




Israel in the Second Iraq War



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Israel in the Second Iraq War

The Influence of Likud

STEPHEN C. PELLETIÈRE

PRAEGER SECURITY INTERNATIONAL

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*To Anna, whose name spelled backwards is Anna,
and Kari whose name spelled backwards is Irak.*

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Can you ever grade atrocity? Not if you are the victim, living out your last months in terror and pain. The rules of war are complex and contradictory. Is dropping fire on to civilians in Dresden more acceptable than cutting their throats with a knife in Bosnia? Apparently so. And what happens when you kill by accident, as when an allied missile hit a Baghdad bunker during the Gulf War? That is OK too—unless, again, you are one of the casualties.

"My War Gone By, I Miss It So," Anthony Loyd

Introduction

This book examines the second Iraq War on two levels. One: it focuses on the principal antagonists who engaged directly with each other over the war—the ideologues grouped around Donald Rumsfeld in the Pentagon, and the officers of the old, Ba’thist-led Iraqi army, who sparked the resistance and kept it going through the crucial interval of the first two years. Both groups, the study finds, were aroused by extraordinary passions. The ideologues had a hidden agenda that they were determined to fulfill; the officers were set on exacting revenge for what the Americans had done to them personally, and to their country.

On quite another level, the book looks at the interests that signed on early to support the war with the intent of reaping rich rewards, when (as they fully expected) the contest turned in America’s favor. The second Iraq War, the book argues, should be seen as a kind of joint stock company venture. The war could not have gone forward without the support (material and otherwise) of a group of powerful individuals and parties in the United States and abroad, and, ironically, it’s the failure of these backers now, six years into the war, to agree on a strategy that has caused the war to become bogged down. The parties, having had a falling out, are, in a manner of speaking, deadlocked over what to do next.

The book speculates as to what is likely to come out of this debacle. It concludes that no matter what anyone may say (President Obama included), the United States is in Iraq for the foreseeable future.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first looks at the administration of George W. Bush. His regime was ideological to the core, and, as frequently is the case with ideologues, much of what

administration figures believed about the world and the way that it works was delusional. Unable to accommodate awkward facts, because they clashed with cherished beliefs that they had, the ideologues crafted a strategy for conquering Iraq that, subsequently, has been seen to have been unworkable. It's not an exaggeration to say that the ideologues facilitated the rise and spread of the Iraqi resistance.

Chapter 2 looks at the resisters, the men who made the insurgency. It discusses their tactics and speculates as to whence those tactics derived. It argues that in electing to fight an urban guerrilla war against the Americans, the insurgents wrong-footed the invasion force, a stumble from which the Americans never recovered. It also introduces Carl Schmitt's theory of irregular war which is remarkably prescient about what is now transpiring in Iraq.

Chapter 3 is a revisionist history of irregular war in the Levant over the past three decades. In it, I argue that the revolts of the Palestinians and Lebanese Shias against the Israelis only make sense when viewed as land wars; theories about clashing civilizations are nonsense. The fight of the Arabs is existential. Both sides, Arabs and Israelis, are contending over what each regards as their essential space. If the space is essential, it can't be relinquished, hence the slaughter can hardly be expected to abate.

Chapter 4 lays out how the Americans botched the takeover of Iraq. The main culprit was Rumsfeld, whose strategic plan was unworkable. Rumsfeld strategized on the basis of assumptions that may have made sense in the 1920s when Britain held the Mandate for Iraq, but which have no validity today. These old ideas were championed by a special breed of ideologues, adherents of Israel's right-wing party, the Likud. The Likudniks were nested in the Pentagon and in the office of the vice president, and, from these twin bastions, they lobbied hard—and successfully—to get America to go to war with Iraq.

Chapter 5 takes up the problem of the war aims, those of Israel as well as of the United States. America wanted a base from which to dominate the Gulf region, and, indeed, the whole of the Middle East. The Israelis wanted the disappearance of Iraq as a nation/state and the emergence of a new entity—an independent Kurdistan in the north of Iraq. I also discuss the flummoxing of the Americans by the Iranians. It was the ideologues in the Pentagon, the Likudniks, who opened the door to Iraq to the Islamic Republic, setting the Iraqis up for what now amounts to a virtual Iranian takeover of their country.

The final chapter considers what's likely to come out of all this. The prognosis isn't good. Reliance on air assets—which is what the Americans and Israelis are doing—is producing, to put it mildly, untoward consequences: it is creating legions of new resisters. This is the irony of the situation the Americans now find themselves in: their style of war has turned out to be hugely counterproductive.

CHAPTER 1

The Ideologues

The purpose of the book is to set the record straight on a number of crucial matters having to do with the second Iraq War. Unless blatant distortions of the Bush administration are corrected, Americans will never achieve closure on this dark episode of their recent history. Thanks to Bush, Americans harbor a lot of wrong ideas about Iraq. They seem to believe, for example, that they can walk away from there, simply get out of Iraq (declare victory and depart). They can't. Iraq is a monkey the Bush administration laid on Americans' backs, and it will be years before they shake themselves free of it—if, indeed, they ever manage to do so.

The most prescient remark made about this war was that of Colin Powell. When asked to give his opinion about whether America should get involved in Iraq, Powell cited what he called the Pottery Barn analogy: "You break it, you own it."

America has broken Iraq, and now—following Powell's logic—it owns it, with all of the fateful consequences that this entails. Unfortunately, Americans have not been able to come to terms with this fact and this will occasion more and more difficulty as time goes on. To date, Americans (the politicians, at least) have dealt with the problem by, in effect, kicking it down the road. However, there's a limit to how long one can keep up this sort of behavior. Americans, inevitably, must come to see this war for what it is, a great tragedy, almost classical in its dimensions, and that's the way that I have tried to portray it in this study.

* * *

By way of setting the record straight, then, I'll start with misconceptions about what went on in the first three weeks of the war, the invasion phase. The Bush administration consistently maintained that the invasion phase

was a stunning success, seeming to put it on a par with the German blitzkriegs that initiated World War II. The media has gone along with this, by and large. Indeed, it's now routine to see journalists refer to how smoothly the invasion went (usually they contrast it to later failures in the occupation phase).

This is simply not true. The invasion went wrong from the start; before the war ever began, the war plan had begun to unravel. The original scheme of Rumsfeld was to invade Iraq from two directions, from the south in Kuwait and the north in Turkey.¹ The two invasions were supposed to occur simultaneously. That way the Americans expected to crush the Iraqis like a nut. With armies coming at them from two directions, the Ba'athists would hardly have been able to cope.

In line with this, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz went out to Ankara in December 2002, to, as he said, finalize arrangements for the northern thrust.² Previous to Wolfowitz's departure, Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said, publicly, that Turkey was not going to go along with this plan—there would be no invasion from Turkish territory.³ Nonetheless, Wolfowitz left on his trip, evidently convinced that, when confronted by Washington's emissary, Erdogan would back down. The prime minister did not reverse himself, and Wolfowitz was forced to depart the Turkish capital with the plan for a northern invasion still very much up in the air.⁴

However, Washington did not give up, announcing that it expected that, when the Turkish parliament took up the matter (expected to happen within a few days) that it would reverse the prime minister. The Turkish parliament did not act until three weeks before the war was actually set to commence, and when it did finally move, it sided with Erdogan—no northern invasion was to be allowed.

Why did Washington not sew this deal up months in advance; why did it wait so long to get a final decision?⁵ As it was, once the Turks had opted out of the war, the Americans were, in a manner of speaking, hoist on their own petard. The force that was scheduled to make the northern thrust (the Fourth Division) was sitting aboard a flotilla of ships standing off Turkey's southeast coast, waiting to disembark on shore. These ships were forced to up anchor and travel all the way across the Mediterranean and around the Arabian Peninsula to the Gulf; a move that took weeks to carry out.

In any event, one would have expected Rumsfeld to wait for the Fourth to arrive in Kuwait, but this he did not do. Instead, he ordered the Third Division, already positioned there, to launch immediately. The Third stepped off into Iraq on March 20. This was a further jiggering of the invasion plan. The original strategy had been for the ground forces to delay entering Iraq until the U.S. Air Force could soften up the Iraqis with round-the-clock bombings. The bombings went ahead, but they occurred coincidentally with the movement of the ground forces across the border.

By way of explaining why he jumped the gun (which, essentially, is what Rumsfeld did), the secretary said that he was seeking to achieve the element of surprise, and the strategy he pursued would appear to bear this out. He ordered the Third Division to strike straight for Baghdad, not entering any of the southern cities on the way to the Iraqi capital. Evidently, Rumsfeld was hoping to move the force fast enough so that it would reach Baghdad in a matter of days, thereby penning the elite elements of Saddam's Republican Guard inside the capital.⁶ In technical military terms, Rumsfeld was seeking to overcome mass (which was what the Iraqis had) with speed.

This all sounds reasonable: a daring maneuver by a force commander who wasn't afraid to take risks, something in the tradition of Napoleon and the other great war captains—except that bypassing the southern cities posed a grave danger. These cities are large, many over a half million (Basrah's population is two million). One doesn't want to pass up large urban centers in wartime, especially when one has reason to suspect that enemies lurk therein. The enemies can dash out and cut one's supply lines.

Rumsfeld operated on the supposition that the invaders would encounter no significant opposition until they got to Baghdad, a belief based on the following. The southern cities were garrisoned by regular units of the Iraqi army (as opposed to the elite elements of the Guard), and the regulars—Rumsfeld had been led to believe—would not fight.⁷ In addition, the cities being bypassed were populated mainly by Shias, whom the secretary also had been given to understand would not support the Ba'hist regime.⁸

When, in fact, the southern cities did not come over to the American side; when the people inside them seemingly joined the resistance, this presented Rumsfeld with a crisis.

With such a small force in-country, and with no backup units to call upon (because the Fourth Division, as I just said, was still en route to the theater) Rumsfeld could not engage in the labor intensive task of rooting out resisters in cities all along the line up to Baghdad. Obviously, this would sacrifice the speed element (if indeed he could have pulled it off, given the paucity of troops he had available).

Moreover, Rumsfeld's predicament was compounded, as the resisters did not remain inside the cities, but, organized into commando teams, small groups mounted on Toyota pickup trucks swarmed out to strike repeatedly at the Americans' northward moving column.⁹ They would attack, and then scurry back inside the cities, obviously daring the Americans to pursue them back inside. Clearly, they hoped to lure the Americans into the cities where the Americans' advantage in superior firepower and maneuverability would be neutralized. A modern mechanized army is always at a disadvantage having to fight inside a heavily built-up area.

The combination of attacks on the column, plus the fact that the southern port of Umm Qasr—the only port through which the Americans could bring supplies into Iraq—held out against the invaders for five days, placed the invasion for a time in peril.¹⁰

At that point, Rumsfeld seems to have experienced an epiphany. Realizing that it was more than just the elite units (the Republican Guard and *Mukhabarat*)¹¹ that were engaging, he revised his thinking as to what constituted the enemy's center of gravity.¹² Rumsfeld began wholesale bombing of the Iraqi cities, as, it would appear, he now deemed that the Iraqis—all the Iraqis (minus the Kurds, of course)—were the center.¹³

Bombing the cities was practically mandated because of the type of defense the Iraqis were pursuing. The Americans had expected them to fight a war along lines of that which they fought in 1991, a conventional war of maneuver out in the desert, at which the Americans easily had bested them. But now the Iraqis had abandoned that approach. The Iraqi general staff seems to have decided—before the war commenced—to fight a guerrilla war in the densely populated areas, and this had the effect of so disorienting the Americans it prompted their force leader to complain: “the enemy we’re fighting is different from the one we war-gamed against”¹⁴

So it happened that, even as Rumsfeld was denying that he had commenced wholesale bombing of the cities, he was doing it;¹⁵ and even as he insisted that he was keeping to his original strategy, he had already set it aside: the mad dash to Baghdad was on hold while the U.S. Air Force concentrated on reducing the defenses inside the urban centers.¹⁶

The Americans used 5,000-pound bombs, guided missiles, and even B-52s on their bombing runs (which in this last instance implies they were carpet bombing).¹⁷ This wholesale destruction of the cities is what eventually told against the Ba'thists: so overwhelmed were they by the destruction, they could not keep control of the heavily populated areas. When Ba'thist discipline ceased to function, anarchy erupted. Iraqi civilians engaged in orgies of looting. At this point, the inadequacy of the invasion force became manifest. The troops available to quell the disturbances being too few to suffice, the Americans were forced to stand by and watch the lawlessness spread unchecked throughout the entire south.

Looked at in this way, the invasion phase, portrayed by Bush as an eminently successful blitzkrieg (Bush at one point even referred to it as “apocalyptically successful”), should rather be seen as a series of mishaps, one following on and growing out of the other, and one has to ask, why did the thing go so wrong?

I hark back to the matter discussed above; that is, of Rumsfeld (and Wolfowitz) failing to get prior assurances from the Turks that the northern invasion was doable. To be sure, Turkey was a long-standing ally of the United States and a member of NATO, and its leaders usually went along with requests such as this from Washington. But, still, given the

importance of getting the maneuver nailed down, so to speak, it was injudicious (even, one could say, reckless) of Rumsfeld not to have gotten a firm commitment from the Turks that permission would be forthcoming.¹⁸

Then, when Rumsfeld decided to strike hard and fast for Baghdad, why did he not stop and ask himself, what's going to happen if I'm wrong about these southern cities? Suppose the troops inside don't capitulate; suppose they try to oppose my invasion force? What happens then? With such a small force, will I be able to cope?

Rumsfeld and the men around him believed that the regime of Saddam Hussein was hated by the Iraqis, who would, as a consequence, be motivated to turn on it, which would ensure a quick, decisive victory. Rumsfeld had been led to this belief by people like Adnan Makiya, who assured him "the Iraqis will greet the invading force with flowers and sweets." It's understandable why Makiya, a renegade Iraqi, would say such things—but ought Rumsfeld have accepted the claim at face value?¹⁹

Rumsfeld and his civilian advisers were indisposed to consider unanticipated consequences (what the military calls "friction"), extraordinary behavior on their part. After all, this was a war, and, in war untoward developments happen all the time; how could they not have considered all of the possible outcomes?

The theory that I am going to posit—and it will underpin everything I write about this war—is that Rumsfeld and his people were hubristic; they thought in ways that were self-deceiving. It's a fatal condition of people who think in this manner that they cannot deal with reality, not if it conflicts with what they have it in their minds will occur.

This condition of hubris is an age-old one. Indeed, it's the classic affliction of empire. The most famous detailed description of a people suffering from hubris is that of Thucydides.²⁰ The ancient Athenians forged a successful empire at the head of a coalition of Greek cities fighting the Persians, but then they went on, in what can only be described as a display of overweening confidence, to perpetrate a series of rash maneuvers that, in the end, brought their empire down.

If we look at the behavior of the Americans, not just in the invasion phase but in the totality of what was done by them in the war (which includes the occupation), we see this same imprudent disregard for conditions which, had they been taken into account, might have counseled restraint. Starting with Bush's arrogant dismissal of America's allies, many of whom were pleading with Washington to go slow on the war; at least to wait for the UN team in Iraq looking for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to report, America blundered into what must now be seen as a failed operation.

When Bush strutted about on the deck of the USS *Abraham Lincoln* under the banner of "Mission Accomplished," he was—although few seem to have noted it at the time—exhibiting hubris.

I've just described how Rumsfeld, with his stepped-up bombings, had destroyed what infrastructure was left in Iraq (after the first Iraq War and the UN-imposed sanctions),²¹ and this created conditions of anarchy that broke out even before victory was declared. I noted, too, that, because the force was inadequate, the Americans could not restore order. They had to let the rioting and looting run its course, with the result that at the end of the war the Americans inherited an Iraq in ruins, which, as it later turned out, complicated their task of administering the occupation.

When a people, like the Americans, subdue a foe such as Iraq, and, in the process of so doing, they run into problems—many of them quite serious—one would expect them to stop and reflect; to see where it was that they had miscalculated. This did not happen in this instance. Bush's response at the time was to deny the reality of what had occurred. He insisted that the Iraqis hadn't fought (those who did, he said, were either diehard Ba'thists or poor devils compelled to go through the motions of resisting by having guns stuck in their backs).²² He also claimed that the widespread destruction of Iraqi infrastructure was not caused by the American bombing; the infrastructure was already rundown (he said), because Saddam, during the interval of the UN-imposed sanctions, had let it deteriorate.²³

All of this was untrue. But what is most dismaying is that six years into the war the popular wisdom in the United States is that the invasion came off pretty well; the Iraqis didn't resist; the Iraqi army just "melted away."²⁴ How could that be? Resistances don't develop overnight, and we know that throughout the occupation a fierce resistance has been maintained. The ground work for that had to have been laid down in the first three weeks.

All of this is to say that there's a lot about this war that Americans still don't know, and they don't because the truth has been kept from them, and, as a consequence of that, no useful lessons have been gleaned from what went on. (The only official attempt to critique the manner in which the war was fought, a study by the Rand Corporation, was suppressed by the Pentagon.²⁵ To my knowledge, the second Iraq War is the only one of America's wars where no postwar assessment [what the military calls *Lessons Learned*] has been published.)

The Bush administration might have saved itself a lot of subsequent grief had it conducted a legitimate critique. For a time it looked as though it might actually have done so. General Jay Garner, who had been sent out to Iraq to administer the occupation, abruptly was withdrawn, replaced by L. Paul Bremer III. This was the point at which a new direction might have been taken. Instead, Bremer took actions that made no sense at the time that he made them, and which have never, to this day, been adequately explained. For example, he disbanded the Iraqi army and

police (moves against international law), and, then, when admonished about this, he discounted the possibility that anything bad would come of it.²⁶ The army and police didn't exist anymore, he said (parroting Bush); they had disbanded themselves (another untruth).²⁷

At that point, still with an inadequate force in-country, the Americans and British turned to unreliable elements that had entered Iraq in the chaos of the immediate end of the war (which they were enabled to do because the Americans, with their inadequate force, could not seal the Iranian border).²⁸ Expatriate Iraqis, all clients of Iran, maneuvered themselves into a policing role, with, apparently, the assent of allied commanders overwhelmed by demands on their limited forces.²⁹ The appearance of Iranian-sponsored militiamen on the streets, patrolling alongside the Americans (and British), galvanized the native Iraqi resistance, which by now was being led by the ex-army officers whom Bremer had cashiered.

Thus, the world was presented with the extraordinary spectacle of Americans and Iranians (the latter supposedly the Americans' arch foe)³⁰ allied against the native Iraqis in a war that carried on. The resistance that erupted at the start of the war has never really let up; the Iraqis through various means have kept it going. Although to this day few in the United States seem prepared to admit it, what the Americans face in Iraq is a national revolt. In any event, as the Americans blundered from one maladroitness maneuver to the next, hatred mounted among the Iraqi civilian population, which has only gone to fuel the resistance. And what most seems to have excited the ire of the Iraqis was the Americans' coopting the carpet bagging expatriate clients of Iran (who today hold practically all of the top posts in the American-sponsored Iraqi government).³¹ The Iraqis will never submit to be ruled by the Islamic Republic of Iran: their enemy in an eight-year long war in which the casualties, on both sides, were in the hundreds of thousands, and during which deep, unreconcilable animosities developed on both sides.

The anomalies don't end here. The Americans, in trying to bring off the elections for a provisional government—and frustrated because so few Iraqis had come forward to stand in the poll (and the entire Sunni community having boycotted it)—turned again to Iran, which, in effect, packaged the deal. The mullahs imported "voters".³² Iranians who crossed the border illegally into Iraq to cast ballots (which they could do because the border remained open). Meanwhile, Bremer caved in to importuning by the expatriates and so structured the elections that (with but two exceptions) only Iranian-sponsored (or affiliated) parties participated in the poll. The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI); Dawa; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP); and the Iraqi National Congress (INC)—, these are all long-standing client organizations of Tehran.³³

Thus, it happened that when the election finally did come off, the elected officials, practically to a man, were all either Iranian stooges or people claiming Iraqi citizenship which they did not possess.

Even the much publicized Ahmad Chalabi—the man from whom the Bush administration got most of its inside dope about Iraq (intelligence the Americans later on discovered was bogus)—he, too, turned out to be an Iranian agent.³⁴ But even after Chalabi was exposed as having betrayed an important American undercover operation to Tehran, he yet continued to make appearances at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) in Washington, where his listeners accorded him respectful attention, as if he were something other than he was—a double, or maybe even a triple agent.³⁵ Chalabi even continued to be received by Condoleezza Rice at the State Department—after he had been exposed as a spy.³⁶

Later on in the book (in Chapter 5), I'll offer my explanation of how the Iranians were able to maneuver themselves into positions of power in Iraq. This achievement, although surprisingly little attention has been paid to it, is on the record, which shows that the process of involving Iran in the takeover of Iraq began before Bush took office, at the time of Bill Clinton. Clinton's principal Middle East advisor, Martin Indyk, invited Tehran to send a delegation to Washington to advise on means of overthrowing the Ba'th.³⁷ The Iranians complied, and, as a consequence, they were in on the ground floor, so to speak, of the invasion planning. This enabled them early on to begin looking out for their interests.

Today, as I said, the Iranians practically control southern Iraq, and through their Kurdish clients, who also occupy high posts in the Iraqi government, they exert considerable influence in the north, as well.³⁸

To me, this affair of the Iranians gaining a foothold in Iraq is probably the outstanding contradiction of the war: that the United States could have gone into Iraq, and, by some strange alchemy—which no one has yet adequately explained—ended up handing the country over to the mullahs, is simply extraordinary.

In any event, as a result of all this America has reaped the whirlwind. It has created a situation that is gravely inimical to its interests. And, because, to this day, the politicians in Washington refuse to confront the facts about the war, they persist in trying solutions that are patently not workable.

* * *

To say that the Americans acted out of hubris and that this is what led them astray doesn't tell us a great deal; it's too psychological an explanation. An argument such as this may have application for fathoming individual behavior, but it's of limited usefulness dealing with social processes.

The ancient Greeks (from whom the term *hubris* derives) did not have this problem of the term not covering the situation.³⁹ They did not distinguish between the individual and the polity. Just as an individual could be overweening in his/her pride, and be guilty of *hubris*, so could the polity, as, for example, the city of Athens. In fact, that's how Thucydides presented the case in his classic dissection of the Peloponnesian War.

In our day, when it comes to explaining matters such as this, we have to take a sociological approach. And we do this by shifting the emphasis (of our investigation) from individuals to groups. It was the German sociologist Karl Mannheim who pointed out that ruling groups in society tend to reinforce their dominance by formulating ideologies.⁴⁰ The ideologies play up certain supposed home truths about the way life is lived, or ought to be. The means whereby they do this is to focus attention on aspects of situations that otherwise would pass unnoticed; similarly, they deflect thought from the object of observation.⁴¹ In other words, the collective wisdom of groups involves a selection process in which certain facts, which the group may not want to consider, or which are considered by it to be irrational, are ignored, while other facts are emphasized because to the group they make sense. It's the unnatural emphasis the ideologue assigns to facts that marks him as such.

Moreover, ideology is thinking about an ideal state or condition. Since it is ideal, it has not been achieved, which means that its practicality needs justifying, and that is why true believers tend to realize themselves through action.⁴² It's as with a compulsive gambler who is convinced his luck won't fail; he keeps betting, even when, to all appearances, his luck (if, indeed, it ever existed) has run out on him. At a point, friends and relations despair of such an individual, seeing him as a pathological case. We will find, as we observe the behavior of Bush and the people around him that they conform to the diagnosis: unquestionably, in the manner in which it conducted the war, the administration was over the top, as one might say.

Now, what is the significance of all this? Well, obviously, if one is dealing with an ideological regime (such as that of Bush), one must expect it not to see certain things. And if it can't see all aspects of a given situation, it can't strategize, since a part of strategizing as it's understood by the military is adapting to changes in a situation as they occur.

The Bush administration shut out recognizing certain conditions that obtained in Iraq in the lead-up to the war, and then, as the war unfolded, it continued to refuse to take on board, as one might say, new information, because it conflicted with its preconceived notions about the way the world was supposed to work.

The German theorist, Carl Schmitt (about whom I'll have more to say below) says that politics mainly has to do with determining enmity, and particularly in wartime one had best be sure who is one's real enemy.⁴³

The Americans ought to have seen that, in the case of Iraq, their real enemy was the Iraqi army and people. Because their ideological conviction led them to disparage the likelihood of this being the case, the Americans strategized against a phantom, the phantom being the putatively evil Ba'thists.

The Ba'thists, to be sure, in their ruthlessness, their pride, and in the courage they displayed in the crisis, were a formidable component of the enemy. But the essential ingredient, if I can put it so, was the Iraqi army—the whole army, not just the elite Republican Guard units.

What Bush and his people overlooked was that the Iraqi army was practically unique not just among armies of the Middle East but worldwide. The population of Iraq was only 24 million, but the army, during the Iran-Iraq War had been built up to over a million. And this was not a comic opera army, mainly for show, good for parades and such. It was a fighting army; throughout the eight years of Iraq's war with Iran, the Iraqi army was involved in one bloody battle after another. As a consequence, practically every male Iraqi of a certain age has had experience of war. One could say that the Iraqi army was a microcosm of society, and thus it followed that once the army elected to fight, the whole of the population (minus the Kurds, of course) was bound to get involved, and did get involved.⁴⁴

The crucial task for an analyst, then, is to discover what motivated the Iraqis, not just the army but all of the Iraqis (minus the Kurds), to fight in the second Iraq War, because the effect of this was to set the society on a course of resistance, resistance which has now carried on for six years.

I believe that there was a plan devised by the Iraqi generals before the war commenced, to fight a guerrilla war, underground in the cities, and that this resistance (which began on the first day of the invasion) was meant to keep on no matter how the invasion turned out. (There is evidence of this, which I'll discuss below.⁴⁵) But most indicative, to me, is the fact of the resistance itself: to get a resistance going is an uphill fight; it takes planning; resources have to be set aside; resisters have to be recruited. I believe the fighting that went on in the first three weeks of the war was conceived by the Iraqi generals as the warm-up to the protracted guerrilla war which was meant to outlast the initial phase of the fighting.

Assuming that my theory is correct, then the Iraqi commanders were advantaged by Rumsfeld's over-the-top response to the unanticipated developments of the first few days of the war. The intensive bombing of the Iraqi cities created conditions that the Iraqis could exploit to consolidate the resistance. I refer, of course, to the anarchy that for a time reigned throughout the land. Initially, the Americans were at a loss to say what it was they were confronting. They believed they were dealing with criminal elements, and it wasn't until significantly later that it dawned on some

of the American commanders that this was an organized revolt, carried on by professional soldiers.⁴⁶

By that time, the precious window that had been open—in which the Americans might have quelled the resistance—had closed. As I say, some American officers do seem to have come to this realization, but the civilian leadership in Washington doesn't ever seem to have done. So what I want to know is, what was it about the ideological mind-set of these civilians in the Pentagon—who were the real architects of the war—that caused them to shut their eyes to the facts? What sort of a world was it that the civilians in the Pentagon believed existed, or was possible to realize?

So, now I've exposed several of the contradictions having to do with this war. I have suggested a revised interpretation of what went on in the conflict, one which repudiates Bush's claim that the invasion was a big success. I've argued that it was a botched job, which it practically had to be because Rumsfeld, in planning for the war, made unsound assumptions about how the Iraqis were likely to react. Then, confronted with confounding developments, the secretary couldn't cope: he insisted that everything was on track for a successful conclusion—even as it was obvious to unbiased observers that the war was going horribly wrong.

And, then, when (on the infrequent occasions) the administration was forced to answer critics, what did it do? It blamed failures on intelligence. This was Bush's mantra: "What could I do, the intelligence that was given to me was wrong?"⁴⁷ But it wasn't wrong intelligence that led the administration astray so much as prejudices about the enemy, and what that enemy would do if backed into a corner. This is what steered the civilians in the Pentagon into the danger zone, one might say.

The biggest misconception of the administration was that the Iraqis would not fight, or, more importantly, be capable of putting up an effective resistance. But why would they believe such a thing? The Iraqis had already fought two wars in a single generation, and won one particularly long and bloody one (against the Iranians), which nobody—or few at any rate—thought they could do.⁴⁸

More specifically, why was Rumsfeld so convinced that the Shias would not fight? The Iraqi army that fought the two previous wars (and was obviously set to wage this one) was predominantly made up of Shias. Rumsfeld evidently felt that the regime of Saddam Hussein was repugnant to the Shias, but if it was so repugnant, why didn't the Shias avail themselves of the opportunity to overthrow it during the UN-imposed sanctions period, when the regime was so obviously on the ropes?

As for the Iraqi general staff, why did Rumsfeld disparage its ability? The generals towards the end of the Iran-Iraq War (in the 1980s) switched from a strategy of static defense to one of offense, and in the process of

doing so the generals had practically to remake the army, an awesomely difficult task (Napoleon opined that this was the most difficult task a general could attempt).⁴⁹ And yet they did it. The Iraqis won the Iran-Iraq War in a sensational campaign, when they not only defeated the Iranians all along the line but penetrated miles into Iranian territory.⁵⁰

Finally, why was Rumsfeld so misinformed about the loyalties of the Iraqi people? Before the war ever commenced, Saddam Hussein opened the Iraqi arsenals and passed out Kalashnikovs and ammunition to responsive adult male civilians (to all adult males, not just the Sunnis).⁵¹ That ought to have triggered a suspicion in someone's mind that the Iraqis might not be as anti-Saddam as the Pentagon was making them out to be: a regime that fears for its survival at the hands of the people doesn't put guns in the people's hands.

When individuals exhibit this kind of blindness; when they simply do not see what is going on in front of their faces, we say they're ideological.

So, what I intend to do in this first chapter is review some of the mistakes of the Americans from the angle that these moves, which later turned out to be so misguided, were ideologically driven. Indeed, the biases the war planners held were so strong as to render the individuals who held them practically dysfunctional.

This is going to require us to puzzle out, not just what this ideology was that they were operating under, but whence it came. It was not, I feel, a native American plant.

In the end, I'm going to argue that because these biases have never been examined, much less overcome, the likelihood of the United States engineering a successful recovery in Iraq is practically nil. The Americans committed a whole slew of mistakes leading up to the war (and in the occupation phase) which have now incapacitated them from exploiting the resources they will need to salvage the situation.

* * *

The Bush administration's purpose in invading Iraq was to set up a base there from which the American military could dominate the region. (This is my theory, and I'll expand on it in Chapter 4.) I find it remarkable that the administration would ever have attempted such a thing. Hostility to foreign bases, among Middle Easterners, is long standing. It goes back to the days of colonialism right after World War I. For many years America respected such sentiments. I would say that, until the 1980s, America not only did not seek a physical military presence in the region, it did not even put itself forward in this part of the world. The one big intervention, coming after World War II, was Dwight D. Eisenhower's overthrow of Mohammed Mossadeq (the Iranian prime minister under the Shah, about whom I'll have more to say below), but, there, the coup was gotten up at the behest of the British.⁵² In the coup's aftermath, the

Americans (the U.S. government, at least) withdrew from the Gulf. The arrangement struck with the reenthroned Shah was an oil company-brokered deal.⁵³ In response to appeals from the Shah for more direct American government involvement, Eisenhower demurred, as did his successor, John F. Kennedy.⁵⁴

It was Richard Nixon who established formal security ties to the Shah: he appointed the Iranian America's policeman of the Gulf.⁵⁵ However, by assigning the Iranians a surrogate's role, America was enabled to keep its distance from the region; thereby, in a manner of speaking, it adhered to a policy of restraint.

After the Shah was overthrown in 1979, America was forced to get involved when the Khomeinists seized American diplomats, whom they held as hostages. Still, Jimmy Carter made no attempt to invade Iran (to get the hostages back), a prudent course that may have (and probably did) cost him a second term as president.⁵⁶

It was only with Ronald Reagan that America began to get involved more directly. Reagan allowed the CIA to arm the *mujahadeen* against the Russians in Afghanistan.⁵⁷ Technically, Afghanistan isn't part of the Gulf, but, in mounting this operation, Reagan called on the Saudis to fund the *mujahadeen* guerrillas.⁵⁸ Thereby, one might say Reagan struck a deal with the then-Saudi king, Fahd, similar to the arrangement Nixon worked out with the Shah, howbeit the Reagan-Fahd deal was covert.

Then came the first Iraq War, which I think definitely the United States brought about. It's inconceivable to me that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would have declared economic war on Iraq (which is what led Saddam to invade Kuwait) had not the sheikhs received backing from the U.S. government.⁵⁹

By the time of Clinton, America had not only abandoned restraint, it was operating quite openly, seeking to incapacitate the two northern Gulf states (this was Clinton's aggressive Dual Containment strategy). Still, the Clinton administration kept military operations to a minimum: Clinton's policy concentrated on inhibiting the behavior of Iran and Iraq mainly through the application of economic sanctions.⁶⁰

Why then, after acting so circumspectly for so many years, did we see America, under Bush, thrust itself forward in the Gulf, not just declaring war on but actually occupying a Gulf power?

Bush's whole Middle East policy (not just as regards Iraq) was so out of character for Americans as to cause universal dismay. Bush pushed democracy at the point of a bayonet, a wild idea by anyone's reckoning.

Further, in making his move against Iraq, Bush spurned international backing, and he specifically spurned the United Nations. Bush's refusal to involve the international community (contrary to how his father had behaved with the first Iraq War) was a repudiation of collective security, the basis of America's international relations after World War II. Bush

pushed a sinister form of outreach, championing the concept of preemptive war, something he seems to have gotten from the Israelis.

It's interesting how many of the ideas Bush espoused in the foreign policy realm would appear to have been derived from the Israelis. Israel has long been anti-the United Nations, professing to believe it is inimical to its interests. Israel has harbored misgivings about the United Nations from at least the time of the 1967 war, when U-Thant, then-UN secretary general, let the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser close the Strait of Tiran, the act which precipitated that conflict.

United Nations resolution 242, enacted to ensure a two-state solution to the so-called Arab-Israeli dispute, is anathema to hawkish Israelis who have worked off and on over the years (most successfully, I would say) to render it unlikely of fulfillment.

