel has the might and will to wreak revenge on any action Palestinians might take, whether its troops have free access or not.

What the Palestinians do not want, and what Israel insists upon, is the maintenance of troops through much of the occupied territories

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[12] General Ariel Sharon during his first appearance before the plenary of Agricultural Association in Tel-Aviv, *Ha'aretz*, July 29, 1977.

[13] Attorney General Gabriel Bach, *Ma'ariv*, October 8, 1978.

with free access to any home or village, as suggested in Begin's self-rule plan.

Israel wants to retain the settlements because of the investment involved and because of domestic politics. The Israelis argue that Jews should be allowed to settle wherever they want. Pinhas Sheinman, Knesset member of the National Religious Party, said:

> I view Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] as part of historic Eretz Yisrael [Land of Israel]. We need to hold it for that reason alone. I accord completely with the view of the chief of state—Eitan—that Israel requires the West Bank for its defense. Of course, having hundreds of thousands of Arabs under our rule has been a burden, but this land is ours, and that is all there is to it.[14]

This is not a serious argument, but it evokes an emotional response domestically. It is difficult to cite a precedent for keeping settlements in occupied territories. The only argument the Israelis make is in terms of domestic politics. Gush Emunim, for example, can put 10,000 persons on the streets to demonstrate against the government (as it did in August 1975) to protest the return of land to Egypt; this was seen as a dangerous precedent to removing settlements from the West Bank.

Of all the arguments Israel employs in justifying the settlements, the legal one is the weakest. Israel claims that the settlements are permitted under international law, because they have not been built on a large-scale basis, nor under coercion, since the Palestinians left their land voluntarily. The Israelis argue that international law is not applicable to the post-1967 no war–no peace situation in the Middle East. Hence, there are no historical precedents. The Israelis, furthermore, give Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 an interpretation that is obviously self-serving. This Article states that

> individual or mass forcible transfers, as well as deportations of protected persons from occupied territories to the territory of the occupying power or that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited, regardless of motive.[15]

This, according to the Israelis, was intended to protect the local population from deportation and displacement. In Israel's view, such

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[14] Pinhas Sheinman, interviewed in Jerusalem, May 18, 1978.

[15] For an examination of Article 49 and other articles of the Fourth Geneva Convention, see Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 27-10, *The Law of Land Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956).

deportation and transfers are not occurring because of Israeli settlements, which so far have been on vacant land. To buttress their argument, Israeli legal experts even cite the Lauterpacht-Oppenheim treatise on international law, which states that

> the occupying power must not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.[16]

In a statement made by an Israeli foreign ministry spokesman, Article 49 is aimed in part against such horrors as the extermination camps in occupied Europe during World War II to which Jews and others were taken by the Nazis, and in part against the displacement of the local population to make room for the German invaders. Thus, the situation envisaged by Article 49 does not apply to the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories because no Arab inhabitants have been displaced by Jewish settlements.

This is not precisely accurate. As early as June 11, 1967, a week after the end of the war, the Israeli authorities demolished 135 houses in which 650 Palestinians lived so that prayers could be held at the Wailing Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem. In 1968, nearly 116 dunums and 600 buildings were expropriated, including two mosques, two Islamic lodges, four schools, over 400 stores, and the houses of 6,500 Palestinians, to accommodate 5,000 Jewish families in the Jewish quarter. This expropriation totaled one-fifth of the walled city of Jerusalem which was owned for centuries by Arab residents.

Many of the Palestinian tenants succumbed to heavy pressures such as the cutting off of public utilities and the demolition of parts of the buildings where they lived. Others were persuaded to accept compensation or alternative housing elsewhere. The expropriated area intruded into the Armenian quarter to the west and, in particular, the Muslim quarter to the north, where excavations along the Wailing Wall threatened many buildings, including Islamic institutions.[17] Furthermore, in 1975, at the village of Tubas, north of the Jordan Valley,

> 2500 dunums belonging to 40 families from Tubas were closed off by the Army for "security purposes." The paramilitary settlement of Nahal Roi was established on part of this confiscated land in March 1976. The villagers were given verbal permission (on an annual basis) to continue to

[16] L. F. L. Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise*, vol. 2, 7th edition, p. 452 (edited by Hersch Lauterpacht).

[17] Nafez Nazzal, "The Encirclement of Jerusalem," *Middle East International*, no. 80 (February 1978), p. 20.

> cultivate most of the confiscated land. However, at the end of 1977, they were refused a permit to continue their farming. Despite this, several farmers planted 300 dunums of wheat. On February 19, 1978, tractors were brought to the wheat field to plow the grain into the ground. The settlement of Nahal Roi, destined to become a sister settlement of Beqa'ot to the south, is now expanding its agriculture to the whole expropriated area.[18]

On July 9, 1978, the military authorities issued an order (No. 87/7), 5738-1978, which read as follows:

> Based upon the authority endowed to me by article No. 2 regarding the supervision of construction work [the West Bank] (No. 393), 5730-1970, and since I believe in the essential issue of security for the Israeli Defence Force, and to secure the maintenance of general discipline, I [Military Governor, of Ramallah area] order the following: No construction should be undertaken in the area circled in red in the enclosed map. And any construction to take place in the designated area must be upon the Military Governor's written approval or consent. Therefore, all construction work that has been undertaken must be stopped.

On part of this land, covering about 4,000 dunums, thirty-five Gush Emunim families are building a new settlement named Beth-El, which will include schools, a community center, an industrial area, and a holiday resort. A large part of this land lies within a planning and zoning boundary; another part lies within a boundary which the municipality has proposed since 1972. On the execution of this order, the city of El-Bireh will be encircled and prevented from further development.