However, it wasn't just that Bush and the Israelis shared a prejudice against the United Nations. For some time, the disposition of the Israelis has been to reject diplomacy out of hand—at least when dealing with the Arabs. Israel has never, at least in my recollection, hesitated to respond forcibly to perceived transgressions by the Arabs. At the same time, however, under Israel's right-wing Likud Party diplomacy was not merely downgraded, it was disparaged. Israel, under the Likud, is set on a course of getting its way by force, and, under Bush, it seemed that this, too, was the aim of the Americans.

All of which is not to say that the United States policy in the Middle East is solely set up to benefit Israel. This is the tail-wagging-the-dog theory, credited by some in Washington, but to which I do not subscribe. What I believe, rather, is that Israel and the United States have for some time been operating more or less jointly on matters of Middle East policy, and they do this because powerful interests in both countries want it that way.

From the time of Reagan partisans of Israel have gained entre into the government, primarily in the Pentagon but also in the State Department, and that has enabled them to influence policy to the benefit the Jewish state.

There are any number of ways that one can cite that these partisans—whom I call Likudniks—have performed this activity. Their principal effort, however, came in the form of undercutting (or outmaneuvering, one might say) elements in the government that advocated a more even-handed approach; that is, one which did not predominantly favor Israel but took the interests of the Arabs somewhat into account as well.

By the time of Clinton, to have gained the reputation of being an Arabist (so-called) in Washington was sure death for a diplomat, or for a member of the defense department (less so, interestingly, with the CIA). And as the Arabists, one by one, were pushed aside; retired; shunted off to bureaus having nothing to do with the Middle East, America's policy became

more and more dysfunctional, because the institutional memory of events in this part of the world dried up. Individuals who might have countered some of the more inane proposals of the Likudniks (and done so with authority) were simply not around to do so, having been effectively abstracted out of the picture.

But the most bizarre idea the Likudniks pushed was that the second Iraq War was doable. To accomplish this they had not only to overcome a number of arguments as to the sense of America's getting involved in Iraq, they had also to craft a strategy whereby the takeover of that country could be effected. Thus we were treated to the spectacle of Rumsfeld and a small coterie of civilians, his entourage, in the Pentagon doing the work of the generals. Professional military men were pushed aside as civilians, with no experience of war fighting, took charge of planning how the war would go, and, presumably, how it could be won.⁶¹

The most famous instance of this involved General Shinseki. General Eric Shinseki, a Vietnam veteran, who held the highest post in the U.S. Army, was challenged by Wolfowitz (who knew nothing about war fighting) on a point that it was crucial to get right; that is, how many troops would be required to garrison Iraq after the war was ended. Wolfowitz seemingly had the better of this exchange.⁶²

So what we need to know, then, is who were these Likudniks? How did they come by their extraordinary influence? And what was it about the particular line that they took that won them such favor with Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld?

* * *

Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, and a number of other Likudniks were mostly, as I said, gathered around Rumsfeld in the Pentagon. There, they enjoyed extraordinary access to the defense secretary. But not just Rumsfeld: the comity exhibited by higher-ups in the Defense Department for Israel, and more specifically for the Likud, was (in my view) phenomenal. A goodly proportion of the top brass, and top civil servants, was pro-Israel. However, this prejudice, as many have sought to make out, was not just ideological—it had a practical application: the tough-minded approach of Likud, when it comes to dealing with Arabs (and Iranians), serves to keep the pot boiling in the Middle East, and thereby mandates huge arms outlays—and that, of course, serves the arms industry.⁶³

All of which is to say, it's a mistake to believe that the right wing in the United States backs Israel for purely ideological considerations, much less because the Israelis, unlike the Arabs, are "more like us." This is in large part a dollars and cents relationship, in which individuals and parties that reckon they will profit from continued upset in the Middle East stand behind Israel's taking the aggressive stands it does.

The Likudniks first began to work their way into government by cultivating the Cold Warriors. It was during the concluding phase of the east-west conflict that chief Likudnik Richard Perle hit on the strategy of exploiting the plight of Soviet Jewry.⁶⁴ This was the fulcrum whereby Perle and the other Likudniks' leveraged their preferment. The immigration issue was taken up by super-hawk, Henry "Scoop" Jackson—senator from Washington state (home of Boeing, a major defense contractor).⁶⁵ Jackson used it to sabotage the Henry Kissinger/Richard Nixon effort to speed Détente with the Soviets.

The hawks in the United States did not want Détente. However, because the policy came at the tail-end of the Vietnam War, when Americans had grown fed up with war financing, it was not politic to attack it head on. Immigration for Soviet Jews allowed the hawks to subvert the policy and proved a much more effective, round about way of getting at it.

Individuals like Andrei Sakharov and Natan Sharansky were portrayed as martyrs because Moscow would not allow them to leave the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ Instead of black propaganda, Perle's approach was to make the issue of Détente into a human rights controversy. The Pentagon and Jackson manipulated the immigration issue so skillfully they practically ensured that Détente would not become operational.

One could say that the ultimate downfall of the Soviet Union was brought about in large part by clever marketing worked out in concert with Reagan's military build-up.

In any event, it was out of that involvement that Perle promoted himself into a position of heading up the Pentagon's Policy Review Board, the command center from which he intrigued to get the United States into war with Iraq.⁶⁷

The extraordinary marketing campaign carried on by various parties to indict Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists for allegedly gassing the Kurds basically was a rework of the Soviet immigration controversy: the same tactics were employed; the same audience (liberals in the United States) targeted.⁶⁸

Rather than presenting the war in a black propaganda-guise, it made it out to be a positive thing: ending the "dreadful tyranny" of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athists.

Where the crusade for Soviet Jewry played up Sakharov and Sharansky, the latter campaign (against Iraq) featured not just the Kurds (who were supposedly gassed by Saddam), it also spotlighted the plight of the marsh Arabs, whose community was portrayed as also being victimized by the regime.⁶⁹

In both campaigns, however, the real beneficiary was the arms lobby, in as much as the campaigns kept things, as I say, at a boil in the Middle East. The Likudniks' approach was to take a principled stand in order to promote a devious, unprincipled objective.

Israel, of course, benefited from the campaign against Iraq, and this is what has led to the belief—held, as I say, by some in Washington—that the conflict was undertaken solely to benefit the Jewish state. It's a somewhat compelling argument. Nonetheless, to anyone who has studied the situation, it's obvious the Pentagon had goals that it wanted to achieve, goals that could be fulfilled by warring against the Iraqis. What it wanted, primarily, was a base in the area, and because it was balked in a number of fronts from achieving its aim, it decided to take what it felt it required by force. In other words, the war was waged for expediency's sake.

That said it's still important to pin down exactly how the Likudniks were influential in getting the war to go on. There were two major problems with this war. One, it was going to be preemptive, and, two, it was going to require occupying Iraq, seen by numerous parties in the United States as likely to cost a lot of money. As to the first, preemptive wars are difficult to justify for a democracy like that of the United States. Democracies, supposedly, are peace loving—they don't start wars, or at least that's the conventional wisdom. As for the expense angle, at the time Bush was maneuvering to get the United States into war the economy in the United States was sound, or seemed so. Americans, who do not like overseas involvements to begin with, saw no reason to take on the expense of fighting a war, and then having to occupy Iraq, once conquered.

The Likudniks overcame both objections. I'll go into detail in Chapters 4 and 5 as to how they did. Here, it's enough to repeat that this was their big accomplishment, making the war seem doable. Had these twin objections not been overcome, the war wouldn't have come off. The Likudniks should, therefore, be viewed as fixers. Whenever problems arose that seemed likely to derail the war-making project, the Likudniks found ways around them. Where evidence was needed to make a case for war, the Likudniks' manufactured it—sometimes out of whole cloth.⁷⁰ Perhaps a better way of describing the Likudniks' role is to say they acted like theatrical producers: they made the "show" happen.

The Likudniks worked on public opinion, and here they drew heavily on their contacts with the American-Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC), one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington. The Likudniks exploited their ties to AIPAC and to other Jewish groups in the United States. The groups talked up the war, agitating among members of Congress, which they could do because they had good connections to that body. (In my view, AIPAC has taken over the role formerly performed by the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars [VFW]—it has become the principal war agitating lobby in the nation's capital.)

In addition to AIPAC, several of the think tanks got involved, including institutions like the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation, both heavily endowed by defense contractors. Also, the so-called

papers of reference—the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*—all were effective in making the war happen.⁷¹

In a way, one could argue that the takeover of U.S. Middle East policy by the Likudniks constituted a putsch. These people (the Likudniks, that is) were, as I said, ideologues. They were more than mere lobbyists, or people who just happened to be stirred by a particular issue. Getting the war to take place was both a practical matter (a way of acquiring rewards) and a matter of principle with them; and they stopped at nothing to bring it off. They viewed opponents as enemies—and this was the case even with colleagues in the bureaucracy. In inter-agency intelligence briefings, the Likudniks in attendance “checked up” on participants.⁷² Anyone who expressed an opinion out of line with what Rumsfeld or Cheney wanted to hear could expect to be “placed on report.” (For a career bureaucrat this sort of thing has a chilling effect.)

In this regard, it’s interesting to consider the political background of the Likudniks. Many were sons (and daughters) of Jewish immigrants, from eastern and central Europe, usually, and many of their parents were ex-communists, thus, individuals whom the press in Cold War days was prone to call lefties.⁷³ Their particular brand of left politics was Trotskyism. The Russian bolshevik Lev Trotsky’s big contribution to communist practice was the theory of the putsch (read: Malaparte 1932).⁷⁴ Party tactics is what Trotsky espoused, and, in reviewing the Likudniks’ maneuvers, this is what strikes one most forcibly—their tactics are recognizable to anyone familiar with left politics as practiced in the United States during Cold War days.⁷⁵

The Likudniks, working through the Defense Department (and also the office of the vice president), promoted the war as a combination security/human rights issue, which, through shrewd propagandizing, was made appealing (or at least acceptable) to a large portion of the American public.

Even so, the Likudniks almost certainly would not have been able to have achieved so great a feat (as getting the country to go to war) had not conditions been ripe. First of all, the Soviet Union had just collapsed and the Soviets were the principal supporters of the so-called Arab rejectionist states (which included Iraq).⁷⁶ With the Soviet Union gone, it was presumed that Iraq would be vulnerable. Second, there was 9/11, in the immediate aftermath of which the American public existed in a state of shock. In the mood the public was in it could be led to go along with almost anything which held a hope of gaining revenge.

But overall, one could say, what the Likudniks had going for them was confidence that the scheme (of taking the nation to war) could be implemented, as long as support in the media held up, and a few powerful lobbies—most notably AIPAC and the arms lobbyists—were on board with it. These lobbyists solicited not just the die-hard Republicans but the

Democrats, as well. The Democratic leadership, practically to a man (and woman), backed the war.⁷⁷

There was yet another factor involved: Bush was predisposed to listen to the Likudniks. Others have made the argument that the Bush Doctrine, so-called, is *au fond* the doctrine of Likud.⁷⁸ This is a difficult question to resolve. In the first place, defining what the Likud Doctrine is about is difficult. I don't know that it's written down anywhere. Basically, a doctrine is a way of behaving, an attitude that one is led to adopt towards handling a certain range of problems. To be sure, the Likud Doctrine calls for acting forcibly towards a particular group of people, namely Arabs; where they are concerned it tends to eschew diplomatic compromise. And that sort of approach obviously appealed to Bush's cowboy-style of problem solving. Bush was no great intellect. He liked to think of himself as a "decider," one who took action, often proceeding on pure instinct. Rather than involve himself in complicated debate, in long drawn-out discussions over how to proceed, Bush was notorious for, as one might say, cutting to the chase. Preemptive war, and "dissing" the United Nations were both in line with Bush's way of thinking. The problem, however, is to discover whence the style originated. After all, Reagan espoused many of the same ideas long before Bush came on the scene. Reagan's aim was to make America "walk tall" again after the debacle of Vietnam. Who initiated the direct action approach, as one might call it? Did the Likudniks originate it, and sell it to the right wingers, or was it the case that Americans of a certain stamp related naturally to such ideas, and the Likudniks, realizing this, tailored their policy to suit.

I think it's interesting to conjecture that the real progenitor of the Bush Doctrine was the 1992 policy statement Cheney circulated throughout the Pentagon, the thesis of which was that America's political and military mission in the post-Cold War era was to ensure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge. The paper took aim at America's allies, like Japan and Germany, which were just then seeming to vie with the United States, not militarily so much as economically. There was much talk at this time about a multi-polar balance. The paper, written by Wolfowitz, so offended America's allies, it was repudiated by then President George H. W. Bush. I would say that George, the son, simply picked up on the 1972 policy statement, massaged it in a number of areas, and presented it as his own.⁷⁹

That said there was one idea that Bush had to have gotten from Likud. The Likud introduced a whole new element of thinking into the Arab-Israeli equation. Middle East policymakers for long had operated on the assumption that it was fatal to disregard the so-called Arab street. Arab leaders had to be mindful of public opinion, the argument ran, because otherwise the street would become enflamed. Likud pooh-poohed any such notion.⁸⁰ The Arab people are sheep, the Likudniks maintained,

incapable of putting pressure on anyone: they are completely under the thumb of their rulers. According to Likud, one had merely to neutralize the leadership and Arab opposition would evaporate.

This idea of the Arab leaders being of no consequence seems to have impressed Rumsfeld, and that, as I intend to argue below, was another crucial factor in getting the United States to go to war. The other big idea of the Likudniks was that one could defy international law and get away with it. What Bush was proposing was against everything that the United Nations stood for, and the Likudniks' argument, in essence, was that the United Nations doesn't count for anything; the United Nations represented old thinking. The Likudniks' operating premise was, those who have the ability to enforce the law, should make it.

There was one more area in which the Likudniks were able to exert influence, and that involved the issue of technology. Over the years America's doctrine of war fighting has evolved as the military has come more and more to rely on air power (I'll discuss this below). People who feel this way are said to be proponents of the air war strategy.

Rumsfeld was the outstanding proponent of relying almost exclusively on air power in waging America's wars. Rumsfeld believed that, by using air power intensively, wars could be won with only a limited commitment of ground forces. Israel's military also operates along this line. This like-thinking enabled the Israeli generals to gain access to and influence with Rumsfeld.

One more thing I should note is the reduced power and effectiveness of the U.S. State Department. Over the years, as the power of the military in the United States has grown, that of the State Department has declined. In Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, Bush had a colleague admirably suited to advise on war, for Powell was a bona fide war fighter. Unfortunately, as head of the State Department, the secretary had no effective constituency. Consequently, in the war planning stage his counsel was disparaged. Powell, in a manner of speaking, wielded a rusty sword.

Now, having said all this, there is this one glaring contradiction that must be noted: over the years Likud's get-tough-with-the-Arabs strategy has not proved very effective. Israel's repeated essays to take over Lebanon, for example, have all miscarried. Why, then, if Israel's approach was repeatedly shown to be ineffective, did not Washington take heed and disapprove it?

In my observation, Washington policymakers over the years had become increasingly frustrated with the Arab states' failure to come across, as it were. Leaders like Husni Mubarak in Egypt and Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, while pursuing strengthened ties with the United States, consistently have held back in key areas. They have never warmed to Israel (that is, worked out a warm peace); and also they have not gone along with American schemes of penetrating the Gulf militarily.

I think Rumsfeld decided early on that the Arab leaders would have to be marginalized. The secretary strove to cultivate an environment where he could proceed to war and not have to worry about opposition from anybody—but especially not from key Arab allies of the United States. Likud was an abettor of this stance. It consistently urged “just do it,” an argument that was seductive not just to Rumsfeld but to Bush and Cheney, as well.

Be that as it may, we can now see that Bush, in following the lead of the Likudniks (to go to war), erred monumentally, and this was because, for all their arrogant insistence that they knew what they were doing, the Likudniks knew nothing about the Middle East, let alone Iraq.

It’s interesting to examine ideas the Likudniks were pushing. Most derived from the British. Parse Perle and Feith’s famous “Defense of the Realm” paper and you get the San Remo treaty.⁸¹ Feith adored Churchill. (He even, I understand, has a bust of the prime minister in his library at home in Washington.)⁸² The *weltanschauung* of the Likudniks vis a vis the Middle East, was a work-up of the old Mandate System. David Wurmser, another Likudnik, before the second Iraq War ever came off, smuggled the scion of the deposed Hashemite dynasty in Iraq into Washington, where he arranged secret briefing sessions in the State Department.⁸³ Wurmser’s idea: to restore the Hashemites to rule over the Iraqis.

Here we have Iraq, a country that was, before the Iran-Iraq War, the most advanced materially in the Middle East, producing millions of barrels of oil a day, with the highest standard of living of any area state, and, on the cultural front, according full rights to women (more than any other Arab state); Iraq, which was completely secularized—and Wurmser, Perle and Feith wanted to see the country revert to the way it was pre-1959, under a discredited monarchy (the representatives of which had been torn apart, literally, by the Iraqi mob in the streets of Baghdad)!⁸⁴

The ignorance of the Likudniks was manifest in the days succeeding the proclamation of victory, when things started to fall apart and they were called on to explain the travesty that was unfolding. They resorted to the most ridiculous defenses. They claimed, for example, that Iraq really did have weapons of mass destruction (WMD), only they were cleverly hidden; that Saddam really *was* an ally of Osama bin Laden, and that all of the investigative commissions that disputed this were wrong, and, finally, that the resistance which sprang up in Iraq was led by parties outside of Iraq. And who were these outside agitators? The Saudis! Not just individual Saudis, but the Saudi royal family, which the Likudniks claimed was bankrolling the resistance! This is mad, mad, mad. (General Tommy Franks wasn’t far wrong when he said that Feith was, in his estimate, the stupidest [bleep] on the planet.)

The Likudniks viewed Iraq through the perspective of nineteenth-century colonialism. Such thinking was, in a manner of speaking, engrained in their psyches.

Thus, to understand how Bush and his minions could have gone so wrong it's necessary to understand this mind-set, the way of thinking that prevailed among Europeans at the end of World War I, when the British and French essayed to break up the old Ottoman Empire.

In espousing the policies of Likud, Bush was (whether he knew it or not) crediting an ensemble of beliefs that originated in post-World War I times, the basis of which was penetration. Britain and France pushed empire on the basis that they had a mission of democratizing the Arabs—when in reality what they sought was to penetrate Arab lands for commercial and strategic purposes. (They also tried to penetrate the Turkish part of the old empire, but were badly burned in the process.)⁸⁵

The idea of the imperialists was that the Arabs, if they were to be let into the community of nations, must first be tutored in the ways of democracy, a concept with which the Arabs supposedly were unfamiliar. Hence, the League of Nations imposed the Mandate System, an exercise in tutelage, where the imperialists took over parts of the old Ottoman Empire: the British would assume responsibility for Iraq (then called Mesopotamia) and Palestine; the French, Syria-Lebanon. Thereafter, the Arabs would be brought along, in a manner of speaking, so they could sit comfortably in the society of the enlightened ones.

Where the imperialists' hidden agenda, as we might call it, was revealed was that, along with stressing the immaturity, the unfitness of the Arabs to be a part of the modern world, they also stressed the rights of non-Arab minorities: the Kurds, the Chaldeans, the Armenians. The Arabs being savages—or perhaps that's stating the matter too baldly, being backward, let us say—would not respect the minorities' rights. The majority element would repress the minorities, and so the latter had to be especially regarded.

By insisting that the minorities be accorded equal concern with the majority Arab population, the imperialists effected that transformation for which empires have always strived; that is, to divide and conquer.

The same type of self-interested thinking motivated Bush in the matter under consideration here. This is to say, where this war is concerned, the wish was father to the act. The United States and Israel wanted something out of Iraq, and their war aims more or less coincided (although in one conspicuous regard they clashed, and I'll look into that in Chapter 5).

All of which is to say that the war should not be seen as in any way noble, or progressive. This was not a case of the United States playing world policeman, on its own initiative chastising rogue states, a job which formerly was left to the United Nations.

It's a much more sordid business, and the question to answer is, can the project of invading and occupying Iraq survive if, as increasingly seems to be the case, the objectives for which it was undertaken cannot be realized?

The grand imperialist scheme miscarried for the British and French, just as, I think, it is now doing for the Americans. As to why it didn't work out for the old-style imperialists, we needn't go into that (there's a whole literature on this). But this much we can say, the imperial powers at the end of World War I were overextended; the war in Europe had sapped their strength, and, as a consequence, they weren't up to confronting real challenges.

The United States is vulnerable in the same way today. Confronted with substantial challenges (especially now that the economy is in recession), the situation in Iraq presents a daunting proposition. And the Americans—the politicians, that is—have so far not been able to come to terms with this new reality.

But on top of everything else there is this. There are forces moving now, not just in Iraq but throughout the entire Middle East of which the Americans seem not to have a clue. And one of the main misconceptions has to do with what I mentioned above: the belief that the Arabs are sheep; that they are easily intimidated. Contrarily, I am going to argue that what we are witnessing in Palestine, in Lebanon, in Iraq (and now in Afghanistan) is a kind of revolt of the masses. As to what's driving this, I'll initiate the discussion of that in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

The Resisters

At the heart of America's debacle in Iraq is a misconception about what it is that motivates people to fight and to die for something. It's a problem crucial for a society like that of the United States which has to confront a dilemma over this. The system in the United States vaunts enlightened self-interest. Why, then, should an individual sacrifice where he/she does not see that their interests are served?¹ That this is a problem was shown in the case of the Vietnam War where an appreciable number of young Americans refused to submit to the draft. They either disagreed with the war on theoretical/moral grounds or because, like Cheney, they "had other priorities."² So intense was the opposition, the draft had to be scrapped.

It was partly in response to this that the U.S. military overhauled its war fighting doctrine: it created an all-volunteer army, and along with this it shifted the focus of combat to the air. To be sure, there were other factors that dictated change, but certainly a part of it was the desire to compensate for the indisposition of Americans' to fight. America's air arm was deemed so lethal that no enemy could oppose it; but more than that, with the air war, it was thought possible to stand off and annihilate the enemy at a safe distance: one didn't have to engage hand-to-hand. Under ideal conditions, with high-tech wars (conducted from so-called aerial platforms), the enemy would be deprived of even the ability to hit back, so outclassed would he be. This particularly seemed to apply in the case of Iraq, since the Iraqis had no adequate air defense system.³ Casualties, on the American side, were expected to be light to nonexistent, whereas the enemy force would be wiped out. In other words, this was to be a no-contest-type war.

In 1996, this concept of fighting wars "on the cheap" (which, essentially, is what this was) was massaged, in a manner of speaking. With the unveiling of so-called Shock and Awe tactics Americans found the means

(or thought they had) to get wars over with practically before they began.⁴ The key was to work on the enemy's psychology. Before the commencement of the Afghan War, American propagandists broadcast the devastation to be wreaked on Afghans, were they not to capitulate straightaway. The Afghan War was a world's wonder: the Afghans did not lay down immediately, but after the initial shock of combat they did pretty much melt away. As a consequence, Rumsfeld's conviction that warfare was about to be revolutionized seemed confirmed: this would be a transformation on a par with Alexander's development of cavalry; Napoleon's use of artillery; and the Wehrmacht's blitzkrieg.

Effectively, Rumsfeld was going to make his reputation with this. And this is what led him to rush into war with Iraq. He meant to show the world what could be accomplished when superior technological capability was wielded with ruthless determination.

Unfortunately, when tried on the Iraqis, the strategy didn't work. The Iraqis did not quail before the awful specter of what was to be done to them. Instead, they fought. The extent to which they did is not widely appreciated (at least, not by the public in the United States) because the Bush administration has done a pretty effective job of covering up much of what went on in the war: publicists for the administration have made it out that the Iraqi army—as had been the case with the Afghans—had simply melted away.⁵

The facts (which are quite otherwise) can be ascertained from a search of the record. Reporting from the front usually was good, even though reporters were so-called embedded, meaning that they had to submit to censorship. By carefully parsing their narratives, however, one can gain a fair understanding of what went on. The real distortion develops not out of the day-to-day coverage, but in the editorializing of the major media after the fact. Years after the war has ended, distorted versions of events keep recurring. This is so, even when the line that is being promulgated has long ago been shown to be false.

In any case, as far as I can determine there was no blackout of whole engagements: battles, as they occurred, were reported, and there were some quite fierce fights in and around Basrah and Umm Qasr, and then all along the line up to Baghdad: in Samawah, Najaf, and particularly in Nasiriyah.

Moreover, one can unearth accounts of saturation bombing raids against Republican Guard positions around Baghdad, which would appear to confirm that wholesale bombing of cities—which Rumsfeld denied was taking place—did, in fact, occur. (Another excellent source of information is the first-hand accounts of soldiers who fought, published after the war.)

That the Americans were taken by surprise in Iraq indicates intelligence failure. However, this was not a case of the intelligence community

misreading the signs. There were plenty of voices within the community which spoke out—before the war—warning not to underestimate the enemy. The failure can more correctly be tied to the prejudicial notions of the civilians in the Pentagon, who believed that the Arab Iraqis could not fight, much less be disposed to do so.

The Likudniks pushed two main lines of argument in the lead-up to the war. First, they argued, the Iraqis, being Arabs, were not up to fighting a high-tech war (which is to say that they weren't capable of strategizing effectively). There, the Likudniks seemed to be on solid ground, based on the showing of the Iraqi army in the first Iraq War, where, as I said above, the army put in a dismal performance.

Along with this, however, the Likudniks also held that "slavish" societies would not fight.⁶ The Iraqis, not being free, had nothing to fight for (they argued). Rather than continue under the dominance of the Ba'ath, the Iraqis would leap at the chance to experience real democracy. There was every likelihood, the Likudniks argued, that there would be no resistance at all: "[The Iraqis] will greet the invader with flowers and sweets."

Unfortunately, for the Americans the Likudniks were wrong on both counts. The Iraqis—after two costly previous wars—one, against Iran, the other, the United States—lacked the means to wage a conventional war; but that didn't stop them from undertaking the kind of war they could fight. By electing to fight a guerrilla war inside the cities, the Iraqi army altered the terms of combat. Having to go inside the cities, the Americans perforce had to confront the enemy one-on-one, and this equalized the situation somewhat.

Rumsfeld's response to having the tables turned on him was to lay waste to the cities—to get the war over with on schedule.⁷ The ploy succeeded, but at tremendous cost to the Americans. They inherited a society practically bereft of infrastructure needed to carry out the occupation: public buildings, roads, factories, and utilities all were blasted.

So now, I repose the question raised at the outset of the chapter: what is it that the Iraqis have found to fight for—for Saddam Hussein; for the Ba'athists? We don't know enough about how the Iraqis related to the Ba'ath to answer that question.⁸ Let's assume, however, that the Likudniks were correct: that the Iraqis were at best ambivalent towards their government; at worst they were seriously disaffected from it. Is there nothing else that might have motivated them to fight?

I believe that the question of what motivates a people to fight is problematic; they may do it for any number of reasons. They may, for example, as with the Palestinians, see themselves existentially threatened, and, fearing to be wiped out, they fight as a desperate last resort. Or a people may do it out of pride, because it's not in their nature not to fight. Or they may do it for what are termed psychological reasons: they like the idea of killing. And this last in particular is a difficult conception for citizens of a

liberal democracy to internalize. Still, we know that in instances (like Bosnia, for example) extraordinary mayhem was perpetrated by individuals who seemingly exulted in the ability to behave so.

In the end, I would argue, to fight or not to fight depends on circumstances. If a people have the means to fight, under certain circumstances they will do so. Therefore, to assign a whole people to a category of non-fighters, as the Likudniks did with the Iraqis, is foolish.

In the case of the Iraqis, it was a particularly foolish thing to do because quite a bit of evidence pointed the other way. In 1982, after the Iraqis were driven out of Iran (in the Iran-Iraq War), the intelligence community in Washington anticipated Iraq's swift defeat. Instead, in a remarkable turnaround, the Iraqi army not only repulsed an invasion by the Iranians outside Basrah, it inflicted huge losses on the Islamic Republican army, forcing it to retreat back across the border.

Intelligence officers in the United States mulled over this untoward result and concluded that the Iraqi army, whereas it might not be good for much on the offense, was a tiger on the defense, and the explanation for this was, the Iraqis, when fighting for their homeland, would not give way. The army cohered, the troops fought, and the Iraqis prevailed.

This judgment about the Iraqis was current throughout the intelligence community before the second Iraq War ever commenced. The Likudniks, if they were even aware of it never considered it, and that, I would say, was what was at the root of the ensuing debacle.

At the same time, however, it would be naïve to believe that the Iraqis, on their own could have ginned up a resistance. Conditions had to be right for this, and this brings me to consider the nature of the instigators, those who made the resistance happen: the officers of the old Ba'athist army who formed the core of the revolt.

* * *

At the start of the second Iraq War a phenomenon developed for which there has subsequently been no definitive explanation. Individuals, who appeared to be civilians; that is, who apparently were not regular war fighters, showed up in all of the major cities, fighting as irregulars.⁹ Initially, the Pentagon tagged these fighters as *Saddam's Fedayeen*, and claimed that these were fanatical youths, seeking to die for the Iraqi president.¹⁰ This line subsequently was amended to that they were die-hard Ba'athists, in other words civilians, not connected to the military. Then a further revision was effected: it was made out they were Republican Guards and Mukhabarat officers, fighting in mufti. George Tenet, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), when pressed on this issue, confessed that he hadn't "a clue" who these individuals were.¹¹

In any event, it was these people who put up the resistance in the first three weeks of the war. They were the ones who held out in Umm Qasr;

drove the Toyota pickup trucks from which they harried the American advance on Baghdad; and who lured the Americans into Nasiriyah, where they tied up the Marines in several costly ambushes.¹²

It's my belief that, whereas the so-called fedayeen may have comprised elements of all of the above groups (youths, Ba'thists, Republican Guards, and Mukhabarat), they had to have been led by professional army men, and I base my belief on the sophistication with which the operations were carried out. Many were quite sophisticated, and they got more so as the war moved into the occupation phase. Indeed, I would argue that the resistance that showed up after the declaration of victory (by the Americans) could not have happened, had the momentum not been developed during the invasion.

In any event, assuming that my theory is correct, the resistance was an extraordinary production. I don't know of any instances post-World War II where an army, facing certain defeat at the hands of a superiorly armed opponent, elected to fight a war of urban resistance, underground in the cities. A fight which it kept up after the enemy had proclaimed victory, and then managed to sustain—without outside support—for six years.

Therefore, I am disposed to treat the resistance in Iraq as phenomenal, and to analyze it on that basis.

It would have made sense for the Iraqi General Staff to have prepared such a strategy. I cited above how the generals had tried to fight a conventional war of maneuver against the Americans in the first Iraq War, and how they had come to grief over it. This time around, the generals had plenty of advance warning that the war was going to take place. They knew there would be no escaping it—they could not hope to dodge the bullet, as one might say. Bush, in the lead-up to the war, declared, in no uncertain terms, that he would not be dissuaded from this fight, not by anyone: not by his allies (European or Arab); not by the United Nations—no one.

Thus, the Iraqis knew the war was coming. What they needed was a strategy that would prove effective—not effective in the sense that they might hope to win. Rather, they had to hold out, keep the thing going into the occupation phase. And that, I think, is what they did.

It's remarkable what the Iraqi officers achieved. First of all, assuming that I'm correct that the core of the resistance comprised the officers—this, in itself, is revolutionary. The officers who fought transformed themselves into irregular fighters; they elected to fight an urban guerrilla war, a war unlike any they had ever fought, or indeed that any Arab officers had fought.¹³ Arab officers have never, to my knowledge, transformed themselves into fedayeen, and fought out of uniform, in a *guerre a outrance*.

There are plenty of instances in recent history where irregulars fought alongside regular armies. There were numerous cases in World War II,

the most outstanding being in Russia (which I'll discuss below). Also, after the Second World War, this type of combat was seen in Vietnam. There, irregulars fought alongside the regular North Vietnamese army. As far as I'm aware, however, it's never happened in recent history that a regular army, having lost a war, has gone underground to fight on as irregulars.¹⁴

It's the decision to go underground, I think, that dictated this so remarkable development; that is, of the officers' taking on the fedayeen identity (about which I'll have more to say presently).¹⁵ The Iraqi officers intended to exploit the built-up areas of the country. It was there, inside the cities, that they determined to make their stand. Obviously, they were hoping to wrong-foot the Americans into forsaking the open spaces. In the cities, the Americans would stand out. Their uniforms would give them away, making them out to be the enemy. Moreover, inside the cities the Americans would have to tread warily, keeping to their tight unit formations, since, obviously, they could not barge into the cities with their tanks, their armored personnel carriers. In the narrow alleys and twisty byways, the Americans' equipment could not penetrate much less find a field of maneuver.

It was also there, inside the cities, that the Iraqi officers could lay their ambushes. However, to bring these off, the contrast between themselves and the Americans had to be maximized. The officers would not want to wear uniforms; they would rather seek to blend in, but (and this is the point I find so fascinating) they did not do away with uniforms entirely; they didn't entirely abandon wearing them.

The type of dress they chose, while not a uniform, in a way it was: black sweat suits, Balaclava masks, *kefeiyahs*—such garb is distinctive; it's the same as that worn by Hamas fighters, Hizbollahis—Iranian Revolutionary Guards, even. In accoutering themselves so, the officers were making a statement; they were associating themselves, one could say, with a tradition, that of the fedayeen. I find it interesting that Arab officers would step so far out of character.¹⁶

An officer in Arab lands is something special; his status is elevated; he epitomizes elite standing, as much as would, say, a high-level, well-paid professional in the United States. Yet, in this instance (of the second Iraq War), such high-status individuals actually condescended to get down in the street and fight as irregulars. I can't see an Egyptian officer doing this, or a Syrian, and certainly not a Lebanese.

But even more, this is an extremely risky thing to do. For an officer to remove his uniform to fight underground means not just stepping out of character; one brands oneself a criminal by doing this—the rules of war don't support such an undertaking (as I'll discuss below). One would have to be desperate to take on such an identity.

My feeling is that, given the enormity of the change, the decision could not have been made on an individual basis; each officer, on his own,

would not have been likely to take such a step: the thing had to have been ordered from on high. The generals, weighing the chances of success, and having the defeat of the first Iraq War to guide them, would want to try something new, and the obvious strategy to have suggested itself was that of the urban guerrilla. Why? Because this was so against everything the Iraqis had done before; the Americans would never dream of them doing it (and they didn't; they were taken totally by surprise by it).

Iraq's army was trained by the Russians. It was not light or deft. Rather it was ponderous in its movements. The last thing that one would have expected it to do was opt for irregularity. An urban guerrilla war is all stealthy movement, slipping in and out of buildings, fighting from 'round corners, from roof tops and doorways. Individuals, not units, form the basis of such activity.

In the first Iraq War, which, as I noted, was fought conventionally (which is to say, out in the open), the Iraqi army was destroyed. Units were lined up in the sights of American air men and mowed down. Recall the infamous *Highway of Death* episode, where the airmen were taped in their battlefield communications, exulting that this was "like shooting fish in a barrel!"

Conversely, in the cities, the officers, fighting as irregulars, could match their individual courage against that of the Americans, forcing the latter into close combat situations.

Still, as much as the decision might have made sense militarily, it would not, from another angle, have been an easy step to take, and *that is* for reasons having to do with system preservation. Bismark is supposed at one point to have toyed with the idea of arming Prussian peasants so that they could carry on an irregular war against the Austrians and French.¹⁷ The idea was rejected as "un-Prussian"; the Prussian Kaiser, Wilhelm I, and the chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke, both regarded it as "uncanny." In reconsidering this step, Bismark is supposed to have remarked that this could "set the waters of Acheron flowing." Acheron is the river of the dead. What Bismark was implying, presumably, was that, once armed, there would be no controlling the peasants. People's wars, as we will see, tend to be enormously destructive, and, it's usually the case that they impair the operation of, if indeed they don't destabilize the existing system.

There are few accounts in the second Iraq War of the people fighting alongside the guerrillas. However, they certainly were in a position to do so, since they were for the most part armed, Saddam having opened up the arms stores and passed out weapons to them. At the same time there were some unusual goings-on. For example, often in American accounts of the early days of the fighting, the presence is remarked of crowds.¹⁸ U.S. Marines, probing Iraqi cities, would run into crowds of Iraqi civilians, seemingly mere onlookers, people out and about, observing what was going on. I find such behavior extraordinary. Why would civilians

want to put themselves at risk by congregating where the battle was set to rage?

One of the things remarked by Americans was the tendency of these crowds to burst apart; individual members would scatter, as if on command. In the process of so doing they'd reveal guerrillas hidden in their midst. The guerrillas, then, would open up with their Kalashnikovs, their RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). It seemed the guerrillas were fighting out of the crowds.

It's difficult to know what to make of this: either the people would have had to have been coerced into letting the guerrillas come amongst them, or else they were complicit. (There is a possibility they might not have known the guerrillas were there; however, this seems farfetched. The guerrillas were armed; it's hard to see how the crowd would not have observed that in its midst was a dark figure packing a Kalashnikov.)

Bush labeled this type of activity criminal; he condemned the practice, claiming that the guerrillas were using human shields, and a case could be made for the validity of this claim. At the same time, however, unless actual coercion can be proved (which, of course, it can't) such claims are otiose. Urban guerrilla war, after all, takes place in the cities; that is to say where the people are. Once the decision is taken to fight such a war, the people will inevitably get involved, one way or another—it can't be helped.

I rather think that what is important is how people react after the battle is joined, whose side do they take? In the Iraq War we have no instances of the populace turning on the guerrillas. They either stood aside and let the fighters operate, or, as I think I can show, in some instances, they actually joined in. Indeed, I don't think combat could have kept up through the first three weeks, let alone have carried on after Bush had declared victory, had not the people been supportive.

I repeat, therefore, for Bush to maintain otherwise, to try to make it out that some principle of morality was involved, is beside the point (I'll talk more about this in Chapter 6).

I think what Bush was trying to do was establish a basis for blaming the resisters for the brutal style of war that has developed in Iraq. And, frankly, I don't believe that this is legitimate. The Americans so structured the situation that the Iraqis were left with but two options: to surrender or die. Bush, before the war ever commenced, said he would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender—but, more ominously, he let it be known that anyone who did resist would be treated as a criminal. This was tantamount to offering the Iraqis no choice at all.¹⁹

There was something else going on. Bush, before the war, said he regarded the Ba'th as a criminal organization. Iraq being the type of society it was under the Ba'th, all high-ranking officers in the military would of necessity have had to have been Ba'thists (and an appreciable number

of junior officers, as well).²⁰ Thus, the officers would not have known what to expect when the war was over.

In all other wars that have occurred in the Middle East, after they were over, the defeated military men and police were able to return to their jobs. Army and police did not expect to be criminalized; thrown out of work; stripped of their pensions; and in some instances hung. But, of course, that's just what has happened to the Iraqi officers.

In addition there was this: The Americans intended to coopt the whole of the Kurdish community—they expected the Kurds to support the invasion (which they did). Therefore, at the end of the war the Aryan Kurds (who for centuries have lived on a basis of enmity toward the Semitic Arabs) would be left holding on to their land, while the Arabs might expect to lose theirs. Add to this that the Kurds were slated to keep their arms, putting the Arabs at risk, and one gets a recipe for disaster.²¹ Under such circumstances I don't deem it at all unusual that the officers would fight.

Because of circumstance, then—circumstance for which the Americans were in large part responsible—the war that has ensued in Iraq is deadly: a war, one might say, of annihilation. And this, in my view, was an inevitable result of the way that Bush framed the contest. In outright criminalizing the enemy, Bush was indicating that the laws of war, which under ordinary circumstances would have operated, would not apply. Therefore, the Iraqis who fought could expect no mercy, and resultantly they would not have wanted to give any.

There's something else about the war in Iraq which makes it distinctive. The fedayeen fighters have not, to my knowledge, publicly proclaimed an ideology (they're certainly not coming on as Ba'thists), and thus it's next to impossible to get a fix on the resistance. All sorts of parties (many proclaimedly not Ba'thist) have joined in the fray, in some cases for reasons that are quite disreputable. Criminal elements are not susceptible to discipline, and, indeed, the ex-officers do not appear to be have tried to exercise control. Whether that's a deliberate tactic, I don't know, but, as a consequence, we have in Iraq a situation that equates with anarchy. Forces have been let loose there which one would never, under ordinary circumstances, have anticipated would appear. Does anyone know (really know) who is fighting there now? Whose side, for example, is Moqtada al Sadr on?²² What does the Mahdi Army represent? What are the so-called special groups that are fighting in and around Basrah? There (in Basrah), the situation is so confused one can't make head or tail of it.

In the aftermath of the proclaimed victory, as the resistance has gone on and escalated, the reaction of many Iraqis has been to flee—desert the public space, which had grown so lethal. The number of Iraqis driven to seek refuge in Syria and Jordan is huge. These refugees are safely out of it in one sense: they are spatially removed from the mayhem, but what sort of lives are they leading? Many who sought a haven in neighboring

states are destitute. However, faced with what's going on in Iraq, they dare not return.²³

On top of that, there are the so-called internal refugees: individuals who, having been driven out of their homes, have elected to remain inside Iraq (it's estimated by the United Nations there may be as many as two million of these).²⁴ Most of these people have been displaced by sectarian fighting which went on under the eyes, and in some cases with the approval of the Americans.

The civilian death toll in Iraq is now so large the U.S. government is at pains to suppress it. Even the American casualties are disguised. Whereas we know the numbers of Americans who have been killed, we know scarcely anything about the condition of the wounded—how serious are the injuries which the Americans have suffered?²⁵ The guerrillas have devised some truly fiendish weapons, not the least of which the roadside bomb and shaped grenade charge. Americans on the receiving end of one of these may survive (and many do because of advances in treating casualties on the scene), however, they are horribly mutilated. One suspects that, for many wounded Americans, the chance of leading active, useful lives is over. They're alive, but hopelessly incapacitated.

I don't think that it's an exaggeration to say that this war in Iraq tops the list of lethal encounters, as far as the Middle East goes. Even the Lebanese Civil War, as bad as it was, cannot compare to this.

Bush responded to the unseemly level of violence by blaming it on fanatics. He conjured up the image of the terrorist, the adherent of Al Qaeda, and made him out to be the enemy.²⁶ But this explanation, like everything Bush has put out about the war, is hard to credit. The U.S. Army has failed to find many of these so-called outside agitators.²⁷ Over and above that, Bush's claim can't cover Moqtada's activity. Moqtada is a native Iraqi and he supposedly commands a following (in the Mahdi Army) that numbers in the hundreds of thousands—all natives.

In this regard, it's interesting to note how many times Bush changed his line on the war. Initially, he called it a *jihad*, but he subsequently switched to saying it was a civil war. All of which indicates confusion. Specialists in low-intensity conflict similarly seem at a loss to explain events. But it's essential to figure this out, because, not knowing, means that one has no theoretical context into which to fit the activity.

* * *

What is wanted is a scientific analysis, or one that is conducted along such lines. That is to say, it should eschew the Bush approach of making the war out to be a fight of good against evil. The situation in Iraq is too complex to yield to so simplistic an explanation. The war is a mixed bag with a whole host of elements that impinge on one another, and which, in combination, make up the result.

In 1962, a German political theorist and international lawyer, Carl Schmitt, undertook to treat the topic of irregular war as a matter of scholarly concern. Schmitt set forth his ideas in a series of lectures (delivered in Spain), later published as *The Theory of the Partisan*. In them, he argued that irregular warfare as it had evolved over the years was more than a mere military-scientific specialty, as he called it. The phenomenon of people; that is, civilians taking up arms to fight regular armies, deserves to be looked at philosophically, he claimed. At the time that Schmitt was writing, outbreaks of irregular war were occurring all over the globe. The militants who waged these battles were associated (in the West, at least) with world communism, and as such regarded as part of one vast international conspiracy. However, it was hardly the case that irregular warfare originated with the communists, or that those who practice this form of warfare can be construed as international conspirators. Such thinking Schmitt regarded as misguided; the phenomenon was being made out to be, he felt, something other than it was. So, then, the question is, what is it—basically?

Schmitt claimed that until 1808 and the appearance in Spain of the so-called *guerrilleros*, who fought against Napoleon after the Spanish army had surrendered, the concept of the irregular war fighter could not even be said to exist, at least it was not something that one could theorize about.²⁸ Schmitt was aware that guerrilla-type war had gone on for centuries—and he specifically cited the case of, as he called them, the redskins in the United States—but, he claimed that until the practice of warfare was regularized the activity of irregulars was not specifically recognized. It was only with Napoleon that war fighting in the modern sense came into being. Napoleon's army, on its appearance, was viewed as well nigh invincible. Thus, when, in Spain, the guerrilleros defeated the army of the French (which they did with the assistance of the British), this provoked comment; attention was paid.²⁹

Military theorists of the early 1800s were beguiled by such an extraordinary development as this. First off, it surprised them that civilians would have had the temerity to engage, actually intrude in a business from which up till then they had been rigorously excluded;³⁰ and, along with that, it was seen as noteworthy that the guerrilleros, in taking on the French army, eschewed the tactics of the regulars, sticking to their own primitive but, as it proved, effective ways of fighting.

Tactics appear to be the key to discovering the impact of the phenomenon. For, indeed, there had been peasant uprisings in the past, and invariably these were crushed, in most cases expeditiously. What launched irregular warfare of the guerrilleros-type into prominence was that it played off the systemic composition of the Napoleonic armies. These armies were huge, complex organisms, and, as such, they were vulnerable. For example, they had no commissary arrangements, hence they

had to live off the land. This condemned them to be constantly on the move, foraging for supplies. To be sure, in lush environments, the armies could sit still and gather in the riches of the countryside. But Spain wasn't like that. Spain was a poor land, prone to frequent famines. As a consequence, as soon as the Imperial Army descended on it, stripping it bare like a horde of locusts, this presented the local population with a crisis situation. Food, and how to get it became tied up with one's very existence.

We can theorize that it was this existential need that originally drove the guerrilleros to take action. In any event, once the guerrilleros bands formed, they were able to benefit from a number of fortuitous circumstances. For one thing, in Spain there were few serviceable roads, and thus, the Imperial Army was forced, in its foraging expeditions, to follow certain well-laid-out routes.

The guerrilleros, many of them, had formerly pursued the vocation of smuggler, and as a result they knew all of the back country trails, the hidden byways.³¹ This enabled them to move swiftly about the countryside and to lay their ambushes so that the French were easily surprised. Then, once the supply convoys were overwhelmed, the guerrilleros would slip back into the hinterland, where the French could not pursue them.

We can see, then, how Schmitt's theorizing has a sound basis. What turned the trick for the irregulars was the changed setup with the regular armies. Because they were complex organisms; because they had special needs that must be fulfilled; and because the guerrilleros possessed special knowledge that facilitated operations against the French, the practice of irregular warfare, in a manner of speaking, came into its own.

So we can see why, when there had been peasant revolts for ages, those other manifestations went nowhere.³² Peasants of centuries past opposed the princes and their *lansquenects*, whose military organization was never such as could be subverted by a particular tactic which exploited weakness—as was the case with the French army, which, deprived of sustenance, died.

Clausewitz, the greatest modern theorist of war, enthused over partisan war (as Schmitt styled it).³³ War of this type, in his estimate, was pure, elementally so: this was a people's war, in the sense of the people, on their own initiative, taking up arms against the occupier. And what were the people fighting for? Their land. That is what made partisan war, according to Clausewitz, worthy of admiration.³⁴ (Another theorist, Jover Zamora, styled this type of war tellurian.³⁵)

Clausewitz claimed that, in electing to fight, the partisans sought to preserve their way of life, or, as he put it, "their altars, their hearths."³⁶ This was a purely defensive type of war, and in that regard, said Clausewitz, "it was the most beautiful there is."³⁷

Schmitt takes notes of the master's judgment; but points out that, in thinking as he did, Clausewitz was in the minority. After Napoleon's

defeat, the ruling class in Europe, at the Congress of Vienna, established rules of war that sharply differentiated what sort of conduct was permissible; what was to be legal (legal was regular; irregular was impermissible). Under the new code of war, the irregular was proscribed; the partisan became marginalized and remained so up till World War I.³⁸

Before Spain, wars were ritualized events, exercises carried on by aristocrats. The elites fought each other in a stylized form of combat wherein the battle was the payoff—everything pointed to it. The elites maneuvered to bring their dispute to a confrontation on the field of battle, the aim being to decide the issue that divided them; to achieve a result whereby one side would concede defeat, and, in the peacemaking stage, make concessions that the other could accept; in that way, the system was preserved.

But with irregular war, what goes on, actually? Partisans avoid battle. They fight by night whenever possible. And, rather than forming up in regular formations, they slink about, attacking from carefully laid ambushes; most importantly, they don't wear uniforms, which allows them during the day to pass as innocent, uninvolved civilians. In this type of war, the name of the game, so to speak, is not to force a decision, but to drag things out, in the hope of exhausting the enemy's patience and inducing the public at home, in the metropole, to call for an end to hostilities.

Irregular war differed so widely from regular war that, for the nobility of those far-off times, it was almost incomprehensible what went on with it, but at the same time the upper classes recognized that it was dangerous. Putting guns in the people's hands could empower them, or, if it did not do this directly, it provided openings for revolutionaries to agitate amongst them.

Not that guerrilleros were all that revolutionary. As Schmitt notes the original guerrilleros were primitive, preindustrial, unconventional-type people. Surprising (to a modern day reader introduced to guerrilla war through learning about Che Guevara), the guerrilleros fought for the king, and for religion—the old ways, in other words. They opposed the so-called *Afrancesados*, liberal, upper-class Spaniards who had sided with Napoleon and against the dynasty in Spain.

Great Britain, which had come to Spain to oppose Napoleon, surveyed the guerrilleros' primitive attack methods, and pronounced them remarkably sound, under the circumstances.³⁹ Thus, Britain undertook to sponsor the guerrillas. Hence, a war, which might have petered out relatively quickly without British assistance, was able to keep going. Ultimately, the French were defeated in Spain.⁴⁰

This result obviously was off-putting to the elites of Europe. That wars could be waged by a mere rabble in arms; that civilians could defeat regular military, was disturbing; it raised the prospect of a system at risk. Clemens Wenzel Lothar von Metternich, the Austrian statesman and

diplomat, at the Congress of Vienna, specified that partisan-type war was criminal.⁴¹ A partisan, caught in the act, merited immediate execution, before a firing squad; no trial was considered, much less permitted.

At the same time, however, Metternich was at pains to protect civilians in wartime. He drafted the most elaborate code to see to it that they were not despoiled, neither of their property nor of their lives, his aim being, apparently, to give the civilians no reason to involve themselves in war fighting. As a result, Europe enjoyed a period of years where partisan activity practically died out.⁴² (There was one conspicuous reappearance in 1870, in the Franco-Prussian War, of so-called *Franc-tireurs* [sharp shooters], and here the Prussians dealt with the guerrillas as prescribed by Metternich—on capture, they were shot.⁴³)

This is the first point that Schmitt seeks to underscore: that a form of war which, under certain conditions, could prove marvelously effective, was to the statesman of the period anathema. The system leaders were at pains to see that it did not occur.

Nonetheless, in as much as irregular war, from a tactical standpoint, was demonstrably effective, it could not be ruled out. Indeed, before the Spanish insurrection was over, the Russians adopted this style of fighting to repulse Napoleon's invasion in 1812. The Czar had observed what was going on in Spain and approved the adoption of irregular warfare tactics, relying on the Russian *mujiks*, along with the Cossacks, to harass the Imperial Army both in its invasion of Russia and in its retreat from Moscow.⁴⁴ One could say that the genie was out of the bottle.

Guerrillas next make their appearance (in a big way) in World War II, when Stalin utilizes them against Hitler's Barbarossa Operation, authorizing the formation of partisan units to fight behind the German lines. Along with that he extended support to guerrillas elsewhere, primarily in the Balkans.⁴⁵ But in doing so, Stalin faced a problem of how to both energize the partisans and control them. He could not, obviously, appeal to them on the basis of furthering the cause of international communism, since the partisan/guerrilla fights only to preserve his homeland, which is the antithesis of internationalism. Stalin's solution was to shift the focus of his appeal. Instead of communism, he promoted the cause of "holy, mother Russia." This worked, apparently, but even so the Soviet leader did not trust the partisans. He routinely salted their units with commissars to keep an eye on them, and he rationed their ammunition. Whenever, as occurred in the Ukraine, they seemed on the point of breaking free from communist control, he crushed them ruthlessly.

It was during this period that the practice of guerrilla war became associated with third world revolution. For, after the Second World War, the guerrillas continued to receive backing from the communists against the colonialists. The British; the French; the Japanese; and the nationalist Chinese, under Chiang Kai-shek, all were beset by guerrillas.

According to Schmitt, it was the unwillingness of the superpowers to risk war with each other (as both being possessors of the atom bomb, this would have lead to Armageddon) that induced them to sponsor proxy wars, where the style of fighting was that of the guerrilla (at least, on the communist side).⁴⁶

After World War II, there was an attempt made with Geneva Conventions to reinstitute Metternich's martial law prohibitions against partisan warfare, and Stalin objected.⁴⁷ Guerrillas, as long as they were sponsored by state actors, could not be so treated, Stalin claimed. If the guerrilla bands received support of states, they should be seen as legitimate political entities, and be accorded the same treatment as regulars under the rules of war. Thus, political commitment became the criteria of legality.

Here, Schmitt notes an interesting paradox. It was not state actors who were promoting partisan warfare during the World War II period and after. It was revolutionary parties.

The association of guerrilla war with revolution caused the democracies to look on it with disfavor. The United States certainly was opposed, the British and the French even more so, since it was their colonial empires that were coming under assault by the guerrillas.

The most confounding development along these lines (for the West) was the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek at the hands of Maoist guerrillas. Mao Tse-tung, formerly ruler of China, assigned practically the whole achievement of defeating first the imperial Japanese army and subsequently the Chinese nationalists to the guerrillas.⁴⁸ Whereas Stalin had employed partisans as adjuncts, to supplement the main effort of the Red Army, Mao reversed the process: guerrillas took on the whole brunt of the war fighting, with the regular army only coming in at the kill, so to speak, to finish off the enemy and dictate the peace.⁴⁹

Also with Mao, there was another great departure. Mao's army was primitive. Unlike that of the Soviet Union, it comprised mainly individuals of peasant origin; one could say that, with Mao, the agrarian element had come into its own. That peasants could take the lead in protracted land-war campaigns seems impossible to credit, the more so because they were fighting nationalist troops armed with American-supplied weapons. The Maoists set up training schools to teach the peasants how to handle modern arms. And as to where the communists acquired the weapons they trained with—in many cases they got them from the nationalists. Deserters from Chiang Kai-shek's army, in going over to the Reds, brought their weapons with them. The Reds also seized arms from the nationalists.

It was during this period that the character of the guerrilla underwent change. The old free-wheeling spirit of the guerrilleros, and of the *Franc-tireurs* of the 1870s disappeared, more or less. In both Russia and China totalitarian governments reigned, and they naturally sought to impose

the tightest control on the people's armies. I've already alluded to how Stalin kept a check on the partisans. In the case of the Maoists, and later with Vietnam, professional revolutionaries indoctrinated the cadres; the recruits were subjected to training sessions wherein ideology was inculcated.

It's problematic, I think, how much ideology played a role in maintaining discipline. I think a greater influence would have to be the land reform. Wherever the communists set up, they instituted land reform, seizing the property of the upper class landlords and turning it over to the peasants. This acted on the peasants' land hunger, but it also worked to focus their consciousness. The landlords (many of whom were executed) became the symbolic representation of the enemy. And, if one goes along with Schmitt, identifying the enemy is the first law of politics.

In any event, Schmitt notes this change and claims that during the period of the 1950s and 1960s the people's armies were staffed with cogs (his word), who served as cannon fodder. (In line with this, it's interesting to note that this was the period in which the so-called human wave attacks were developed—used in Korea, but also at Dien Bien Phu, in Indo China. Here, masses of infantry were thrown at entrenched positions spewing forth deadly fire, which naturally resulted in huge losses. One would have to be something of an automaton to engage in this kind of warfare.)

Whatever went on, peoples' war, during this time, did appear to be uncommonly successful. After the triumph of Mao came Vietnam, and then Algeria. Algeria is of special interest, because here a pattern emerged of ex-colonial soldiers taking charge. The leadership of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) comprised a number of ex-noncommissioned officers, who, having served with the French in Indo-China, returned home, where, rather than resubmit themselves to colonial rule, they turned on their erstwhile masters. A pernicious development for the French, because these noncommissioned officers, having served in a modern army, knew how to handle modern weapons, knowledge that they wielded against the French.

About the French: the next great transformation in irregular war comes with them. General Raoul Salan, who oversaw the French colonial army in Vietnam (and later performed the same role in Algeria), confronted a dilemma similar to that of the French marshal's in Spain: he couldn't distinguish who were the partisans because the guerrillas didn't wear uniforms and did not constitute regularly organized fighting units. Desperate for intelligence, Salan resorted to measures of collective punishment.⁵⁰ Since the people knew whom the guerrillas were, and would not deliver them up to the French, the people, in Salan's view, could be held accountable—indeed, complicit. For Salan, it was defensible to practice disreputable methods of pacifying native communities.

Salan did more. Impressed with the guerrillas' ability to infiltrate practically all areas of colonial society, so that even house boys of the colonial administrators were suborned, the Frenchmen concluded that, against such unorthodox tactics, unorthodoxies of a similar kind were required, and out of that realization he developed the doctrine of counterinsurgency, whereby the authorities abandoned traditional ways of responding and instead developed newer, more innovative methods.

Effectively, what Salan had done was to resurrect an old idea, one familiar to military men from times past, that is that in order to fight the guerrilla one has to become one.⁵¹ The guerrilla style of war, from its inception, was brutal. (Witness: Goya's lithographs, *The Disasters of War*, a kind of on-the-spot record of the horrors of the Peninsula War.) The French reconfigured their units, shrinking them in size, and deployed them undercover. They prowled the Casbah in Algiers, stalking suspected terrorists, whom they then dispatched, *à la Metternich*, without trial, executing the victims summarily. These were assassination squads. The French worked to acquire informants, netting them by various coercive means. All of which is to say that counterinsurgency while it may have proved effective in very many instances, raised problems of its own. It was not anything that French officialdom would countenance, at least publicly.

Under Salan's dispensation, the very character of irregular war changed. It became, as the French styled it, *psyche war*. And it was the people's psyches that were being acted on—both those of the colons and of the natives. The fights that erupted between death squads and guerrillas took place, a good many of them, in the public's midst. It was an aim of the guerrillas to create no-go areas, non-public space within the public sphere (Schmitt's phrase). The authorities, to make their administration work, needed access to all areas of the polity. The guerrillas by undermining security in the central city (by setting off bombs and such) made this practically impossible.

Schmitt thinks that the guerrillas accomplished a great thing here. He says, in effect, what they did was pioneer a whole new dimension of warfare, that of the underground.

In any event, by the late 1960s this brutal, psychologically oriented type of war—irregular war, reconstituted for the modern era—was going on all over the globe. Effectively, what had happened was that, with Salan's espousal of counterinsurgency the focus of battle in irregular war had shifted to the public space. Wars moved into the cities. This was the case in Vietnam, and certainly it was so in Algeria.⁵²

All of this, Schmitt points out, raised formidable questions for international lawyers. With both guerrillas and authorities, in effect, beating up on the populace—terrorizing them—who was the criminal? This, of course, goes back to the question I raised above about Bush's trying to tar the insurgents for, as he charged, using human shield tactics.

After the 1950s and 1960s and the development of counterinsurgency, the line between criminal and protector of the people blurred. From the people's standpoint, one could argue, the attitude was a plague on both your houses! The people were caught in an impossible bind, being subject to torment by both parties.

We—or rather Schmitt—has now isolated three crucial areas on which the analyst should focus in looking into the phenomenon (of what really goes on in irregular war). First of all, the problem of how to control the people-in-arms is a real one. Individuals, peasants, for example, who have never been empowered under the ancien regime, in possession of arms may do anything. If the militant cadres are to stay in charge, so as to direct the course of events, they have to impose discipline.

Second, the transfer of the locus of activity to the public space is a crucial development, as it affects the kill ratio (if I can so describe it). Civilians (who are not combatants) get involved and they die, suffering in ways previously not even imagined. And this, as I noted above, challenges the constraints previously adhered to under the rules of war.

And, finally, one more development needs to be considered. One of the basic insights analysts of irregular war (in the West, specifically, this is so) have come to is that irregular war is asymmetrical. By that it is understood that the irregulars are disadvantaged by not having access to all of the technology modern armies can employ. But, what we see when we analyze how the irregulars have performed over the years is that they are ingenious in their ability to adapt the technology to their uses. What has enabled irregularity in war fighting to persist is the innovations wrought in tactics. Take, for example, the development of the roadside bomb and shaped charge in Iraq. These sorts of tactics are primitive, but marvelously effective.

Now, in the next chapter I want to shift the focus back to the Middle East, specifically to the Levant, to consider the phenomenon of the fedayeen fighter in Palestine and Lebanon. I'm going to try to make the point that events in Iraq cannot be understood except in context of what went on in the Arab-Israeli dispute in the years between the 1970s and the present day.

CHAPTER 3

Land Wars

When formed, in the 1960s, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) embodied the Palestinian resistance. However, the PLO *was not* a people's movement, in the sense that it sprang from them. The PLO was a creation of Nasser when the Egyptian president led the movement of Arab nationalism.¹

The outcome of the 1967 war was such that Arab nationalism was seen to have been discredited. Arab arms had not won back territory lost to the Israelis; the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) was too strong for that; the Arab states lacked the means to overcome the Israelis' technological advantage.

It was then that Nasser promoted the idea of the Palestinian resistance, a popular movement ostensibly, whereby the focus of Arab attempts to regain lost lands would be on the people: the PLO, by carrying on the Arabs' fight, would keep the cause of Arab nationalism alive. Meanwhile, the Arab states could build up their military capability to have another go at the Israelis.

All of which may seem natural and straightforward—in fact it was not. The PLO cadres did not behave as legitimate resistance fighters. Although they carried out commando-type raids into Israel (initially from Jordan, where they first were situated), the operations had scant military value; they mainly were undertaken for publicity purposes.² In that sense they could almost be seen as stunts—and that, I think, was somewhat the case with the airline seizures, where specialized teams of commandoes would hijack liners to hold the carriers up for ransom and thus embarrass the Israelis.³

Over time, it did appear that more and more of the Palestinians' operations were geared toward grabbing headlines, as, for example, the highly publicized attack on Israel's team at the world Olympics in 1972, or the

takeover of the Achille Laura. Raiding, a traditional form of partisan resistance, if it didn't die out, was subordinated to operations designed to attract the world's attention.

At the same time, however, it would be wrong to denigrate the importance of this period. This was the era when the fedayeen image was popularized all over the world. The figure of the Palestinian commando draped in kefeiyah and brandishing a Kalashnikov became an icon, of sorts, as ubiquitous as that of the image of Che Guevera. However, the fedayeen image was, if anything, more appealing, to a certain class of youth, in particular. Behind that mask, of the shrouded fedayeen fighter, any personality could lurk, even a nerdy high school kid.

Still, the fact of the matter is, popular involvement in the cause of Palestinian nationalism was limited. The Palestinian community inside Israel remained passive. Indeed, the Palestinians resident in the occupied territories provided cheap labor for the Israelis. Israel made the most of this apparent submissiveness, dismissing the resistance as a phony, which—in the sixties and early seventies, at least—it did appear, to a certain extent, to be.

The real, true popular involvement did not come until 1988 with the *intifadah* (which I'll discuss below). To understand how that came about we have to shift our focus to Lebanon.

When the PLO was driven out of Jordan in 1970, it relocated in Lebanon.⁴ This was not a development of which the Lebanese approved; indeed many of the Lebanese looked on the Palestinians with mistrust, contempt even.⁵ Nasser, however, prevailed on the Lebanese government to take the cadres in. Had the PLO been content merely to shelter in Lebanon, its presence there might not have occasioned difficulty. However, Nasser wanted it to remain active, and so, establishing base camps on the Lebanese-Israeli border, the cadres began raiding into Israel; this aggravated the Lebanese' unease.

The Israelis' response to being raided was to raid back, indiscriminately targeting Lebanese and Palestinians alike with their air force, an impossible situation for the Lebanese. Moreover, the Palestinians behaved in an arrogant manner: they lorded it over the Lebanese, swanning about, armed and truculent. This had the effect of souring whatever fellow-feeling the Lebanese might have had for them.

Ultimately in 1975, the Christian Lebanese, the so-called Maronites, attacked the Palestinians, which initiated the infamous Lebanese Civil War.⁶ In the give-and-take between the forces, the Palestinians early got the upper hand, and looked for a time to be bent on finishing off the Christians. The PLO succeeded in penning up a sizeable contingent inside the town of Zahle (in the ante Lebanon, just above Beirut).

The then-Christian president of Lebanon, Suleiman Franjiyah, in despair, called on Hafiz Assad, the Syrian president, to send troops; separate the belligerents; and broker a truce.⁷ Assad complied.

Assad had the reputation throughout his life of a master intriguer. A cunning operator, he was notorious for playing weak hands into jackpot winnings. He was a Machiavellian who shifted strategies as circumstance seemed to warrant, as was the case in this instance of his coming to the aid of Franjijah.

In inserting Syrian troops into Lebanon, Assad foreswore Arab nationalist ideology: he focused on curbing the Palestinians, and acted in a way that shocked many in the Arab world—it did most certainly appear that he was out to crush the PLO entirely. However, this was not the case. Assad merely had perceived that the geopolitical balance in the region was tipping. The Israelis were inching towards a major invasion of Lebanon, which inevitably would have drawn Syria into a fight it was in no position to take on.⁸

After having subdued the PLO and gotten away with it, the Syrian troops settled down in Lebanon; they took over the whole of the Bekka Valley, effectively annexing it to Syria. In a manner of speaking the Lebanese had gone from the frying pan into the fire.

Paradoxically, in performing this maneuver of settling into the Bekka, Assad produced the very result that he had entered Lebanon to forestall. The Israelis were not about to let him aggrandize himself at their expense. In 1982, Menahim Begin, Israel's then-prime minister in a Likud government, aided and abetted by Ariel Sharon, Israel's then-defense minister (another Likud politician), launched the long-feared invasion (actually, as it turned out, this was a war). It was brutal, it was intense, and it carried on right up to the outskirts of Beirut. However, when the Palestinians fell back into the capital (wherein they intended to make their stand), the IDF halted, not daring to enter the city, because there the Israelis' high-tech advantage would be neutralized. (As I showed above, urban guerrilla war in built-up areas is casualty intensive.)

When the standoff developed, Israel turned to the United States for relief. Then-president Reagan responded by sending U.S. Marines to intervene. Essentially, the Marines were tasked to perform the same operation as the Syrians: lift the siege (of Beirut); extract the beleaguered defenders (the Palestinians) and arrange a truce. The Americans certainly expected to get this over with quickly. This, however, was not to be, for a combination of reasons.

In going into Lebanon, Reagan put together what he called a Multi-National Force (MNF), made up of European nations (some from NATO). He did this because he disapproved of the United Nations (which, by rights, should have been tasked with the operation), and therefore, in a manner of speaking, he was dissing the world body.⁹

The Syrians observed the maneuver and put their own peculiar spin on it. They saw the appearance of NATO in the region as a geopolitical threat. It so happened that Iran, Syria's ally at the time, drew the same conclusion.

The reasons it did are too complex to go into here. Suffice it to say that the Syrians and Iranians convinced themselves they were being subjected to a pincers attack—by NATO from the direction of Beirut, and by the Turks (another NATO power) from northern Iraq.¹⁰

Both Syria and Iran mobilized to meet the putative threat. Among the actions undertaken by Iran, it sent Revolutionary Guards to Lebanon to bolster the Syrians.¹¹ This may have been what motivated Tehran to get involved in the Lebanon embroglio.¹²

The Guards set up camps in the Bekka (which they could do since the region was under Syrian control). And although initially they seemed merely to be standing by in case the feared NATO thrusts materialized, gradually the Guards began reaching out to the Lebanese Shia community, their co-religionists.