This order is one of a series forbidding building in the El-Bireh area. In 1978, a similar order was issued which forbade building on 2,000 dunums in the eastern part of the city. In early 1979 another order was issued forbidding building in the northwest part of the city. Still another order was issued giving Jerusalem municipality jurisdiction over a part of the El-Bireh land in the south.

The basic issues involved in the two cases of Tubas and El-Bireh are identical. The villagers claim that their land was taken from them illegally and given to Jewish civilian settlers who now live there and cultivate the land. The Israelis, however, view the settlements of

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[18] Paul Quiring, "Israeli Settlements and Palestinian Rights," *Middle East International*, no. 87 (September 1978), p. 11.

Beqa'ot and Beth-El as an integral part of the defense system for the state of Israel. The minister of defense alleged that the Tubas land is needed to monitor the land within a seven-mile radius of the settlement of Beqa'ot, where it claimed many infiltrations had taken place. Settlers are deemed a necessity at Beth-El because it is a strategic location and it is needed to facilitate military operations both in war and in peace. The seizure of the land of Tubas and El-Bireh were thus "within the bounds of international law."

The more thoughtful Israelis seem to be aware of the weakness of the international law argument. They prefer to employ sentimental and religious arguments to justify the existing settlements. They assert that Jewish settlements in the land of Israel date back to Biblical times and that Jews have continuously adhered to their historic right to settle in their ancestral homeland. Israelis who have been living in the occupied territories since the 1967 war have convinced themselves they are responding to a religious-national obligation, a sense of duty that is quite often mystical or spiritual. A religious woman born in France claimed: "The reason I live in Kiryat Arba is Biblical. . . . Our Jewish ancestors had paid for the land."[19]

The incentive for living in the settlement of Gush Etzion was at first only thinly ideological. Today, after living in the oldest of the Jewish settlements for eight years, the settlers say outright that this is their home, that they will not move. A member of the settlement of Tomer, a burgeoning settlement in the Jordan Valley, proudly surveying his twenty-five dunums of corn, tomatoes, and eggplants, acknowledged that he lives in the settlement to make a good living. Had he been offered a chance to farm in Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee (within the pre-1967 lines) he would have jumped at it. He has no time for ideology.

Arab sentiment toward the settlements has been abundantly clear from the start. Their establishment has led to numerous demonstrations in the occupied territories and has created an atmosphere of restlessness and anxiety among the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank. Increasingly, the Palestinians recognize the settlements as the most threatening consequence of occupation. Whereas the occupation intended to govern, the settlements seek to transform. Regardless of their location, size, or stated purpose, the settlements and the settlers are perceived as provocative and are deeply resented by the Palestinians.

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[19] The Bible in Genesis 23:9 says that Ibrahim bought the cave of Machpeler in Hebron, or, as it was then called, Kiryat Arba.

Israel's policy with regard to the settlements in the West Bank up to 1977 was based on the Allon plan: the unpopulated areas and the eastern slopes of the Jordan Rift Valley should be incorporated into Israel. This combined security advantages with the annexation of unpopulated land. The present Likud government of Israel has expanded this policy and adopted what is often referred to as the Sharon plan. In this view, parts of the western slopes of the West Bank are also thinly populated and even more crucial to Israel's security than the Jordan Rift Valley; and they therefore must become an integral part of Israel.

> Here is Israel's coastal strip. Look. To the right is Hadera, in the center Tel-Aviv, to the left is Ashkelon. About 70 percent of Israel's population lives here, between the light on the right and the light on the left. Two million people, and they won't be able to live here if we don't settle the belt of Jewish settlement that lies about 20 kms. east of the "green line." Because already now we don't have 13 kms. from the sea to the "green line," as we thought, but only eight or nine kms. Arab Tira is expanding westward. The narrow strip which separates Israel from what was once the "green line" is being gnawed away, is disappearing. It is here that Israel's fate lies in the balance, and it is here that it will be decided.[20]

Thus, Israel continues to build more settlements. The Israelis argue that many settlements were established primarily for security reasons, that many have been converted from military to civilian status, that there is no reason why these settlements cannot remain in the West Bank even if the land is returned to Arab rule. "The settlements are not established in order to be abandoned."[21]

Arabs fear that Israel's determination to establish new settlements will require the expropriation of more land. Israeli expansionism is no Arab myth. The UN partition plan of 1947 granted Israel 5,500 square miles. Today, Israel's area—including the occupied areas in the Sinai, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights—exceeds 50,000 square miles. As recently as December 1978, the Israeli military authorities expropriated over 48,000 dunums from the village

[20] An interview with General Ariel Sharon, Israel agricultural minister, and the chairman of the Ministerial Settlement Committee which determines the site and the timing of setting up Jewish settlements in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. *Ma'ariv*, January 26, 1979.

[21] Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, Jerusalem, June 1976.

of 'Anata, 1,000 dunums from the town of Beit Sahur, 400 dunums from the city of Hebron, and 12,000 dunums from the village of Abu-Dis to build new settlements where there is a large indigenous population.[22]

It is this policy—Israel's intention to increase the settlements in the occupied West Bank at a time when the peace talks with Egypt are at a most delicate stage—that contributes to the Palestinians' feelings of helpless rage and despair.

> Settlement is the essence of our existence here. For us, more important than peace is to be able to exist here—that should be understood. That is the main point. . . . It is important to make it clear that our right is to live all over this country.[23]

Palestinians foresee that the continued expropriation of Arab land and the establishment of Jewish settlements would make it difficult to break up the Israeli infrastructure of electric power grids, water supplies, and roads constructed in the occupied territories. In that event, there simply would be no hope of ever achieving a peace settlement on the West Bank.

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[22] *Ha'aretz*, December 15, 1978.

[23] Ariel Sharon, *Daily Telegraph*, September 10, 1977.

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ISBN 0-8447-3380-6