In 1983 a series of ghastly attacks occurred, where suicide bombers—Shias apparently—drove bomb-laden trucks into the compounds of the American and the French peacekeepers and subsequently that of the IDF. The American death toll reached 241.

That was sufficiently dismaying as to unnerve Reagan. He speedily withdrew the Marines, a major embarrassment to the Americans.

Perhaps impressed with the success of these initial essays, the Iranians now went further. They recruited Lebanese Shia youth to come to the Bekka, where, in their newly established camps, they trained them as guerrilla fighters. It was in this way that Hizbollah developed into being one of the most formidable guerrilla outfits in the Middle East, if not the world.

The Shias had a grievance, which the Iranians shrewdly appreciated and which their offer of employment (for, basically, that's what this was) could address. In retreating from Beirut, the Israelis had not departed entirely out of the country. They had stopped just short of the Lebanese-Israeli border, inside a so-called security zone they had set up after a previous smaller invasion in 1978. This aggravated what was already a tense situation with the Lebanese Shia community, which calls this area home.¹³

Moreover, the Lebanese government did nothing to rectify the situation—indeed, it could not: the government was/is notoriously weak.¹⁴

However, the government's action (or rather it's lack of same) had the effect of disenfranchising the Shias. Not only were they bereft of their land, there was no longer any material aid coming to them from Beirut. The Shias, the largest sect in Lebanon, traditionally have occupied the lowest rung on the socioeconomic ladder. Desperately poor, they barely got by when they were under Beirut's governance. Now they were worse off than they'd ever been.

To compensate the Shias, the Iranians created a welfare system, doling out subsistence in various forms. Thus, in a relatively short period, the Iranians, in effect, had significantly altered the terms of reference in the area.

The IDF may have congratulated itself on driving the PLO away (under the terms of the American-brokered truce, it was forced to relocate to Tunisia). However, now, with the appearance of the Shias as trained (howbeit rudimentarily) guerrilla fighters, the power balance was reset, so to speak.

We shift our focus back to the occupied territories.

As I indicated above the Palestinians residing inside the territories were quiescent; they didn't appear to be touched by the fight going on across the border in Lebanon. The United Nations administered to their basic needs in the camps, and all-in-all, materially the community seemed reasonably well off.

However, with the driving away of the PLO to Tunisia, this situation began to change. Whereas Israel's Labor Party had been open to conciliation with the Arabs, Likud was uncompromisingly hostile. The abrupt (and somewhat enigmatic) abdication of power by Begin,¹⁵ which might have presaged a policy change, had no such result: Begin's successor, Itzak Shamir, was similarly indisposed to resolving matters by peaceful means. Moreover, Sharon was a power in the new government, and he was dead set against allowing the Palestinians to continue *in situ*. Sharon's "solution" to the crisis was that the Palestinian community should relocate to Jordan: if the Palestinians wanted a home, they could find it there, he said.

All of this set the stage for the intifadah (intifadah, in Arabic, means spasm or frisson), which came about in this way.¹⁶ One of Sharon's tactics was to gin up ultra nationalist Jewish groups like the Gush Emunim. Gush commandoes terrorized the Palestinians.¹⁷ For example, on February 25, 1994, there was the infamous incident of a young American-born Jew going into a mosque in Hebron armed with grenades and a machine gun and killing 60 Palestinians while they were at prayer.¹⁸

So charged did the atmosphere in the territories become that by the late 1980s the area was in an uproar: the Palestinian population began showing signs of serious derangement. There was an upsurge of stabbings in the territories: Palestinians began to run amok, attacking passersby on the streets, indiscriminately striking out at Arabs as well as Jews.¹⁹ There was an incident where a Palestinian riding on a bus, apparently on impulse, wrenched the wheel from the driver and drove it over a cliff.²⁰ There were Palestinian attempts to immure themselves, seal off their communities. Barricades of burning tires were thrown up, behind which youths pelted the Israeli police with rocks.

On December 9, 1987, an incident occurred which was to trigger the intifadah. An Israeli Jew drove his truck into two vehicles packed with Palestinian laborers killing four.²¹ The Israeli authorities claimed that this was an accident; the Palestinians viewed it as deliberate manslaughter. That set off rioting which went on for days.

Roughly coincidentally with this, in the United States, Perle's campaign of freeing Soviet Jewry had begun making headway. As I indicated above, the campaign was portrayed to the world as a human rights endeavor. However, as Perle managed it, it was meant to benefit Israel. Perle intended that the Russian refusniks, so-called, should immigrate to Israel. He purposed this even though the publicized aim of the campaign was to secure "free immigration." The Russians who were allowed to leave supposedly could go anywhere in the world.

The United States, which originally had espoused a program of unrestricted immigration, subsequently amended its policy. As the campaign developed, the principle of free immigration was abandoned. Washington fell in line with Perle's aim of directing the refugee flow to Israel.²² In other words, it was no longer sufficient for the Soviets to allow the Jews to leave; their departure had to be directed.

Thus by 1990, plane loads of Soviet Jews began arriving in Israel. Suddenly, the Palestinians in the occupied territories perceived themselves under siege. Sharon, who was now the housing and development minister, directed the new arrivals from Russia to the territories where, under various pretexts, homes were found for them—on Arab land.

The full horror of the Palestinians' predicament thus was made plain: the PLO, having been driven across the seas to Tunisia was removed from interfering in events in Palestine. Who, therefore, was there to protect the captive Palestinians?

This combination of events: the activity of Sharon and the ultra nationalist Jewish groups, and the adventitious, for the Israelis, consequence of the Americans' bowing to Perle's intent of directing the immigration, caused the intifadah to burst fully out of control.

This was a purely spontaneous uprising. The PLO had no hand in it, and even Hamas, which later took charge of the uprising, was surprised by it.²³ One could say that the artificial nature of what had been advertised up till then as a popular resistance was exposed. Only belatedly did the PLO insert itself into the revolt, and then it counseled pursuing tactics of passive resistance, a so-called white intifadah. The mood of the Palestinians was, anything but! The disposition was to resist, violently, and it was its alert reading of the popular mood that enabled Hamas to take over, effectively sidelining the secular leadership of the PLO.

Israel, in reaction to this spontaneous revolt, which was now sweeping the territories, rounded up 415 Palestinians, whom it claimed were ring leaders, and expelled them to Lebanon, something which was against international law: an occupying power can't arbitrarily change the status of a people under occupation.²⁴

The United Nations, aware of the principle at stake here, sided with the expelled Palestinians, insisting they be repatriated. In the end the world body made its authority felt; the Palestinians were returned. But by then

the situation had changed irretrievably. For the Israelis had tipped their hand, showing themselves intent on driving the community out by any means.

At this point, we note a significant change in tactics on the Palestinians' part. Up till now the resistance inside the territories, such as it was, consisted of rioting, mainly: youths facing down police in the streets, battling fiercely, armed with nothing but rocks in most cases. However, at this juncture a new organization appeared, the so-called Islamic Jihad.²⁵ This was a Muslim group, radical in the way of Gush Emunim. It was small, and I don't know that it's ever been established where it came from. Certainly, it did not appear that any of the Arab states had set it up. One theory, which, I think, can be credited, is that Jihad originated in the Israeli prisons. As part of the Israelis' campaign to get control of the intifadah, they rounded up thousands of adult Arab males, on no specific charge—if they were of an age to join the resistance, they qualified for imprisonment.²⁶ In the jails, the more violent types proselytized, and out of that Jihad appeared.

At any rate, Jihad introduced tactics of violence not previously associated with the Palestinian cause. In fact, the tactics seemed to derive from the Algerian insurrection. The Jihadis wielded bombs, detonating them in public places (for sure this was an Algerian tactic); however, with the added fillip that the Jihadis didn't merely plant the bombs to go off when they were safely away—they blew themselves up, taking as many people with them as possible. Being a religious organization, basically, it perhaps made sense that Jihad should embrace martyrdom, a principle of the Muslim faith, although up till this point martyrdom operations were confined, pretty much, to the Shias. (It's significant that this development came after the Israelis had expelled the Palestinians to Lebanon, since it was there that the two peoples—Palestinians and Lebanese Shias—formed ties, and swapped ideas, we must imagine.)

I want to underscore this development. As long as the PLO was in charge of the fight against Israel, the activity was restricted to more or less traditional forms of resistance. Actions were carried on from bases in Lebanon, while inside the territories the Palestinian community remained, as I said, largely inactive. Further, the fact of the PLO being dependent on Egypt, and the rest of the Arab states, imparted a measure of control by these outside parties over the movement. The PLO was not autonomous, in any true sense.

As I say, as far as anyone could tell, no one backed Jihad. Indeed, there was no need for outside aid. The kind of tactics they employed was, in a manner of speaking, labor intensive. For example, they went after collaborators, of which there were quite a few in the territories. Finding them, they killed them. In one famous instance the group actually convened a kangaroo court inside one of the camps, tried and executed a suspected

collaborator—all out in the open, without the Israelis having an inkling of what went on.²⁷ This, for the Israelis was an impossible state of affairs; they were being blindsided. But it also had a bad affect on the Palestinian society. Without any strong organization to exert discipline, elements in the community, disposed to undertake criminal activity, began appearing. Instances of violence were recorded which had nothing to do with the resistance. Gangs practiced extortion, and there were even sexual crimes—rape, for example—and this, for a Muslim society was extraordinary.

The Israelis responded by forming so-called special groups; in fact, these were assassination squads, a la the French in Vietnam and Algeria. The squads would infiltrate the territories in disguise and, locating wanted individuals (lawbreakers or political types), they would cut them down, summarily in the street.²⁸ No attempt was made to capture the targeted individuals; they were killed on the spot.

As I say, in practicing such tactics, the Israelis were emulating the French, and, as had occurred with the French, this approach produced untoward results. The resort to terror, on both sides (Palestinians and Israelis), destroyed whatever semblance of calm remained in the territories. The Palestinian community now became completely disturbed. No one knew anymore who was a terrorist or an Israeli hit man lurking undercover, waiting to strike. Under such conditions, violence could explode at any moment: one minute there was calm; the next carnage. And as the situation became more and more disrupted, normal routines were affected: the community ceased almost to function. A dysfunctional community is not a productive one, and this meant that the Palestinians' former utility to the Israelis was impaired: they no longer were available as cheap labor. The territories had become a battleground.

Meanwhile, back in Lebanon, Assad, bereft of support from the Soviet Union (which had collapsed by then), turned once again to his ally, the Iranians. At Assad's behest, Tehran began flying planes loaded with arms to Damascus. There, they were off-loaded, so the Syrians might convey the arms to the south, putting them in the hands of the Hizbollahis. The Hizbollahis then began conducting operations inside Israel's security zone, targeting an outfit called the South Lebanon Army (SLA). This was a client group Israel had fabricated to look out for its interests in the south. The SLA, composed mainly of Maronite Christians, policed the zone, freeing the IDF from having to maintain a presence in the area.

Under repeated pummeling by the Hizbollahis, the SLA began to disintegrate; SLA fighters deserted in droves. In time, the zone became exposed, necessitating the return of the IDF.

At that point the Iranians began supplying newer, more lethal weapons to the Hizbollahis. Formerly, the Shias were vulnerable, because the quality of arms they used was inferior. The Katushya rockets on which they especially relied were short-range. This exposed them to retaliation.

As soon as they mounted an attack, the Israeli air force would zoom in to conduct search-and-destroy maneuvers, usually successfully. Now, however, with longer-range weapons the Hizbollahis could attack from greater distances, which increased their escape time. In that way the situation heated up appreciably. Moreover, they used these long-range rockets to shell Israeli nahals (these are supposedly villages, in fact, these are forts, manned by Israeli paramilitary units).

In July 1993, the Israelis, apparently their patience at an end, launched a full-scale assault on Lebanon.²⁹ This was the so-called Operation Accountability. The IDF fired some 25,000 rounds of artillery over the border into the south, and kept it up for seven days, causing some 250,000 Shias to flee the south to Beirut, Lebanon's capital (with civilian casualties of over 150 killed, 500 wounded). The UN Secretary General, Boutros Ghali, reacted with, for a UN official, uncharacteristic anger. He called on the world community to witness this "deplorable" behavior of the Israelis in creating more refugees in a part of the world already overrun with them, some dating from 1948.³⁰

In undertaking this operation, the Israelis may have been seeking to pressure Assad into curbing the Shias. But if that was the aim, it didn't work. Assad, the savvy politician, was not impressed. In his view the Israelis were compromised having to hold onto their security zone: they could not (or would not) leave, and, as long as they stayed, they were exposed to attack.

In 1991 Clinton, who was now president in the United States, invited the Arabs and Israelis to the United States for peace talks. The talks stalled, however, when Clinton, who had posed as an honest broker, threw his support behind an Israeli "solution" which patently favored the Jews. At that point Assad withdrew from the negotiations.³¹ And with that he let the Hizbollahis off the leash, so to speak. Whereas in the past, Assad had kept a more or less tight control over the Hizbollahis, now he let them have at the Israelis—no holds barred.

In April 1996, another major operation was carried out by the Hizbollahis. This occurred after the Hizbollahis had shelled the Israeli village of Kiryat Shimona.³² This latter retaliation was much more severe. Dubbed Operation Grapes of Wrath, the IDF assault involved wholesale bombing, not just of the south but of Beirut and the north as well.

Lebanon had suffered grievously in the 1982–1983 war (and in the civil war of the 1970s). Its capital Beirut had been blasted. However, the Lebanese, nothing if not resourceful, had succeeded in rebuilding, and, in effect, they made the capital even more grand, more opulent. This they did under the direction of their newly elected president, Rafik Hariri. Hariri, a Sunni Arab and self-made billionaire, wangled aid from the Saudis, with whom he had close ties (he also contributed money of his own), and as a consequence he showed the world the so-called Lebanese miracle, a practically rebuilt country.

In 1996, the Israelis, with their Grapes of Wrath operation, essayed to set the Lebanese back to where they were immediately after the 1982–1983 invasion, at least this was Hariri's interpretation.³³ Hariri claimed that Israeli acted out of pure spite, being envious that, as a result of Lebanon's revival, the economy there was booming while Israel's had experienced a decline. There may have been elements of this, but I don't think that Hariri's explanation covers all of the facts. I think that, after Operation Accountability, the Israelis were frustrated, because, if anything, the depredations of the Hizbollahis had increased, becoming more effective. And so the Israelis shifted strategy. By focusing their attacks on the whole of the Shia community, they aimed to show that support for Hizbollah was unwise, and therefore that the Shias would do well to repudiate the Hizbollahis. Essentially, this was a repeat of the tactic Salan employed in Vietnam, but given the scale of the Israelis' operation it was much more destructive. With their American-supplied super-lethal weapons, the Israelis had the ability to degrade Lebanese Shia society, and that's what they did—or, at least, attempted to do.

In any event, the destruction wrought by Israel bordered on the apocalyptic. The IDF hit everything: they cratered roads, blew up bridges, destroyed the electric grid, and carpeted the whole of the south with cluster bombs. This last was certainly an anti-personnel tactic, since it made it difficult for the Shias to return to their land; effectively, the Israelis had booby trapped it (the whole of it).

The Israelis did one thing more in their campaign, which, to me, gives their game away. On April 18 they shelled a UN refugee camp at Qana, crowded with some 800 Shia refugees. In the process of which they killed over a hundred persons, and wounded scores more.³⁴

Boutros Ghali immediately ordered an investigation of the event, as clearly he viewed the shelling as deliberate. What seemed to add credence to this view was that the Israelis never apologized, unusual under the circumstances. When the report was complete both Israel and the United States pressured Ghali to suppress it. Ghali released the report. Madeleine Albright, who was then the U.S. secretary of state, reacted with anger, claiming that she was "devastated that the Secretary General chose to draw unjustified conclusions about this incident that can only divide and polarize . . ."³⁵

In the end Ghali paid for his gutsyness. He was turned down for a second term as secretary general of the world body, the only such official repudiated, and the thinking was, among the diplomatic community, that the United States had vetoed him for releasing the report.

Why did Israel shell the camp (because, obviously, I, too, feel that it was deliberate)? As I just said, this operation of the Israelis represented a major shift of strategy. The Israelis were aware that under existing rules of international law, they were constrained from suppressing Hizbollah

in any effective way, since to do so meant wreaking destruction on the whole Lebanese Shia community, within which the Hizbollahis sheltered. In every instance where the IDF attacked southern Lebanon, the United Nations condemned the activity, and the resulting furor inevitably mobilized world public opinion against the Jewish state. Therefore, it's my belief that, in deliberately bombing a UN camp, the Israelis were setting about to desanctify the world body. They were aiming to marginalize the United Nations as a factor in resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute (more on this below).

Indeed, there was probably an additional motive. Up till 1972, the Jewish state was not making real headway combating the insurgencies. Then, when Nasser died and the cause of Arab nationalism faltered, Israel sought to take advantage of this by creating facts on the ground: ingathering masses of Soviet Jews, while coincidentally evicting Palestinians, and even going so far as to expel Arabs from the territories, a move, which as I said above, was blocked by the United Nations.

At that point the intifadah erupted, and that was a huge setback for the Israelis because, one, it undercut their line that the fight of the Palestinians was phony, and, two, because, in a series of maladroitness maneuvers, they lost control of events. Having for years presided over a quiescent Palestinian population, the IDF was unschooled in crowd control methods, and, in attempting to suppress the rioting, it precipitated a greater flare-up. Further, whereas under the circumstances it might have expected the rioting to wind down—because the Palestinians were leaderless (with the PLO driven overseas)—that situation was transformed when Hamas took charge of the revolt.

Hamas was a creation of the Muslim Brotherhood organization in Jordan. The Brotherhood, a religious group, was the mainstay of the Hashemite dynasty there, and, as such, a sworn enemy of the PLO, which the king of Jordan, Hussein, viewed as a rival claimant for influence in the territories. Israel, which covertly supported Hussein, also backed Hamas, knowing that it would oppose the PLO, which it did.

However, one of the ultra-right Jewish groups Sharon had encouraged was the so-called Temple Mount Faithful, which sought the dismantling of the al Aqsa Mosque, to restore the site of the original Temple of Solomon on which the mosque is built. When the Faithful, in 1988, attempted to lay a cornerstone on the mount, Hamas erupted, which the Israelis might have anticipated because Hamas, after all, is a religious organization, and, to it, the mosque is sacred.³⁶

Hence, in a matter of 24 hours, one could say, the picture in the territories underwent significant alteration. Palestinian nationalism—support for which had never really been tested—was supplanted by what could be construed as jihad. A whole new cast of oppositionists assumed direction of the fight, in which, as I said above, the PLO was sidelined.

One of the tactics of the PLO had been to discourage armed violence in the territories, manifest in its refusal to sanction the use of weapons. Until Hamas came on the scene, the Palestinians fought with rocks—not small arms. But now, under Hamas' direction that situation changed as shoot-outs developed between militants and IDF units on a practically daily basis.

Then (as outlined above), in the early 1990s, Hizbollah emerged as a formidable opponent of Israel, and thus the Jewish state found itself beset on two fronts. Repeated attempts to suppress the Hizbollahis (and the Palestinians) while observing the constraints imposed by the rule of law were consistently proven counterproductive (for Israel's purposes). Thus, in Israeli eyes, the enemy was not only the formal entity, the United Nations, but the whole concept of international law.

So, I would say that, in the mid-1990s, with Operation Grapes of Wrath, the Israelis turned their backs on playing by the rules. From now on they would rely solely on force; negotiation was out, no longer even to be considered, and that meant that Israel had broken with the so-called two-state solution of the Palestinian problem. The Arabs who opposed the state of Israel as resisters were no longer seen by the Israelis as legitimate representatives of a political movement; they were criminals. And thus any means could be employed against them—even extermination.

Nonetheless, as terrible as the Israelis' counterattack proved, it was yet unsuccessful. Once the IDF stood down, the Hizbollahis reinfiltrated the zone, resuming their attacks, until finally the Israeli public had had enough. With the Labor Party in control in Israel, the party's leader, Ehud Barak, ordered the IDF to abandon the zone.

As a consequence, an entirely new situation has emerged both in Lebanon and in Palestine. Neither in Gaza nor in the south of Lebanon is there now any legitimately constituted government; that is, one recognized under international law. The Hizbollahis have practically repudiated the government in Beirut, claiming that, since only they have the will to resist the Israelis, they will fend for themselves. They have refused to surrender their arms to the Lebanese army, and effectively have shut the government out of administering the south. Thus, was created a separate enclave outside government control.

At the same time, in Palestine, the underground resistance kept up, until finally, in 1994, Israel pulled out of Gaza, as it had done from southern Lebanon. The PLO initially took control there, but its rule was disputed by Hamas, and in subsequent elections the PLO lost out to Hamas, which now dominates the strip. In response to this untoward development, Israel, which as I say, has come to view Hamas as a criminal organization, with which it is indisposed to deal, abruptly escalated the fight by blockading the strip, preventing supplies of all kinds from reaching the interned Palestinians. Hamas, meanwhile, had taken to lobbying

rockets into Israel, and that led, in 2008, to Israel's invasion of Gaza, which I'll discuss in Chapter 6.

Southern Lebanon and Gaza have now developed into twin spheres wherein the resistance should be seen as practically autonomous. Local militias are in charge in both areas. The people look to the militias for protection, whereas previously they looked to the international community. When Nasser was alive support came from Egypt. With the passing of the *ra'is*,³⁷ Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, briefly took on that responsibility. But with the overthrow of the Ba'th by the Americans that source of protection, too, disappeared.

Nor is there any significant protection forthcoming from the United Nations, repeatedly stymied in its attempts to succor the benighted Palestinians (and, to an extent, the Lebanese Shia) community by American obstructionism—all attempts to sanction Israel for its treatment of the captive peoples are blocked by the United States (usually with the aid of Britain) in the Security Council.

In 1870, at a point in the Franco-Prussian War when the Prussian forces were involved in fights with the *Franc-tireurs*, the Prussian general Moltke, who was directing the Prussians, is reported to have said, "We are living in interesting times, when the question of which is preferable, a trained army or a militia, will be solved in action. If the French succeed in throwing us out of France, all the Powers will introduce a militia system, and if we remain the victors, then every state will imitate us with universal service in a standing army."³⁸

What we are witnessing now in the Middle East and Central Asia is, it would appear, a switch over to a militia system—not by the Powers, to be sure, but by the isolated communities of peoples who feel that for their own protection they need a militia.

Hamas is a militia. So is Hizbollah, and now in Iraq militias are proliferating at such a fast rate one can't keep up with them.

These militias, I would argue, have come about because the communities affected have either been betrayed by the governments to which previously they looked for protection, or those governments have found themselves unable to provide for the people's welfare.

This, of course, is a far cry from the judgment of Bush and the Likudniks that the militias come about by a grand design of the Islamists, who are seeking to destroy Western civilization.

In the next chapter I hope to show how the United States is faring with its militia-posed threat in Iraq.

CHAPTER 4

Presence

I indicated above that I disagreed with what I regard as the simplistic notion that the second Iraq War was fought solely to benefit the Israelis. The alternate view, that the war was over oil, this, too, I feel, is overstated (or misconstrued). What I propose to do now is, briefly, give the background of America's involvement in the Gulf, because then we can see that, in fact, the war was over land, land that the U.S. military believed that it must have for geopolitical reasons.

The mass of Americans misunderstand what the United States was after in Iraq. Yes, it was looking to consolidate its hold over the oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf, but this did not mean that it needed physically to possess the oil fields, not of Iraq nor of anywhere else in the Gulf. To be sure, there were parties, influential in bringing about the invasion, who did want this (and I'll explore their motivations in the next chapter); but as far as the country's wanting to seize the fields because this was considered a neat thing to do—no, that wasn't why America went to war.

Critics of the U.S. policy who fail to appreciate this distinction—between having control over something and actually possessing it—miss out on what the war was all about.

The decision to seize land in Iraq, which I think the Americans came to in the 1990s, was related to their need for a base in the region.¹ By means of this base the United States meant to establish its dominance, not just over the Gulf but the whole of the Middle East; and as to why America could not exercise dominion without having to invade and occupy Iraq, that will be brought out below.

Commentators who adjudge that America wanted the oil because the world's supplies were running low, and, therefore, it would be only

prudent to, in effect, sew up this one area of rich supplies—such thinking is wrong (in my view).²

Prior to 2003 the Americans were drawing all of the supplies of oil from the Gulf that they needed. Except for two occasions (one of which I will describe in some detail below) there was never a time when they couldn't count on being supplied. Indeed, from as far back as the 1920s, when American oil companies first moved into this area, the United States never (except for the aforementioned two times) experienced a cutoff.

What the Americans wanted was access. Access is an interesting term: it covers a geopolitical reality; that is, the ability to come and go in the area without let or hindrance. In other words, they wanted to be able to assert their authority in the Gulf, without having to worry about anyone's interfering, which translated into having a military presence there. They wanted this because that way they could assert their hegemony, that which they had had during all the days of the Cold War. Hegemony over anything is valuable; hegemony over a region like the Gulf, where practically all of the world's easily obtainable oil is located, is extraordinarily so. The fact that the Gulf was guarded by the United States during the Cold War translated into perks for the Americans, some quite lucrative, as we'll see.

Originally, it was the big oil companies (the so-called majors) that exercised this kind of control.³ They did this through concessions worked out with the Gulf oil producers. Through the concessions, the companies fixed the price of oil—at a level the companies thought the producers' should accept. The companies determined how much oil would be pumped, and, in the main, the producers went along with the decisions.⁴ This benefited the producers, to whom profit was returned in the form of royalties, but it mainly benefited the companies, since it enabled them to dominate the industry. The oil industry is a natural monopoly; it can't function reliably and efficiently over the long term except in a limited competitive arrangement. However, after the passage of the Sherman Anti-trust Act in the early twentieth century, the majors in the United States had to fear government regulation, which would have come about were oil prices to have gotten significantly out of line, affecting business adversely. The companies, therefore, were motivated to keep the price of oil at a level that would not provoke Congressional action, but which would be remunerative both to them and to the producers.

This system, which in an earlier book I dubbed the International Oil System (IOS), lapsed after 1973 and the Arab oil embargo, because then the producers took control over their native product.⁵ The majors stayed involved as traders for the producers, but their erstwhile dominance over the IOS ceased to operate.⁶ This did not mean that the producers became free agents. Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two main Gulf producers, stayed in, as one might say, with the Americans, because, among other things,

they felt themselves threatened by the Soviet Union. The United States, by offering to form special relationships, first with Iran (under the Shah), then the Saudis, was in that way able to keep up its influence in the region.

The basis of these special relationships was military agreements. The United States declared its readiness to defend the producers from the suppositious threat of overthrow from subversive forces (operating, assumedly, as proxies for the Soviets).⁷ In return for this protection, the producers agreed to work with the United States on matters of pricing and supply.⁸ This had the effect of keeping the price down—not to the level that existed pre-1973, but still to where the United States and the rest of the industrialized West could accommodate it.

But, then, in 1979 the Shah was overthrown, and effectively America had to depend exclusively on the Saudis were it to continue to maintain its access. The special relationship of the Americans with the Saudis had, however, changed considerably. Over time, the Saudis had been induced (by the Americans) to buy enormous quantities of arms, which supposedly their military could use to defend the kingdom.⁹ This, however, was a conceit—this was a pure money transaction, which the Americans had worked up as a nice source of income for themselves.¹⁰

So it transpired that by the mid-1980s, along with having an interest in Gulf oil, the Americans were also financing their arms build-up (against the Russians) on the back of Saudi arms purchases. The Saudis—and the Gulf sheikhdoms—had an additional incentive to buy arms after the Iran-Iraq War erupted: to supply the Iraqis, in order to keep them from being overwhelmed by the Islamic Republic of Iran.¹¹

Then, however, with the end of the Iran-Iraq War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Asia Meltdown in 1998, this scheme, of working with the producers through specially crafted relationships, passed under a cloud. America began to lose influence over what went on in the Gulf, as the Saudis, who had been coordinating oil prices with the United States, scrapped the arrangement (which they now considered prohibitively costly).¹² To be sure, the United States yet managed to stay in with the Saudis, so to speak; but the relationship was much less cordial, due in large part to heavy-handed maneuvers by the Clinton administration (see below).

So, now the question is what prevented the Americans from working out a new arrangement of the old style; that is, one that was basically cooperative? Why did they opt for intervention in the Gulf militarily? For really there was no good reason for invading. Iraq was considerably weakened after its ordeal of having been driven out of Kuwait during the first Iraq War. It constituted no threat to the Americans; nor, in its weakened condition, did it threaten its neighbors. Yet, professing that the Iraqis did constitute such a threat, America mounted this war—not a mere operation, as the Bush administration maintained; this was a full-scale war.

To get at the answer to this question we need to examine that system whereby the oil companies had up till 1973 been able to control oil as a commodity, because it was the forced abandonment of that system (the IOS, that is) that started events moving towards American military takeover.

The distinctive condition of the Persian Gulf up till 1973 was that it was compartmentalized, a situation that the big oil companies actively strived to perpetuate. Being compartmentalized meant that the Gulf was not involved with domestic politics of the United States. Oil was viewed strictly as a commodity; it was never seen as a weapon, which is to say, as a factor having influence over politics. All that the big oil companies were interested in was profit, and as long as the producers did not inject politics into the equation, the situation, in the oil men's minds, was *copacetic*.¹³

It was the 1973 Arab-Israeli War that changed all this, because then, of course, oil did become a weapon, wielded by the Arab states to force the West into making concessions related to the Palestinians, and to Israel's continued occupation of Arab land in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, all of the rejectionist states.

When the war ended and the Arab Oil Embargo was called off, the situation vis a vis the Gulf oil pretty much reverted to the status quo ante bellum. The oil producers, although they had emerged from the war with considerably enhanced control over the commodity, still, in as much as they remained focused on achieving a profit, steered clear of power politicking.¹⁴

The seeds of mistrust were sewn, however, as the world had come to see that the Arabs, formerly of no, or very slight consequence politically, held the potential of becoming significant actors on the world stage. Were Saudi Arabia (or any combination of Arab producers) to reassert the power of oil the world would have to deal. In 1973, because of the unexpectedness of the Arabs' move, the world had had to deal on the Arabs' terms.

But this painful situation, for the West, could be negated, or at least it was hoped that it could, by abstracting the most important actors, the Saudis and the sheikhs of the lower Gulf, out of the front of aggressive oil producers: those nations disposed to politicize the industry. The politicizers (and they varied; now one, then another member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC] would seek to play this role) invariably were beaten down by a combination of American intimidation and Saudi manipulation of the oil quota.¹⁵

In any event, it did appear that a repeat of the 1973 oil embargo was unlikely. The 1973 crisis had only developed through a unique combination of circumstances. Three states—Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia—had colluded to bring the war about. But then, in the aftermath, Egypt was abstracted out of the Arab rejectionist front (when Anwar Sadat signed a

peace treaty with Israel); King Feisal, who had led his kingdom into war, was dead, and that left Syria, which by itself constituted no very great threat. It was not envisioned, therefore—after 1973—that any such combination would reemerge.

But when the Iraqis came out of their 1980s war with Iran as victors, and with the added weight of having a million-man army and an officer corps that had demonstrated its competency by defeating Iran, then, I would argue, perceptions changed.

Throughout all of the Iran-Iraq War, the United States had maneuvered to see to it that neither side won militarily.¹⁶ However, in the last days of the war Washington, in a manner of speaking, lost the bubble; America did not anticipate Iraq's defeat of the Islamic Republic.¹⁷

After that, in American eyes, Iraq became a potential menace. Not only was Iraq militarily confident, but the Ba'athists were not overly friendly towards the United States, not after the Iran/Contra affair was exposed.¹⁸ Saddam took a number of actions in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War which, no matter what his intent may have been, gave the appearance that he was maneuvering in a hostile direction.

Some parties in the United States—and they tended to be the same ones that later took the country to war—professed to believe that Iraq was trying to take over the whole of the Gulf. For example, Saddam courted Egypt, Yemen and Jordan, proclaiming his intent of forming a regional trade bloc. However, in Washington it was noted that this alignment of states, had it ever materialized, would effectively have ring-fenced the Gulf. The Gulf up till the end of the Iran-Iraq War was dominated, politically, by the so-called Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This was an alliance between the United States and the states of the lower Gulf.¹⁹ When the GCC was formed Iraq was specifically excluded, which was possible because at the time Baghdad, being wholly taken up with fighting its war against Iran, and being dependent on subventions from the oil producers (to pay for its arms supplies, among other things), could not make its objections felt.

But after 1988 the proposed alliance of these four Arab powers (Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan) did seem to certain parties in the United States to pose a threat to the GCC, and more particularly to the United States.

One could argue that at the point that Iraq ceased to be dependent on the lower Gulf oil producers for subventions, by means of which to fund its war, it came to constitute, in American eyes, a danger.

The United States took steps which may have seemed to the first Bush administration to have been logically dictated but which nevertheless excited the Iraqis' paranoia, and there is no question that Saddam in many regards was a very paranoid individual.²⁰ It wasn't long before, as we say, one thing led to another and the Iraqis invaded Kuwait.

This presented the Americans with the necessity of ejecting them, which could have been done through negotiation. But the war party in

the United States rejected that approach, a rejection encouraged by Britain's Margaret Thatcher.²¹ And so in the end war was decided on.

The complication for the United States was that its military really could not function efficiently in the Gulf unless it had a base there. Lacking such, it had to undertake the daunting logistical operation of moving 350,000 troops to the region. It did this, but at a tremendous cost financially. Whatever else the first Iraq War showed it made clear that the United States needed to have military presence in the Gulf, if it were to dominate the region in any efficient manner.

Specifically, the situation that developed out of the first Iraq War appeared to advantage the Arabs. The war, as I just said, was hugely expensive. The whole cost of it, practically, was absorbed by the Saudis and the sheikhs.²² This meant that in any future such operation the Arabs would have a large, if not a determining say not only as to how the war was fought but in the arrangements that would come out of it.

Conversely, if the United States had a base in the Gulf, it could act off its own bat, so to speak. The Saudis and the sheikhs, rather than being veto-wielders over U.S. policy, would have to defer to the Americans.²³

So, seen in these terms, for purely power considerations, the Americans decided to situate their military in the Gulf. At first they sought to do this indirectly. Washington proposed that Riyadh should buy weapons from the Americans and then store them in warehouses, in reserve for the U.S. military, were it to conduct war in the region.

This arrangement might have served but for one thing. The Saudis, whereas they were willing to store the weapons, were not receptive to having an American military force in the kingdom—supposedly there to act in an emergency. The Americans claimed that they had not only to be on hand in case war should break out, but they also had to maintain the weapons, which the Saudis were not disposed to do. (The Saudis did not see that the weapons were their concern, their argument being that they were merely warehousing them. Let the Americans take care of them.)

Saudis are devout Muslims. They, and indeed all Muslims, revere Mecca and Medina, respectively the birthplace of the Prophet and the area from which Muhammad mounted his original jihad. To have American soldiers on the street, out and about, as it were, in Riyadh and elsewhere throughout the kingdom, was an affront to Saudi sensibilities: the Americans, being non-believers, had no business being in Saudi lands, the site of the Holy Places (the Arabic expression for this is *haram*: it is haram [forbidden] for infidels to intrude on the sacred space).

And it was this animus that provoked the rise of Al Qaeda, and which, subsequently, has facilitated the spread of militant Islam in a number of areas around the world. Osama bin Laden specifically objected to the Americans' seeking a military presence on the Arabian peninsula.²⁴

When Mohammad Ata and the other militants of Al Qaeda flew their planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon they were not, as theorists like Samuel Huntington would have us believe, declaring war on the West.²⁵ This was an act of pure frustration. Repeated warnings to the Americans not just from the militants but from the Saudi government to depart the kingdom had gone unheeded, and so the militants struck.

Forced to withdraw militarily from Saudi Arabia, which the Americans did after 9/11, and having no other suitable base in the region to which to repair, some Americans began to plan for the takeover of Iraq, the intent being to make it into America's base in the region.

In this maneuver, it is certain that the Likudniks played a role. The problem is to specify how much influence they actually exerted. To get at an answer to that question I need to say something about Israeli influence on American policy generally. How could the Israelis exert influence in an area (the Gulf) which for years through successive administrations had been off limits to them? Recall that I said the whole thrust of American policy vis a vis the Gulf had been to keep it compartmentalized, not affected by the problem of Israeli-Arab relations.

All that changed with Reagan.

The United States, as I indicated above, had up till the time of Reagan eschewed a forward policy in the Gulf, or indeed anywhere else in the Middle East. But in 1979, the Shah was overthrown, and the United States which formerly had looked on the Shah as its regional surrogate felt that its interests were threatened.

In 1980—the very next year after the overthrow—Sharon traveled to Washington to conduct a series of interviews with luminaries of the new Reagan administration, after which he came away with an extraordinary deal: Reagan agreed to maintain Israeli arms parity with all of the Arab states.²⁶ This significantly altered the balance of power in the region, since now the Americans were committed to replacing whatever arms Israel expended in any war that it might wage. This freed the Israelis to enter into open-ended conflicts. Prior to Sharon's brokered agreement, they were, in a manner of speaking, kept on a tight leash where war fighting was concerned: they had had to fight short wars geared to the amount of weapons they had on hand. Now, they could fight away, so to speak, knowing that the United States would replenish their stocks.

One doesn't give that kind of power to another state unless one trusts that state implicitly and is willing to stand by it in any action it might take.

It wasn't generally realized (in the United States), but this concession, which the Israelis had wangled from Reagan, gave them extraordinary access to the Pentagon. Whereas previously they primarily had focused on lobbying Congress, to influence American policy, now they had entre to the most powerful institution in the United States, the Defense Department.

The first action the Israelis took after the pact was sealed was to invade Lebanon, a fateful decision with dire repercussions for the Americans: it drew the United States directly into the Israeli-Palestinian fight (since Reagan was motivated to dispatch troops to the area). And, then, of course, when the Marine Corps barracks were blown up, Reagan hastily withdrew them—a huge embarrassment for the Americans.

Even though this was, as I say, a great embarrassment, it didn't affect the Israelis' lobbying the Americans. Working through Bill Casey, the then-head of the CIA, the Israelis dreamed up an even more disastrous scheme in which to get the Americans involved. This was the notorious Iran/Contra affair, where the United States was induced to sell arms covertly to Iran, ostensibly to induce the Islamic Republic to broker the release of American hostages in Lebanon.²⁷ This deal, too, miscarried when the intrigue was exposed. Reagan once more was embarrassed by being forced to admit that he had deceived the Congress by keeping it secret, and, also, since part of the deal was to use the money Iran paid for the arms to fund the Contras (when Congress had specifically told the White House to cease doing that), this, too, came across as an embarrassing revelation.

That was two fiascos, now, in which the Israelis had involved the United States. There was a third, and that was the brouhaha that erupted over the campaign to indict Saddam for allegedly gassing the Kurds, which effectively destroyed whatever rapport Baghdad had maintained with Washington after the Iran/Contra scandal.²⁸ The gassing controversy has to be viewed in context. It was through this maneuver that the Israelis began laying the ground work for an eventual war between the United States and Iraq, since by demonizing the Iraqis for alleged human rights violations they were able to portray the Ba'thist regime as a pariah. And, certainly the second Iraq War has come to be seen as a major (if not the all-time) embarrassment for the United States.

So, now, we have three major foreign policy involvements of the United States in which Israeli influence peddlers figured prominently. In all these deals the Israeli hand was more or less kept hidden, but it didn't take much to ferret it out. Nonetheless, the media in the United States have over the years made no such attempt, nor interestingly has the academic community (I'm thinking here of the academics in the Washington think tanks), both of which kept up the fiction that the State Department was exclusively in charge of directing policy in the region, when, in various roundabout ways, it was the Israelis who were influential.

The last instance of Israeli interference that I want to discuss involved the first Iraq War.

In October 1990, before that war ever came off, a top U.S. Air Force general, Michael Dugan, granted an interview with the *Washington Post* in which he revealed that, in going up against Iraq, the United States would be pursuing a strategy worked out by the Israelis.²⁹

Bush (the first Bush, that is), by way of preparing to go to war, had appealed to the Arab states for support. Thus, the interview was a veritable bombshell; it was extremely ill-judged, and the general summarily was forced into retirement. Nonetheless, when the war did finally come off, the strategy that was implemented pretty much followed the line that the Israelis had advocated.

As the general had explained the strategy, the Americans were going to pursue so-called leadership targeting (the Israelis' description). Using their super surveillance systems, they would locate the top Ba'thists (inside the country) and, by means of laser-guided bombs, assassinate them, one by one. Once the leaders were dead, the Iraqi army would then be compelled to submit (at least that's what the Likudniks claimed). In graphic terms, America aimed to cut the head off the serpent.

This strategy, although, as I say, it conformed to the Israeli plan, was massaged in one important area. The then-commander of the Joint Chiefs, Colin Powell, and General Norman Schwarzkopf, the force commander, argued that leadership targeting alone would be insufficient to bring about a successful conclusion of the war. A large ground force had to be employed, to insure victory. Hence, the epic transport of 350,000 American troops to the theater, at huge cost, as I mentioned.

Afterwards, even though the Americans had achieved their goal of driving Iraq out of Kuwait, the war was looked on by parties in the United States as not completely successful. Critics claimed that Bush had let the Ba'thists off the hook by not invading Iraq and bringing down Saddam's government. And, along with that, it was claimed that the war was too costly, the major cost being the transport of all those troops to the theater.

Then, when Saddam not only managed to survive the war, but was able to cling to power—as the Iraqi people, contrary to expectations, did not turn on and overthrow him—the war party in the United States began agitating for more forceful actions.

Partially, as a way of appeasing these hawkish elements, the British and Americans mounted attacks on Iraq on a number of fronts. In the United Nations, they pushed through a program of sanctions on the Iraqis, the most Draconian inflicted on any state post-World War II. But these sanctions, in as much as they caused considerable suffering to the Iraqi people, were condemned not just by the Arab states but the Europeans. America's allies wanted them lifted. So, for a time, it appeared that Saddam, in a manner of speaking, had dodged the bullet.

The Clinton administration, which had taken over from Bush, agreed to more direct methods: along with Britain, the Americans declared so-called no-go areas, first in the northern Kurdish region, and then in the far south of Iraq, where Iraqi air planes could not fly. This had the effect of removing these areas from Baghdad's control.³⁰ Since the Ba'thists rejected curtailment of their sovereignty, they fired on allied planes

over-flying the areas, which led to a resumption of combat, as the American and British planes retaliated by attacking Iraqi installations on the ground.

The one thing that Clinton did not do was authorize a new war, and for this the Likudniks, and other right wing elements in the United States, stepped up the pressure. A campaign was instituted, the Project for the New American Century, which aimed to influence Clinton into overthrowing the Ba'th,³¹ and, indeed, subsequently America's policy was amended so that this did become the aim. Still, Clinton held back from committing the United States to all-out war.

What forced the issue was 9/11 when the Likudniks, seeing their opportunity, initiated another campaign to link Saddam to Osama bin Laden. Claiming that Iraq had WMD (even a nuclear capability, which, of course, was not so), hawks in the United States and Britain began to work on public opinion, claiming that Iraq constituted a grave danger to America, and, indeed, to the world. And, of course, they succeeded in this.

That war, essentially, was a repeat of the first Gulf War; however, under Rumsfeld's direction, the supposed shortcomings of the original war plan were "corrected": the ground component, over the fierce objections of the U.S. Army and Marine commanders, was reduced to an almost negligible quantity. Rumsfeld was determined to show that leadership targeting, in its purest application (that is, in the absence of a large ground component), could be effective.

Which it might have been, if the Iraqi army hadn't resisted. The Iraqis fought from the first day of the invasion, and, as I indicated above, kept on after April 12 when the United States, in effect, declared victory. For example, by August there were significant acts of sabotage being recorded, acts which targeted the oil installations, and these, in the manner that they were being carried out, clearly showed the professional involvement; that is, they were being perpetrated by military men.

Initially, Bush and his minions do not seem to have appreciated the significance of what was occurring. Rumsfeld, for example, immediately after Baghdad fell, ordered a draw-down of American troops in Iraq, which order, had it been obeyed, would have wreaked havoc on the Americans, because the rampaging Iraqis would easily have overwhelmed the almost negligible contingent Rumsfeld wanted left behind.

The generals on the ground—the U.S. Army and Marine commanders—objected to implementing the order. They evidently saw what the civilians in the Pentagon either refused to take note of or else were predisposed to dismiss; that is that the situation in Iraq was lurching out of control. I find it remarkable that the generals were able to make their objections felt. They actually seem to have succeeded in overruling Rumsfeld, something that usually never happened—no one ever contradicted the Rumsfeld.

What is significant is that a gulf was opening between the ground commanders (those who were there doing the fighting) and the Pentagon (both civilians and the brass).

For awhile Rumsfeld carried on as if nothing untoward was happening in Iraq. Asked to explain the continuing disturbances, he figuratively shrugged ("Stuff happens," he said).³² Rumsfeld believed that the rampaging would die down; howbeit this might take a little time.

But, then, in July, General John Abizaid, the head of CENTCOM, stated publicly that this unrest was not mere criminal activity (as Rumsfeld was maintaining). This, said Abizaid, is an organized resistance; it's a guerrilla war.³³

Rumsfeld refused to accept this interpretation, but then General Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, one of Rumsfeld's chief lieutenants, and one who was loyal almost to the point of sycophancy, equivocated. General Meyers more or less confirmed Abizaid's judgment, saying, in effect, that something unusual was going on which would have to be looked into.³⁴

At that, the official line of the Bush administration shifted, and the Americans began talking up Al Qaeda, claiming that fanatical Muslims, from Saudi Arabia, had infiltrated Iraq and were mounting the resistance.

This was a pure public relations ploy, designed to obscure the fact the war had not, as the White House was maintaining, really, truly ended. The famous Thunder Run had not broken the Iraqis' will to resist.³⁵ The staged photo of the Iraqis, supposedly on their own pulling down the statue of Saddam Hussein—that, too, was a public relations stunt.³⁶ The propagandists' campaign to convince the American public that not only could they put the war behind them but that they should see it as a huge success—this campaign was starting to lose credibility.

The press in the United States went along with the campaign, reporting that the war, if it wasn't exactly over with, was certainly winding down. Congress, too, for awhile supported the administration's stance. Interestingly, it was the public reaction that queered the pitch, so to speak. The war was being fought in large measure by National Guardsmen. Americans could not but note that units continued to be called up. Young men and women were wrenched from civilian life and sent overseas, where many were killed; more were grievously wounded.

Also Americans were aware that expenses for the war were climbing astronomically. It was costing \$12 billion a month!

It was the public clamor to bring the troops home that finally compelled the Democrats, who up till then had been enablers, to turn on the administration. And although Bush attempted to cast the Democrats as betrayers of the troops, this tactic failed, as was demonstrated when, in 2006, the Democrats scored an upset victory in the midterm Congressional

elections, handing the Republicans a defeat which few had anticipated, and which, for awhile, could barely be assimilated.

At that Bush, evidently recognizing the mood swing, in an effort to appease the public, sacked Rumsfeld.

The secretary was allowed to depart with honor. Nothing was said about the failure of his strategy, but in fact it had failed.

Why? Because the Iraqis resisted? Yes, certainly, that was a part of it, but there was more to it than that.

CHAPTER 5

The Big Carve Up

I think that we have to assume that the Bush administration's intent going into Iraq was to destroy it; notionally, that is, as a functioning nation/state. Effectively, Iraq would disappear from the map of the Middle East.

I conclude this on the basis of the administration's behavior in the lead-up to the war and on the things that it did (or, more importantly, what it did not do) in the aftermath.

I think that Rumsfeld's behavior is unfathomable under any other interpretation. The Americans had no intention of rehabilitating Iraq, restoring it as a functioning society, the way that it was under the Ba'th. The instance to which I alluded above, of Rumsfeld's ordering General Tommy Franks to get the force down to a mere 30,000, to me, points to this.¹ The country was falling apart; civilians were being terrorized by criminal elements; foreign militias (the Badr Brigades) were roaming the streets, armed and dangerous, and in the north, the Kurdish militias, so-called *pesh mergas*, had begun "cleansing" communities of Arabs and Turkmen. All this, and Rumsfeld wanted to reduce the American force to a mere token presence!

The Bush administration had no civic action plan to put into operation after the war. The State Department had put one together, looking into all aspects of the Iraqis' possible postwar needs—Rumsfeld vetoed it.²

The army commanders who were assigned an improvised civil affairs mission (this was done only after things had gotten dangerously out of hand) complained that they weren't prepared for this; didn't have the resources to do the job, and didn't want it.³

Then, scarcely a month after the war had supposedly ended while the civil unrest far from dying down was, in fact, escalating, the American

viceroys Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military and police. Why disband the native institutions which, in the absence of adequate American protection, might have restored a semblance of law and order?

The conventional wisdom is that Bremer erred; that he misperformed—did something stupid. That does not explain anything—he was warned before he took the step not to do it.

I think that one has to assume that Rumsfeld, Bremer, the whole of the Bush administration, were working from a plan; that the decision was made before the Americans ever went into Iraq that the United States was not going to devote any considerable resources to administering the country (or, to put it another way, do nation-building). I think the belief, on the part of administration figures, was that, as the Iraqis would not fight (which the Likudniks had said that they would not do), repair bills for infrastructure damage in the war would be minimal, and once the Americans got the oil industry up and running, rehabilitation, such as it was, could be financed from the oil sales.

In other words, I think that Bush had been led to believe that he was going to inherit an Iraq essentially as it was before the war, only with the Ba'athists having been abstracted out of the picture, the Iraqis having obliged by turning on Saddam and his people.

But, then, one would think that when things did not work out; when Rumsfeld was forced to lay on that intensive bombing campaign, destroying, as I said, what infrastructure there was; and in the process traumatizing the whole of Iraqi society (which facilitated the looting), then, at that point, the administration would have rethought its game plan. I don't think that dissolution of Iraqi society (or at least the Arab part) troubled the administration one whit. Indeed, I think the administration was perfectly prepared, if not predisposed, to see the Arab portion of Iraq languish.

And here, I think, the war planners were following the lead of the Israelis in the way that they treated southern Lebanon. Israel vis a vis the Lebanese faced many of the same problems as Rumsfeld when he essayed to invade and occupy Iraq. Israel hasn't got a large population. Young Israelis dutifully report for mobilization in an emergency, but they do not expect to be kept in service overlong, and become quasi-mutinuous if their release from service is, as they perceive it, unduly delayed.⁴ Therefore, the leadership in Israel is not prepared to countenance prolonged mobilization. This is what led the IDF to sponsor the militia, the SLA (discussed in Chapter 3). Unless Israel can find surrogates able and willing to police land that it feels it requires as a security zone, the zone can't be kept up.

I think with *Grapes of Wrath* the Israeli force commanders devised what they thought was a new and effective strategy for finessing problems like this. Instead of trying to garrison the outlying areas (or man them with ultimately unreliable militias), they would devastate them.

Grapes of Wrath was, as I tried to indicate above, a nasty piece of work, and it left the south of Lebanon in a practically demolished condition. When the IDF withdrew from Lebanon, the Shias returned to the area, hoping to resume their normal course of existence, but first they had to rebuild, and as long as they were occupied with that, the Israelis gained a respite from depredations.

I think Israel's new strategy was to serve notice on the Shias that the IDF was set to return and hit them again so the rebuilding would have to start all over. This, in effect, was a copy of Chiang Kai-shek's extermination drives during the Chinese Civil War, where periodically the *generalissimo* would send troops into so-called bandit areas (areas controlled by the Reds) to lay waste to wide swathes of territory, and then he would pull the troops out, with the implicit threat that they would return periodically.⁵

A strategy like this, I think, would have appealed to Rumsfeld. He was assailed by critics within the Pentagon—mainly the ground commanders—who, in the lead up to the war, insisted on knowing how he intended to occupy Iraq once conquered? Occupation can't be done without, as the military men say, boots on the ground, and that's a major undertaking. Rumsfeld also had to rebut criticism from fiscal conservatives, who feared that the war would be overly expensive. Both sets of objections—that of the commanders as well as the conservatives—could be obviated by simply not having an occupation, at least not a full-scale one, such as America mounted after World War II for Germany and Japan. As to how Rumsfeld thought he could get away with such a thing, I think he was counting on the Iraqis not fighting. I think Rumsfeld really did believe that the Iraqis would be so thankful to have been relieved of the tyranny of Saddam Hussein that they would (as Makiya said) greet the invading Americans with flowers and sweets. A grateful Iraqi populace was also likely to be a docile one—it would make no problems for the Americans, and occupation matters would just sort themselves out.

Also, I think, Rumsfeld was counting on enlisting support of the Kurdish pesh mergas. The Kurds had responded to a call from the first President Bush to rise in revolt against the Ba'th in the first Iraq War, and I think Rumsfeld anticipated they would do so again, which the Kurds did. Rumsfeld may also have believed that he could use the Kurds as surrogates (much as the Israelis recruited the SLA).

In any event, he certainly counted on exploiting Kurdish territory wherein he could station air assets.⁶ So set up the Americans could police disturbances in the south, as the British had done in the 1920s. The British used the Royal Air Force (RAF) to bomb recalcitrant Shia tribesmen. This was a strategy worked out by Churchill. It was the first known instance where planes were used for such a purpose, and the first time on record where regular military targeted civilians from the air. Rumsfeld may have counted on adopting a similar aerial policing system.

In any event, I do believe that Rumsfeld and the Likudniks had a secret agenda, things that they weren't confiding to anyone, not to the generals in the Pentagon, who, as the deadline for the declaration of war approached, were becoming more and more agitated as the secretary ruthlessly pared the invasion force down, stripping out ground units. There were lots of indications before the war that higher-ups in the military were upset over this. And after the "victory," when things started going wrong, the issue escalated into a major controversy, as retired generals demanded that Rumsfeld be sacked, precisely because he had, in the generals' view, imprudently scaled the force down so far.⁷

Rumsfeld, however, was bound to show the air war strategy would work with practically no ground forces assisting. And, I think, he was emboldened to think he could pull this off because he had the example of Grapes of Wrath to reassure him. With Grapes of Wrath, the Israelis had succeeded in thoroughly working over southern Lebanon, after which they walked away from it, taking no heed of the devastated condition in which they had left the territory—and they pulled it off, as I said above. Why not the same for Iraq?

As to the objection that the occupying power is obliged under international law to look out for the welfare of conquered populations, I don't think that Rumsfeld troubled himself over this. As with the Israelis, I think he was prepared to, in a manner of speaking, thumb his nose at the United Nations, and I think we have to assume that Bush and Cheney were supportive of such a stance.

The plan was to set up a puppet government in Baghdad, one with native Iraqis nominally in charge.⁸ This regime would then be advised to run things "on the cheap." There would be some expense, not a great deal, as the Arab Iraqis would be kept barely supplied with necessities. This would be a policy of benign neglect.

General Jay Garner was the administration figure initially sent out to run the occupation. He was the man selected to be America's viceroy in Iraq. Garner entered the country shortly after the victory was declared and immediately set about making plans for a provisional government, in which all Iraqis would be represented. (Garner frequently employed the image of a "big tent"; that is, he was going to arrange things so that all Iraqis were involved in the governing process.)⁹

Good idea, but only if Iraq was violence-free. Once the resistance developed, Garner's scheme of an inclusive government did not make sense. Such a regime perforce would have had to have included nationalist-minded Iraqis, who could not have been counted on to slavishly follow the Americans' dictates. True nationalists would be motivated to contest policies the Americans were set on implementing as not being in the interests of Iraq.

So abruptly, Garner was removed and Bremer sent out. And what did Bremer do? He took steps to set up a new system of rule that resembled

the setup under the Mandate, whereby British advisors, operating behind the scenes, guided native Iraqis, who were, as I said above, only nominally in charge. This plan, once revealed, set off a howl of protest from those Iraqis who had been expecting to acquire places in the new government that Garner was going to create, a government which would have been a real structure of power.

It was into this crack in the Americans' governing arrangements that the Iranians inserted themselves, chipping away until it became a wide open fissure.

Among the parties that entered Iraq after the fall of the Ba'ath with the intent of finding places in the new system were a number of expatriate organizations. Five of these—the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq; Dawa; the Kurdish Democratic Party; the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan; and Ahmad Chalabi's party, the Iraqi National Congress—were clients of Iran, as I discussed in the first chapter.

All of these groups in addition had fairly firm ties to the Israelis. The two Kurdish parties had long-standing ones,¹⁰ and as for SCIRI and Dawa their linkup came late—not until the 1990s, when, during Clinton's tenure in the White House, they were invited to join the anti-Ba'athist front, discussed in the first chapter.

This front-idea, as I said in Chapter 1, was the brainchild of Martin Indyk, then Clinton's principal advisor in the State Department on the Middle East. Indyk's background is revealing. Prior to being appointed Middle East advisor he was not an American citizen—he was an Israeli.¹¹ Indeed, he was director of the principal Zionist think tank in Washington, the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy (WINEP). Hence, Indyk, as much as Perle, or Feith or Wolfowitz, was a partisan of Israel, if not the Likud.

Indyk's maneuver of soliciting the Iranians to send representatives to Washington, for whatever reason he did it, was potentially fraught as it gave the Iranians entre to the decision-making in Washington before the war.

Given how America's relations with the Islamic Republic have subsequently developed, it seems incredible that Indyk would have entertained—much less implemented—such a scheme. However, at the time that he extended his invitation, the prime minister in Tehran was Muhammad Khatemi, and Khatemi was looked on in Washington as a potential ally of the United States, a moderate who, it was believed, would lead Iran into the Western camp.

So it was that before the war ever came off, the Iranians and Americans held a series of discussions, and although the content of these talks has never been revealed it seems reasonable to assume that, whatever else might have been discussed, the talks had to have involved the stance that Iran would adopt vis a vis the invasion.¹²

I don't believe that Rumsfeld could have gone ahead with his lean-mean strategy (of depending predominantly on air assets), were the Iranians not on board with this; they had to have given assurances they would not make trouble. After all, suppose the Iranians had taken the side of Iraq. The consequences of that, for the United States, would have been dire. Or look at it this way: suppose Saddam actually had the WMD the Bush administration claimed he had. Were he to have tried to smuggle it out of the country and delivered it into Iranian hands, he could have succeeded.¹³

To be sure, Rumsfeld could have threatened Iran with retaliation should it attempt to interfere with the invasion, but it's just as likely that he proffered a carrot along with the stick. If Iran cooperated with the Americans, at least to the extent of staying out of the war, arrangements could have been made to extend the mullahs' influence over Najaf and Karbala, two Iraqi cities that constitute the holiest sites of Shiadom, which the mullahs were keen to get control of.

In any event, when the war did come off and immediately the resistance broke out, the situation, as regards Iran, changed overnight. For now, with the border open and Iraq sliding into anarchy, it was a simple matter for Tehran to flood the country with agents, which, as I showed in Chapter 1, it did.

But Tehran did more. In a seeming show of magnanimity it offered to help out with the occupation, making available SCIRI's militia, the Badr Brigades, to restore order. Meanwhile, covertly Iran began working to obstruct Bremer's plan of creating a governing setup that would have enabled the United States to exercise control over the country. Working through the expatriates (the Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani; and Hakim of SCIRI, along with representatives of Dawa), Tehran pushed an alternate scheme along lines inimical to American interests; and here the Iranians were aided by having Iraq's supreme Shia religious authority, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, in their corner, so to speak. Sistani, though a long-time resident of Iraq, is an Iranian.¹⁴

It wasn't long, then, before, as I described in the first chapter, Iran had become the *de facto* authority in Iraq, a dominance exercised through its having agents installed everywhere in the new government. Indeed, the situation in Iraq had reverted pretty much to what it was in the days of the Shah. In the 1950s, the Iranian consul general in Basrah was the *de facto* ruler of southern Iraq, as the Arab governments in Baghdad, throughout this period, were too weak to assert themselves. Then, the Iranians continued to agitate among the Iraqi Shias during the Khomeini period. That the United States would try to restore Iranian influence after the second Iraq War sounds fantastical, but the Likudniks' scheme of restructuring Iraq (into Kurdish and Shia cantons) could not be made to work, unless some arrangement for controlling the southern Arab portion

was devised. Handing the spiritual direction of the south over to Tehran was a possible solution—of course, there had to be a government in Tehran that the Americans could work with.

Then, in 2005, Khatemi, the putative friend of the United States, decided not to run for reelection, and instead Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad became Iran's prime minister. Ahmadi-Nejad loathes the United States and Israel.

It would appear that the Iranians had performed a classic bait-and-switch. Ahmadi-Nejad is a former member of Iran's Revolutionary Guard.¹⁵ The Guard is a power—if not the power—in Iran, and it is unalterably opposed to doing deals with the United States, let alone with Israel. I think the Guard was opposed to the American occupation all along, but, feeling itself inadequate to block it, the Guard bided its time, and then, when the occupation ran into difficulty, it pounced, so to speak.

Khatemi was abstracted out of the picture; Ahmadi-Nejad was installed as his replacement; and all at once Bush, who up till now had seemed ignorant of, or indifferent to the Iranians' machinations, awoke to the potential for harm to the United States. Bush had been blaming the resistance on Al Qaeda; now he switched to blaming Iran, saying that it was arming the resisters.¹⁶ Coincidentally, the Israelis got into the act, raising a hullabaloo over Iran's supposedly gaining a nuclear capability. Ehud Olmert, the then-Israeli premier, announced that Israel stood ready to unilaterally take out Iran's nuclear facility at Natanz.¹⁷

At this point Cheney weighed in, saying that the United States would take on that chore (of destroying the reactor), and Bush went along with this.¹⁸ This galvanized the peace forces in the United States: the blogosphere erupted with protests. But it wasn't the peaceniks who forestalled the event, it was the American military. Unexpectedly, Admiral Michael Fallon, then the CENTCOM commander, weighed in, giving an interview to *Esquire Magazine* in which he let it be known that the attack wasn't going to take place.¹⁹ Fallon and other serving senior officers foresaw that any such move would widen the war. The United States already had its hands full trying to quell the Iraqi resistance. How was it going to manage if 60 million Iranians joined the fray?

Fallon's behavior was extraordinary. The Bush administration scrambled to tone the matter down, but, effectively, this was a mutiny on the military's part (Fallon ultimately lost his job over this).

The Fallon affair is interesting, but it wasn't the first such revolt to have occurred. Even before the U.S. military broke ranks, another powerful interest in the United States came out in opposition—not to the war per se, but to a move by the administration in regard to restructuring Iraq's oil industry.

It was part of the Likudniks' original scheme for administering Iraq that its oil industry would be privatized. The old setup whereby, under the

Ba'th, the government controlled Iraqi oil would be scrapped and foreign interests invited to bid for concessions. This move was opposed by the native Iraqis, at least the Arab Iraqis.²⁰ It also upset the oil majors. The majors benefit from oil prices being more or less controlled, which they can be as long as OPEC is in charge of setting production quotas. Were independents to be let into Iraq, the amount of oil coming onto the market would be unrestricted, and prices likely would gyrate wildly, to the majors' detriment.²¹

In any event, if there were going to be any oil concessions given out by the Iraqis, the majors meant to have them, exclusively.²²

As had been the case with Fallon, the oil men let it be known that privatization was not a good idea. They appear to have intervened with Cheney, because abruptly, the administration did a right-about face and appointed an oil czar to manage Iraq's oil industry. This individual turned out to be Philip Carroll, former Shell CEO, in other words, a representative of the majors.²³

When Carroll went out to take up his duties as overseer of Iraqi oil he gave an interview in which he said that privatization was off, and, indeed, fairly shortly after that it was cancelled. Ahmad Chalabi, whom the Likudniks had tapped to orchestrate the privatization scheme, had previously gotten himself appointed Iraq's oil minister, and was in the process of working the privatization out.²⁴ Carroll's appointment scotched that maneuver.

The affair is interesting from a number of angles, but principally for what it tells us about how the Likudniks and Rumsfeld intrigued in the lead-up to the war. It's inconceivable to me that Bush could have taken America to war in the Gulf and not let the big oil companies in on the war planning. The companies would probably not have been called upon to advise on the takeover, but they would have wanted to know if anything was planned which would compromise their stake in the region.

Similarly, the U.S. military needed to be kept abreast on what arrangements were being made for the occupation phase. Nonetheless, it does appear that Rumsfeld and the Likudniks held back informing both the oil men, and the ground commanders, at least, about certain details regarding the proposed end state. This relates to what I described above as the conspiratorial nature of the operation. This was, I feel, a putsch.

Once the oil men and the ground commanders got wind of what was actually planned, they rebelled, and since none of them were lightweights they had the means to make their objections felt. As a consequence, I would say that, from roughly 2005–2006, Bush's Iraq policy was in disarray. With three major institutions—the ground force commanders, the oil men, and the CIA—all in revolt, it was impossible for the president to forge a consensus that would have enabled him to pursue a coherent strategy.²⁵

There's an interesting sidelight on this. The majors had been burned once already over a similar deal which took place in Russia. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Yeltsin agreed to privatize Russia's vast oil industry. As a result, lucrative oil contracts were awarded to obscure individuals, so-called oligarchs.²⁶ Every one of these (with perhaps a single exception) had ties to Israel—one, Boris Berezovsky, was actually an Israeli citizen. Putin, when he came to power, clawed back the contracts, causing the oligarchs to flee into exile (in Israel and Great Britain) and one ended up in jail in Siberia.²⁷

The possibility should at least be explored that this was what was in the works all along; that is that this is what the Likudniks were aiming for in promoting the Iraq takeover—they hoped to acquire a source of oil for Israel. Israel has no oil—it's practically the only area in the Middle East that does not. Israel has been maneuvering to get oil ever since it's founding.²⁸ It's not at all farfetched, I think, to speculate that the Likudniks, in promoting the overthrow of the Ba'th, were looking out for Israel's interests, as well as those of the United States.

The affair is further complicated by the scheme to create a federated Iraq. Long before the war ever came off influential politicians in Washington began agitating for the breakup of Iraq into three separate cantons: a Kurdish canton in the north, a Shia Arab one in the south, and a Sunni entity, of sorts, in the middle region of the country.²⁹

Vice President Joseph Biden is a foremost proponent of this idea.³⁰ Supposedly, this is the only way that Iraqi society can be managed, because the Iraqis (the theory goes), a naturally fractious people, are unable among themselves to cooperate. The sectarian divisions inside the country are too sharp, too deeply rooted to permit cooperation.

This is a dubious proposition. Iraqi society cohered very well under the Ba'th. There was no sectarian violence (that the Ba'thists weren't able to manage) and the society held together sufficiently well during the Iran-Iraq War so that, ultimately, the Ba'th triumphed over the Islamic Republic.

The real aim of federation, I believe, is to create a basis for hiving off the Kurdish north from the rest of the country, and the intent here is to open the north to oil exploitation. Under the Ba'th, the north of Iraq—the Kurdish part—never was exploited, even though it's generally known that the north has rich oil deposits. The Ba'th could not develop the region as, for most of the early years of the republic, the Kurdish north was in revolt against the government in Baghdad.

But also, Iraq, which was left in a woefully backward condition by the Hashemite dynasty, had its hands full developing even the southern oil fields. Once the Ba'thists nationalized, the majors, which formerly held concessions for all of Iraq's fields (north and south), withdrew from the country, and, obviously, they were no help in getting the fields up and running.

Tied in with this federation scheme is a demand by Masoud Barzani—who, as I said, is the principal warlord in the north—that revenue from the sale of oil produced there must stay there. In other words, Barzani is claiming that oil formerly the possession of all Iraqis is now exclusively the property of the Kurds. Having staked his claim, as it were, Barzani has begun letting concessions. The government in Baghdad has objected to this and vowed to contest the matter in the courts.³¹ Thus the question of what is to become of the “Kurds’ oil” is as of now unsettled. But, in a related—and fascinating development—one of the first concessions that Barzani has let went to Richard Perle, and another went to Ray Hunt, a longtime friend of Bush and a member of the Texas mafia.³² And now it’s been revealed that Peter Galbraith, who as a staffer for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, first accused Saddam Hussein of gassing the Kurds, and who is a longtime champion of Kurdish autonomy, has admitted to having “business activities” in the oil sector of the Kurdish region of Iraq (see “Galbraith Admits to Oil Sector ‘Activities,’” *Financial Times*, October 16, 2009).

Given this kind of background, it’s hard not to conclude that the Bush administration’s decision to go to war with Iraq was tainted. Despite Bush and Blair’s declaimers that their only interest lay in toppling the Ba’th, it does appear that there were, as one might say, other priorities.

In any event, if there was a conspiracy it’s now been compromised by the way that things have turned out. I refer to the resistance. The resistance has made the Kurdish connection of dubious benefit to the United States (and, for that matter, to Israel). Why so?

Look at the map. The Iraqi Kurdish territory is inconveniently located; in fact, it’s surrounded by enemies: Arabs to the south and west, Iranians to the east and Turks to the north. What does it matter if the Kurdish region is rich in oil, and that the Kurdish warlords are anxious to let concessions to the West? If the oil can’t be transported out of the area, it’s of no use to anyone. It might as well stay in the ground.

As long as the Kurds’ neighbors are inimical, oil from the Kurdish region—or anything else produced in the north—can’t move out of the area. The Kurds’ isolated situation also affects the U.S. military. The scheme of setting up an American base in the north is impractical, if the area is blockaded. How can the Americans keep the base supplied, if access to it is restricted? They would have to fly supplies in, in a Berlin-type airlift.

Had the Iraqi Arabs not resisted, had they not fought the invaders, and had they not succeeded in keeping up the resistance after the victory was declared, I think the scheme of partitioning Iraq would, in all likelihood, have been implemented. The resistance has thrown everything into a cocked hat, so to speak. Suddenly an elegant conception has become complicated. Now Obama, if he wants to withdraw from Iraq, has to negotiate the withdrawal with Tehran. It’s not unreasonable to conclude that

Obama's recent diplomatic opening to Tehran, whereby he is encouraging exchanges, is tied into this problem. If the United States walks away from Iraq, as Obama has promised to do, Iran takes over there. And if Iran gains control of Iraq, this is going to alienate the Saudis and all of the sheikhs of the southern Gulf from the United States. America's erstwhile hegemony over the region will finally be at an end.

Already the parties in Iraq have begun positioning themselves for the eventual showdown. Mosul is the third largest city in Iraq, and the Kurds claim it as part of what they say is a predominantly Kurdish region. They claim Mosul was originally Kurdish, but that under Saddam Hussein the demographic composition of the city was reconfigured, with Kurds being driven out and Arabs resettled therein. This is nonsense. Mosul has always been split three ways, between Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds, with the Arabs the largest community.

Taking advantage of unsettled conditions immediately after the victory was declared, the Kurds began infiltrating Mosul; driving out the Arabs and Turkmen (the cleansing, I referred to above).³³ But since the Surge, this process has been halted. The Arabs have fought their way back into the city (along with the Turkmen), and now Mosul is a veritable cockpit.³⁴

The Kurds have let it be known they are not going to give up on Mosul, and the Arabs, in effect, have told them that any takeover attempt will be resisted, forcibly.

The American military is aware of what's going on. General David Petraeus, U.S. commander in Iraq, prudently made it a condition of acquiescing to Obama's pullout plan that Iraq must be stable, at least sufficiently so as to guarantee the safety of the residual force the United States plans to leave behind when the pullout is effected.

If the Mosul problem is not finessed—and given the passions the city arouses in all three communities, I don't believe that it can be—the withdrawal will never come off. For one thing, the Turks, who, as I have indicated, are unalterably opposed to seeing an independent Kurdistan emerge, have espoused the cause of the Turkmen, who, as their name implies, are ethnic Turks.³⁵

In February 2008, the Turks sent commandoes into the Iraqi Kurdish enclave, ostensibly to quell cross-border raiding by anti-Turkish elements based in the region.³⁶ These commandoes swept through the mountainous north killing any Kurds they encountered, making no distinction as to whether they might be loyal Barzani-type Kurds or Turkish-Kurdish separatists.

The United States tried to forestall the Turks from launching this operation. However, the Turks spurned the warning. Ultimately, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates backed down, and, in a manner of speaking, sanctioned the raid, even to the extent of supplying the Turks with intelligence on conditions in the north.

This infuriated Barzani, who let it be known that he felt betrayed by the Americans, after all the support he had given them in the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

What all this points to is that the situation in Iraq is more complicated than the Bush administration has let on, or, for that matter, than Obama appears willing to admit.

Obama may want to pull out of Iraq, and certainly this is what the mass of Americans are hoping for, but the question remains: how can this be accomplished? Once the United States exits Iraq the whole region will collapse into turmoil. Iran will certainly move in; Turkey may likewise move south, annexing the Kurdish territory; and as for the Arab Iraqis, they will go to war with everyone.

This is the mess that the Bush administration has gotten the United States into.

In the final chapter I want to speculate on the likely outcome of all this. That is, what is likely to be the effect of this half-baked (as I would describe it) scheme of the Likudniks to upset the balance of power in the Gulf.

CHAPTER 6

Nemesis

I said in Chapter 3 that since 1996 and Israel's Grapes of Wrath operation a new style of war has emerged in the Middle East, one where states war against civilians, and now I want to describe why this has come about. By way of doing so I'll return to a topic I raised earlier: oil, and its connection to the arms industry in the United States.

Above, I alluded to the International Oil System (IOS), the setup whereby the majors; that is, the big international oil companies, which formerly operated as a cartel, gained control over Persian Gulf oil. The legal basis of the system was the concessions, guaranteeing the majors' right to exploit the oil over time (ideally up to 30 years). With the concessions, the principle was maintained that the rulers of the oil producing states owned the oil (in their personal right), and therefore they could dispose of it as they saw fit. The rulers surrendered control over the development of the oil fields to the majors in return for subventions in the form of royalties. This was a setup to the majors' advantage, since it allowed them to fix oil production targets, which translated into their being able to control the price.¹

The procedural assumption of the rulers' personally owning the oil—operative until World War II—was challenged immediately afterward. Nationalist-minded politicians, like Iran's Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, claimed that the oil belonged to the people, and the concessions should reflect that fact. Translated: the people should get a better deal. After a long and ultimately fruitless bout of negotiating with the oilmen, Mossadeq (in 1950) unilaterally dissolved Iran's relationship with the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), setting up an new entity, the so-called Iranian National Oil Company (INOC). By this action, he, in effect, nationalized Iran's oil industry.²

The upshot of this was that the governments of Britain and the United States overthrew Mossadeq, after first branding the prime minister “a dupe of the communists.” The same tactic was used against the Iraqis, who, in 1961, made a similar attempt to nationalize. In 1963, the CIA overthrew Iraq’s first republican ruler, Abdul Karim Qassem.³

Thus, one can say that, in regard to the Gulf, the capitalist West viewed nationalism with disfavor. The Anglo-Saxons had to tread warily, however, as among Iranians a significant residue of support existed for Mossadeq, and corresponding resentment of the Shah.⁴ The Shah, to offset ill-feeling, posed as a nationalist, professing to steer his country on a course of supporting neither west nor east.⁵ The Americans and British did not object to his taking the stance that he did, as, in their minds, they had him sewed up, as one might say—the Shah’s military was armed with U.S. weapons—so it was easy to see whose side he was on.

The Shah bought a lot of weapons. He bought so many, in fact, questions were raised about his mental balance. There were those in Washington who deemed him a megalomaniac, seeking to bolster his self-esteem by posing as a great war leader.⁶ When generals in the Pentagon pointed out to Kissinger that the Shah’s army wasn’t competent to use the complicated systems he was buying (because the bulk of Iran’s population was rural and illiterate and hence could not understand the systems, let alone operate them), the American secretary of state is supposed to have quipped, “Good, then he can’t get into trouble with them.” And when, in 1973, the Shah set himself up as a hawk, pushing for higher oil prices in OPEC, Kissinger is supposed to have told him, do whatever you want with the oil, but keep buying the weapons.⁷

It should be obvious why Kissinger would adopt this position. Oil is traded in dollars. With dollars flooding Iran’s treasury (because the price of oil had shot up post-1973)⁸ the Iranians were motivated to buy American. There were lots of things the Shah might have purchased with his dollars. By focusing on weapons, he handed the defense contractors in the United States a windfall. Money from the sale of oil was returned to the United States in the form of weapons purchases. This was a reciprocal deal: the United States bought oil paid for in dollars; the Shah bought weapons, which had the effect of returning a portion of those dollars to the United States. Also there was a strategic component. Since the Shah’s military had to be trained to use the weapons, American military advisors were put on loan to Iran. The Americans not only trained the Iranians, they maintained the systems, which otherwise would over time almost certainly have become unusable through neglect. The Americans also assisted the Shah with his manifold modernization schemes, contracting out services to the Shah: for example, the Agency for International Development (AID) became active in Iran during this period, as did the TFL program (Teaching English as a Foreign Language). TFL instructors

tutored the Shah's pilots, and also security specialists were on loan to develop the Shah's secret police, SAVAK (Sazman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar).⁹ At its peak over 30,000 Americans served in Iran in one capacity or another. Effectively, Iran had become America's military base in the Gulf, howbeit it was never formally designated as such.

But then, in 1979, the Shah was overthrown, which posed a great crisis for the Americans. What now would Khomeini do with the weapons, as obviously America didn't want them rattling around the Middle East, getting into the hands of just anyone? He didn't do much of anything with them; in fact, he let them rust away. It so happened that Khomeini mistrusted the Shah's old army, and so he gutted it. That was one big problem (for the Americans) taken care of. Still, the defense contractors in the United States took a hit: a regular source of income had dried up.

Enter the Saudis. Since roughly 1974, the Saudis, too, had been buying American arms, and the Saudi military no more than that of the Shah was competent to use them. This meant that the Americans could replicate their erstwhile arrangement with the Shah. However, the new relationship differed in one key regard. Whereas, under the Shah, American bankers, specifically those of Chase Manhattan, were tooled in, one might say, to Iran's power structure, now, with the Saudis there was no such close inhouse arrangement.¹⁰ There was, to be sure, the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO), which for years had dominated the oil scene in Saudi Arabia. But, after 1973, and the Arab oil embargo, ARAMCO was taken over by the Saudis. Thus, its status had changed. American oil men still managed the company, but as contract employees. They took orders from the Saudis, who remunerated them well, but it was not as in the old days, when the Americans ruled the roost in Riyadh.

Effectively, what had happened was the aforementioned IOS had become defunct. With Saudis setting production quotas, price control had passed to them, and that translated into their gaining significant clout internationally—a situation not altogether to the Americans' liking.¹¹ The Saudis, by manipulating production targets, could affect the price of oil, and that would have a great—and potentially an adverse—effect on the U.S. economy.

Reagan, who was then president, made a lunge at recovery, as one might describe it. He hatched a scheme with Britain's Margaret Thatcher whereby Thatcher would set the price of Britain's North Sea oil below that of OPEC.¹² This would force OPEC into a price war, which Reagan and Thatcher confidently assumed they would win. And, were they so to do, this would break the OPEC cartel.

The Americans and British didn't win. Instead of destroying OPEC, it was they who lost out. Indeed, one unanticipated result of their being defeated was America's oil industry in the Southwest effectively went out of business. The Saudis had run the price down so low in competing with the British the Americans were priced out of the market.

Reagan had to execute an embarrassing volte-face. He sent his vice president, George H. W. Bush, to Riyadh, where in secret negotiations with the Saudis' then-ruler, King Fahd, Bush wangled a deal whereby the Saudis agreed to keep the oil price in a narrow band (between \$14 and \$17 per barrel), which the Americans could accommodate.¹³

For awhile, it seemed that American-Saudi relations were back in sync; indeed, for a time things could not have been better. The Iran-Iraq War was yet raging, and the United States, which at the war's outset had refused to take sides (between Iraq and the Islamic Republic), had by then swung over to supporting the Iraqis. Since the Saudis and sheikhs of the lower Gulf feared an Iranian victory, this worked to strengthen American ties to the Gulf Arabs.¹⁴ Meanwhile, the Iranians, in an effort to drive a wedge between the sheikhs and the Ba'athists, began physically attacking first Saudi Arabia, then Kuwait. This served to underscore the Arabs' vulnerability, and by extension their dependence on the United States for protection. (When the Iranians fired a missile at an oil tanker bound for Kuwait, Reagan responded by re-flagging Kuwaiti tankers so that any future attack by Iran on the tankers would invite retaliation from the United States.)¹⁵

Then, when the first Iraq War broke out (in 1991) the Gulf oil producers practically bankrolled the entire operation. The Saudis (and Kuwaitis and the Emirates) essentially underwrote much of the expense incurred by the coalition partners. The Turks, for example, received a subsidy for allowing the Americans to use Incirlik as a base from which to attack Iraq. The Egyptians and the Syrians, too, were subsidized—for joining the coalition.¹⁶ And, on top of everything else, the Saudis supplied the coalition with cheap oil.

This left the Saudis after the war, for the first time in their history, reeling from debt. However, when the Saudis went to the Americans to plead for relief (the Saudi ambassador in the United States had, on his own authority, bought enormous amounts of weapons from the Americans, all of which had to be paid for), Clinton, the then-president, not only refused to ease up on repayment but also he insisted that the Kingdom make good on a prior pledge to buy commercial airliners from Boeing.¹⁷ A debt schedule was worked out, but the relationship was not the same afterward. One could say that bad blood obtained between the parties, and this may have influenced the Saudis, after the Asia Meltdown in 1998, to scrap the arrangement whereby they colluded with the Americans to keep the oil price down. It appeared, as of the late 1990s, that the Americans' influence in the Gulf was on the wane.

This deterioration in relations affected the weapons purchases. The Clinton administration lobbied hard to get the Saudis to keep up their buys, arguing that, even though Iraq was defeated, the Gulf was yet threatened by the Ba'ath.¹⁸ This argument was a hard sell.

Why should the Saudis fear the Ba'athists, so thoroughly beaten in the just concluded war?

The United States was in a bind. Weapons production had become a mainstay of the U.S. economy. It was not just that key states in the United States depended on arms contracts to fund their local economies, the U.S. military did as well. It's not generally known but the Gulf states during this period actually were buying more arms than the Pentagon. Hence, the Americans could not easily afford to have such a great source of revenue diminish, much less disappear.

Additionally, elements within the U.S. Congress were agitating (after the collapse of the Soviet Union) for a drawdown in appropriations for the military. It got so bad that, among military men, this period became known as the era of the Great Train Wreck.¹⁹

It's interesting to speculate what might have happened had the U.S. military treated the situation other than it did: it might, for example, have viewed it as an opportunity for reform. The systems on which the United States depended were not good for much anymore, there not being a superpower to wield them against. What good was a Stealth bomber for quelling a rural insurgency? Or a Polaris submarine, for that matter? The military might have done well to rethink its doctrine, converting to something less grand—like how to defend against irregular war, that which the Americans styled low-intensity conflict.

It didn't do that, for obvious reasons. War, to the Americans, was/is big business. Producing super-lethal, super-expensive weapons systems was a way of making money. Selling such systems to the sheikhs (and to others around the world) brought cash into the United States. Moreover, since the systems were continually being upgraded (and made more expensive), more money went into the contractors' coffers. All of which is to say that the interests that stood to benefit from the military procurement setup would not have approved an overhaul of America's military doctrine. Particularly, they would not have wanted to see a switch to infantry-type combat, as that was much less of a money maker. Were a switch to have been proposed, the interests would, dependably, have lobbied against it.

In any event, no change came about—because of 9/11. The attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon were a godsend for the military/industrial complex. Downsizing went out the window, as the Defense Department geared up for yet another war—two, actually.

Still, the question remained: how was the United States proposing to fight these wars? The Afghans were nothing but a collection of rude tribesmen. The Iraqis had suffered after fighting one costly eight-year long war (with Iran), and then another brief but brutal engagement with the Americans wherein they had been badly mauled. And after that they had had to suffer through 12 years of Draconian sanctions. There wasn't a lot left of the Iraqi military. Would America fight these second,

third-rate armies (that of Iraq and Afghanistan) the way it would a super-power, using all of those lethal systems?

That's precisely what Rumsfeld proposed doing, and he had prepared an argument as to why this would be a good idea: Rumsfeld claimed it would be more humane(!). The systems were so lethal, he argued, nothing could withstand them. The wars, therefore, could be gotten over with expeditiously (a maximum of three weeks). No one on the American side (or few at any rate) would be killed, and not many of the enemy either.

Moreover, if one bought the Likudniks' argument—about the Iraqis not fighting, at all—the loss of life would be nil.

But suppose they did fight?

In that case, Rumsfeld, I'm sure, counted on finding WMD in Iraq, after which he would make the case that against a regime of such awfulness that it would use WMD, any form of retaliation, even bombing the country back to the Stone Age (a new-Carthage), would be justified. A-bombing was probably not ruled out.²⁰

So it happened that, when the second Iraq war came off, the Americans fought it using primarily air power, which was not suitable under the circumstances. Indeed, one could argue that, in employing the systems, the Americans were resorting to an extreme form of overkill—the destruction inflicted on the hapless Iraqis was appalling. They had to undergo yet another punishing round of aerial attacks, at the end of which whatever good will they might have had for the Americans (assuming there was any to begin with) was squandered. Iraq was left, as I said in Chapter 1, a smoking ruin; psychologically the trauma inflicted on the Iraqis was severe.²¹

In 2004 and 2006, the *Lancet*, Britain's oldest medical journal, published two studies on the effect of the 2003 war on Iraq's mortality rate. The first study found that, owing to the war, Iraq's mortality was up 50 percent, with an estimated 98,000 fatalities which could be attributed to the conflict. The second study upped the figure to 654,965 excess deaths.²² Both reports were challenged, in the United States and Britain. However, independent researchers; that is, those not connected with the report, pronounced its research methods "robust."²³ Washington set a much lower figure of perhaps 30,000.²⁴

The Americans sought to offset the bad publicity from the report by claiming the aim of the coalition forces was laudable, to institute democracy in Iraq, and thus the war was just, even though the damage was, perhaps, excessive. (Having adopted that argument, of course, the United States then had to make sure that the elections in Iraq came off—even though, as a consequence, Iran was able to infiltrate the provisional government). The American defense is questionable, I feel.

Iraq was virtually destroyed by the war, both materially and in a number of other ways meaningful to the Iraqis. For one thing, they lost their

sovereignty, and, on top of that, since the occupation, in practically all departments, was badly mismanaged, the suffering of the Iraqi people was compounded thereby. This last result, the Americans refused to consider. Madame Albright, in response to an interviewer's question about infant mortality in Iraq, said that the United States thought the deaths of so many Iraqi children were justified to get rid of Saddam Hussein!²⁵

However this may be, over the course of the war and the occupation Iraqi resentment against the United States increased appreciably, with the Iraqis coming to view the Americans as malign. I would say the mishandling of the occupation went a long ways towards fueling the resistance.

What particularly seems to have alienated the Iraqis was the scheme, described in the last chapter, to break Iraq into cantons. This raised the specter of the country's being deconstructed. The Iraqis (the Arabs, at least) saw themselves physically dispossessed; driven off their land, to become permanent refugees, a la the Palestinians. Of course, the Americans never at any point proposed seizing Arab land, which is what the Israelis are in the process of doing with the Palestinians. Still, as Rumsfeld so famously remarked: "Stuff happens." How have the Israelis handled the Palestinians? First, under the Labor Party, they proposed swapping land for peace. And then, under the Likud, all that changed: now the Palestinians can have "peace for peace" (whatever that means), and meanwhile the Israelis encroach and encroach on Palestinian land, until today, on the West Bank, the Arab population is herded into veritable Bantustans—and as for Gaza, that's a killing ground.

The Israelis defend their transfer-of-populations scheme by claiming the Palestinians, once dispossessed, can go live in Jordan, or anywhere else in the Arab world. This might have been possible at one time, when there was a strong Arab nationalism movement. But, Arab nationalism, as I said above, is dead. Dispossessed Iraqis would hardly be welcome in Egypt, say.²⁶

Arabs rendered landless (or worse, as in the case of the Palestinians, stateless) are lost creatures. Once dispossessed, they've no place to go. They can't go to Europe; Europe has shut its doors to them. The days when an Arab could migrate to Germany, say, or to France, or even to one of the Scandinavian countries, and there find work and send home remittances—that's over with.

I pointed out above that Iraq today has a refugee problem. I cited statistics of the United Nations about millions of Iraqis camping out in Jordan and Syria. The United Nations has reckoned that half the refugees in the world today are victims of America's wars with Iraq and Afghanistan.²⁷ I also cited the internal refugee problem, whereby millions of Iraqis are displaced inside the country.

So what recourse do the Iraqi Arabs have except to resist? As of this writing, the violence in Iraq seems to have abated, but, given the fact that

the United States is committed to withdraw from Iraq, is it not likely that things will regress? There are already indications this is happening. There have been mounting incidences of suicide bombing, which the occupation authority has tried to downplay, but it would appear that the resisters are seeking to provoke a recurrence of civil war.

If Obama really believes that the United States can withdraw, in my view, he's deluding himself. The state of play in Iraq is really not much changed from what it was a couple of years ago: the resisters are still there; they are still armed, and any letdown of protection by the Americans will certainly trigger a recommencement of the fighting.

Moreover, since there's no program anywhere in the works (not in Washington, or in New York with the United Nations) to correct this condition, the future for the Arab Iraqis is not hopeful. Formerly, there was a scheme to set up a Marshall Plan for the Middle East, whereby Europe, the United States, and Japan (in cooperation with the wealthy Arabs) would rehabilitate the region. The notion that any such scheme could win assent in the U.S. Congress today is farfetched, I would say.

One could make the argument that the rich oil sheikhs should undertake Iraq's rehabilitation. To be sure, they could—but will they do it, if there's a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad? The Saudis fear the Iranians as much as they do the militant Iraqis.

In other words, increased violence is practically assured, and now I'd like to examine what is likely to be the effect of letting these conditions not just exist but spread throughout the region.

* * *

America has this huge military/industrial complex which needs to be fed, so to speak. It's optimally convenient for the contractors if there's war going on someplace—any war, it doesn't matter with whom, as this is an argument for keeping up weapons production. But this is not essential. The complex is so entrenched in American society, its doubtful that anyone, or any combination of forces, could gainsay it. We saw how powerful it was when Gates tried recently to ax several costly weapons systems, most notably the F-22 Stealth bomber. Congress—Democrat and Republican alike—went into an uproar over this.

Moreover, AIPAC is certain to push for war since Israel's status as America's surrogate is predicated on there being unrest in the region. I don't think it's an exaggeration to say that Israel has now become an arm of the Pentagon.

To keep Pentagon appropriations flowing all that is really required is a threat, and unfortunately, for the Arabs, they seem to be the threat du jour. This seemingly is what is behind this appallingly racist campaign of individuals and groups associated with AIPAC, to tar Muslims as Islamofascists. There's a whole stable of writers, who promulgate this view.²⁸

Were this campaign to succeed (if it hasn't already done so), the way would then be clear to destroy Muslim society. After all, one does not negotiate with evil; one eradicates it.

Are Muslims, as portrayed, so evil? Are they even aggressors? I don't think so. Rather, the Muslims appear to be the victims. As I said in Chapter 3, the fight of the Palestinians and Lebanese Shias is over land. Israel wants Arab land; Israel means to have it. If the Israelis were sincerely motivated to negotiate a two-state solution, and were the Palestinians, even so, to go on fighting, one might then be able to write them off. But few people who have followed this issue believe that Israel is searching for a peaceful solution. Israel's new foreign minister, under a recently elected Likud government, Avigdor Lieberman, recently specifically ruled out such a result.²⁹

Thus, the Palestinians will likely go on resisting, as, were they to let down, they'd lose out, all around. The Israelis would then be likely to step up pressure, convinced that coercion pays. Once the Palestinians accept the idea of Israel being a Jewish state, the Palestinians' hope of holding out in the territories, much less being compensated for land already taken, would be extinguished.

This brings us to a discussion of Gaza, 2008.

Three days before the close of the year, and while Bush was yet ensconced in the White House, Israel launched an all-out assault on Gaza. The aim, as given out by the Israelis, was to stop the Palestinians rocketing southern Israel. I think there was more to it than that. The Israeli elections were pending. Three major parties were set to vie for control of the government. The politicians hoped to score advantages at the polls. From the domestic angle, the operation could be seen as a vote-getting ploy.

The Israelis had launched a similar attack against Hizbollah in 2006 and were badly shown up in the process: the campaign failed, spectacularly. Now, with an invasion of Gaza, that humiliation was set to be avenged (or so the politicians seem to have believed).

Bush, the best friend Israel ever had, was copacetic.³⁰ Thus, the Israelis probably viewed this as a chance (perhaps the last for awhile) to hit the Palestinians really hard.

The Israelis gave it everything they had. Wave on wave of F-16 fighters flew low over the strip, targeting everything—but everything.³¹ The Israelis hit the municipal infrastructure—the ministries of Hamas; they hit private residences (on the pretext Hamas fighters were inside); they blew up whole neighborhoods, known strongholds of Hamas.³²

By the end of the first week, the IDF effectively had run out of targets. The strip only measures 132 square miles (27 miles long and 3.5–6 miles wide). Over a million Gazans live in the strip, one of the most densely populated areas on earth.

The Israelis, with the air attacks, had so worked over the territory that they had hit every conceivable target. So now they went back and did it all over again, blowing up the same things twice.

Meanwhile, on the ground, the Israeli army had moved into the strip—not into the dense center, because that would have been too dangerous. Urban guerrilla war was not anything they relished—too casualty intensive. If the aim was to affect the upcoming elections, the last thing the politicians wanted was casualties.

But, it appeared that, on the other side, the sky was the limit: the Israelis clearly had no compunction about killing Palestinians. In an area that was, as I said, so densely packed civilian casualties were inevitable; it's impossible to destroy infrastructure and not kill people (collateral damage, as the Americans say). The death toll of Palestinians has been estimated, by the United Nations and relief agencies, at over 1,400, the bulk non-Hamas civilians.

The hospitals in Gaza at the time the invasion commenced were poorly supplied. Israel had been maintaining an economic embargo of the strip before the attack took place.³³ As a consequence, medical supplies were low to nonexistent.

By the end of the first week Palestinian health workers were overwhelmed. The hospitals had become so overcrowded, the doctors could not cope. One Palestinian doctor was quoted as saying that it was better to be brought into the hospital dead; once there, there was nothing that could be done for the merely wounded.³⁴

But, then, the Israelis targeted the hospitals, claiming there were Hamas fighters inside. They also targeted mosques, and, as I say, municipal buildings.

They hit the UN headquarters in Gaza, with white phosphorous. White phosphorous used against civilians is a fiendish weapon.³⁵ On contact it melts the flesh off the body. (The Americans used it also against civilians in Fallujah).³⁶ Definitely this was a war crime. The UN secretary general Ban Ki Moon's reaction was one of horror.³⁷

The Israelis claimed that they thought there were Hamas fighters inside.

The Israelis destroyed the American school, giving the same excuse.³⁸

All this was cant, as seems to have been shown by a brouhaha that erupted in Israel after the campaign was over, when some of the IDF fighters complained their commanders told them, before the battle, specifically to go after civilians.³⁹ The Israelis were out not just to destroy infrastructure; they knew when they undertook this operation there would be large loss of life; this was to be a repeat of Grapes of Wrath, and of Jeneen. In 2002, the Israelis, claiming that the Palestinian refugee camp at Jeneen was a haven for terrorists, undertook an assault similar to that of Gaza. At the end of it, the IDF withdrew, leaving the camp a heap of rubble,

under which, the Palestinians claimed, lay the bodies of some 500 of people. When the United Nations attempted to send a team to Jeneen to investigate, the Israelis refused to cooperate, and the Bush administration, through its representative on the Security Council, blocked the world body from entering the camp.⁴⁰ And now in this instance, of Gaza, the Israelis appear to be following the same procedure: the United Nations created a special team to investigate war crimes committed (by both sides) during the operation, and the Israeli government once again has refused—as of this writing—to cooperate.⁴¹

What we seem to be witnessing is the implementation of a strategy. Israel and the United States, by repeatedly dissing the world body, are devaluing international law. And now I want to discuss this aspect of the business.

* * *

The United States and Israel are both obviously committed to the air war strategy, the reasons why, I've already explained. Neither country is disposed to commit large numbers of ground forces, except in certain limited contingencies. Among other factors, there are institutional constraints which operate against this. Instead of garrisoning the occupied territory with foot soldiers, the approach is to use the air force, as a policing instrument. At the first hint of disturbance, the force goes airborne to carry out raids against the putative malefactors.

At the same time, however, based on experience to date, the approach doesn't seem to work. It didn't succeed against the Lebanese Shias nor against the Gazans.⁴² Nevertheless, the determination is to keep on with it. The Americans and Israelis must believe the strategy can be made to work, if persisted in long enough. The operating assumption would appear to be: people only can absorb so much punishment; inevitably, capitulation will ensue. And if, in the process of working things out, rules of international law are transgressed, so be it. The end (of eliminating terrorism) justifies the activity.

What Bush and the men around him failed to perceive—or deliberately blocked their minds to—is that rules of war are there for a purpose. Without rules wars tend to become annihilatory. Without constraints conflict degenerates into savagery.

George Bush, the father, went to great lengths to establish just cause in undertaking to fight Iraq the first time around. The first Iraq War was brutal. But since the war was authorized by the United Nations, excesses were condoned. In the first war, Saddam, by refusing to heed the UN injunctions, brought destruction on himself and on his people, or so the feeling went.

But, in the second Iraq War, Bush, the son, made no attempt to cover himself by seeking UN sanction. As a consequence, much of what was done in that war now is perceived, in the world's eyes, as criminal.

Interestingly, the American public doesn't appear to be affected by censure; Americans don't seem troubled by the suffering they have inflicted on the Iraqis. The viewing is otherwise on the Arabs' side.

In observing what was done to the Iraqis, the Palestinians and Lebanese Shias have drawn the lesson that this is what is in store for them.

And this, I think, explains why, in all of the instances where the air war was tried, there has been no disposition on the victims' part to accept the verdict. The Hizbollahis conned the lessons of Iraq and set about preparing themselves for when (not if, but when) the same was tried on them. They burrowed underground, constructing an elaborate system of tunnels, in which to cower until the bombings had passed over, after which they emerged to resume rocketing the Israelis. Moreover, they stockpiled rockets of longer range which permitted them to target Israeli ships standing off the coast of Lebanon!

The same sort of thing went on with the Gazans. They, too, built tunnels, and smuggled in rocket parts which they assembled and stockpiled, and thus when, the Israelis proclaimed victory (after pounding the Gazans for 22 days), the very next day the Palestinians resumed rocketing southern Israel.

In the case of Iraq, the resisters laid low when the Surge was implemented. Violence abated after the Americans dispatched additional forces to the theater, but now, as the Americans are preparing to withdraw from Iraq, resistance is picking up again. Moreover, the Iraqi resisters have adapted to the Americans' tactics. They have developed fiendish weapons, as I pointed out above—the shaped grenade charge, roadside bombs, and, of course, as always, they have recruited suicide bombers.

There's a variable operating here which neither the Americans nor the Israelis seem able to comprehend.

* * *

Schmitt, in his *Theory of the Partisan*, continually makes reference to the "logic of counter-insurgency (and in some places to the 'logic of terror and counter-terror')." ⁴³ He never explains what he means by this. Logic, as I understand it, means one thing following naturally on another. But, a logical sequence is not an easy thing to construct. So who or what is responsible for setting up this logic train?

In the process of waging an insurgency, events develop according to a pattern. For example, were the guerrillas to perpetrate an outrage—a suicide bombing in Afghanistan, let us say—the Americans would then be motivated to respond with missile attacks on Afghani villages, suspected guerrilla strongholds. But then, as is inevitable, this produces civilian casualties, and so a reaction sets in. Individuals, who prior to the bombing may have had no links to the resistance, take a stand; some may even be

driven to become guerrillas. We know that this goes on. Numerous accounts testify to its happening.⁴⁴

This sequence of events points up the mechanism that drives the process, that which impels the resistance to carry on, and the occupiers to resort to more and more severe forms of collective punishment, until finally, it would seem, the terror becomes self-perpetuating.

What appears to be acting in all such instances is psychology. The psychology of the natives is acted on by the collective punishment to which they are subjected. The psychology of the authorities is similarly affected by the outrages, as these not only occur but multiply, gaining in ferocity, becoming more and more horrifying.

The response of Bush and the Likudniks to this unfolding process was to try to define it out of existence. Bush apparently believed that by labeling the resisters terrorists he could cope with the problem; could gain a warrant thereby to use any means necessary to eradicate it.

But, by going all out, he hasn't achieved a great deal. The war in Iraq continues. Similarly, in Palestine and Lebanon, the resistance survives, and, if anything, has gained in strength. The inevitable result, therefore, of using air war tactics is to produce more and more resisters.

Thus, the resistance is seen to be spreading—to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and even to as far away as Algeria, Yemen, and Somalia.

What seems to account for this is that, in adopting the course that they have; that is, by succumbing to the belief the issue can be forced, the Americans and Israelis have compromised conditions that formerly operated to keep the Middle East (and Central Asia) stable. In some places (and Iraq comes to mind as an example of this) a situation of anarchy has developed.

Americans may believe that anarchy in far off corners of the world is a situation they can live with. They may believe (and seemingly many do believe) that they can walk away from Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon, leaving the inhabitants there to stew in their own juice, so to speak. But this is not just some far off corner of the world. This is where most of the world's easily obtainable oil supplies are located. If instability spreads to the lower Gulf this is going to affect the world's economy. America, which through all of the years of the Cold War, acted as the Gulf's protector, will perforce have to return to restabilize the situation, at whatever cost. If it does not, the United States will cease to play the role of hegemon—not just of the Gulf but of the world.

In other words, the idea that the United States can live with a Middle East in turmoil is mistaken.

There's something else going on here. At a point in any conflict aggression persisted in becomes irrational, as one side comes to view the struggle as existential. This was a point Schmitt noted. When the oppressed start believing that forces aggressing against them are out to

finish them off, actually exterminate them, the tendency is to resist, no matter what.

What policymakers in the United States ought to be paying attention to is conditions inside the affected areas: there is total break down of law and order; there is anarchy.

The perfect state for the bourgeois is security. The bourgeois yearns for it, strives to create conditions under which it can obtain. However, there's an element in society that thrives on insecurity. A certain class of individuals sees it as a preferable condition; under it, one can become empowered. With gun in hand, psychopaths assert themselves, in ways not previously thought permissible. Whatever the psychopath wants to do, he does; whatever he covets, he takes. Cooool.

Thus things fall apart. To be sure, a proportion of the resisters inside these affected areas are sincerely motivated: they want to keep possession of their land, to maintain their way of life. But, alongside these legitimate ones there is this other lot: the ones who enjoy the mayhem. To indulge in mayhem is pleasurable to them; it's actually experienced as liberating. And this being the case, why not pile it on, so to speak? More violence, more killing. It may not make sense, however, it happens.

In the aftermath of the Bosnia conflict (to take this as an example), accounts of participants in the war have been published, the details of which are horrifying.⁴⁵ Things were done in Bosnia that are almost beyond imagining—so loathsome were they. Appalling acts were perpetrated by individuals who apparently reveled in the activity, to the extent of devising new, previously unheard of outrages they could perpetrate, ingenious varieties of torment they could inflict on their fellow human beings.

This, it would seem, is the essence of what Schmitt was after; what he was striving to uncover with his theorizing about irregular warfare. Along with Clausewitz, Schmitt believed that self-defense, the option of resisting whenever one's existence is threatened, is a right. And he also took it as natural that where people perceived themselves to be so threatened—and had the means to defend themselves—they would.

But Schmitt went beyond Clausewitz, theorizing that irregular war, which is what ensues when a people undertake a program of self-defense, can, if not quelled expeditiously, transmogrify into something awful. In the process of resisting, certain of the fighters gain a taste for violence, and then, it was Schmitt's conviction, the system becomes imperiled. Schmitt, at the end of his brief essay, cited a quotation of Hobbes. To wit:

"A man who believes himself endangered by others is as much more dangerous as any animal, as his weapons are more dangerous than the so-called natural weapons of animals, such as teeth, claws, horns, or poison."

The partisan, under this construction, is the denizen of a Hobbesian world of man-against-man. His appearance betokens nothing less than the imminent breakdown of the system. The partisan, in Schmitt's conception, must not be viewed as a romantic, Che Guevara-type figure. Nor is he, as the communists averred during the 1950s and 1960s, the prototypical representative of a society on the way to becoming more perfect. Correctly viewed, the partisan conveys a darker image.

At the very end of his theory, Schmitt posited two possible outcomes for the partisan. In one instance, the regular forces, with their high tech weapons, their superior technology, grind the partisans to extinction. Schmitt cited a chilling analogy: the partisans, he said, will become obsolete, like dogs on the autobahn.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Schmitt queried, what if a new breed of partisan were to emerge, one who has mastered the technology, and learned to survive the, as he said, long night of the bombs, to emerge from the cratered ruins and carry on the fight?

Schmitt even went so far as to speculate that the irregulars might eventually gain possession of the A-bomb. Isn't this the fear now, over Iran's supposedly seeking to acquire a nuclear capability? One should not overlook the fact that the Revolutionary Guards and the basij in Iran, basically, are militias—no different than Hamas or Hizbollah or the Iraqi insurgent groups.

Schmitt doesn't venture to predict which of these images will ultimately prove out. But, given what we have witnessed in Lebanon and in Gaza, the latter must be seen as having at least a possibility of occurring.

This being the case, it would appear that Rumsfeld and the Likudniks' dream of triumphing through air power is delusional. One can't assume that merely by expanding the range of killing one will win out in the end. Rather, what the world must look forward to (assuming the American-Israeli style of war continues) is an escalating struggle, becoming ever more and more brutal, more and more indefensible, as the constraints that formerly operated to keep war within bounds are overridden. Wars will become, if, indeed, they haven't already become, genocidal.

Conclusion

In trying to uncover how Israel was instrumental in getting the United States into war with Iraq, I've come down to asserting that the Israelis supplied the philosophical justification for the war, and for the particular way in which it was waged. The war, as it developed, was illegal, particularly this was the case with the aerial targeting of Iraqi cities.

This method, of relying almost exclusively on air power, and deliberately going after civilians—with the intent of demoralizing them—is a tactic much favored by Israel. It used it first against the Lebanese in 1996, the infamous Grapes of Wrath operation. It repeated the operation in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2008.

In all cases, the course of events was similar. Weapons meant to be used in total war (against superpowers) were wielded against defenseless civilians. No regard was paid to the extent of the damage incurred, and afterward, the aggressor departed, giving no thought to rehabilitating the damaged area. There was one other feature, difficult to square with any concept of justice: the aggressor deliberately targeted the symbols of international law. UN installations are hit, as in Qana, in Jeneen, and in Gaza. And then, when the inevitable outcry ensues, the aggressor dismisses the clamor. It does not choose to acknowledge it.

Since these features all occur, and reoccur, one must assume this is part of the strategy. Call it Shock and Awe, call it counterterror, what it comes down to is blurring the line that formerly was sharply drawn between combatants and noncombatants.

For awhile this sort of behavior was seen only in the Middle East. With Afghanistan, it spread to central Asia. America is now using more and

more missiles in its fight against the Taliban.¹ And, ignoring issues of sovereignty, the United States is going after suspected terrorists in Pakistan, ignoring the Pakistani government's complaints that this not acceptable. The Americans, acting on informants' tips, many of which turn out to be spurious, raid putative terrorist sites. Wedding parties seem to feature in these attacks wherein civilians are killed. Afterwards, the U.S. military denies that there have been civilian casualties. The United Nations then comes in; investigations are conducted; the results seem conclusive—there were, indeed, civilians killed, women and children.

And, of course, as the situation heats up in Iraq, this is seen more and more there also.

Thus, the behavior cannot be construed as accidental, something that just seems to happen, without intent. This is all part of a strategy, the strategy of the air war.

The question then becomes, ought the United States be doing this?

It seems to me that it's become pointless to raise such concerns. The fact of the matter is that the United States has put itself in an impossible bind. Arms production, as I said above, is big business. Today, the United States is the biggest exporter of arms to the Third World, with China, interestingly, now having taken the place of Russia as the second biggest. This means that the Third World, presently awash with weapons, is likely to go on sopping them up, so to speak. And inevitably these weapons find their way into the hands of irregulars—the militias that are proliferating at such an alarming rate everywhere in the region.

Unless the United States wants to stand down in the marketing of arms overseas this provisioning of the militiamen with weapons will go on, unabated, and the violence—and the anarchy—will spread. The United States, given the strength of the lobbies that support arms production, is unlikely to give up on this lucrative trade; therefore, we must expect it to go on doing as it's doing; that is, pursuing the strategy of trying to wipe the enemy (civilians included) out. Anti-people wars are the way things will go; they are the way that wars have come to be fought. It doesn't make a lot of sense what Israel and the United States are doing, but the fact is that it's unlikely to change.

So now people who are concerned must ask, how does one cope with this new, horrid reality?

One just does, I guess. As Rumsfeld says: "Stuff happens."

Notes

CHAPTER 1

1. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Is Pressing for Turks' Help in Move on Iraq," *New York Times*, November 28, 2002.

2. Ibid.

3. Turkey had had a bad experience with the first Iraq War, when it allowed the United States to use Incirlik Air Base to fly raids against Iraq. The Turks felt that their then-president Turgut Ozal had misled them about economic benefits he promised would flow from helping out the Americans. Those benefits never materialized. In fact, when the Ba'thists rallied and crushed an Iraqi Kurdish uprising in northern Iraq, Turkey found itself besieged by thousands of fleeing Kurds who decamped en masse over the border. Turkey has a large and restive Kurdish population of its own, and thus is adamantly opposed to seeing the Kurds gain independence anywhere, as they fear that this will inspire Turkish Kurds to separate from Turkey (there are large Kurdish communities in Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria). For a more detailed account of the Turks' reasons for eschewing participation in the war see my book, *Losing Iraq: Insurgency and Politics* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2007).

4. See "Disappointed Wolfowitz Still Supports U.S.-Turkish Defense Ties," *American Armed Forces Information Services*, May 7, 2003.

5. Wolfowitz's departing interview, before he left for Ankara, was quite optimistic, conveying the impression that Erdogan's acquiescence was in the bag.

6. The mainstay of Saddam's regime, the Americans believed, was the elite Republican Guard. The Guards had the best equipment and were manned by the pick of Iraq's 350,000-man army.

7. Saddam Hussein, in the first Iraq War (1991), had sacrificed the regular army so as to preserve the elite Republican Guard units. He ordered the Guards to withdraw out of Kuwait back to Iraq, supposedly to make a last stand in defense of the

government in case the Americans invaded Iraqi territory. However, by leaving the regulars pretty much to fend for themselves, to get out of Kuwait as best they could, he, in effect, placed them in a trap, and many were killed. This treatment was supposed to have soured the regulars on the government. Thus, they were not expected to fight when the United States re-declared war in 2003.

8. Iraq's population is divided into three main groups: the Shias and the Sunnis, both of which are sects of Islam, and the Kurds. The Shias and Sunnis are Arabs; the Kurds are Aryans. Popular wisdom in the United States held that all three were mutually antagonistic. The Shias and the Kurds supposedly were downtrodden by the Sunnis, who, it was believed, ruled Iraq (Saddam was a Sunni). This was supposed despite the fact that the Shias constitute over half of Iraq's population, and consequently are a huge majority (the Sunnis and Kurds each account for about a quarter). This belief, that the Shias were inimical to the Ba'thist regime of Saddam Hussein, was not born out in fact. The Ba'thists had been successful over the years in elevating the Shias, and, indeed, many of the top posts in Saddam's government were held by members of the sect. Which is to say that among the Shias and Sunnis (but not the Kurds) the primary identification was on the basis of national feeling, not religion; that is, they saw/see themselves first and foremost as Iraqis. I'll go into this in more detail below.

9. The appearance of these irregular fighters was reported in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. See Michael R. Gordon, "New Iraqi Force Emerges," *New York Times*, March 24, 2003. Asked who were these irregulars, Rumsfeld claimed they were fanatical youth, seeking martyrdom for Saddam Hussein. In fact, as later was brought out, they were mainly regular Iraqi army and elite Republican Guardsmen and intelligence officers, fighting in mufti. See below.

10. Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).

11. Mukhabarat is the designation for the Ba'thists' security force.

12. A military term for the focus of one's concentration, assuming if this element (the center of gravity) can be neutralized or overcome the enemy is then put at a disadvantage.

13. The Kurds actually supported the American invasion, assisting Special Forces teams that parachuted into the mountainous northern region.

14. Lieutenant General William Wallace, commander of V Corps, speaking from the battlefield was quoted as saying this. See Bernard Weinraub with Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld Design for War Criticized on the Battlefield," *New York Times*, April 1, 2003.

15. Vernon Loeb, "Rumsfeld Faulted for Troop Dilution," *Washington Post*, March 30, 2003.

16. Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Shifting Focus of Land Campaign to South," *New York Times*, March 26, 2003.

17. Michael R. Gordon, "Aerial Pounding Intended to Push Iraq's Government Toward Brink," *New York Times*, March 22, 2003; "The Blitz Over Baghdad," *New York Times*, March 22, 2003; Anthony Depalma, "Bombarding Baghdad, Deaths in Battle, and Rising Support for Bush," *New York Times*, March 22, 2003; and Thomas E. Ricks, "Unfolding Battle Will Determine Length of War," *Washington Post*, March 25, 2003.

18. There was a complication that Washington ought to have picked up on. Recently Turkey had undergone a change of leadership, with the so-called Justice and Development Party coming to power. The party's leaders were avowed Muslims, which clashed with Turkey's traditional stance of secularism. Turkey's army generals, with whom Washington was wont to deal, had tried to unseat the new party, and failed—in large part because it had strong support among the Turkish people. Washington seems not to have heeded these changed factors when it simply assumed that, as in the past, the generals would decide the issue in favor of granting the Americans approval to stage.

19. Makiya was an expatriate Iraqi who fled his country to live in the United States, where, like Ahmad Chalabi (whom I'll discuss below), he became a source of inside information about Iraq and the Ba'th (much of it fabricated) which the Bush administration swallowed hook, line, and sinker.

20. Thucydides, "The Peloponnesian War," (New York: The Modern Library, 1951).

21. During the first Iraq War the Americans bombed Iraq for 43 days. These were attacks on cities, and therefore destruction of infrastructure was widespread. Then, during the U.N.-imposed sanctions period the Americans and British not only saddled Baghdad with crippling sanctions so the Ba'thists could not repair the damage done, but under Clinton the United States and Britain also carried out regular air attacks which further degraded the infrastructure.

22. "Excerpts From Bush's Speech to Veterans Groups at the White House," *New York Times*, March 29, 2003.

23. Ibid. See also Deb Riechmann, "Bush Blames Saddam for Iraq Instability," *Associated Press*, March 29, 2006.

24. What is noteworthy about this is the sophistication with which Rumsfeld's Pentagon managed news on the war. The Defense Department created a new bureau of public relations where it enlisted support of high ranking American military men to appear on nightly news programs, giving the Pentagon's slant of the conduct of the war, how it was going. The campaign was exposed only years after it was implemented. David Barstow, "Behind Military Analysts, the Pentagon's Hidden Hand," *New York Times*, April 20, 2008.

25. Michael R. Gordon, "Army Buried Study Faulting Iraq Planning," *New York Times*, February 11, 2008.

26. "Jobs at Risk, Ex-Iraqi Soldiers Vow Fight if Allies Don't Pay," *New York Times*, May 25, 2003.

27. The Americans had expected the Iraqi army units to remain intact, simply not fight. When, in fact, the units seemed to "melt away," they did not simply go home, as the propagandists for the administration maintained. The Iraqis fought as commandoes, the fedayeen fighters, about which I'll have much to say below.

28. Douglas Jehl, "Iran Is Said to Send Agents Into Iraq," *New York Times*, April 23, 2003.

29. It was estimated that the Iranians may have sent as many as 10,000 agents into Iraq.

30. After all, hadn't Bush labeled Iran as a member of the so-called Axis of Evil?

31. Malaki, the prime minister of Iraq at this writing, is a former Iranian agent, a member of Dawa, a group created in Tehran.

32. A development facilitated by the fact no certified authentic voter lists existed in Iraq.

33. The fact that SCIRI and Dawa were Iranian clients was well known; that the two Kurdish parties were also is not as widely perceived. Yet, both the PUK and KDP were actively cooperating with Iran during the Iran-Iraq War, and both had headquarters in Tehran. For details on the relationship between the KDP and PUK with Iran see my book, *Losing Iraq*, op. cit.

34. Bob Drogin, "Suspicion of Chalabi Deception Intensifies," *Los Angeles Times*, May 23, 2004.

35. Robert Dreyfuss, "Chalabi and AEI: The Sequel," *TomPaine.common sense*, November 10, 2005.

36. Ibid.

37. "Gingerly, Pro-Iranian Muslim Group Lobbies for Washington's Favor," *New York Times*, May 7, 2003.

38. Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq (installed by the Americans), who is also the head of the PUK, one of six political parties that the Americans encouraged to participate in the Iraqi electoral process, is wholly owned, in a manner of speaking, by Tehran. Because of the area in which his power base in northern Iraq is situated he must stay in with the Iranians or else they'll close their border, cutting him off from the outside world.

39. For the views of the ancient Greeks on hubris and empire-building generally see Jacqueline de Romilly, *The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

40. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: A Harvest Book, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1936).

41. See Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, Preface, xxi.

42. See Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 3-6.

43. See Carl Schmitt, *The Theory of the Partisan: A Commentary/Remark on the Concept of the Political* (Berlin: Duncker & Humboldt, 1963, English translation, Michigan State University Press, 2004.)

44. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Kurds nominally were allied with the Ba'ath, in as much as they participated in so-called *fursan* units which guarded the north against penetration by the Iranians. However, these units could not be used outside the north, and, since the bulk of the fighting in that war went on in the south, this meant most of the actual combat was conducted by Sunnis and Shias, in other words, the Arabs. Sixty-five percent of Iraq's army was Shia. These Shia soldiers all had families, and if, in the second Iraq War, the army determined to fight, this naturally would engage the Shia population on its side.

45. Michael R. Gordon, "Iraq Said to Plan Tangling the U.S. in Street Fighting," *New York Times*, August 26, 2002; and Douglas Jehl, "Inspector's Report Says Hussein Expected Guerrilla War," *New York Times*, October 8, 2004.

46. Thom Shanker, "U.S. Commander in Iraq Says Yearlong Tours Are Option to Combat 'Guerrilla' War," *New York Times*, July 17, 2003.

47. "Bush Blames Saddam for Iraq Instability," *Associated Press*, March 29, 2006.

48. American intelligence during the Iran-Iraq War believed the Iraqi army was only able to win because it used gas, a claim I'll address below.

49. David G. Chandler, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 62.

50. The claim that these battles were successful only because the Iraqis used gas were disputed at the time. See Stephen C. Pelletière, Douglas Johnson II, and Leif Rosenberger, *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990). Nevertheless, the myth persists. The claim is repeated over and over in the Western press. This phenomenon I call a "mirage"; that is, a statement of suppositious fact which, even though disproved, keeps being reported in the media. Obviously, for whatever reason the political class in America needs to believe this, and the press obliges by consistently misrepresenting the situation.

51. John F. Burns, "Threats and Responses: Baghdad: Iraqis Join a Rally to Show That War Will Be Resisted," *New York Times*, March 16, 2003. The reporter for the *Times* puts his own gloss on this, saying that the rally was obviously staged. It may have been, but that doesn't take away from the fact that all those Iraqis were armed. How was the regime to get the Kalashnikovs back after the rally—go around and collect them? It's a bit of a stretch to think so.

52. It was Churchill who approached the newly elected President Dwight Eisenhower with the scheme for overthrowing Mossadeq, which scheme was then put into operation—not by Britain's intelligence, but by the CIA.

53. It was the oil cartel (Exxon, Mobil, Chevron and British Petroleum [BP] and Shell) that fixed the deal with the reinstalled Shah. Prior to the overthrow of Mossadeq, Britain's BP and Shell were the sole operators inside Iran. Effectively, after the coup, the concession was reworked to include the Americans.

54. The Shah made his pitch on grounds that, were the United States to build up Iran's army, it could then act as a defense of the so-called free world against Soviet penetration into the Gulf. Eisenhower thought the idea of Iran defending U.S. interests in the Gulf was bizarre. Kennedy, when asked to reconsider by the Shah, told the Iranian to clean up his regime, which the Americans considered hopelessly corrupt, and stop trying to become a regional superpower. For details on this see the Shah's autobiography, *Mission for My Country*, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi (London: Hutchison & Co., 1961).

55. This was part of the Nixon Doctrine, whereby the United States undertook to supply potential surrogates with the military means to defend themselves rather than depending on U.S. military intervention.

56. Carter did take one step to directly involve the United States in the region: he caused to be created a new military command, the Central Command (CENTCOM), and attempted to implement a so-called Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) which would respond to emergencies primarily in the Gulf. The RDF went nowhere, meeting stiff Congressional resistance. Also, up until the first Iraq War, CENTCOM languished. Among force commands it was long considered the runt of the litter. CENTCOM is the only U.S. command that never had a base in-theater; it operates out of Tampa, Florida.

57. Mujahadeen is merely a descriptive Arabic designation for a partisan, one who fights for a cause but not as a regular soldier. The CIA, using Saudi money, recruited Muslims from all over the world to fight against the Soviets after the Russians had overthrown the dynasty of devout Muslims and substituted a secular regime in Kabul.

58. The Saudis were motivated to cooperate because, after the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic began supporting Shia elements

in Afghanistan, seeking, in effect, to expand its sphere of influence there. Previously, Afghanistan was considered a predominantly Sunni society, and the Saudi regime has traditionally regarded itself as the bulwark of Sunnidom in the Middle East.

59. See the transcript of Saddam's interview with American Ambassador April Glaspie, in which he charges that Kuwait and the UAE were waging economic war against him, with U.S. backing. The two sheikhdoms were throwing oil on to the market, thus driving down the price at a time when Iraq needed every penny it could get from oil sales to rebuild itself after the Iran-Iraq War. *New York Times*, September 23, 1990.

60. Clinton also set up the so-called no-fly areas over the northern Kurdish and southern Shia areas of Iraq, where the Iraqi air force was prevented from operating, which had the effect of taking these regions out of Iraq's control.

61. See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, "Dash to Baghdad Left Top U.S. Generals Divided," *New York Times*, March 13, 2006; and "Outmaneuvered and Outranked, Military Chiefs Become Outsiders," *Washington Post*, September 8, 2008.

62. Shinseki said it would take a couple of hundred thousand. Wolfowitz said that estimate was "wildly overstated." Subsequently, Shinseki was sidelined in the Pentagon, and when he retired Rumsfeld did not attend his departure ceremony, which was unusual.

63. Israel has a special deal with the United States whereby, whenever the Arabs get arms contracts from the Americans, the United States is compelled to offset these by enhancing Israel's military. This works out as a twofer, one might call it, because the arms contractors get to sell more arms under the arrangement; however, in the case of Israel the arms are paid for by the American taxpayer.

64. Bernard Reich, Noah Dropkin and Meyrav Wurmser, "The Impact of Soviet Jewish Immigration on Israeli Politics and Policy," November 1991.

65. Feith also got his start in politics in Washington as an intern for Jackson. Jeffrey Goldberg, "A Little Learning," *The New Yorker*, September 9, 2005.

66. President Bush awarded Sharansky the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2006. For a rundown of his philosophy see Spengler, "Sharansky's Mistaken Identity," www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JJ21Ak02.html.

67. The Review Board is a kind of lobbying group, although supposedly it serves to bring to bear informed opinion of American leaders (mainly ex-Defense Secretaries and politicians of both parties) who are defenders of the Pentagon on matters related to national defense. Along with Republican hawks like Newt Gingrich and Henry Kissinger, a few prominent Democrats are members. <http://cooperativeresearch.org/organization/profiles/defensepolicyboard.html>. For the charter of the board see "Rumsfeld's Feith and Bum Corps: What Is Defense Policy Board?" *Executive Intelligence Review*, August 30, 2002. www.larouchepub.com/other/2002/2933what_is_dpb.html.

68. The gassing the Kurds issue had the effect of creating facts on the ground to supplement what up till the time the campaign materialized was merely an insubstantial animus of American leaders against Iraq. Supposedly the campaign proved the Ba'athists were fiends, beyond the pale of civilized society (more on that below).

69. The Ba'athists, in an attempt to expand the cultivated area in Iraq, undertook to drain the marshes in the south, the home of certain Shia tribesmen. The community was relocated in homes elsewhere in Iraq. Being displaced was certainly not welcome to the Shias. But the displacement was undertaken for economic reasons, it was not a pogrom.

70. The actual cooking of the analysis (to produce evidence that would incriminate Iraq in the production of WMD) was done in the Office of Special Plans and the Counterterrorism Evaluation Group. This was headed by Feith.

71. It would have been extremely difficult to move the country toward war without the cooperation of the *Times*. As I note above (endnote 70), Rumsfeld set up the so-called Counterterrorism Evaluation Group in the Pentagon, and it fabricated (in many instances) bogus reports about the suppositious threat posed by the Ba'athists. These reports were supplied by agents like Chalabi and fed to the vice president's office where I. Lewis Libby then flogged them to *Times* reporter Judith Miller, who passed them to the *Times* editors, who, in more than a few instances, translated them into print, after which they were cited by congressmen partial to the war as proof that America must act to protect itself from the Ba'athists. How much the editors knew about this setup is problematic, but, in its mea culpa published after the war, the *Times*, in apologizing for having been taken in by these reports, revealed that Miller had intelligence clearances. This is astonishing. If she had clearances (from the Pentagon) she was an intelligence agent. It's extraordinary if the *Times* editors didn't know this.

72. In my time at the Central Intelligence Agency, I had first-hand experience of this.

73. Timothy Noah, "Fathers and Sons," *New York Times*, January 14, 2008. Noah is reviewing Jacob Heilbrunn's book, *The Rise of the Neocons* (New York: Doubleday, 2008).

74. Curzio Malaparte, *Coup D'Tat* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1932).

75. For insight as to how the communists behaved during the period of the 1930s, agitating within the labor movement, see Peter Cole, *Ben Fletcher: The Life and Times of a Black Wobbly* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 2007).

76. The original Arab rejectionist front comprised Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, all countries who had lost territory to Israel in the 1967 war. Later Iraq promoted itself as a member of the front.

77. "Backing for Iraq Resolution Grows," *Washington Post*, October 9, 2002.

78. Naomi Klein, "The Likudization of the World: The True Legacy of September 11," *The Guardian/UK*, September 10, 2004; and Ghali Hassan, "The Bush Doctrine Is Israel's Doctrine," *Countercurrents.org*, October 6, 2004.

79. Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. Strategy Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," *New York Times*, March 8, 1992.

80. Shibley Telhami, "The United States and Middle East Peace: The Troubled Assumptions," in *The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Assessing the Cost of Failure* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 1997).

81. "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm." In the paper the authors presume to advise the head of the Likud Party, Benjamin Netanyahu, on a new direction for Israeli policy. The paper is interesting for a lot of reasons, but most intriguing is that throughout the authors identify themselves as Israelis—not as Americans writing for Israelis.

82. Jeffrey Goldberg, "A Little Learning," in *The New Yorker*, September 9, 2005.

83. Jim Loeb, "Cheney's New Advisor Has Sights on Syria," *Asia Times*, October 22, 2003.

84. For details on this see my book *Losing Iraq*. The last prime minister under the Hashemites, Nuri Sa'id, was literally torn apart by the Baghdad mob which discovered him disguised as a woman trying to escape Baghdad during the 1958 coup.

85. The British, French, and Italians planned to break up the Turkish portion of the Ottoman empire, parceling out whole provinces to themselves. Mustafa Kamal Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, a general on the side of the Central powers in World War I, forged a resistance which drove the British army out of Turkey, and coincidentally negotiated the departure of the French and Italian forces.

CHAPTER 2

1. Carl Schmitt speaks to this in his essay, *The Concept of the Political* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 48, "Under no circumstances can anyone demand that any member of an economically determined society, whose order in the economic domain is based on rational procedures, sacrifice his life in the interests of rational operations." And again on page 70, "No consistent individualism can entrust to someone other than the individual the right to dispose of the physical life of the individual."

2. The vice president is supposed to have made this statement when pressed as to why he got several deferments to avoid serving in the Vietnam War.

3. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqis had a fairly good system, but it was destroyed in the first Iraq War and never really rebuilt.

4. Harlan Ullman and James Wade Jr., *Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance* (Washington, DC: The Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 1996).

5. The most effective of these publicists, interestingly, were retired military men, generals, usually, who prepped on the line the Pentagon wanted to put out on the war, then went on television and spun it for public consumption. David Barstow, "Inspector at Pentagon Says Report Was Flawed," *New York Times*, May 6, 2009.

6. This line about slavish societies not being up to war fighting is as old as ancient Athens. See Peter Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare and Ideology in the Greek Historians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2, "... the use of slaves in war receives short shrift in the classical historians. Their world view could not easily accommodate a military role for slaves."

7. Rumsfeld wanted it over in three weeks.

8. Iraqi society under the Ba'ath was one of the most closed in the Middle East. Few foreigners—except for some diplomatic personnel and intelligence officers—were allowed in, and so the world had a sketchy appreciation of what went on in Iraq, at best.

9. Michael R. Gordon, "New Iraqi Force Emerges," *New York Times*, March 24, 2003.

10. Gordon, "Dash to Baghdad Left Top U.S. Generals Divided."

11. Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

12. For an excellent account of the Nasiriyah battles see, Tim Pritchard, *Ambush Alley* (New York: Ballantine Books, 2007).

13. The other instance I can think of where something like this occurred is in 1948, when Egyptian officers joined up with Hasan al Banna's Muslim Brotherhood to infiltrate Palestine and fight as irregulars.

14. There is the example of the German *freikorps* after World War I. But, obviously, these weren't Arabs, and there the Germans were fighting, not against a conquering army but their own government, the policies of which they rejected.

15. This phenomenon of the Iraqis adopting the role of fedayeen fighters is another matter which the Bush administration has contrived to cover up, or at least tried to obscure. The fedayeen first were noted, or at least publicized in the press, on March 24, 2003, in Gordon's article in the *New York Times*, "New Iraqi Force Emerges." Initially, the American command dismissed the appearance. General Franks said, "I don't think it's appropriate for general officers to respond to this type of hype (R. W. Apple Jr., "Lowering Expectations," *New York Times*, March 24, 2003). Subsequently, the Americans gave it out that these were youths fanatically devoted to Saddam Hussein, who were seeking martyrdom in his cause (in other words, not regular army men, pursuing a predetermined strategy). And, finally, quite a long time after the war was over, George Tenet, the CIA director, revealed to *Washington Post* editor Bob Woodward that the Americans "didn't have a clue" who these people were (Woodward, *State of Denial* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006]). The reporters embedded with the American forces recorded the activity of the fedayeen; however, their editors made no attempt to elucidate who they were; the matter was left hanging—there was no follow-up. Later on it was noted, without comment, that these fighters were probably regular army men, fighting in mufti. The best accounts of the fedayeen interestingly appear in books published by American servicemen who engaged with them. For example, see Pritchard, *Ambush Alley*.

16. For a profile of the traditional Arab officer-type see P. J. Vatikiotis, *The Egyptian Army in Politics* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1961).

17. Schmitt, *The Theory of the Partisan*, 28, "Bismark . . . wished to take up any weapon proffered by the unleashed national movement not only in Germany but also in Hungary and Bohemia, in order to avoid defeat. Bismark was set to set the Acheron flowing."

18. See Pritchard, *Ambush Alley*.

19. "Excerpts from Bush's Speech to Veterans Group at the White House," *New York Times*, March 29, 2003.

20. Iraq was, essentially, a one party state, and any Iraqi who wanted to rise, particularly in the military, would have to become a member of the party.

21. Patrick E. Tyler, "U.S. May Let Kurds Keep Arms; Angering Shiites," *New York Times*, May 24, 2003.

22. Sadr is the head of the so-called Mahdi Army, about which I'll speak below.

23. "Iraq: Nearly 2.3 Million Displaced," *Associated Press*, November 5, 2007, www.highbeam.com/doc/1A1-D8SNFOSG3.html; "U.S. Accused of Ignoring Crisis for 4.5 Million Displaced Iraqis," *McClatchy Newspapers*, November 13, 2007.

24. "More than 2.77 Million Iraqis Internally Displaced: UN," *Agence France Press*, April 1, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_kmafp/is_200804/ai_n24970147.

25. The Bush administration put a gag on coverage of American casualties in the war. Photos of dead and wounded Americans never appear in the press. And even coverage of the corpses being returned home are taboo.

26. "Bush Plays al Qaida [stet] Card to Bolster Support for Iraq Policy," *McClatchy Newspapers*, June 28, 2007.

27. Jonathan Finer, "Among Insurgents in Iraq, Few Foreigners Are Found," *Washington Post*, November 17, 2005.

28. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 3, "In all ages of mankind and its many wars and battles there have been rules of battle and war; and, of course, disregard and transgression of those rules. Especially in times of general dissolution, as during the Thirty Years War (1618–48). In Germany as well as in all colonial wars in world history, there are occurrences that could be called partisan. It has to be taken into account, however, that for a theory of the partisan as a whole, the force and significance of his irregularity is determined by the force and significance of the regular that is challenged by him."

29. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 4.

30. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 36, "... [T]he contained war of classical European international law, proceeding by recognized rules, is little more than a duel between cavaliers seeking satisfaction."

31. The best, and most thorough, treatment of the Spanish War of 1808 is Ronald Fraser's *Napoleon's Cursed War: Popular Resistance in the Spanish Peninsula War* (London: Verso, 2008).

32. See Frederick Engels, *The Peasant Wars of Germany* (New York: International Publishers, 1926).

33. Irregular war fighter is probably the most scientific description, but the man (or woman) who fights out of uniform goes by a variety of names: partisan, guerrilla, fedayeen—even terrorist—Bush's description.

34. This is not to be confused with nationalism. In fighting for their homes, the peasants would not have equated homeland with Spain, or Prussia, or any other sovereign state. Their identification was with their ancestral region. The word *pays*—usually translated as country—refers not to the abstract nation, but to the tangible, ancestral region that people thought of as their home.

35. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 13.

36. Schmitt cites this quote of Clausewitz in *Theory of the Partisan*, 31, which, he says, was penned to the German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte.

37. *Ibid.*

38. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 6, "There is no place in classical martial law of the existing European international law for the partisan. He is either ... a sort of *light*, especially mobile, but regular troop; or he represents an especially abhorrent criminal, who stands outside the law. ... So long as war retained a whiff of chivalry, of dueling with pistols, it could hardly be otherwise."

39. Fraser, *Napoleon's Cursed War*, op. cit.

40. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, citing Clausewitz, (4). According to Schmitt, half of all French forces were active in Spain, and half of those were tied down by the guerrilleros, whose numbers was estimated at around 50,000.

41. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 6, "The Congress of Vienna (1814/15) re-established also . . . existing concepts of European martial law. It is one of the most astonishing restorations of all of world history. It was so immensely successful that this code of law of the contained . . . continental land warfare still governed the European conduct of the continental land war in World War I (1914–18). It is still called classical war and it has earned this name. For it recognizes clear distinctions, above all between war and peace, combatants and non-combatants, enemy and criminal. . . ."

42. Indeed, the whole topic of irregular war was tabooed. Very little reference was made to what went on in Spain, where it was made out to be the case that regular armies waged the war without partisan assistance. A good example of writing the partisans out of history is Ian Robertson's *Wellington and the Peninsula War, 1808–1814* (Barnsley, England: Pen & Sword Books, 1988). Robertson, after a brief derogatory mention of the guerrillas (19), then covers the whole of the war barely mentioning them.

43. The best account of the Franc-tireurs I have seen is Michael Howard's *The Franco-Prussian War* (London: Routledge, 1961). Also see Stewart Edwards's *The Paris Commune, 1871* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).

44. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 7.

45. There's a whole literature on this. One book that gives a good feeling for what went on is E. P. Thompson's *Beyond the Frontier* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997). For a description of partisan warfare in Greece, see John. O. Iatrides's *Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis* (Hanover, NH: University of England Press, 1981).

46. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 56.

47. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 21.

48. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 42, "So the question arises about the quantitative proportion of military action to be conducted by regular army relative to other methods of class warfare that are not openly military. Mao finds an exact number: revolutionary war is nine-tenths non-open, non-regular war, and one-tenth open military war."

49. Ibid.

50. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 93 f.

51. Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan*, 9.

52. The best account of this period from the French side I have seen is General Paul Aussaresses's *The Battle of the Casbah* (New York: Engima Books, 2002).

CHAPTER 3

1. The concept of Arab nationalism dates from the time of Nasser, who effectively operationalized the concept. However, there were other expressions of it than so-called Nasserism. Indeed, Ba'thism is one such variant. Nasser, however, was able to meld two developing trends after World War II: that of the nonaligned movement, and anticolonialism, which swept not only the Middle East but the entire world. By setting Cairo up as the capital of a putative Arab world, and by adopting a decisionist stance, which overwhelmed all of the other approaches to coping with changed conditions, the Egyptian was able to wield power far beyond

the resources he could actually claim as the leader of a state which, economically, certainly, was near to being bankrupt.

2. The PLO was driven out of the occupied territories in the late 1960s and relocated in Jordan.

3. There was, for example, a sensational operation in the 1970s where two PLO commandoes rode a glider into the occupied territories, to foil the Israelis' close surveillance of the Israeli-Lebanese border. It was a flashy affair and caused universal wonder that they would try such a thing. But what was the military value?

4. Jordan, with its large population of Palestinians, from the time of the original breakup of Palestine going back to mandate days, was the obvious place for the PLO to set up. However, Jordan's King Hussein, sensitive to the fragile condition of what essentially was a contrived state, never accepted the PLO presence, and ultimately this led to clashes between the Jordanian army and PLO cadres, until in 1970, Hussein succeeded in driving the PLO out.

5. When I first went out to the Middle East in 1964 and was driven around Beirut by wealthy (or at least once wealthy) emigres from Iraq, I was shown the Palestinian refugee camps and derived a quite distinct impression that, among upper-class Lebanese, these people were viewed with contempt; they exploited them as a cheap source of labor.

6. The Maronite community was politicized by an outfit called the Phalange, which, as the name suggests, was an extreme right-wing (some would say fascist) grouping.

7. Franjiyah, although a Christian, was inimical to the Phalange. Also his bailiwick was in the north of Lebanon, on the Syrian border and, unlike the Phalange, Franjiyah had always maintained good relations with the Syrians.

8. Israel had already invaded Lebanon once in 1978. But this was a relatively small-scale operation. At the same time, it was significant because the Israelis never completely withdrew, keeping a small force inside Lebanon on the border. The United Nations intervened to set up a peacekeeping contingent in the disputed zone.

9. Interesting in light of what I already pointed out in Chapter 1 about Israel's similar disregard for the world body. I hope to show below that this wasn't just visceral dislike on the part of both countries (or on the part of the Reagan administration and Israel) it was policy.

10. This is a much neglected episode in the story of America and Israel's growing alignment of views over the Middle East. It particularly is significant because it's here that America's attempt to reconfigure NATO as a stand-in for the United Nations has its genesis. The MNF never advertised itself as a NATO auxiliary, but there was NATO involvement because the Italians took part. It's the Turkish angle, however, that's of particular interest. In 1983, the Islamic Republic, unable to overwhelm Iraq's defenses outside Basrah, switched to invading the northern Kurdish area of Iraq, hoping to spark a revolt of the Kurdish tribes. Immediately after this invasion, which took place at Haj Umran, Turkey sent troops into northern Iraq in pursuit, it said, of Turkish-Kurdish separatist guerrillas, the now famous PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The move stunned the Iranians because it was a scarcely concealed Turkish warning to Tehran not to mess with the Kurds, and, unless Tehran could find a means of responding effectively, its northern strategy was dead. Tehran did retaliate by

agitating the expatriate Armenian community to carry out terrorist attacks on Turkish diplomats; the so-called Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) also perpetrated a series of terrorist attacks in Ankara. The best source on this is my study "Turkey and the United States in the Middle East: The Kurdish Connection," in *Turkey's Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, 1993).

11. The Revolutionary Guards, or Pasdaran, are a unique organization. Formed after Khomeini gutted the Shah's old army, the Guards were irregular war fighters, but, with sanction from Khomeini, they were at one and the same time Iran's premier military institution. Few of the Guards had military training (their notorious tactic was the human wave attack). Today, the Guards are the most powerful institution in Iran.

12. Actually Iran had a long involvement with Lebanon going back to the days of the Shah. For the best treatment of this early activity see Richard Norton's *Amal and the Shia: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1987).

13. The Israelis' 1978 invasion had been welcomed by the Shias, who felt themselves oppressed by the PLO presence, and they were glad to see the Palestinians driven out of the region. But the support quickly disappeared as the Shias found the Israelis, if anything, more offensive than the Palestinians. Obviously, the fact that the IDF never left the region rankled.

14. Lebanon, like Iraq and Palestine, was a construct of the of the old Mandate System, as I indicated above. Cobbled together by the French, the mandate holder, the aim was to make the area predominantly pro-French and Christian. Thus, the Maronites were granted supremacy under the so-called Confessional System, whereby representation in the government was accorded on the basis of demographics. When Lebanon was formed, the Christians were the largest sect, but that majority had been overtaken by the growth of the Muslim community. By the 1970s, although the Christians still were the dominant party politically, the fact that their ascendancy was based on numbers was a fiction. Moreover, the Lebanese army was practically precluded from functioning, because, being composed of the various sects, it risked breaking apart, if it attempted to interfere in any zone claimed by one of the sects.

15. Begin simply stood down, giving no explanation why he wanted to remove himself from government. It was conjectured he resented the way the 1982 invasion had played out, realizing that Sharon had tricked him. The theory goes that Sharon had sold the invasion as a limited incursion and then, on his own, pressed the fight all the way to Beirut, where the operation went sour, as it were.

16. The very choice of a name, which was made by the PLO leadership, shows how out of touch that leadership was—a frisson, or shudder, after all, is not a very cataclysmic description of the event, and the intifadah, as it turned out, was quite sensational.

17. For background on the Gush see Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendancy of Israel's Radical Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

18. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cave_of_the_Patriarchs_massacre.

19. Anecdotal evidence told to me during a visit to the territories in 1994. For my report on this visit see, *Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994).

20. Steve Coll and David Hoffman, "Radical Movements Thrive on Loose Structure, Strict Ideology," *Washington Post*, August 3, 1993.

21. For details on this see, Pelletière, *Hamas and Hizbollah*; and Stephen Pelletière, *A Theory of Fundamentalism* (Carlisle, PA: The Strategic Studies Institute, September 1995). I was in Gaza during this period and witnessed some of these incidents myself.

22. The United States did it in a roundabout way. The refusniks were being directed from Russia to Austria, where previously they could apply for visas at the American embassy in Vienna. However, abruptly, the policy changed: the refusniks were directed to go to the Israeli embassy, which meant relocation to Israel.

23. Hamas was a creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, a religious movement which dates its history to pre-World War II Egypt. The Brotherhood formed a branch in Gaza, and originally, since Hamas, being religious, opposed the PLO, the Israelis and the Jordanians cultivated it, as a foil to the secular Palestinian movement. However, when the intifadah broke out Hamas suddenly switched from fighting the PLO to combating Israel. For details see, Pelletière, *Hamas and Hizbollah*, op. cit.

24. See, Pelletière, *Hamas and Hizbollah*, op. cit.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid. It's not widely appreciated how many Palestinians the Israelis have interned. At the time of this writing it was estimated that anywhere from 9,000 to 12,000 Palestinians and Lebanese Shias were incarcerated in Israeli jails.

27. Told to me on my 1994 visit to the territories.

28. Pelletière, *Hamas and Hizbollah*, op. cit.

29. Ibid.

30. For a good account of this period see, Brian Urquart, "The Making of Scapegoat," *The New York Review of Books*, August 12, 1999.

31. Ibid.

32. Pelletière, *Hariri's Critique of Operation Grapes of Wrath: The Implications for the Peace Process* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997).

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Urquart, "Making of A Scapegoat," op. cit.

36. Pelletière, *Hamas and Hizbollah*, op. cit.

37. Ra'is is Egyptian colloquial for "boss," the Egyptians' nickname for Nasser.

38. Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (London: Routledge, 1997), 299.

CHAPTER 4

1. There are those who would argue that the United States already had bases in the Gulf, in Qatar, in Kuwait, and in the UAE. However, these bases (particularly this was the case with Qatar) really didn't exist until the second Iraq War. Moreover, the bases that were available (in the sheikhdoms) were not very commodious. The U.S. military wanted a big base; it thought/thinks spatially. Evidence of this is how long it clung to the base in Saudi Arabia. The UAE, Qatar, and even Kuwait are not real countries; they're restricted territories. The only really large,

bona fide countries in the Gulf, outside of Iran and Iraq, are Saudi Arabia and Yemen. There is also the problem of Israel being America's base, which I alluded to above. The Israelis are not interested in seeing any Arab state—even Egypt—become the base for the American military in the Middle East.

2. For a discussion of controlling the oil industry as opposed to physically possessing the fields see my book *Iraq and the International Oil System: Why America Went to War in the Gulf* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).

3. There were seven major oil companies back then: Exxon; Mobil; Chevron; two British companies, the British petroleum Company (BP) and Royal Dutch/Shell; Texaco; and Gulf Oil. Since then, mergers have cut this to four.

4. During this period oil prices were "posted"; that is the majors, operating out of a headquarters in London, determined what the price would be, and that was the price it was set at.

5. Pelletière, *Iraq and the International Oil System*, op. cit.

6. As to why the majors acquiesced in this transfer of control, it was profitable for them to do so. Since they controlled the downstream operations, and since, after 1973, the price of oil shot up, in relative terms, astronomically, for them to have made a fight over it would have invited outsiders, independent companies, to move in and supplant the majors in their exclusive position.

7. Iraq, for example, was considered at the time to be such a proxy. The Shah, in propagandizing against the Iraqis, made much of the fact that Iraq had a friendship treaty with Moscow. Also, the Shah in inserting Iranian forces into Oman in the early 1970s did so on the basis that that country was threatened by Communist takeover.

8. The then-ruler of Saudi Arabia, in 1986, worked out an arrangement with the United States whereby the Saudis would adjust their production so as to keep prices within a narrow band of between \$14 and \$17 a barrel. This was necessitated because in 1985 Reagan, in concert with Great Britain, had tried to "break" OPEC by supporting Margaret Thatcher's ill fated attempt to undercut the OPEC price. In a ensuing price war the Saudis drove the price down so far that non-OPEC countries, facing ruin, agreed to go along with the OPEC price. However, the deal with Fahd did not save America's oil industry in the Southwest which, because it could not remain profitable with oil selling at a mere \$9 a barrel, effectively had collapsed.

9. I say supposedly because the Saudis did not really have a military. Earlier they had contracted with the Pakistanis to supply them with troops. That arrangement lapsed but still no one ever expected the Saudis to fight independently in the event of a war. The one instance where they did attempt to wage war independently, against Yemen, they were badly beaten.

10. It's not widely recognized but before the first Iraq War, the oil producers of the lower Gulf were buying more weapons from America's arms dealers than the Pentagon.

11. At the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, Baghdad funded its own arms purchases, but by 1983 it had run its gold reserves down to a perilous level, and thereafter its arms supply was maintained by the Gulf monarchs.

12. Just prior to the Asia Meltdown, the Saudis, over the objections of their fellow OPEC members, had insisted on keeping the price down, which they could do by refusing to cut production. When the Meltdown threatened the world economy, and oil sales fell off, the OPEC members turned on the Saudis, blaming

them for having exposed them to huge revenue losses by pursuing what the rest of OPEC saw as a ruinous pricing policy.

13. The majors did make one attempt to play politics and that was before the 1973 Arab Oil embargo; they sought to get the Nixon administration to be more evenhanded in dealing with the Arabs—this they did at the behest of Saudi Arabia's then-ruler Feisal. They were stonewalled in the White House, never getting farther than an interview with Joseph Sisco, Kissinger's deputy.

14. Essentially, the producers nationalized their industries, which worked out to their tearing up the concessions. This was known as taking control of "up-stream" operations: they determined whether new fields would be brought on-line and how much oil was to be produced from existing fields. The majors, however, were left with exclusive control of "down-stream" operations, refining, marketing, etc., which, under the circumstances was still an extremely lucrative setup.

15. At the time, Saudi Arabia was the only oil producer with enough surplus capacity to affect the market for oil. Thus, were the price of oil to plummet, the Saudis, by cutting their production, could force it back up; similarly, if they wanted prices to come down, they simply would open their taps. This is called playing the swing producer's role: the Saudis were the world's swing producer. Now, Russia also has that capability.

16. It did this by shifting sides, until 1984 when it swung decisively over to supporting the Iraqis. But even here it fudged, so to speak. It induced the Ba'th to abstain from seeking a military solution in the war, and, in return, the United States promised to broker a negotiated end to the war through the United Nations. But, then, after the Iraqis had adopted a static defense posture, Reagan was induced (by the Israelis) to sell weapons to Iran, which enabled the Islamic Republic to score a major victory in the battle for Al Faw in 1985.

17. Once the truth about Iran/Contra was revealed by the Senate investigation in Washington, the Iraqis concluded they'd been duped. They abandoned their static defense strategy and went on the offensive, ending the war in a lightning offensive, over in three weeks.

18. There was another factor. In the last months of the war the Iraqis revealed they had developed a long-range missile capable of hitting Tehran, which also showed that now they had the ability to target Israel.

19. The GCC was cobbled together by then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1981. It included all the Arab states in the Gulf except Iraq and Yemen.

20. Of course, as they say, just because you're paranoid doesn't mean people aren't out to get you.

21. Thatcher met with then-President Bush in Aspen, Colorado, and, as she said, "put fire in his belly."

22. Not only did the Saudis and the sheikhs fund the arms supply, they also provided cheap oil, and Saudi Arabia specifically subsidized the Turkish, Egyptian, and Syrian involvements. Effectively, it bribed them to join the coalition.

23. One big demand of the Saudis was that the war be restricted to driving Iraq out of Kuwait; the Americans were not to enter Iraq and not try to overthrow the Ba'th.

24. Bin Laden, at the start of the war, offered to supply mujahadeen fighters, recruits from the Afghan adventure, if the kingdom would reject U.S. aid in ejecting Saddam from Kuwait.

25. Samuel Huntington, *A Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

26. A Memorandum of Understanding to this affect was signed by Reagan in 1981.

27. For the involvement of Israel in Iran-Contra, see *The Tower Commission Report* (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), 23, 83, 111, 137, 150f.

28. For details on the involvement of Israel, and more specifically of AIPAC, in the gassing controversy, see my book, *Iraq and the International Oil System*.

29. The interview appeared in the *Washington Post* and *Los Angeles Times*. For a detailed description of what the strategy constituted see "If Mid-East War Erupts Air Power Will Hold the Key to U.S. Casualties," *Wall Street Journal*, November 15, 1990.

30. The rationale for this was that the Ba'athists supposedly were terrorizing their Kurdish and Shia constituencies through carrying out pogroms.

31. For details on this group, plus a list of the signatories to the letter to Clinton, see Project for the New American Century, www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm.

32. Rumsfeld made this observation during a Pentagon press briefing. "Rumsfeld's Words on Iraq: 'There Is Untidiness,'" *New York Times*, April 12, 2003.

33. Thom Shanker, "U.S. Commander in Iraq Says Yearlong Tours Are Option to Combat 'Guerrilla' War," *New York Times*, July 17, 2003.

34. "Three GI's Killed in Iraq Capital, One on Campus," *New York Times*, July 7, 2003.

35. Towards the end of the second Iraq War, the U.S. Army sent a convoy of tanks and personnel carriers driving through the Iraqi capital, while the capital was still being contested. The army maintained this brazen maneuver showed the Iraqis the war was lost and they capitulated.

36. The actual participants in this affair were partisans of Ahmad Chalabi. It was a planned photo op, a stunt, in other words.

CHAPTER 5

1. Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II*, 458, op. cit.

2. Michael R. Gordon, "The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War," *New York Times*, October 19, 2004.

3. Ibid.

4. There were accounts, told to me by UN peacekeepers when I visited southern Lebanon in 1994, of Israeli troops refusing to go on patrol in the security zone. They were overdue to be demobilized and did not want to be killed, before they had a chance to get home.

5. Edgar O'Ballance, *The Red Army of China* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

6. "Iraqi Lawmakers Say U.S. Demanding 58 Bases," *McClatchy Newspapers*, June 9, 2008; and "Iraq: Kurd Says US Can Have Bases in North Iraq: Report," *Agence France Presse*, November 2, 2008.

7. "U.S. Ex-Military Brass Raise Voices in Criticism of Iraq War," *Agence France Presse*, October 18, 2007.

8. "Role for Exiled Leaders Urged; Rumsfeld Proposes Interim Authority in Southern Iraq," *Washington Post*, April 4, 2003.

9. Michael Gordon and General Bernard Trainor, *Cobra II*, op cit.

10. The Israelis have cultivated the Kurds for decades. David Ben Gurion, Israel's first premier, devised the so-called peripheral strategy, whereby Israel strives to develop ties with non-Arab minorities in the Middle East. When I first went out to Iraq in 1964, to interview the leader of the Kurdish revolt against Baghdad, Mulla Mustafa Barzani, I was told by my Kurdish contacts in the United States to look out for an Israeli colonel, from Mossad, stationed at Mulla Mustafa's headquarters in Ranyah.

11. In fact, at the time Clinton chose him he had dual citizenship as an Australian and Israeli. Once his selection was made Clinton arranged for Indyk to become an American, which was done in 24 hours. Since America recognizes dual citizenship, I assume he remained an Israeli.

12. See Nichols Kristof, "Diplomacy at Its Worst," *New York Times*, April 29, 2007. On the Iranian side, these discussions were apparently arranged through Iran's highest-ranking diplomat in the United States, Javad Zarif, the Islamic Republic's ambassador to the United Nations. Zarif, when he left that post to return to Tehran, received encomiums from, among others, Vice President Joseph Biden. He was feted at dinners hosted by the president of the Nixon Center, Dimitri Simes, and at the Council on Foreign Relations, by Indyk. This was in 2007, which seems odd that he would be so honored, given how relations between the United States and Iran have developed.

13. Stephen Holmes in his book *The Matador's Cape: America's Reckless Response to Terror* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), raises this question.

14. Sistani is based in Najaf but claims Iranian citizenship and speaks Farsi. For details on Tehran's machinations to take control of the elections in Iraq see my book *Losing Iraq*, op cit.

15. Actually, of the Basij, which is an arm of the Guard. The Guard was the institution Khomeini called into being after gutting the old Iranian military of the Shah.

16. Steven Lee Myers and Helene Cooper, "Bush Says Iran Still a Danger Despite Report on Weapons," *New York Times*, December 4, 2007.

17. "Israeli Officials Reject U.S. Findings on Iran," *McClatchy Newspapers*, December 4, 2007.

18. Gareth Porter, "Pentagon Blocked Cheney's Attack on Iran," *Asia Times*, June 10, 2008, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JF10Ak01.html.

19. Gareth Porter, "Fallon Falls: Iran Should Worry," *Asia Times*, March 13, 2008, www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JC13Ak01.html.

20. "A Draft Oil Bill Stirs Opposition from Iraqi Blocks," *New York Times*, May 3, 2007.

21. To understand how, one needs to know how the oil system operates. The majors are firmly allied with the Saudis. The Saudis not only have probably the world's largest pool of untapped oil, but, with their state of the art facilities they—and they alone—of all oil producers have the ability to control the market simply by turning on or off their oil tap. Were independents to move into Iraq, which

has undeveloped reserves which could rival those of Saudi Arabia, a new swing producer could emerge, and this would destroy OPEC and with it the majors' dominance of the international oil business.

22. Andrew E. Kramer, "Deals with Iraq Are Set to Bring Oil Giants Back," *New York Times*, June 19, 2008.

23. Details on this affair were exposed by reporter Greg Palast, who revealed them initially on a BBC broadcast. Palast later appeared on Amy Goodman's *Democracy Now* program on which a clip of Carroll was shown where he described how he nixed the Likudniks' scheme. See Palast, "Secret US Plans for Iraq's Oil," March 17, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/4354269.stm>, and "U.S. Broadcast Exclusive: Secret U.S. Plans for Iraq's Oil Spark Political Fight Between Neocons and Big Oil," *Democracy Now*, March 21, 2005, www.democracynow.org/2005/3/21/u_s_broadcast_exclusive_secret_u.

24. "Ahmad Chalabi Takes Over Oil Ministry," Reuters, April 28, 2005, <http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=45654>.

25. The Agency unexpectedly got involved when it published a controversial Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which disputed the Israelis' claim that the Islamic Republic was closer to getting an A-bomb. Steven Lee Myers, "An Assessment Jars a Foreign Policy Debate," *New York Times*, December 4, 2007. As to why the Agency did this, I would say the intelligence arm was angry over its rough handling by Cheney before the war came off.

26. Yeltsin was induced to agree to the privatization by Clinton's economic team of Larry Summers and Robert Rubin. Although the majors subsequently secured concessions in Russia, initially they were shut out.

27. Oligarch Mikhail Khodorsky went to jail; his associate Leonid Nevzlin fled to Israel, as did Vladimir Gusinsky. Berezovsky fled to Britain. "Court rejects Yukos chief's parole plea," *Financial Times*, August 23/August 24, 2008.

28. Israel for years had a source of supply in the Sinai: there was oil there which Israel seized in the 1967 war. When the peace deal was cut with the Egyptians, Israel had to surrender those fields, but Kissinger agreed to keep the Israelis supplied, from American sources. As far as I know, that arrangement is still operative.

29. Katarina Kratovac, "Call for Regional Iraq Echoes U.S. Plan," Associated Press, October 13, 2007, www.redorbit.com/news/general/1101076/call_for_regional_iraq_echoes_us_plan/index.html.

30. "Biden's Immoral Blueprint for Iraq Will Only Cause More Bloodshed," *AlterNet.org*, October 13, 2007.

31. "A Draft Oil Bill, Stirs Opposition from Iraqi Blocs," *New York Times*, May 3, 2007.

32. The Bush administration, which originally okayed these concessions, was forced to retract its permission when a controversy threatened in the United States. Alissa J. Rubin and Andrew E. Kramer, "U.S. Official Calls Kurd Oil Deal at Odds With Baghdad," *New York Times*, September 28, 2007. See also Susan Schmidt and Glenn R. Simpson, "Perle Linked to Kurdish Oil Plan," *Wall Street Journal*, July 29, 2008. The story of the contract to Perle was broken by the *Wall Street Journal*; however, this was a one shot deal—there was no follow-up. Indeed, the *New York Times* never printed the original story about Perle's getting the contract—odd, from a paper claiming to be the paper of record. This is unfortunate.

It would be interesting to know who else has gotten one of these valuable concessions. Mulla Mustafa Barzani, the father of Masoud and the leader of the Kurdish revolt for many years, once said publicly that, if he ever got his hands on Kurdish oil, he would let concessions to the Israelis for all the help they had given him over the years. In the 1970s, Israel talked Henry Kissinger into backing the Kurdish revolt—a bad deal, since the Ba'athists subsequently were able to crush the revolt, after which the deal, which had been kept secret, was exposed. See "Israel 'Trains Kurdish Forces,'" *BBC News*, September 21, 2006.

33. "Kurds Impose Limits on Where Arabs Can Live in Iraq's North," *McClatchy Newspapers*, February 17, 2008.

34. Edward Wong, "Sectarian Strife Grips North Iraq, As Sunni Arabs Drive Out Kurds," *New York Times*, May 30, 2007.

35. David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Weapons, Given to Iraqis, Move to Turkey," *New York Times*, August 30, 2007; "Turkey Opens Investigation Into Iraq's Barzani," *Reuters*, June 18, 2007; and Ernesto Londoño, "Kurds in North Iraq Receive Arms from Bulgaria," *Washington Post*, November 23, 2008.

36. "Turkey Presses Offensive in Iraq; US Urges Short Campaign," *Agence France Press*, February 24, 2008.

CHAPTER 6

1. The rulers were weak and, consequently, unable to defy the majors, as the latter could call on aid from their governments. When in the 1930s the then-Shah of Iran, Reza, tore up the concession with the British owned Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)—which is now known as British Petroleum—the company handed the dispute off to the British government, which ordered British paratroopers mobilized at the British base in Cyprus and threatened to have the British fleet demonstrate off Abadan, the company's main refinery in Iran, which had been taken over by the Iranians.

2. This act of national assertiveness had an electric affect on Middle East politics. Nasser later claimed that it was Mossadeq's action in standing up to the British that inspired the Egyptian Free Officers to topple King Farouk, viewed by Egyptians as a British puppet.

3. The involvement of the CIA in Qassem's overthrow has been imputed, but never conclusively shown, whereas there is no question the Agency acted against Mossadeq.

4. The Shah despised Mossadeq, who had become involved in an increasingly bitter feud with the Iranian ruler. Mossadeq finally forced the Shah to appoint him minister of defense, along with his being prime minister, and when the Shah tried to retract the appointment, rioting ensued in Tehran and the Shah and his wife fled to Rome, Italy, whence they were brought back to Tehran by the British and Americans after Mossadeq's regime was toppled.

5. The Shah devised a policy he dubbed Positive Nationalism which was meant to signify that he would behave in an evenhanded manner toward both Moscow and Washington.

6. In fact, the Shah was seeking to bolster his regime by catering to the military, the leading officers of which derived considerable graft from the contracts they negotiated with the American defense contractors.

7. Pelletière, *Iraq and the International Oil System*, 156.

8. It went from \$3 a barrel to over \$12, largely due to the Shah's sales on the spot market. The majors, before the crisis, set the price of oil; however, a small percentage of oil traded on the open market. When the crisis broke, the Shah dumped his oil onto the open market, where it brought the price it would fetch, no matter what price the majors had set it at.

9. The father of General Norman Schwarzkopf who won fame as the head of the New Jersey State Police during the Lindbergh kidnapping, was hired by the Shah to organize SAVAK. Later, the Israeli Mossad fulfilled this function. SAVAK was one of the most feared secret police outfits in the Middle East.

10. When the Shah, after being deposed by the Khomeinists, applied for asylum in the United States it was David Rockefeller of Chase, and Kissinger who led the campaign to allow him in, a campaign which failed when Carter, fearing reprisals against the hostages, refused to sanction it.

11. The big change that was introduced in 1973 was the Gulf producers bought out their old contracts with the majors, effectively nationalizing their oil industries.

12. Pelletière, *Iraq and the International Oil System*.

13. Ibid.

14. America did not sell weapons to Iraq (as is frequently alleged), nor did American weapons purchased by the Saudis pass into Iraqi hands. What Reagan did do, however, was relax his prohibition, maintained since the start of the war, against America's allies supplying the Iraqis. For example, America had been blocking a sale by France of Super Etendard fighters and Exocet missiles to Iraq. After 1984, that embargo was removed.

15. Pelletière, *Iraq and the International Oil System*.

16. The entry of Cairo and Damascus into the war effectively neutralized the charge that this was an imperialist war of the West against the Arabs.

17. Ibid.

18. The joke in the Pentagon at this time was that Clinton's defense secretary, William Cohen, would go out to the Gulf each year with his order book in hand.

19. Don M. Snyder, "The Coming Defense Train Wreck," *Washington Quarterly*, Winter, 1996.

20. Before the first Iraq War, then-Secretary of Defense James Baker is supposed to have threatened Iraq with tactical A-bombs, were the Iraqis to attempt to use chemicals in their defense.

21. In the first Iraq War the U.S. Air Force bombed Iraqi cities for 43 days before the American ground forces launched their attack.

22. "Lancet Surveys of Iraq War Casualties," Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lancet_surveys_of_Iraq_War_casualties.

23. Owen Bennett-Jones, "Iraqi Deaths Survey Was 'Robust'," BBC News, http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6495753.stm

24. Ibid.

25. Albright made this claim in an interview with Leslie Stahl on CBS's *Sixty Minutes*.

26. During the Iran-Iraq War, to free up Iraqis to fight, Saddam invited workers from all over the Arab world to come to Iraq and take over manning the home

front. Over two million Egyptians responded to the appeal, and Saddam granted them Iraqi citizenship.

27. Nick Cumming-Bruce, "World's Refugee Count in 2007 Exceeded 11 Million, U.N. Says," *New York Times*, June 18, 2008.

28. Among the more notable, Christopher Hitchens, Martin Amis, Ann Coulter, and others. See, for example, "Bush Likens War against Islamic Extremism to Fight against Fascism," *Agence France Presse*, May 28, 2008; and "Ann Coulter's Anti-Muslim Name Calling," *Washington Post*, October 13, 2007, http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/undergod/2008/08/ann_coulter-s_name_calling.html. Also, "The Agitator: Orina Fallaci's Crusade against Islam," *The New Yorker*, June 5, 2006. The most heinous example of this campaign was a DVD circulated by a group called the Clarion Fund, issued and widely distributed just before the 2008 presidential election in the United States called "Obsession: Radical Islam's War against the West." "Group Swamps Swing States with Movie on Radical Islam," *Washington Post*, October 26, 2008.

29. "Lieberman and Wiping Countries Off the face of the Map," *Informed Comment*, April 2, 2009.

30. Actually, it was more than just the United States approving the raids—America participated in them. Throughout the operation, the United States kept Israel supplied with weapons, and, when the Israelis ran out of cluster bombs, Washington dispatched an emergency delivery. The operation was only called off after the United States cut off its arms reprovisioning. See Lora Lumpe, "America AWOL on Cluster Bombs," [truthout.org](http://www.truthout.org/article/america-awol-cluster-bombs), <http://www.truthout.org/article/america-awol-cluster-bombs>; Thom Shanker, "Rights Group Faults U.S. over Cluster Bombs," *New York Times*, December 12, 2003; David S. Cloud, "Inquiry Opened into Israeli Use of U.S. Bombs," *New York Times*, August 25, 2008; "Israel 'Presses US on Bomb Sale,'" *BBC News*, July 23, 2006; "US Suspends Munitions Delivery to Israel," *The Guardian UK*, January 15, 2009; "US to Give Israel Another Week for Attacks: Paper," *Reuters*, July 22, 2008; Colin Brown and Francis Elliott, "Just Hot Air? Bush and Blair Refuse to Call for Ceasefire," *Independent/UK*, July 29, 2006.

31. Ethan Bronner and Taghreed El-Khodary, "No Early End to 'All-Out War' on Hamas in Gaza," *New York Times*, December 30, 2008.

32. *Ibid.*

33. The aim of the embargo was to force Hamas into discontinuing rocketing southern Israel.

34. Taghreed El-Khodary, "In a Hospital, Pain Despair and Defiance," *New York Times*, January 9, 2009.

35. "Israel Admits Troops May Have Used Phosphorus Shells," *The Guardian UK*, January 21, 2009; also "Israel: Shelling of U.N. Complex 'A Grave Mistake,'" *CNN.com/world*, <http://www.mail-archive.com/proletar@yahoogroups.com/msg47780.html>.

36. Andrew Buncombe, Kim Sengupta, and Colin Brown, "Incendiary Weapons: The Big White Lie," *Independent/UK*, November 18, 2005.

37. "Israel: Shelling of UN Complex 'A Grave Mistake,'" *op cit.*

38. "Israel's Destruction of U.S.-Style School Shocks Gazans," *McClatchy Washington Bureau*, January 28, 2009.

39. Ethan Bronner, "A Religious War in Israel's Army," *New York Times*, March 22, 2009.
40. James Bennett, "Jenin [stet] Refugee Camp's Dead Can't Be Counted or Claimed," *New York Times*, April 13, 2002.
41. "UN Issues Critical Report on Gaza Fighting," *Associated Press*, May 5, 2009.
42. Tobias Buck, "Gaza Offensive Boosted Hamas, Poll Concludes," *Financial Times*, February 6, 2009.
43. Schmitt, *The Theory of the Partisan*, 47.
44. Of course, the great source of information on this is Frantz Fanon's classic, *The Wretched of the Earth* (Hammondsworth Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1963).
45. Antony Loyd, *My War Gone By, I Miss It So* (London: Penguin Books, 2001).
46. *The Theory of the Partisan*, 55.

CONCLUSION

1. Carlotta Gall, "From Hospital, Afghans Rebut U.S. Account," *New York Times*, January 26, 2009; Ernesto Londoño and Amit R. Paley, "In Iraq, a Surge in U.S. Airstrikes," *Washington Post*, May 23, 2008; Josh White, "U.S. Boosts Its Use of Airstrikes in Iraq," *Washington Post*, January 17, 2008; "U.S. Air Strike Kills Eight Family Members in Iraq: Police," AFP, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5iqAR1Zl8vaBv-OFd8FQn_SDqg6Q; Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Inquiry Is Said to Conclude 30 Civilians Died in Afghan Raid," *New York Times*, October 8, 2008; Sabrina Tavernise, "Civilian Death Toll Reaches New High in Iraq, U.N. Says," *New York Times*, November 23, 2006; Kim Sengupta, "Iraq Air Raids Hit Mostly Women and Children," *The Independent*, April 16, 2009; Sam Dagher, "Conflicting Reports on Death Toll in Bombing in Baghdad," *New York Times*, September 18, 2008; Carlotta Gall, "U.S. Killed 90, Including 60 Children, in Afghan Village, U.N. Finds," *New York Times*, August 27, 2008; Carlotta Gall, "Evidence Points to Civilian Toll in Afghan Raid," *New York Times*, September 8, 2008; "U.S. Airstrikes Put Pakistan's Leaders on Defensive," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 21, 2008; and Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Takes to Air to Hit Militants within Pakistan," *New York Times*, October 27, 2008.

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